PROCEEDINGS

OP THE

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

NEW

SERIES.

VOL.

XX.

Containing the Papers read before the Society during the

Forty-first Session, 1919-1920.

\Y!^

PUBLISHED BY

WILLIAMS AND NOKGATE,

14,

HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON, W.C.

1920.

Price Twenty-five Shillings

nett.

2.

CONTENTS.
PAGE

II.

III.

THE BEGINNING
ADDRESS. By JAMES

THE

PRESIDENTIAL

WARD

THE NATURE OF INFERENCE.

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL

MOORE
~IV.

"

"!N

By GERALD GATOR
EELATIONS.

G.

By

...

E.

VI.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.

By

J.

A.

VII.

63

OF IMPULSE, EMOTION, AND

F. SHAND
Is

III.

IV.

XI.
XII.

By MORRIS GINSBERG
COMMON GOOD.

89

By

WEBB

113

SYMPOSIUM: Is THE "CONCRETE UNIVERSAL" THE

TRUE TYPE OF UNIVERSALITY?
I.

X.

C. J.

By ALEXANDER
79

OBLIGATION, AUTONOMY, AND THE

II.

IX.

INSTINCT.

THERE A GENERAL WILL

CLEMENT
VIII.

_\/

40

...

SMITH
V.

25

By J. W. SCOTT
By G. E. MOORE
By H. WILDON CARR
By G. DAWES HICKS

125
132
140
147

IN CHINA AND JAPAN.

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGovERN

BUDDHIST METAPHYSICS

By
157

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND EXISTENCE AS TREATED

BY ANSELM. By A. E. DAVIES
...
...
...

167

MEMORY AND

191

CONATION.

MYSTICISM TRUE AND

COBB

By BEATRICE EDGELL
FALSE.

By W.

F.

...

GEIKIE-

215

**

IV

Symposia Contributed

to the Congress of Philosophy, Oxford,

September 24^-27^, 1920.

PAGE
I.

II.

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

I. By ELIE HALE>Y
II. By MARCEL MAUSS
III. By THEODORE RUYSSEN
IV. By RENE" JOHANNET
V. By GILBERT MURRAY
VI. By SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK

SYMPOSIUM

237

242

252
254
257

260

Is THE EXISTENCE OF THE PLATONIC EIAO2

PRESUPPOSED IN THE ANALYSIS OF REALITY 1

SYMPOSIUM

I.

II.

III.

IV.

By C. E. M. JOAD
By A. D. LINDSAY
By Miss L. S. STEBBING
By R. F. ALFRED HOERNLE"

ABSTRACT OF THE

MINUTES OF

266
274
281
287

THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE

FORTY-FIRST SESSION

301

MINUTES OF THE CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY, OXFORD, SEPTEMBER 24TH-27TH, 1920

LIST OF OFFICERS AND
1920-1921
.

MEMBERS FOR THE FORTY-SECOND

304
SESSION,

307

PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY.

leie 1030.
Meeting at 22, Albemarle

W.

Street,

1,

on November

1919,

'3rd,

at 8 P.M.

ADDEESS

I.__THE PKESIDENTIAL

BEGINNING

"IN THE

."

By JAMES WARD.
THE

which

topic to

would invite your attention is that of

It is, I think, still an unsettled

the method of philosophy.

question what this method should be though the question is

one which was raised at the outset of what we call modern
;

and notably by Locke and by Kant.

It is a
till it is threshed out
seems seriously to
question, too, which
bar the way to further progress I doubt indeed if there is any
philosophy

"

"

which more
every
metaphysic
urgently requires continuous discussion. The most I can hope
to achieve now is, however, merely to make the issue as clear
prolegomenon

as I can

and

in inducing
"

I shall be

any of you

Begin at the

maxim

many

and

think

said, are

future

to

if

it

amply rewarded

to follow it

further.

beginning
should be respected anywhere,

should-

it

be respected by philosophers. They, it has been

to seek truth without making assumptions.

bound

must begin

at the beginning.
the
foundations:
we must
lay

one

I should succeed

a sound but commonplace

is

In practical undertakings there

can cook

up

"

if

is

often no alternative

To build a house we must

first

as it

In philosophy, however, this practical

seems to me that we can never observe

many attempts

to

first

catch our hare before

it.

failure of all the

we

conform to

it

maxim
;

we
is

and the

that have

JAMES WARD.

hitherto been made is strong presumptive evidence against all

methods in philosophy that purport to be primarily direct and
constructive.

We

must now try

When we

be clear about our leading terms.

to

say, begin at the beginning, the imperative refers to

time, but the substantive does not necessarily do so, and, in

When we

the main does not.

fact, in

say

you must begin

building by laying the foundations, the significance of these for

the superstructure is not exhausted by their place in the

temporal order of the process.

When

this is finished

and the

building stands complete, what we may call the logical priority

It is in this sense that
of the foundations still remains.
by a
of

sort

metonymy

capienda

answer to

we come

to

talk

of

principles

prima

what epistemologically come

first, and
apxai
what ontologically are their grounds, primary beings

as

or

or entia, as Aristotle called them.

But now

in building a house,

though we begin by laying the foundations, we do not provide

the earth or ground on which the foundations are to be laid, yet
that

is

the

first

essential

but then

it is

keeping with this procedure in the practical

already there.
arts, Aristotle

In

found

an analogous procedure in the theoretical sciences. These all

rest on principles, take for granted grounds, which they do not
examine though some investigate further than others, mathe;

matics further than physics, for example.*

Aristotle, then,
conceived the theoretical sciences as a sort of hierarchy, and
thought it obvious that there must be a highest science, and
this

"

first philosophy."
But though first in the order
was as the highest the furthest removed from us.
This is a point on which it will be well to enlarge.

he called

of rank, it

Speaking generally, the problem that the universe sets us is

an inverse problem. George Ill's bewilderment as to how
the apple got into the dumpling or the puzzle of bygone days
which was first, the hen or the egg, are trivial instances

as to

* Cf.
Metaphysics, IV,

i-iii,

VI,

i.

"

IN THE BEGINNING

."

an inverse problem. George III had presumably never

seen a dumpling made and all that our forbears could say was
that all the hens they knew of had been hatched from eggs
of

all the eggs they knew of had been laid by hens.

In
some such quandary Goethe represents Faust on returning to

and

his study after

his

saunter with his colleague,

lamented that life was not half

Easter

Wagner had

Wagner.

Day

long enough to reach the beginnings of things, and so Faust

bethought himself of revelation.
Taking up the New

Testament, he sat down to render into his

'

beloved

German

'

the opening sentence of the fourth gospel ev apxfj TJV 6 \6yos.

1m Anfang war das Wort he found too literal the meaning
:

must be

Im Anfang war

Yet could

der Sinn.

it

be merely

Sinn, nothing but thought that moves in all things ? Surely it

should be Im Anfang war die Kraft. Still something warns
him that he cannot stop at that. Then the inspiration comes

and he boldly writes Im Anfang war die That. But what

deed and whose deed further, was there one doer or many ?
Aristotle, as I have said, recognised at the outset that his
;

problem was an inverse one, though unhappily before very

long he forgot the fact. At any rate he did clearly recognise
that, as he put it, the ordo ad nos is the inverse of the ordo ad
universum.

Goethe, too, recognised this inverse character of

the philosopher's problem, and, moreover, suggested the only

way towards

its

seemed open

solution that

Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten

Geh' nur im Endlichen nach aller Seiten.

And

this

sciously

is

the

followed.

way which,
Partial

in fact,

mankind has uncon-

advance from the more known,

the notiora nobis has secured partial knowledge of the less

known, the notiora natura. From whatever side the unknown

has been effectively explored,

been the method followed.
direction,

point,

discursiveness,

viz.,

and

from where we

this, as I

said,

has always

method

implies,
are,

have

i.e.,

implies definite
a definite starting
in mediis rebus.
By

too,

A 2

JAMES WARD.

from particulars we may advance to deduction

but such advance, though it may yield an exact science as
in mathematics
can never carry us beyond the restricted
induction

"

universe of discourse

propos of this,

"

to

which such particulars belong.

though they must

two or three remarks

needs be more or less disjointed

help us on. First,

every special science, we say, represents a restricted universe
of discourse.
A satisfactory classification of these sciences,

may

what Dr. Bosanquet has happily called a morphology of them,

is still a desideratum.
But for our present purpose a single
and concrete.

division will suffice, that into abstract

abstract
rational

sciences

logic,
it

if

dynamics,

and what

mathematics,

be conceded that this

In the

is

is

called

truly an

we have universal propositions; in the

Their laws are
special concrete sciences we never have.
but generalisations and belong entirely to the region of what
science

abstract

'

'

Hume

called

probability as

distinct

from exact knowledge.

The knowledges furnished by the exact sciences are beyond

always and of all conceivable worlds, dependent on

cavil, true

no other knowledges and implicated in all our concrete knowSo far as they go, we regard them as ideal knowledges
ledge.

inasmuch as no other knowledges come up to their standard.

For all that, they are not the ideal of knowledge, of that

knowledge embracing the whole

of

are

which

is

what

with our

told,
They provide us,
laws of thought,' with all our theoretical axioms and
we apply them to the real world, but they
archetypal ideas

so-called
'

things

we

philosophy seeks.
'

'

do not belong there.

no affair of theirs.

And

yet,

side to das

We

owe

or non-existence of that

is

we may next remark, they

an

to

The existence

alien Seiten

them our

alone carry us on one

Unendliche which Goethe talked of.

precisest instances of the infinite, the

absolute, the perfect, the simple.

All the concrete sciences

Moreover, at a
together, on the other hand, fall short of this.
time when these sciences were practically non-existent, the

....

"IN THE BEGINNING

exact sciences were comparatively advanced. No wonder, then,

that philosophy should have been started on a false track.
It
was, in fact, so started

when Plato assumed

that the exact

do furnish the ideal of knowledge, and therefore

From ideas as archetypes to things as
prescribe its method.

sciences

but their ectypes or imperfect copies, seemed to be clearly the

only way and to be not only direct but unerring. Philosophy
then for Plato began at the beginning. To be sure Aristotle
;

protested, but in large measure

forgetting

it,

And

conviction.

as I

is

changed

stultified his

protest

by

said, instead of

holding to his first

so philosophy wandered in the wilderness for

thousand years.

of

couple

have

he

How

shown by the attempt

little

of

the

was

situation

Descartes and

more

especially of Spinoza to develop metaphysics more geometrico.

The

were made by Bacon, Locke, and

was who formulated them indepen-

effective protests

first

Hume

though Kant it
with
more completeness and more precision. He insisted
dently
on the strictly formal character of what is ordinarily called
logic,

and pointed out the radical difference between mathematics

and philosophy; the difference being that mathematics can

start from intuition and construct its concepts, whereas philosophy can do neither.
This

is

Kant was

a point important enough to deserve special remark.

fully alive to this difference quite early in his career.

In an essay written for a Berlin Academy prize, Concerning the

Intelligibility of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals*

he

first

of

examines how mathematics and

all

philosophy

respectively obtain their definitions, for definitions are everywhere indispensable to permanent advance. Till these are laid

down we

are

left

with nothing better than temporary and

tentative exploration by trial

mathematician

is

and

error.

Here, however

so far master of the situation that

we may

the
call

* The
and
prize was awarded to Kant's friend, Moses Mendelsohn,
own essay, adjudged proxime accessit, was published as an appendix
to Mendelsohn's in 1764.
Werke, Hartenstein's ed., ii, p. 281 ff.

his

JAMES WARD.

his

work almost

creative

for he obtains his definitions directly

The

in the very act of synthesizing the concepts they define.

philosopher, on the other hand, to obtain his definitions, has, as

best he can, to analyze the

more

are already there, thrust upon

or less obscure concepts that

him by experience.

As a matter

numberless cases, he finds his problem insoluble, or,

like the old physicists, who resolved all matter into four or five

of fact, in

elements, he goes off content with an analysis that turns out to

be incomplete. The mathematician can begin at the beginning

because he can define

him

intuition enables

all

the

way through

as he goes

pure

most elementary

at once to construct his

concepts and to formulate axioms concerning them. But for

the philosopher the elementary concepts that are first by nature
are the last to be reached

by

his analytic

method.

When,

then,

he attempts by imitating the mathematician to begin at the

beginning, he forgets that what is here first in the order of

knowledge
of

consists

not the easiest but the hardest to conceive,

is

die

allerabgezogenste

Begriffe,

the

most abstract

Both psychology and the history of thought

concepts of all.
bear Kant out completely in maintaining that such concepts are
therefore just those which are not reached historically
last.*

Accordingly he concludes,

philosopher

is

to start
"

"

till

the

that the right course for the

from what one certainly knows, even

Albeit we may make attempts, setting

though it be but little !
out from such (avowedly) imperfect knowledge, hoping that
perchance we may come upon the trail of something more
certain.

But

in

any case we must not mix up the two.f

In short, as everywhere in dealing with reality, so in philosophy, we proceed in Baconian fashion 'per scalam ascensoriam'
But, if
through axiometa media towards the highest truth.
the sides/ as Goethe called them, are infinite, and if the steps
along each are infinite too, obviously we can never accomplish

'

Of.

menology
t Op.

Psychological
of
cit.,

Mind."
p. 294.

Principles,

pp.

293,

231

if

"
;

Hegel,

Phamo-

"IN THE BEGINNING

our task.

."

Aristotle bethought himself of this

and maintained

finite, and that the steps must be finite too,

or there would be no dp^r) at all.
I must content myself with

that the sides are

saying that, so far as I know, his reasoning has failed to satisfy

his commentators either of ancient or modern times.*
As for

We not
Kant, he did not shrink from the consequences.
only cannot begin at the beginning, the ultimate ground or
A
apX*) of things, but theoretically we can never reach it.
science of metaphysics, that
is

for us

searching to find out

is

a science transcending all science,

We

an impossibilty.

cannot hope by intellectually

But though philosophy must not

God.f

try to imitate mathematics by beginning with definitions,

may, Kant maintained, make use

the concrete sciences do which
systematize.

This, in fact,

physics has ever done

is

hence

all

it

of provisional definitions, as
it

seeks

to co-ordinate

and

that in spite of itself metathat, unlike the formal

comes

it

"swarms with faulty definicontain some elements towards

sciences, philosophy, as he says,

tions, especially

such as really

So far, however,
a definition though they are not complete."!
"
as these
relate to an object which we can never reach in any
experience," they are to be called speculative not scientific.
Speculation, in fact, has been described as experimenting with
ideas.

The proper function of speculation, according to Kant, is

not to dogmatize beyond all we know, but having criticized
what knowledge we have to organize in conformity with
regulative ideas the further knowledge we
the main burden of his first Critique.

may

obtain.

This

is

Here, however, he

Post. anal. II, ch. xxv.

Cf. Metaphysics, bk. , ch. ii, init.
" The Ideal of the Pure
vii.
t Critique, on
Reason,"
I

758 f.

B, pp.
Critique, A, pp. 730 f.
24.
Cf. F. Harms, Oeschichte der Logik, 1881, p.
;

Mr. Bradley, in a
" Some
on
1914)
Aspects
Reality,
speculation as experimenting. Here, how-

chapter (Truth and

specially interesting
of Truth," describes his

own

ever, Dr. Bosanquet apparently does not follow him.

Address to this Society, Proceedings, 1914-15.

Cf. his Presidential

JAMES WARD.

proved to be anything but the ruthless iconoclast

rationalism that he was at first supposed to be.
trary, his speculative ideas or

'

of

dogmatic

On

the con-

he himself

ideas of reason/ as

new phase of philosophy which far

and brilliancy the old dogmatic ventures
Descartes and Spinoza.
Whereas the latter had taken

called them, ushered in a

outstripped in boldness
of

mathematics as their paradigm, the new outburst sprang from

logic; not, however, from the old Aristotelian logic that had
reduced rationalism to the barren formalism of the Leibniz-

new transcendental
'

Wolffians, but from the

logic,'

which Kant

This was not analytic but synthetic,

claimed, a revolution in philosophy com-

himself had propounded.*

and would

Kant

effect,

parable with that effected in astronomy by Copernicus. But

as often happens in revolutions
the immediate result was

and it filled him with

anything but what Kant expected
he
lived
to
become
acquainted with the
dismay, though
only
;

first

stage of

of literature,

at

any

it.

The circumstances

but I must

length here.

resist the

temptation to dwell on these

say that the young and

himself to Kant in a gushing

Suffice it to

Fichte introduced

struggling

are one of the curiosities

letter covering a

This

new

manuscript entitled Critique of Revelation.

critique claimed merely to fill a lacuna in Kant's

own system
for

its

and Kant at

publication;

first

and when

approved so far as to arrange

as it chanced
it appeared

was actually hailed as a long expected work

by Kant himself. I mention this as evidence of a certain continuity, such as that connecting an adventitious bud and its
it

anonymously

was as the bud developed that its divergencies

its sporting character
Kant compelled
became alarming.
"
to disown Fichte, whom he called
a clumsy friend," described
parent stem.

It

the Wissenschaftslehre

as

thought you had caught

*

On Kant

"

it,

like
lo

sort of

there

ghost,

when you

was nothing there but

as the fountain-head whence the

metaphysical knowledge' of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel sprang, cf.
F. Harms, Op. cit., p. 216 ff.
4

'

transcendental logic

'

"IN THE BEGINNING

."

your hand vainly clutching." It was, in

a
case of hunting the snark and finding it a boojum.
short,
yourself, or rather just

Such was

Ego and

all
its

that, so far as

he could

Meiner Anstoss came

to.

Absoluts

see, Fichte's

Doubtless he would

have said the same of Schelling's supplementation of Fichte's

Absolute and of Hegel's development of Schelling's Absolute.

But the innovators themselves thought otherwise. In the

volume of his Encyelopcedia, commonly spoken of as the

first

Smaller Logic, published in 1817, nearly 14 years after Kant's"

presumed to say
People in the present day
have got over Kant and his philosophy; everybody wants
to get further."
About 14 years later Hegel died himself, and
death, Hegel

the collapse of the

new movement

rampant materialism inaugurated

at once began.

spell of

by Hegelians of
over 30 years later still, a
period of some 60 years after Kant's death that of Hegel
Otto Liebmann, reviewing the collapse
falling about half way
"
the so-called " left set

each of the

of

new

in.

in good part

little

idealisms in turn, raised the cry

muss auf Kant zuruckgegangen werden.

to Kant).
So N co-Kantianism began

Also

(We must then, go back

Kant was revived, but

Hegel slumbered on. Yet that is not altogether true for have
we not in England, at any rate, our Neo-Hegelians too, and
among them, in the opinion of most of us, the most distin;

guished of our contemporary philosophers ? And so it comes

that with us one still hears more about Hegel than about Kant.

is

From first to
the name for

"

whole movement, " the Absolute

the dominant or first principle; this is the

last in this

I
beginning, and with this the movement professes to begin.
do not propose to discuss the very different forms this Absolute
assumed in the earlier systems the Absolute Ego, the Abso-

Identity of such polar opposites as Ego and non-Ego, the

Absolute Idea.
But the prior question, what in general is-

lute

meant by the term itself the Absolute

In what sense, can an Ego
raise.

while to

thing else be called the Absolute

Now we

it

or

may

be worth

an Idea, or any-

are familiar in the

JAMES WARD.

10

works

and Aristotle with such phrases as the true, the

good and it seems to be on the analogy of these

of Plato

beautiful, the

that

ology
it

modern philosophers
is

peculiar,

This termin-

talk of the Absolute.

and perhaps

it

ought to strike us more than

We can readily find particulars to which the adjectives

does.*

and good apply, and can more or less intelligently use the abstracts, truth, beauty, and goodness formed
from those adjectives: we can even regard the true, the
true, beautiful,

beautiful,
abstracts,

and the good not as severally many nor yet as

but as ideals in Plato's sense, which we nowhere find

completely realised in our concrete experience. But when we

come to the Absolute the case is by no means so simple.
What is there in or within our experience of which the

Absolute

is

leaving the archetypal but formal ideals

the ideal

of mathematics out of account

absolutely wicked, but this

leave

is

aside for the present.

it

We

obviously hyperbole, and we may

No quality that we know of is

We

absolute or perfect in this sense.

monarch

talk of absolutely good or

talk again of an absolute

or autocrat or of a judicial sentence that

final, as

is

being thus absolute. This sense of absolute as unconditioned or

unconditional is perhaps the most literal of all.
Absolute
accordingly

often thus defined

is

be said

At

least,

unconditional or non-

it is

know of anything
so we are told, the

relative.

But do we

implies the absolute or unconditional.

of

which

can truly

this

relative or conditional

But

is this

so

Would

not be more correct to say that what relative implies is some

as father implies child or master implies 'servant;
correlative!

it

* Ficino in his celebrated translation

"
dpropos of TO KaXov, wrote Unumquodque
hoc Plato vocat

ormam

in omnibus, pulchritudinem

supra omnia, pulchrum ipsum

opinioque.

Secundum

[TO avro KaAoV].

ratio cogitat.
p. 21 On.

by Grote, Plato, ii,

+ " The word absolute

of Plato published in 1482,

e singulis pulchris,
:

pulchrum

speciem et ideam

Primum

sensus attingit

Tertium raens intuetur."

Quoted

is put upon much too hard duty in metaphysics

not to be willingly spared where its services can be dispensed with."-

J. S. Mill, Logic,

I,

ii,

7.

"IN THE BEGINNING

11

."

and that what conditioned implies is its conditions as effect

implies a cause and means imply an end ? Further the term
like

non-relative,

so-called

all

infinite

becomes meaningless.

from

is

the

restricted,

It is infinite in the old sense of aireipov

The most we can say

or indeterminate.

unless

terms,'

universe of discourse in which they are applied

that

of the

Absolute regarded

If all
ambiguous.
things, distributively regarded, are correlative, then the Absolute
becomes nothing: hence perhaps Hegel's favourite saying, "God
this logical

standpoint

without the world

is

not God."

is

is

it

If all things are collectively

regarded, they as the whole are all there

then called the Absolute, for

it

is

The whole may be

Hence

is:

related to nothing.

the tendency of our intellect to cling to

relations
that we find the idea of the Absolute so frequently
associated with the idea of nothing and that not only by the

perhaps

it

is

such

is

Mystics and by Schelling, but even by Hegel and the neoThe All, or as we say the Universe, can, however,
Hegelians.
an ideal, save perhaps as the knowledge of it
be
called
hardly
is

an

ideal, since

we can never attain

to

it.

This, of course,

was

the burden of Kant's cosmological antinomies.

But

we reach an ideal if we go back to the meaning

when it is applied to individuals. As ordinarily

after all

of absolute

used, however, the

tive.

The

word

autocrat, as

a constitution,

is

in this sense is always really

comparawith
monarch
limited
the
by
compared

absolute

and similarly the decisions of a

supreme court as compared with those of a court from which

there can be an appeal.
Still even the greatest autocrats live
in

'

'

fear of

change and have often been overthrown

and the

highest judicial functions are liable to ex post facto legislation.

But we can, or think we can, imagine an ideal individual free

from

all limitation.

of God,

In this way, in

fact,

we

which the very presence everywhere

dependence suggests

attain our idea

of limitation

and

hence the argument a contingentia mundi*

* So Schleiermacher traced
religion to ein schlechthinniges Abhangiga feeling of absolute dependence.

keits gefiihl

JAMES WARD.

12

Now

between these two ideas

of

and God, there has been and

tion,

the Absolute, the Universe

still

is

more or

even in philosophy, to say nothing of

less

oscilla-

religion.

We-

have theism, pantheism, often 'a polite atheism/ and panentheism.*

Of course, when the two ideas of the Absolute are

combined one must be subordinated, for there cannot really be

two Absolutes. The alternatives are (1) Krause's panentheism,
in some form the All in God, and (2) God in the All
for which
I

know

of

no name, unless we use henism in

seems to be the doctrine of our neo-Hegelians, with

whom we

now

are

chiefly concerned.
Let us see then what

understood.

and space;
within

may

it

we can say about the Universe sowe can deny that it had an origin in time
they however we explain them must fall
apart from it there is nothing. Secondly, we

First,
for

since

deny that

conditions

To

This

this sense.

it

must

had a cause and so

within

fall

it

is

an

effect

since beside

it

for again, all

there

is

nothing.

cause or Causa sui seems meaningless for it

"
the
sort
of mistake made by Locke's
only repeats
poor Indian
as everywho
also
well
that
the earth
philosopher,
[as
imagined
call it a first

thing in it] wanted something to bear it up."f To apply to it

the scholastic term aseity is simply to say that it absolutely
is.
Obviously then we cannot call it phenomenal, for all
'

'

appearance presupposes reality. Nor, thirdly, can we equate

with the entire sum of things as a plurality, regard it, that
to say, as

merely what

Wm.

James

called a multiverse.

it
is

It is

the whole and therefore a unity.

Eegarding this one whole or
we are bound to say ?
is
there
more
which
Absolute,
anything
is,

we

last,

see

Indeed there
*

As

to

the

are told.

in

J. E.

It

must be a

self -consistent

Erdmann's Geschichte der neueren

1853, pp. 637-686, the account of an allendliche

Losungeversuch, by K. C. F. Krause, for a short time a junior colleague
of Hegel. In consequence largely of the forbidding terminology which
Philosophic, Bd. Ill,

ii,

Krause invented, the high place which Erdmann assigns to him has only
recently been at all generally recognised. Verily, a warning to us all
t Essay, II, xiii,
19.
1

"IN THE BEGINNING

13

."

for were it
even in its smallest part contradictory,
there would be no eliminating the contradiction. With one such
little rift within it, the universe could not be real.
True as
,

'

'

this is it hardly

But have you

seemed

to

need saying, since

realised all that

Apparently not
that implies, it is
;

it

means, we

it

also trite.

is

be asked

may

for, since the Absolute excludes contradiction

said, that it

excludes discord.

the absence of logical opposition

is

In other words

identified with the absence

and Kant notwithstanding.* Not

the absence of discord
by no means the only form

of real opposition, Leibniz

merely so

of real opposition
finally the Absolute
perfect."
4C

is
is

forthwith equated with perfection and

"
Experience, individual and
;

declared to be

These seem giant strides to accomplish by a principle

"
"
to quote Mr. Bradley
as
the law of

so absurdly simple

contradiction which says no more than that sheer incompatibles

must not be

conjoined."!

Anyhow we may allow

itself,

and with

that the Absolute does not contradict

as

this negation

an absolute criterion the

epistemological problem, the criticism of our knowledges is to

Now, in the tentative process of acquiring these, we are
begin.

often pulled up by some logical opposition between two alternative possibilities. One or other must be false
so much the law

but which

of contradiction declares
for

long before

Very

we

find

some

crucial

We may

have to wait

instance that

decides.

different is the purely logical treatment of propositions.

proposition, without

explication of its

going beyond it, may by

content be shown to contradict

similarly two propositions

thing, I think

we may

the

mere
and

itself,

to contradict each other.

But no

confidently say, ever really contradicts

* I
refer, of course, to the distinction drawn by Leibniz between our
knowledge concerning possible existence and our ignorance concerning

compossible existence (De Veritatibm primis, Erdmann's ed., p. 99) and

especially to Kant's classic paper, Versuch den Begriff der negativen
Grosse/i
in der Weltweisheit einzufuhren (Werke, Hartenstein's ed., ii,
;

p. 71 ff).
t Principles of Logic, 1883,

p. 141.

JAMES WARD.

14
itself,

nor does one thing ever really contradict another. It is

of this conviction that we maintain that

only on the strength

the universe

We may

at least not self-contradictory.

is

ground of the so-called

was clearly announced in

"

this fact the ontological

and

tradiction,"

it

law

call

of con-

form by

this

Aristotle.*

Yet the thinkers

have in view seem

flatly to

deny

all this.

them, Reality, i.e., the Absolute, being the one

According
complete whole, must be the ultimate subject of every item of
to

what we take

less

self-contradictory
"

designated as
Spirit or,

we

ought,

if

But

for knowledge.

this implication, all our

knowledges are declared to be

most so when the subject

when

this," least so

God.

will, as

you

and ignoring
more or

as they stand,

the subject

is

Instead of saying S

are told, to say the Absolute as or in

merely

defined as

is

is

is

we
P is

P,

P.

not strictly a predicate of S, for S itself is ultimately but a

Dispart, and, so far, but an adjective of the Absolute.
regarding for the present this
part and predicate, we may ask

contradictory to say
and yet not equally contradictory to say the Absolute

is

is

P.

questionable identification of

The

logical definition

why

of

it

is

S or subject

that which

is

cannot be a predicate but can only be predicated of and taken

strictly in this sense the Absolute alone is the ultimate
:

subject, for

taking a

whatever
of

lump

soluble, is sweet

certain

some

is,

onlv

sugar,
I find,

is

as a predicate of

it.

Suppose,
say this substance is white, is
however, that it is only white in
I

only soluble in some liquids, only sweet to

What it would prove to be if it could be taken

lights,

tastes.

as an ens per se subsistens is

more than any

Hume

there are

who

that

but a bundle of relations

it is

like

maintain that
;

of us
it

know.

Some

would be nothing,

forgetting that relations

imply fundamenta and that interactions imply agents. Others

like J. S. Mill think it suffices to fall back on the notion of
the

'

permanent
*

Cf.

my

possibility.'

But obviously the

article in the current

number

'

bundles

of Mind, No. 112.

'

of

"IN THE BEGINNING

one and the

and so our

'

'

something there

is

same

treating all other things in the

up

is

On

what

15

."

We

with the lump of sugar remain.

difficulties

cannot deny that there

that I take

imply some actuality,

of the other

possibilities

nothing anywhere.

if

seems to be in

of its relations to other things;

and

for

otherwise,

fashion, there could be

the other hand,

it

I find that anything

virtue

itself solely in
all

my

not

now

attempts to
determine its own nature only lead me beyond it in a search
that I can never complete am I not driven to conclude that it is
but a part, an element, or a member of a continuous whole, that
if

to say, of the Absolute ?*

is

Let

me

this

way
made

is

relations
is

say in parenthesis that I

of

it

and

to resolve all finite

objecting to

things, along

with their

interactions, into a tissue of contradictions

just this tissue of finite things

that constitute our real world.

"

am

of looking at things in itself, but only to the use that

"

for it

and their mutual appearances

Our procedure,"

it is

allowed,

from [these] common facts of our

lives."
Nevertheless, in almost the same breath we are told
"
This is the method I am
that We should begin from above."
naturally makes

its

venturing to question

always done

start

and surely what we naturally do and

'

'

a procedure
that should either be
or
at
at
the
outset
refuted
any rate discredited by one
directly
that supersedes it by better results. Let us then briefly examine

have

some

is

of these results.

But

first

a word or two concerning the resolution of partition

is offered, at one time as an epistemo-

into predication which

logical ground, at another as

an ontological consequence, of the

11) is pertinently
long paragraph in Locke's Essay (IV, vi,
I may quote a sentence or two from
cited in support of the affirmative.
" This is
certain : things, however absolute and entire
his summary
in
seem
themselves, are but retainers to other parts of nature for
they
:

that which they are most taken notice of by us. Their observable
and powers, are owing to something without them "

qualities, actions,

a something which he has previously described as "utterly beyond

"
our view and " impossible for us to determine." Then, of course, there
"
flower in the crannied wall."
is Tennyson's familiar apostrophe to the

JAMES WARD.

16

identification as

have savoured

as to say that in

'

'

questionable

of

now to speak of such

have said more then might

I ventured just

doctrine of absolutism.

Now, however,

dogmatism.

my opinion

to

I will go so far

the criticisms advanced from

many

have completely disposed of

That the parts of any concrete whole are constitutive of
reality, not terms in its definition, is a truth recognised

sides against this logical innovation

it.*
its

throughout the history of logic from Aristotle, who expressly

rejected physical definition,' to Aldrich,t and onwards to our
'

own

The venerable

day.j

proof enough

of

this.

though the possession

of it

doctrine of the five predicables

part as such

may

be.

We may

men

describe

two-legged, dogs as four-legged, spiders as eight-legged,

on

we never say
Nor again,
legs.

but

man

is

inter alia

is

never predicated,

is

two

legs,

as

and so

or a dog

so far as I know, has this reality of a

whole ever been maintained while at the same time the reality

four

appearance
Schein

it

viel

so

To be

was denied.

of its parts

sure, the part

may

be called an

cannot be called a mere appearance.

Wie viel
Sein
was
one
of
Herbart's
Hindeutung aufs

trenchant phrases embodying the truth fully recognised by Kant,

that phenomenal reality is never mere illusion.
If, however,

viz.,

the parts are to be called phenomenal, their whole

called so too.

To deny

this is to ignore the difference

must be
between

a partial whole which limits and is limited by other partial

wholes, on the one hand, and the absolute whole which includes

them

all,

on the other. Lastly, so far as

ever maintained that whatever

simpliciter of

predicable

know, no logician has

predicable of the part is

the whole, maintained, for example,
is

that a cat with white paws must itself be white.

quid,

viz.,

But what

as to its
is this

paws, the cat

may

Secundum

be said to be white.

beyond the admission that perhaps,

after

all,

I refer especially to the criticisms of Professor Stout, to be found

in the Proceedings of this Society ; as also to those of Professor PringlePattison and of Professor A. E. Taylor.

Whose

(?/., e.g.,

is censured
by Mendel (Rudiments, p. 41).
127.
Drobisch, Neue Darstellung d. Logik,
17,

laxity

"

the cat, which

paws

as such

that

that

its

17

."

not white, though its

cannot, then, straightway apply to the Absolute
seen,

what we can truly predicate

Granted,
all

THE BEGINNING

we may never have

We

are.

IN

not as such

it is said,

of its parts as such.

for,

is

though

in the

examine as appearance, in the hope of escaping

tradictions, is found on the way to the Absolute

and there commits

in the Castle of Despair,

some seven or eight of such

are
is

one of the results

nothing

it is

not.

self-con-

There

Well

this

beginning from above, to which

of

But

its

to be landed

suicide.

suicides on record.

would now invite your attention.

It is allowed that the Absolute
is

Absolute

there so transformed and merged

there, yet
In fact, much that we
partial nature has vanished.
it is

is is

it

is

is its

not

its

appearances, for there

appearances as such, for

they are a plurality. It is then its appearances, as utterly

fused and transformed, i.e., as Reality. This is the new dialectic

Meanwhile the untransforrned, unmediated discrepant appearances remain to perplex us and to perplex us
movement.

incomparably more, I will venture to add, if this is indeed the

Is the Absolute making a sport of us ? we
truth about them.

That can hardly be, since these appearances are said to

be its revelation. Yet again we ask, But how is that possible
are thus
if there are indeed two sides
since the two sides
ask.

Perhaps the way out of this difficulty is to

treat the question not as ontological but as merely epistemof what we simply feel and
ological, not as concerning the being
utterly different

do not differentiate, but

as

would have called the face-value

for us they are

known

'

aspect.'

Comparing

grown man with that

as.

the

James

concerning what Win.

of

And, in

such differentiations, what

fact, stress is laid

knowledge and conduct

of the child

on

this

of

the

he once was, we realise that

many transformations and blendings have taken place. And a

like contrast comes out when we compare the knowledge and
conduct of savage races and of races that are civilised.*
*

Cf. Psychological Principles, pp. 413, 467.

The

JAMES WARD.

18

and systematisation

unification

all

principle underlying

Due

social.

though

it

human development,

individual and

reflexion on this principle, imperfectly realised

be with us,

is

it

yet sufficient,

what

difficulty in conceiving

Absolute

of particular experiences is the

is,

said, to

is

remove any

so to say, fait accompli in the

'

never accomplished/ for it is always

there.
Such language ceases to be appropriate when what
Still we might
eternally is and never becomes is in question.
or

rather

pardon an expression so natural to our standpoint,

all.

If,

that

is

to say, the reality of the percipients to

the so-called phenomenal world

ledge with us, though

it

'

'

or

is

so,

AufJiebung or reconciliation of contradictions

coherence,

whom

revealed was

given
the progress of knowinvolves both what Hegel called the

But even

respected and retained.

increasing

that were

if

and

also

an ever-

shows no signs of reducing the

and the fundamental concepts of

yet

leading categories of thought

science to a

number

of

mere

adjectives.

who know are

share the common

"When, however, those

appearances destined to

also resolved

into

lot of either fusion

and transformation, we begin to wonder what it all means.*

For the principle illustrated from experience of this process of
transformation and blending in its epistemological
aspect
'

is

is

now appealed

to to

show that within experience a

discernable from the ontological standpoint.

described

as

'

essentially impersonal

With

of

organizations

must confess

it

content

and objective

reminds

wand

me

of the

like

'

like process

Persons are

content which
(

'

is

the objective mind'

German legend

of Riibezahl,

will be

remembered, converted his carrots into companions for the princess he had carried off.
a stroke of his

They played

this

gnome,

it

their part so long as the juices of the carrots kept fresh,

to the common earth from which they

and thereafter were returned

came, to be followed by others presently to be treated in like manner.

All that was permanent was just this common ground from which they
sprung and with which they were once more blended. But anyhow the
without her
princess was not a carrot, and has still to be accounted for
the whole drama becomes meaningless. We shall fall in with her again
:

under the alias of

'

finite centre.'

"IN THE BEGINNING

of Hegel,

we may assume.

What we

19

."

ordinarily call personality

but a formal distinction of a precarious and superficial nature,

which is ever being transcended and impaired, as this identity

is

of content within formally different selves preponderates

more

and more. In other words, selves in the truest sense tend ever
more and more to coalesce, being, in fact, hindered only by the
impotence which their formal distinctness entails. Nothing but
our mortal coil with its partial outlets and their 'broken

In the absolute transparency all

So again, it is argued that our own
such division disappears.
experiences of the advance towards a higher unity should
suffice to convince us that in the Absolute this unity is already

lights' stands in the way.

But the

question is does our experience verily

furnish the slightest evidence that with increasing understanding,
sympathy and co-operation real personalities tend to disappear ?
complete.

first

It is a lamentable fact that in one respect it does

but that,

unfortunately for the argument in question, is one that makes

I mean, of
against the goal of our endeavours being reached.
course, the

of character, the absence of almost everything

want

but formal distinctness, that makes so many people but gens

On the other hand, it is
moutonniers, as Ribot called them.

and originality of people of character

Nevertheless it is conthat keep the world from stagnation.

precisely the stability

turn out in ultimate analysis to be but

'connexions of content/ within the Absolute. At all events

tended that

we may

all alike

at least maintain that our experience cannot fairly be

appealed to in verification of any such contention.

Other results incident to the particular method of beginning

from above that

identification

of

am

the

venturing to discuss follow from the

Absolute with Eeality.
Reality, as

We owe
is an ambiguous term.
on things to the Cartesian dualism of res
extensa.
Leibniz, for good and all, as I believe,

Aristotle long ago remarked,

the stress
cogitans

now

and

res

laid

started philosophy on a better track by

making

substantiality or reality, the fundamental idea.

activity, not

So Faust was

JAMES WARD.

20

him to say Imwar

die
non
non
said Leibniz too.
That.
existit,
Quod
Anfang
agit
"
The main antithesis to " real is " imaginary."
Appearances
right in yielding to the inspiration that led

then are real or actual, that is to say they imply something

but they are not active themselves.
Appearances,

active,

therefore, cannot appear to other appearances, for so far there

would be no activity at either end.

implies

is

activity

at both

commercium dynamicum,
'

ends,

as

But what

i.e.,

Kant

reciprocal

called

it.

'

finite centres of

are mentioned, are

experience
interaction,

When, then,
we not entitled

experience
understand this phrase as meaning individual agents en
rapport together ? We can give no explanation of this rapport
which does not covertly imply it for we come here to the
to

bedrock of experience it involves two agents, we know that,

and that is all we can say in the beginning.
But it requires
also the Absolute, we shall be told, and that again perhaps now
:

we should hardly think

first

of

denying altogether.

in our knowledge, however,

speculations about the Absolute,

of subject

and

is this

knowing and object known.

is

What comes

the basis of

all

our

interaction, this duality

To reduce these

finite

centres to appearances means, I think, the 'Disappearance of

'

reality

for us.

not a mistake to speak of these finite centres as

To reduce the universe to fragments with
fragmentary
comes perilously near to bringing back the
ragged edges
chaos of older ways of thought.
After all, Eags and Bones
Again,

is it
'

'

'

'

'

'

is

not the cry of science

what

it

accidens, is form, unity, function,

fessor Pringle-Pattison has said

finds everywhere, save

and organization.
"
it finds
that mind

per

As Prois

organic

and nature organic to mind."

From this, I repeat,
we actually start. Our knowledge is acquired apart from any
to nature

speculation about the Absolute, speculation that

first

becomes

urgent as the limitations and difficulties of the pluralism from

which we begin make themselves felt.
This procedure our
as
we
have
seen, are bent on reversing.
neo-Hegelians,
Begin-

"IN THE BEGINNING

21

."

'

ning with the concrete universal which they denominate by

the abstract term Reality, they are led by their logic to deny
'

that the particular reals have any independence at

all fall

somewhere

less or

more

such reality as

of

we seem back

And

pertain to these.

may

now

at the bouleversement just

reality of our world, the

is

They
and have only

in the rank of appearances,

all.

so

The

indicated.

major premiss from which we all start

a concluit could not yield

refuted by a conclusion which

sion based rather on a dialectic

And

to be not entirely sound.

which confirms

which

this exposure.

been shown

has, I think,

surely here

we have

As another

critic

a result

has said

"

The unity with which the system concludes tends to abolish

I would rather
the plurality of centres from which it starts."
say

the unity from which the system, as such, starts tends to

abolish the plurality of centres which, in fact,

on to a fresh point.

this leads

That experience takes place in

a fact, but a fact that

is felt

finite centres, is

same thing as

But

us.

beyond

to

be inexplicable

to be incompatible.

And

With

still

is

admitted as

Why

to be inexplicable.

the Absolute divides itself into centres and

this is

But

it finds.

or

how

remains one

by no means the

this

presumably we

only the so-called 'divisions' of Eeality

into finite centres of experience were recognised as themselves
all agree.

if

real in a sense quite different

real

as real in the sense in

from appearance, in

which the Absolute

itself

other words, they were regarded as creatures

part in carrying on the
the

'

main miracle

refers, a will that

Universe

'

to

still

'

of will, to

can accept as

less

ground

real

who have

of creation, beings

short,
if

in

their

endowed with

which one of our neo-Hegelians

its

own, 'the immanent will of the

quote a phrase of another

we should have
might

work

is

to dissent

in that case, certainly,

from their doctrine.

We

object to the so-called divisions of the Absolute

being described as fragmentary, or as needing to be blended or

'cemented,' although the Absolute itself still remains one.
Again,

if

the Absolute

is

the Universe,

i.e.,

the totality of the

JAMES WARD.

22

which we otherwise

interrelated plurality

then

call the cosmos,

to speak of such diversity in unity as inexplicable is to utter

either a paradox or a truism

sary inexplicability of what

Absolute

a paradox in view of the admitted

the Universe, a truism in view of

complexity of

is

all

and ultimate.

the neces-

But

the

if

Experience, than why this should involve finite

"
in
is
indeed inexplicable, especially experiences
experiences
endless error hurled."
Why such an Experience, like the
vorjo-i?

is

of

vor)ae(D<$

Aristotle's divine

absolutely self-sufficing,

but even

superfluous

not

should

rendering anything beside not

'

incompatible,'

crux of absolutism from the

The two ideas

being,

has been the

be

only

common

first.*

of the Absolute, then, the

and the Individual whose Experience

Universe as the whole,

is

Eeality,

our neo-

Hegelians, so far as I can discover, do not clearly distinguish.

Both seem merged in a unity that has suggested henism as

perhaps the most appropriate term by which to characterise
their doctrine.
But the two ideas cannot, I believe, be
:

'

'

contents

other;

'

'

identified

predicates

seem more appropriate to the one,

more appropriate to the

in its psychological use,

and yet these terms are used almost interchangeably. So

what we find elsewhere

I think I find in the philosophy before us

viz.,

more

or

of the Absolute.

less

oscillation

between two

The only solution

of the difficulty

us, as it seems to me, is the solution

beginning where we are,

with a
One above,' that

instead of

'

this

is

distinct

ideas

open

to

we naturally reach by
attempting to

theoretically inaccessible.

begin

On

view the Absolute would consist of God and the World

For
is immanent, while yet transcending it.
view we might, as I have suggested, adopt Krause's term,
panentheism, if we concede to the agnostic that we cannot

in

which God

this

prove either by any logic or any science any more than he can
the existence of such a being as that which we call
disprove
* Cf. The Realms
of Ends, pp. 30 ff.

"IN THE BEGINNING

Such a concept

God.

a flaw/ as

is

a rational ideal*

Kant maintained

but

23

."

it

may

be 'without

use in theoretical philo-

its

sophy can only be regulative, as he also maintained. Its value

and it has there other
for religious faith is another matter
;

is

we may contend

This faith too

grounds.

is

reasonable

but

it

not science.

Only a word or two more must suffice by way of summary.

Hegel compared Schelling to a painter who had but two colours
on his palette, suggesting that his work was ineffective through
I

deficiency.

philosophers

venture to compare our neo-Hegelians to

will

who work with two

which implies

principles,

Kant

It is the sort of defect that

failure

through redundancy.
abhorred and stigmatized as philosophical rhapsodizing
continuity and

paradoxically

so

it

lacks coherence.

maintained that

it

is

it

lacks

somewhat

Ferrier too,

more important that a

philosophy should be continuously reasoned than that it should

I will content myself with saying that it is more
be true.
important that philosophy should be systematic than that it
should be complete.
then, a hopeless

Complete, in fact, it cannot be.

attempt one that, as I have said,

It seems,
is

held by

general consent to have hitherto always failed

to begin from
the standpoint which only a completed philosophy would occupy

(i.e., if

were not absorbed

it

be coherent

that, it

To advance continuously and

!).

seems to me, should be our golden

The whole procedure

will be tentative

that

to

rule.

must always be

the case with inverse problems.

Crises will occur in the future
as they have in the past
they are inevitable incidents in the
:

development

of concrete

knowledge at any

rate.

But

as the

elemental cataclyisms are over for our planet and

days
merely superficial earthquakes are the worst that we need fear
so with philosophy.
It has passed the nebulous stage and
of

become

at

least

an inchoate

Poincare has said of

'

would be true

physics
cases of

'

the

What
organism or system.
crisis in
mathematical
'

present

of philosophy

its crisis

would only be

sloughing an outgrown skin,' an incident of growth

"IN THE BEGINNING

24

."

and enlargement rather than a real disease. Like knowledge

generally, philosophy on the whole has progressed, growing
from within,
abides by the

no

leaps,

i.e.,

following the ordo ad nos

method which Nature

why

should

not progress

it

and

so long as it

herself observes,

But we cannot

still ?*

dismember philosophy and have two independent

Wolff, tried to do this and failed.f
points.'

But when we are

offered

two principles

and makes
'

growing

so disparate as,

on the

one hand, the self-contradiction that makes utter havoc of all

our world or at least 'infects' it in varying degrees; and as, on the
other, the Absolute, in

our ken

which

it is

when, too, the result

points of view,

we might

say

reconstituted for ever beyond

such that,

is

"

forgetting other

Thus every part is full of vice,

Yet the whole mass is Paradise "

maintained

"

that

through their imperfection [the infection of the parts] that the Absolute is enabled
to affirm itself," may we not exclaim with the Geisterchor in
where,

finally, it is

Goethe's Faust

Weh
Du

Weh

hast

sie zerstort

Die scheme Welt,

Mit machtiger Faust
Sie stiirzt, sie zerfallt

Wir

Und

tragen

Die Trummern

ins

Nichts hiniiber,

klagen

Ueber
* I trust I

it is

'

'

die verlorne Schone.

may be pardoned

for referring here to

an address (which

had the honour

of giving just thirty years ago to another Philosophical

"
The Progress of Philosophy." It appeared in Mind,
Society) entitled

1890, pp. 213 ff.

t Cf. Zeller, Gesch. d. deutschen Philosophic, pp. 217

f.

Meeting at 22, Albemarle

W.

Street,

1,

on December

1st,

1919,

at 8 P.M.

THE NATURE OF INFERENCE.

'

II.

By GERALD
"

No man

ever told one great truth, that I know, without the help of

a good dozen of
"

GATOR.

lies

at least."

THE General Nature

BROWNING
"

of

Reality

in

is

constructive and important chapter of

book.

am

persuaded

that

fundamental

presupposition,
that
namely,
reality as such,

it

and
i.e.,

Soul's Tragedy.

the

incidentally

we can say

super-personal,

something

of

this absolutist

of it that

or

it

fallacy,

is

divine

of

the

discloses

Absolutism

self-conscious,

if

it

is

to be real be

for instance, be

such

individual, or spiritual,

or

not

self-conscious,

or

or

The group of arguments against

doctrine which I shall advance in this paper

some

sort.

are not brought to that degree of unity

which

the most

in virtue of its very realness,

must have some general character, must

something more than merely real, must,
that

of

title

Mr. Bradley's famous

and

of

coherence with

should have wished to present them.

Indeed, I rather
than see clearly and mediately that they are all

outcrops of one problem.

My
tions,

theses are, (a) logical doctrines, (b) metaphysical applica(a)

That there are

for thought,

no things which being

given something else different from them necessarily follows.

That advance by inference always involves infiltration. That

no

connexion can be at once pure and synthetic. That

no logical " ought," no canon of demonstration and no

logical

there

is

authoritative court

of

appeal to decide between

conflicting

(b) That the Absolute taken as meaning the allinclusive reality has no character.
That that which has the

theories,

character

of

"

being

that

than

which no

greater

can
o

be

GERALD GATOR.

26
"

conceived
i.e.,

that

it is

cannot simultaneously have any other character,

a contentless limit.
That exhaustive mediation

which

mediation

completely

regenerates

its

data

not

is

That no highest possible level of apperception is

That no genuine judgment in the form " Keality is
"
"can be made e.g., " Keality is one experience or

possible.

possible.
"

such

is

Reality

that

if

then (certainly,

or

probably

possibly) N."

make no attempt to prove these theses one by one.

only try to recommend a general logical view of which

I shall

I shall

they form the most salient and recognizable features. Scientific

or common-sense thinking does not, except when the scientific

man

or

the common-sense
criticize

philosopher,

must be

its

thinker

happens

presuppositions.

also

to

be a

Consequently,

it

some extent, in the last resort, using words without

what
Its utterances must have someknowing
they mean.
to

thing of the character of incantations or soothing spells, they

produce in the subject a state of logical peace, or, at least, of

but he does not quite know how or why.

find myself forced to the conclusion that philosophy

temporary
I

ease,

is

in

the same case, that no higher type of certainty than that to

which common-sense or natural science attains is attainable or
distinctly desirable.

as saying

"
:

have somewhere seen Mr. Eussell quoted

is the science in which we never

Mathematics

know what we
is

true."

philosophy.

are speaking about nor whether what we say

think this true also of all sciences and of every
I think that it is

by not recognizing

this that

lay waste our powers, turning with too fastidious

from apples,

we

appetites

and demanding fruit which is

is something of an impertinence

pears, cherries, etc.,

nothing but fruit. Perhaps it

to introduce a criticism of Absolutism by an allusion to Hegel,
but this is how it appears to me in an Absolutism which was
:

logic no result would ever be attained, but (as

it were)
every result would always be just-about-to-be attained.
The goal of the dialectic would always be ahead of the yield of

true to

its

THE NATURE OF INFERENCE.

27

The promissory note would never mature, but

the dialectic.

would always be just on the verge of an ever receding

There is no more remarkable instance of the
maturity.
thought to conjure something out of
-knowledge out of the very substance of ignorance
The story is told
found in the logic of chance.

apparent power of
nothing
than is

an omnibus, who, when the conductor

her fare, found she had left or lost her purse.

of a lady traveller in

came

An

to collect

old gentleman, a fellow-passenger,

saw her predicament

her.
The next day she was travelling again,
same conductor, same lack of penny. The conductor stopped

and paid for

She glancing wildly round in her

same old gentleman
"
No
with an unconscious appeal.

the 'bus and ordered her out.

shame and

distress caught the eye of the

a fellow-passenger

again

"

he

Who

would have said anything else ?

but, if not, no matter),

you

don't

And

yet (I hope the ratios are right

said.

the probability of the

ought to go

ought

to

out

lady going out purseless was

purseless twice running once in

meet the same conductor say once

in

the same fellow-passenger once in P 2 times.

2
x
coincidences ought to coincide once in

Now who

is

And

she
2

times,

times and
all

these

times.

is

not the

xP

that this once, this actual once,

to say

if

once imposed by the laws of chance ? What is the justification

for the italicized minor premiss in the following syllogism
(author, the old gentleman)

Such a compound coincidence as I have witnessed only

happens to an undesigning female one time out of a
million times

This time

is

not one time out of a million times

Therefore this time

happened

Why

is

the answer

to

is

not a time when the coincidence has

an undesigning female.

I think
the conductor certain of the lady's guilt ?
that he makes what amounts to a construction of

is

c 2

28

GERALD CATOR.

the relevant area of reality on the basis of her innocence and

another on the basis of her guilt.
The construction on the

him* with the abiding

But if a logician was one

basis of her guilt fuses inevitably for

construction which

is

his real world.

of the witnesses of the incident, then for

him the world con-

structed on the basis of the lady's innocence (involving elaborate

constructions of coincidences) would also be supportable.
Both

the innocence-world and the guilt-world would compete for

fusion with the logician's real world, so that where the conductor

was

easily certain, the logician

would be laboriously doubtful.

any one tells me that 2 angels plus 3 angels make

5 angels, he is ostensibly giving me information about the laws
If

of combination of angels, but really he is only giving definitory

information about units.f The apparent advance gained by
applying the laws of the combination of units to the combination

of angels is gained by a trick.

This trick consists in obtaining
consent to the substitution in the formula of "angels" for
"
"

units

"

under cover

of a tacit pledge that

"

"

angels

shall

mean

angels "-so -far -as -they -have -the -nature -of -units and then,

having, under cover of this pledge smuggled "angels" into the

formula, straightway restoring to them their angelic natures.
It is as if a man should get into Parliament by identifying
himself with one party, and then when safely elected not only
vote with the other party, but claim the authority of his

constituents for so doing.

pretences.

It is first

It is obtaining a position

pushing aside

angels and units as nothing

the

difference

by false
between

and then

the

purpose remaining unchanged, triumphantly producing

as a glorious prize.

this

to

the purpose

same nothing

Now

let

us turn our attention to the formula 2 and 3 are 5

* These
worlds, z'.e., the real world and the ideal world based oil guilt
are sympathetic, or they would not fuse, but they are different or else the
one would not extend to the other. The sympathetic attraction breaks
down, the conductor's distinguishing power
with the fact.

tissue

t Croce's Logic, Eng. trans., p. 217.

the hypothesis becomes one

THE NA.TURE OF INFERENCE.

29

and see whether the apparently synthetic character of this

judgment is not obtained by similar playing fast and loose.

What happens when I effect the judgment that 2 + 3 = 5 ?

Have I before my mind a universal within which " 2 and 3 " on
"

one side and

"

relevant differences

on another side are interconnected and

think not.

I appeal first to

an

illustra-

the two ends of an electrically charged circuit are

gradually brought together, then, when they are a certain
If

tion.

Here we have

distance apart, an arc will form between them.

and (metallic) discontinuity.

(electric) continuity

want

convictions that 2

my

to refresh

+3

=5

Now when
I

make an

experiment on the following lines (the nature of the experiment

would be more obvious if larger numbers were concerned, but

show what happens when a judgment is

made and how the making of it is prepared), I imagine two

still

it

will serve to

clusters of dots, one cluster consisting of

"

dots, thus,

(cluster

a
"

of five dots,

(cluster

two dots and three

and the second cluster consisting

"),
If I glance at them and deny
c").

myself the aid of counting units I experience a flicker of

hesitation to equate them.
If this hesitation does not at once
" "
a
I interpolate between cluster
yield, this is what I do.
" "
"
cluster c a third cluster
b," intermediate in character,

and
i.e.,

such that the dots are not so obviously divided into groups as
"
"
"
c."
in
a
nor so symmetrically placed in one cluster as in
This I can do by drawing a faint line across "c,"
"
use " b
as a middle term or stepping stone for

..|...

then I

my thought
"
"
b I
attending to the line in
"
"
emphasize it sufficiently to make it serve for the gap in a
"
and thus approximate " b to " a," then I ignore the line, treat
between

it

"

"

as nothing,

"

and

c."

By

and thus approximate

"

"

to

"

c."

Lastly,

by

ignoring the oscillation of my attention I deceive myself into

"
"
a middle term which, while
b
supposing that I have in

remaining unchanged and

"

opposed

"

and

This example

"

self -identical, is

yet able to unite the

c."

is

know

faulty in treatment.

It is faulty

GERALD CATOK.

30

also in its facility because it does not reproduce the hesitation,

through and

break

the pause, the

forward,

spring

which

distinguish the genuine judgment, which adjudicates something

from the poor ghosts of judgments, which we perforce

experiment with in logic. But this is what is essential. There is

in doubt,

an advance and there

gap

is

The advance

a gap.

is

wide, and no wonder, for the gap

is the

to conclusions is not a logically permissible

is

as great as the

advance.

method

Leaping

of progress,

only possible mode of advancing.*

Professor Bosanquetf to whom I owe this insight, though he
makes the suggestion only in passing, and in order to reject it,

and yet leaping

states
"

it

the

is

as follows, in the course of a discussion of pure cases:

cannot cohere with

unless

coheres with A.

found not to hold good, and

while AC does not involve AB, it

fact this is

AC

relevant to

But

it.

AC

was not
mine)

(italics

element which

made

abstracting from
tautology,

As

i.e.,

it

really

may

AB

is

is

If in actual

found to involve

what was

plain that

but some element

a/3

within

not the irrelevant element le just the

AB into AB as
AB is reduced to

destroyed ?"J

AB

distinct from AC, so that ly

AC, and the judgment made

Professor

Bosanquet continues,

the 'bus conductor leaped. Source of this view of the middle

am concerned, Cardinal Mercier's Criterologie General,

term, so far as I

pp. 23 and 253.

t Only because Bosanquet's Logic has been the wood in which all
I am as far
arrows have been cut, do I make it a text for
criticism.

my

my

as possible from supposing that any substantive criticism of

.

it

which

could make, would be of any value. To emphasize this I have quoted

throughout from the first and therefore relatively superseded edition.
The passage I have italicized states the essence of my argument. There is

no distinction without difference, no difference without division, no

division without breach of continuity. The dialectic advances charac-

teristic of the intellect, i.e., who says

must say B ... Z is essentially
a sorites which owes the extension between
and Z to its missing links.
I cannot forbear from adducing Lotze's criticism on the categorical
" This absolute connexion of two
judgment.
concepts S and P, in which
the one is unconditionally the other, and yet both stand over against each
other as different, is a relation quite impracticable in thought," and " the

impossible judgment S
J

is

P."

Logic, 1st edition, vol.

i,

Lotze, Logic, Eng. trans., vol.

pp. 261-2.

i,

p. 79.

THE NATURE OF INFERENCE.

"

The suggestion

31

tempting because it aims at cutting up by

the root a troublesome scientific problem, viz., the statement

of

is

connected attributes as purely relevant to one anotner and yet

We constantly tend either to insert irrelevancies

as distinct.

by way

of distinction or to let both attributes fall

grasp a distinction in unity

Nevertheless,

if it

is

back into the

To

which connects them.

undistinguished abstract relation

an

effort,

and we

dislike effort.

were impossible, the idea of system, of the one

many, would be gone."

For my part I am convinced that

in the

not merely an effort

but that it is an impossibility which is never achieved. 1
interpret the sense of strain, i.e., the effort of grasping distinction in unity, as being the effort of overcoming the inertia
of the attention,

repeatedly

of

keeping

breaking down

it

it is

continually on the

incipient adhesions.

move, of

Thus, there

struggle between two or more extremes for the adhesion

- middle term.
appears now as AB

A---B---C

now

as

BC.

The

between

B and C

A and B

are indiscernibles,

differences

between

and

is

of a
-

C,

B and

taken separately, below some critical

threshold value though the difference between A ana C as not
broken by the interposition of B is above threshold value, i.e.,
are,

B and C

are indiscernibles,

and

Then by flickering of attention between A

and C mediated and A and C unmediated one gets by super-

are discernible.

position a representation of

and C

as purely relevant to

one

another and yet as distinct.*

E.g.

Socrates-inan
Socrates

mortal.

man-mortal.

Socrates
.

man ....

mortal,

Compare with Mr. Bradley's account of the generation of such pseudorepresentations as that of time by means of oscillation of attention.
" It is

no solution of the discrepancies, and we might rather call it a

of holding them in suspension.
It is an artifice by which we
become blind on either side to suit the occasion, and the whole secret
consists in ignoring that aspect which we are unable to use."
Appearance

method

Reality, p. 47.

GERALD CATOR.

32

The following

illustration,

which

hope will not be taken to

be offered as anything more than an illustration, will perhaps

explain what I suppose a concrete universal to be, that is,
not a universal but a tertium quid. In many text-books of
Psychology there are to be found diagrams, which if gazed at
fixedly, are seen

now

as concave

now

as convex.

One can

within a certain range of ambiguity.

attention

directed to

is

see

that this fluctuation

it

worth

It is

noting that any diagram to be suitable for this purpose

must

fall

when

one's

due

to a

is

wandering of the point of regard so as to confer salience now on

one feature now on another (which saliences being determined
determine in

But

features).

turn
it is

sympathetic constructions of the

very easy to be unaware

the diagram seems to go over autogenetically,

now

into another.

Suppose

this

to

of this,

and then

now into one

happen,

as

other

phase,

suppose

might with a properly balanced diagram, rhythmically

and automatically, so that the convexity appeared while the
impression of concavity was still vivid, then one phase would

it

be as

were seen through the other, and one would see a unity

it

in difference, a concave-convexity.*

affirm

that a straight line

two points
* "

is

I cannot find that

the shortest

when

distance between

do anything else than fluctuate rhythmically

those intellectual creations that are the object of philosophical science, in which the whole system not merely appears by its
common nature in parts which remain external to each other, but tends
(my italics) to throw itself in its entirety into each of these differences
.

passing by an organic necessity from one difference to another. Here,

in short, the differences are not merely parts which remain outside
one another, not merely phases which succeed one another, but moments
which succeed one another, so that the earlier are retained in the later

through a progressive development, and yet the distinctive character of

"
each moment is not weakened (Bosanquet's Logic, vol. ii, p. 194). Note
how the climax is worked up to " tends " gives the benefit of does and
does not without accepting the responsibilities of either. Then, again,
"
"
"
by the traces left by such words as passing," succession," earlier,"
"
"
latter,"
development," etc., we make ourselves beneficiaries of a wealth
of suggested meaning, so that we seem to be just on the verge of an
'

'

experience of activity without change.

'

THE NATURE OF INFERENCE.

33

between straightness and shortness, via an ambiguous neutral

form. And when I enjoy, as the humblest may do at times, the
"
apparent experience of becoming spectator of all time and of
"
all existence
I find, on close attention being given to it, that
this field of

thought

dissimilar to the

way

way not

sustained as co-present in a

is

in

which a juggler sustains a dozen

balls

by giving each attention in turn. I am thus led to

think of thought as an activity of which the characteristic nisus

in the air,

is to

mediate between difierents by the 'interposition

of just-

nots, separately imperceptible, cumulatively perceptible.

Thought's working principle

just

is

that a thing

That minimal differences

not.

is

may

indiscernibles (note the plural) are identical.

activity, relating

preparation

only

That

It is a relating

for

thought connexion

When

in apperceptive level and, for example, think

of

it is

by going between, otherwise the manner of

of contents

approximation would be uninterpretable.

predicates

what

be ignored.

man

as mediate predicates of

by gradual

I raise

myself

the immediate

animal, which

is

the beginning of a process of elevation, which would if continued lead up to envisaging all possible predicates as predicates of being or of reality, I do not attain to an unchanging

knowledge of changing things.

My

thought takes some con-

auditory or motor such as the

of
utterance
a
word, as a basis of operations and
suppressed
thence makes feints and recoveries to dart across to possible

venient phantasm

visual,

predicates

making a

sort of velleities

towards judgments

it

achieves agility but not ubiquity.

The ideal of thought would be a complete system, that is to
say, a system in which the elements were so disposed as to form

a closed system of symmetrically disposed just-nots.

As every
term in such a system represents a momentary check to
thought, thought's striving

is

to

make

smooth, unchecked, uniform, and

its

movement

effortless.

But

perfectly

a system of

pure thought corresponding to this requirement is as impossible

as an electric circuit all spark gap.
In the course of such an

34

GERALD GATOR.

would be no subjects and no predicates these

are the stadia of a discontinuous motion. There is a temporary
activity there

check to thought, a gathering of

forward,
is ...

e.g.,

have

a stream of water

of
is

break through and leap

is ... is ...

When

it ... is spiritual.

effort is absent the sense

When

force, a

man approaching

that

SMITH.

this sense of

Eeality

check and

judging activity is also absent.

checked it deposits part of the

matter in suspension, when a stream of thought

is

checked

it

deposits terms.

Our

not that if we play the game of thinking to

take the consequences, understood as consequences of scepticism or nescience, or that we can play it to
is

position

the end

we must

the end if we will take the consequences.

There is no end,
there are no consequences, and there is no beginning.
is B
is not true,
is
is no truth.
That it is a paradox is false,

and that

it is

a truism

is

insignificant.

a significant statement
it must
If it slay but a ghost,
adjudicate something, conquer a doubt.
it is but a
statement
is a possibly false
ghost.
Any significant

Any

true statement

statement.
is

It

not meaningless.

is

paradox
*

is

Any
It is

not a pure case.

false

statement.

to truism like Idealism

I take the following

"
in spirit
I
I like ....
:

possibly false statement

Any

a not absolutely true Statement,

an absolutely

from W. K.

which

to be, the being of

is

It presents itself unconditionally,

conditionally true.

statement

must deny something

false statement.

ment,

is

is

Clifford's

is

only

partially false

an untrue state-

So we

from Berkeley

a partially

but

circle

from

to Hegel.*

Essays as being Hegelian

am

a dogmatic nihilist, and shall say the brain is conscious if

true idealism does not want to be stated, and conversely

an idealism that requires to be stated must have something wrong about

it.
In the same way to say that there is God apart from the Universe is
to say that the Universe is not God, or that there is no real God at all
it may be all right but it is atheism.
And an Idealism which can be
denied by any significant aggregation of words is no true Idealism" (It is
clear is it not ?
that an Idealism which cannot be denied also cannot be
affirmed by any significant aggregation of words, and is, therefore,
entirely empty and nugatory.)
;

THE NATURE OF INFERENCE.

Till

the
"
is

spiritual

"

has been

correction

last

35

applied
Reality is
not true; when the last correction has been applied

The

no truth.

is the real, seems to promise

out
into
the real is the rational, so
peters
that real and rational are each defined in terms of the other.

it

is

everything, but

rational

it

Every philosophy at once appeals to and yet claims to create

a standard of reference.
Therefore in the end its utterances
are only true in

own Pickwickian,

its

Spinozistic, or Hegelian

sense.

Has

inference any essential character

When

all so-called

accidents of inference are purified away, such as transition in

time-advance from
clusion,

known

to

unknown, from premises

to con-

from given to extension, novelty, discovery, selective

is there
any residuum ? I believe not. We can

abstraction,

dispense with these accidents in turn, but not with

once.

Why

is

continuation," a

a fragment

more

of

"

a circle

effective instance of

them

able to

all

at

dictate its

an active universal

than a piece of straight line, and why is a fragment of ellipse

more telling than a fragment of circle ? I think because of the
impression of novelty of the continuing change of direction as
against the simple continuance of direction, and of the continuing change of change of direction as against the continuing
change of direction. How can it be otherwise than that the
attack which

and

is

fatal to the

shall also

effect

primd

facie intelligibility of cause

be fatal to these entirely cognate pairs

Again, what does a curve's present

tinuation amount to ? I as I look

ability to

at

it

dictate its con-

itch to continue the

sweep with my pencil or eye, but that is not what is wanted. In

what order of reality are the degrees of this dictator obeyed ?
"

Lastly,

its

continuation,"

i.e.,

the continuation of

it,

it

is

defined or individuated by forecast of this continuation; any

other continuation would be a continuation of something else.

broken column

may

be a complete monument, a broken

a complete tragedy, a broken sentence

eloquence.

Formal completeness

in

life

more expressive than

some order

is

always

36

GERALD GATOR.

secured.

It tells

The

us nothing.

bit of

curve might be a

part of a circle or a part of a sinuous line or a piece of decorative work.

Given a jigsaw puzzle complete but for one piece, or an

animal complete but for one bone, or a universe with but one
gap in its completeness, could we say with certainty what the
missing element must be

makes the ground

piece

No

Either there

is

because the absence of the

determination

of

precisely in the direction in

minate.

which

it

no ground

is

itself

indeterminate

required to be deter-

for, or else

there

no room

is

Newman amused himself by picturing how

two theologians, disputing about St. Paul's meaning, would
insensibly begin to trim and qualify their assertions if suddenly
a conclusion.

for,

Saint was

told that the

relieved
to

when

some extent on

north of A,
find
is it

approaching. Who is not a little

?
The laws of arithmetic were

sum comes out

trial

till

it

a mile east of B,

did.

measure

If I

a mile south of C,

a mile

and then

not due east of A, have I measured wrongly ? Or, what

that those learned folk say about actual space being possibly

non-euclidean

At

the very end of his Logic Professor Bosanquet writes

Necessity, then, is a character attaching to parts or differences
interrelated within wholes, universals, or identities.
If there
:

<;

were any

totality such

could not be set over against

something else as a part or difference within a further system,
such a totality could not be known under an aspect of necessity.
that

it

The universe, however we may conceive of it as including subordinate systems, must ultimately be incapable, ex hypothesi,
of entering as an element into a system including more than
* I

which

may perhaps make one more attempt to enforce the

have been trying to illustrate in so many ways, thus

difficulty
If

between given and extension the distincand arbitrary, i.e. there is no reason for
saying at any point that here the given ends and the extension begins.
But if there is any breach in continuity, then the back of the inference
which extends the one by means of the other is broken.
there

is

no breach

tion between

them

of continuity
is irrational

THE NATURE OF INFERENCE.

it.

speaking,

of reality, not

of

a reality which

relation

necessity.

to

But

knowledge

also, strictly

we have no power

to question
our questioning or explanation falls
There can be no meaning in talking about what

it is

or explain, because

within

its

therefore,

speaking,

Strictly

must be one

37

it.

all

might be the case if the universe were other than it is, or

about what has been the case to make the universe what it

But except

is.

in

reference of that which

to

read this passage to

for in this

is

this

paper

is

itself,

mean

what

that

have been contending

forcing an open door.

"strictly speaking, etc.,"

reality

is

of

every judgment is the synthesis of

have never been clear as to whether I should

something outside

differences."*

unique and imaginary

assumed to be the absolute whole

the case

mean

just a matter of

Does the passage

that the ultimate character of

fact

But a

fact not fixed in a

system would have no character and no persistent identity,

would, in fact, not be a fact, would be nothing for knowledge.

And

the ultimate character of reality is nothing for knowthen

surely all the subordinate characters which arise
ledge,
within and depend upon this nothing are nothings too, Then
"
"
again the passage beginning There can be no meaning

Does

if

this

mean

that (as I contend

is

the case)

if

we exact

the

law every supposition is illegitimate ? It destroys

the world on which it rests.
Lastly, is there some sense in

letter of the

which the prohibition of discussing " what has been the case to
make the universe what it is" prohibits any discussion, and
Either, I think, it permits
yet permits any other discussion ?
both a discussion of the " Nature of God as He is in Himself"

and a discussion

of the causes of the prevailing high prices or

else it rules out both these discussions as illegitimate.

Casting

my mind back over the previous course

my anxiety to set my opinion in

paper, I feel that in

lights I

may have given

*

of this

various

the impression of firing a charge of

Logic, vol.

ii,

p. 236.

GERALD GATOR.

38

small shot at reason generally.

more, however, than that though

We

what we know.

What

have said comes

to

no

we can know, we cannot know

no higher type of certainty

cannot excogitate a theory of
knowledge by means of which we shall be entitled to pass
judgment on the claim of any item of ostensible knowledge.
can

We

than every day certainty.

And

to

rise

Such a theory is not a possible

There is nothing specially sceptical

this is not our failure.

achievement of thought.

about this view, nothing that should make us

that our

feel

established certainties are unduly precarious or at the

emerging new
best

The

is

facts.

good enough

source

of

"

for

Evidence

is

me " might

philosophic

the test of truth

be adopted as

scepticism

is

mercy
"

its

failure

"

or

of

the

devices.

take

to

thoroughly to heart the purely negative character of the ideal

of reason, because by this failure a shadowy realm is maintained
in being to confront and to depreciate the actual.
excluded from nothing is no exclusion no limitation.

As

the " ideal of reason

"

To be

Kant, may I be permitted

to bring my paper to an end by a few remarks under the form
"
(merely under the form ") of a criticism of Kant. Kant then,
recalls

I opine, failed to eradicate the transcendental illusion because

he did not see that there

is

no area constructions in which are

not vitiated by the autonomy of reason. Eational theology is

no more and no less a pseudo-science than history, geology, or

The

physics.

distortion on a Mercator's chart does not begin at

the poles, though only at the poles does

patently unbearable.

it

become

infinite,

and

That the limits of the validity of reason should be taken to

that possible
coincide with the limits of possible experience
experience should be conceived as a function of sense experience
that sense experience should be (surreptitiously) equated with

common-sense experience that an acorn or an atom should be

conceded to be an object of possible experience and an angel or an
absolute denied to be such an object

and place

all these are idylls of

time

accidents of profession, not generated conclusions.

THE NATURE OF INFERENCE.

Limit

of

of

beginning

philosophy,

limit

shifting

limit

experience,

limit,

becomes

therefore

in

general,

are

theology,

(for this

mind

in

that.

all

names

for

supporting complex

through precise

or that) insupportable.

man

of

the

dis-

This

man, from interest to

expanding and contracting, now in

varies from

now

of

out

carried

interest,* from age to age,

this direction

knowledge, beginning

which the burden

at

hypothetical constructions
tinctions

of

39

If

to

we

are to determine

its

locus

we can only do

(in general) is the

detiniteness
force

which

And

"

so by saying that the real world

world which can be sustained with relative

and continuity, by that expenditure

is

standard

statistically

better canon,

the disposal of

at
"

must

be largely,

obtained
"

of intellectual

a standard

though

average in which, in
Every one counts for one."f

human mind.

not entirely, a
default

of

any

"
Idea, quse esse formale humanse
ex plurimis ideis composita."
sed
simplex,
human mind is a society of
Spinoza, Ethics, Pars. II, Prop. XV.
mindlets.
" Theism as an Intellectual
t Vide my paper,
Polity," in the PhiloIn an earlier group of papers, the
sophical Review, September, 1919.
"
"
Structure of Reality," Mind, N.S., No. 61 ;
Eeality as a System of

From

interest to interest because

mentis constituit, non

est

Functions," Mind, N.S., No. 79; "Id quo majus cogitari nequit,"
Monist, October, 1908, I took the absolutist view which is criticized in
this paper.

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Grower

on December I5th, 1919, at 8 P.M.

London,

EXTEKNAL AND INTEENAL EELATIONS.

III.

By
IN

Street,

index

the

to

G. E. MOORE.

Appearance

and Reality

(First

Edition)

Mr. Bradley declares that all relations are " intrinsical " and
the following are some of the phrases by means of which he
;

tries to

must

explain what he means by this assertion.

both ends

at

"Every

(p. 364).

affect,

and pass

into, the

"

being of its

relation

terms

"

relation essentially penetrates the being of

"
"
To stand
terms, and is, in this sense, intrinsical (p. 392).
in a relation and not to be relative, to support it and yet not to
be infected and undermined by it, seems out of the question "

its

(p.

142).

And

a good

other philosophers seem inclined

many

same view about

relations which Mr. Bradley is

here trying to express. Other phrases which seem to be sometimes used to express it, or a part of it, are these: "No
"
"
relations are purely external
All relations qualify or modify

to take the

or

"

make

"No

a difference to the terms between which they hold

terms are independent of any of the relations in which

they stand to other terms" (See

e.g.,

Joachim, The Nature of

Truth, pp. 11, 12, 46).

It

is,

I think,

by no means easy

these philosophers

mean by

to

make out exactly what

And the main

these assertions.

is to try to define
clearly one proposition,
does not give the whole of what they mean,
to be always implied by what they mean, and to be

object of this paper

which, even
seems to me

if

certainly false.

it

I shall try to

make

this proposition, to point out

some

quences, and to distinguish

clearly

tions

which

are, I think,

it

more

clear the exact

of its

meaning of
most important conse-

from certain other proposi-

or less liable to be confused with

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

it.

And

I shall

a relation

would give

is

to

"

maintain that,

internal

it,

"

if

we

41

give to the assertion that

the meaning which this proposition

then, though, in that sense, some relations are

"

internal," others,

no

less certainly, are not,

but are

"

purely

external."

To begin with, we may, I think, clear the ground, by putting

on one side two propositions about relations, which, though they
seem sometimes to be confused with the view we are discussing,
whole meaning of that

do, I think, quite certainly not give the

view.

which is quite certainly and

is a proposition
without exception, and which,
of
all
true
relations,
obviously
of
though it raises points
great difficulty, can, I think, be

The

first

clearly

enough stated

for its truth to be

proposition that, in the case of

obvious.

It is the

relation whatever, the kind

any
which we express by saying that a given term A has
that relation to another term B, or to a pair of terms B and C,

of fact

or to three terms B, C,

and D, and

so on, in

no case simply

terms in question together with the relation.

Thus the fact which we express by saying that Edward VII was
consists in the

obviously does not simply consist in

Edward, George, and the relation of fatherhood. In order that
the fact may be, it is obviously not sufficient that there should

father

of

George

merely be George and Edward and the relation of fatherhood

it is further necessary that the relation should relate Edward to
;

George, and not only so, but also that it should relate them in
the particular way which we express by saying that Edward
was father of George, and not merely in the way which we

should express by saying that George was father of Edward.

This proposition is, I think, obviously true of all relations

and the only reason why I have mentioned

article in which Mr. Bradley criticizes
Mr. Eussell (Mind, 1910, p. 179), he seems to suggest that it is

without exception
it

is

because, in

an

inconsistent with the proposition that any relations are merely

external, and because, so far as I can make out, some other

D 2

42

G.

who maintain

people

that

E.

all

MOORE.

relations are internal

seem some-

times to think that their contention follows from this proposiThe way in which Mr. Bradley puts it is that such facts

tion.

are unities which are not completely analy sable ; and this is, of
course, true, if it means merely that in the case of no such fact
is

we can truly say

But whether from
internal must of course

there any set of constituents of which

This fact

identical with these constituents.

is

this it follows that

depend upon what

all relations

are

meant by the

is

latter statement.

If it

be

merely used to express this proposition itself, or anything which

follows from it, then, of course, there can be no doubt that all

But

relations are internal'.

who

mean by

say this do not

itself

proposition

I think there is

and

am

no doubt that those

words merely

their

going to point out

this obvious

something which

think they always imply, and which certainly does not follow
from it.
I

The second proposition, which,

be put aside at
once as certainly not giving the whole of what is meant, is the
proposition which is, I think, the natural meaning of the
I think,

may

"

All relations modify or affect their terms or " All

relations make a difference to their terms."
There is one
"

phrases

natural and

intelligible sense in which a given

be
said
to
may
modify a term which stands in that
relation, namely, the sense in which we should say that, if, by
putting a stick of sealing-wax into a flame, we make the

perfectly

relation

sealing

wax

melt,

the sealing-wax.

which part
modified,
I

think

meaning

what

of

that

is

it
is

its

is

relationship to the

This

it

is

is

a sense of the

meant by saying
has actually

of

flame has modified

word

"

"

modify
term
that
any

in

it is

undergone a change and

which this is part of its
:

clear that a sense in

"
"
the only one in which the word
modify

can

properly be used. If, however, those who say that all relations
modify their terms were using the word in this, its proper

what would be meant by this assertion would be

terms which have relations at all actually undergo

sense, part of

that all

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

43

Such an assertion would be obviously false, for the

reason
that there are terms which have relations and
simple
changes.

which yet never change

who

that those

sense

we

could

be

at

all.

And

think

quite clear

it is

assert that all relations are internal, in the

are concerned with,

mean by

asserted

consistently

to

something which

this

be true of

all

relations

without exception, even if it were admitted that some terms

which have relations do not change. When, therefore, they
"
"
use the phrase that all relations
their terms as
modify
"

equivalent to
"

"

all relations

are internal," they

must be using

some metaphorical sense other than its natural

modify
one.
I think, indeed, that most of them would be inclined to
in

assert that in every case in

another term

it

comes

to

have to

did not have to

in

which a term

a relation, which

some

immediately preceding interval, its having of that relation to

that term causes it to undergo some change, which it would
not have undergone if it had not stood in precisely that
relation to

and

think perhaps they would think that this

some proposition which is true of all

is what they mean by
are internal.
The question whether

proposition follows from

relations, without exception, and which

saying that all relations

the coming into a new relation does thus always cause some
modification in the term which comes into it is one which is
often discussed, as

whether

if

all relations

it

had something

are internal

as

to

do with the question

when,

for instance, it is

discussed whether knowledge of a thing alters the thing known.

And

part I should maintain that this proposition is

not
true.
But what I am concerned with now is not
certainly
the question whether it is true, but simply to point out that
for

my

so

far

as

can

question whether

reason

that

it

with regard to

can have nothing to do with the

see,

it

all

relations

are

internal,

for

the simple

cannot possibly follow from any proposition

without exception. It asserts with

all relations

regard to all relational properties of a certain kind, that they

have a certain kind of effect ; and no proposition of this sort

44

G.

can, I think, follow

MOORE.

E.

from any universal proposition with regard

to all relations.

We

certainly 'not giving the

have, therefore, rejected, as

whole meaning

of the

dogma

that

all

relations are internal

no relational

(1) the obviously true proposition that

completely analy sable, in the precise sense

assertion

and

(2)

the

obviously

false

which

facts are

I i>ave to that
(

that

proposition

all

relations modify their terms, in the natural sense of the term

"

"
modify," in which it always has as part of its meaning cause
Arid we have also seen that this false
to undergo a change."
proposition that any relation which a term comes to have

always causes it to undergo a change is wholly irrelevant to the

question whether all relations are internal or not. We have
seen finally that
their terms

that

if

the

assertion

that

relations

all

modify

be understood as equivalent to the assertion

"
"
are internal,
modify must be understood in some

all

is to

The question

metaphorical sense.
phorical sense

is

What

is

this

meta-

And one point is, I think, pretty clear to begin with. It is

obvious that, in the case of some relations, a given term A may
have the relation in question, not only to one other term, but
to

several different terms.

relation of fatherhood,

it is

If,

for instance,

not only of one, but of several different

who say

we

consider the

man may be father,

children.
And those

obvious that a

that all relations modify their terms always mean, I

think, not merely that every different relation which a term has
modifies it but also that, where the relation is one which the
;

term has

to several different other terms, then, in the case of

each of these terms,

it is

modified by the fact that

relation in question to that particular term.

is

father of three children, B, C, and

that he

is

modified, not merely

I),

by being a

If,

it

has the

for instance,

they mean
father,

to assert

but by being

the father of B, also by being the father of C, and also by being

the father of D.
their

The mere

terms does not,

assertion that all relations modify

of course,

make

it

quite clear that this

is

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

what

meant

is

meant

and,

term, which
is

that

all

I
I

but I think there

we can

think,

no doubt that

is

more

it

express

it is

always
by using a

clearly

have already introduced, and saying the doctrine

relational properties

which remains

45

to be defined.

modify their terms, in a sense

I think there is no difficulty in

understanding what I mean by a relational property. If A is

father of B, then what you assert of A when you say that he
is

so is a relational property

B and

father of

it is

namely, the property of being

is not itself

quite clear that this property

a relation, in the same fundamental sense in which the relation

of fatherhood is so

and

also that, if

C is a different child from

C is a different relational

B, then the property of being father of

property from that of being father of B, although there is only

one relation, that of fatherhood, from which both are derived.

So far as I can make out, those philosophers who talk of

relations being
"

internal,

relational properties

"
:

often

actually

when they

mean by

all

''

relations,"

talk of all the relations of

a given term, they mean all its relational properties, and not
merely all the different relations, of each of which it is true
that the term has that relation to something.

It will, I think,

conduce to clearness to use a different word for these two entirely

"
"
"
"
relation
to call
different uses of the term
fatherhood a
:

relation,

and

"

fatherhood of

B"

"

the fundamental proposition, which

that

relations are internal,

all

is,

relational property."
is

meant by the

And

assertion

I think, a proposition

with

and not with regard to relations

no doubt that those who maintain

regard to relational properties,

There

properly so-called.
this

dogma mean

is

maintain that

to

related in a peculiar

way

to

all relatfonal properties are

the terms which possess them

that they modify or are internal to them, in some metaphorical

sense.

And

once we have defined what this sense

is

in

which

a relational property can be said to be internal to a term which

possesses

it,

we can

easily derive from it a corresponding sense

in which the relations, strictly so called, from

which relational

properties are derived, can be said to be internal.

46

G.

MOORE.

E.

Our question is then: What is the metaphorical sense of

"modify" in which the proposition that all relations are
internal

is

"

properties
it

is

equivalent to the proposition that all relational

"
I think
the terms which possess them ?
modify

clear that the

used at

to

all

express

"

"

term

would never have been

modify

relation meant, unless there

the

had

been some analogy between this relation and that which we

have seen

is

the proper sense of

And

change.

I think

we can

"

see

modify," namely, causes to

where the analogy comes

by considering the statement, with regard to any particular

term A and any relational property <, which belongs to it,
that A would have been different from what it is if it had not

in

had 0: the statement, for instance, that Edward VII would

have been different if he had not been father of George V.
This is a thing which we can obviously truly say of A and
</>,

some

in

sense,

whenever

true of

it is

the proper sense of the word

if

that

<

it

modified

A in

the being held in the flame

causes the sealing-wax to melt, we can truly say (in some

sense) that the sealing-wax would not have been in a melted

But

it

were a thing which might also be true of

state

it

is

if

it

it

had not had

</>

0,

caused

internal

And

it

to

would have been

those

would have been

it

say that

change

different,

that
it

the

would

all relations

what they
speak
In the case of every relational

do sometimes tend
:

who

if

and <, where

caused

<

have any property which

meant could be put in the form

property which a thing has, it
which has

seems as

does not necessarily imply

A to

not have had otherwise.

property

mere assertion that

possession of

are

flame.

not true that the possession of

since the
if

had not been in the

is

as

to

if

always true that the thing

if it had not had that

different

they sometimes say even

If

<f>

be a relational

property and A a term which has it, then it is always true

This is,
that A would not have been A if it had not had
(/>.

I think, obviously a

clumsy way of expressing anything which

could possibly be true, since, taken strictly,

it

implies

the

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

self-contradictory proposition that

not have been true of

more or

theless a

less

A that

it

natural

if

had not had

did not have

<f>.

(f>,

But

would

it

never-

it is

of expressing a proposition

way

which might quite well be true, namely,

then anything which had not had
</>,

has

that,

supposing

This

is

wish to suggest as giving the metaphorical meaning of

which we are in search.

modifies A, of
to

would necessarily
the proposition which
</>

have been different from A.

I

47

which

<

It is a proposition

think a perfectly precise meaning can be given,

all imply that the possession of </>

and one which does not at

r((iiscd

of all

any change in A, but which might conceivably be true

terms, and all the relational properties they have, without

And

exception.

it

seems to

the proposition that this

me

that

"
expressed in the form,

it is

not unnatural that

and A, should have been

modifies A," since it can be more

is true of
<

<f>

or less naturally expressed in the perverted form,

not had

would have been

it

(/>

we

which, as

different,"

"

If

had

a form of words,

saw, can also be used whenever

<

does, in the

proper sense, modify A.

want

suggest, then, that

to

implied by the

"

dogma

that,

one thing which

is

always

All relations are internal,"

is

the case of every relational property, it can always

be truly asserted of any term x which has that property,
that, in

that any term which had not had

different

This

And

from
is

it

would necessarily have been

x.

the proposition to which I want to direct attention.

it, which require some further

there are two phrases in

explanation.

The

first is

the phrase

"

would necessarily have been."

And

the meaning of this can be explained, in a preliminary way, as

follows
To say of a pair of properties </> and i|r, that any term
:

which had had

</>

would necessarily have had ty, is equivalent

from the proposition with regard

to saying that, in every case,

to

has

any given term that

A/T

it

has $,

it

follows

that that term

follows being understood in the sense in which from the

48

G.

MOORE.

E.

proposition with regard to any term, that

follows that

it

a right angle, it
an angle, and in which from the proposition

is

it is

with regard to any term that it is red it follows that it is

coloured.
There is obviously some very important sense in
which from the proposition that a thing is a right angle, it
does follow that
red

is

thing

maintaining

which

it

is

it

it is

an angle, and from the proposition that a

does follow that

it is

And what

coloured.

am

is that the metaphorical sense of "modify," in

maintained that all relational properties modify

the subjects which possess them, can be defined by reference to

"
this sense of
follows."
The definition is To say of a given
:

relational property

term

that

</>

which possesses

to say that

it, is

that a thing has not got

from A.

modifies or

it

<p it

In other words,

it

is

internal to a given

from the proposition

follows that 'that thing

is

to say that the

is

different

property of not

possessing <, and the property of being different from

related to one another in the peculiar

way

in

are

which the pro-

perty of being a right-angled triangle is related to that of being

a triangle, or that of being red to that of being coloured.

To complete the definition it is necessary, however, to

"
"
different from A
is to be underdefine the sense in which
There are two different senses which the statement

stood.

that
that

A is different from B may bear. It may be meant

A is numerically different from B, other than
Or

identical with B.
case,

but also that

And

relations

make

mean

of these

difference

That

is

qualitatively different

two meanings, those who say

difference to

in

B, not

may be meant that not only is this the

is related to B in a way which can be

it

roughly expressed by saying that

from B.

merely

the

latter

their

sense

terms, always,

That
I

all

think,

and not merely in the

be a relational
mean, that if
the
of
absence
$ entails not
property which belongs to A, then
only numerical difference from A, but qualitative difference.
former.

But, in

to say, they

<

from the proposition that a thing is qualitatively

from A, it does follow that it is also numerically

fact,

different

is

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

49

And

hence they are maintaining that every rela"

"
internal to
its terms in both of two
property is

different.

tional

same time. They are maintaining that,

be a relational property which belongs to A, than
is
internal to
both in the sense (1) that the absence of </>

different senses at the

if

<

<

entails qualitative difference

of

from

(/>

neither of these propositions

is

and (2) that the absence

It seems to me that

from A.

entails numerical difference

true

and

I will

say something

about each in turn.

As

for the first, I said before that I

"

properties really are

means

all

are.

But,

"

internal to

if

think some relational

their terms,
"

we understand

though by no

internal to

"

in this

am

not really sure that any are.

In order to get
an example of one which was, we should have, I think, to say
that any two different qualities are always qualitatively different
first sense, I

from one another

that, for instance, it is

not only the case

that anything which is pure red is qualitatively different from

"
"
anything which is pure blue, but that the quality pure red
itself is qualitatively different from the quality
pure blue."
'*

am

and

not quite sure that

so, it

if

which

is

we can

easy to get

is

is

The quality

internal in our first sense.

intermediate in shade between

This

say this, but I think

a relational property, and

assumption,

it is

we can

an example of a relational property

"

"

is

orange

the qualities yellow and red.

it

an internal one.

is

quite clear that, on our

Since

is

it

quite clear that

any quality which were not intermediate between yellow and

would necessarily be other than orange and if any quality
other than orange must be qualitatively different from orange,

red,

then

it

internal

to

"

relational property
entails the property

There

is

"

"

intermediate between yellow and red is

That is to say, the absence of the
orange."

follows that

"

"

intermediate between yellow and red,"

different in quality

from orange."

then, I think, a difficulty in being sure that

relational properties are internal

what we want

to

do

is

to

in

this first sense.

show that some are

not,

any

But,

if

and that

50

G.

dogma that

therefore the

MOORE.

E.

all relations

are internal

think the most conclusive reason for saying this

were internal in

this

sense,

and that

internal in the second,

in fact, the

first

all

that

is

is

it

false, I

that

if

all

would necessarily be

this is plainly false.

most important consequence

relations are internal,

is

of the

follows from

I think,

dogma

that all

that all rela-

it

tional properties are internal in this second sense.

I propose,

therefore, at once to consider this proposition, with a

view to

bringing out quite clearly what it means and involves, and

what are the main reasons for saying that it is false.

be a relational
The proposition in question is that, if
property and A a term to which it does in fact belong, then, no
<f>

matter what
of them, that
sarily

</>

and

may

be truly asserted

any term which had not possessed

circumstances,

(j>

would neces-

numerically different from A

necessarily, in all conceivable

have been other than

or, in other words, that

"

may always

be, it

would

And with this sense of

have possessed $.
from that which says qualitatively

internal," as distinguished

easy to point out some relational properties

which certainly are internal in this sense.
Let us take as an
which
we
the
relational
assert
to belong to a
example
property

different, it is quite

visual sense-datum,

when we say

of it that it has

another visual

sense -datum as a spatial part the assertion, for instance, with

regard to a coloured patch half of which is red and half yellow
:

"

"

"

"

This whole patch contains this patch (where this patch is

name for the red half). It is here, I think, quite plain

a proper

that, in a perfectly clear

and

intelligible sense,

we can say

that

any whole, which had not contained that red patch, could not
have been identical with the whole in question
that from the
with
to
term
that
it does not
whatever
proposition
regard
any
:

follows that that term

contain that particular patch

it

than the whole in question

though not necessarily that

from

is

other
it is

it.
That particular whole could
not have existed without having that particular patch for a part.
But it seems no less clear, at first sight, that there are many

qualitatively different

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

other relational properties of which this

is

51

In order

not true.

an example, we have only to consider the relation which

the red patch has to the whole patch, instead of considering as
to get

before that which the whole has to

it.

It

seems quite clear

that,

though the whole could not have existed without having the red
patcli for a part, the red patch might perfectly well have
existed without being part of that particular whole.

words, though

this for a spatial

is

part"

"

"internal" in our sense,

it

"
equally clear that every property of the form

of this

whole

"
is

is

a spatial part

Yet

this

It implies that it is just as neces-

sary that anything, which

.a

having
seems

one of the things which the dogma of

internal relations denies.

should be

is

not internal, but purely external.

according to me,

last,

In other

form

every relational property of the

is

in fact a part of a particular whole,

part of that whole, as that any whole, which has a

particular thing for a part, should have that thing for a part.

any term which does

It implies, in fact, quite generally, that

in fact have a particular relational property, could not have

And

existed without having that property.

in saying this it

It seems quite
obviously flies in the face of common sense.
obvious that in the case of many relational properties which
things have, the fact that they have them is a mere matter of

fact

that the things in question might have existed without

having them. That this, which seems obvious, is true, seems to

me to be the most important thing that can be meant by saying
that

some relations are purely

to see

how any

not true

external.

And

the difficulty

philosopher could have supposed that

that, for instance, the relation of part to

more external than that

of

whole to

one main reason which seems to

part.

me

to

it

whole

I will give at

have led

is

was
is

no

once

to the view,

that all relational properties are internal in this sense.

What I am maintaining is the common-sense view, which

seems obviously true, that it may be true that A has in fact
got <, and yet also true that A might have existed without
having

</>.

And

I say that this is equivalent to saying that it

52

G.

be true that

may

has

(/>,

E.

MOORE.

and yet not true that from the pro-

position that a thing has not got

other than

why

this is disputed

that

if

has

it

<j>

numerically different

</>,

I think,

is.

and x has

follows that that thing

from

it.

simply because

is

And

one reason

it is

in fact true

other than

not, it does follow that

is

These two propositions, the one which I admit to be true

(1) that if A has <, and x has not, it does follow that x is other
than A, and the one which I maintain to be false (2) that if
A.

has

that

then from the proposition with regard to any term x

has not got <, it follows that x is other than A, are, I

<f),

it

And

think, easily confused with one another.

it is

in fact the

they are not different, or if (2) follows from (1),

then no relational properties are external. For (1) is certainly

case that

true,

and

if

(2)

is

certainly equivalent to asserting that none are.

therefore absolutely

It is

if

essential,

we

are

to*

maintain

external relations, to maintain that (2) does not follow from

These two propositions (1) and

maintain that (1) is true, and (2)

is

(1) asserts that

way, as follows

which has

must be other than A.

not,

(1).

with regard to which I

false, can be put in another

(2),

if

has

<p,

then any term

(2) asserts that

if

has <, then any term which had not, would necessarily be other
than A. And when they are put in this form, it is, I think,
easy to see why they should be confused
"
"
is necessarily
with
confuse " must "or
.

"

you have only to

would necessarily

And their connexion

with the question of external relations

To maintain external relations
can be brought out as follows
to
maintain
have
such
things as that, though Edward VII
you
be."

was in

George V, he might have existed without

George V. But to maintain this you have to

fact father of

being father of
maintain that it

is

not true that a person

who was

not father of

George would necessarily have been other than Edward. Yet

it is, in fact, the case, that any person who was not father of
George must have been other than Edward. Unless, therefore,
you can maintain that from this true proposition it does not
follow that any person

who was

not father of George would

EXTERNAL

53

INTKKXAI. 1,'KLATIONS.

AN'h

have been other than Edward, you will have to give

up the view that Edward might have existed without being

necessarily

father of George.

most important point in connexion with the

seems to me to be simply to see

far the

By

of internal relations

dogma

between these two propositions (1) and (2),

clearly the difference

and that

(2) does not follow from

If this

(1).

stood, nothing in connexion with the

is

not under-

can, I think, be

dogma

And

perhaps the difference may seem so clear,

that no more need be said about it.
But 1 cannot help thinking
it is not clear to everybody, and
that it does involve the
understood.

which are sometimes held as

rejection of certain views,

meaning

"

of

So

follows."

I will try to

a perfectly strict form.

Let </> be a relational property, and

in fact belong.

what

that

<f>,

That

(in the sense

a term to

we

which

it

does

meant by saying

is

now concerned

are

meaning that from the proposition that a thing has

with) as

not got

propose to define

internal to

is

</>

to the

put the point again in

it

is

"

follows

"

that

it is

other than A.

between the two

to say, this proposition asserts that

"
"

"

properties not having </> and other than A," there holds that
relation which holds between the property "being a right angle"
"
and the property " being an angle," or between the property " red

and the property

"

any term whatever, from the proposition

that, in the case of

that that term

is

we express by saying

coloured," and which

a right angle,

it

follows, or

deducible, that

is

an angle. Let us express the relation which we assert to

hold between a particular proposition p, and a particular

it is

proposition
or

"

is

q,

when we say

deducible from

chosen to express
for

"

entails,"

it,

"

p,

that in this sense q

by the symbol

because

and because "p

it

may

entails

"

ent

"

"
;

follows from

which

"

have

be used as an abbreviation

q"

is

a natural expression

"

"

for
q follows from^>," i.e., entails" can naturally be used as
the converse of "follows from."
(We cannot unambiguously

use the

"

phrase

"

p implies

as

equivalent to

"

q follows

54

G.

from

p"

it

though

in fact often so used, because, especially

is

name

"

"

Mr. Eussell's writings,

in consequence of
to be used as a

MOORE.

E.

has come

implies

for a totally different relation

we might

perhaps use "p logically implies q" or "p formally implies q"
though Mr. Kussell has also given a different meaning to
"

formal

"

"

implication).

"

ent q

will then assert that there

p and q that relation which holds, for instance,

between the two premisses of a syllogism in Barbara, taken as
holds between

one conjunctive proposition, and the conclusion, equally whether

the premisses be true or false and which does not hold, for
;

"

between the proposition " Socrates was a man and

the proposition " Socrates was a mortal," even though it be in

instance,

men

fact true that all

assertion that

"

And we

are mortal.

internal to

can express the

"

A, using (I hope correctly)

the symbols of Principia Mathematica, in addition to our new
"
"
symbol ent by saying that what it asserts is
is

<

or, in

other words

(x)
"
:

-*-

<px

ent

^A

x the proposition that

for all values of

you get by asserting of a particular value of x, say B, that B

has not got $, entails the proposition that B is other than A."
The assertion with regard to a particular term
and a par-

ticular relational property $,

internal to
is,

of

which

means then

course,
is,

in

sarily

"
<f>

</>x

or

"

to

to

turn, equivalent to

identical with A, would, in

have

(x)

-*~

equivalent

logically
its

which

"

actually has, that

ent.
:

(x)

^ A.
:

=A

And
.

ent.

<

is

this
<J>K

anything which were

any conceivable universe, necescould not have existed in any

"

world without having

just as the proposition
"
In any possible world a right angle must be an angle," is, I take
x is a right angle ent x is an angle.
it, just equivalent to (x)
possible

<

Having thus got what is meant by asserting of a particular

A and a particular relational property which A in fact

term

possesses, that

</>,

<

is

"

internal to

"

A, we can then express what

am calling the dogma of internal relations, or the dogma

that all relational properties are internal to the terms which

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

55

have them, by saying that what it asserts is that, for all

those values of <f> which are relational properties, the pro:

"

position

y)

(x,

-^

<f>x

<^y

"

en t .y =^ x

true

is

or (to give

the equivalent form) the proposition

"

y)

(x,

This assertion

fa :):?/

for

that,

=x

ent

<j>y."

values

those

all

proposition (2)

What

false.

of

(f>,

above, and

what

is

y)

(x,

I called

that for some values

is

which

it

.'.

^ $?/. ent .y^x "

</>&:):

and that

true,

for

what

which are relational properties, the proposition

"

is

is

I maintain to be obviously

maintain to be true

which are

of

relational properties, this proposition is true

for others it is false

true I

is

and those values

propose to call

properties," those for which

it

false

is

"

internal

of

<

relational

"external relational

properties."

And now

us contrast (2) in this form, with what I

and which I admit to be true, and

let

called above proposition (1),

which

has led to the assertion

suggested

What

confusion.

(1) asserts

"

is

y
fyy ent x
<$>x
proposition (x, y)
logically equivalent to this), the proposition
.'.

"
(a?,

is

y)

.'.

-*~

it,

has

then, whatever

allows

term, which

moment

is

the

(ft

A may

</>,

is

is

true

</>,

the

or (what

is

^x"

be, the proposition that

as a

matter of fact, no
identical with A. It does not for a

ded action

without

assert that

and

through

(2)

asserts that, if you take a parand a particular term A which

it

ticular relational property <,

has

Qx ent ~~ $y

In other words,

true.

of

that, for all values of

"

that,

from the proposition that

A has
A

that no term which did not could be identical with

it

<

follows

nor even

that (2) asserts) that in no case is the proposition

that a particular term has a particular relational property true,

(which

is all

and the proposition, that no term could be without that property and yet be identical with the term in question, false.
(2) therefore, is neither identical with nor follows

from

(1).

To

56

G.

say that
it

it

E.

does follow from

follows that

q ent
.

it

MOORE.
to say that

from p g ent r

which can be

easily seen to be

is

by taking for p and q the two premisses of a syllogism in

"
All men
Barbara, and for r the conclusion. The conjunction,
false

and Socrates

are mortal

But

mortal."

from this what

"

"

'

Socrates

is

"
All
the case that

men
'

a mortal

Socrates

may

is

"

does entail

man "

Socrates

is

Socrates

true and the proposition

is
'

follows from

false

is

"

are mortal
"

The proposition that

"

man "

obviously not the case that there follows

"
q ent r asserts namely, that it is not

is

it

is

Socrates
"

and yet

mortal

is

false.

"

from

follows

men

All

"

a man,'

is

are mortal

"

Or, to take the alternative form of (1).

quite well be true.

To say that (2) follows from

(1 ) is to

there follows the proposition

say that from

ent

ent q

But

r.

this again

can be easily seen to be false in the same way. The proposition

"
"
"
All men are mortal does entail that " Socrates is a man
materially
"

Socrates

implies

case both that

mortal
that

"

"

"

men

"

that

Socrates

But

false.

All

use

(to

mortal

is

Mr. Kussell's
is

is

man

"
is

for

expression

to say, it entails that

"

and

true,

it is

))

not the

Socrates

is

does not in the least follow from this

it

are mortal

"

"

materially implies that

"

Socrates

is

"

"

on the contrary,
Socrates is a man
follows from
"
it
may, as we have seen, quite well be the case that All men
"
"
are mortal is true, and yet the proposition that Socrates is a
a mortal

man "

entails

"

Socrates

To maintain,
confusion.
plain

And

is

must

"

false.

the source of the confusion

is,

<A

is

(1) allows

proposition

"

therefore, that (2) follows from (1)

to assert that,

you

"
"

a mortal

-^<f>y

here expresses

if

2/^A" must be
is

is

mere

I think, pretty
true,

then the

And what

true.

the

merely that this proposition follows

from the hypothesis $A, not that it is in itself a necessary

But it is supposed, through confusion, that what
proposition.
is asserted is that, on the hypothesis <A, "^<y
) ^^A" is in
.

a necessary proposition, that is to say, that <A materially

"
is an
a thing which is true, if
implies
^<$>y ent i/^A"

itself,

<

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

and

internal relational property,

false

if it

57

an external one.

is

have here used the phrase " a proposition which is necessary

in itself," and have implied a definition of it.
The definition
I

"

be roughly indicated by saying

)
</>x
^x is a proin
itself
is
that
(or apodeictic)," means
necessary
position
"
That is to say, I am maintaining that
ent tyx"
<f>x

may

<f>x

) tyx

<f)X

ent

a necessary truth,

is

tyx.

meant

generally

Leibniz

and

and only if it is also true that

to give what has in fact been

if

me

This seems to

in philosophy

"

by

necessary truths,"

e.g., by
between them and

to point out the distinction

mere matters

of fact.

what the dogma

this language,

Using

may, I think, be expressed by saying

on the hypothesis that A is true, <j)A is itself
A is equivalent to x = A ) <#. and
since

of internal relations asserts

that

it

asserts that,

a necessary truth
it

<f>

<

asserts that, on the hypothesis

the contrary, in asserting that

am

external,

even where

=A

true,

since

it is

asserting that </>A

it is

true

that

yet

not true that x

=A

(fix,

is

is to

this

c/>A,

some

is
.

=A

ent

mere matter

often a

say, that though,

on

I,

<j>x.

are

relational properties

of fact

where

it is

often not a necessary truth,

ent

</>#.

So much for the distinction between (1) which is true, and

(2), or the dogma of internal relations, which I hold to be false.

But

I said above, in passing, that

my

contention that (2) does

(1), involves the rejection of certain views that

"
and
have sometimes been held as to the meaning of " follows

not follow from

I think it is

worth while

to say

something about

It is obvious that the possibility of

does not follow from

(1),

from

the proposition (x)

(x)

<$>x

And

not follow.

-fyx

this has

depends upon

this.

maintaining that (2)

being true that
ent tyx does
<f>x

its
:

sometimes been disputed, and

is,

think, often not clearly seen.

To begin with, Mr.

Russell, in the Principles of Mathematics

(p. 34), treats the phrase

"

q can be deduced from

"

"

as

if

it

meant exactly the same thing as "p ) q

or "p materially
"
and has repeated the same error elsewhere, e.g., in
implies q
;

58

G.

MOORE.

E.

Philosophical Essays (p. 166), where, he

axiom

calls the

is

what he

discussing

And

of internal relations.

am

afraid a good

people have been led to suppose that, since Mr. Eussell

has said this, it must be true. If it were true, then, of course,

many
it

it

would be impossible to distinguish between (1) and (2), and

would follow that, since (1) certainly is true, what I am

calling the

internal relations

of

dogma

imagine that Mr. Eussell himself would

true

is

now be

so far from being true, the statement

that,

But

too.

willing to admit
"
that
q can be
"

"

means the same as "p ) q is simply an

enormous howler"; and I do not think I need spend any time
in trying to show that it is so.
deduced from

"

But

"

be held that, though "p ent q

does not mean
from
nevertheless
) q" yet
(x): <j>x. ) <px, the

may

it

the same as

"p

proposition (x) (fix ent tyx does follow, for a somewhat more
subtle reason and, if this were so, it would again follow that
:

what
It

am

calling the

dogma

be held, namely, that though

may

<A
"
<A

mean simply

must be

of internal relations
(/>A

ent

true.

not

i/rA does

-^A, yet what it does mean is simply the

tyA, and this proposition is an instance of

conjunction
)
"
"
"
a true formal implication
formal implication
(the phrase
being understood in Mr. Kussell's sense, in which (x) <j>x ) tyx
.

asserts a formal implication).

This view as to what

(/>A

ent

^A

understand him rightly, been

asserted by Mr. 0. Strachey in Mind, N.S., 93 since he asserts
that, in his opinion, this is what Professor C. I. Lewis means by

means

has, for instance,

if

"

Professor
</>A strictly implies ^A," and undoubtedly what
Lewis means by this is what I mean by, <A ent i/rA. And the
same view has been frequently suggested (though I do not know
that he has actually asserted it) by Mr. Eussell himself (e.g.,
.

Principia Mathematica,

though
(a;)

<f>x

(x)
.

(f)x

tyx,

ent

yet

it

ifrx

p.

would not be

true,

fa

view were

identical in

would follow from

(x)

were

If this

21).

it

true, then,

meaning with

since, if

^x

then every particular assertion of the form

</>A

59

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

would not only be

but would be an instance

true,

formal implication (namely (x) fa

:

to the
If,

proposed definition,

were true,

it

therefore,

must be

tional properties

me

all

is

-tyx)

that

and

(./): <f>x

of a true

according

this,

ent

yjrx

asserts.

would again follow that all relaBut that this view also is

it

internal.

The proposition that

I am in this room does materially imply that I am more than
and the assertion that it
five years old, since both are true

untrue appears to

perfectly obvious.

does

is

also an instance of a true formal implication, since

in fact true that all the persons in this

room

it is

more than

are

but nothing appears to me more obvious then

that the second of these two propositions can not be deduced
five

years old

from the

that the kind of relation which holds between

first

the premisses, and conclusion of a syllogism in Barbara does

not hold between them.
"

"

and

the kind of
"

it

in another

quite obvious that the properties

to ni

room

To put

being more than

way

in

which

"

five

"

it

seems

being a person in this

"
are not related in

years old

being a right angle

being an angle/' and which

way

"

is

we express by saying

case of every term, the proposition that that term

related to

that, in the
is

an angle

can be deduced from the proposition that it is a right angle.

These are the only two suggestions as to the meaning of
"

"

known

me, which, if true, would yield the result

that (2) does follow from (1), and that therefore all relational
properties are internal and both of these, it seems to me, are

p ent q

to

false.

obviously
would leave
fore

that I

it

All other suggested meanings, so far as I know

true that (2) does not follow from (1), and there-

may

possibly be right in maintaining that some

relational properties are external.

It might, for instance, be

suggested that the last proposed definition should be amended

"
"
"
that we should say
p eut q means p ) q, and

as follows

this proposition is

an instance

of a formal implication,

which

is

not merely true but self-evident, like the laws of Formal Logic."
This proposed definition would avoid the paradoxes involved in

Mr. Strachey's

definition, since

such true formal implications as

60
"

G.

all

the persons in this

room

certainly not self-evident

something which

is

E.

MOORE.

are

more than

and, so far as I can see, it

in fact true of

p and

"

five years old

are

state

may

whenever and only

<?,

when p ent q. I do not myself think that it gives

"peutq" since the kind of relation which I

of

the meaning

hold

see to

between the premisses and conclusion of a syllogism seems to

"
"
to be one which is purely
objective in the sense that no

me

psychological term, such as

involved in

is

evident,"

its

"

involved in the meaning of self1 am not,

definition (if it has one).
is

however, concerned to dispute that some such definition of

"
"p ent q as this may be true. Since it is evident that, even if
it

were,

from

(x)

my
:

proposition that (x)

.

<f>x

^rx,

would

still

(j>x

ent

be true

tyx does not follow

and hence

also

my

contention that (2) does not follow from (1).

So much by way of arguing that we are not bound to hold
that

all relational

properties are internal in the particular sense,

with which we are now concerned, in which to say that they

are means that in every case in which a thing A has a relational
property,

follows from the proposition that a term has not

it

got that property that the term in question

But

properties certainly are not internal.

proposition I
it

is

other than A.

have gone further and asserted that some relational

seems to

do not

me

And

in defence of this

know

that I have anything to say but that

evident in many cases that a term which has a

certain relational property might quite well not have

that, for instance,

from the mere proposition that

by no means follows that

relations which it in fact
admit that

if

all

this

has.

had

has to other things

all

Everybody, of course,

the propositions which assert of

it

this is this, it

it

that

the

must
it

has

these properties, do in fact follow from the proposition that

this is this,

we cannot
no reason

see that they do.

And

so far as I can

any kind for asserting that they do,

except the confusion which I have exposed. But it seems to
me further that we can see in many cases that the proposition
see, there

is

of

that this has that relation does not follow from the fact that

it

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

is this

Edward VII was

that, for instance, the proposition that

father of George

want now

is

a mere matter of

to return for a

moment

"internal," in which to say that

is

<f>

61

fact.

to that other

internal to

meaning of
means not

merely that anything which had not (j> would necessarily be

other than A, but that it would necessarily be qualitatively
different.

was the meaning

I said that this

which the dogma

properties are

"

"internal"

of

in

of internal relations holds that all relational

internal"; and that one of the most important

it, was that all relational

consequences which followed from

properties are

"

internal

"

in the less

extreme sense that we

have just been considering. But, if I am not mistaken, there

another important consequence which also follows from

is

it,

For

namely, the Identity of Indiscernibles.

had not that

would

property

necessarily

if

it

be true

any term which

in the case of every relational property that

be

qualitatively

from any which had, it follows of course that, in

the case of any two terms one of which -has a relational
different

property which the other has not, the two are qualitatively
different.
But, from the proposition that x is other than y, it
does

follow

has not

that

some

x has

and hence,

if

the

true, it will follow that if

qualitatively different
of Indiscernibles.

dogma

from

This

is,

relational property

dogma
is

y,

other than

which

is

as

y,

is

always also

the principle of Identity

of course, a further objection to the

of internal relations, since I think it is obvious that the

principle of Identity of Indiscernibles

far

which y

internal relations be

of

I can see,

the

dogma

consists in the joint assertion of

is

not true.

Indeed, so

internal relations essentially

of

two indefensible propositions

(1) the proposition that, in the case of no relational property,

is it true of any term which has got that property that it

might not have had

it

and

(2) the Identity of Indiscernibles.

I want, finally, to say something about the phrase

Mr. Eussell uses in the Philosophical Assays

dogma

of internal relations.

He

says

it

may

which

express the
be expressed in

to

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS.

62
"

the form
related

Every relation

terms

is

"
(p.

160).

in the natures of

grounded

And

can be easily seen,

it

if

the

the

account which I have given be true, in what precise sense

Mr. Eussell is uncertain as to whether by
it does hold this.
the nature of a term

to be understood the

is

something else. For my part

nature is 'meant, not the term
called

its

all

properties.

what

as

qualities

it

seems

itself,

to

me

but what

term

itself or

that by a term's

may

distinguished from

its

roughly be
relational

But whichever meaning we take, it will follow from

said, that the dogma of internal relations does

have

imply that every relational property which a term has

is,

in a

grounded in its nature. It will follow

such
property is grounded in the term., in the
every
sense that, in the case of every such property, it follows

perfectly precise sense

that

from the mere proposition that that term

is

that term that

it

has the property in question. And it will also follow that any
such property is grounded in the qualities which the term has,
in the sense, that

if

you take

all

the qualities which the term has,

will again follow in the case of each relational property, from

the proposition that the term has all those qualities, that it has
the relational property in question since this is implied by the

it

proposition that in the case of any such property, any term

which had not had it would necessarily have been different in

quality from the term in question.

then, the

dogma

In both of these two senses,

of internal relations does, I think,

every relational property

imply that

in the nature of every

is

grounded
term which possesses it and in this sense that proposition is
Yet it is worth noting, I think, that there is another
false.
"
"
sense of
grounded in which it may quite well be true that
:

is grounded in the nature of

any term
which possesses it. Namely that, in the case of every such
property, the term in question has some quality without which

every relational property

it

could not have had the property.

relational property entails

quality in the

term

In other words that the

some quality

in the term,

entails the relational property.

though no

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Gower Street, London,

on January 19th, 1920, at 8 P.M.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.

IV.

By
THE minds

J.

A. SMITH.

of English students of

contemporary philosophy
some time turning with at least curiosity towards
At first what have proved to be minor luminaries

have been
Italy.

for

But gradually their gaze has

caught their wandering eyes.
tended to fix itself upon Benedetto Croce, in whose works there

them a

has been revealed to

carefully constructed system of

philosophic thought, based upon deep and solid erudition,

For
designed and carried out upon an encyclopaedic scale.

some time

this

system has drawn

all

eyes, towering impres-

sively above the jerry-built syntheses of

With

varied emotions

Idealistic

we have come

movement, which took

outworn positivism.

to realize that the great

its rise

with Kant in Germany,

has not spent its force that in Croce it possesses a champion

not ashamed of its cause, but convinced that with it there
;

came into the world a principle living and indeed immortal as

the mind of man.
Proclaiming not only Hegel but before him

Kant

and acknowledging his unreto

debt
their
inspiration, he boldly throws aside as
payable
antiquated much that has descended from them and, disenas his spiritual ancestors,

gaging the essence from the accidental and contingent details,

reconstructs almost from the foundations a system, in which he
is

confident that the

mind

of the

XXth

century with

its

vastly

increased store of scientific and historical experience can

home.

Nor

still

he content merely to have erected this

impressive palace of many mansions, and to have thrown open
With tireless energy he
its doors to all men of goodwill.

find its

is

advocates the central principle of

and redefining

its

construction,

his philosophic position, developing

defining

and modi-

64

J.

tying

form

its

so as to

meet the needs which further meditation

discloses to him, turning

in

to

response
stands

now

external
clear

principle

SMITH.

A.

to

this

now

criticism

or

that side of his thought

attack.
The central

view, unmistakable,

self-confident,

heady currents of the fight the standard of

holds
Idealism
steadfast, and for all the dextrous strategy and
tactics of the commander in the warfare the main cause is
militant; in the

Round him Croce has gathered a band of

trained and loyal lieutenants, who feel themselves so far at one
with him as to join with him in effective co-operation. But we
should be mistaken if we regarded all these as mere disciples
or ready jura/re in verba magistri.
Some of them at least are
never compromised.

themselves also masters, or in the

exercising,

way

to

become

so,

and

what he would not only not grudge but welcome, a

large independence of judgment, are indeed not so

longer disciples as colleagues

and fellow-workers.

much any
Indeed, I

may have already exaggerated his predominance among them,

and wrongly suggested a planetary subordination of them to
him as the light-giving sun of the system which they together
form.

In

less figurative language,

he and they are fellow-heirs of

an inheritance which has descended to them from a common

The

which they are the

as
I
have
runs
back,
said, to Hegel,
present representatives
and behind him to Kant. It passed to them through such
ancestry.

line of spiritual descent of

fellow-countrymen of theirs as Spaventa, De

etc.
But no more than in the case of our
JSTeo-Hegelians or

Neo-Kantians have we

Sanctis,

own

Jaja,

so-called

to do with the

mere

of ideas to a

transplantation of a philosophical idea or

system
Native influences such as that of Vico have gone
to the reshaping of it, and the undying spirit has undergone a

foreign

soil.

genuine rebirth, moulding for itself a new body as the vehicle

and instrument of its life. The new idealistic system, or shall

we say systems
are adjusted

which encounter our eyes

and adapted

to

in

modern Italy
and

their special environment,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.

worldwide

or

though European

are,

65

their

in

significance,

redolent of their date and place of origin, have a national (yet

not a provincial or parochial) physiognomy. They claim and

with justice to be at once, as philosophy should be, in essence

and

and as philosophy also should be, in form

their special time and place.
And for them I

spirit universal,

adjusted to

would allow the claim

at least

minds and yet

all

"

in

also

to be

the

both for

modern," addressed to the demands and

of

from modern

and experience
a respectful hearing from us.

arise

There

is

all

sense

truest

time and for

the word

of

problems which

deserving therefore

life

one outstanding characteristic of the whole move-

ment on which

would here lay

special stress.

The ground

upon which the whole structure of their philosophizing rests is

In that there is not, and
of course, as it must be, experience.
cannot

But what

anything distinctive.

be,

sort of experience

It is not, as it is elsewhere, specially religious nor specially

nor specially ethical, and perhaps above all it is not

to them the need for philosophical
specially scientific
reconstruction does not appear as specially created by the
political

success (or

the desire

Croce this

the

failure) of

for

philosophy

is

particularly

What begets
activity.
the experience of History.
In

scientific
is

plain,

for

it

was just

dissatisfaction with the actual practice, so

historian that forced

philosophy.

The part

Yet

in a large

it is

his

speak,

inner
of

the

necessity of the search for

measure true

of all of

them.

success, part failure, of history in achieving a theory

of itself drives

them outward and inward

understanding.

problem

upon him the

to

which

This

it

is

reflexion

in the quest for self-

which dictates the form

finds

most

urgent.

of

the

Hence

the

problem is at once general or universal and particular or

even individual. The task which philosophy accepts as now
set to itself is that of understanding History,

own

history.

And by

(or at all) the History

and imprimis

its

History we must mean not merely

itself before us, but the

which unrolls

F 2

66

J.

SMITH.

A.

we enact, and again not merely (or at all) the

which
we enact (historia historizata), but that which
History
we more potently create in thought or judgment, in ceaseless
commentation upon the bare and vanishing facts (historia
History which

commentary which encroaches from the margin

until the gloss extrudes and displaces the

historizans), a

the

upon

text

evanescent original. In fact, there is no such original the

text itself is the product of mind's self-interpretative activity
:

and

the whole roll on which

fills

is

recorded the content of

such experience as alone we can have or at least have access to.

All else follows the paths of dreams and is lost as soon as it is

Nought remains or holds in being for the tiniest

mind distils out of what is done or

acquired.

moment

save what the

sense

"

word

the

of

we have

out of what

suffered under the sun

And

experienced."

in the widest

lastly

prerogative

reality and worth attaches to what the mind by reflexion

further distils out of this precious essence, and in the record of

the results of man's philosophizing is the quintessence of all our

Out of the history of philosophy arises the need
experience.
for further philosophizing,

of

position

and

In this view

it

of

its

nature

mind continues

so the life of the

was without beginning.

mind, which creates at once

without end as

and

its

This
its

is

the universal

object

function

and

lies

itself.

the

also

which we are speaking.

supreme modernity
For at the present time, surely what we most desire and
demand is that the mind should frame and hold some theory
of the philosophy of

of

its

activity

primarily of the
in passing

ments.

problem

the

as

manner and

judgments

systematization of

However

define for

philosophy as
that

"

its

own

justification

of fact or value

Might we not
of

of

interpreter

the

upon

ourselves

history,

of

its

its

past achieve-

procedure

the present-day

determination, organization,

the critical presuppositions of history

may

and

be the group

of thinkers

"
?

among whom

Gentile occupies a leading place so understand the problem.

Like Croce he takes it as in form determined by the

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.

67

and approaches
self-imposed task by an

essentially historical character of all experience

with a mind prepared for its

acquaintance deep and wide with the past of the
with that past which still lives in him and in us.
it

human mind,
And he has

spared no pains to lay deep and broad the foundations of his

philosophy, sharing Croce's contempt for the shallow and

second-hand learning of contemporary positivism.

However
high their Idealism may soar it springs from and returns to

what Bacon
So much

"

"

the right earth of historical experience.

by way of general introduction to an appreciation

calls

of the general character of this

movement, always appealing to

interpreted) and yet rising, as we shall see,

experience (rightly
to such heights of idealistic speculation, joining as

empyrean

to the lowliest

and most familiar

it

were the

levels of earth.

It

with this endeavour to link together universal and individual

philosophy and life that we shall here concern ourselves. I beg
is

leave therefore to omit any attempt even to sketch the external

facts of Gentile's life,

Indeed

know

little

(probably) that he

is

upon which I am indeed very ill-informed.

more than what I gather from his works, as
by birth and early education a

Sicilian, that

he studied also at Pisa (at the Scuola Normale Superiora) and

that he has been Professor of Philosophy successively at Palermo,
Pisa,

and

and Eome, where he now

his

appointment

is.

Between

his student days

to a Professorial Chair at Palermo, he wa.s,

so at least I should divine, a secondary schoolmaster, and, so I

should also surmise, singularly successful and happy in his

He commenced authorship about 1898, and has
scholastic work.
since then poured forth a nearly continuous annual stream of

To the journal La Critica he

books, pamphlets and articles.
as
much
as
Croce himself. From time
has contributed nearly
to

time he has formulated the results of his systematic thinking,

and then more at length. The fullest of these

at first briefly

statements

is

in

the

two volumes

entitled,

Sommario di

Pedagogia (1913 and 1914), and in the course of lectures

I
entitled, Teoria generate dello Spirito come Atto puro (1916).

68

J.

A.

SMITH.

have prepared for myself a rough bibliography of his writings,

and have attempted, through such as I have been able to see, to
trace the development of his mind.
of his production has not

The rapidity and variety

easy, and I am conscious

made my task

that I have not always succeeded.

During the period

of

development up to the first

mind was travelling
which gradually converged. In the
his

statement of his systematic position his

along several distinct lines
first place,

he was, as I have

said,

deepening and enriching his

experience as a teacher, and meditating upon the practical and

by that experience. He took a

theoretic problems suggested

and active part in the public controversies which raged in

Italy round the topic of education, especially of secondary
education and the training of teachers for it, labouring always

large

to raise the discussion to the philosophic plane,

for the necessarily

and contending

philosophical character of the

science of

He

protested against the purblind practicalism

which ignores the necessity of clearheadedness about principles
and dreams of carrying on without a conception of the
education.

nature and development of Mind, and also against the laicism

which ignores the essentially religious character of all educa-

In the second place, he was enlarging his view of the

Besides writing a General History
history of philosophy.

tion.

of

Philosophy, which I

La

Critica

have not seen, he contributed

to

(1903-1913) an elaborate critical review of the chief

Italian writers on philosophy from 1850 to the beginning of the
present century.
Concurrently with this he edited with
valuable introductions and notes a large number of the un-

published lectures and rarer treatises of some of his predecessors.

In both ways he broadened and strengthened the foundations

on which later to erect the fabric of his independent thought.
The result of Gentile's preoccupation with the tasks and
has been in the main the conception
of mind as essentially a process of education, of

problems of the teacher's

of the life

self -education,

that

is,

life

of self-formation or self-creation.

Its

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.

life is

the

life

69

in or of a school, wherein through the conflict

co-operation of

minds, in

ceaseless progress

is

and

appearance divided but in reality one,

In such activity lies all the

secured.

worth, the joy, the sacredness of life, and it is of this that he

seeks the philosophy, which is no extraneous addition to the

which

activity
itself

at a

universe

is

it

interprets, but the continuance of that activity

higher level of understanding and power. The

itself an immense school, the place as Keats has

"

Soul-making," where Minds (for he would not accept

Keats' distinction of Souls from Intelligences) are moulded
said, of

and perfection. The figure lends itself to easy

caricature, and will appeal diversely to those whose school
experiences are diverse, and to tell the truth, it is in the
into integrity

Pedagogia ridden almost to death. But it is used by Gentile

with a large measure of enlightening and attractive power, and
I

commend

it

to the notice of those who, like so

many

of us,

approach philosophy from the avenue of a professional interest

as teachers.

Yet
it

after all the figure

and the experience which suggested

determine rather the form than the substance of Gentile's

thought and constitute rather

as Croce's thought

is

its

outward physiognomy, much

determined by his long

in expression

pre-occupation with the work of erudite history.

Ignoring minor but important influences, I must return to

the results of his concern with the History of Philosophy.
This interest connects with the former through his identification of Philosophy with the
it differs

is

as

it

Theory

were in scale only.

of Education,

The History

just the record of Mind's self-creation.

from which

of Philosophy

In the study of it
into the

we become acquainted with, appropriate, and digest

substance of our own minds, what Mind has in
achieved and accumulated.

the

past

Keviewing the more recently depo-

and the process of their deposition, Gentile is

conducted outwards from Italy and backwards from the present,
sited strata

and of the

total process reaches a

view wide at once in space

70

J.

A.

SMITH.

and time, until the prospect has no bounds

Pedagogics enlarges into a Metaphysics
Spirit or

Mind

in its actual life

The

in either.

a general theory of

and existence.

In this expan-

sion the trees are not lost in the wood, but the details of the
vision are preserved to sight while they fall into the order

and

The resultant impresperspective of a systematic philosophy.

sion may be put in a highly abstract way, which fails to do
justice to the concreteness
first place,

which

it

with History in general,

quintessence or living
of

is

of

spirit.

In the

really possesses.

the History of Philosophy

is

intrinsically identical

which, as I have said,

it

is

the

In the second place, the History

intrinsically identical with Philosophy itself.

Philosophy
These identities depend upon, or issue from, the still more
fundamental identity of Mind or Spirit with itself, of its being
with its history, for it is what it makes itself, is the process of
its

own

self -creation.

This

Mind

is,

is

the cardinal principle of Gentile's philosophy, that

as he puts

it,

atto puro, absolute self-actualization

that and nothing more,

of its nature

and

less,

its life,

this as centre all roads of

This

or other.

from which

all

is

the open secret

the rest follows.

thought converge and out

To

of it all

In this
diverge again to reach every quarter of experience.
which
is
not
but
Thought,
thought merely
knowledge, selfknowledge, all facts of experience are dissolved, to be reborn as
themselves thought or knowledge. This all-dissolving but also
all-creating or re-creating Thought is thought a priori and
absolute,

is

the act or reality of thought at

its highest.

As

it

predetermines and prescribes the immanent method of its own

development, it begets and maintains an endless philosophy,

which may be called by various names, the Idealism

or Absolute Spiritualism.

such

of Actuality

its fundaNothing
mental position, save Spirit, and Spirit is naught but the process,
without beginning and without end, of its own absolute selfis

real,

is

creation.

Now we

have* heard this often enough,

and

it

may

be said to

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.

be the end (which

71

rather the beginning) towards which was

is

inevitably tending the current of thought that bore Hegel, and

who

those

avow that they have learned from

put the claim more boldly towards
the whole movement of modern philosophy.

are not ashamed to

him, onwards, or perhaps

which has been

And

set

to

yet
mind."

it is

hard doctrine, and we take

We

cannot resolve to embrace

upon

to

it,

to palter

upon

us,

commit ourselves

it
it,

"

with such a heavy

to stake

finally to its control.

everything

We

are fain

and compromise with the absoluteness of its claim

and even those who first descried or discerned it lost
and wandered back

faith in it

ground.

But Gentile

this is to

him the

more

to

familiar

and homely

admit no compromise or condition

will

articulus stantis aut cadentis philosophice.

What

he offers or presses upon us is a principle of exegesis

whole of our experience, and he offers it as the last and
best result of Mind's reflexion upon the meaning of its whole
for the

past history, the process by which

by which
can
else

it

it

what

is

maintain

there

is,

it

itself in

it

has come to be what

it is,

and by continuance of which alone

being by which also there is whatever

is,

or seems to be,

as its environment.

In this

principle Mind has come to itself, and affirms itself

knower of its own being, which is its own work and life.
rien n'est donntf, tout se fait

nothing

is

as the

To

it

but thinking makes

it

own self- formation.

It may serve to make this end and beginning of reflexion
clearer, if it be thrown up against the better-known system of
Croce as its background. This way of presenting it must,
so in the act of its

however, not be understood as implying a judgment on my part

that its emergence has put Croce's view into the background or
has in any way superseded it.
To suggest such a relation

do injustice to Croce, more especially as his

development is by no means at an end and it may be that he
will prove able to appropriate and overreach all that Gentile

would be

urges.

to

Yet, taking Croce's view as

systematic presentment of

it,

what

it is set

before us in his

strikes the student of

it is

72

J.

the prominence which

mind

is

SMITH.

A.

given in

it

to the articulation of the

into the distinct grades of Theory and Practice, each with

two sub-grades. Doubtless behind this lies or lurks the

unity of the mind which preserves its identity in and through

its

But the unity seems to be separated from

genuine multiplicity, and is rather a problem

these distinctions.

the articulation or

The

than a solution.

What we

assumed.
its

nature what

may

articulation
start

with

is

not deduced, but given or

one, but it possesses also as
is

be called a statical structure

endow

this structure or necessarily

give

itself

And

indeed

it

diversifies

its

existence

fall

remains obscure how or

primordial unity, and

inexplicably apart.
the one from the other is concealed.

must be added, that

why

so

it

itself

does not

with

it distinctifies

and

essence and

its

its

The gap which sunders

In justice to Croce,

grasp upon

the

it

in his actual philosophizing the breach is

and that he practices better than he preaches.

healed,

it.

primordial

which he draws from

unity prevents the

distinctions

stiffening into a dead rigidity,

concrete manifestations of the

life of

His

and the

the Mind, into whatever

detail his interest follows them, never finally fall apart, or lose

their vital connexion with one another

and the whole.

The

roi faineant.
Yet it is not demonstratively or
and
sufficient
source of all its complex
the
irrefragably
single
is

unity

no

'

but orderly multiplicity.

To Gentile

much
of

it is so.

insisted upon,

educing out of

The

itself all

dialectical process

immanent,

lutely

In him perhaps the unity

and upon
which

it

the

is

multiplicity that

is its life

and, as I have said,

without beginning and without end.

posits

and

and cancels

is

being

the author of
it

itself, like

But

it

forms,

even too

is

there

is.

completely or abso-

always and everywhere

The one spirit or mind

is

or supersedes all oppositions

all

is

thrown the responsibility

degrees,

and

distinctions,

grades,

stages

of

makes and unmakes everything whatsoever including

Time begetting and devouring its own offspring.

would be misleading

to dwell too long

upon the contrast

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.

between the two thinkers,
difference than there
It

is

principle

lest there

seem

73

to be suggested

more

is.

more important to raise the question whether the

which is so posited can do what is expected of it. Can

show itself capable of generating out of itself and by its own

unaided power, such a system as the Universe is ? Or rather
must it do so ? Does the starting point prescribe a dialectic
it

which by an inner necessity develops into the whole wealth of

concrete detail which is the filling of experience ?

At
But

first

empty and barren enough.

us attempt to realize what precisely

let

Mind

is

sight the principle seems

in its proper being

What

it is.

and existence, that

it is

Self-con-

is,

sciousness, not as a state or result but as a self-engendering

This

activity.

is

to us a paradox, for it is all

start with the misconception of it as

presupposed by Mind as

to

is determined by it, being

and
presupposing Mind as its
theorizing

Mind

or refashioner, not as its creator.

we say

to ourselves, with an object over against

and

history

its

common

which determines and

thing else

fashioner

too

an attitude towards some-

and modify

is

the tale of

moulding

it,

it

how

it

it

starts, so

as subject,

comes to know that object

Gentile bids us,

to its purposes.

this, and reminds us that being what it is

self-conscious, it can and must posit itself as

however, go behind
or

is to be, viz.,

object and concurrently itself as subject, while

one with
are

The

itself.

moments

in its

still it

remains

subject, the object, the synthesis of both,

being and

life,

moments

in

and

to

it

eternally distinguishable and

distinct, yet also phases or stages

in its historical existence.

Hence

may

be

spoken

as

of

from one another, and allowing them the

separating these
fullest scope to

it

become what they

are.

Into each in turn

it

throws itself wholly, so that each constitutes an absolute form

of its experience; in each, however widely they are drawn
asunder and however they put out of sight the bonds that
unite them, it remains indefectibly what it is, consciousness,
self-consciousness,

in

the making.

As

consciousness

of

the

74

A.

J.

SMITH.

it is Art
as consciousness of the object it is Religion
consciousness of the synthesis of both it is Philosophy.
Art as the endeavour to develop to the full the moment of con-

subject,

as

sciousness of the subject as such, to be itself the whole being

and existence of the mind, defeats itself, issues in empty and

impotent subjectivity, and

driven

is

its

by

intestine

self-

contradiction to pass into Religion

Religion taking up the
task of self -integration finds its work endless if it denies itself
:

the aid of Art, yet with that aid

unless

still fails

it

merges

together with Art in Philosophy, in whose hands is the knowledge, the principle and method, and the result of the integra"

tion of both.

So that Philosophy

is

the final form in which

the others are taken up and reconciled, and represents the

Truth, the plenary actuality and the Spirit," which is the one

and only Reality.

Thus we reach, or rather restore and confirm, the principle
that Philosophy, the supreme form of self-consciousness, is the

consummate form
that

is

or

is

real,

Nought

Reality.

created or

is

itself

making
To some

and because experience is all

Philosophy is also the whole and sole
or comes to be save what Mind has

of experience,

is

creating philosophando, that

the knower of itself.

this doctrine

may appear

is,

as the

in the process of

mere extravagance

of a subjective Idealism, conceiving all Reality after the pattern

of its

own inward nature and

projects outwards

upon

activity,

which

it,

as

it

were,

other (so-called objective) being.

all

open even to
caricature, and may be represented as a philosophy which
bids us regard the Universe under' the figure of a University
Like the earlier draft

of

the

it

system

is

in which all the faculties are branches of philosophy with only

relative

independence
itself.

of

But, after

tbeir

Philosophy
world save after the pattern of

its

we

are

parent

how

shall

itself,

and sovereign-

Mind

conceive

and how best save

highest and happiest activity ?

bidden to read all our experience in the

after the pattern of its

Certainly

own

all,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.

of

light

because

we

that
it

find

which

experience

most

is

superlatively self-clear.

is

truly

experience,

And where

and

this

75

else

shall

or

guiding
illuminating
interpretative
experience except in that where mind enjoys the maximum
of insight into its own glassy essence and self-transparent
life

Towards

quarter and

enigma of existence from this

modern speculation have

this clue to the

that, the currents of

long been converging let us take heart of grace and assume

this as the clue, bending our energies to its use in the constructive work of our philosophizing.
Here we stand on firm
:

ground here we have reached a TTOV crrw, from which we can

view all that is or can be, here and nowhere else.
;

We

we

seek for Truth (or the Truth), and looking ever outwards
seek it in vain.
Veritas habitat in interiore hominis ; seeking

it

there,

we

and finding it, go forth with renewed

seek and find it elsewhere, projected outwards

find

confidence to

it,

from the inner source

of illumination.

Yet

all

we

find in the

apparently outward^ returns and enriches the inward content

from which it flows, and so the inward truth advances in clearness and power without hindrance or stay.

The nuclear or

surrounded by a penumbra which shades

germinal experience
inimitably into the utter darkness where there is nothing, but
is

it

irradiates

flame.

in the

surroundings with beams which light

its

and returning

to

their origin

feed

it
up
and quicken the central

Thus, what seems opaque to its light has yet its office
whole economy, breaking the white light into infinite

variegations of colour, which, reflected to the centre, stir

a heightened activity of emission

Such

in its effulgence.
lives,

and moves and has

But, again,

may

it

is

its

till

the whole world

if

once accepted,

applies itself, prescribing

ourselves to

its

it ?

and

this principle stand

The answer,

of its application,

direction

is,

being.

be asked how, even

we apply

it

bathed

the activity in which all that

self-assured, shall

mode and method

is

it to

I repeat, is that,

by its nature the

and we have but to submit

control.

For the development

76
of

SMITH.

A.

J.

"

exposition in his essay called

(in

refer you to Gentile's own

"
The Method of Immanence

consequences, I can but

its

La riforma

the volume entitled

where he distinguishes

it

della dialettica hegeliana),

over against

"

The Method

cendence," tracing the history of the latter from

dawn

Plato, noting the

its

to

struggles

philosophy

rival or competitor

its

dawn

(its false

origin in

former in Christian thought, and

of the

supplant

of Trans-

its

in

modern

in Spinoza, the apprehension of its

principle by Kant, the efforts of Hegel to disengage it from its

involution with tramelling elements of the other).
To-day and
for us, he contends, it is disengaged and has achieved com-

We

plete I'reedom.

are

organon

knowledge. What
of continued work.
Ail this

it,

but we must use our

In this new- won freedom, of

it.

the self-imposed law, we find not a new

knowledge, but a beginning and a desire for further

which the method

of

of

free

freedom in order to possess

is

to

is

it offers

some

of us

and even paradoxical that a

mitted to bring home

us

is

not a result, but a program

not, I hope, to all

last

so strange

Endeavour may be here perWe are all at one in

its significance.

the quest for some clue to the riddle of existence we all seek
the principle of a metaphysics, a principle which of itself will
:

expand into the

detail of a systematic account of ourselves

and

our world, bringing both at once and together into knowledge.

And so far also we may be said to be agreed that the clue is
to be found in experience

a full
only

title to

in

so

be called

far as it is

experience, or

is

or nowhere.

real,

Experience alone has

everything else having a claim

an element or factor or moment in

a feature or presupposition of

it, etc.,

And

etc.

the experience which has this title must be (a) present or

actual, the past and the future only holding whatever measure
of reality they possess in dependence

upon the present

and

each part or parcel of it being similarly

(b) total or universal,

upon its complete or self-contained reality.

Experiences owe whatever reality (and worth) they have to
dependent

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.

their participation on the one

somewhat

77

and single Experience.

Abating

of the rigour of this doctrine (and abate it

in order to appropriate it)

we may

we must

say that Eeality (which

is

Experience)
compact
experiences, which, however disor
remain
each an experience and repeat,
severed,
tinguished
each in its manner and degree, the structure of Experience.
of

is

Each experience
microcosm
is

it

is

experience, because and in so far as in

its

mirrors the whole macrocosm of Experience, and

higher or lower in the measure in which it effectively does so.

let us ask ourselves what we mean by saying of this or

Now

that parcel of Reality that

makes

that

it

is

an experience.

it

"

an experience

It

is

what

";

it is

not merely that in

something stands face to face with

else

it

it

(which
something
apprehends or appreciates or appraises), or again that something moulds something else to its heart's desire, or is mixed
with

it

and

in alternate action

reaction,

no nor that somehow

Is it not
they are twisted together like strands in a rope.
rather our meaning that in such a fragment of the Universe

there

is

somewhat that

portion of that

life

and self-begotten, a
which creates at once itself and its environis

self-begetting

ment, no mere dlan vital which adjusts itself to surroundings

which dictate its form, but a free self-determining activity, the
author at once of

its

world and

itself

And where

can we find

a higher or better sample, so to speak, of what experience so

regarded means, than in those supreme moments of spiritual
life

it

when Mind generates the problems

in the solution of

celebrates the high triumphs of its

power and

its

which

worth

In such experiences for in such we are privileged to partake

do we not find the archetype of all experiences, the open secret
being and existence, their standard of their value ?
we know know ourselves and our world not
In them

of their

at last

as for ever sundered

an Experience which
Still it

and apart, but as rooted and grounded in

is

ours but not ours alone.

will perhaps be replied, such Experience is not

cannot be ours

each of us

is

confined to his

own

and

experience,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE.

78

an experience and not the Experience, at best and

irremedially a part, and so mutilated, disordered, and distorted,
no true mirror of the absolute Experience, or at least such
which

that

is still

unserviceable to us as the clue

it is

doubt

this final

that

it is

not

so,

for' which

we seek.

To

would rejoin that for myself I am persuaded

this doubt my assurance is in no way

and that by

only say, and that not in despondency or

despair, that I know no better or more solid foundation upon
which Thought can rear its structures, and that upon it rest

But

shaken.

I will

home which we build

moments this final
doubt assails us, let us remember that, while we at times say
and must say " you and I," " you not I, I not you," we can also
most securely the

pillars of the spiritual

When

ourselves.

for

in

unguarded

in unison say

"

celestial eagle

which Dante saw

"

we," each speaking for one and all like that

in Paradise

For speak I saw and likewise heard, the beak

And utter with its voice, both I and My,
When in conception it was We and Our."

So speaking and so conceiving, we shall recover our assurance

we are not so severed from one another arid the whole as

that

our words imply, and that our experiences for

and

all their

multi-

though experiences, truly also

Experience, the genuine and necessary forms which the one
whole and single Experience creates in order to exist and be.
plicity

With

differences

are,

these words I refer you to the works of the great

leader of thought which have suggested them.

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, G-rosvenor

on February 16th, 1920, at 8 P.M.

W.

1,

OF IMPULSE, EMOTION, AND INSTINCT.

V.

By ALEXANDER

F.

SHAND.

THE ANALYSIS OF IMPULSE.

1.

WE

Street,

"
meaning of the term impulse,"
a substitute of the term "conation."
It is a

shall follow the ordinary

and not use

it

as

common

term, and connotes as clearly as the term "emotion"

a concrete fact of our conscious experience and no abstraction

from such
If

fact,

such as

conation

is

is

conation.

the most conspicuous

factor

in

impulse,

impulse contains also affective and cognitive factors.* Impulses

feel pleasant or

or obstructed,

unpleasant (1) according as they are furthered

(2) when we anticipate that the actions to

and

which they lead

will be pleasant or unpleasant,

and

(3) accord-

ing to our bodily state.

Impulses are

felt

with certain sensations localized in the

part of the body that

we

are about to exercise, but

we can

distinguish the impulse as a unique mental fact from these

The

sensations.

and

affective

tone of

the sensations spreads to

affects the impulse.

element in impulse which carries

In the
the mind away from the present into the future.

There

is

also a cognitive

impulses that accompany the action of instincts this cognitive

element may be extremely vague, and is supposed not to
include the end aimed at, but it is still looking forward with

an expectant or questioning attitude into the future.

questioning attitude seems to be the germ of curiosity.

This

* This was
clearly stated in the Foundations of Character, on p. 459,
but Dr. Drever, who apparently did not read it, and supposes me to
"
If there is not
analyse instinct into impulse and sensation, objects that
"
an affective element involved in all instinctive activity
he cannot see
how the primary emotions could have developed. (Instinct in Man,
p. 159.)

80

ALEXANDER

F.

SHAND.

and cognitive, how do we

distinguish them from emotions, which we have also found to
contain conative, affective, and cognitive elements ?
If impulses are conative, affective,

2.

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IMPULSE AND EMOTION.

An

(1)

since

it

more comprehensive than an impulse

contains an impulse.
(2) If impulse were some kind
emotion

is

it ought to have a name, since all of our emotions

have names, except their unstable combinations, which impulse
could not be. No one of the species of emotions that have

of

emotion

names can be

identified

usually very different

much

the

account of
greater

with

impulse.

from one another

(3)

Emotions are

impulses feel very

There are a few impulses which, on
the marked sensations connected with them, have a
same.

individuality

become intensely

(4)

felt

than others.

Under

and even violent

obstruction

they

yet this does not lead

our confusing them with emotions. For over and above the
differences between impulse and emotion that we can analyse
to

there seems to be a specific difference that

in accordance with

we

cannot.

This

is

the general character of mental develop-

ment, which gives rise to unique differentiations between one

mental fact and another. (5) An impulse has a result or end,
but no object distinct from this, though the end of the
"
An emotion has both
object."
impulse is often called its
an object and an end. (6) An impulse is directed to a future
It' has a prospective attitude to this
event.
event.
An

emotion has both a contemplative attitude to its object as

well as a prospective attitude to the future event which is its
end.
felt

3.

Impulse, then, is not emotion, however intensely

but it is a concrete fact of mind like emotion.

it

be

OF THE DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF IMPULSE AND EMOTION.

The

primary forces of character include the primary

impulses and the primary emotions. The primary impulses

OF IMPULSE, EMOTION, AND INSTINCT.

are

those

accompany and condition the operation

that

We

instincts.

here confine ourselves to these

emotions.

these

If

are parts

impulses

we

do

why

instincts,

81

sometimes

impulses and

the

of

systems
need emotion ?

also

of

of
If

impulses are also parts of the systems of emotion, why still

do we need emotion ? The ends of impulses are different
from the ends of emotions, as the ends of emotions are

from the ends

different

of sentiments.

(1)

The end

of

the

more general than the end of the instinctive

impulse organized with it: the end of an instinct of concealment is to escape by concealment the end of fear is to
emotion

is

escape.

(2)

The

instinct is limited

by

its

and by the hereditary mode of behaviour

this end.
The emotion is not so limited.

more concrete end,

for the attainment of

It

may have

several

then possess several

different hereditary modes of behaviour for the attainment of
its end.
It also tends to acquire other modes of behaviour
instincts organized in its system.

It will

its experience, and chiefly through

the instinctive tendencies to experiment and to imitate which

with the accumulation of

belong to

its

system.

The emotion through the

(3)

and acquired tendencies organized in

variability of behaviour

The

of situations.

mode

common

gence

of

ticular

or

place

the

to all

members

an animal serves

adaptable to a great variety

specific

pattern,

bush or place

to

which

The same

it

species.

The

intelli-

instinct to the

its

behaviour of

of

but adapts

same

parapply
but must follow out and cannot

situation,

mode

of the

to

and experienced, constructs

itary

system possesses a

instinctive impulse possesses an invariable

attainment of the end.

old

its

of behaviour, in respect of its typical character, because

this is

alter

making

it

instinctive

it

his

its

instinct for the

species of spider,

web

after the

however

same hered-

through his intelligence

has to be attached.

to

the

(4) It follows

the system of the primary emotion is a superior type

of organization to the system of the instinctive impulse,
that

because

it is

more adaptable

to a greater variety of situations,

ALEXANDER

82

and

is

F.

SHAND.

not, like the instinctive impulse, confined to a single

mode

hereditary

of behaviour.

It is here, and in respect of its function, that we must

estimate the superior value of the primary emotion over the

instinct with its impulse.

when an

instinct

For emotion tends to be aroused

not working successfully, but

is

is

checked

or fails, bringing the resources of its plastic system to deal with

the situation.*
full

measure

of its superiority to instinct is only

in

organized

It has, however, defects of its

which

reflection

sentiment,
it

fully exemplified in

4.

WHY WE

obtains

it

lacks itself

and

the

this

own, and the

shown when,

self-control

and

is

only

development

man.

SHOULD NOT INCLUDE THE PRIMARY EMOTIONS

AMONG THE

INSTINCTS.

Neither the primary emotions nor the primary impulses!

can be rightly regarded as instincts, but only at most as parts
of instincts

active

it

when they are not

that we feel the

because instincts exist in us

is

only

when they

are

active

We

impulse or emotion connected with them.

instinct

a whole,

as

as

structure of the

must take the

mind and body,

without which neither the impulse nor the emotion would

Our
instinctive.'
produce the behaviour that we call
'

now is whether the systems of the primary emotions

can be rightly regarded as instincts. They at least contain
question

instincts.
'

But some

clinging,'

instincts
'

'

shrinking

are very simple, as

others

more complex,

as

'sucking,'

the

loco-

* See The Foundations

Dr. Drever
of Character, pp. 189, 192.
appears so far to agree with the theory of emotion there outlined as to
"
state that,
Biologically the function of emotion is apparently to
reinforce impulse and interest," for (1) surmounting an obstacle, and

"where a more or less prolonged course of trying to find the

appropriate reaction is necessary." See Instinct in Man, p. 161.
'
" Now we are
t
proposing to call the conscious impulse Instinct/
."
when and so far as it is not itself determined by previous experience.
(2)

(James Drever, Instinct in Man,

p. 88).

OF IMPULSE, EMOTION, AND INSTINCT.

motory

instincts of different animals,

ment and

flight

building instincts of

and instincts

still

The most complex contain simpler

of birds.

of conceal-

more complex, as the weband

the nest-building instin<-is
spiders

others

So

as, for

instincts,

we
locomotory
Why,
not regard the systems of the primary emotions as complex
instincts, seeing that they contain simpler instincts, have
the

instance,

forms of

instinctive

and are

behaviour,

pursue ends which they cannot at

experience
(1)

then, should

instincts.

first

pre-determined to
have foreseen through

We have taken as the chief

functional difference between

and primary emotions the invariable type of behaviour

which the one tend to produce as compared with the variable
types of behaviour of the other, which in man become ever more
instincts

numerous through the acquisition of new means. (2) There is

a second important difference between them. The instincts are
directed to biological ends

while

still

the systems of the primary emotions,

pursuing biological ends, create other ends through

This supremely important

their organization in sentiments.

fact

Dr.

McDougall

impulses," he writes

"

"The instinctive
appears to deny.
determine the ends of all activities, and

supply the driving power by which

sustained

and

all

all

mental

activities are

the complex apparatus of the most highly

developed mind is but a means towards these ends

With every new sentiment that man acquires he acquires

."*

new

Loving himself, he fears the loss of his reputation, of his

wealth or power, or the affection of those that love him all
which are ends of sentiments in him lacking in the animals.

fear.

For these new ends

instinct

often

Through

fear

conceal

his

man

evil

acquired method
*

man

avails

acquires

him, but

new means.
not

has to conceal

its

many

The end

things.

of

some

means.

instinctive

He

has

to

No instinctive or
thoughts and actions.
concealment of material things is here

for the

Social Psychology, Sect.

1,

Ch.

11, p. 44.

G 2

ALEXANDER

84

He

of service.

or

SHAND.

F.

new method

invents a

of

silence, deception

lies.

While then the original systems

are hereditary structures

like

of

the primary emotions

the instincts,

amount

this

of

identity between them does not justify us in regarding these

systems as instincts

means and

to vary

because of their capacity to vary their

their ends, because they are not confined

ends

each instinct,

to

the

to

one invariable type

of

behaviour.

same name would tend

to

obliterate the recognition

biological

of

like

instincts, nor,

To

call

both by

the

the

of

functional difference between them.

5.

How

FAR

HUMAN

INSTINCTS HAVE THE SPECIFIC AND

INVARIABLE CHARACTER OF ANIMAL INSTINCTS.

With regard to human

bodily movements in which

instincts Dr.

McDougall

"

the

says,

the instinct finds expression

may

be

modified and complicated to an indefinite extent."*

With
regard to the excitement of instincts, that they come to be
"
aroused not only by their original objects, but by ideas of such
objects,

and by perception and ideas

of other objects."!

We

have, however, only maintained that the behaviour of instincts

is

substantially invariable, because

it

has a

'

'

specific

and cannot therefore vary from one individual

another.

to

This

Dr.

character,

of the

same

also

McDougall
appears to
some sense-impression "... he writes, " excites
some perfectly definite behaviour "... which is the same in
species

maintain

all

"

same species and on

the question is whether purely

individuals of the

Now
varies

that in man, especially,

much behaviour

that

is

it

acquired

comes
is

all

similar occasions^

instinctive behaviour
to be

combined with

generally admitted.

"

The

animals, Dr. McDougall writes,

acquire and use hardly any
other movement- complexes that are not natively given in their
*

Op.

cit.,

p. 33.

t Ibid.
I

Ch. 11, pp. 25, 26.

OF IMPULSK, EMOTION, AND INSTINCT.

In man,

instinctive dispositions."*

it

instincts that ripen soon after birth

"

is

only

85
"

the simpler

which are displayed

in

"

movements, such as the instincts of sucking,

winking and shrinking from a coming
But most human instincts become active at relatively

purely instinctive

of wailing, of crawling, of

blow."f

late periods

when

imitation of

"

considerable power of intelligent

movements has been acquired."!

control and

Under the impulse of hunger the infant cannot, like

young of many animals, find the way to the breast of

He

mother.

is

and in place

of

the
his

their

complicated
only the simple instinct of sucking. The
mother supplies the requisite movements for the attainment of
helpless,

instinct

inherits

this end.

The

is fragmentary and useless

Afterwards he may be able to acquire

instinct of the child

without her aid at

first.

some of the requisite movements. But the instinct of sucking

remains substantially the same, though combined with acquired
tendencies that make it self-sufficing.
Let us next consider his
There is one simple instinct manifested early,
the shrinking or starting back from what arouses fear also the
clinging or clutching instinct, often shown when, in his
instincts of fear.

mother's arms, some sudden noise

concealment-instinct

power

is

heard.

Has he

also a

To conceal yourself requires either the

power of disposing the body so as

which the child does not possess and only slowly

of locomotion, or the

to conceal

acquires.

it,

But he appears

to inherit the disposition to

pursue

the end of concealment though without any definite behaviour

for

its

When

accomplishment.

he can walk, he

may adopt

some acquired behaviour as to hide behind his mother's skirt.

But what is innate in this process the end of concealment
appears to remain substantially unchanged, though a great
variety of means to it, for use in different situations, come to
be acquired.
*

Op.

cit. y

p. 40.

t Ibid., p. 41.
+
Ibid.

ALEXANDER

86

SHAND.

F.

much

It is

The end

the same with the aggressive instincts of anger.

destruction appears to be innately given the end

of

breaking down opposition, and these ends remain

substantially unchanged, but not being able to walk or to
also

of

dispose his body

as he pleases, the

child

can only hit out

vaguely or push things away. This hitting out, if too vague to

be regarded as an instinct, with experience and practice will
become efficient as the child slowly acquires the modes of attack

man.

characteristic of

To sum up

the child inherits only the capacity for a few

very simple forms

of instinctive

appetites and

behaviour connected with his

but he inherits all the

primary emotions
ends
of
these
Most
of these instincts are
biological
systems.
useless fragments until combined with other means, which the

mother

first

to

supplies

and the

But these

child slowly acquires.

sufficiently definite to be called instincts, appear

if

fragments,

remain substantially invariable through

their ends, though

life,

into

together with

more complex and

becoming expanded
The acquired parts of these systems retain
which they had from the beginning, though

efficient systems.

the

variability

checked by the force of habit.

The primary emotions of
simple

human

where serviceable
behaviour

is,

man may

as

to their ends.

we have

any of these
and variable factors,

utilize

instincts with their acquired

But the

variability of their

They are

seen, of a different nature.

not confined to the end of any one of the instincts, where they
employ more than one, as each one of these is confined to its
end, but

may

follow some other, or an end acquired through

experience.
6.

WHETHER ALL

INSTINCTS HAVE PARTICULAR EMOTIONS TO

SUPPORT THEM WHEN IN DIFFICULTIES.

Although impulses are always, and emotions only sometimes
involved in the operation of instincts, we may still enquire
(1) under what conditions these emotions are aroused (2) what
;

OF IMPULSE, EMOTION, AND INSTINCT.

these emotions are

(3)

whether each one

the operation of a particular instinct.

instinctive impulse

anger when

which

of one instinct

from that

desires, as

is

peculiar to
of

every

sufficiently strong, tends to arouse

and sorrow when

No one of these emotions

frustrated.

them

The operation

obstructed, joy or satisfaction

it is

attained after difficulties,

were

is

of

87

when

it

is

its

end

is

completely

distinguishes the operation

of another. If again impulses of instincts

some may become with

foresight of their ends,

the operation of instincts, long obstructed arid delayed, might

be conceived to give rise to the prospective emotions of desire

despondency, anxiety, disappointment, confidence, and

But again no one of these emotions would be peculiar
despair.
to any one instinct, no more than they are to one desire.
to hope,

How
more

comes

or

less

then that any instinct can arouse an emotion

Concealment-instincts are
peculiar to itself ?
it

sometimes organized with the fighting instincts, as in the felidce,

but are more frequently connected with fear. Fear pursues the

same end

more general form, and therefore may

when in difficulties. The instincts that

of escape in a

support the instinct

may arouse emotions more or less peculiar to themselves would
seem to be those for which primary emotions exist that pursue
There is no primary
their ends in a more general form.

emotion peculiar to the locomotory

to all emotions, and no one whose end

instincts,
is

which belong

a more general form

This holds also of the most complicated instincts,

such as the web-building and nest-building instincts. These
take such a long time to fulfill their ends, and may meet with

of their end.

so

many

difficulties,

the

that

all

and

the prospective

all

we might suppose them to experience

to which we 'have referred,
emotions, but nowhere should we be

common emotions

in turn

able to indicate the presence of

any emotion peculiar

to the

instinctive process as a whole.*

* Dr.
Drever, who knows that in such a case we must take the
hypothesis that best explains the facts, yet to my former denial that we
can point to any primary emotion as distinctive of the nest building

OF IMPULSE, EMOTION, AND INSTINCT.

88

we cannot

If

principal instincts,

or less

Dr.

accept

when

McDougall's

in operation, elicit

distinctive of them,

confusion between emotion

which seems

and impulse,

accept Dr. Drever's modification of

of

human nature have

emotions

"

?*

only elicited

all

their

it

is

tried to

it,

that

the

an emotion more
to

be based on a

can we any more

that the

"

great instincts

accompanying and typical

although he admits that these emotions are

under " tension."! If we begin by assuming that

fear, anger, disgust, curiosity are

then

theory

among

these great instincts,

easy to indicate their typical emotions.

We

have

show that these primary emotional systems are not

instincts,

though

having

many

points

in

common with

instincts.
"
instincts, says,

whether there

is we are in no
position to say
a distinctive emotion involved" or not.
(Instinct in

The obvious rejoinder

is

From this point of view we must say nothing about the

p. 159.)
emotions of animals, not even that they exist
*
161.
cit.,

Man,

Op.
t P. 157.

p.

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor

ow- March, 8th, L920, at 8 P.M.

IS

VI.

Street,

W.

1,

THERE A GENERAL WILL?

By MORRIS

GINSBERG.

THE

conception of a general will has played an important role

in political philosophy since the days of Rousseau.
It has, in

the main, been used as a basis for what

may

be termed a

monistic theory of sovereignty and law, but it is noteworthy

that many of those who are now insisting on the claims of

minor associations within the State do so on the ground that

"
"
these minor associations possess a real or general will of their
own.* The literature on the subject, and on the kindred problem
personality of associations, is enormous, but there are

of the

not

many attempts

of this

paper

is

at a really systematic analysis.

to deal critically with

some

The object

of these problems,

and in particular with the doctrine of a real will, as worked

The attempts referred to fall
out by Professor Bosanquet.
into five groups, which are more or less clearly marked off,
though they are not mutually exclusive, and for convenience
of discussion they will be dealt with separately.
In the

the general will is conceived as coming to*

individual in a group or society, or a compact
majority of such a group or society, has a conception or idea of
the group as a whole and identifies his good with the good pf >
first place,

when every

be

This would appear to be the view of Dr. McDougall.

Sometimes, as is the case with Novicov, the presence of such an
idea of the whole is required only in the case of the social elite
that whole.

i.e.,

the actual leaders

(not

thought and action in a

*

Cf.

necessarily the

In

community.

government) of
Novicov's view

Gierke, Genossenschaftsrecht, vol. 3, and Das Wesen der Mensch; Maitland's Introduction to Gierke's Medieval Political

lichen Verbande

theories ; Figgis, Churches in the

ture of Guild Socialism.

Modern

State

and much

of the litera-

MORRIS GINSBERG.

90
(Conscience

and the

Volonte Gdne'rale) society

et

social 6lite constitutes for

a psychical organism,

is

him

common

sensorium,

analogous to the brain of an individual organism.

In the second place, a will is said to be general when a
f
decision

is

arrived

at

by deliberate discussion, aiming at a

real integration of differences,

member

i.e.,

at utilizing the contribution

group, and not at mere

This
blending
apparently is the view of
Professor Mackenzie, according to whom the idea of a general
will involves: (1) the concurrence of a number of people in a
of

each constituent

of a

of individual wishes.

single decision

(2) the fact that the decision is taken with

reference to the good of the whole group, and not merely by a

The first of these conditions,

balancing of individual wishes.
however, is watered down to a mere vague desire or feeling, on
the part of those by whom the decision is made, that
harmony with the point of view of others whom

in

When

this qualification is

made,

it is

it

shall be

it

affects.

clear that the decision

is

most

at,
cases, by a comparatively few
individuals, although they may take into account the opinions
and desires of the majority of the people for whom they are

really arrived

in

acting, in so far as these

can be ascertained.

In this sense the

term

is innocuous, but not particularly important.

It is merely
a rather confusing way of saying, e.g., that governmental acts
should be based on some form of consent, active or passive, on

the part of the majority of the governed and it has the defect
that it hides the fact that in actual groups, especially States,
action taken is often the result not of unanimous co-operative
;

agreement, on the part of a majority, but only of a comparaIn the hands of some writers,
tively small number of people.
e.g.,

Miss

may

Follett, the integration of differences,

be connected with the doctrine of the

spoken of above,
"

confluence

"

of

minds or the compounding

of states of consciousness,

case the general will

conceived as constituting an actual

result of the interpenetration of

entity,

the

product

is

or

individual minds, in what

is

and

called the social process.

in that

IS

THERE A GENERAL WILL

91

In the third place, it comes to be recognized that society as

a whole and the social good can only be common contents of
consciousness in the very highest stages of social development.*
It is, however, claimed that in all societies possessing a certain
amount of continuity and independence there must be other

common

contents of thought and will, with the result that its

members, when confronted with the same situation, or stimu-

by the same objects, will experience the same inner

There may be moments or periods in the life of a

lated

reaction.

nation,

it is

feeling

and

admitted,
will,

when

there

and then

is little

social

community

of thought,

self-consciousness

is

at a

minimum. But this is the case, also, in individuals, except that

for them the moments of conscious activity are more frequent
and

last

relatively

individual self

is

longer.

regarded as a

According to this view, the

combination of certain tempo-

rary and transient contents of consciousness, with those which

are more constant, such as certain enduring relations of the

inner
this

life,

and certain experiences relating

combination or union the constant

to the body.

is set

Through

over against and

contrasted with the variable, and becomes, as such, relatively

clear and explicit, thus resulting in self- consciousness.
So, too,
in society there are certain contents of consciousness

which are

permanent and constant, e.g., the traditions and the

consciousness of a common past, which are at the background

more or

of the

new

less

common mind, and when

over against these there appears

experience, perhaps threatening them, society becomes

and

capable of self-conscious volition. Compare

the Greeks against the Persians, the Germans against Napoleon,
smd the like.

self-conscious

is

In dealing with these views we must note, at the outset,

two important distinctions. In the first place, we must distinguish the act of volition from the object willed.
place,

we must
*

Cf.

distinguish definite acts of will

In the second

from dispositions

Barth, Oeschichte der Philosophic als Soziologie.

H 2

MORRIS GINSBERG.

92
or habits of will,

i.e.,

capacities to will

We

certain situation.

say that as a result of group-life,

the more or less permanent systems

may

will, or

definite acts of

when confronted with

of dispositions or habits of will of the individuals

composing

be influenced and determined by an idea of the interest

not only of the individual, but of the whole group. Where

it,

may

this is the case, in

or a

members

member

regard to every individual

compact majority, we can speak

as general,

of a

the will

of

meaning by that not that they

of

group
such

aim

all

at a

universal object (which has not been shown), nor that there
will, a?

general
that there

from a number

distinct
sufficient

is

of

community

of wills,

ideas

is

but merely

and

ideals

to

influence the specific acts of will of the individuals concerned,

to induce

them

decisions.

We

to take

common

action, or to arrive at joint

are not in such cases entitled to speak of a will

of the whole, but merely of a will of

the good

of the

individual, concrete.
will,

due

to a

resemble one

The

ivhole.

The

determined by a sense of
must remain

of volition

will of the people

concurrence of such
another,

all,

acts

because

acts,

of

can only be a joint

though the

the

good

by what

is

of

similarity

contents, or because they are all influenced

of the whole, or rather

latter

may
their

by an idea of the

conceived to be the good

of the whole.

Whether such a general

fact, to be

will exists or not is a question of

determined with regard to each grouping by special

investigation.

Generally the psychological forces that ultiwould seem to contain little that

mately issue in a public act

can be called will in the

strict sense of the

word.

They are

rather an impalpable congeries

of elements including blind

unconscious
or half-conscious
impulses, dimly-foreseen ends,

inferences, habits

and prejudices. Even great

political decisions

are rarely arrived at as a result of clear co-operative thinking,

on the part of all members of a group or even of a majority.*
*

Cf.

Graham

Wallas,

Human

Nature in

Politics,

Ch.

3.

IS

If,

THERE A GENERAL WILL?

93

with Dr. McDougall, we confine the collective will to those

cases of group actions which are the result of a determination

member of the group, by a sentiment of

regard for the group as a whole, and by an idea of the good of
that whole, the sphere of collective volition is exceedingly

of the will of each

narrow.

It

may

exist,

e.g.,

in

some

families, or in

some small

but in the large groupings

of the modern world, the existence of such a will is a hope and

groups working for specific objects

The State

aspiration, rather than a fact.

complex groupings with

many

in particular includes

divergent interests.

Such group-

ings, moreover, develop a collective selfishness, often in conflict

with the good of the whole. There may be, there no doubt is,

present in the majority of the people a diffused sense of interest

in the whole, a vague desire to contribute actively or passively
to the

maintenance

be called a

will.

any one idea

or

of the social structure,

but this can hardly

The reasons that determine the adoption of

plan of action, and the rejection of others, are

often found in anything but a conscious recognition of their

inherent truth or value

thought,

it is

and

in so far as there is such conscious

confined to a few persons who, in

high-minded and

many

cases, are

disinterested, but in others deliberately foster

the spread of certain ideas, in the interests of certain classes,

rather than of the people as a whole.
Though, in some cases

unconsciously, the process of selection

case of complex groupings,

we may

often biassed.

is

In the

as there is present self-conscious volition, it

is

not general, and

in so far as the psychical forces operating in a society are

general, they are not will.

Similar remarks apply to Dr. Earth's

The kind of self-consciousness of which he speaks

can exist only at periods of great crises in the life of a nation,
when the whole of society is in danger. It is only in such cases,

treatment.

when

a nation

feels

threatened, that

doubtful whether
volition.

For

it

that

all

its

permanent possessions are

Even then it seems

will act as a whole.

it

we
is

say, therefore, that in so far

get an example of

really self-conscious

during such periods that very often the

94

MORRIS GINSBERG.

lower impulses and instincts of a mob get free play. It might,

perhaps, be urged that in the case of individual volition, too,
the existence of self-conscious volition has

a precipitate of habits, instincts, and dispositions, but while in the case

of the individual, the instinctive elements are fused with and
overlaid by conscious ideas in the

same

its basis in

personality, in the case

whole may be present

enlightened and public-spirited

of society, consciousness of society as a

in

minds

the

of

its

most

members, yet the majority

of habit or instinct, so

of the people

may remain at

far as their relation to the

the level

whole

is

Here again, therefore, in so far as there is will, it is

not general, and so far as the forces operating are general, they

concerned.

are not will.

We

can

somewhat

now

discuss a fourth view of

analogous to

worked out

that,

Dr.

Earth's,

of

Wundt.*

the general will,

but more
This view

thoroughly
based on

is

namely,
an analysis of the mutual implications of presentation and will.
Will cannot be bare activity, but implies presentation, as content and motive.

On

presentative activity.

according to

Wimdt,

the other hand, presentation implies a

Presentations, in fact,

to the action of

owe

their origin,

one will on another.

It

any concrete will pre-supposes other wills. This

leads Wundt to the conception of reality as a series of willfollows that

eine Stufenfolge von

unities

Willenseinheiten

mutual determination, or reciprocal action,

activity,

extent.
will

is

develop into a series

which through
viz.,

of will-complexes

presentative
of

various

The unity which attaches to any concrete empirical

only relative. The individual is really a general will,

uniting within itself will-forms of lower grade, for bare individual activity is a limiting point, which is never actually met
with in experience.
Again, at the other extreme, we may

conceive a general will of all humanity, uniting all its members

and groups of members for common purposes, and finally the
*

Cf.

System der Philosophic, and Ethik.

IS

THERE A GENERAL WILL?

religious consciousness postulates the will of

highest and

last

The

realization.

God, which

unity, at once the source

possessions of

spiritual

95

the

of

mankind, and the conditions

is

the

common
of their

general will (Gesamtwille), according to this

very complex, and includes within itself many forms

But the reality which
of unity, varying in extent and power.
belongs to it, and, within it, to the wider and narrower forms of
view,

is

it,

is

The true

not hypothetical but actual.

reality of the

not to be found in some underlying substance

or substratum, but in actual spiritual life, in conscious activity
individual self

is

Bewusstseinstdtigkeit

capacity to con-

in the extent of its

itself, and give expression to the common

spiritual possession of mankind, the will-directions or tendenOnce we abandon the view of the soul or self
cies of the age.

within

centrate

as a separately

and independently existing substance or sub-

stratum, we are justified,

will

general
individual will.

degree

Wundt

of

thinks, in assigning to the

reality

The movements

not less than

that of the

of civilization, the

cultures, are indications of a really

common

life

growth of
which cannot

be a merely fortuitous resultant of individual aims, related

We must, however, Wundt warns
externally to one another.
us,

beware

of attaching too

much importance

to the general or

This

objective will at the cost of individual wills.

is

just as

one-sided as the narrow individualism of the opposed theories

There are individuals
of psychological and ethical atomism.

who have

so

mastered the ideas or feelings which move their

community, and who are so gifted to give these effective

expression, that they have come to be not merely the agents

and creators

of the

aims of the general

but are able to

will,

impose and impress features of their own upon the general will,
and stamp with their own character the tendency of the time.
This, however, is not incompatible with the reality of the
general will, since the latter

is

essentially very

complex and

is

really a series of will-unities.

Wundt's treatment has the merit that

it

does not involve

MORRIS GINSBERG.

96

the conception of the general will as an entity independent of

individual minds, and that it allows room for the existence of

smaller units within the general

is

it

At

will.

the same time,

it

liable to dangerous misinterpretations, and fundamentally

suffers from the fatal ambiguity that attaches to the word

not the place for examining

the validity of the assertion that presentations are themselves
will- activities.
It will, at any rate, be conceded that, if they
This, of course,

presentation.

is

are of the nature of will or activity, the activity spoken of

is

not the activity in and through which they are apprehended.

If this distinction be admitted, then the reasons for regarding
higher complexes as having the same reality as the individual

For the acts in and through which

will fall to the ground.

are

presentations
specific

acts,

must

apprehended

different

to

belonging

course, several individuals

always be individual
individuals,

unite, act as

may

common, i.e., be aware

the same ideals.

presentations in

and aim at

The

distinction

himself.

He

referred

to

of

the same objects

of

often

is

though,

one body, have

ignored by

Wundt

speaks, for example, of presentative activity as

being the same thing as presentation, and if this view is joined

with his view that the reality of the self consists in activity,
mind stuff " theory and the theory of
the door is open for the
''

the group-consciousness, such as

the

we

find,

e.g.,

are regarded

latter, presentations
"
mous realities which have the

power

of

as

in
"

Durkheim.

By

partially autono-

mutual attraction and

forming ever new syntheses. Thus there come

to be, according to the latter, social or collective presentations
which belong to the social mind, and are spoken of as
repulsion and

"

exterior

"

often makes

of

to the individual
it

mind

and although Durkheim

clear that the social presentations can exist only

mind as an
new creation

in individual minds, yet he also speaks of the social

actual entity, over and above individual minds

sui generis.

Thus he speaks

of the collective consciousness as

the highest form of the psychic

life

and as a

consciousness of

IS

THERE A GENERAL WILL

Now

consciousnesses*

there

is

a sense in

97

which contents

of

presentations have an independent being.

Mythologies, e.y.,
have a way of growing by a sort of inherent power of ideas to
combine and re-combine. But this really means that an idea

once having been thought out by an individual and communito others must necessarily modify the ideas of those

cated

There

others.

no warrant, however, for speaking

is

of collective

presentations as constituting a mind, or soul, or consciousness.

We
is

now

can

deal with the doctrine of the general will as

worked out by Professor Bosanquet, and

in a modified

it

form

In essence, this doctrine consists of the

by other idealists.

following three elements:

In the

first place, it

is

maintained,

that both the particular acts of the will of an individual, and

the system of volitional dispositions which

call

his

standing will," imply a real will or a will of

By this is not meant the actual character of a

character or his
the true

we may

"

self.

man, the permanent underlying nature or bent of an individual,

but rather a supposed rational or good self, an ideal will based
on

"

a fully articulated idea of the best

life

for

In the

man."

second place,

it is

character,

in fact, qualitatively identical in all individuals,

is,

argued that the latter

and therefore constitutes one

And,

will.

that this one will, described as "real

is

"

essentially social in

in the third place,

or "general,"

is

embodied

in the State.
I

propose to confine attention here to the

first

two

of these

propositions.
(a)

In the

first

place then, the real will

is

contrasted with

the actual will, or the will of the individual in the ordinary

routine of life.
The latter consists of acts which are incomplete,
"

abstract and fragmentary," and they point beyond

themselves to a system which would give them meaning, a
system of connected volitions or dispositions, which is held or
imperfect,

bound together by organizing

*

Of. Les

principles.

Formes Elementaires de la

Of such principles

vie Religieuse, p. 23.

MORRIS GINSBERG.

98

we may be

where they are not consciously

they are none the less, it is

conscious, but even

appreciated by the individual

This so far may be

implied in his conduct.
from
but
such
it
would
not follow that
granted,
arguments
the real will is rational or good.
it
will
not be denied
Surely

maintained,

that the standing or permanent wills of most individuals are

from harmonious unities governed by rational principles.

would seem, then, that by the real will is not meant merely
the standing or permanent will which actually belongs to

far

It

individuals, but an ideal will,

ought to

be.

Such an ideal

in the actual will.

in other words, the will as

will

is,

it

it is

however,

For no object of action

is

satisfactory, ever exhausts all that our full

argued, implied
ever completely
nature demands.

At any given moment we do not know what we

really want,

what would completely satisfy our whole personality.

To
discover what we really want, we should have to correct our
desires of the moment by a comparison with what we desire at
other moments, and with what other people desire

we should

have, in short, to institute a process of criticism and examination

into the conditions of a good

and harmonious

had been gone through, our own

us in a shape which we should almost

life

back

to

This reconstructed will

is, it is

and when

will

would come

fail

to recognize.

this process

maintained, our real

therefore, the rational or good will, the will as

the will as determined by an idea of perfection

it

will.

ought

It

is,

to be,

and, though

it

transcends by far that at which we consciously aim, it is nevertheless implied in the latter, since it alone can give significance
to the practical life.

argument seems to me to depend on two

(1) upon the question in what sense a person may be
will
what is implied " in his actual volitions, and

The value
things

said to
(2)

of the

l<

upon the meaning

Firstly, then,

if

of the

word

by the term will

is

"

real

"

meant

in this connexion.

actually conscious

might be denied that a person wills anything except an

of
which
he is distinctly aware. This restriction of the
object

choice,

it

THERE A GENERAL WILL

IS

term

will,

however, inay be inconvenient.

99

Recent psychology has

familiarized us with the fact that often our conscious motives

are only a

"

"

camouflage

unconscious, and

it

for deeper

would

wants

some

be, in

of

which we may be
words to

cases, carping at

wants do not represent our real will.

however, there is no reason for supposing that

say that these deeper

Granting
in

any

this,

particular case, the discovery of such deeper motives

enumeration would reveal a rational or good

the contrary, it may well bring to light deep and

their complete

On

conflict.

reaching
those courses of

and
will.

far-

Again, by what is implied may be meant all

conduct, plans and aims which a man might

admit were involved in any particular volitional act of his,

reflected critically on that act. Here, too, in any particular

he

if

case,

suppose that such a scheme of life must

necessarily be good or rational, though no doubt it would appear
so to the individual concerned.
It would seem, then, that for
there

is

no reason

to

"

the purpose of the above argument the phrase " what is implied
must mean all those courses of action which a perfectly rational

person would see were involved in any act or system of acts of

an individual. In what sense, now, can this be said to be the
real will not of completely rational

mortals

I think that

hold this view

is

what

is

in the

persons, but of ordinary

mind

of the thinkers

who

that the sense of moral and political obligation

cannot be explained unless we assume the presence in each

individual of an idea, however vague and ill-defined, of a best

and ultimate good. This is sometimes stated in a way which

would seem to imply that when I say I ought to do this, I

mean

that I will do

this.

Thus Professor Bosanquet says

"

The imperative claim of the will that wills itself is our own
inmost nature and we cannot throw it off. This is the root of
political obligation."

As

against this,

it

must be

said

that

though it might well be argued that what is ethically obligatory

must be psychologically capable of being willed, ethical
obligation does not consist in being willed
object

known

consists in its being

known.

any more than an

The fact that I will,

100

MORRIS GINSBERG.

or that

my

real self or

anyone

else wills a thing, is not

an

adequate reason why it should or ought to be done, unless there

is a reason to show that it is good that it should be done.
The
is something objective, and obligawhich such a moral order has upon

moral order, in other words,

tion consists in the claim

but neither the moral order nor the obligation consists in

us,

or

is

identical with, acts of will,

human

or divine.

Apart from the misconception referred to, we may admit

that the sense of moral obligation and moral conduct do imply
some sense of a possible perfection, some dim awareness of an
ultimate good struggling to assert

itself in the

individual or in

a society of individuals. But can this be rightly described as a

real will in contrast with which the actual will is regarded as
It is surely one thing to say that a
illusory or fragmentary ?
conception of a possible good is implied in our will and quite
another that such a good is really willed. The idea of an
ultimate good, after all, is only a vague schema or assumption

resembling the assumption of the principle of the uniformity of

nature that is held to be implied in scientific investigation

and from
the

this

schema

details of

as such, nothing can be

conduct.

By

calling

it

deduced as regards

real,

however, more

definiteness is ascribed to it than really belongs to it, and this

has disastrous consequences when further it is identified with
the general will as embodied in law, for the ground is then

prepared for the argument that what

imposed on the individual

really imposed upon him by himself and
in this way any amount of interference with him can be

by the general will

is

is

theoretically justified.
"

In the second place, the use of the word " real in this con"
nexion implies the idealist doctrine of
degrees of reality,"
I should say that
of
be
cannot
here
examined.
which,
course,
a thing
will is

either real or not real, and that, therefore, the actual

" real "
will, if by the latter we mean
just as real as the
is

the permanent or standing will, though the former is relatively

to it transitory.
If, on the other hand, as seems to be the case,

IS

by the

THERE A GENERAL WILL?

meant a completely

real will is

is

(b)

good

but

ideal.

The General Will.

The

not real at

will,

all,

the will as

real will then,

ought to

it

rational will with a

system of purposes, then such a

definitely articulate organic

will

101

be.

Now

the rational or

is

such a

quality and content identical in

argued,
It is not merely a joint will or will of all, but
is in

all
is

it

will,

is

individuals.

rather of the

nature of a thread of connexion permeating all individual wills,

or a universal in Bosanquet's sense of the term, i.e., a scheme

which

realizes itself in particular wills, but is

and greater than any actual

wills, in other words,

will.
"

is

more permanent

The content

of all rational

universal," an organic

concrete

system of those ends and purposes which would completely

From such identity of
satisfy the demands of human nature.
content, an identity

existence

is

inferred

and the

will

general

moi commun, a

of as a person, a

and continuity

of substantive unity

will,

is

of

then spoken

an experience

which

of

Society thus comes

continuous self-identical

individuals are imperfect manifestations.

to be conceived as a single experience, a

Particular individuals, in and

being of psychical contents.
"
through whom this social universal" realizes itself, are organizations or connexions of content,

more or

less articulate,

within

All have within them the active spirit or form

of the whole, and as a result, they strive after unity and
this system.

i.e.,
completely articulate experience. To the
extent to which they succeed, they become moie and more
articulate, and in the end, they would merge or become identical

individuality,

with the

single

articulate experience

Separateness, therefore,

is

The argument

rests

"

the

whole.
of

the
wills

communicable, expansive."

on the assumption that identity of

content involves identity of existence.

how

is

and content the minds and

individual, for in substance

of individuals are universal,

which

not an ultimate character

Waiving the Question

must be identical

far all rational wills of finite individuals

in content

(though

it

does not seem to

me

that this has been

MORRIS GINSBERG.

102

proved),

we may note

that Bosanquet himself has

tion to the distinction

ideas as contents
this

might appear that once

made the argument for the unity of minds

and, at

distinction is

on

in society, based

down.

drawn atten-

between ideas as psychical existents and

first sight, it

their

community

of

experience,

breaks

For though ideas as contents may be common, ideas as

When two people are aware

psychical existents never can be.

of the

same

objects,

the

acts

of

awareness considered as

psychical occurrences cannot be the same, though they might

be regarded as resembling one another.
Professor Bosanquet

himself seems sometimes to admit this.

"

No

one would attempt to

he says
overthrow what we have called the

formal distinctness of selves or souls.

Thus,

e.g.,

This consists in the

impossibility that one finite centre of experience should possess

as

its

own immediate

another."*

Yet

it

experience, the immediate experience of

would seem that

this formal distinctness is

compatible with a fundamental sameness or identity. How is

this to be explained? It seems to me that the root of the matter
lies

in the fact that Professor

Bosanquet

is

not really serious

with the distinction between psychical existence or immediacy,

it, and content, and that he tends virtually to deny

as he calls

the reality of the former.

Immediacy

or psychical existence

is

taken to be not a part of the series of mental acts or occur"

It is a phase and riot a
rences which we call the mind.

stratum of experience. "f By this is presumably meant that it

a phase into which contents may enter, and out of which they

is

Acts

apprehension are, as they are also described

"
Any content of
by him, forms which contents may assume.
a
or
become
state of our
comprehension may
apprehension

may

pass.

of

"

All our objective apprehension is something which

capable of taking the shape of a mental state, i.e., of becoming
1
The content is taken to be a continuum, having
immediate.* }

mind."

is

* The Value and

Destiny of
t Logic, vol. 2, p. 301.
J Ibid., p. 300.

the Individual, p. 47.

IS

THEHE A GENERAL WILL?

108

an independent reality prior to the acts of apprehension, which

latter are merely a limitation of it, a partition introduced into

due presumably to the fact that they are dependent on

Thus we are told that different persons are
different bodies.
it,

"

organizations of content which a difference of quality generally,

though not strictly dependent on or belonging to different bodies,

prevents from being wholly blended." In respect of content,
however,
It

maintained they are identical and confluent.

clear, from what has been said, that the whole

it is

seems

favour of

in

argument

the

inclusion in a larger mind,

is

confluence

minds, or

of

their

based upon a hypostatization of

contents and a denial of the reality of acts of experience.

against this whole position it must be urged

As

The former are

(1) Contents never become states of mind.
of the nature of universals and possess the kind of being that
belongs to truth.

The

latter are

temporal processes or occur-

rences.
(2)

The contents cannot be regarded as having an inde-

pendent existence prior

hension.

They

to the act of

apprehension or compre-

are rather the nature or character of acts of

consciousness resulting from the direction of the latter upon an

As natures or essences, the term existence cannot be
object.

properly applied to them.

(3) It follows that acts
persons or of the

on the same
to

sum up

experience,

sense that

object, will
all

of

consciousness,

same individual at

resemble one another, and,

is

of

two

we

if

like

such acts and include them under the term

we can say that experience

it

say

different times, directed

a class of objects

(i.e.,

is

a universal in the

acts),

resembling one

another or possessing identity of character. But two acts

whose contents were exactly the same would still be two acts

and similarly two minds.

(4) The question, however, might

still be pressed
Does
not unity or identity of content, in the case of thought or will,
so penetrate the existence of the separate acts of will or
:

104

MORRIS GINSBERG.

thought as to convert unity of content into unity of existence ?

seems to me that the thinkers who argue in this manner do

It

them-

so because they really regard contents or essences as

selves existents, and, in particular,

if

the problem

is

approached
and purposes, because of the belief they
entertain that the ideals and purposes of human subjects are in

from the side

of ideals

Thus Professor

a sense already realized in a Universal Mind.

"
Bosanquet quotes with approval Green's statement that when
that which is being developed is itself a self-conscious subject,
the end of its becoming must really exist, not merely for, but

in or as a self-conscious

subject.

There must be eternally

such a subject, which is all that the self-conscious subject,

as developed in time, has the possibility of becoming, in which
the ideal of the human spirit or all that it has in it to become,
is

completely realized."

Muirhead argues

Similarly, Professor

"

that though actions belong to individuals, yet

their purposes,

included in the organic

have agreed can only be real in

so far as they are harmonized, are

system of purposes which we

so far as they are the purposes of a Universal

makes

it

clear that in the

Mind

"
;

and he

supreme mind the meanings and

* Now
purposes of finite minds must, in some sense, be fulfilled
all this seems to me to involve a hypostatization of ideals and
the denial

of

the

distinction

^ Ideals are contents

of

between truth and existence.

thought and

will,

and I

fail to see

that

them is altered
thinks them is the

the non-existential character which attaches to

when
mind

the
of

mind
God.

fail
life,

between minds.

Is

common

to

see,

is

gained for the

by insisting on a unity of existence as

it not enough if they can be shown to

religious or social

have

them or
also, what

that entertains

purposes and be striving after the same ideals ?

the standing will of each

Professor Bosanquet argues that

individual, the system of his connected volitions, implies

is

implied in other similar systems of other individuals

* Problems
of Science and Philosophy,

p. 133.

and

and

THERE A GENERAL WILL?

IS

hence he concludes that there

105

a single inclusive system of

which all particular wills are limitations or parts.* Leaving
aside the argument that such a complete system of wills is an
is

ideal rather than a fact, it seems to

me

clear that the kind of

no

unity that such a system would exhibit throws

whatever on the problem of the confluence of wills.
that any will, having for

its

light

Granting

object a part of such a complete

"

"
system, wills by implication the rest of the system, all that
follows would be that all the particular wills would will the
same object, but it would not follow at all that any particular

will is existentially identical with

The

will of society.

any other

will or

with the

my

purposes

fact that the realization of

dependent on the existence of other human beings and the

realization of their purposes on mine does not involve that
is

and the continuum of mental

they
acts, which constitutes the phases of a self, does not lose
its existential unity because their contents are identical in
they must be

or I

I,

character with the contents of the mental acts of another

In yet another way, Professor Bosanquet

tries to

self.

show that

and individual minds are really the same fabric or

The mind, it
structure regarded from different points of view.

society

is

argued,

ideas,

is

made up

each with

its

of

apperceptive masses or systems of

controlling

or

dominant

idea.

Social

institutions or social groupings also consist of systems of ideas,

held together by a dominant purpose which connects them in

such a way as to render possible the fulfilment of the function
of

the whole.

social institution is

the meeting point of

"

a system of appercipient
many minds, is,
systems by which the minds that take part in them are kept
in other words.

in correspondence."

Further, social groupings, each with

its

dominant purpose, may aid or support one another, or again,

they may be divergent or conflicting, but at bottom, they must
be organs of a single pervading life, and cannot be ultimately
*

Mind, January, 1920,

p. 80.

106

MORRIS GINSBERG.

irreconcilable.

From

this point of view, society is seen to be

of the nature of a continuous or self-identical being consisting

which by their differences are made to play into

one another and to form a thoroughly- welded whole or " world."
Now, it is of course true, that society and individuals are made
of activities

up

of the

same elements since society

we

But, in the first place, unless

of states of consciousness or else

consists of individuals.

believe in the

compounding
deny the distinction between

and content, the argument does not prove that the social
mind constitutes a unity of existence in the same sense in

act

which the
mind,

series

of states

of

consciousness which

constitutes a unity of existence;

place, the

problem we have to face

is,

we

call a

and, in the second

whether

social acts, or

deliverances of the social mind, the purposes embodied in social

institutions, exhaust the character of the individual.

Bosanquet seems to start not

purposes, but with the universal

with
"

Professor

and

individuals

human

nature

"

their

as a kind of

organic scheme of functions or purposes; and, theoretically,

"
"
individual existence or uniqueness of form should be accom-

panied by uniqueness of matter or content every finite individual ought to have one special function to perform in society
a function which would never be performed by any other
;

individual.

Such an individual would be

the social universal."

Were

this

the

"

a true particular of

case, there

would, in

be no ground for ascribing

Professor Bosanquet's view,
exclusiveness to selves, for individual minds would then have
still

to be regarded as organic parts of a single whole,

and these

organic parts would ~be the whole, would be, i.e., ways in which
the Universal manifests itself, or assumes special modification.

This latter argument clearly rests on Professor Bosanquet's

"
doctrine of the concrete universal," and it is open to anyone

who

does not accept that doctrine to maintain that the parts

never are identical with one another or with the system that

In point of fact, however, the theoretical " one

mind, one function/' is never realized in society. The capacities

includes them.

THERE A GENERAL WILL?

IS

of individuals are " arbitrary

repeat,

dne mind may

and contingent."

and comprehend the

overlap,

10?

experiences of

mind may vary

other

"

from what just

a function like that of an ant to a self which

minds.

The contents

suffices

for

of a

possesses the frame-work

entire society."

and very much

Yet does not the

of the detail of

fact of repetition
"
"

an

and over-

human nature is wrongly

lapping prove that the universal
conceived as an individual, does it not prove that particularity
is more than an
appearance and refuses to be swallowed up
in the whole

universal
"

ality

Is

there not here

"human nature"

which does not consist at

society,

which does consist

of a

a confusion between the"!

"human

or

capacity or potenti-

all of particular existents,

number of

and

particulars related to

one another in various ways, and which, though it possesses a

kind of unity of its own, cannot possibly have the kind of
unityj
that belongs to a concept ?
What is meant by the " true
"
particular of the social universal
depends on the meaning of
the latter phrase.
actual individual
is to

If the

is

reference

member

an organic scheme

the true particular

"

is

of

of

it.

human

not an individual at

which he

is

enters.

self-determination, a substantive unity

never merged in these relations.

He

any

however, the reference'

purposes or to

true particular," in the former sense,

social relations in

to society, then

is

If,

all.

capacity, then

Further, the

never exhausted in the

He

possesses a kind of

and continuity, which

is

is

the centre of a rich

which are but imperfectly expressed in

and so far from saying that the individual

diversity of relations
social institutions,

an expression or reflection of society from " an unique point

of view or special angle," we should say that society is an
expression or reflection of individuals from an unique point of

is

The appercipient systems which constitute the common material of individuals and society contain
in the case of each individual elements of feeling, emotion and
view or special angle.

bodily sensation which are exclusively theirs and incommunicable.

It must, I think, be apparent that the real weight of

MORRIS GINSBERG,

103

the argument in favour of a general will rests, not on a psychological analysis of de facto states of mind, or even of human

purposes as conceived by the generality of actual individuals,

but upon an inferred real will in which all human purposes are

and harmonized.

unified

Now, Professor Bosanquet himself

Humanity as a whole, Humanity

argues that a general will of

as an ethical ideal,

"

type or a problem rather than a fact."

So long as we confine ourselves to facts, may not the same be
is

said of the general will of

hand, the real will

mind

any existing state

the ideal will

is

on the other

If,

especially,

if,

we have

in

some sense already

in

rational system of

purposes
Universal Mind, does not then a greater reality
attach to the general will of Humanity, in which the wills of
fulfilled in the

existing states
wills

general

would be harmonized and

of

the

several

states

Humanity, can only be regarded

Summing up
1.

There

may

be something in each individual, and, there-

fore, in a society of individuals,

of

to

*
?

as particular

say

relation

in

which,

we may

this discussion,

than to the

unified,

an ultimate good or idea

which responds

of perfection.

to a conception

This, however,

is

"

"

The actual wills of indireal

will.
badly described as a
viduals contain many elements which are not in correspondence
with such an ideal of perfection, and these elements are quite
as

"

real

latter

is

"

as the

meant a

or ends, this
2.

is,

"

real

"

will.

scheme

strictly speaking,

The crux

of

on the other hand, by the

If,

fully articulate

of organized purposes

an ideal and

riot

a real will.

the problem, however, really

identification of this

in the

lies

ideal will with the general will.

This

seems to rest on a confusion between content and existence

and breaks down utterly

if

we

tinction clearly before our minds.

to

aim

at a universal or general object, they

psychical existents remain

Cf.

Kousseau,

on keeping that disEven if all wills be shown

insist

would

distinct.

Discourse on Political Economy.

still

as

THERE A GENERAL WILL?

IS

Since

3.

109

no such thing as a general will, the

is embodied in the State does not arise.

there

is

question whether it
This does not mean that the State and other forms of com-

munity do not exhibit a kind of unity, but only that the

unity which they possess is a relation between the individuals
constituting them, based on

community

and

of purposes

ideals,

and that such a unity need not be hypostatized and spoken of

as a person or will.*
For the purposes of social theory, what
is

required

is

not a

common

self

but a

common

good.

It is not

minds have a unity

but merely that they have a oneness

at all necessary to prove that individual

and identity

of existence,

of spiritual content in the sense that they

must

same common good and be animated by the same

we speak

strive for the

ideals.

When

a kind of absolute being of which

individuals are expressions or reflections, or as a" kind of
of

society as

thread of connexion running through

same

in all of them,

we

all its

members and the

are really dealing with a conception or

general concept which may have logical meaning, but which

cannot be said to be an existent fact alongside of other
existent facts.
The unity that belongs to a concept cannot
possibly belong to the

mass

of individuals to

whom

the concept

refers.

With

it

a view of bringing together the results of this paper,

In the
will be useful to emphasize the following points.

first

place,

we may

refer

between a particular,
or

habit of

will

(i.e.,

to

the

distinction already noted

definite act of

capacity of

and a disposition
willing under suitable

will

Both the
systems of such dispositions.
particular act of will and the dispositional will are essentially
In the
individual, and can never be anything but individual.

circumstances),

or

second place, from both of these must be distinguished that

which is willed, the object of will. The latter may be individual or

Cf. E.

common
Barker,

to

"The

many

acts of will,

whether

of the

same

Discredited State," Political Quarterly, 1915.

110

MORRIS GINSBERG.

individual or of

that which

be willed

many individuals. In the third place, from

we must distinguish that which ought to
and which we may call the Good, the nature of
is

willed

which does not consist of being willed and which may or may
not, in point of fact, be willed.
Now, it might conceivably be
proved that the acts of will of individuals and their permanent dispositional wills have a common object, e.g., the
maintenance of the social structure. Whether this be so, or
not, is a question of fact,

and

will involves the presence of

if

at, such a will would appear to

few enlightened individuals. In the
people, all that is present is a mild

a clear idea of the object aimed

exist only in the case of a

case of the majority of

interest, ranging

from

tacit acquiescence to

blank indifference.

Further, supposing a will for the maintenance of the social

structure be proved to exist in all individuals,

merely a joint will for a

The

common

it

would

still

be

object.

and the systems of dispositions referred

to above, need not be, and are not, completely rational or
harmonious, either in the individual or in the community. The
belief

acts of will,

that they are would seem

between that which

is

willed

to

be due to a confusion

and the Good.

It

is

tacitly

assumed that that which ought

a supposed real self

to be willed really is willed by

of the individual or by an Absolute Mind.

Since that which ought to be willed is presumably rational and

harmonious, the real will is conceived as a rational system of
purposes, of which particular wills are imperfect manifestations.
Here, again, supposing that it could be proved that individual
wills are rational

would

still

for the good.

is

due

and therefore aim

not constitute a general

The

belief that they

to a confusion

at a
will,

harmonious good, they

but merely a joint will

do constitute a general will

between content and

act.

Now,

acts are

always individual and neither the object of will nor the good
constitutes existential parts of the individual consciousness,
since they are either objects
in existence

is

which exist and whose continuance

willed, or else objects

which do not

exist but

IS

\\liich

THERE A GENERAL WILL?

we think ought

Ill

In neither case do they form

between

to exist.

parts of the individual unless the whole distinction

There would seem, therefore, to

subject and object be invalid.
be no real sense in which unity and continuity can be ascribed
to the general will.

In

all

that has been said,

it

has not been implied that

individuals are isolated beings, independent

within themselves

all

that

is

needed

for their

reals,

containing

development.

It

mode of experience the

indebted
to
the
social
milieu, and that the
largely
are
of
social
connexion and
forces which govern action
products

is

obvious that both for content and

individual

arise

is

from the interaction

of personalities in society.

tissue of psychological forces

operating

in a society

But the
not

is

unitary in character, though in their highest phases those forces

In the lowest phases of a
crystallize into unity within unity.*
when
conditions
are
very much alike for all
people's culture,
the members, and

members

the

when

there

is little

feelings, ideas, interests are of a

more advanced stages

essential influences

members

or no class differentiation,

are very homogeneous

of culture,

remain

of a society,

to

in

character and

their

very uniform kind. In the

though at bottom the same

determine the character of

and though

their

common

all

influences are

strengthened by the growth of language and the spiritual

possessions of a civilized community, yet differentiations take
place and we get a number of groupings each with its own
atmosphere, moulding the life and action and thought of its
members. Individuals may and do belong to more than one
of these groupings.

Morever, the latter are in contant motion

and transformation and produce collective powers which determine changes in the social, economic and religious life. Some
of these collective

powers may become crystallized in enduring

have only a vague, formless kind of

institutions but others

Cf. Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political

Theory, and G.
Schmoller, Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre,

112

THERE A GENERAL WILL?

IS

being,

and may receive expression

in social class-differentiation,

which gradually become

judgments
standards of conducts, in codes of honour, public opinion.
of value

political parties, in

When

all this

has been admitted, we are yet a long

way

off the

mind and will. The tissue of psychoelements

to has not the kind of being which
referred
logical
to
a
or
self, nor can the kind of influence it
person
belongs
doctrine of an objective

exerts on the individual be described as a general will.

There

need be no mystery about the complex of ideas operating in

Their
society and embodied in its institutions, books, laws, etc.
significance lies in the fact that they are interpreted, modified

and sustained by individual minds from generation to generation.

Further, the unity which community of ideas gives to
associations varies enormously, according to the closeness of the
ties

that link

member

to

his

group.

sacrosanct about social organizations.

to

Even

There

is

nothing

states are subject

change and transformation, as recent events show: and as to

cultural influences

it

is

surely

common

experience that indi-

viduals often can and do withstand them, abandon,

e.g.,

the

No
language and religion of their race and choose others.
embrace or exhaust the

association or associations can ever

entire life of

man.

Men

do indeed share in a

common

life

and

contribute to a collective achievement, yet nothing but confusion

can result from hypostatizing this life and ascribing to it a

reality, over and above the reality of the lives which individuals
live in relation with

one another.

Meeting

<>/'

ike Aristotelian Society at 74,

March 22nd, 1920,

071

By CLEMENT

C. J.

W.

til.rrd,

1,

at 8 P.M.

AND

OBLIGATION, AUTONOMY,
GOOD.

VII.

Grosvcaor

TFIE

COMMON

WEBB.

some time ago the Secretary pressed me to fulfil an

overdue promise to do my duty after a lapse of (I fear) some

WHEN

offering the Society a paper for discussion, I set

fifteen years

by

down

subject

as

my

"

Obligation,

Autonomy, and the Common

Good," because the problem of the mutual relation of these

three conceptions, which play so large a part in the discussions

moral philosophers, was much in my mind at the time but,

that I come to put on paper what I have to say about

of

now

them, I fear that

it

may

prove partly so

trite

and partly so

inconclusive as to be scarcely worthy of the Society's atten-

be asking you to consider the familiar contrast of

"
"
rather than
ethical systems which dwell upon what is
good
"
"
dwell
those
which
with
is
what
upon what is
right
upon
tion.

I shall

"

"

right

known

rather than upon

what

is

good

to

examine well-

phrases of authors so often discussed in the schools of

British philosophy as Aristotle, Kant,

it

"

"

were, to peep at the significance of

this consideration

and examination

and Green

what we may

and only, as
discover by

for those occupied

with the

not less familiar but more burning problems associated with

such expressions as
"

right

and

"

"

"

authority

and

"

"

democracy,"

divine

general will."

In mentioning the "general will," I may say that my

remarks about will have nothing to do with the question of
its

relation

to

the wills of the individual

members

of

the

community, which has been so prominently brought before

our notice of late by papers in our Proceedings and in Mind.
I

may

perhaps, however, be permitted, before coming to close

CLEMENT

114

G.

quarters with the subject which

consideration, to express

which

either,

attributed

my

WEBB.

J.

am now

proposing for our

view that no theory is satisfactory

falls into an error akin to that

on the one hand,

by Aristotle

to the Platonists of

Xwpiopos or the

ascription to the universal of a separate existence alongside of

and speaks

"

"

as another
general will
will or of the personality of the State or other community as
another personality over and above the wills or personalities of

its

particulars,

the citizens or

hand,

the

of the

community

or,

on the other

do justice to the undoubted facts of common life,

shame at the acts of our family or of

fails to

wherein we

members

of

feel pride or

our nation, or

even for the deeds

of

kinsmen or

fellow-

countrymen, although we may have no individual responsiIt is not enough in order to explain the
bility for them.

phenomena which have suggested the

"

doctrine of the

"

general

common and not the will,

of
as
we
the
common
just
perception by several
might speak
people of the same object, where all we mean is that each of
them perceives it.
This does not allow for much that is
involved in the actual consciousness of willing as a member
will

to say that the object willed

is

a society. But I do not intend to pursue this subject.

have attempted to discuss some aspects of it in a book just
For the present I leave it and turn to the problem
published.

of
I

with which I have undertaken to deal to-night.

I conceive that

Kant was

in

the

right

in

finding

the

essential feature of our moral consciousness in the sense of

I do not propose to discuss here the

obligation.

well-known

from his description of the Good Will

as willing nothing in particular, but only the form of universal
nor to do more than touch upon another question,
legislation

which

difficulties

arise

more relevant

present purpose, namely, that of the

explanation of our sense of obligation as due to the presence
in us of a recalcitrant sensibility alongside of the Practical

my

Concerning this latter point I would only observe

while it may fairly be said that the opposition between

Reason.
that,

to

OBLIGATION, AUTONOMY, ANH THE

COMMON GOOD.

the moral law and our desires which characterizes so

115

much

of

our moral experience no doubt depends upon the presence in

us of such a recalcitrant sensibility, there seems to be in the
recognition of a supreme authority and the correspondent sense

something which need

not disappear even if we should imagine our desires brought
wholly into accord with the moral law and the service of God
of self -surrender involved in morality

no bondage, however legitimate, but as a joyful freedom.

The tendency which we note in Kant not only to illustrate the
felt as

authoritative character of the moral law by its opposition to

our desires but to identify that authoritative character with

that opposition does, I think, to
tion of the truth (as I take

it to

some extent, mar

be) which

it

his exposi-

seems to

me

that

has grasped more firmly and maintained more consistently

than any other thinker, the truth that the sense of obligation
lie

is

the essential feature of the moral consciousness.

When

from Kant we turn

to Green,

we

find

him

and here

representative of not a few thinkers in the Englishspeaking countries who, as regards the principles of their

he

is

ethical

and

political philosophy,

of his school

Kant

may

be said to be more or

on the one hand making his

the

own

less

the teaching of
"

"

of morality
imperative
196, 202), but also representing the
(Prolegomena to Ethics,
sense of obligation as flowing from the acknowledgment of a
"
common good," the conception of which is put forward as the

respecting

categorical

central or fundamental moral idea, while the position that the

"

"
sense of obligation in a nature such as ours is directly consequential upon the acceptance of this idea is treated throughout as too obvious a truth to stand in need of any argument in

defence (see, e.g.,

It is interesting to observe
*7, 202, 203).
"
in the chapter on
Pleasure and Common Good Virtue as

its

how

"

Common Good," and in that on The Moral Ideal and

Moral Progress," apart from an occasional and incidental use of
"
"
"
"
the word duty," all reference to " obligation
or to a
law
the

is

absent

but without, I think, any indication of a suspicion

CLEMENT

116

C.

J.

WEBB.

might be missed by any who had followed with agreement the endorsement of Kantian language in the earlier part
that

it

of the book.

Now this

assumption that the notion of a

common good, when

entertained by beings whose private desires

may impel them

to acts inconsistent therewith, leads necessarily and directly

"
to the notion of obligation or of a
categorical imperative,"

me

appears to
to

to be

an assumption which we are not entitled

make.
In saying this I do not, of course, intend to ignore the
matter of history, the sense of obligation no

fact that, as a

doubt

originates

Kant begins with

as a sense

of social obligation.

Although

the consciousness of obligation as present in

man already morally cultivated, and reaches

"
the notion of the ethical community, the so-called
kingdom
of ends," by subsequent reflection on this experience, and, as a

the soul of the

well-known remark

in his

NaMass, informs -us, was

well aware

that this was not the historical order, to which the procedure ,of
"
Rousseau (which he calls " synthetic in contrast with his own
(i

analytic" method) aimed at conforming, he saw, however, no

reason

why

the one should not be as well adopted as the other.

But we need not therefore deny that out

of

an experience,

originally stimulated by a certain environment and relative

to it has been developed one in which we reach an apprehen-

sion of reality to
is

which consideration

no longer relevant.

We may

of this original

impulse

remember Martineau's

striking

comparison of the development of the moral consciousness to

More directly to our purpose is
that of the sense of sight.
a comparison of the evolution of our recognition in philosophy

thought or rather of fundamental features of

doctrine, with which the name of Durkheim is

of principles of
reality.

The

associated,

make no

of the

social, origin

of

our categories contains,

question, an important truth.

Although

I think, be accepted as it stands, because social

and

it

cannot,

arrangements

institutions presuppose a perception of temporal succession

OBLIGATION, AUTONOMY,

and

of

spatial

Time and
to the

is

of Space, of the

human mind

117

which they therefore cannot

no reason to doubt that our notions of

extension

account, yet there

AND THE COMMON GOOD.

for

World and

of

God, are

in a context of social

first

interests

presented

from which

their absolute, or at least objective, value (for I do not wish to

"

involve myself, by the use of the word

absolute," in controversies which would be irrelevant here) was only gradually

But unless we permit

disentangled.

this

fact to

sceptical of this absolute or objective value as

Science, Philosophy, and Eeligion,

and

make us

acknowledged in
by some

of course it is

permitted to do this in one or other of these spheres we map

allow that we may acknowledge our acquisition of a consciousness of obligation to be conditioned
of a

community without

tion of a

We

common good
may perhaps

by our membership

necessarily holding that the recogni-

explains the consciousness of obligation^

trace

the

influence

of

Eousseau, an

influence to which, in respect of his doctrine of the primacy of

the Practical Eeason^ Kant himself has called attention, in the

"
"
choice of the expression
autonomy by the latter to describe
the status of the Good Will. I have lately discussed this point
elsewhere at some length in connexion with the question of the
relation of the Kantian ethics to theism.
Kant no doubt
desired to exclude by his choice of this

word any view which

in obedience to the arbitrary will of

placed duty
whatever channels

it

might be revealed.

God, through

As such

sovereignty

was vested by Kousseau's political theory in the General Will,

which was yet not to be identified with the volontt de tons, so,
according to Kant's teaching, the authority whose command was
"
"
conveyed in the categorical imperative of morality was that
of the Eeason which is common to us all, though we may any
the guidance of desires which
As, in the sphere of theory of
prescribes.

or all of us choose to follow

conflict

with what

it

only by counting that we can come to know the

necessary truths of arithmetic (which are therefore synthetic
judgments a priori), and yet we can only count one way (for to
cognition,

it

is

CLEMENT

118
reckon wrongly
at

all),

is

C.

J.

WEBB.

not, strictly speaking, counting those

so in the sphere of practice

numbers

we can only be aware

of the

moral law by willing in accordance with it. For our knowledge of morality is not and cannot be purely speculative and
when we will what is contrary to our duty, we can only do so
;

by what we perceive to be a contradiction in our will since in

recognizing that we ought not to do what yet we choose to do
we are actually willing its contrary as what ought to be done,
;

or,

Kantian phrase,

in the

as

And, as we can

law universal.

only be said in the proper sense to know e.g., a mathematical

truth when we see and understand its proof (or its self-evidence)
for ourselves, so we can only recognize the obligation of a moral

we have seen, means (even when we

disobey it) willing it when we recognize it for ourselves. But, on
the other hand, we no more make the latter our duty by willing
it than we make a mathematical
proposition true by knowing it.
Now for Kant himself there was certainly not implied in
duty

which, again, as

word

his use of the

"

"

autonomy any denial of the authoritathe law which yet (in a sense) we ourselves enact.

tiveness of

A profound

sense of this authoritativeness

is,

on the other hand,

evinced throughout his account of the nature of morality

there is indeed nothing in his teaching which is more charac-

teristic

and

amenable

to our control

was ready
of

"

Nevertheless, since words are even less

distinctive.

than

Humpty Dumpty

to admit, I strongly suspect that

"

autonomy

to express

what was

for

in the fairy tale

Kant's description

him the supreme

or

rather the sole expression not merely of human freedom but

of divine authority has eventually contributed to promote the

widespread tendency actively present in contemporary thought

upon moral and social problems, to repudiate altogether the
conception of authority as in any sense primary or irreducible.
In England, at any rate, the first stage in the progress from
the Kantian doctrine towards what
authoritarian ethics and

politics

may be called the antinow so much in vogue is

represented by the teaching of Green.

It

might indeed seem

AND THE COMMON GOOD.

OBLIGATION, AUTONOMY,

more natural

119

Kantian tradition at

to affiliate these not to the

but rather to the Utilitarian, which could never find a place

all,

I am not, however, denying the

"ought."
influence exerted by the latter but only attempting to trace a
less obvious, but perhaps not less important, .line of descent

a genuine

for

connecting the ethics and politics in question with the great

"
German philosopher in whom the " ought had found its
I

doughtiest champion.

have already pointed out how Green

from that of a

treats the notion of Obligation as flowing directly

Common
.

for

The influence

Good.

something in the divergence

of Hegel may no doubt count

from Kant involved in making

the latter rather than the former of these two notions primary
in ethics; but

what probably counted

for

more

in

an Oxford

teacher was that of Plato and Aristotle, the intensive study of

whose philosophy

It

a reversion from

Kant

General Will and

the

may

also be regarded as in

to Rousseau,

Oxford

the

the characteristic note of

is

philosophical course.

some sense

between whose doctrine

Kant's doctrine of

the

of

Categorical

Imperative there is, as I have noted above, a close kinship as

well as an important difference. In recent English writers who
be said in a general

may

treated as fundamental

Green

to belong to the school of

way

in political philosophy, the doctrine of the General Will

is

often

despite its

but I shall venture to urge that it is,

historical importance, less illuminating than is often

supposed.

For, after

because

it is

all, /it

is

not because

right that the volontt gtndrcde

it

is

is

general, but*

really authorita-

it is only thus indeed that it can be distinguished from

"
the volonte de tous, which we do not allow to be
general,"

tive

though
as that
if

at

it is

the will " of

which

Kant's

all

all,"

just because

ought to will.
"

"

analytical

method

of

we do not approve

itj

Thus we may recognize that,

procedure leads him to present,

any rate at the outset, too individualistic a conception of

morality, owing to his consideration of the consciousness of

moral obligation in abstraction from the social medium in which
on the other hand those who take
it arises and is maintained
;

CLEMENT

120

WEBB.

J.

"

"

the

C.

for their watchword, by considering it in

general will
from
the
abstraction
consciousness of obligation and treating

that consciousness as explicable by reference to the "general

miss what alone gives to that will any ethical
will,"
significance.

But

the

if

General Will

modern doctrine derived from Eousseau

is

open

to the charge of insufficiently

of a

empha-

the

notion of obligation, so also is the teaching of

Of Aristotle it
Aristotle, and possibly even that of Plato.
sizing

must, I think, be admitted that he for the most part regards

morality, as it were, from the outside, and not unfrequently

seems to confound the phenomena of moral conduct with those

which have only, as' Croce might say, an economic character.
This
"

pre-eminently the case with his celebrated doctrine of

expounded in the second book of the Nicomachean

is

"

habit

where he speaks as if a certain kind of action could

a moral value by mere repetition, and appears to make
[acquire
no distinction of principle between moral education and the
Ethics,

tricks.
Not only, however, in
in
his
but
ethical
particular passages,
teaching as a whole,
there may be observed a failure to grasp the distinctive
character of the moral experience.
Thus, though he rightly

training of an animal to do

lays

it

down

that the virtuous

displays his virtue

St'

man

wills the action in

avro, for its

which he

own sake and not

for the

yet with scant consistency herewith he

makes
regularly
Trpoaipeo-is, which is the will exerted in moral
"
"
of the means
and not " of the end."
This
action, to be

sake of anything

else,

inappropriate use of the category of means and end

is

bound,

in the sphere of morals as of that of art, to lead to confusion

and

whole exposition suffers from it. El&ai/j,ovia or

"
"
is the
which
end/' being thus excluded from the
Happiness,"
"
means" in dealing with which the moral life is, according to him,
Aristotle's

mainly,

if

not solely, concerned, inevitably tends, in consequence,

from ySovrj, " Pleasure," to be

despite his efforts to distinguish it

eventually confounded with

it.

Of course Aristotle does not

COMMON GOOD.

OBLIGATION, AUTONOMY, AND THE

121

the
ignore the obligatory character of morality
to
facts
the
witness
occurrence
of
the
word
bears
Sel
frequent

altogether

which were before him as they were before Kant but, as I

have tried to show, it is not grasped by him, as it is by Kant,
as the distinctive feature of moral experience.
;

Of

Plato, with his profounder insight into the facts of

moral

His doctrine, which

according to which the

experience, these criticisms do not hold.

Aristotle

so

emphatically

rejected,

knowledge of the Supreme Good was the true foundation of

social and individual morality, however in certain respects
open, as stated by himself, to the criticisms brought against

by

his

famous

I think, assign to morality that

has for Kant, but not for Aristotle.

pupil, does,

absolute value which

Nevertheless,

it

it

we may,

I believe, safely

admit that Kant

in his

"

"

upon the categorical imperative of morality has

us
with a description of the moral experience which
supplied
insistance

we

shall not easily find

matched

and decisiveness

in clearness

whether in Plato or in any other of the ancients.

I do not think that we can dissociate the tendency conspicuous in contemporary social and political thought at the
least to lay

and often

no stress upon

to repudiate

of authority (except may be in the sense in

"
"
to expert opinion) from the
authority

the idea

which we ascribe
acquiescence

of

have directly or indirectly

among
moulded the minds of the present generation who have most
those

the

thinkers

that

earnestly upheld a spiritual interpretation of

human

life in

the

notion that such an interpretation can be satisfactorily based

upon the conceptions

of a

General Will and a

Although such thinkers may themselves have

Common

Good.

so closely asso-

ciated these conceptions with others derived from a different

source that they did not realize the possibility of dissociating

them from

those, yet they

have

facilitated

correlative conceptions of authority

a general will and a

theoretical elimination

common
of

the

by subordinating the

and obligation

good,

former

practical

from the

to those of

and even
social

and

122

CLEMENT

C.

J.

WEBB.

The philosophers of whom

am thinking were in their sympathies what is generally
"
"
nowadays called democratic." But the principles of a demo"
cratic
society, if so worked out as not to secure to the idea
political ideals of their successors.
I

of authority its

primary and independent position, must

ulti-

what they are described as being in the

"
Green's well-known lectures
principles of political

mately cease to be
of

title

obligation."

If

may

have used elsewhere

here quote words of my own which I

One may quite well admit or even

"
:

only where the members of the community freely

choose or accept for themselves the person or persons in whom
insist that

the sovereign authority is reposed is there an adequate security

that this person or these persons, since they are not of
different clay from those that are to be in subjection to them,

be able to appeal to a sense that the government has

authority and can claim loyalty and obedience from its subjects.
will

In other words, the true ground of preference of free or

popular institutions over despotic lies not in this, that no one
is
is

under obligation to obey any authority but one which

ultimately his own; but in this, that only where he has

really

himself a say in appointing or accepting the vehicles of that

authority can he be counted upon to acquiesce in their authority
not his

as

but the best representative he can find of

The one-sided doctrine

^God's.

that

own

is

to

say,

of the divine right of kings,

embodied one-half

of

the

true doctrine of

political obligation, while the one-sided doctrine of the rights of

man embodied the other. In the process of reaction from the

error

which invested certain particular modes of selecting the

supreme authorities

in the

community with a

religious sanctity

which authority
not really authoritative at all unless it be essentially God's
and not our own in any sense in which we can at all contrast

it is

apt to be forgotten that there is a sense in

is

our

own with
It

is

God's."

noticeable that Kant, while, as I observed before, he

was probably,

in part at

any

rate,

induced to insist as he does

OBLIGATION, AUTONOMY,
"

upon the

"

autonomy

of

AND THE COMMON GOOD.

the

Good Will by

123

his desire

to

exclude any such reference to the will of God as the source of'
obligation as would introduce an element of arbitrariness into
the moral law and open the door to the equation of positive
enactments supposed to be "revealed" with rules genuinely
apprehended as valid by the moral consciousness, yet not

only admits that

it

is

legitimate to represent moral laws as

divine commands, but regards

we

that

do

should
"

"

personality

it

His

as natural or even inevitable

moreover,

about

as the proper object of that reverence

which

so.

language,

pre-eminently due to the moral law, though I do not

say but that it is patient of an interpretation which would
avoid a conclusion that Kant certainly fought shy of reaching,
yet

is

nevertheless points in a direction which I will here do no

more than

indicate

because I have dwelt upon the subject

elsewhere at some length. I will only hint my own conviction that a recognition, such as we find urged by Martineau,
that in the consciousness of obligation there is implied not
"
autonomy," but one which,
only a factor which we may call
if we may adopt an expression already used by certain writers

in this connexion,

we may

call

"

theonomy," would be contrary

rather to the letter than to the spirit of Kant's doctrine

so

long as we are prepared seriously to take to heart the principle

involved in Kant's own treatment of theism as a " postulate of
the practical reason

"

and

to renounce

any attempt

to attain

such a knowledge of the will of God in other ways than

through the moral consciousness as would contaminate with
arbitrary precepts the purity of the moral law.

This can be

done, as I venture to think, without refusing to acknowledge

the possibility of such a personal intercourse with God in
religion as Kant, in his dread of

allow, but without

and become

(as with

superstition,

which religion must cease

Kant

it

would never

to be religion,

tends to become) a mere symbol

of morality.

Without, however, urging

now

the legitimacy of such an

124

OBLIGATION, AUTONOMY, AND THE

have just outlined from Kant's position to one

hesitatingly theistic than his, I will only repeat my

advance as
less

COMMON GOOD.

cannot be directly

conviction that the notion of obligation

common good " that, on the contrary,

common good," as also the closely connected

derived from that of a

the notion of a

"

"

"
notion of a
general will," derives

and eventually

for

notion of obligation

politics

from

and that

this

its

significance for ethics

connexion

its

makes

truly ethical conception of the State

to

it

with the

necessary for any

retain

the idea

of

"

authority/' as ascertained, indeed, through the general will,

because only thus can it be recognized as authority by the

community

for itself,

but not as in

the generality of the general will,

absolute factor therein, which
as the sovereignty of God.

merely the result of

but as the expression of an

may

itself

perhaps be best described

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor

London, W. 1, on April 12th, 1920, at 8 P.M.

Street,

SYMPOSIUM: IS THE "CONCRETE UNIVERSAL" THE TRUE TYPE OF UNIVERSALITY?

VIIL

By

J.

W.

SCOTT, G. E. MOORE, H.
G.

DAWES
By

1.

J.

WILDON CARR and

HICKS.

W.

SCOTT.

No
if

theory which professes to be knowledge can hope to stand

its truth would render knowledge itself an impossibility.

We

must know.

at least this

There seems to be no getting away from

minimum

of certainty.

is left in the hands of the metaphysician, in conone

sequence,
problem from which he cannot escape. What
commentary is made upon the nature of the universe by the

There

fact that

knowledge

arises in it

of knowledge in the

I believe that the presence

universe carries with

it

an affirmative

answer to the question at the head

these papers, in the
simpler form to which that question, I think, reduces itself,
of

and

which I propose here to reduce it, namely,

universal concrete ? The fact of knowledge seems to
to

carry with

and

it

the consequence that the universal

so that it is concrete.

Such, shortly stated,

is

is

Is

me

the
to

the real,

the thesis

which

I should like to support in this paper.

In indicating how I seem to be brought to such a view, I
shall give the position first quite crudely and summarily, and

after that attempt

me

some detail.

The fundamental point is a fairly simple one. It seems to

that if I know, then what I know is always someone else's.

It is not simply mine.

than-mine whilst mine.

It

is

always other- than-mine

other-

And

How

herein I find the answer to the question, Why is it, or

comes it, that that which I know presents itself to me
L

126

W. SCOTT.

J.

as real-and-objective

It presents

something

mine shows

of

itself

thus,

in the state of

presentation precisely consists

itself to

inasmuch as
things

where

be also, and at the same time,

other-than-mine.
Finally,

what appears

and concrete
I

If

Someone

And

had

in this state of things is universality,

universality.
to knit the three points together I should say

and

else's

Universality,

and

knowledge at

so objective, if there is to be

I should reckon that as

amounting

to

all.

the statement

concrete universality, if there is to be knowledge

at all.

In attempting to interpret this statement in detail, it will

be well, perhaps, to begin with the last-mentioned notion, univerI take it that universality is simply the characteristic

sality.

of being not

mine alone but

also other people's.

We may

here recall the fact that this appears to have been

the object of search in at least one famous enterprise in the
history of philosophy which we all agree was a search for the
universal; I refer to the dialectic of Socrates.

His

thirst for

the Idea plainly has its spring in the sense that what is ours
must be other people's too that our meaning for Temperance
;

allowed to be ours only.

So long as
the
hold
for
Athenian
does
not
at Sparta
just
people

or Justice cannot be

what

is

must go

or elsewhere, discussion

present which keeps the

The

on.

dialectic in motion.

situation

is

still

The process comes

agreement where what is just for me is also

Thrasymachus and you and everybody. In this context
at least, we find a search instituted for that which exhibits the

to rest only in

just for

characteristic,

There

is

if

might so express

a search

by-all-minds.

still,

it,

of

I think, for the

And, although

it

being found by all.

thing, the found-

same

would probably not be

readily agreed to be a search for the universal, I think

1 refer to the

work

That the quest

so

it is so.

of natural science.

of

modern

science

is

for the universal

would

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

127

not be so readily granted, perhaps, as that the Socratic dialectic

Very little reflection, however, should be enough to

was.

convince us that

is

surely trying to say

time you meet one.

In trying, say, to define a

so.

what

is-always, or

it

is

That, surely,

circle, I

am

what you meet every

a process of seeking the

And it consists in trying to state what logically

universal.
could be stated by anybody whomsoever regarding the circle
now in front of him. In trying to describe imitation or play,
an instance from another quarter,

to take

universal.

am

am

still

after the

what play is-always. And

express what anybody might

surely trying to say

that consists, again, in trying to

see in the particular set of gambols of the particular animal or

human

being which he witnesses.

paths of the planets I

am

planets are always-doing

to say

In trying to

settle the true

similarly trying to settle

and

that, once more, is the

what they might be found engaged

in,

what the
attempt

by anyone whom-

a striving on the part of men to

reach the universal in the sense of something which is not

There

soever.

is

thus

still

which might at the same time be anybody's.

a point, then, where ancient dialectic and modern

theirs alone, but

There
science

is

meet;

human

observation of natural facts,

same aim.

from which

a standpoint

dialectical sifting of

both

the ancient

opinions and the modern scientific

can be seen to have had one and the

They are a search

for the universal in that both are

a search for what x or y or z is-always.

(That if they are the
latter they are also the former should, I think, go without
saying.

How

What else

can the universal be ?

can I ask for the universal
"
for
or
for
the
universal
white,"
instance,
upon," except in one
"
"
way, namely, by asking to be told what white is-always, or
"
"
"

"

is-always ? And the

always," as we are now
a
involves
to
reference
other
minds which is as
contending,

what

upon

essential to the
dialectical.

It

modern
is

scientific procedure as to the ancient

only more clear in the latter than in the

former.)

The

universal, then,

is

that

which

is

common

to

more than
L 2

128

The next point

me.

SCOTT.

\V.

J.

that this of others', which I find and

is

cannot be a knower without finding, this of others' which

meet on the door-step every time I seek as a knower

emerge from

my own

universal

the real.

It

is

was

privacy into the great public world, this

and

so to Socrates

which might be

all

I
to

Plato.

The Justice and Beauty

men's, were alone, to them, the real Justice

and the real Beauty. Even by us, it is clearly presumed that

until we have found what any one might find
until we have
found the definition of the circle, the law of the planets' courses,
we have not found the real. We do not very naturally,
etc.,

We

however, go beyond this negative commitment.

usually
allow that it is possible for us to have found this universal
while yet the real escapes
is justified.
I think that

I think the larger

us.

presumption

when we have found the universal

the real is indeed present to us. The universal, in fact, contains
those parts of the real which we sometimes fancy may escape
and in knowing it we know them.

What

are the parts of the real which seem to be capable of

when he knows

wholly escaping one, even

are, of

They

course,

universal appears to

We may
it

At

me

universal's

we may take

the standpoint of

know,

is

but to apprehend
extent I succeed.

it

Now, the

particulars.

more than one way.

to the bar of

common

common

it

what

sense,

am

not 'to apprehend the object as

it

as

it

What

is

to

me and

think, for

sense and

after
is

it

me and everybody

when

to

me,

To some

everybody.

does such success imply

I see the object as it is to

see

universal

justified there.

I seek to

the

to contain its particulars.

test this thesis in

instance, that
find

the

When

do

Surely when

as containing all possible appearances of itself.

Common
appearance

sense does not consistently take

to be

the very

what the thing is-always and what

Common-sense has

its little

search to make.

terminates upon that appearance which

is

And

first

it is- to-all.

its

search

the container of the

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

129

the front view of a facade contains all the perspective

views, or as the circular aspect of a hoop contains all the
rest, as

What

the

seems.

which

aspects

elliptical

object

it

from

presents

is-always

contains

When

It is the real, therefore.

different

what

it

it

angles.

momentarily

is

the

present

real is verily present.

But the best proof that the universal contains

and so

is real, lies

it

particulars

otherwise there could

Concrete universality must be, if there is

The reason is that except the parall.

not be knowledge.
to be

were

in seeing that

its

at

knowledge
were in a containing universal, nothing could present

ticular

And

other-than-me.

itself as
is

independence of the object

this

essential to knowledge.

That other-ness

is

essential to

be proved.
of

Knowledge,
something which is not

contrary,

common

This

is

numerous

mine can be

is its

me

others'.

The question

others.

it this independence,

can

see, just

The universe
its

is,

how

Its being theirs is the problem.

my

what makes mine

mind.
others'

Now
is,

is

more

so

Let

the concrete or containing universal.

try to state this crux of the position a little

When

is,

objectivity, this is its independence, this is its being

what gives
far as I

on the

numerous others

on-its-own, and being no part or creation of

me

but

or just- mine,

to others than just-me, to

in the end, infinitely

what

knowledge hardly needs to

must be of something and

to be at all,

explicitly.

compatible with there being knowledge.

form and colour and motion, decide

features, its

not to remain

dark but to appear in knowledge,

knowledge that they appear.

What

appear, in

it

is

in

other words,

are the features themselves in their authentic independence,

not anything merely created by the contemplating point of

How can this be ? How can I
If I ask,

consciousness.

have to do with what

the

charmed

outside

the

is

circle of

only

not just myself

my own

possible

How

can I break

privacy and reach what is

lies in
the concrete

answer

130

w. SCOTT.

j.

I contemplate what is not-myself

because
the
fact
that
I have begun to contemplate
simply
involves already the fact that the object before me has ceased

universality of the object.

be just-myself.

to

can break through the circle of my

privacy simply because, as conscious, I am never in it. To be
through the charmed circle of my own subjectivity is to be in
I

the presence of what

I

am

men

in

objects

many

one,

universal.

in letting

my

multiplying

my

and

The object before me

(concrete)
consists

For as conscious I

conscious.

in one.

many

others's

is

consequently, on

is

particulars

my

Deepening

more

am always there when

am others 1 am many
I

in

hold

one

its side,

containing

on any

reality

that universal into consciousness,

of

points of contact with

it

through mobilizing

To encounter something
do with something which is infinite

available points of consciousness.

independent
others'

or

One

is

is

to

have to

infinitely other-than-just-mine.

the realistic philosophy of the present has

been to push into the foreground the idea of independence.
In terms of this conception I would attempt to draw together
what I have said in my paper into the following formula
effect of

The

necessary

of the

object

is

falls,

its

and

ty

sufficient

which

concrete

the

condition

possibility

of that independence
of knowledge stands or

Ergo, there

universality'.

concrete

is

universality.
It will readily be

remarked that

want

to

go the whole

knowledge must be of the independent.

But the only independence
quite true that I do.

way, in insisting that

And

it

which

is

I can conceive of as characterizing a thing that

thing to
it is

me,

consists- in its being

not theirs as

it is

mine,

eyes as it is to mine, then

to, it

something

if it is

is

any-

to others too.

If

not some such rest to their

whatever the independence attaches

does not attach to that object which, in the language of

the familiar metaphor, swam into my field of vision and across

and out again. The object must have independence. True.

it

But

this

means that something

of

what- the object

is

to

me

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

must independently
something I

On

131

The independence must attach

be.

to

see.

the other hand,

if

this

be what must be found inde-

pendent, then there is no difficulty in finding that it is so.

There is no difficulty in my really finding what yet

This

because of what

is

is

we have

genuinely not-mine-only.
It is because of the internal multiplicity of each
pointed out.
individual personality.
That each of us should be many men
in one
to cast

a curious fact (though biology

is

on

but

it),

in

would seem

light

There

to be a fact.

is

no

you and me being

touch with the same independent objects and so being
the same world (what subjectivism denies to be possible)

more insuperable
in

it

may have some

than about

me

difficulty, therefore, about

being in contact with the same objects and

to time.
If it is absurd

same world from time

being in the
to say that I

am

brother now, then

literally in the
it is

same world with

also absurd to say that 1

same world with the child who went

to

school

twin

my

am now

in the

under

my

ten years ago, or with myself of last

last
or
of
last
hour.
Whatever I find at all is
week,
year,
common to many. It is already others'. And so it is inde-

name, or with

my

self of

pendent.

To sum up:
what is others'

others' is the real.

is

Man's search, as a knower, is a search for

To Socrates and Plato this of

or universal.

And

they seem to be

justified.

Because

it

the sole conceivable independent, of the sort requisite for the

It is the only independent which

possibility of knowledge.
can conceivably be, at the same time, something-to-me. And

the independence
it

it has,

has to offer to others

words, in

its

consists precisely in its containing all

who could contemplate

being concretely universal.

it

or, in

other

132

G.

U.

E.

By

MOORE.

G. E. MOORE.

propose to confine myself to discussing Mr. Scott's paper,

although it seems to me to have hardly anything to do with
I

the question

we were asked

And

to discuss.

may

as well

begin with that one among his theses, which, owing to the form
which he has chosen to express it, might seem at first sight

in

most directly relevant to our question.

"
tells us at first that he believes that
the universal

to be the

He

is

concrete," by which he ought to mean that all universals are

concrete while at the end of his argument he seems to confine
"
himself to asserting that there is concrete universality," by which
;

he ought to mean that some are concrete. And, if he were using

words in their proper senses, then either of these two assertions
would, I think, have some relevance to our question, though
obviously the second would have very little you are giving no
;

answer to the question whether universals are the true type

by merely asserting that there are concrete

The assertion that all universals are concrete

of universality,

universals.

would, I think, have more relevance, though I cannot agree

with Mr. Scott that our question can be reduced to the ques"
tion,

clear

Are

universals concrete

all

from the

"
?

fact that a person

That

it

cannot

is,

I think,

might consistently answer

our question in the affirmative, while denying that

all universals

are concrete.

But, in
expression,

fact,

what Mr. Scott seems mainly

"Some

universals are concrete" is:

which are both mine and

it

seems

to

me

to

mean by the
Some things

others' contain their particulars.

quite plain that this

is

And

an utterly different pro-

position from the proposition that there are concrete universals.

I

do not for a

used the term

moment
"

believe that those philosophers who have

concrete universal," and have been anxious to

insist that there are concrete universals,

have ever meant by

merely that there are things which are both

mine and others', and which contain their particulars. I think,
this assertion

133

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

therefore, that this proposition of Mr. Scott's, as well as the

universal proposition

(if

he means to

make

it)

that all things

that are both mine and others' contain their particulars, are

wholly irrelevant to the question we were asked to discuss ;

but since they seem to be one of the things which Mr. Scott
anxious to maintain, I will give

is

my

reasons for dissenting

from them.

One

point

I think,

is,

the

the meaning of

worth insisting on with regard to

"x contains

expression

its

particulars."

cannot be properly used to express the tautoiogous

Obviously
proposition "^contains those particulars which it does contain/'
What it ought to mean is that those things which have to x
it

some

relation other than that of being contained in it are also

contained in

what
as
"

And

it.

if

the expression

I venture to think is
to

equivalent

attribute

"

(all

"

universal

most proper

its

"

be used in

namely,

sense,

"characteristic,"

"property," "predicate,"
of which can be properly used as synonyms), it

obvious enough what relation you are asserting to hold

and any universal P, when you say
between any given thing

is

that

A is

that

it lias

of it

A simply
can be truly predicated
be the characteristic of being red, the
You

one of P's particulars.

the characteristic

so that

particulars of

if,

e.g.,

that

are asserting of

will be all the things

which are

red.

With

obvious enough that, in general at all events,

meaning
But if the term
a universal does not contain its particulars.

this

"

universal

it is

"

be used

in

the

extraordinary

sense

in

which

"
what is
Mr. Scott has thought proper to use it, as meaning
both mine and others'," it is no longer obvious what can be
meant by saying of a given thing A that it is one of the

particulars of a given universal.

gather, corresponding to his

new

And,

in fact, so far as I can

use of the term

"

universal,"

Mr. Scott has adopted a new use of the expression "x contains
its particulars."
One such usage is clearly indicated in the
case of the
"

two

solitary instances

which he gives

universals," which, according to him, do

"

of so-called

contain their parti-

134

G.

culars."

which

is

He

implies that

MOORE.

E.

we have an

both mine and others'

!C

"

whenever we have one

appearance

instance of something

containing its particulars,"

"
of a thing containing all

the other "appearances" of the same thing, "as the circular

aspect of a hoop contains all the elliptical aspects which it
presents from

different

implies, is:

is

That

angles."

"

arbitrary definition of

is

is

to

say,

new

the

y's particulars," which he

the same thing of which y is

one of

an appearance

of

an appearance.

Now

with this definition of "x contains

doubt whether what

is

its

particulars," I

both mine and others' ever contains

its

doubt whether anydoubt, that is to say, whether

particulars, for the simple reason that I

I
thing whatever ever does so.
of
a
ever
contains
any appearance
thing

all the other appearances of the same thing. Mr. Scott tells us that the circular
aspect of a hoop does contain all the elliptical aspects which it
Does he mean to say that a
presents from different angles.

hoop never presents more than one circular aspect

The more

natural use of language is certainly to say that it presents

many, e.g., a circular aspect of one size, when viewed from one

and a circular aspect of another size, when viewed from

And if Mr. Scott is using "aspect" in this natural
in which the same hoop may present many different

distance,

another.
sense,

would not have proved his point that

one
any
aspect which contains all the other aspects
even if he were right in saying that there is a circular aspect
which contains all the elliptical aspects since he would have to

aspects, all circular, he

there

is

maintain that there

is

a circular aspect which contains

other circular aspects as well as all the elliptical ones.

the other hand, he

"

all
If,

the

on

"

is using
aspect in such a sense that a hoop
never presents more than one circular aspect, this throws an
important light on what he means by an aspect or appearance.

He must

hoop, the characteristic

mean by the circular aspect of a

which a hoop appears to have when it

appears to be circular

namely, circularity

in that case, I think,

itself.

In that case,

135

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

when Mr.

that the circular aspect contains

Scott maintains

the elliptic aspects, he must mean that the characteristic

"
"
"
contains the characteristics,
elliptic of such a
circularity

shape that the major .and minor axis are in the proportions
"
to 1,"
elliptic of such a shape that the major and minor axis
are in the proportions 3 to 1," etc., etc.
And it seems to me

quite evident

the characteristic

that

contain these other characteristics

whatever

in

two

does not

of a thing contains all the

other characteristics which that thing

If,

"

circularity

nor can I think of any case

which one characteristic

on the other hand, Mr. Scott

sense that there are

"

is

appear to have.
using "aspect" in such a

may

many

different circular aspects, there are

different views as to

what may be meant by any one

Some people hold that the expression, " This

"
hoop looks circular to me now," means The sense-datum of
"
this hoop presented to me now is circular
and on this view,

circular aspect.

every

which

different sense-datum

called an aspect or appearance of

different circular aspects of

which are sense-data of

it

is
it

of the hoop can be naturally

and there will be as many

as there are circular sense-data

Others hold that the meaning of

the expression This hoop looks circular to me now," cannot be
analysed in this way that it does not imply that anything
it.

"

whatever which

is

presented to

me now

really is circular

but

only that something presented appears (in an ultimate sense)

On this
to be of a circular shape of some particular magnitude.
view, no sense-datum would be an aspect or appearance of the

hoop
it,

there would only be as

as there are circular

appears to possess

and

many different

shapes

it

of

circular aspects of

different

would be natural

sizes,

which

it

to call the different

"

"
having a circular shape of this size," having a
circular shape of that size," etc., the different circular aspects of
the hoop.
But, whichever of these two analyses of the facts be

characteristics

correct,

it

seems

to

me

quite plain that in no case does any

circular aspect of the hoop contain any elliptic aspect of it.

Ih short, in whichever of these three senses Mr. Scott

is

136

G.

"

using

me

seems to

it

aspect,"

aspect of a

hoop contains

MOORE.

E.

that his assertion that a circular

its elliptic

is

aspects

a sheer mistake

with the obvious fact

due, I think, to his confusing this assertion

that if you take a circular area of any particular magnitude of

diameter, that area will contain elliptical areas such that every
possible proportion holds between the lengths of their major

and minor

axis.

This obvious fact by no means implies, as I

suppose he must think

datum contained
elliptic

does, either that

it

in a circular

sense-datum of the same

one
size

"

"circular"

occasion,

contains

ever

having an

elliptic sense-

ever identical with any

and proportions which the

same thing may present on another

characteristic

any

is

the

of the proportion

or

that

the

characteristic

2 to 1," or that
"

elliptic shape
such a characteristic as " having a circular shape of this size
ever contains such a characteristic as " having an elliptic shape,

with major axis of

this length,

major and minor axis."

For these reasons,

Mr. Scott means

if

and with

by

"

this

proportion between

x contains

its

particulars"

an appearance which contains all the

other appearances, which are appearances of the same thing of
which x is an appearance," I should deny that anything ever
contains

"a? is

its particulars,

and therefore that anything which

both mine and others' ever does

is

so.

In another passage, however, Mr. Scott seems to give a

different meaning to "^contains its particulars," though he does
not seem to notice that he

is

doing

so.

Immediately before the

means " x contains

passage just referred to, he suggests that he

willing to

appearances of itself." And with this meaning I am

admit that it may be true that some things which are

both mine

arid others', in

all possible

some of the senses in which Mr. Scott

seems to use that expression, do contain their particulars. Some

material objects seem to me to be both mine and others', in the
sense that they are known both by me and by others, and all,
I should say, are both

mine and

might (conceivably) be

known by all minds

others' in the sense that they

;

and

am

willing to

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

admit that

(as

some seem

to hold) it

may

137

be true that every

material object contains every possible appearance of itself, in

the sense that it contains all the sensibilia which might be

though I cannot possibly be expected to discuss

occasion whether any sense-data are sense-data of

sense-data of

on

this

it

material objects in the required sense, or whether,

if

so,

the

material object of which they are sense-data contains them.

It',
however, by his statement, "The universal is concrete,"

Mr. Scott means merely to assert that some things which are
both mine and others', namely, those which are material objects,
contain, in this sense, all possible appearances of themselves, I

am willing

to

admit he

may

be right, though I

he should seem so certain about

But

it.

am

surprised that

should

still

protest

no sort of ground for the assertion, which he seems

to mean to make, that everything which is both mine and others'
that there

contains

is

all possible

which seems

to

whatever I know

appearances of

me

itself

nor for the assertion

plainly false, that in

knowing anything

all its particulars.

But how about

that what

contains
I

can find only two arguments.

He

"
The universal is
begin with, that his thesis
"
follows from the premiss
The universal is the real."

tells us, to
"

concrete

And

its

his arguments in favour of his proposition

both mine and others' (always or sometimes)
particulars ?
Perhaps they prove that he is right.

is

he seems in fact to use one argument, which does employ

a premiss about reality.

He

prove directly that every

known

tries, if

am

not mistaken, to

real thing is (in one of his

senses) both mine and others'. And he seems to assume, as selfevident (what I should not dispute), that some known real
We thus get an
things have parts which are particulars.
"
argument having the two premisses Every known real thing
"
"
is both mine and others'
and
Some known real things

contain particulars," which, of course, yield the conclusion

"
Some things that are both mine and others' contain particulars."

But, of course, this argument does not yield the con-

138

G. E.

MOORE.

elusion that anything whatever contains

in the tautologous sense that
it

does contain

it seems to me that this

argument
some
even
that
which
are both
prove
things

and hence

entirely fails to

mine and

its particulars,
except
contains those particulars which

it

others' contain their particulars, far less, of course

that all do.

But there

another argument,

is

if

it

can be called

so,

suggested by Mr. Scott, which uses no premiss with regard to

reality, and which, if sound, would yield the conclusion that
everything which
is

both mine and

known both by me and

laying

it

down

given object

S1

S2

arid

others', in the sense that it

must contain several par-

others,

This argument, so far as I can

ticulars.

O2

is

it

see,

simply consists

in

as a self-evident principle that, in order that a

A may

be

known

to both of

must contain both

of

two

two

different subjects,

different objects,

O 1 and

one of which belongs in some sense exclusively to S 1 and

And with regard to it, I have only
the other exclusively to S 2
to say, first, that it again would not yield the result that any
,

such object contained any of its particulars, but only that

contained some particulars in order to yield the result that
:

contained

its

particulars,

O 1 and O 2

either that

it

would have

to be further

it
it

assumed

were both appearances of A, or that they

of the same thing of which A was an

were both appearances

And, secondly, I cannot see the slightest ground

appearance.

for regarding the principle as true.

I can only suggest that

may have been led to suppose it self-evident, owing

what seems to be an empirical fact namely, that when two

Mr. Scott
to

1
and S 2
subjects, S

perceive the same material

object

A,

it

always does present to each of them an appearance which it

does not present to the other and owing to his making the
;

further assumption that these two appearances are both con-

tained in A.
that,

even

objects

know

if

cannot see the slightest ground for supposing

this is true of material objects, it is true of all

known by

that

it

is

several minds.

Indeed, in order that I

true of material objects,

it is

may

obvious that I

139

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

know

the appearance which a

material object presents to you. though that appearance is not
presented to me. Does Mr. Scott hold that in order that you

must, in a sense, be able to

and

both

may

know

this appearance, it

present different appearances

to

must, in

you and me, and

its

so

turn,

on ad

infinitum

have only space for one more remark on Mr. Scott's

So far as I can see, he is quite as anxious, if not more
paper.
I

"
maintain the thesis which he expresses in the form The
universal is the real," as to maintain that with which we have

so, to

been hitherto concerned, and which he

And by

concrete."

"

calls

the form of words

"

The universal

The universal

is

is

the

he means, so far as I can make out, principally the proEvery real thing that is known is both mine and
position
real,"

others'.

Now

in order to consider

we have

to ask

whether

this proposition is true,

"

both mine and others'."

what he means by

And he

himself identities the meaning of this expression with

at least three entirely different conceptions, without appearing

aware that they are different. He tells us (1) that

"
he means x is found by all
both mine and others'

to be at all
"

by
minds

is

he tells us next that what he means is (2) x might be

found by anybody; and he tells us, finally, that what he
means is (3) x is what some sort of thing is-always. I should
like briefly to define my attitude to each of the three pro;

positions

which will result from understanding

"

is

both mine

and others'" in the statement "Every known real thing

"
both mine and others's in each of these three senses

is

(1)

As

for the proposition that

Every known

real thing is

actually found by all minds, I have only to say that I see

not the slightest reason for believing it. On the contrary, it

seems to

me

been known
to

highly probable that many real things that have

to each of us have never been known in any sense

any other mind.

(2)

On

the other hand, the proposition that Every

known

140

II

WILDON CARR.

might be found by anybody, seems to

but absolutely trivial, if it means only There

real thing

impossibility in

the supposition that what

known by anybody

might have been

else

to be true

is

no logical

known by me

is
;

me

and

if

false,

it

means anything else.

(3) The proposition that Every known real thing is some"
"
seems to me
is-always
thing which some sort of thing
certainly false.

In order that x

may

be what some sort of

"

a circle,
e.g.,
is-always" x must be a characteristic,
a universal in the proper sense of the term since to say

thing,
i.e.,

"

circle is-always

the characteristic
that not all

"

means merely

And

,/.-."

known

it

seems

"

Every

me

to

circle possesses

absolutely certain

real things are characteristics

no

e.g.,

no material object is one. That

event is
Mr. Scott should suppose the opposite seems to me only
explicable on the hypothesis that, as has often been done,
a characteristic,

he has confused the

expresses identity,

red

"

am

"

"
is

of predication

with the

and has supposed that when

asserting that

is

"

c:

is

which

I assert

"

is

identical with the characteristic

of being red.

III.

% H. WILDON CARR.

Dr. Moore has submitted Mr. Scott's thesis to a critical

analysis, but prefaces this by expressing a doubt
whether the thesis has anything whatever to do with tne
question we are asked to discuss. Whether it has or not I
logical

find the thesis of great interest,

has done, to take

my

and propose,

lead entirely from

it.

My

as

Mr. Moore

interest,

how-

ever, is in the metaphysical

import of the argument rather

than in the formal consistency or inconsistency of the logic.
"
I take to mean the theory of
The " concrete universal
those who, following the Hegelian principle, the real

is

the

rational, hold that it is possible to give a consistent account

141

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

and

of experience, subjective

objective, internal

and external,

an extra-mental object of
without
mind and
knowledge, existing independently, confronting the
it is purely passive
exercising upon it an influence to which
resorting to the notion of

and

The expression

receptive.

"

concrete universal

"

conveys

in its very terms the self-sufficiency of mind and the

inclusion within its activity of the object of knowledge: for
to

me

the term universal can only apply to concepts, not to intuitions,

and the term concrete can only be descriptive of that which

within

possesses

itself

the ground

question propounded to us

nature

particular

the

means

of
"

its

The

existence.

concrete universal

"

the

me

the problem of the

abstraction from
an
concept
a convenient mental device for classifying

true type of universality

of

is

the concept.
reals,

Is

for

the passively received revelation of experience, or for making

an inventory of its contents ? Is it only the naming of classes
?
Or, is it a comprehensive
and inclusive apprehension by the mind of

in order to facilitate intercourse

and
its

self-sufficient

own

activity in the definite stages or

moments

of its life

In affirming that the pure concept is a moment of developing

mind-life, by which I mean a stage or degree in the outward
expression of an inner mind-energy, and in denying that the
pure concept is an abstraction which the mind makes from
particular independent reals, assumed or inferred to be presented to it, I suppose myself to be answering the question in

the affirmative.

The

Mr. Scott also answers the question in the affirmative.

reason he gives for his answer, however, implies an entirely

opposite meaning in the terms, and the difference between my

view and his

question.

new

it

is

Mr.
is

only concealed by our identical answer to the

argument is a striking one, but it is not

Scott's

practically the

common-sense reply which

proposed to the scepticism of Hume.

Also

revival

its

Eeid
is

novel, for it is substantially the position of the

now more

often called, the critical realism.

not

new, or as it is
I do not think

142

WILDON CARR.

H.

the argument

is

sound, either against

Hume,

or against

modern

It declares concrete universality to be the fact that

idealists.

"

"

my knowledge is not mine alone, or simply

someone else's, just as Eeid said that when
ten men look at the sun, each sees the one object of commonthe

object

mine,

it

sense.

is

of

also

I dispute the
"

"

that the

fact.

plainer to

is

Nothing

me

not someone

object
my knowledge
and that when ten men look at the sun each man's
of

is

than
else's,

"

"

is

object

different.

It does not

seem

to

resolved by argument.
"

"

me
If

that the two positions are to be

anyone

tells

me

to be identical

of his

that he believes the

with the

knowledge
mine, at the same time that he acknowledges
object

"

"

object

(as surely

of

he

must) that the image in his mind is totally different from the
image in mine, I cannot think of any way of disproving it. I
can only wonder that he should suppose such a hypothesis
necessary (for such I understand to be the argument) in order
to explain intercourse.
This is at any rate the crucial point

with Mr. Scott.

All I can do, therefore,

such hypothesis

is

to point out that

if

when presented with

common

there exist a

object of two minds, independent of the individual image in

each mind, then in so far as

it

but abstract, and in so far as

it is

is

universal
concrete,

it
it

is

is

not concrete
not universal

but particular. And I challenge Mr. Scott to show me how

his universal can become concrete save by becoming particular,
and how, if it be supposed concrete, its universality can be anything but a pure abstraction ?
I admit, however, that in concentrating attention on the
problem of intercourse Mr. Scott does good service, for he
enables us to see very clearly the essential difference between

the two principles. He shows, in fact, how both have their

I
origin and take their departure from the critical philosophy.
agree with the realist that it is impossible for the mind to
construct the
intuitions,

object

by means

of

knowledge out

of sense-data, Kant's

of concepts belonging to the original

nature

143

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

of the
realists

I understand the critical

mind, Kant's categories.
to insist that an a priori condition of the possibility of

knowledge is the existence of the object of knowledge. If this

be their position (I have to be cautious for I am generally
charged with misunderstanding them), then I agree to this
extent that they are pointing to a hiatus or deficiency in
Kant's theory of knowledge.
as

it

is

(I

mean,

generally understood.)

of course,

I hold in

Kant's theory

opposition to

the

no need to go outside the mind to make

What Kant has not seen is that the image,

realists that there is

good this defect.

which is the immediate object of knowledge, is not a construction nor an agglomeration of manifold sense intuitions or sense-

work

data, it is a sui generis

of the mind.

My theory turns upon this point. There are images, that is,
mental objects, which are not constituted of, nor analy sable
and it is images, not sense-data, that our
into, sense-data
;

concepts relate.

It

seems to

me

that this fundamental prin-

ciple, or at least that its full significance, has been unnoticed

until our

own

The merit

generation.

to it belongs to Benedetto

Croce.

of
I

having called attention

refer

to

his

aesthetic

theory.

The concrete universal

is

Kant's principle of the synthesis

a priori carried to its complete logical conclusion. It is not a

fact to which we can point and say there it is. It is a principle
which is called for by the negative results which have followed

and which must follow

all

attempts to deduce the possibility of

knowledge from the assumption that the antithesis between

mind and matter, subject and object, which common-sense
accepts as fact,

is

original.

way by which dual

It is impossible to conceive

any

could severally or mutually

relation.
Descartes, who wrestled

existences

generate the knowing

hardest with the problem, had to

fall

back on faith in the

veracity of God.

When the
terms as dan

idea of this original synthesis is presented in such

vital, activity, mind or spirit, life or consciousness,

144

we

H.

WILDON CARR.

are at once reminded that

we

are borrowing from our ordinary

experience figurative expressions which have in experience no

substantial reality.
never, it is said, experience movement,

We

or thought, but only things

life

minds which think.

The reply

that move, beings

that this

is

is

who

live,

true and also that

the ground of our appeal to the principle of the concrete

The polarization of the subject-object relation which

it is

universal.

characterizes actual experience

must have

its

ground in an

Extension, which gives the universe its aspect

of externality, has its correlate in tension.
The principle is
grounded in the very nature of conceptual thought.

identical nature.

I conceive, then, the ultimate reality of the universe

on the

analogy of the individual mind. Mind is the only real existence which I know, or at any rate might know, directly and
without mediation.

In

my

developed experience

to

which they are attached, and the

to contrast as reality, with mental

minds from the bodies

actions of these bodies

seem

I distinguish

as ideality.
The
thoughts, desires, purposes and ends
bodily actions which express the life of the mind have a

action

beginning and end in time and boundaries in space, and they are
therefore a finite part of an external universe, but when I

my full concept of mental

the
limitations
alter
their
The restrictions
character.
activity
which circumscribe the activity of the individual mind are not
integrate these bodily actions in

the spatial and temporal limitations which circumscribe the

I cannot in fact conceive mind as I
.activity of the body.

conceive body as pure actuality.

I have to duplicate actuality
with virtuality. Whenever an action is presented to me which
I interpret as the expression of a mind, interpretation

that I duplicate the expression with an intuition.

universal
ideality

Now

means that

means

The concrete

cannot cut expression from intuition,

from

reality, actuality from virtuality.

the challenge to such a position which

forward, and which, if

particular would make,

am

I
is

"
:

is usually put
not mistaken, Mr. Scott in

Very

good, but

you are now

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

the

intrigued into

which appears
condition of

knowledge

to

its

the

Your theory makes

impasse.

solipsistic

intercourse an illusion."

145

It is therefore the fact of intercourse

realist

possibility

demand

to

the

of

positing

How,

as independent real.

as

it

is

the

the

a priori
object

common knowledge unless there be independent

common to the knowers ? What else is a common
be

but one which

for their

is

objects

presented indifferently to individual

discernment

The reply

of

asked, can there

object

minds

of the idealist is that this

completely to misunderstand the nature of intercourse and

It is not possible to divide
actually to misinterpret its mode.
is

the world into entities which are active (minds) and entities

which are passive or inert (objects), because passivity is a

What
which is simply extinction.

limit the attainment of

There exists no mode by which

nothing.
manifest quality save by exercising activity.
The activity must fall on the mental side. Activity cannot
be expressed as a property of the inert, that would be a plain

does nothing
anything can

is

self-contradiction.

There

inert, of distinguishing it

no way of conceiving the purely

from pure nothing. This disability
is

does not attach to the concept of activity simply because that

concept is directly given to us in life, mind, consciousness
itself.

Mind

develops.

or spirit is activity, activity

The

intuition

which

is

which unfolds or

expressed in the image, the

image which reveals the intuition is concrete ideality. Images

and concepts are all the mind possesses and these are the
products of its activity. In intercourse the mind does not
project its images or concepts into another

who

believe in telepathy for

example appear

mind

(as

those

to hold) but the

actions which are the outcome of one mind's activity evoke the

Intercourse does
expression by another mi ad of its intuitions.
net depend on common objects but on responsive actions. That

common

objects, if we suppose them to exist, should manifest

themselves by a chaotic multiplicity of sense-data is to me
simply unintelligible. The mind and its world is one and

146

H.

my

This, in

indissoluble.

WILDON CAKR.
the theory of the concrete

is

view,

universal.

Let

scheme

me now

view

set against the

of the activity

which

Mr. Scott

of

my own

finds expression in intersubjective

intercourse, in order directly to challenge the .theory that at

stage whatever

independent

it

is

common

necessary

In

object.

view

my

any

the notion

introduce

to

so far

of

from simplify-

ing the problem of intercourse such a hypothesis would comI

I prefer, however, simply to challenge the fact.
plicate it.

we communicate by sensibility, by
and
and
not by the mutual recognition of
emotion,
by imagery
independent objects. The living being, man or animal, enters
say that as a matter of fact

on individual existence with the lines of objectivation, or the

Consider then

articulation of reality, determined in advance.

the

mind

in its development

would not be objects

outline of its

mother

may

find

expression in
;

the
per-

they present to the mind the

actions as well as being the condition of them.

such intercourse

each

intuitions

actions,

kisses her child,

the impact,

Clearly not, such clusters

Sense stimuli call

images frame themselves in perceptions

ceptions are virtual

Is it a fact that sense stimuli

in the sense required.

into activity imagination;

images formed

form objects

cluster together to

is

each,

where and what

supposed to require
let

us suppose,

is

the

"

"

object

Each no doubt

feels

experiences the emotion,

imagery of one another,

There is clearly sensibility,

create a wealth of imagery,

imagery of their several worlds.

emotion and imagery, where and what is the common object
identical for each and of which each is a passive discerner.
Intercourse between minds depends wholly and at every stage

on mental
is

my

activity,

and

this self-sufficiency of

theory of the concrete universal.

mental activity

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

TV.
"

The key

G.

DAWES

sound philosophy

HICKS.

taking the concrete

the individual, as the true type of univer-

to all

universal, that

By

147

is,

lies in

In these words Dr. Bosanquet gives expression to

sality."
what he would probably not hesitate to call the fundamental
principle of his Gifford Lectures.
vidual in this context he means

He
"

explains that by indi-

a system of

members, such

that every member, being ex hypothesi distinct, nevertheless

to the unity of the whole in virtue of the

contributes

peculiarities
of

this

which constitute

character

he

its distinctness."

usually

identifies

with

An

individual

a "concrete

"
true
although sometimes he speaks of it as a
embodiment" thereof. And he contrasts universality with
1

universal/

generality

the latter he characterises as

of the other/' the

former as

"

"

sameness in spite

sameness by means of the other."

in fact, an independent presenta-

Dr. Bosanquet has given us,

tion and elaboration of Hegel's argument in the third book of
the Logik, and has raised an interesting issue for discussion.
It is unfortunate

that Mr. Scott was

prevented, by the

of space imposed upon us in this Symposium,

from showing the way in which he conceives his thesis to be
When he finds that
connected with that just indicated.
restrictions

Dr. Carr has taken his argument to be identical with the

"reply which Reid proposed to the scepticism of Hume," I

imagine his feeling will be not unlike that of the eels that
were skinned by the fair Molly, a feeling, namely, of being
lost between pain and astonishment.
For, unless I am greatly
mistaken, so far from wishing to recommend the doctrine of
Reid, Mr. Scott is taking his departure, as, indeed, Hegel
likewise did, from the familiar contention of the Kantian

philosophy that objectivity is identical with universality, that

it is the function of thought to be productive of that peculiar

component
apart from

apprehended which constitutes

special sensuous clothing, an object at

in the content
its

it,

all.

148
"

G.

An

object," said

Kant,

DA WES
"

HICKS.

that in the notion of which the

is

"

in other words,
manifold of a given intuition is combined
the sense manifold was, so to speak, fitted into a framework
of universal notions, and these subjective notions then pre;

sented themselves to us objectively as part and parcel of

every externality of sense that can come before us. Not

only

The universality

so.

had as

of the object

correlate the universality of the subject

and

its

necessary

for such subject

the object was an object of possible experience, and might,

for all individual subjects.

moment

common

be said to be a

therefore,

that Mr. Scott

the details of the

is

object (das All-G-emeine)

do not, of course, suggest for a

desirous of committing himself to

Kantian

analysis.

that in laying the stress he does

But

I have little doubt

upon presentation consisting

"

the state of things where something of mine shows itself

to be also, and at the same time, other-than-mine," he has
in

been largely influenced by the leading ideas of that analysis.

And I gather from what he has written elsewhere that he does
intend to imply, after the manner of Hegel, that the universal,
which in his view is the real, and therefore concrete, is at once
a self-constructing activity, and at the same time (up to the
"
limit of our apprehension of it)
none
a construction of ours
;

the less our construction for

In a curious passage
(A. 385),

Kant

talks of

its

of

the

being the Absolute's."

the

first

edition of the Critique

presentations of outer sense

as

"
having the appearance of
detaching themselves from the soul
"
and hovering about outside of it
and in a manner it would
;

not be unfair to say that the whole armoury of the categories

was called into requisition in order to account for the alleged
fact

which

is

thus paradoxically described.

Somewhat

simi-

larly, Mr. Scott states the problem of knowledge, as he conceives it, in the form " How can I break through the charmed
:

my own

"

privacy and reach what is outside ? The

implication apparently is that an object first of all presents
"
"
itself to me as
ceases to be
just-myself," and then somehow

circle of

149

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

And the brunt

and becomes other than myself.
of the problem would seem to lie in finding a mode of explainI am bound at once to
ing this extraordinary transformation.

just-myself,"

say that I think the problem thus presented to be an entirely

problem and Mr. Scott himself virtually admits it to

fictitious

be such when he proceeds to answer his question by saying,

"
I can break through the circle of ray
enigmatically enough,
as
conscious, I am never in it."
because,
privacy simply

why, in the Kantian and

post-Kantian theories of knowledge, objectivity should have
been brought into such close and intimate connexion with
Whether when ten men look at the sun they
universality.
It is not, however, difficult to see

them seeing different suns

when they are thinking of

are each of
it is

that

judging, for example, that

"

or the

same sun, certain

the law of gravitation or

is

"

a relation

(presuming,
they are thinking about these things and not
about something else), what each is thinking of is not different
from what the others are thinking of, but is identical with it.
similarity

of course, that

If,

then, all objects of sense-apprehension either involve as part

of their structure

Kant

a priori determination by universal factors (as

held) or are syntheses or

"

"

meeting-points

of universals

(as was Hegel's view), there would appear to be at once

suggested a mode of explaining what unquestionably both Kant

and Hegel took

common

to be a fact that

an object

of

is

knowledge

object for individual minds.

But obviously the two notions the notion of universality

and of that which is common for different individual minds
Whatever else
cannot be forthwith treated as coincident.
the term

"

universal

"

may

this
signify, it signifies at least

property or attribute or predicate that characterises two or

more so-called things. What, then, is the connecting link

between
different

"

common

minds

"
?

to

different objects

"

"

and

It is to be found, so far as

cerned, in the thought of Bewusstsdn iiberhaupt,

common
Kant

is

for

con-

in the thought,

namely, of the universal consciousness, of which, in

its relation

150

DAWES

G.

HICKS.

the manifold of sense, the categories

to

It is to found, so far as

expression.

Hegel

are
is

the ways

of

concerned, in the

"

of the notion or concept as

the principle of all life,

thought
and thus possessing in every part a character of concreteness," as
"
an infinite and creative form, which includes, but at the same

time releases from

itself,

the plenitude of

all it contains."

Neither mode of effecting the transition can be pronounced

successful.
As regards the first, while an object is declared only

an object in virtue

to be

nothing short of

of its

a priori

factors, yet it

miraculous that these,

characterising empirical contents, should be

into

them from the

As regards

outside.

remains

not intrinsically

if

somehow imported

the second, with which

we are mainly concerned, it seems to me to be based upon

a number of erroneous assumptions to some of which I will
briefly refer.

One has to remark, at the outset, upon the woeful confusion

between a universal and the conception of a universal. Two of
Hegel's most competent interpreters, W. T. Harris and William
Wallace, agree that he ought never to have employed the term
Begriff with the significance which he here attaches to it, the

former asserting that his having done so has given

serious misunderstanding of his system than

That

be

but more

rise to

more

any other cause.

evidently involved in such procedure

than the mere misuse of a term. It involved, in fact, the

may

failure

which

to

a two-fold

recognise

is fatal to

distinguish

is

distinction,

clear thinking.

of

It is essential, namely, to

the

which that universal,

way
and through the act in question, is cognised. A mental

state of conceiving is
"
rence, a
moment,"

but
is

neglect

the act of cognising a universal both from

universal itself and from the

in

the

it

is

in

undoubtedly a concrete event or occur"

"

developing mind-life
as such neither a concept nor a universal.
It

characterised,

of

if

you

will,

course,

as

of

every other

concrete

fact

characterised, by a plurality of properties which it has

n common with other mental states, whether of conceiving,

is

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

or

or even

of perceiving,

definitely particular as
it

any

of willing

but in

fact in nature

were, in truth, all that Hegel says

151

it is

itself it is as

can possibly

be.

If

a self-determining

still that
activity which supplies its own matter or contents
would not in any way convert it into a universal in the sense

which

he, like every one else, is perpetually using the term.

a
Again,
concept is the way in which a universal is conceived,
the mode in which it is grasped or apprehended by thought,

in

and obviously

is

not to be confounded with the act through

and by means of which it has been attained. A concept, as

Mr. Bradley puts it, does not happen, neither can it possess a
And, lastly, although it is usual
and
the universals to which they
identify concepts
and although for ordinary purposes no serious misunder-

place in the series of events.

roughly to
refer,

standing

is

thereby occasioned, yet

it

needs but

little reflection

to realise that the identification is in strictness illegitimate

may
now

readily lead, in dealing with a question of the kind

discussing, to

downright

error.

A concept is

we

and
are

a product of

thought exercised doubtless upon a world of objects

which are found to exhibit certain identities of character. Its
of

thought

manner of formation can be more or less psychologically traced,

and its actual nature determined. It is reached by a process
that

is

at once analytic

hand, of singling out

and synthetic a process, on the one

is imbedded in a matrix of reality,
;

what

and, on the other hand, of bringing together what is presented in

numerical difference. The universal to which it refers is a quality
characterising a

number

from one another

of particulars,

in time

and

space,

often widely

"

removed

pervasive character

Alexander expresses it although what precisely

the pervasiveness implies is a vexed metaphysical problem.
of things," as

Mr. Scott would solve that problem in Hegelian fashion*

*

"The

universal," says Hegel, ."is

identical with

itself,

with the

express qualification, that it simultaneously contains the particular and

the individual." Or, again, " the universal is that which permeates and
includes in it everything particular." Et passim.

152

G.

DAWES

HICKS.

insisting that the universal contains its particulars.

by

I agree

entirely with Dr. Moore's criticism of that contention, and there

is no need to reiterate what he has so lucidly said.
I will only

add that the instance which Mr. Scott gives of his thesis seems
to be unfortunately chosen.
Even though there were one
"

'

thing which contained all the other

the
same thing, yet that would surely not
appearances
If I fill a
entitle us to describe the former as a universal.
"

"

of

appearance

of

tumbler with a number of smaller tumblers, each one

fitting

into another, I do not thereby change the nature of the contain-

was when

remains

it

ing tumbler;

just the particular entity that

still

contained nothing but

it

And

air.

respect to the containing appearance.

it

so likewise with

In what sense can the

"

"
appearances which it contains be said to be its particulars ?
If the reply be that the containing appearance is not a mere
indiscriminate collection of other appearances, but a unity,

more

or less systematic, of specific contents, an individual with

a variety of characteristics, then clearly the same might be said
of any one of the contained appearances, and what the conten-

amounts

tion really

particulars at

Indeed, in whatever

be formulated,
of

any

to

is

that there are no such things as

all.

it

way the

doctrine of

"

concrete universals

"

seems inevitably to involve the abandonment

between universal and particular. The true

distinction

universal,

is

it

maintained,

is

a system of
contributes to the unity of

the

individual

members, such that each member

the whole, and the unity of which permeates the whole, so that
the

members

are

related

And inasmuch

attributes.
to be a

to the

unity, as

as each of the

of like nature,

its

adjectives or

members

is

declared

one seeks in vain to discover

system
anything which can be said to be particular. The individual, in
the sense of an independent substantive existent, vanishes, and

in its place is substituted a phase in

its

turn

is

some

universal,

which in

a phase in another, and so on, until ultimately the

is reached in the Absolute.

culmination

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

As

153

against this view, I would

universal in

its

particulars

is

urge that the unity of the

totally different from the unity of

the individual as a unity of its attributes. Colour, for example,

as a characteristic of material things, may no doubt possess some

kind of unity, but most assuredly

exemplified by what

sponding

The
as

there

amongst colours simply nothing correand continuity of an individual object.

is

to the unity

a correspondence only seems plausible,

Hobhouse has recently argued, because the

idea that there

Professor

universal

not the kind of unity

Appearand everywhere, under the most varying

ing, as it does, here, there

conditions,

it is

ordinarily called an individual.

is

is

is

confused with the concept of

colour we can, as he points

it.

The concept

out, picture to ourselves,

with

some show of reason, as a sort of scheme, which in order to be

realised must be filled in in certain definite ways, but which as
a scheme maintains

unity through all its differences of

And then to describe a thing as having a parfulfilment.
ticular colour will seem to be tantamount to placing it in the
scope of this scheme

its

"

we can

"

is a spirit upon
become
to
the
But
which
expressive
they
spirit."
things by
the conceptual system is one thing and the reality to which it

refers another

colour,"

say,

and, whatever the relation between

them may

"
The universal,"
not a relation of identity.
manifestly
"
and
is
the
so Hegel affirmed,
foundation, the root and
ground
is

be, it

substance of the individual.

Caius, Titus, Sempronius,

other inhabitants of a town or country are

all

men.

and the

That they

not merely something which they have in common,

but something without which these individuals would not be at
are so

all."

is

They

are individuals, that

is

to say, only as included in

and controlled by a superior individual. The passage illustrates

with sufficient clearness the confusion which Hobhouse is
concerned to exhibit.

Caius and Titus are each of them

individuals, and each as a physical and thinking being has a

unity pervading his different characteristics resembling in

some measure <;he way in which colour pervades red and

154

DAWES

G.

Each

blue.

tinuity of

of

common

character

is

other than

quite

members

although both of them

and,

character

true that Caius and Titus

unbroken con-

has, however, an

temporal existence;

the

possess

men

these

HICKS.

manhood, that

of

common

substantive continuity.
It is
to
a
or
the
clan,
family
belong

may

which are in intimate relations with one another,

and such a family or clan may be said in a sense to form an
of

But as such

individual whole.
like

manhood be

of a

type different

stituents

and

it is
is

qualities

from that

of a physical

To represent the individual

self-conscious individual.

a universal because

would not

an individual,

a universal, but essentially

though an individual

and

this family or clan

as

a unity in the diversity of its conan error at once in logic and in

metaphysics.

My

main

point,

then,

that

is

there

a fundamental

is

between a universal and an individual, and that

no universal, however complex, can become an individual. An
difference

individual

predicated

is

a substantive in the sense that

of,

nor inhere

in,

it

can neither be

in a significant

anything else;

predication, it can be referred to only as subject

And

and never as

can never be exhaustively

predicate.
that
characterise it; it can be
determined by the universals
the
determined
only by
unique position it occupies
adequately
the reason

is

in the world of existent fact.

is

that

it

The

never a mere combination or

individual, in other words,

"

"

meeting-point

of universals,

simply because universals are not individuals, and no synthesis

of any number of them could ever yield of itself the concrete
existence of an individual thing.

One

is

not of course intend-

deny that whenever we characterise a substantive by an

adjective we are thinking of the adjective as capable of
But that is never the
characterising a plurality of instances.
ing to

our meaning. We cannot think of adjectival predicates without at the same time thinking of them as exemplified

whole

of

in instances
"

which are ultimately concrete individual things

"

Wandering

adjectives

can

be, at the most,

but concepts

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

155

be found not apart from but as qualifying

particulars, while it is equally true that particulars exist only
universal

to

is

as qualified

by universals.
now to Mr. Scott's paper, in order to elicit information regarding a contention upon which considerable weight
I return

"

"

Concrete universality must be," he says, if

appears to be laid.
there is to be knowledge at all. The reason is that except the
particular were in a containing universal, nothing could present
itself as

If we had any ground

mind were so constructed as

not?

Why

other-than-me."

for supposing that each individual

any other, and that no one could direct his

apprehension upon an external object without casting over it a
to be quite unlike

film

"

"

created

by peculiar eccentricities of his own, there might

be cause for the scepticism suggested, although in that case I

am at a loss to understand how the fact of the particular being
in a containing universal

mend

matters.

such supposition.
individuals

would have the smallest tendency to

no justification for any

I can, however, find

Intelligent

characterised,

characterised,

by common

as

minds
all

are,

I take

concrete

attributes.

There

it,

concrete

individuals
is

are

nothing, there-

structure to countenance the surmise that their

fore, in their

apprehending concrete objects must deviate from one

another in any considerable degree, and nothing, so far as I can
discover, to lead us to imagine that such modes of apprehension

modes

of

Why, in order
men do must I, in some admittedly
those other men in one ? To have a dozen

are ill-adapted for discharging their function.

to
"

apprehend

curious

"

as other

way, be

eyes instead of two, or half a dozen centres of consciousness

instead of a single centre, would surely

make

rather for baffling

bewilderment than for mutual harmony.

I have only space for a brief concluding word on one topic
touched on by Dr. Carr. When I found him identifying
"

critical realism

eels skinned

"

with the

"

new

by the fair Molly.

coining the phrase

"

realism," I too felt like those

I believe I

am

responsible for

critical realism," at least in this country.

THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL.

156

explained carefully that it was introduced for the purpose of

designating a theory of knowledge diametrically opposed to the
"

new

realism

"
;

and, so far as

know, no adherent

of the

has ever had the slightest wish to adopt the name.

Latterly it has been made use of by a certain school of

latter

American philosophers but, although I gather their position is

different from mine (their book of Essays is announced, but has
;

not yet appeared), they are no less opposed to the realism that
"
is called
new." One of the chief positions of the critical
realists is that in the act of perceiving

"image"

in

an object there

is

no

the mind, and in that respect I should imagine

Again, they have never insisted

"
an a priori condition of the
that the existence of an object is

Mr. Scott

is

at one with them.

They have

possibility of knowledge."

tried to

show that

in

perception the presence of an existent object can be empirically

Once more, so far as I am aware, no one has ever
established.

imagined that the world

active (minds)

No

and

entities

is

divided into "entities which are

which are passive or

inert (objects)."

existent object, I should say, can be passive or inert, simply

because

it

moreover

forms part of an interconnected causal system, and

is

a source of bodily stimulation

relation to a percipient individual.

when standing

in

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor

on April 2Qth, 1920, at 8 P.M.

Street,

W.

1,

BUDDHIST METAPHYSICS IN CHINA AND

IX.

JAPAN.
By WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN.
IT

is

and Oriental

interesting to note that both Occidental

problem, and having

thereafter to diverge.
continued
ways
The speculators of Greece and India both began with the

with

philosophy

started

answered

in different

it

similar

Being and Becoming, or the Unchanging and the

with
which we may, in these days associate the
Changing,
conceptions of Space as opposed to Time.
antithesis of

Plato and Aristotle attempted to compromise between the

and the teaching of Heraclitus, but their com-

Eleatic school

promise was essentially in

According
constant

favour of the

flux, is

of reason, the

unchanging noumenal world.

and value

this

rational

of

basis

is,

or

standpoint

Two
it

is

is

obvious.

of

Being.

The importance
It

whether

of

philosophical.

a thing

school

phenomenal world is in a state of

a Becoming, but behind it is the static world

to Platonism, the

scientific,
dogma,
and two are forever four a
;

not

there

is

been the

has

religious,
is

or

always a
is not an

an Absolute or there

Absolute.

1.

Primitive Buddhism.

In India, when an age of metaphysical inquiry arose after

the decay of the primitive faith

which

for a

Buddhism.
change,

of

number

of

of

the

Vedas, the system

centuries secured predominance was

This philosophy insisted upon the theory of

impermanence, of the eternal becoming. The

noumenal and

static aspect of the system,

Nirvana, was never

developed from the logical point of view,

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN.

158

The body was

considered

living, complex, mutating

"
"
organism, possessing no self-nature. The nature of the soul
was supposed to be analogous. The percipient consciousness
was no fixed entity having a direct insight into truth through

a stable and transcendental reason, but a

In

its

environment.

earlier stages this philosophy resulted in a curious

its

form of agnosticism.

Our minds being

can not

know

finite,

whether the world

definite information as to

We
We

effected

compound

by the chain of causation, and conditioned by

the ultimate

we can

obtain no

is infinite

or not.

nature of external reality.

can only deal with facts and data of which we are immewith states of consciousness
with an
diately conscious
;

the emotions

of

analysis

with the universe as perceived,

as opposed to the universe as it

is.

Buddhism was built upon this psychological basis.

"
marks or essential features are constructs arising

Primitive

The three

''

from perceptual or emotional experience.

"

(1) All

im-

is

(2) All is sorrowful.

(3) All is lacking a self."
This last phrase refers not only to the soul, but to the universe
as a whole.
It consists not of simple or self -existing things,
but of complex, caused, conditioned things.
The fourth

permanent.

"

mark," Nirvana,

is

no

less psychological.

By means

of con-

templation certain forms of samddhi trance or ecstacy

experienced.

Magnify the experience, consider

associate with it the abolition of

and the theory

remembered that

The

so-called

basic ideas.

of

Nirvana

is

it

were

permanent,

sorrow, sin, and ignorance,

formulated, for

it

must be

originally Nirvana is purely a state of mind.

Four Noble Truths are derived from the same

Transformed from an ancient Indian medical rune,

(1) Suffering exists.

(2) The cause of suffering is
desire (and ignorance).
(3) There is a possible end of suffering

they are

Nirvana. (4) This end may be achieved by following the

Noble Eight-fold Path. The first and third " truths " are the
same as the second and fourth " marks."
The fourth is purely
a point of ethics and does not concern us.

The second

is

the

159

BUDDHIST METAPHYSICS.

most important, and contains the seed

of

very complete
"

"

for at a

became,
very early stage suffering
phenomenology,
"
"
was
truth
in this instance, synonymous with life, and this

supposed to explain the origin of the experienced world the

no
eocperienced universe let it be noted, for early Buddhism had
interest in the origin of the external universe.

Primitive

Buddhism was probably

It believed

realistic.

an external universe closely corresponding to our

it realized that in its present form the world as
but
sense-data,
that there

we

see

is

it is

subjective, the result of the action of the percipient

consciousness

Vijndna) acted upon by external stimuli.

The theory
the

Vijnana

of the origin,

is

awakening, and development of

explained in the obscure Pratitya Samutpdda

more lucid account

or the twelve-linked chain of causation.

is

viz.

contained

in

the

much

Prajnd Pdramita Qdstra,

later

Sense Organs)

(Sense Objects.

y
Sensation

t
Self -consciousness

(Vijnana.)

Consciousness of the external world

(Samjnd.)

The experienced Universe.

(Samskara.)

The commentary
(Citta),

coming

states that the

elementary mind substance

in contact through the five sense organs with

the five sense objects gives rise to Vedana (sensation or percepThis, in turn, gives rise to

tion).

lent

to

self-consciousness),

(conception,

ratiocination,

externality),

and

so

Vijndna proper (here equivawhich again results in Samjnd

here

equal

to

consciousness

the fully developed experienced

of

world

(Samskdra) comes into being.

The
desire.

origin of the percipient consciousness

Without these the individual

is

ignorance and

consciousness

would

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN.

160

disintegrate,

and though the experienced universe cannot

without object,

it

exist

Conseequally cannot exist without subject.

attained Nirvana) dies,

quently when an Arhat (one who has

the experienced world for that personality comes to an end.

Such was early Buddhism, or so Japanese scholars suppose,

and we are not at present concerned whether or not they are
historically correct.

Hlnayana Buddhism.

2.

This philosophy became crystallized in Hlnayana Buddhism,

the Orthodox branch of the faith which, though long ago driven
out of India, maintains itself in Burma, Ceylon, and Siam.

Though

Theravada (The Way of the Elders) and

the letter of the law expounded by Gautama

calls itself

it

attempts to keep to
The most
Buddha, it has added several important features.
is
it
has
that
abandoned
the
important point
agnosticism concerning the external world of the earlier faith, and depending

upon the

fidelity of sense

impressions proceeds to systematize

Thus, for example, it has accepted in a

objective phenomena.

form the ancient cosmogony

geography, astronomy, and account of the
slightly modified

disintegration of the material

of India, with its

integration

and

external) universe.

(i.e.,

The metaphysical analysis of the parts of being was also

vigorously developed. Early Buddhism had taught that instead
of

an ego-entity, the personality consisted

viz.

parts (skandha),

Rupa (Form,

i.e.,

of five constituent

the

Vedana

body),

Samskdra

(here meaning
Samjnd (conception),
The
various mental qualities), and Vijnana (consciousness).

(sensation),

Theravada school divided Form, the material world, into

mental
27 parts sensation into 3 or 5
conception into 6

later

qualities into

52

and consciousness into 6 or 89

parts.

These divisions were the result of introspective analysis, but

they were considered absolute and final. They constituted the
elements of existence from which
Another, and

in ancient days

all things are compounded.

even more powerful, school of

BUDDHIST METAPHYSICS.

Hmayana Buddhism,

the

i-lciiients objectively, for

was supposed

was

161

Sarvdstivddin Sect, classified these

by

this

time the fact that Buddhism

to ignore the real nature of the external

forgotten, and these elements

of existence

world

were thought

to

constitute the objective as well as the subjective world.

According to the Abkidharma Ko$a Qdstra these elements

are 75 in number, classified in the following way
:

I.

Simple Elements (Asamskrita Dharmas) so called because

they do not enter into combination with other elements.

They are three in number

Nirvana are two.
II.

of

which Space or Ether, and

Compound Elements (Samskrita Dkarmas)

so

called

because they enter into combinations, though themselves

Their compounds constitute
simple and permanent.
the
in

of the universe.

phenomena

number, divided into

1.

These elements are 72

Material Elements, 11 in Number.

3.

Mind, 1 in Number.
Mental Qualities, such as

4.

Miscellaneous Elements, such

2.

love, hate,

etc.,

46 in

Number.
as

life,

decay,

etc.,

14 in Number.
These elements are permanent and unchanging, as were the
physical elements of the scientists of J;he generation ago.
Accordingly in their present state all phenomena are changing
and unstable, but they are composed of stable and unchanging
rudiments.
3.

At

this point

Mahdydna Buddhism.

Buddhism almost abandoned

its essential spirit

of insistence upon change and becoming, and approached the

of the
standpoint of Western philosophy. The root instinct

was too strong, however, and in the new Mahayana

a return
system which arose in India about the Christian Era
was made to the principle of eternal transience and imper-

religion

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERX.

162

manency. This Mahayana school took root in China and Japan

and after Buddhism was expelled from India continued to
flourish there.

The

or

undeveloped Mahfiyfma is Cum/a

This doctrine lias frequently
(literally emptiness, or the void).
been totally misunderstood in the West and taken to mean the
basis of

early

theory of the non-existence of the universe or pure idealistic

It is only recently that the conception has been
Nihilism.

expounded in Yaniakami's Systems of Buddhistic

Thought, and Suzuki's Outlines of Malmyana Buddhism.
Qfmya is simply an insistence that all things have no self-

properly

essence, that they are compounds, unstable organisms even in

The

their elemental stage.

science of the present generation

believes that the supposedly rigid physical elements are not

necessarily

permanent

that they

may

down

be broken

that

the elements may themselves prove to be compounds possessing

the essential qualities of transformation and decay. In like

manner the Cunya school, represented by the Madhyamika sect

of Mahayana supposed that the DJiarmas (elements) are imperthat they
manent, and have no existence-unto-themselves
may be broken down into parts, parts into sub-parts, and so
;

on eternally. Accordingly, all phenomena have a relative as

opposed to an absolute existence. In a word all of life was
once more reduced to a single underlying

flux,

a stream of

existence with an everlasting becoming.

The next stage of doctrinal development was a very

important one, and resulted in the formulation of a remarkably
complete system of idealism. The stream of life was supposed
Mind, a fundamental mind-stuff that was

to be the Essence of

permanent yet ever changing like the ocean. From this all
elements (the 75 elements became 100 in this school), and
therefore

Vijndna,

all

phenomena

are

derived.

Consciousness,

It

was called Alaya

was considered

it

Eepository
yet
matter nor mind, but the basic energy that was at

to be neither

the root of both.

BUDDHIST METAPHYSICS.
It

would be easy

identify
it

has

to exaggerate this doctrine,

and

to falsely

many more developed systems, but undoubtedly

with

it

163

modern

points of contact with certain phases of

many

Occidental philosophy. The Alaya Vijhdna is like the Alan de

Vie of Bergson, the Energy of Leibniz, the Unconscious of

Von Hartmann.
consciousness,

Like the
not

it is

it

though

last,

itself

conscious in

is

its

the essence

of
It

early stages.

mental yet there is a certain objective reality about

Each unit of life may be regarded as a vortex in the sea

is

The

mind-essence.

phenomenal appearance
aspects, viz.

ness

the

common stream

Alaya

Vijndna

much

person comes

regarded

We

three

in

and as

(3) as the object of false

as being the root of self -consciousness, each

an eternal ego entity.

may, perhaps, better understand the nature of this
to regard himself as

Essence of

Mind, and

enumerating

its

1.

Form...

development

...

...~\

3.

Perception
Eatiocination

...

4.

Eeflection

...

Hmayana

start

its

four faculties, which are

...

2.

we

is

(1) as active, or the seed of percipient conscious-

receiving the influence of all things

In

brings about the

of the universe.

(2) as passive, as the sensibilia of consciousness,

belief in as

of

action and interaction of these units, one

with another, and with the

Accordingly

it.

...

of

the universe

by

Outer-objective.

Dinner- subjective.
)

the external world

is

taken for granted and

with the percipient consciousness fully developed.

In Mahay ana we are told that both the external world and
consciousness are ultimately reducible to the Alaya Vifadna.
The Alaya Vijndna in its yet unindividuated stage is the

energy behind inanimate

life,

the world of minerals,

also the life force behind the vegetable world.

Form
life

or the essence of the objective world.

force attains the

power

etc., it is

As such

it is

Eventually this

of sensation or perception.

It is

164

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN.

latent in

and

vegetable world

the

animal world.

becomes aware

It

fully

developed in the

of the other currents in the

stream of

life, or, if you please, the other phases of the Alaya

from
which we understand why this essence is both
Vijndna,

subject

and

As
arises

this

the

object.

sensatory or perceptive faculty

ability

associate them.

retain

to

So

it

impressions,

to

develops

there

compare and

that the third faculty, thought or

This is to be found

is

normal consciousness comes into being.

only in the higher animals,

This in turn develops into

self-consciousness or reflection, making man and the other
etc.

possessors of this faculty capable of metaphysical speculation.

This

may

be called the cosmic development of the Alaya

Vijndna, or the development of the universe itself, or the

universe as it really is, as opposed to the experienced

In order to comprehend the latter we must examine

eight-fold division of normal human consciousness as

universe.

the

These are known as the eight Vijndna.

Vijndna may be called the sensatory aspects

taught by this school.

The
of

first five

consciousness.

They are co-ordinated with the

five

sense

organs and serve as recipients of the stimuli given by them.

The

sixth

Vijndna

normal waking consciousness, is similar

and correlates the data presented by the
It functions through memory and reason.

is

to the rational faculty,

first five

Vijndna.

The seventh Vijndna

is

the focus of self-consciousness, dis-

tinguishing itself from the general stream of consciousness.

The eighth Vijndna

is

tion of the essence of

the Alaya Vijndna, or the individualiza-

mind containing

potentially all aspects of

existence.

From
view the

this it is easy to see that

first

lead

five

from the relative point of

an acquaintance with

to

Vijndna
phenomena, as they are presented by the senses, the sixth
by means of comparison builds up the mental constructs, and

from the confused mass

of sense data

formulates and recognizes

the eject

such as colour, form, etc.,

The seventh
ink-pot.

BUDDHIST METAPHYSICS.

165

Vijndna seeks to find the real nature of the ink-pot, and its
relationship with other phenomena, while the eighth Vijndna
is

all

the real basis of all this psychological action,

is

the root of

the other seven Vijndna, and contains within itself a micro-

cosmic replica of the macrocosm, being in fact the only reality

behind all the seeming complexity of the phenomenal world.

be said to represent the idea of the school

concerning the everyday activity of consciousness, but we are
concerned with how this individualized experienced world came
This

may

into being,

and the

and external

real relationship

reality.

We

between the eight Vijndna

are told that the

formation of the microcosm are as follows

stages

of

the

Before the development of the other Vijndna, the Alaya

Vij^dna in its active aspect, acting as the seed of life interacts
1.

with the passive or external Alaya, and so produces the essence

the world as perceived, the basis of the empirical universe,

of

which

is still

faint

and

from distinguishing

free

characteristics.

In the meantime the seventh Vijndna or self-consciousness, that which firmly distinguishes between the subjective and
objective having developed, it is fecundated by the Alaya, and
2.

becoming aware

to take it into its

shape,

which

qualities,
3.

world proceeds
comprehension and so gives to it form and

of the nucleus of the external

are,

needless

and not inherent

The sixth Vijndna

to

say,

secondary or subjective

in the external world.

or that which discriminates between

the universe then develops and,

phenomena
fecundated by the Alaya, adds to the gradually developing germ
the concept of like and dislike, associating with it other objects

the various

of

with reference to cause and

4.

There then develop

effect.

the remaining five

Vijndna correthese have been

When
five sense organs.
the
Alaya, they give, on coming into contact
impregnated by
sponding to the

with the germ of objectivity the

final

touches of the external

Thus, for example the first Vijndna, visual consciousness, gives the sense of colour and presents the phenomenon in

world.

BUDDHIST METAPHYSICS.

166

question in the form which our ordinary sense impression makes

familiar to us.

Mind has played a very

ana
Mahay
philosophy, and in the later schools

This doctrine of the Essence of

important part in

much further development.

In China arid Japan the doctrine of Being is known as Ke,
In contrast to them
the doctrine of Becoming as Ku (Qunya).

has received

Mahayanists offer the doctrine of Ghu, the

Middle or the Mean. In later Mahayana the Essence of Mind

both, the later

is

known

as Bhutatathata, literally Suchness

things-as-they-are.

The waves are

Waves

life's

the Suchness-of-

This they conceive to be like the ocean.

phenomena. The ocean is always changing

are always arising, and no two waves are alike.

the stream of

So does

ever go surging past, never remaining the

Yet there is in a sense a certain stability, a certain

same.

life

Being, a fixity, a changelessness in

This is the doctrine of the Mean.

This Essence of
Occidental

Mind soon

Absolute.

It

this

very changeability.

received all the attributes of the

was conceived

as

identical

with

Nirvana, and as the waves and the ocean are the same, so was
the world of life and death and Nirvana the same.
The goal

was not

to be gained

by transcending the phenomenal world,

noumenal world in ordinary life.

but by
Later a religious phase followed, and the Absolute was conceived as the Universal Buddha immanent in the hearts of all
the expression of the

was frequently symbolized as Amitdbha

Buddka, or the Buddha of Infinite Light. It was considered to
sentient

beings.

It

be possessed of three bodies (kayo) or aspects, similar to the

Sabellian heresy concerning the Trinity.
or sages were supposed to be the

All

human Buddhas

embodiments

of this being,

corresponding to the doctrine of the Incarnation.

All these points, however, belong to comparative religion
rather

than

untouched.

to

philosophy, so

that

we

must

leave

them

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grosvenor Street,

London, W. 1, on June 7th, 1920, at 8 p.m.

THE PKOBLEM OF TRUTH AND EXISTENCE

AS TREATED BY ANSELM.

X.

By ALBERT
In the history of

E. DAVIES.

philosophical

thought, Anselm's

name

is

associated mainly with his famous proof of the existence of God.

His treatment
ment,

of the

its special

problem of truth and existence in that argumodern philosophy has, it seems

interest for

me, been generally misunderstood. The proof is commonly

regarded as purely ontological, and this, notwithstanding the

to

obviously empirical implication of the terms in which it is

described by Anselm.
In the Preface of the Proslogium he
represents his
evident, ..."
of

"

one

God and

who

attempt, by a

"single argument," itself selfGod truly exists," as that

to demonstrate that

mind

strives to lift his

seeks to understand what he

to the contemplation of

believes."

originally entitled Faith seeking understanding.

on

"

"

understanding

clearly

implies

The

treatise

he

The emphasis

confidence

in

logical

thought. It is also no less clearly implied that the function

"
"
assigned to thought in the attempt is that of the verification
"
"
of a specific form of experience termed
Lord give
faith."

we find him desiderating, " to understand intelligere

that Thou art as we believe."
Such understanding, such attain"
ment of truth, he explicitly asserts, is conditioned by " faith

me,"

"credo ut intelligam,

non intelligam

nam

et

hoc credo,

"

(Proslogium,

Chap.

I).

quia nisi credidero

And by " faith " he

"

rather an experience than a mere acquiescence in

"
authoritative dogmas
(Webb. Proceedings of Aristotelian

understands

Society,

O.S., Vol. 3,

No.

Anselm's use of the term

2,

1896).

faith.

"

So also Weber interprets

In religion faith plays the

ALBERT

168

E.

DAVIES.

part played by experience in our understanding of the things

of this world."

The argument
it

so

a posteriori rather than a

is

ontological aspect,

"

viewed ceases to be

when

the experience from .which

it

It has, however,

priori.

viewed, that
takes

ontological

strictly

in abstraction

is,

its

origin

and which

";

an

from
it is

intended to verify.

My

purpose

ment on

to

is

experience,

show
and

the dependence of the argusecondly the implications of that

first,

as to the relation of thought to existence.

dependence
1. Let me note at the outset that the argument depends
"
for its starting-point on experience.
And, indeed, we believe,
that

Thou

a being than which nothing

art

conceived." So

Anselm begins

God

greater can be

The basal premise,

his reasoning.

"

"

as the

greatest conceivable being

is clearly represented here, not as a creation of the understanding, not as a mere thought-product, but as an apprehension of

the conception of

God obtained
"

faith."

mere

and through the experience which he terms

The language

ment seems
a

in

to

of

represent

product

and independent

of
of,

much

thought,

of the criticism of the argu-

basal

this

conception

in complete

experience.

Its

first

critic,

founds his criticism on such an interpretation.

tion of

God from which Anselm

starts

that might originate in thought, that

of

any

is

is,

single experience, just as one

of

God

abstraction

as

from,

Gaunilo,

The concep-

regarded as an idea

in total independence

might frame a mental

Indeed, the point of the objecpicture of a beautiful island.

tion lies in that supposed abstraction.
It is contended the

argument involves an unwarrantable transition, namely, from

Kant's well-known illustration that it is
essence to existence.
one thing to have a hundred thalers in thought, and another to
have a hundred thalers in one's pocket, though perhaps barely
expressive of the full force of his criticism, is yet eminently
indicative of the same tendency, the tendency to view the argu-

ment

as entirely isolated from experience.

But surely the

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.
"

author's starting-point

reasoning

is

credimus

169
"

esse

te

suggests that

the

not from essence to existence but rather from a

particular experience of existent reality to a fuller apprehension

of the

of such experience.

meaning

on

Significant also in its bearing

Hegel found in reconciling the

his

interpretation
"

ceivable/' as the

he remarks,

"

it

"

this point is the difficulty

form

basal

"

"

the

argument with
con-

highest

Of Anselm's reasoning,
but the form faulty."

is right,

worth noting,

is

of the

notion,

merely conceivable."

the content indeed

His objection,

mere

the

of

"

that the "subject"

is

is

It brings out the opposition

of the Highest."

thought
between thought and being, but without clearly showing that
here in the subject, that is, in God, the opposition does not
obtain, that in

God

"

lacks

proof

as the Infinite, the Absolute, thought

And

being are united.

the

perception

existence in the Infinite."

It

no mere

is

slip

and

so he finds that the statement of the

or

unity of thought and

the

of

Now

lack

this

As

oversight.

is

all-important.

understand

it,

the

absence of an explicit expression of that perception is from

Anselm's standpoint inevitable, and, far from being a " lack," it
is,

as I

hope to show, essential

Hegel has evidently

his

own

theory.

to his

failed to see,

and

As Weber puts

it

argument.

This

is

what

so is able to read into it

"
:

What

the

theologian

not the existence of the God-idea of

(Anselm) aims to prove
Plato or Hegel, but the existence of the personal God," the God
is

with
2.

as

whom

he has personal communion.

The real nature of Anselm's argument I have described

the verification

me now
we have

of

explain more

a specific form
fully

what

of

experience.

mean by

that.

seen, describes this effort of his as "faith

Let

Anselm,
seeking

"

"
I take him to mean
understanding," and by
understanding
and
clearness
as
it
has been put, "to
certainty, or,
logical

make explicit to one's reason that which is implicit in faith."

Then by "faith," as I have said, we may assume Anselm
intends a mode of experience, that is to say, a mode of direct
o 2

ALBERT

170

or immediate apprehension

DAVIES.

E.

and, in the statement I have just

quoted, his awareness of God, a state of consciousness in and

through which God

is

polemic against Roscellinus,

De fide

experience,

to

his

de incarnatione

et

Anselm's proof does not require

It follows, then, that

"

be the

Trinitatis

Anselm writes " He who believes not cannot

and he who has not experienced cannot under-

Verbi, Ch. 2,

stand."

In

immediately apprehended.

mortale

salto

"

from thought to existence, which

Caird takes to be the gist of Gaunilo's criticism.

If the proof is of the nature of progress in the apprehension of existent reality, then there is no need to suppose a

The

break with existence.

"

immediacy of the
knowing and the

relationship,

real object,"namely, between the act of

must still obtain, even though the activity itself becomes more
That verification consists in clearer apprehension
specialized.

means, does

it not,

a progressive realization of that

immediacy

Again, the fact that the proof is of the nature of verification

through fuller apprehension accounts for the terms of the
It

argument.

is

not

"

terms

in

speculative reflection that

of

Anselm

faith

but in terms of
"

reasons.

We

believe," he

Thou art a Being than which a greater cannot be

and
his argument is that we cannot think of this
conceived,"
begins,
"

that

greatest conceivable being," or ens realissimum, without self-

There

contradiction except as existing.

difficulty

which the view

apprehension

demand

faith as a

of

If faith is

raises.

is

thus explained a

mode

awareness of God,

a proof of his existence

I agree

"

immediate

of

why

does

it

that just as the

aesthetic consciousness is sufficient evidence of the existence of

the aesthetic object

"

so the existence of

mean by God no more than

ness

is

not really doubtful at

not merely as

summum

that

is

to

its

object

all."

seems

to

so far as

The demand

but,

so

illustrate

is

aware

Anselm

cogitabile," or ens realissimum.

say,

"

we

the object of religious conscious-

however, arises from the fact that faith

"

God

for

proof,

of its object

puts

it,

as

the

Anselm's experience,

Mr. Webb's contention

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.
that

"

which

the
is

religious sentiment

is

sentiment for an object

but as somehow

regarded as riot merely its object

fundamental or ultimate

the

171

Such a demand

reality."
"
"

"

"

and
trust
implied in the
worship
the attitude of religious faith towards
or not it is a conscious implication

is

which characterize

its

Whether

object.

in

every

stage

of

it evidently is so where the

development
has attained the stage represented by Anselm. And have we
not here the reason why the proof sought should be of the
nature of clearer apprehension ? Faith is essentially a cognitive

religious development,

It is cognition in its earlier stage

experience.

when

as yet the

The
object
consciously incomplete.
conscious need for further differentiation occasions the doubt

discrimination

and explains

of

its

its

is

character as

that

not of the sceptic who

knowledge but that of

refuses to believe in the possibility of

one who has absolute confidence in thought and seeks the

solution of his doubt in understanding.
can now bring out more clearly perhaps what I mean
when I speak of the dependence of the argument as stated by
Anselm on experience. I will put it in this way, that the
proof Anselm sought was not a proof through experience or by
appeal to experience in the way Kant meant when he spoke of
I

"

confirmation from sense."

No

one could be more convinced

than Anselm of the impossibility of such a verification of the

"
idea of a Being whom no man hath seen at any time."
Nor
does he in the argument as such, as it relates to the fool,
appeal even to the specific mode of experience he terms faith,
though, as I shall try to show he does so when he comes to

apply his proof to the particular case he has in mind

the existence of

God

argument is intended
he terms " faith." Is

as

God

is

experienced.

To

that of

repeat, the

mode of experience
God true ?

to verify the specific

my

experience of

The appeal to thought or understanding accounts for

what one may describe as the dual character of the argument.

We may

distinguish two stages in Anselm's reasoning.

He

ALBERT

172

E.

DA VIES.
"

"

exists, but
begins by proving that the summum cogitabile
his ultimate aim is to prove that the God of his religious

The former proof is entirely an appeal

The criterion of truth is found in the laws

experience exists.

understanding.

It is there the principle

thought.
diction

serves.

that the

fool

is

to
of

of identity or non-contra-

In this portion of his reasoning he argues

convinced that " that than which nothing

greater can be conceived exists in his understanding, because

he understands it, but the greatest conceivable Being cannot

the understanding alone, for such a Being can be

"
conceived to exist in reality." Again he proceeds
It is
to
conceive of a Being which cannot be conceived not
possible
exist in

to exist,

and

"

There

is

than one which can be conceived

this is greater

Hence the contradiction involved

not to exist."

then," he concludes,

"

so truly a

in denial.

Being than which

nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot be

conceived not to exist." But mark the words that follow, " and
this Being, Thou art,
God." Here we have the transition to
the second stage. And here the appeal is to experience.
The
first portion, the appeal to understanding, has proved that ice
must think of ultimate reality in terms of existence. He has now

to prove that this ultimate Eeality is his God.

"

For

if

mind

could conceive of a being better than Thou," he goes on (note

"
the ethical term now used, " better not greater, it is clearly
the personal

God he has

above the Creator."

This

in
is

pursued in the Monologium,

mind)

"

the creature would rise

the line of argument which he has

and which

is

avowedly a posteriori.

My point is that in completing his proof, in showing that

"
the greatest conceivable
whose existence he has proved in
the first stages of his reasoning, is the God in whom he believes,
"

he appeals

to

experience.

reply to Gaunilo,

opponent's

where we

individual

position that

"

inconceivable."

So much
find

religious

is

borne out by his

him

actually appealing to his

experience in proof of his

God is certainly a Being than which a greater is

"
Or else he is not understood or conceived and

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.
is

not in the

understanding or in

"

Anselm, I call on your

is most false."
3.

To some extent

it,

and conscience

There seems to

as to the relation of thought

be, as I

ambiguity in Anselm's use of the term

of

"

conceivable

is

"

and

"

the " esse

"

esse in intellectu

that the latter

to attest that this

upon the question

to existence.

"But" adds

concept.

have already anticipated what I now

the bearing of Anselm's argument, as I have

turn to consider
interpreted

faith

173

have indicated, some

existence."

esse in re."

It

He

speaks

clear, however,
he intends to prove of the greatest
is

the

namely, which, as

that,

Being,

"

antithesis

Existence,
implies, constitutes the reality of external objects.
that is to say, is viewed as a kind of reality distinguishable

from that which appertains

thought.

It is esse

"

in

the world of

to the contents of

re."

The language of Scholasticism shows a keen sense of the

between concrete existence and the contents of

distinction

"

thought.

The

contrast," says Professor Eoyce,

"

between what

belongs to the mind, to the process of knowledge, to ideas, to

the reason, and what belongs to the external facts, to the world,
divine or created, beyond the human mind receives rich expression in scholastic doctrine

"

(Dictionary of Philosophy,

In their use of the term "ens,"

distinguish between entitas rei
veritatem proposition/is*

that which
real,

may

is

And

if

for

I, p.

636).

example, the Scholastics

and

entitas

quce

significat

ens rationis be taken to

"

a pure product of thought,

mean

a fictitious object,

not without, but only within the mind," then I think we

say that, although we find the term reality often used

synonymously with existence, existence was not

identified with

the whole of reality.

Like ens the

reality, as being, that

term

esse

is,

has a variety of significations.

employed with an ontological reference,

When, however,

not merely as a
it usually denotes existent reality, esse in re.
Even
copula,
when it is used as Anselm uses it in the phrase esse in intellectu,
or as St.

Thomas

uses

it

i.e. f

in the phrase esse intent ionale, the

ALBERT

174

DAVIES.

E.

qualification in each case suggests the

of the

term, nor has

import of ens

rationis.

it

"

more common

significance

in these cases the purely subjective

To sum up the important features

this collection of terms for existence," says Professor

the article above quoted, " an

object

existent) in scholastic usage, in so far as

said

is

it is

to

Koyce

be real

of
in

(i.e.,

viewed as outside

of

the knowing mind, and so as in contrast to a mere idea." That

it is existence understood in this sense that Anselm seeks to

prove of the greatest conceivable Being would probably be

But herein lies the problem. It is just

generally admitted.
this that has occasioned difference of opinion as to the value of

By some

the argument.

argument

by

tion to thought.

argument

is

it

has been supposed to vitiate the

its value as a valid contribu-

others to constitute

By

Gaunilo and Kant, as we have seen, the

taken to be invalid because

involves, as they say,

it

"

crossing from thought to existence."

By Hegel it is held to
have a value, in substance at least, because it presupposes,

according to his view, the ultimate unity really identity of

thought and existence. It seems to me that the import of the

have indicated in

bearing upon Anselm's

reasoning has in both cases been missed. The tendency has
distinction

its

been to regard Anselm here as making existence qua existence

a part of the content of an idea.
There is an illustration of
I mean in Ueberweg's interpretation. For while Ueberweg
shows that Anselm intended to distinguish between thought and

what

existence he yet thinks he has confused the literal and meta"

phorical meanings of esse."

By taking esse in its literal sense
in the phrase esse in intellects he thinks the conditional clause

on which the argument depends, namely, if God exists, is left

out of view, and the conclusion of the argument escapes
meaningless tautology only if it is regarded as denoting not the
that
fact of God's existence but the manner of His existence
"

so surely as

the

mind but

absurd

is

God

exists so surely does

in nature."

"

That which

He
is

exist not only in

demonstrated to be

in reality not the belief entertained

by the atheist

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.
that

God

175

does not exist and that the idea of

God

is

an objectless

idea, but the belief which he neither entertains nor can be

namely, that God himself (assumed as

mind) is an objectless idea. This

forced to entertain,

existing objectively in the

maintained so long as

is

appearance

argument a plausible

basis.

But

in

seems

it

to

give the

conclusion

the

which

argumentation not merely

the manner of God's existence, but the fact of this existence,
pretends to contain as a result of the

the original sense of the antithesis between in intellectu

in re

human

namely, exist ideally alone in the

esse

ness and exist in reality,

Vol. I, p. 383).

is

assumed

esse

and

conscious-

"
(

History of Philosophy,

Weber

also

seems

to take the

"

same view

of

Anselm's state-

"

ment.
Indeed/' he says, the ontological argument would be
conclusive only in case the idea of God and the existence of God
in the human mind were identical."
This would be a strange

and

identification,

if

the interpretation were correct, one would

need to inquire how Anselm came to make it. For nothing

would seem to be more remote from his intention. Ueberweg
admits that Anselm was fully aware of the distinction between
"
"
"
"
real and
merely ideal existence (as he puts it), and that it
is this distinction he intends
by the antithesis between in
intellectu esse

and in

But

re esse.

it

seems

significance of the distinction implied has

to

me

that the full

been generally over-

looked, and the argument in consequence misunderstood.

What,
would urge, Anselm's reasoning presupposes is that the
distinction is an ultimate distinction, that existence is never
I

the content of a thought, and that the content of thought is

never an existent.
In other words, I would maintain the

argument implies that truth and existence are two ultimate

forms of reality, ultimate if I may borrow Dr. Hicks's state-

ment

of

the distinction

in

regarded as a product arising

the sense

that "neither can be

from or evolved out

of the nature

of the other."

Much

confusion in the attempts

to

interpret

Anselm's

ALBERT

176

argument is due, I think,

"
and " reality as identical.
existence
"

puts

it,

E.

DAVIES.
"

"
tendency to regard existence
According to the view I am taking,

to a

not identical with reality. Existence is, as Lotze

the reality which belongs only to things," whereas the
is

which belongs to a content of thought, regarded in

abstraction from the mental activity of thinking, is the reality

reality

of validity.

tion in

Anselm,

mind

it

seems to me, had virtually this distinc-

in framing his basal conception

"

namely, that
is here thinking

than which a greater cannot be conceived." He

of what it has been customary to speak of as ultimate Keality.
"
So much is asserted when the " greatest conceivable Being is
described as ens realissimwn.

have urged,

is

that

What

we cannot think

the argument proves, as I

of ultimate Keality

without

In his reply to
Gaunilo he points out that his opponent's objections are due to
his not having fully apprehended the ultimate nature of the

contradiction except in terms

subject of his argument.

He

of existence.

finds the

argument inconclusive

because he persists in applying it to other contents of thought,

"
"
I promise," says Anselm,
that if any man
e.g., a lost island.
shall devise anything existing either in reality or in concept alone

except that than which a greater cannot be conceived, to which

he can adapt the sequence of my reasoning, I will discover that
thing and will give him his lost island not to be lost again."
of

Again the ultimateness of the distinction between the content

thought and existence is presupposed in the pre-eminently

logical

character of

known

contention that whether with idealism

existence

It

anticipates

Lotze's

well-

we deny

the

things and regard the

our ideas as alone reality, or whether we maintain

of

contents of

the proof.

au external world of

the existence of things outside the mind which act upon it, in
As little on the
either case knowledge can only be knowledge.

on the former can existing things pass into our

the utmost extent of the power possessed by an

latter theory as

knowledge:

apprehending subject could not enable that subject to do more

than to know as perfectly as possible.

177

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.
That, I

His aim

more

is

"

is

know

the background of Anselm's procedure.

as perfectly as possible

fully the object of his faith, to

we
know

art as

We

think,
to

valid.

"

"to apprehend

understand that Thou

our only criterion of reality.

Validity
existent reality only in so far as our thinking is
And his contention is that you cannot think validly
believe."

is

that the greatest conceivable Being is non-existent. No one

who understands what God is can conceive that God does not
exist.

The point Ueberweg

discusses in his interpretation of the

argument raises the question

whether Anselm intended his

reasoning to conform strictly to the formal method in vogue in

Caird thinks Anselm's reasoning has suffered by the
adoption of the syllogistic form which he considers is inadehis day.

quate for the purpose. But Ueberweg, as we have seen, holds

Anselm's argument only avoids meaningless tautology by a
confused assumption which brings it into line with the demands
of syllogistic reasoning.

tion

Eecoguition of the essential distincof thought throws

between existence and the contents

light, I think,

on the point.

We

have seen that in replying to

the question, how it is possible for the fool to say in his heart
or to think that there is no God, Anselm insists upon the
difference between the mere thinking of a word, or the being
conscious of an idea, and the cognition of the reality which the
word denotes, and to which the idea corresponds. For the

purpose he has in view, what Anselm seeks to make clear is the

meaning of the terms the fool employs, to help the fool to
know more perfectly that of which he is thinking. If in the

very act of denying the existence of the greatest conceivable

Being he contradicts himself, then all Anselm has to do is to
exhibit that self-contradiction.

In his reply to Gaumlo, his own account

was attempting

to prove

what was

still

of his reasoning is "I

uncertain and contented
:

with showing that this being is at least underIt was my

stood, in some way, and is in the understanding.

myself at

first

ALBERT

178

DAVIES.

E.

intention to consider on these grounds whether this being is in

the understanding alone, like an unreal object, or whether it

And

exists in fact, as a real being."

the conclusion he comes

can only be understood as existent. The example of

the picture in the artist's mind he also points out is intended

to

is, it

not

suggest any analogy between the two meanings or

"
to show that what is not understood to exist can

to

contents, but

be in the understanding."
picture to exist.

"

The

suppose the
But that than which a greater cannot be
artist does not

conceived can have meaning only as

In

this line of reasoning

we

it is

understood to

detect the theory of

exist."

knowledge

involved in mediaeval realism, on the basis of which, as

Dewey

whose representation of it I think is misleading points out

Anselm works. " The universals are the reals and since there
;

are grades and degrees of universality there are all grades of

The

reality.

most

God

universal

is

the

most

real-

ens

realissimum"

As

have

said, I

do not think Dewey's language does

full

justice to the Scholastic position, especially as represented in

the argument.

the point I want to

that
the universal was
namely,

It suggests, however,

emphasize in this connexion,

regarded as real not in the sense that it is as such an existent,

but that it is valid.
It is real not because it shares in, but
because

it

represents, the real nature of the object

that the object as an existent

is

a universal.

known.

Not

Knowledge, as

Lotze rightly urges, is not a process of mirroring. But that the

coherence which is essential to validity, and which constitutes
the universal,

is

representative of some coherence or inter-con-

nexion found in existent

and that

only as an object
essential relations that its real nature is
reality,

it is

apprehended in its
known. That is to say,

is

it is only
through universals that the
nature of the particular can be known.
Lotze has pointed out
that Plato's theory of Ideas has suffered misinterpretation

because the Greek language had

distinction

between existence and

no terms

reality

to

express the

ova-La being used for

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.

179

both, with the consequent confusion of the reality of simple

validity with the reality of existent fact.

But the
Ideas of

which Plato ascribed

reality

Anselm
what is an

that which

predicates of

God.

to universals is not

It

was the absence

in

essential characteristic of existent reality,

namely, the element of change that led Plato to attribute to

In contrast to the temporal succession in which
Ideas reality.
in our experience, the contents of knowledge
occur
presentations

Because of the static character possessed by the

contents of thought as contrasted with the Heracliteau flux of
"
The reality of
the world of sense, they are named eternal.

are timeless.

being (concrete existence) indeed they have not

but that

reality which consists in validity which is a reality all their

"
own remains untouched by all this change (Logic, Book III,

Chap.

2, p.

Mediaeval realism,

441).

it

true, got its doctrine

is

from Plato, but the moderate realist was

"To Aristotle," says
Aristotelian in his view of existence.
of universals in part

Lotze,
thing,

"

the only genuine ovo-ia, existence,

is

the individual

and there we must certainly agree with him

And

individual alone belongs the reality of existence."

moderate
individual

realist,"
"

says

Eickaby, "everything

(Scholasticism, p. 5).

difference of opinion as to whether

that

to the

"

to the

exists

is

there seems to be

Though
Anselm was a moderate or

an ultra-realist (Kickaby thinks he inclined to ultra-realism

while Perrier* regards him as having anticipated moderate
realism), there is

no doubt that

it is

the existence

we

ascribe to

individual particulars he predicates of God.

So, for Anselm
God was not a universal as the passages I have quoted from

Ueberweg understands Anselm to

Dewey might suggest.
"
of
that
of existence we find
God
form
in rerum
predicate
natura."

Gaunilo certainly so understood

it,

hence his applica-

"

* "
Aristotle," he says,
having supplanted Plato as the inspirer and
the guide of mediaeval thinking, there appeared a modified form of
realism,

Modern

which had been already foreshadowed by

Scholasticism, p. 23).

St.

Anselm "

(Revival of

180

ALBERT

DAVIES.

E.

tion of Anselm's reasoning to such objects as a lost island

also lies the force of his objection that the

an illegitimate transition from thought

therein

argument involves

to existence.

Existent reality can, of course, only be known in terms of

"
"
in the understanding
a content
knowledge. There must be
of

thought

And

if

existent reality
"

"generality

or

"

is

be a subject of thought.
"
it has been said,
is one

to

universality/' as

coin-marks of the activity of thinking." The " existent

does not become something different from what it was when it
of the

enters the relation which

real nature

is

involved in

being known.

its

apprehended by the

is

act

it

Its

is

not

knowing
It seems to me so evident that
by that act."
Anselm was working on this assumption that I find it difficult
;

influenced

to suppose the possibility of his falling into

in his use of the term as

I

am

Ueberweg

any such confusion

suggests.

aware that the ultimateness of the distinction between

existence qua existence and the contents of thought

is

the very

ground on which Kant rests his rejection of the ontological

argument. In his criticism of the argument, Kant insists that
"
Whatexistence is never a part of the content of an idea.
,

"

our concept of an object may contain, we must

outside
it, in order to attribute to it existence."
always step
can
This he claims
only be done within the sphere of perever," he says,

"

ceptive experience.
"

this takes place

With

the

objects of

senses,"

through their connexion with

he says,

any one of

my

perceptions, according to empirical laws with objects of pure

thought, however, there is no means of knowing their existence,
;

because

it

would have

Kant's objection

is

to be

practically

known

entirely

a priori."

Gaunilo's, that the

So

argument

involves an illegitimate transition from thought to existence.

"
The existence of the subject- is included in the mere notion of

the subject, the 'is' of the copula in a judgment of logical

is
of existence."
And
necessity is confounded with the
'

Anselm's reply to Gaunilo that God

a

"

lost island

"

is

'

something

applies also to Kant, as

different,

Hegel saw.

from

God

is

181

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.

something different from a hundred

Kant's position

thalers.

limited to phenomenal existence, and that

that knowledge
such existence can be affirmed only when the material of sense
is

given necessarily involves not only the rejection of the on tological argument, but also that of the possibility of any know-

is

ledge of ultimate reality.

According to the interpretation I have given, the view of
the cognitive relation involved in the argument is more

with the recognition

consistent

the

of

ultimate

distinction

between thought and existence than is Kant's doctrine of

"
As against Kant's doctrine it holds
sensibility and thought."
that the most elementary processes of cognition involve an
activity which is in nature akin to thought; that even the

crudest sense-presentation would not be possible apart from

the discriminating activity which
It

cognition.

is

is

the

that

true

throughout characteristic of
relations

which constitute

things are in the more elaborate processes of reflective thinking

recognized as such, but the differentiation without which

there could be no presentation at all implies the presence of

a discriminating or relating activity of a more rudimentary

kind in which there would be no consciousness of self and

consequently no recognition of relations qua relations. Thus,

even in perceptive experience, we are dealing with contents of

knowledge which can as

subject to

little

admit within them existence as the

"

pure thought," and which as processes of knowing are

the same criterion of validity for their verification.

contents of

As Lotze has

said,

when we

individual thing, "in

prospect of a result,
universal principles.'"'

investigate the

nature and

its

we

its

meaning

an

workings with any

invariably proceed
to

of

according

to

this

According
presupposition,
namely, that the difference between existence and thought is
Anselm's procedure, that of subjecting the content
ultimate,
of a specific experience to the test of logical thought,

not only consistent, but

acquisition of knowledge.

is

the only

method

is,

then,

possible for the

ALBERT

182

E.

DAVIES.

Dr. Caird, in the article to which I have alluded, contends

presupposes "the ultimate unity of

"
"
is concealed from
This," he says,
thought and existence."
Anselm by the fact that he has not perceived, as Descartes

Anselm's

that

proof

had, the necessity of the idea of

consciousness of self

the

in other words,

or,

which he conceived

in

its

priority to the

by the external way

God the world and

of the relations of

Anselm, he admits,

self."

God and

starts

with the absoluteness of

the opposition between subject and object, but he contends

"
The defect
that this position is not maintain throughout.
of

argument, as Anselm states it, is that

with the opposition of subject and object, as

this

start

it

seems

if it

to

were an

absolute opposition, in which there were mere ideas on one

side and pure realities on the other: and then goes on to

bring in a consciousness of the unity which transcends this

But if we hold to
opposition as if it were one of these ideas.
the opposition

we cannot make

existence by means

words, existence can neither in

added on
again,

we

a bridge

mere thought

of the

this,

from thought to
In other

of existence.

nor in any other case, be

thought by any extension of its content." Here,

find what I have described as a common tendency,

to

namely, to regard Anselm as including existence as such

Caird represents Anselm as replying to Gaunilo's objections by maintaining that "there

in a content of thought.

is

all

an

distinction

essential

other

ideas,

that

it

between the idea

the

is

of

God and

one and only idea which

over-reaches the distinction between thought and reality

"

"

that in this one case thought analytically contains existence."

Now it seems to me that in this criticism there is a confusion

Anselm

of standpoints.

an

idealist.

He

is

represented as at once a realist and

argument as a realist, with an

his

begins
absolute opposition between subject and object, in which there
were mere ideas on one side and pure realities on the other.

But he goes on

to bring in a consciousness of the unity

transcends this opposition as

if

it

were one

which

of these ideas.

As

183

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.
a realist, that

to

is

Anselm

say,

thought and existence, yet

idea

reality,

of our

phenomenon

the dualism of

on

insists

prove that

to

God

not a mere

is

but an existent

subjectivity

he must renounce his realism and become an

He must

find

an idea in which

this

idealist.

dualism disappears or

is

superseded by an identification of thought and existence. Now,

I understand aright Anselm's answer to Gaunilo, he agrees

if

"

with Caird that

we hold

if

to the opposition

we cannot make

a bridge from thought to existence." He would say you never

can bridge the gulf, if, that is, the bridging means that a
content of thought becomes an existent, or that existence
becomes a content of thought. He seems to me in his reply to

be very conscious that he is here concerned with logical values,

"
I have
with validity. He says, for example, in Chapter 2,
said that

if

it is

even in the understanding alone, it can be

which is greater. If, then, it

conceived also to exist in reality,

is

Being than
one than which a

in the understanding alone, obviously the very

which a greater cannot be conceived

What

can be conceived.

greater

is

is

more

logical ?"

Then

"

for if it exists even in the understanding alone,

can be conceived also to exist in reality." According to the
"
view I am combating, we should expect to read, if it exists

he adds,
it

in the understanding alone,

"

in the understanding

assumes/'

make

it

it

here

"

says Caird,

thought will

"

exists in reality," because existing

is

"

He

content

of

identical with reality.

that an

addition

to

more than thought, and

the

will break

through

the opposition which he started by assuming between thought

and reality." But in the words I have quoted, Anselm has
"
Can it not be conceived also
carefully framed the question
:

to exist in reality

he goes on to say,
the very unity

What

"
?

"

So I cannot agree with Dr. Caird when

to admit such a transition we must assume

we seek

to prove,

and that

is

just

what Anselm

have been trying to show is that this is just

what he does not do, that, on the contrary, the standpoint he

does,"

assumes

is

that

of

the

dualism

of

thought and existence.

p

ALBERT

184
"

Dualism," Kickaby

"
insists,

Scholasticism.

teristics of

DAVIES.

E.

is

one of the

common

Modern philosophy

is

pantheistic, such, eminently, Scholasticism

monistic,

And what Anselm

in regard

to

seeks to prove

God.

He

is

charac-

idealistic,

was

not."

that this dualism obtains

does not assume that an

certainly

addition to the content of thought can

make

more than a

it

content of thought, or will break through the opposition he

It would rather,
started with between thought and existence.
I think, be true to regard

him

as saying that the

"

reality of

God's existence compels me to think of Him as existing, to

add the thought of existence, i.e., to the content of my thought
of

Or

Him."

conceive

as Descartes puts

God except

"
it,

as existing,

from the

it

fact that I

cannot

follows that existence

is

inseparable from Him, and therefore that He exists not, indeed,

that my thought can cause it to be so, or impose any necessity
;

upon

things,

and so make the thought more or other than

thought, but contrari-wise the necessity that is in the thing

itself, i.e., the necessity of the existence of God, determines me
to

have

this thought."

The necessity

of so conceiving of

God,

or of the ens realissimum, in Anselm's case, so far at least as

the

first portion of his argument is concerned, would, of course,

be logical rather than psychological.
Anselm's reasoning, I have tried to show, presupposes that
the distinction between existence and the content of thought is

an ultimate
truth

distinction, in consequence of

must inevitably be

which our quest of

But the

in terms of logical thought.

question as to the transition from the ordo cognoscendi to the

ordo existendi raised by the foregoing criticism still remains.
I

am, of course, concerned with this issue only in its bearings on

Anselm's statement. What I have said of Anselm's theory of
as regards his own saying that there can be no knowwithout
ledge
experience has relevance here. Let me, however,
first deal with a more strictly metaphysical aspect of the matter.
While pfesupposing a distinction of nature that is ultimate

knowledge

between thought and existence the argument presupposes

also

185

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.

(or

asserts)

between them an ultimate connexion or inter-

relation.

We may distinguish a twofold

The

first is

implication of such connexion.

in the contention as to the nature of existent reality.

If validity is the criterion of reality,

if

know

the ultimate

Reality to be existent because I

can think validly of it only as

existing, I am assuming that the real nature of existent reality
is as such
ultimately knowable. Notwithstanding the fact that
it is

fundamentally distinct from the content of thought,

it is

It was
yet capable of being perfectly apprehended by thought.
this
at
the
which
to
the
root
of
he
saw
be
just
assumption

rationalist position

know

that called forth Kant's challenge.

We

Kant grants, else they could not appear to

but
we
know
them as they appear. The average
us;
only
things to be,

Schoolman would not have been troubled by such a fundamental

"
The most pronounced feature of all
misgiving as this.

The
pronounced objectivity.
Scholastic mind was bent on being,' not on 'forms of thought or
Scholastic

treatises"

is

their

'

'

constraining 'needs' of

Berkeley,

Hume

believing.

and Kant were

The

difficulties

raised

by

not difficulties to Albert or

Thomas" (Rickaby. Scholasticism, p. 44). Whether or not

Anselm was apprehensive of Kant's problem, it is clear that his
argument assumes the very position which Kant attacked.
And herein lies the value of the argument. While it assumes
that the relations that

the

relations

which

constitute thought are distinct from

obtain

in

existent

reality,

that

for

no exact equivalent in existing fact to the

relation of general and particular implied in the concept, yet

example there

is

that these two aspects of reality, existence and the content of

thought are so related that some agreement or correspondence

obtains, such that the relations of thought validly represent the
real relations of things,

and that knowledge is fundamentally

Of course the Scholastics would

of existent reality.

knowledge
have been helped here by their theology. Such fundamental
agreement and its ground in God Anselm brings out in his

186

ALBERT

E.

DAVIES.

"
Monologium, where he insists on the implication in

all of

our

a reality which is the object and, therefore,

knowledge
not the creature of our apprehension and which must possess
of

in

what we

fullness

its

each particular" (Webb.

Theology).

Professor

find

only imperfectly present in

Studies in the History of Natural

statement

Pfleiderer's

mental agreement, which he urges

is

"

abiding truth contained in the so-called

"

ment

of

funda-

this

the proper sense and

Argu-

Ontological

certainly in accord with Anselin's theory as expressed

is

De

"

The laws according to which the human

understanding thinks and calculates, arranges the given phenomena and anticipates future ones correspond to the laws
in the

Veritate.

according to which things hang together and work upon

each other in the real world. How is this correspondence

between the laws

of our thinking,

which are not given

to us

from without, and the laws of being, which are not made by us,
explained ? So far as I see, only from this that the two have

common ground

their

in a Divine thinking, in a creative

Keason

which manifests

its thoughts partly in the order of the real

world and partly in the thinking of our understanding as it
"
"
copies that Order."
(I think the term
copies here is unfortu-

"

The agreement of our thinking," Pfleiderer proceeds,

with the being of the world rests on the fact that it is the

nate.)
"

reproduction of the creative thoughts of the Infinite mind, a

reproduction which is always imperfect according to the

measure

The truth

of the finite mind.

participating in the truth which

and

St.

God

essentially is

Such he thinks

of Religion, p. 146).

Thomas Aquinas, according

of our cognition is a
"

to

is

(Philosophy

the view of Augustine

whom,

"

we

see

and judge

things in the light of God, in so far as the natural light of

our reason is a participating in the Divine Light," and he claims

all

that this thought

As

forth

have
in

said, it

the

Malebranche.

is

distinctly found in Anselm's Proslogium.

accords with the theory of truth which

De

We

Veritate,

and

see truth,

which

seems

to

is

set

anticipate

Anselm there maintains,

in God.

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.

"Truth

the accurate perception of

is

mind

the

While

God."

involving, as

his

it

summa

statement

does, the

of

the archetypal ideas in

veritas

per

subsistens

se

is

the

ontological argument,
that
assumption
validity is a criterion

"

our thinking and being are indeed different,"

implies also that they "are constituted for each other"

of reality, implies
it

"

the

of God,"

187

(Pfleiderer).

This, I think,

may

is

further illustrated in the second, which

we

distinguish as the psychological, implication of Anselin's

statement as to the connexion of thought and existence. Here

I am concerned more particularly with what I distinguished as
the second stage in Anselm's reasoning, that in which he asserts
that the greatest conceivable Being is the God in
he

Whom

have tried to show that at

believes.

this stage the appeal

experience, that the reasoning is avowedly a posteriori, and

assumes some such religious experience as his own, e.g., his
Anselm's
appeal to the faith and conscience of Gaunilo.

is to

explanation of how, since to understand what God is, is to

understand that he exists, the fool could deny his existence,

seems

to suggest

be

to

God.

of

"

which a thing may be

in

way

depended
There is," he

convincing,

finally

experience

he was conscious that the argument, in order

direct

upon
"

says,

personal

more than one

said in the heart or conceived.

The word

signifying the thing may be thought of or we

think or understand the thing itself. In the former sense

can be conceived not to

exist,

but in the latter not at

For no one who understands what

fire

and water

are,

may
God
all.

can

be really water, though he may have this

conception so far as the words go. Thus in like manner no one
who understands what God is can conceive that God does not
conceive

exist
fool,

fire

to

"

(Proslogium, Chap. 4).

who

represents for

Is it not implied here that the

Anselm the

atheist, lacks that relation

with the object signified in consequence of which he

is

invalidated
"

And

that

when Anselm speaks

without which there can be no knowledge

"

of

is

thinking
"

"

he

experience
is

assuming

ALBERT

188

E.

DAVIES.

the connexion between thought and existence which is implied

immediacy of the relationship, namely, between the

in the

knowing and the real object, and which is popularly

conceived as " direct contact," whereby the occurrence of the
contents of thought is determined ? The transition, that is to

act of

say,

from thought to existence does not

made

for

Anselm need

to be

in the process of reasoning as the criticisms I have dealt

with seem to imply. Thought, when its thinking is valid,

starts from existence in the sense that its content is occasioned

by existent reality and is

struction which has to be

The process

not,

to say, a subjective con-

i.e.,

verified

by "a leap from idea

of

is

to

that of discriminating,

knowledge
comparing and relating, by which features in the real object
come to be more and more clearly and distinctly apprehended.
reality."

The following quotation from Contra

this point.

psychology

it

Gentiles,

75, bears

on

as representing the Schoolman's

Kickaby quotes
"
whose metaphysics," he

"

says,

went with

his

psychology" and to whom Man's invincible belief that he sees

a world which is no part of himself, was an axiomatic truth.
"

In the process of understanding the intellectual impression

received in the potential intellect

is

that whereby (quo)

we

understand, as the impression of colour in the eye is not that

which (quod) is seen, but that whereby (quo) we see. On the
other hand, that which (quod) is understood is the nature of
things existing outside the soul, that are seen with the bodily
sight for to this end were arts and sciences invented, that
;

"

"
The
(p. 45).
might be known in their natures
distinction here drawn," says Eickaby, "between quod and

things

quo forms the standing reply of Scholasticism to Idealism.

My consciousness is not the object but the instrument of my
cognition."

Such expressions as that

"

of

"

"

"

impression received
theory of Locke, but

tabula rasa
exploded
the distinction here made suggests that an idea was regarded
rather as a way in which the real object was apprehended

recall the long

than something which stood between the knowing mind and

189

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.

And
"

is

was not a

"

tertium quid" but a "quo."

not this distinction implied in Anselm's contention that

the known, that

it

an unreal object

in the understanding alone

is

exist in fact as a real being

If I

am

right in this,

and does not

"

(Anselm's Reply, Chap. 6) ?

then the terms in which Dr. Caird

Anselm's reply to Gaunilo's objections " that there is an

"
essential difference between the idea of God and all other ideas
states

may

mislead, and the idealism of the statement that follows

is

"
it is the one only idea which overperhaps not surprising
reaches the difference between thought and reality." In his
summary of the reply Dr. Caird Jias an expression which is

"

truer to Anselm's realism.

Everything can be thought not to

be except that which is supremely
That alone cannot be
thought not to be ... which no thought ever finds except
"
always and everywhere whole {Journal of Theological Studies,
.

Vol.

I, p.

It is of a

24).

Being

"

"

thought finds

Anselm reasons,

not of an idea and certainly not of an idea conceived as a

bridge between thought and existence.
existent, the

"

most

with Lotze that

"

object

an

is itself

Anselm, seems to me, would agree

never possible, starting from mere con-

real."

it is

The

it

ceptions of thought, to prove the actual reality of that which

is

mere conception

of thought he would
"
whereas
he
would
assert that all
object"
our knowledge strikes in at a point in a reality which it finds as
a matter of fact given to it." It is true that Lotze regards the

contained in them."
regard as

"

Ontological

mentioned.

an unreal

Argument

And

his

as

committing the kind

account of

the

of fallacy

intelligibility

he has
of

the

temptation, as he puts it, in this case, seems to fit in with the

"
The conception of God as a
occasion of Anselm's argument.
necessary consequence following from a reality other than

Himself, and given in perception, contradicted our idea of Him,

demanded that He should be conceived as the

for this very idea

grounds of

"
all

consequents

also finds the occasion of the

(Logic, III, p. 499).

argument

Ue'berweg

of the Proslogium in

dissatisfaction with the relativeness of the

argument

in

the

ANSELM'S PROBLEM.

190
"

Monologium.

For Anselm had been disquieted," says Ueber-

"

weg, by the circumstance that in the proof attempted in the

Monologium the demonstration of the existence of the Absolute

had appeared dependent on the existence

of

the relative

"

But, as both these statements

(History of Philosophy, Vol. I).
imply, the conception of God on which the argument in the

not a mere " conception of thought," a

mere subjective product it is that arrived at by the a posteriori
argument of the earlier treatise. Moreover, that treatise Anselm

Proslogium

is

based

is

describes

Faith

as an

Example

of meditation

on the Grounds

of

de ratione fides (Proslogium, Preface), a description

it as a rational verification of

which implies that he regarded

the content of his faith
clusion

and

is

the conception of

God

in the con-

already a deliverance of his own religious experience,

"
merely a necessary consequence following from

so is not

a reality other than himself."

Again, the fact that Anselm's basal conception of

God

pre-eminently an
ethical conception (he speaks, for example, in his Preface of the
purpose of his argument as being to demonstrate that God

namely, as the greatest conceivable Being

is

the Supreme Good) proves it on Lotze's own

"
Such
showing to be more than a mere product of subjectivity.
"as
in
a
that
rest
Lotze,
beliefs," says
Supreme Good,
upon an
truly exists

and

is

extremely broad, though unanalysed, foundation of perception.

They start from the fact of this actual world as it is given in
experience."

intends

That, I

when he

think,

is

the

says that knowledge

presupposition
is

Anselm

not possible without

specific content of thought is not a subexperience.

and
if, as we have seen, existence qua existence
jective creation,
If the

is

never part of that content, then the content itself contains

for its own appearance.
That is to say, "know-

no ground

ledge presupposes a

mode

of reality dissimilar

from

itself."

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Cfrosvenor

on June 2lst, 1920, at 8 P.M.

Street,

W.

1,

XL MEMORY AND CONATION.

By BEATRICE EDGELL.
"

Where

art thou, storehouse of the mind, garner of facts

and

fancies,

In what strange firmament are laid the beams of thine airy

chambers ?
Or art thou that small cavern, the centre of the rolling brain,
Where still one sandy morsel testifieth man's original ? " TUPPER.

no problem of mind which is so provocative as that of

memory. To unfold its complications would be to disclose the
It is a
threads which form the warp and woof of mental life.

THERE

is

problem that

is

accorded very different treatment at the hands

of different writers.

The purpose

and compare the treatment which

three

writers

who approach

it

of this
it

paper

to outline

is

receives at the hands of

from

the diverse paths of

philosophical psychology, biology and psychiatry, viz., Professor

James Ward, Dr. Richard Semon and Dr. Sigmund Freud.

The comparison undertaken has

in

view

the

question:

Does the faculty of memory imply the existence of conation as

a specific mental function ? It will be convenient to consider
iirst

a writer's account of the development of

secondly, his treatment of the various

It is to be noted that the

under that faculty.

is

used descriptively.

the faculties

...

memory and,
phenomena which fall

of

"

term

faculty"

To quote Professor Mitchell " Most of

which we ordinarily speak are merely
:

they are faculties for this or that experience of the

same name. As it is useful to have a scheme in terms of which

descriptive

to analyse all experience, so it is useful to

have

it for

analysing

and describing minds in a systematic manner" (Structure

and Growth of Mind, p. 116). In the question stated above,
Q

BEATRICE EDGELL.

192
"

"

belongs to the scheme of terms for analysing and

"
"
describing minds, function to the scheme for analysing and
faculty

describing experience.
No English writer on psychology has given a fuller account
of the generation of the memory-continuum than Professor

Ward

in his Psychological

Though he approaches

Principles.

Ward

the problem from a philosophical standpoint, Professor

follows a biological method.

Ideas of

memory

which have individuality and chronological

are

"

free

"

ideas

In order

position.

such ideas he outlines the progress of

to trace the evolution of

"

who shall owe nothing

from
a
totum
of
undifferentiated sense
to heredity.
Starting
impressions, the individual advances to the level of sense
an imaginary

psychological individual,"

perception where he

is

aware

world of real things and

his actions to, the immediate

of a

can preperceive and preadjust

future, i.e., a level whereon representative images occur in
conjunction with sense impressions. From this stage of the
"tied" idea he advances to "free" ideas which are neither
"

sense-bound

trains of

What

"

nor

"

sense-sustained."

From them

arise

the

memory which are referred to the past.

presuppositions as to mental life does Professor Ward

require for the development he thus outlines ? Persistence of

the old alongside the new in a changing whole, and progressive

blending of the new with the old, these features Professor

Ward terms " plasticity," and one may say they are implied in
the

very

conception

of

life.

Such

presentations, the objective side of

plasticity

that duality

pertains
into

to

which

But mental life for Professor Ward is

experience is analysed.
the life of a subject who acts as a real agent, whose one capacity
"
is feeling, whose one power is that of
variously distributing
that attention upon which the effective intensity of a presentation in part depends

One may

"

(p. 57).

try to discern the office of presentations

and the

office of this subjective activity, called attention, in the generation

of the

memory-continuum.

Presumably

all

that figures

as

MEMORY AND CONATION.

"

193

subjective selection," a term which occurs frequently in the

Principles, is the exercise of

which guides the

selection

sense impressions, but

is

it

"

the one power."

differentiation

It is subjective

and integration

of

the plasticity of the presentations

which makes such differentiation and integration possible. It

is persistence or retention of presentations which produces
"

"

after-images

and

"

recurrent sensations," but

it

attention

is

"

It is not
which brings about the " primary memory -image."
a mere residuum of changes in the presentation-continuum it
:

a distinct effect of these changes, but only when there has

"
Provided that
been some concentration of attention on them."

is

was

trace"

and

impression may be for some time

very intense ones leave no appreciable
Such an image is a "tied" idea, "sense-bound"

sufficient, the faintest

retained
"

and without

(p. 176).

it

sense-sustained,"

and

in

figures

The

preperception.

repetition of similar situations and the retention of the issue of

those trial and error processes which attention initiates, result

of preperceptions such as Professor Ward
"
simulates
by the cogitation, It may be a weasel,
dramatically
"
if so, I back
it may be a rabbit, if it is, I spring
(p. 187).

in

an alternation

From such

alternations emerge

"

free

"

ideas,

which become

more frequent as life becomes more complicated. The advance

"
from sporadic " free ideas to a train, the memory-continuum,
wherein the members have individuality and chronological
"
Thus the
order, appears to be due to the work of attention.

most important peculiarity

of this

series of representations integrated

of

attention

out of the

continuum

by means

differentiations as pertain to

memory-image ....
continuity which
local signs they

it is

it is

movements

of

what we know

To them

that

the primary or
of so much of these

differentiations

presentation-continuum, or rather out

is

of the

as the primary

proposed to look for that

images lose in so far as they part with the

had as percepts and cease

to be either localized

or projected" (pp. 196-7).

It is clear that,

however important the intensity

of pre-

Q 2

194

BEATRICE EDGELL.

sentations in reference to non-voluntary attention, and however

great the part assigned to the plasticity of the presentation-

continuum,

it

the subject which

the activity of

is

in

the

the

is

the

of

explanatory principle
generation
memorycontinuum. The rdle of the subject is manifested even more
plainly in that synthetic survey of mental life (Chap. XVII)

Ward completes
He there repeats a

with which Professor

his account of psychostatement

made by him
logical principles.
in Mind, to the effect that Presentationism will account for

nine-tenths of the facts, or better for nine-tenths of each

"

The

fact.

presentationist's services to psychology have, however,

been greater than he knows.

making

The more he has succeeded

the structure of the nine- tenths clear the

in

more he has

unintentionally brought to light the fact that this pre"

sentational structure implies a subjective function
(p. 411).
"
From first to last the growing structure ... is the work of

the subject so surely as feeling or attention, or in one word,

"

mental synthesis in any form

actual," as distinguished from the

interest, is essential to

In the case of the

"

logical

"

individual, the

"

formative

"

psycho-

action of the subject

facilitated in so far as the individual inherits a

i.e.,

(p. 414).
"
is

"

psychoplasm,"

a plastic presentation-continuum, wherein the formative

work

of its ancestors is latent as

"

peculium."

Certain lines of

differentiation, retention, assimilation are predetermined, others

"The young rabbit begins by being indifferent to mice

and interested in carrots, the young cat by being indifferent
to carrots and interested in mice, while both are alarmed at

not.

the sight of a dog

means

"
(p. 183).

This doctrine of heredity by no

lessens the necessity for postulating the activity of the

subject as the explanatory principle in development.

On

the

requires such a principle for its own justification.

contrary,
In passing on to consider various phenomena of memory,
it

one must in the

first

subconsciousness.

He

place notice Professor Ward's view of

declines to recognize

to the field of sense presentation.

any fixed boundary

In respect of attention

MEMORY AND CONATION.

there

the focus and the margin of the

is

195

field,

beyond such

margin he would postulate the subconscious wherein differentiation cannot be effected.

It is a penumbra of potential prean

sentation,

when

there

attention.

it

is

some

is

when

or

intensity,

beyond

unditferentiated

increase

in

subconscious prethe differentiated

of

inherent or absolute

its

is a change in the distribution of

from these subconscious presentations

range of attention are the subconscious ideas, and

subconscious ideas with which memory is concerned.
'the

mental

of

life

retention of sense impressions.

recurrent

life

field

there

Distinct

The conception
"

totum.

can only pass into the

sentation

history

sensation

be

may

"

the

"

and the

after-image
regarded as phases in the

So also the

whose production attention

for

or

persistence

"

a sense impression.

of

memory -im age

"

implies

The

is

"

primary
essential.

When

no longer attended to it continues its life story in subconsciousness as a psychical disposition.

It may subsequently
be assimilated with some fresh impression like itself or it may
function as a " representation." In this latter case its assimilation with the

ment

of

with

it

new

accompanied by the reinstatethose attendant circumstances which were integrated

situation

is

by attention on a given

disposition

is

to be conceived as a

The psychical

occasion.

mental function correlate

with physiological function. Professor Ward protests against

"
If a given
the attempt to explain function by structure.
functional activity entirely ceases it does not leave behind it

'

'

On the
a structural plasticity that survives independently.
has
when
the
function
completely lapsed the
contrary,
molecular structure has no longer any 'power' to facilitate
its

recurrence"

^potential process.

(p.
"

99).

What

The
is

functional

disposition

is

requisite to the realization of a

given potentiality is 'sometimes a condition to be added, sometimes it is one to be taken away.

Now presentational
dispositions we assume to be always of the latter sort.
.

These dispositions are processes or functions more or

less

196

BEATRICE EDGELL.

and the inhibition

inhibited,

determined by their relation to

is

other psychical processes or functions

What

(p. 97).

important to notice here

is

it

"

that

is

psychical

and representations are processes and as such

the
activity of mental life, but this activity of a process
possess
is not to be confused with that
activity which was stressed in
dispositions

the previous paragraph,

Although

Ward

of presentations a

dynamics
any view

the activity of the subject.

viz.,

Professor

"

Herbart's

styles

wild dream

"

and

statics

and would deprecate

of presentations or representations as forces attracting

and repelling each other, he accepts the Herbartian terms

"
"
and " involution " to express the rising and
evolution
falling

of

Professor

from,

representations

and

into,

subconsciousness.

Ward compares

the subconscious images with a

The same image may figure in various con-

concordance.

In the schoolboy's knowledge of the first book of

the jEnM the one verbal image, " ^Eneas," may figure in
nexions.

An image

different settings.

sentation in
i.e.,

so

as

far

it

only serves the purpose of repre-

reinstates

a complex whole into which

attention.

All

"

"

representations

some particular

this sense a psychological disposition is

is

evolved

setting,

has been incorporated by

may be termed ideas, and in
it

when the reinstatement takes

an

"

involved

"

place.

understand to what extent Professor

It is difficult to

It

idea.

Ward

images and ideas. In speaking of memory he more

frequently uses the term "image" than the term "idea," but

identifies

even in the case of memory one may question whether images

represent all that is remembered. To quote Professor Stout:
"

The image is only one constituent of the idea the other and
more important constituent is the meaning which the image
;

"

conveys

(Manual,

the setting of

p.

529).

Would

Professor

Ward

assert

images which form

the main image, and which may vary from

that the meaning

is

conveyed by those

clear prehensible particulars to flickering, elusive fragments

Reduplication of

the

memory

train

and the dying out

of

MEMORY AND CONATION.

some

members

of its

are the conditions which give potential

generality to representations,
is

"

"

termed,

"

ideational
tissue

What

"

and so

continuum.

of intellection as well as for the

to appreciate is

is difficult

thread and the weaving of

activity,

and how

far

it

what

to the formation of

from the memory-continuum, the

"
The " concordance serves for the

distinction

in

197

is

how

"

"

thread

of

memory.

far the spinning of the

the tissue

is

due to subjective

determined by the

of those

life

processes,

which are the filaments constituting the threads.

Professor

Ward

ideas

"

tells

undisturbed

'
;

we

us

"

rarely experience

and diverted

tinually interrupted

It

to ascertain that, so far as it is left to itself,

is

How

the

even in dreams and reverie

is

it

of

con-

not difficult

such flow takes a

very different course from that which we should have to

"
retrace if bent on reminiscence and able to recollect perfectly
(p.

Does

201).

this refer to the activity

filaments as mental processes?

which belongs

to the

Is the flow of ideas just the

working out of the life-story of the threads when these are

free from superintendence ?
Professor

Ward draws

due

or conflict

the

to

"

"

rectangle

a distinction between the inhibition

significance

the

of

ideas,

e.g.,

the

idea

of

idea

which

any
predication
rectangular ity," and the inhibition due to the
This
rival presentations to secure attention.
inhibiting

conflicts

with

struggle

of

"

seems

ultimately to depend upon the difference

between an activity concerned with the manipulation of ideas

distinction

and the activity which

is

inherent in ideas themselves as mental

processes.

The

same
"

"

judicious

apparent in the distinction of

"
In discussing
mechanical
memory.

contrast

and

"

is

"

"
associations
mediate
Ebbinghaus's experimental work on
between members of a series of nonsense syllables,
b, c, d,
,

etc.,

Professor

say, of

a with

Ward
c

regards the so-called mediate associations,

and I with d as cases of interrelation. " After

several repetitions,

when

the primary associations have begun

198

BEATRICE. EDGELL.

to be familiar, the subjects' attitude

and does

and

it

does,

some persons sooner and more frequently than

so with

with others.

may change

It

is

between the members

then possible to note various relations

"
of the series besides their serial order

Professor Ward agrees with Professor Muller that

236).
the subject's activity in relation to the series " displays far
more freedom and spontaneity " than merely linking item to

(p.

item as each

files

"

past.

The point

subjective initiative is present

is

that unless such further

nothing more

As

achieved.

is

result of that initiative, however, a supplementary process of

'

'

comes into play.

interrelating

relating

the

is

feature

distinguishing

This secondary interof Kant's 'judicious

'

memorising and implies the more complex process of redinte"

Such interrelating is surely to be attributed
gration (p. 237).

which

It is a part of that one-tenth

to subjective activity.

cannot be explained by Presentationism.

Professor Ward's explanation of so-called
ciation

"

follows the

on movements
forwards, there

of

same

lines.

attention,

no

"

In so far as association depends

and attention can only move
"

"

regressive

association.

like it is in reality redintegration

and not pure

is

regressive asso-

What

appears

association.

It is possible to regard the life story of the filaments as the

explanation of the facts cited in regard to the age and strength

of associations.
Experiments by Dr. Jost, and still more convincingly the experiments of Dr. Ballard, show what one may
term the ripening or maturing of associations with age. Eepetition effects more in the case of old associations than in the case
of

more recent

ones.

short interval than

tion.

Professor

the difference

is

Reproduction

more complete

when attempted immediately

Ward

"

says,

We

seem

left to

after a

after acquisi-

conjecture that

the effect of the process of assimilation working

"

subconsciously

is

(p.

241)

i.e.,

it is

due to the plasticity

of the

presentation-continuum.

Ebbiughaus's investigations as to the progress of forgetting

resulted in the formula that, roughly, forgetting is proportional

MEMORY AND CONATION.

to the logarithm of the time

a result

199

which Professor Ward

points out as being in harmony with Herbart's assumption

that presentations sink below the threshold of consciousness in

proportion to their intensity, the less there is to sink the

slower the process. This result is also one which is intelligible

without reference

to the activity of the subject. It is intelligible

as the decay of living processes.

Where then do we stand if we try to balance the accounts

and interpret the

results

It is plain that

whether we consider

the formation of the memory-continuum, or whether we consider the phenomena of remembering and forgetting, we must,

according to Professor Ward, recognize the presence of determining factors other than the sense impressions and their
images,

even when these are treated biologically as living

governed

processes

their

by

own

laws,

the

exhibiting

characteristics of all life: change, persistence, growth, decay.

I find

however, extraordinarily

it,

difficult

to obtain

any

clear view of the nature of this other factor^ or factors, referred

to as subjective activity, subjective selection, attention.

whole

of experience is experience which,

we

point of view,

attribute to

The

from a philosophical
subject, and in

an individual, a

we accept the
conception of mental life all experience is activity. But it is
clear that Professor Ward means more than this when he refers
that sense all experience

is

subjective.

to the activity of the subject.

From

Again,

if

the analysis of experience

would seem that there are aspects of experience

where the dominant features justify the title " objective," and

into a duality

it

others where they justify the

title

"

subjective," but the subject

cannot be identified with any one aspect of experience. It

There
stands over and above experience.
It has experience.
is

a significant

Mind

passage in which Professor

Ward

speaks of

as the subject of experience plus its experiences

It is to be

remembered that the word

posely selected by

cance than

"

him

as being

consciousness."

more

"

"

experience

(p.

408).

was pur-

catholic in its signifi-

200

BEATRICE EDGELL.

Ward

Professor

and

Of the capacity we have direct experience in

one power.

What

feeling.

attributes to the subject one capacity

of the power, attention

under many names.

now

thought.

The work

of atten-

Now it is perception,
All the faculties of the old

tion has to figure

now

imagination,

"

attention to different kinds of

psychologists are reduced to
Attention to a special class of objects, viz., motor
objects."
is

sensations,

feature that

serve as a

it

termed " conation."

It has this distinguishing

preceded by feeling. Attention, then, has to

for the activity of the subject in its cognitional

is

name

relations to different kinds of objects.

Obviously, as such, it is
not the name for a specific mental function other than cogniYet if this be so, it
tion, even though it bears a specific name.
is strange that reflection on experience should lead us to
postulate a subject-agent

who manipulates

the growing living

combining

processes, selecting this, rejecting that,

these, severing

only ground for our conception of an active

the
fact
that we find this selected, that rejected, these
subject
those
severed, and cannot otherwise explain how it
combined,
those.

Is the

came about

Does the case stand thus

of the subject in experience is feeling,

cognition

On

of

the only direct witness

but the explanation of

an active subject-agent

me to be one interpretation of
a
misinterpretation, but, nevertheperhaps

the whole, this seems to

Professor
less

demands the postulate

Ward;

one which

reflects the general analysis of

experience given

in his table (p. 56).

In accordance with

the question stated at the beginning

of the paper should be answered thus
Ihejaculty _oL_Uifiinjpryi
of
an
active
the
existence
subject-agent, but does not
implies
it,

imply the existence of any

But

specific function, conation.

there are indications of a different view

which are more marked

indications

in those parts of the Principles

which

new or rewritten than in those parts which are reproduced

from the article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1885.
are

The

definition of psychology lays

emphasis on experience

MEMORY AND CONATION.

201

understood as conative activity or behaviour, and it is stated

"
not intellect but will, not cognition but conation, not

that

sensitivity but activity, is the clue to the true understanding

of the character

and development

of experience

"

"
(p. 20).

view here merely attention

Is the conation in

(p. 204).

"

motor presentations, with the proviso,

I

think not.

When
"

"

can the

striving

Life

and feeling

or experience as conative involves both activity

initiated

"

to
"

by

feeling

one turns to the account given of desire,

there* recognized as present be brought

under the heading

of

Is the attitude
motor experiences ?
"
?
Does the " want which

of interested expectation, feeling

Ward

Professor

says gives

new

character

an object,
the answer be

to

with value, stand for feeling ? If

be difficult to avoid assenting to qualitative
yes,"
differences in feeling, and also to avoid extending the simple
it

endowing

"

will

it

duality of pleasure and pain into something resembling

Wundt's

tridimensional system.

In discussing the question whether the strength of desire

proportional to the pleasure value of the aim, Professor

speaks of

Such

"

He

seeking."

styles

it

is-

Ward

a condition essential to desire.

"

"

seeking is not cognition of the aim, nor can it, without

Is it then
straining, be brought under the category of feeling.
to be conceived as motor sensation ?
The same type of experience

implied in the account given of concentration, idea-

is

"

tional adjustment.

most

referred

of

To

this

the strain

adjustment may be
connected
head-splitting

ideational

and

'

'

with recollecting, reflecting, and all that people call headwork

of one intently thinking or absorbed in

;.

and the absent look

c

'

reverie seems directly due to that lack of sensory adjustment

which the concentration on ideas

"

entails

such adjustment nascent movement

it with
sensory adjustment ?

"
?

"

(pp. 173, 174).

If

it is,

why

Is-

contrast

indication which Professor Ward gives of

a
recognizing
specific function which might be termed conation
in Professor Stout's sense of the term, viz., " wanting the object

But the greatest

202

BEATRICE EDGELL.

some respect other than

to be in

as

it is,"

is

The pure

it is

or in wanting

his account of
subjective being."
"
"
or
the
idea
of pure reason," Kant's
focus
I,
ego

imaginarius," cannot be conceived as an object, yet

so

continue

it to

"

conceived,

how can

be

it

the

it

if

be not

towards which the

limit

Professor Ward's
empirical ego, the self as known, points ?
solution of this problem is that "experience is wider than
knowledge" (p. 378). "That pure subject or ego which we reach

no

in our analysis of experience at its rational level stands for

abstraction so long as

attempting

When

non-ego.

we

are content to distinguish

to separate it
in

from

some supreme

saying, like Caesar crossing

Worms,
is itself

'

its

I will,' to tell

objective
issue a

without

it

complement the

man

affirms himself,

the Kubicon, or Luther entering

him then

that this I of which he speaks

an utter abstraction, because our concept of

limit of a long process of intellection

surely this

it

is

the

would be

Surely here Professor Ward is relying

on the direct witness of the experience of subjective activity
in contradistinction to the indirect witness gained by the

outrageous"

(p. 379).

intellectual reflection on

knowledge and cognition

Can

this

direct witness, subjective activity, be that attention of which

is said,

"

the activity of attention

relation to

and

that

we

....

is

one.

It is

are tempted to resolve

it

it

only in
into a

"

No, for if the activity of

plurality
(p. 66).
attention truly be one, and that cognitional, then ex hypothesi, it
cannot be the witness which establishes the being of the
of

subject.

faculties

But

if,

in the end, the being of the subject is guaran-

teed by a direct experience, that aspect of experience which

provides the guarantee ought to be recognized in the psycho-

mate

fact.

and

psychology the proxi"

For such an aspect of experience " conation seems

logical analysis of experience,

is for

the suitable name.

Ward's

teaching be
more correct than the one previously given, then the statement with regard to memory may be amended. The faculty
If

this

interpretation

of

Professor

MEMORY AND CONATION.

of

memory

implies

the

existence

203

of

function,

specific

conation.

Dr. Eichard Semon's treatment of

it is

so in a very different sense

not in terms of mental

memory

is

biological,

from Professor Ward's.

but

It is

but in terms of organic life, that

traces out the formation of the memory-continuum.
life,

Semon
In Die Mneme one has

Dr.

the lineal successor of Bering's Ueber

das Geddditnis and Butler's

"

uses the term

Mneme

general function of

memory

all

Unconscious Memory." Dr. Semon

for

in Bering's sense, viz.,

memory

organic matter, and he

Human memory

occurs.

tion of such

"

principles,

and

Mnemischen Empfindungen.
conditions which gave

response to

a.

first

is

with in his book Die

dealt

The central

fact to be explained is

rise

to it

when

the original

not repeated in their

are

The problem embraces both the reproduction of

stimulation and the reproduction of characteristics
Only the former

in ontogeny.

The

the

will be but a special applica-

the reproduction or return of some action

entirety.

tries, in

the general conditions under which such

establish

to

place,

"

series of events

is

in place here.

in the reproduction

of a

response is
The excitation of organic matter by stimulaoutlined thus
tion gives rise to what may be termed a response to the
:

stimulation, which response

form even after stimulation

may

be continued in a weakened

There next ensues what,

Semon terms a

ceases.

in relation to the state before stimulation,

The organic matter, however, is

second indifference period.
not in the same state as before stimulation. This_ change In
the character of organic matter

is

an

"

engramm."

The proof

the fact that hereafter the organic matter

change
will yield a response to stimulation which could not have
lies in

of this

called forth that particular response previously.

only

new

stimulation

"

"

"

but

also

the

bringing

of the
engramm left by the old
Semon does not conceive the " engramm "

excitation

in

the

is

forth,

not,
or

"

ekphorie
of

There

organic

matter.

response.
as a persistence

In Die Mnemischen

204

BEATRICE EDGELL.

"
Empfindunyen he says, We are not in a position to say more
than that after a vigorous stimulation has run its course, the
change which is produced is to be conceived as a change in the

excitable substance, that

as a substantial or material change."

is,

In other words, Semon favours that structural interpretation

against which Professor Ward protests. All

of persistence

simultaneous excitations in an organism form a

of

complex
the

"

original

engramms."

A situation

situation

the most

is

which

connected

a repetition of

is

one for repro-

effective

ducing the response, but when parts of the original situation

are repeated, that part which succeeds in repeating the
be most effective in bringing
about a reproduction, for the repeated effect calls forth the
"
"
"
a produces the excitation a,
appropriate
engramms," e.g.,
original stimulation effect will

"

and

"

the excitation

The excitation a

is

brought
about by the stimuli a + b. But in virtue of the
engramm"
"
"
complex A + B, due to these excitations, the stimulus a can
/3.

-H

/9

"

hereafter, acting

since
"

"

"

by

itself alone,

brings about
"

engramm-complex

produce the excitation a + /3

effect a,

A -f B,

and

this

and thus gives

"

calls forth

rise to the

"

the

response

a + b.
Dr.

Semon reduces

An

all

association to simultaneous associa-

a systematic whole of co-existing parts.

organism
At any moment there exists a co-ordinated totality of excitable
Each stimulation has its effect without confusion
conditions.
tion.

is

with any other.

A complex stimulation

produces a co-ordinated
response.
Perception is a complex of this kind. Within the
some
elements are more enduring than others, thus
complex
in successive

at

moment

moments there
will

there will be an

"

are

common

What

moment

A is

inevitably, in virtue of its enduring

moment

"

called forth,"

factors,

All

of

association thus rest ultimately on co-existence.

It

it

in

B.

it

will

bring up what

cases

co-existed

exists

have some factors in moment B, and thus

"
engramm-complex of A and B. If here-

after anything belonging to

with

factors.

successive
is

interest-

205

MEMORY AND CONATION.

ing

between Professor

to note the contrast

When

here.

association

made

is

Ward and

Dr.

Semon

on movements

rest

to

of

attention, the fundamental form of association must be successive, but when association is made to rest on the systematic

co-ordination of response to co-existing stimulations, the funda-

mental form must be simultaneous.

"

tion.

"

are directly related to strength of stimula-

Engramms
The

special nerve path stimulated is

the whole nervous system

exception

affected, but

some degree, with the

affected to

paths which are so specialized as to be

those

of

is

most

"
impenetrable by any but their adequate
therefore, no definite localization of
is,

"

There

stimulation.
"

"

they
engramms
cannot be thought of as deposited in certain cells.
Plainly
there is nothing in this account of the generation of a memory-

continuum,

if

that phrase

In turning

may

to consider

imply conation.

pass, to

Dr. Semon's treatment of some of

"

"

the phenomena of memory, the theory of

homophonie may
be noticed first. Just as sense excitations are regarded as coordinated but not mixed, so "engramms" must likewise be

Further, there is no
regarded as co-ordinated but not mixed.
mixture between sense stimulation and the reproduced response.
If p or} signifies the original situation and p mi the memory

evoked, then

p mi

is

never fused with

pora

The likeness between

and

por2 may be complete, as in the case of recognition, or

2) mi
partial, as when a definite memory of a different occasion is
evoked by a situation but be it complete or partial, p mi is
;

never fused with

"

separate

pors

More than

"

engramm

Instead of an

"

is

distinct

this, upon repetition each

from those which preceded it.

inextricable confusion

result of repetition, there results

This

is

what

is

to contrast Dr.

termed

"

an

homophonie."

Semon and

"

"

of

"

"

engramms

as the

analysable consonance."

Here, again,

it is

useful

Professor Ward, and to recall the

against a theory of persistence whereby expe"

It is true
rience drags at each remove a lengthening chain."
"
"
that Dr. Semon does not claim that each
engramm can

latter's protest

BEATRICE EDGELL.

206
actually give
effectiveness,

to a

rise

but of their separate

reproduction,

Even when not giving

he has no doubt.

rise to

contribute to the vividness or complete-

reproduction they may

ness of other reproductions.

Here, indeed, he seems to come

near to Professor Ward's conception of " plasticity."

In place of Professor Ward's "concordance," Dr.
presents the conception

of

"

layers

of

Semon

engramm-complexes,"
what may be

differing in date, but each possibly containing

thought of as the same

"

engramm," through the presence of

which the different layers become associated with one another.
This is Dr. Semon's illustration He sees in a garden atTorbole
:

a tree with a blood red fruit and

kaki-tree.

Some years

is

told the tree is called the

later he hears a discussion as to suit-

able colours for military uniforms, khaki

"

thinks to himself,

must be very

it

while at the same time a

rises before

where he hears a traveller ask

Again an image

of the

mentioned and he

different

from kaki

fruit,"

of the scene in the garden

memory
Some time after he

him.

is

at a railway station

is

for a ticket to

garden and the

Nago-Torbole.

fruit arises.

later in a restaurant fancy ice fruits suggest

Months

by
Each

their colour

of the kaki fruit can be associated with

one another.

recall gives
the kaki fruit and the garden at Tor bole.
rise to a different complex, but the complexes, by virtue of the
"

"

engramm

This would be Dr.

experience.

weaving

The

Semon's explanation

co-existence

of

of

filaments

the

"

tissue

suffices

"

of

the

for

of the fabric.

The explanation of mediate associations and forward association is made clear by a scheme of the relations of excitations to
one another in the successive moments of a series of events
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

d,

6.

7.

d,

Successive moments.

MEMORY AND CONATION.

Let A, B, C,

represent events and

the dying effects of A,

etc.,

moment when event

the

it #3,

b2

thus association

GI,

possible but necessary

and

c,

similarly for b

If the

engramms,"
"

"

"

"

"

of

engramm

association of

Ci,

indicate

it

Obliviscence

engramms," but

forward

may

"

than

rather

Should the event C be

will suggest the event

"

fading

b\,

rather

be

whereas the

The

and vivid D.

"

engramms."

not

to inhibition of

b\.

by the

of attention are replaced

due,

event

of the original

regarded as stronger than that of C,

principle of the relative intensity of

"

"

why

"

movements

Professor Ward's

At

to illustrate the relation of

engramm
"
engramm of the

is

represent

place, there co-exists with

between a and c is not merely

co-exists with the actual

c\

etc.,

d, etc.

repeated on any occasion

than event B, because the
co-exists with the

takes

association takes place.

regressive

a4

hence the mediate association of a

and

will

it

during successive moments.

same scheme be used

'*

20?

to

the

dying
"

"

ekphorie."

away
"

Ekphorie

of

may

depends upon the partial return of the

"
excitation which gave rise to the engramm," and with a change
be hindered, since

it

in the state of the organism, such return

may become

impos-

sible.

Does Dr. Semon, then, give an account both of the formation of a memory-continuum and of the phenomena of memory
without implying the existence of such a function as conation

The answer

so far

would seem

"

to be

The

undeniably yes."
temporal order of stimulations, their strength and repetitions,
together with the basic facts of organic life, appear to explain

memory

in

man

just as they explain

"mneme"

in all organic

matter.

Does Dr. Sernon commit the

Ward

issued a warning in his Giffbrd Lectures,

'retention'
'

fallacy against

itself,

and

all

cognate

residuum,' are meaningless unless

terms,

which Professor
"

The bare term

such as

'trace,'

some present circumstance

can be related to the past; thus they presuppose

memory?"
R

208
This

BEATRICE EDGELL.
is

the fallacy of the Behaviourist,

in our sense is a general

term

e.g.,

Watson,

"

Memory

to express the fact that after a

the function is not

period of no practice in certain habits
lost but is retained as part of the individual's organization,
.

although

it

through disuse have suffered greater or less

For whom is this a fact ?
(Psychology, p. 304).

may
"

impairment
Only for someone who can bring past and present together
by memory and compare them.
Memory is presupposed.
"

Dr. Semon, however, does recognize the " experiencing

of
impressions and images in his treatment of Die Mnemischen

Empfindungen. But this very recognition has its consequences.

Sense perception is complex and, as such, leaves an

engramm-complex.
is

perception

The memory reproduction

difference

between perception and memory

partly on

this circumstance.

mneme "

What

is

made

explanation

is

to

depend

there for

In accordance with the principles of

the whole complex should be reproduced. Dr. Semon

the fragmentary image

"

of the original

usually fragmentary, indeed for experience the

conceives this as being actually the case, but says that

memory images

He

are too faint to be experienced.

many

compares

the remembered items to the summits of a submerged range of

mountains. Just as only the high peaks would be visible and

would appear as separate

islands, so only the vivid impressions

reproduced
memory as fragments of the perceptual
in the original impression is thus treated
Vividness
complex.
are

in

as a determining factor, and vividness is carefully distinguished

from intensity. Direction of attention to an impression gives
One may
it that vividness which ensures it being reproduced.

compare with Professor Ward's statement that primary memoryimages

depend

impression.

upon the attention given to the

attention which selects elements in the sense

mainly

It is

complex and also selects features in the reproduction. The

"summit" memories which are attended to become clearer,
those that
difference

are

not,

fall

back into the sub-conscious.

between sense impression and image

is

The

one of vivid-

MEMORY AND CONATION.

209

and

it is this, rather than any difference in intensity which

an
keeps
image and a sensation distinct when they are present

ness,

together in consciousness.
vividness of an image

(Cf. Professor

Ward,

p.

173).

The

not independent of the intensity of the

sense impression, but nevertheless the image of an intense

not necessarily more vivid than the image of a less

The only way in which the vividness of images

is

impression

intense one.

be increased

may

When

is

by attention.

is

several

sense

impressions are

experienced simul-

taneously there will be decreasing degrees of vividness

them

in relation to

to the

same

some one vivid impression.

sense, simultaneous

among

If

they belong
impressions will inhibit one

another or give rise to consonance or become vivid in succession

In the case of competing trains of images the
(retinal rivalry).
train followed

train into

There

must be one only

will not

be two trains side by

ness in the train of images

it

of the competitors, or a single

which members from each

is

as a condition of vividness.

of the rival trains enter.

side.

important.

This fact of singleDr. Semon explains

Apart from

this

requirement

there seems no necessity for recognizing a limit in the

number

impressions simultaneously present, and none for

Does the requirerestricting reproduction to a single thread.
of

sense

ment

of vividness lie at the root of intellectual incompatibility

Professor

Ward

distinguished the conflict of presentations to

secure attention from the conflict

of

ideas due

to

content.

to make both alike depend ultimately

"
"
vividness. Will the laws of mneme
determines
whatever
upon
In so far as vividness is not due to
cover these conditions ?

Dr.

Semon would seem

consonance

of

images or impressions,

selective action of attention.

But

it

is

attributed to the

of attention itself

we have

no explanation whatever, save what can be gathered from a

"
I should like to lay stress on the
somewhat cryptic footnote.
laws of the interplay of simultaneous and
successive excitations, laws which have still in part to be

fact that the specific

discovered, correspond to what

we have

called attention.

These

210

BEATRICE EDGELL.

laws, however, will only

form a separate chapter in that same

law which we have attempted

"
the present book (Mn. Emp., p. 341).

book

of

Are we

to infer

that depends upon

and response

it,

from

there

But

theory of

that finally vividness, and all

will be resolved into laws of stimulation

If so,

this

to study in the text of

memory.
William James, appears

no place for conation in the

the meantime Dr. Semon, like

is

in

to use attention as

an original force

give that character to images, without which

of neural habits is of

no

all

to

the mechanism

effect for the explanation of the actual

course of ideas.

What

shape

psychology

does

the

problem

take

in

Dr.

Freud's

It is not easy to obtain a clear conception of

principles, for Dr.

Freud and

his followers

have been primarily

concerned with establishing a method for psychiatry, not in

working out a theoretical psychology. In the last chapter of

The Interpretation of Dreams there are some indications of

Dr. Freud sketches the outline of a primitive

a general theory.

Stimulation, excitement,
psychic apparatus of the reflex type.
of
should
be
its
events,
but, in addition to
cycle
discharge
stimulation from without, this apparatus is subject to stimula-

by bodily conditions. The excitement thus

more continuous, and its removal, which requires a

tion from within

aroused

new

is

situation,

The new
ciated,

is

situation

accompanied by a feeling of gratification.

and the feeling of gratification are asso-

presumably on the principle

possibly

something analogous

to

of temporal contiguity,

Professor Ward's principle

On

of subjective selection is implied.

an excitement there will

arise

but

the repetition of such

a "psychic feeling"

(a wish)

which reinstates the memory of the situation which gave rise

The situation is revived with hallucinatory
to gratification.

The purpose which such a simple apparatus could

force.

serve

the

"

is

to allow of hallucinatory

wish situation."

arises

"

wish fulfilment

"

following

If in place of gratification painful fear

with the new situation, there will be no reinstatement

MEMORY AND CONATION.

211

memory, on the contrary, any tendency

towards such reinstatement will be repressed. The only energy

of the situation in

in

such a primary system

wish energy, and

is

it is

controlled by

pleasure and pain automatically, being condensed

hallucinatory vividness to the memory of wish

in

giving

fulfilment.

is supplemented by a
whose
occupation energy is governed by
secondary system
In face of the claims of the external senses,
different laws.

This simple reflex type of apparatus

this system can inhibit the hallucinatory wish fulfilment, and

thus find place to the trial and error processes by which the
The rough sketch of the two
individual learns his world.

systems conveys a meaning so long as it is treated as a rough

sketch only, blocked in partly in terms which suggest physiological

It

is,

processes,

partly in

terms suggestive

of

mental

life.

presume, as performances of the secondary system that

one must account for those processes of perception, association,

memory,

intellection,

psychology.

which

The recognition

are

described in

commonplace
two systems and of their
to the doctrines which have

of the

relations to one another gives rise

distinguished Dr. Freud's psychology.

As

the secondary sysbem develops

there arises a conflict

ideas and the wish fulfilments of the primary

In
system.
place of gratification comes pain and consequent
But as the wishes themselves are beyond the
repression.
inhibitory control of the secondary system these endure as

between

its

potential forces of conflict.

and condensed into

system, and when

The wish energy may be transferred

any ideas repressed by the secondary

sufficiently reinforced these ideas

may break

through the inhibitions to which they have been subjected.

The bond of association between the wish and the repressed
idea to which

it

transfers its energy seems to be

some

partial

identity in content.

Of the events which take place in the two systems those

which we are conscious are only a small
is

"

part.

of

Consciousness

a sensory organ for the reception of psychic qualities

"

212

BEATRICE EDGELL.

(The Interpretation of Dreams,

p.

Sense impressions,

453).

images, including verbal images, and

pleasure and pain, are

"Mental processes themselves are

devoid of quality except for the excitements of pleasure and
"
The primary system,
pain accompanying them
(ibid., 490).
cited as psychic qualities.

the wish system,

unconscious.

is

Its qualities therefore are

never perceived as such, but only in

much

of

which

is

relation

their

also

secondary system,
sense of not being actually perceived

the

unconscious, in the

such

to

is

"

the

fore-

conscious."

Dr. Freud

tells

us that,

when the unconscious

trates through the foreconscious to consciousness,

foreconscious idea

is

idea pene-

and when a

repressed and taken up by the unconscious

or primary system, this

is

not to be conceived as

spatial

change, but as a change in energy of the system concerned.

Consciousness is regarded as exercising a regulative control
over occupation energy (attention ?).
Both systems have the

same raison

d'etre,

wish fulfilment.

"

The primary process

excitement, in order to establish a

strives for a discharge of

sum of excitement thus gathered

the secondary process has abandoned this intention and under"
taken instead the task of bringing about a thought identity

perception identity with the

(ibid., p.

of

477).

memory

become

How does
What

this general theory affect the

does

the

life-story

of

problem

any impression

Contiguity in time
image.
and similarity are accepted as conditions of association and
reproduction as, to a certain extent, taking place in accordance
?

Impression gives

rise to

with these conditions, but only to a certain extent. If mental

were solely on the model of the primary system, memory

life

would be entirely incidental to the life story of wish.

would be remembered which was connected with wish

ment

What

That
fulfil-

that would be forgotten which was connected with pain.

would have been absolutely true of the primary apparatus

is

regarded as partly true for the whole apparatus.

js

reproduced and

of

what

is

forgotten

Much

of

what

finds its explanation in

MEMORY AND CONATION.

Moreover, in the dream the

the wishes of the unconscious.

primary system makes use

213

the images of

of

that hallucinatory vividness which

memory

to secure

characteristic of its wish

is

These images are wrested from their true associaand their significance is only to be found by regarding
them as the vehicles for the expression of ideas which belong
fulfilment.

tions

to

the

unconscious.

The

relation

of

images to ideas was

Ward.

referred to in discussing Professor

this interpreta-

By

dreams the whole problem of imagery and meaning

raised in its most difficult form.
But whatever their

tation of
is

signification,

such reproductions must form

part of the life

Dr. Freud cites cases of forgetting,

history of the impression.

substitution of false memories

and concealment

one

of

memory

In every case he finds the explanation in some

repressed element which has been associated with the memory
in question, and thus taken it into the unconscious.
The

by another.

substitutions

(much
their

and the memories which conceal other memories

dream images conceal repressed wishes) " do not owe

existence to their own contents, but to an associative
as

relation

of

their

contents

(Psyclwpathology of Everyday Life,

It
is

makes very

adopted

"

another

to

little difference

repressed

p. 58).

in principle

of the ultimate source of the wishes

the primary system, whether

all

what conception
which belong to

wishes are reduced to the

whether a variety

sexual wish or

thought

of instinctive

wishes are

recognized, in either case the structure of

as at the service

of the

unconscious

memory is regarded
wish.
One may ask is

there any difference between this standpoint and that of Professor

Ward, when he

"

says,

sole function of perception

to

guide

action

Psychologically regarded, then, the

and

intellection

and subserve

is,

it

is

contended,

more generally

volition

to

"

promote self-conservation and betterment ? (p. 21). There is

For Professor
just this difference, and it seems fundamental.

Ward, just
of the soul.

as

much

as for

To conceive

Aristotle, intellect

of

it

is

the vision

as a blind slave directed by

MEMORY AND CONATION.

214
a

cunning master

is

misconceive

to

it.

Consciousness of

success or failure together with awareness of the situation

essential

if

action

is

to be guided

by cognition, and

is

this con-

dition requires that even instinctive impulses should fall within

the realm of conscious activity.

Ward
is

of

is

governed by

its

own

Further, cognition for Professor

put upon subjective activity

the memory-continuum and
it

memory,

is

Whatever interpretation
and its work in the generation

laws.

in the various

phenomena
This

self-consistent in its operations.

it

of

could

not be, unless that upon which it worked had inherent characteristics in accordance with which its operations were deter-

mined.

With

reference to the influence of the unconscious wish on

the forgetting of proper names, Dr. Freud writes

explanation does not contradict the conditions

"

the given

of

memory

reproduction and forgetting assumed by other psychologists,

which they seek in certain relations and dispositions" (ibid.,
p. 10).

But

is

this really the case

The conditions assumed,

conditions of dispositions and relations, are conditions wherein

wish fulfilment or non-fulfilment yields consciousness of success

It seems impossible to piece together the laws of a
or failure.
psychology wherein the duality of the conscious and the unconscious is not recognized with laws which result from just that
recognition.

In conclusion, what answer shall be returned to the quesIn accordance

tion as to the faculty of memory and conation ?

with Dr. Freud's theories,

it

is

not

memory which

implies a

specific function of conation, but unconscious conation

implies

memory and the laws of unconscious

many of its manifestations.

determine

which

conation which

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 74, Grrosvenor

on July 5th, 1920, at 8 P.M.

XII.

1,

MYSTICISM TEUE AND FALSE.

By W.

Two

W.

Street,

F.

GEIKIE-COBB.

questions are to occupy us in this paper

the

fact of

mysticism and its value for philosophy. That mysticism is

what it is is another thing, and it is one of the
is one thing
;

functions of philosophy to decide this latter question.

Our initial difficulty is due to the many shades of meaning

And

with which the terms mystic and mysticism are charged.

of this variety a few examples maybe usefully given.

"All

mysticism asserts, in contradistinction from the external,

mechanical and dualistic character of ordinary orthodoxy, the

immediate character
religion in
"

its

values."*
"Mysticism
and
most concentrated
exclusive form "; it

that attitude of

of

mind

in

religious

which

all

is
is

other relations are swallowed

the soul to God."f "That occupation

up
with the spiritual world which is of the essence of mysticism
inevitably involves a view that at the least lightly esteems the
in the

relation of

"
The conception (of the subliminal Self) is
world of sense/'J
one which has hitherto been regarded as purely mystical. "J
"
The mystics of all ages have been so far justified in their con-

the form of our experience which presents the

truest analogy to the experience of the Absolute must be supratention that

relational,
finite

*
t
ii,

or,

in other

words, that

the

most

real type

experience must be one which transcends the

of

distinction

Hoffding, Phil, of Religion, p. 214.

Caird, The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers,

Edward

210.
| Encycl. of Religion

F.

and

Ethics, ix, 114A.

W. H. Myers, Human

Personality, p. 13.

216

W.

GEIKIE-COBB.

F.

And

of subject and predicate."*

"

again,

In holding that

all

genuine individuality, finite or infinite, involves a type of

immediate felt unity which transcends reduction to the relational categories of thought

and

we may

will,

have reached a conclusion which, in a sense

his Problem of Conduct^ he says truly

is

is

mystical/'t

As

and in

the Alexandrian

not by knowledge or science, but in an

something more and less than knowledge, and

Platonists knew,
intuition that

"
:

fairly be said to

it

is

cannot be described in language appropriate to our roundabout

conceptual modes of experience, that the absolute whole, if
So
apprehended at all, would have to be apprehended."
"

A mysticism

which ignored the claims of the

understanding would no doubt be doomed. None ever went about
to break logic, but in the end logic broke him.
But there is a
Dr. McTaggart

mysticism which starts from the standpoint of the understanding, and only departs from it in so far as that standpoint shows
itself

To

not to be ultimate, but to postulate something beyond itself.

is not to ignore it,"
and " The view that

transcend the lower

selves are manifestations of the Absolute, in such a

way

that

they change and perish while the Absolute remains unchanged

is one which has always had an attraction for mystics.
It is
especially prominent

of

is

philosophy
of

ceptions

among

the

oriental thinkers."||

transformation

genius into rational

of

"

The course

the mystical con-

cognition. "H

Stephen remarks that

"

Speaking of

adherents are ready

optimism
to admit that the pure reason requires the support of the
emotions before such a doctrine can be established, and are
Leslie

its

marked by a certain tinge of mysticism "; the rest

not
been able to escape into any mystic rapture."**
have

therefore
"

* A. E.
Taylor, Elements of Metaphysic,

p. 152.

t Ibid., p. 413.
J P. 306.
Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, p. 292.
||

IT

**

Ibid., p. 33.

E. von

An

Hartmann, Philosophy of

the Unconscious,

Agnostic's Apology, pp. 36-37.

ii,

234.

MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

Miss Jane Harrison

"

man

a dead

can be a daimon

the two aspects are incompatible, even

and

death

contradictory

how

in asking

of fertility objects that

217

not

are

life

the

same,

though

mysticism constantly seeks to blend them."*

that

"

true

mysticism

is

Nettleship says
the consciousness that everything

which we experience, every

element in

'

the fact/

i.e.,

'

'

an element and only an

being what it is, it is signifi-

fact

is

that in

cant or symbolic of more.f Speaking o the Dionysian type

"
Because the province of a
of religion, Mr. Cornford says
:

Mystery God

is

always,

which he immediately springs,

human

as well as divine.

human

primarily, the
it is

possible for

society from

him

to

remain

In this lies the secret of the vitality

So Hoffding says that " the feeling of

love has a mystical character due to the arousing of uncomprehended organic instincts, and to the influence of these on
"
Value
the vital feeling and on the imagination."! And again
of mystical religion."*

can only be preserved by means

This state of things

and the

relation

of

changes and transformations.

depends on the reality

reality of differences in

of the

general.

pure mysticism, the logical outcome of which

way

of

can

we (sometimes)

attain

to

disregard

temporal

Only by
is

ecstasy,

of this order of

things.!
Koyce, while affirming that Mysticism
applied

name

is

"

not a vaguely

for superstition in general, or for beliefs in spirits,

"
"
for the mystic,
says that

in special revelations, and in magic

according to the genuinely historical definition of what constitutes speculative Mysticism, to be real means to be in such
wise Immediate that, in the presence of this immediacy, all
thought and all ideas, absolutely satisfied, are quenched, so that
the finite search ceases, and the Other

* Themis.,
+
%

||

is

no longer another, but

p. 269.

Philosophical Remains,

p. 32.

From

Religion to Philosophy, p. 112.

Outlines of Psychology, p. 77.

Philosophy of Religion,

p.

252.

'2

218
is

of

W.

And

absolutely found."*

Mysticism

GEIKIE-COBB.

F.

"

the

true historical importance-

not in the subject to which it applied the

but in the view it holds of the fundamental

lies

predicate real,

meaning of that very ontological predicate

itself

Mysticism
and wholly, to be

consists in asserting that to be means, simply

Yet in spite of his ample recognition of the

immediate."^
practical value of Mysticism, Eoyce in the end rejects it as a
metaphysical guide, on the ground that like Realism it is a
mere

abstraction,

and ends

the Manifold into the

the

sum

He

of the series.

from the world of

in a salto mortale

One which

"

is zero.

The mystic ignores

cares only for the final term

viewed as the limit which the other terms approach/'J

Eoyce

confines his criticism of Mysticism to

activity this conclusion

is

not surprising.

its

itself,,

Since

speculative

But speculation

is

not the peculiar work of Mysticism it does not define its

essence it is hardly a property of it, and is probably not more
;

than an accident.
Plotinus

lends

no countenance

to

the

suggestion

that

in the mystical vision

essentially speculative,
Mysticism
"
there are not two things, but seer and seen are one.
Perhaps
we ought not to speak of vision it is rather another way of
is

an ectasy and a simplifying, a self-abandonment, a

yearning for a touch, rest, and a striving after union with what

seeing,

filled

So again " The soul being

be seen in the sanctuary."
with deity brings forth these (beauty, justice, virtue).

And

this is both the beginning

is to

and end

to the soul.

It is

the

beginning indeed, because she originates from thence but it

the end because the Good is there, and because when the soul
;

situated there, she becomes

the soul

is

different

necessarily loves him,

*

what she was before ....

is

Since

from God, but is derived from him, she

and when she is there she has a celestial

The World and

t Ibid., p. 80.
| Ibid., p. 191.

Enn.,

is

vi,

9-11.

the Individual, p. 144.

MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

219

love; but the love which she here possesses

vulgar."*

Finally,

41

Mr. A. B. Sharpe

without the

define Mysticism

The

supernatural."

common and

is

finds himself unable to

use of

the

they are directly and immediately supernatural."

is,

therefore, a passive state

"

himself illuminates

it.

of the soul

The only

direct,

term

discredited

characteristic of mystical states

"

is

that

Mysticism

God

during which

immediate or experi-

mental knowledge of God that man can attain to must be supernaturally bestowed upon him."f
It

seemed necessary

to cite reputable authors

on behalf

of

the claims of Mysticism because of the dislike, expressed or

unexpressed, felt

by professed

for

philosophers

it.

Their

perhaps well illustrated by a remark

made by Talleyrand when the Host passed by in procession
"
Nous nous saluons mais nous ne parlons pas." The above

attitude

towards

it

is

testimony that Mysticism

represents a series of facts of experience, and also that it is a
term of art which it is specially difficult to define with precision.

citations

serve

may

as

sufficient

seems impossible, however, to dislodge from popular language

the loose sense of the term mysticism.
It

In

spite,

however, of the appeal to the supernatual as alone

of the mystic experience, it would seem that

mysticism has a double aspect, one preparatory, or partial, or
perhaps improper, and one final, complete and proper. The

constitutive

former

to be recognized in the search for the meaning of

and
the latter in the ecstatic experience in which
things,
and
subject
object melt into that mysterious Somewhat which
is

is

the ground of subject and object alike.

Partial

and successive

experiences of a mystical character form a cumulative disposition which has its term in the mystical experience proper,

much

as progressive modifications of a structure

epigenesis into something which,

when

it

emerge through

appears,

creature.
*
t

Ibid., vi, 9, 9.

Mysticism: Its True Value, pp. 61,

14.

we

call

new

220

W.

F.

GEIKIE-COBB.

A. It will perhaps be most useful

what has been

first

that study of nature which

a.

men

All

Science.

nature

of things

And

makes no

it

we

if

And we

we

will take

call

are concerned with a study of

and the uses and purposes

to be

bottom indistinguishable,

theory has a practical value

whether they

indeed, these are

for the establishment of a

;

the-

found in them.

difference to our present inquiry

are studied for a practical or theoretical end

at

illustrate a little-

just called partial mysticism.

complete

the doctrine of the Absolute, for

example, is as truly a practical as a theoretical good. The

exact study of things, then, is an attempt to trace them back
to their

origin

success

every

character,

and
in

to follow

them

to their final cause,

their

nature

is

of

and

mystic
ascertaining
it is a discovery of some aspect of the

inasmuch as

Eeality hidden behind the Appearance. For Mysticism assumes

that the life is more than the form, and it is incompatible with
all realistic striving to state philosophic thought, or any other
activity of life in mathematical formulae.
of phenomena
/3. Mysticism is the ultimate explanation
such as those presented by instinct or impulse. The most

thoroughgoing phylogenetic inquiry into instinct comes to a

pause before the end is reached. The theory of heredity, even

though carried back

pre-historic

to

account for pre-human antecedents, or

us still with some unknown

conditions, leaves

cause not to be found in the history of the object. Even so nodoubt it will be found that omnia exeunt in mysterium, but at
all events the mystic's hypothesis does carry us back, as does
philosophic thought with which here
further

than science can.

further back
7.

is

And

to

it

runs parallel, a stage

carry a process

step

always so far a service to science.

The theory

of evolution,

or,

more

technically, of epi-

genesis, seems incapable of being unified without a dose of

mysticism. For, presuming all species to have been derived from

primordial protoplasm, we have to account for the power which

has produced the many species out of the one root of their

MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

existence.

We

have

to

221

account also for the adaptive power

which has given success to the survivors, for as all are supposed to have started on equal terms, we must assume an

unknown

x,

which has acted as a differentiating

factor.

But

x making for improvement in the case of some species

has a teleological value, and having the whole in view we can
this

but recognise

it

as mystical.

We may
When

reach the same result by the way of psychology.

Dr. Ward explains* that pleasure is one thing and
that these latter become graded into

pleasures another, and

higher and lower through accommodation and novelty, he is

building on the fact that there is a power at work which
constructs

differences

qualitative

out of quantitative.

But

this fact is not obvious so long as natural differences

the attention exclusively; indeed

it

may

occupy
appear to be not

when the many examples

Hence, if we conclude for a
every lower organism we shall be

applicable to an enumerative whole

of degeneration are considered.

tendency to improvement in

applying a pre-judgment mystically arrived

intuition of the nature of the whole.
8.

new chapter

in

human knowledge

at,

i.e.,

by an

has been opened by

anthropology with its description of folk-beliefs and customs.

But these latter have been treated ordinarily as being merely
the rude and primitive beginnings of our later culture. And
little

been directed to the question of their

Eather, the assumption has been made that they

attention

validity.

has

have been over-lived, and that they have, therefore, ceased

to have more interest for us than as landmarks of a longforgotten and obsolete stage in our
closer scrutiny

might

own development.

Yet a

disclose the fact that as a general rule

formally false, is materially a true transcript

of Eeality.
The universal belief of the savage in gods, whether
or
celestial or telluric, witnesses to man's innate
low,
high

folk-psychology,

if

Psychological Principles, p. 267

f.

222

W.

GE1KIE-COBB.

F.

sense of the principle of Otherness, and

is

at all events

more

rational than the later attempt to dispense with the Other in

That the principle

favour of Self-deification.

Otherness

of

should have held undisputed sway in periods when criticism

was in possession of no scientific instrument is remarkable,
and perhaps inexplicable, unless we have recourse to the
hypothesis that man's mind is determined not only by a view
of the Manifold, but also and concurrently by a synoptic view.
.But every synoptic

view

identical with

is

what our authorities

are agreed in calling mystical.

e.

Since Kousseau's day

many

thinkers have insisted on his

doctrine of a general will as the expression of the conation of a

On the other hand, voices have been raised from

time to time urging that psychological concepts are made
chaotic by any such doctrine.
And these latter seem to plead

community.

the better cause. Yet a man who urges that England, or the
Catholic Church, stands for something more than a joint will of
all,

or for

more than the

joint agreement of the

numbers

of a

governing junta, can hardly be silenced. Here too the solution

The will
of the antinomy seems to be in the mystic's hands.
of the individual is the type of all will,

from the several wills

and his

will is distinct

of the rest, but it is not a separate will.

a phase, perhaps a moment, of the universal will of the

Absolute, the phenomenal expression of the one will. Similarly,
It

is

every several will in the community converges on the same

And if it be
universal will, and at the same time expresses it.
said that these several wills are over a large area contradictory

of each

other,

the

answer

is

direct; the

volitions

may

be

contradictory, but the "standing will," if we probe deep

enough, will be found self-identical. The general will might
be indeed accounted for on the supposition of the over-ruling
activity of the will of a Sal/Aav or genius patrice,

would be the standing will of

be singular, and would have

all.

But such a

will

whose

will

would

still

to use persuasion or coercion to

secure the adhesion of the several wills of the

members

of the

MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

223

case, what would be operative in

would
be the wills of the members
order
the phenomenal
acting jointly in the latter case there would be no will at all,

community.

In the former

for

through

immanence,

presiding

officer,

wills,

"

But whether acting

freedom would be wanting.

and

or

the will of the one

this conclusion is a

through

indirectly

is

product

directly

departmental

supreme over

all lesser

of mystic intuition.

To him,
The mystic is a devout lover of Nature.
waving its row of lamps the universe sings in worship day

and

night.

There the sound

there the Lord

of the

unseen

bells is

The

on his throne."

of all sitteth

heard

air is full of

daimons, and the earth of the knowledge of the Lord. Nature

is, for him, a treasure-house of natural and necessary symbols,

and hence the creation

of arbitrary

and

fanciful

symbols

is

an

True symbolism is gained from

Nature by intuition, and rests on a system of correspondences
where wheels revolve within wheels, for the spirit of the living

impertinence, or a disease.

creature

is

denies the

fact,

an irrelevance.
he takes

The mystic

in the wheels.

reminder that Nature

little

is

or explains

it

His intuition
heed

is

untouched by any

red in tooth and claw with ravine.

away, or disregards
is

it

He

as being

and as a mystic
holding them to be but

of the unity,

of the differences,

If
incident to progress towards the perfection of the whole.
Nature be the vesture of the invisible King, then it is the

King on whom the attention

of the mystic

vesture has but a mediate value and

In these examples

note that the mysticism

dimly

sees,

is

of a partial or
is

rivetted.

is

comparatively negligible.

improper mysticism

of a nature akin to instinct.

but does not apprehend

The

its object,

and

it

we
It

builds on

past experiences which now form the structure of the UnconIn fact, the mystic impulse is at once the ground of
scious.
instinct, impulse, folk-beliefs, and the feeling for Nature, and
also the vivifying principle

which assures them

their

form and

Nature itself is in all those

persistence in the Unconscious.
shapes already deposited in the Unconscious by aeonian

W.

224:

It

experience.

is,

GEIKIE-COBB.

F.

however, the function of consciousness to

survey the phenomena of the inner and the outer

life in

the

origin and texture,,

experience under the One whose

light of reason, to point to their unity of

and

to bring the

existence

is

Manifold

of

mystical postulate suggested by the intuitive

man's own mystical being.

B. The mysticism which we have up
sidering is but the forecourt of the temple.
unity of

has been

con-

what

suggests the ground on which the palace of Truth

be erected.
It is conservative rather than pro-

it

itself shall

It

gressive.

now been

It enshrines

till

assumes what cannot be demonstrated

an upward

tendency in the world asserts that what has been achieved is

but an earnest of what shall yet be done and, most important
;

of all,

maintains that the mind of

spirit, or

power, which

function

it is

to

is

man

is

in living union with a

the spirit, or power, whose peculiar

draw under law

all

things to their perfection

in the whole.

of

In the last paragraph we seem to have reached the parting

is true and
the

the ways between the mysticism which

mysticism which

is false.

the Unconscious, which

is

The mysticism which springs from

sum of our past, human and pre-

the

not mysticism proper but memory. It seems to act

in the same way as mysticism proper, but the appearance is

human,

is

fallacious.

Its characteristic

medium ship,

in

of activity are to be seen in

speculation in nubibus, in automatic writing,

crystal-gazing, inspirational

audience, and in

modes

all

writing,

clairvoyance, and

similar phenomena.

These

and

their utility in revealing to us the nature

clair-

all alike

have

extent of the

memory, and in reminding us, by the

contrast they afford between the foundations of the Conscious
and the formless ghosts of the Unconscious, how correct was
buried

treasures

of

the Greek thought which assigned good to the limited and evil
to the infinite.

True mysticism, on the other hand,

is

of a

roots are not in the earth but in the eternal

forward look.

Its

Eeason which over-

MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

shadows and penetrates all thinking.

Hence, every mystical
is
of
a higher power with
due
to
the
activity proper
inspiration
which the mind of man is in touch by virtue of its kinship of

The mystic experience begins

nature.

perfected in

as

intuition

judgment.*

evanescent as to elude the grasp of reflection.

"

glimpse

of

and

is

It is true that the intuition is often so

incomprehensibles,

and

It

has but a

thoughts about things

it does not seem to-

But

which thoughts but tenderly touch."

"
be correct to refer this intuition to feeling, if feeling be the
one capacity of the pure ego," by which it is either pleased or

displeased with

its

presentation.

beginning of thought, and may, or

ting

its

right to

Kather, the intuition

may

become thought. The

is

the

not, succeed in vindica-

cases, therefore, in

which

succeeds should be taken as illustrating the character of those

in which it fails.
Thus we should conclude that all mystic

it

is neither
thought nor feeling, but that the consequent
concerned
comes
under the category of thought, and
activity
not properly of feeling, though of course here as everywhere

intuition

some

an accompaniment of the thought. In other

words, mysticism proper is the most positive form which a
moral valuation can take. It is a revelation not so much of the
is

feeling

true as of the good

aspects in

common,

quality which
as

and though the good and the true have

we know

is

it,

it

has a positive, personal, unquestioning

a necessary feature of a moral valuation even

whatever thought's ideal claims may be. It

would follow from

mystical experiences would ,be

were not most people content to take

this

much more common

a shabby intellectualist

that

interpretation

of

their

most

vital

moments.
Mysticism, then,

is

an immediate apprehension of some

immediate knowledge we have

interior good comparable to the

* The
mystical conception begins with the phenomena of imagination,
and, provided nothing intervenes to disturb or interrupt, it is completed by an act of powerful intellection (Re'cejac : The Bases of the Mystic
Knowledge,

p. 109).

226

W.

GEIKIE-COBB.

F.

of the objects of the external world.

speculative.

of herself that

over
that
It

It is empirical

and not

Saint Teresa (an unexceptionable witness) says

"

a feeling of the presence of

God would come

me unexpectedly, so that I could in no wise doubt either

He was within me, or that I was wholly absorbed in Him.

was not by way

of vision

I believe it

was what

is

called

"

As the human
mystical theology."* So Scaramelli says :f
it
touches
is
touched
and
another
body
by
again, as it thus
body
feels the other's presence, and this sometimes with enjoyment

so the soul touches a spiritual substance,

again,

pure

and

is

touched by

it

with the sensation that pertains to

and this sometimes with great delight for example,

feels the presence

spirit,

when it
But

and

God who touches her and

is

present to her."

is

not necessary to labour proof of the proposition

that mysticism is by common consent an empirical knowledge
of,

it is

or direct acquaintance with, a presented non-sensuous Good.

Not only

Catholic mysticism at one about this, but Sufi

mysticism, and indeed all mystijism, is in agreement. All
is

mystics affirm also that their knowledge is intuitive, and as

such is ineffable, incommunicable. That knowledge alone, which

depends on
all

that

facts, or

lies

known must

on ideas

Eeason, can be communicated;

of

beyond these lies also beyond logic, and to be

be lived through. But it is just this world of the

"
excessive," which is the object of the mystic's
beyond, this
awareness. And this world, by its very nature, is self-excluded

from the operations

of the intellect.

called

upon

to pass

what

it

apart from

is,

judgment
its

Hence Philosophy

either on the fact that

expression.

Its

it is,

is

not

or on

function in this

pronounce merely whether what the reporter of a

mystic experience says is or is not contradictory of its own

respect

is to

accepted conclusions. But since these are confined to what

Sense and Understanding jointly supply, and since mystic data

Life, x,

t Tr. t

3,

i.

No.

24.

MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

lor,

e passa."

guarda

"

Non ragionam di
In other words, the function of

are beyond these, Philosophy can only say

ma

227

philosophy when mysticism comes before it, is to accept the

data of the latter as it does the data of the sensuous order, and

then to find a place for them in

sense

the mystical intuition

its

is

much

though here as elsewhere

of thought.

system

In this

judgment, even

in

perfected

of the living fact evaporates in

the process of abstraction.

Here the objection might naturally be made that

data of
solution

mysticism are

of

character

intractable

this

would be better found in hallucination, or

the

if

their

alienation,

than in the hypothesis of a reason of the heart which

But

beyond the reasonings of the intellect.

it is

lies

in the first place

noteworthy that acknowledged mystics have shown them-

selves on their guard against these aberrations of the mind.

The delight that comes from feelings or visions is " very

"
It is
suspicious to come from the enemy," says Hilton.
more natural that God should communicate Himself through
the spirit than through the senses," says
"

It is very important to prevent souls

and
of

ecstasies

this sort of

to illusion, are

We may

these graces are

gifts,

visions

say in

false.*

and

general

greater the caution

and the

the least

shown

John

St.

of the Cross.

from resting

greatly subject

to

in visions

illusions

pure, and those most subject

ecstasies,"

that the

Madame Guyon.

says

the

truer

mysticism the
between the true

in discriminating

And, speaking generally

again, the test

by

auditions and visions, whether intellectual, imaginary,

or corporeal, are tried, is not only the circumstances of their

which

all

happening, but even

much more

their value.

Kevelations

genuine, must inure to the heightening of the

any
life of the spirit, must be clear, free from self-seeking, not
of

sort, if

*
Cf. Hilton, The Scale of Perfection, i, xi
Subida del Monte Carmelo, ii, xi
Guyon, Vie,
The Graces of Interior Prayer, chs. xxi, xxii
verarum visionum.
;

St.

John

of the

Cross,,

Father Poullain,
Gerson, De distinctione

i,

ix

W.
self-contradictory, not

F.

GEIKIE-COBB.

referable

human

to

agency, properly

And even so they are to

attested, and purely transmitted.
be accepted with caution, and are not to be used as foundation
for
"

though

but,

doctrine,

not

are

approved,

more

than

probabiles et pie credibiles."

In

the

second place, between pathological hallucinations

and alienation and the mystic's sense of the presence of God,

there is the difference of a whole scale of values. Between

memory-images and morbid hallucinations, are many

-degrees of reality, and in all a minimum of sensuous impressions
free

is

But the hallucination

present.

consists in the projection

whereby it is mistaken for a presentation.

The mystic's experience, on the contrary, whether justifiable

of a representation

or

not,

is,

because

it

at

all

events, not

lacks all

immediate vision

of

the

a hallucinatory character,

of

reference

to

"

corporeal

reality.

is
Godhead," says Suso,
a vision is to be esteemed the

without doubt the pure truth

more noble the more intellectual
;

The
"

naked

it is,

the more

it

is

stripped

4
image and approaches the state of pure contemplation."
And although theologians have discussed the question whether

of all

the two outstanding figures of Catholic faith have appeared

bodily form, the evidence of the mystics themselves is
St. Teresa, for instance, says that
against the supposition.

in

"

when anyone can contemplate the

a long time, I do not believe

overmastering idea."f

and auditions

of

And

it

is

sight

of

our

Lord

for

a vision, but rather some

in general, the visions, locutions

mystic literature seem explicable in terms

of ordinary psychology.

We
is

are here reminded that the mystic experience proper

one thing, and the mode of

The

vision

it is

gone the

is

its

formulation

is

another.

as long-lived as a flash of lightning, but before

mind has given

it

intellectual form.

Leben, ch. LIV.

t Int. Castle, Sixth Mansion,

ix, 5.

The essence

MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

1>29

of the mystical experience consists in a transcendental apprehension of the reality which appears in all ordinary experience.

These appearances, according to mysticism, are the garment

worn by the reality on which perhaps no man can look and

The myth of Zeus and Semele enshrines a law. But
live.
the mind of man presses towards awareness, and awareness
implies a mental form but the form can hardly comprehend
the full content of the concrete reality, the touch of which
;

makes the mystic.

to

represent
is

pressed,

Hence the form by which the

himself that

to

misleading.

reality

The mystic

is
is

seer seeks

inadequate, and if
not mistaken when

he affirms that the boundaries of the flaming world have for

him for a brief moment been removed, but he cannot for all
that be enabled to claim for his private explanation of that

experience greater validity than that of a working hypothesis.

This is only to say that the mystic's explanation cannot
The touch of reality is an
transcend the limits of symbolism.
inexplicable fact

The one

bolic.

sciousness
of that

is

it by the mind is
syman "irruption" of the Absolute into con-

the formulation of

the other

which in

is

the figurative expression by the

mind

Indeed, every real

inexpressible.
for
is
is
what
expressed must be known
inexpressible,
particular
as thought, and all thought is universal, and from the universal
itself

is

there has slipped out that particularity which makes the thing
be unique and unsharable. Hence the gulf between the that

to

and the what in mystical experience is comparable to the difference which yawns between every that and every what. In all
thought the materials we work with are
symbols, the data of science no less than the data of art or of

the activities

And

of

But it
inadequate to express reality.
that
wherever
is
not
a
chimcera
should be observed
thought
bombinans in -vacua there is assumed necessarily the same union
religion.

all are

of the absolute reality

symbolic
joint

and

of

its

appearance, and the same

The symbol is a

relation of the latter to the former.

product of the Absolute and of the materials already

230

W.

mind

possessed by the

F.

GEIKIE-COBB.

for the purposes of thought.

no a priori ground for regarding the mystic

abnormal and therefore suspicious.
there

is

Hence,
fact as

Sensuous experience and mystic experience, then, are alike

and that whatever gets

in that neither is fully expressible,

But the
expressed succeeds by the use of symbols.
the
used
are
not
selected
conscious
deliberately
by
symbols

itself

They emerge from the unconscious.

mind.

In that

if

we

may use metaphorical language are stored up the memory

images of all the objects of our experience, or else these are
capable of re-creation at need.

undoubted but unexplained.

is

tion,

shades off into the

However we express

it,

the fact

perception, or even a sensa-

unknown no more and no

less

than an

an element of mysticism lurks in a preapperceptive mass

sentation and lies at the base of all cumulative dispositions.
;

Man

can call spirits from his own vasty deep, and they will
When they come, he uses them as
obey him sometimes.*
"
"
has
Pascal's
He
experience, and he cries out Fire ;
symbols.

he
"

conscious of a higher Something, and he

is

says,

"

or is

"

"

a new angle-point
changed
and
the
Servitor sings,
understanding,

sound

feels

joy enters his heart, and with Eichard Eolle he

thought into song is turned, and the mind into full sweet

touched
"

"

is

"

is

"

made

effective for the

Illuminare, illuminare

imperfection calls for the

feeling
"
"
a sense of harmony and
variegated imagery of pilgrimage

Jerusalem

of

utter

go further than this and postulate an "ethereal

records not only the things retained in the memory
of the individual from his own experience, but also images in an
"
"
Thus JE. says (Candle of Vision, p. 56)
In
earth-memory."

Many

will

medium" which

tracking to their originals the forms seen in vision we discover for

them a varied ancestry, as that some come from the mind of others,
and of some we cannot surmise another origin than that they are
of Earth which is accessible to us."
Personify
portions of the memory
Earth, and postulate the power of transmission of thought from mind
But still the record has
to mind somehow, and all this is credible.
to be read, and the mind that reads is still the central mystery.

MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

231

translated into the language of the "spiritual marthe

two-fold experience of an indwelling Spirit and a
riage
transcendent Power without is symbolized by the familar
is

unity

"

doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity

he finds

God

loves a

thereof

Biiyazid,

when

"
God, can only say that when
endows him with three qualities in token

in himself the love of

man,

He

a bounty like that of the sea, a

sympathy

the sun, and a humility like that of the Earth,"

like that of

all of

which

is

so the Sufis speak

couched in symbolic terms
organs of spiritual communication, the heart which knows
God, the spirit which loves Him, and the inmost ground of
of

Him.

the soul which contemplates

secret of mysticism

we took

if

its

And

unutterable

three

But we should miss the

symbolic utterances for

perhaps we may

its

share the

experience.
robust common-sense of Dr. Johnson who, speaking of Jacob
"
Bohme, said that if Jacob had seen unutterable things, Jacob

should not have attempted to utter them."

But, then, how
Yet the
else could others have been stirred to emulate him ?

main point

is

that

get back from symbols, and words,

we

names,

the scholastic theologian, says

and

Jalaluddin Kunri, addressing

to the mystic fact itself.

:

Do you know

a name without a thing answering to it ?

Have you ever plucked a rose from K.O.S.E. ?
You name His name go, seek the reality named by it
Look for the moon in the sky, not in the water
:

We

driven then from the symbol to the thing

and
symbolized,
though we are compelled to limit ourselves
to writing about it, we can perhaps set up one or two signare

posts on the road for the benefit of

also

seekers.

the travellers

Each, however, must do the

who

are

travelling and

seeking for himself.

a.

The mystic

seeking to become,

known
infinite

is

not seeking to get, or to know. He is

And what that is is the secret
to be.

and

to himself alone.

He

believes himself to be unique,

in his reach, capable of

an undreamed

of perfection,

232

W.

F.

GEIKIE-COBB.

"

"
Other for everything, at once everything
dependent on the
and nothing.
Yet he does not stand in isolation as if he

possessed some secret denied to others, but

when asked what

he has to claim as his distinguishing mark he can only reply

that he has nothing which differs from what all others have

"

Where one heard noise, and one saw flame, I only know he
named my name." His secret is to himself, but so, he avers,
is

that of everybody else.

ft.

and

The mystic's devotion

in his

is

to the

Whole which

most characteristic moments

his

is the One,
whole being is

One alone is, and that the Many

Hence, when he incautiously sets out to

suffused with a sense that the

are but shadows.

turn his intuitions into theology he

view was pantheistic.

has no creed, and if he

is

apt to talk as

if

his

The mystic, however,

mystic,
somehow tempted to form a creed,
as

is

no longer pure but mixed. He has stepped

into philosophy
the Good becomes the True, and vovs has
to
In any case, pantheism is not the
Sidvota.
given way
his mysticism

is

most suitable creed by which

to formulate his intuitions, still

less is it logically necessary.

But because the mystic is so deeply interested in the one

incommutable Good he is open to the charge of neglecting
its differentiations for thought.
The distinction between good
and evil is not for him sharply drawn, nor that between being
and not-being. Time and space seem to him negligible, and
subject and object imply a division which would be better
This disinclination to allow for phenomenal differences
is ordinarily
regarded as the cardinal defect of mysticism.
It does not, however, derogate from its essential value, but

away.

serves at best as a reminder that

needs for

its guardian
both science and philosophy.
7. It would be a misunderstanding of the mystic if we
supposed him to be concerned with his own interior states only.

He

it

does certainly turn away from the external world, as he

away from all its differences, but he does not thoroughly

turns

MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

what he

confine his attention to

looks within, as he does,

the Other which

finds within himself.

because he

it is

233

is the object of his

is

If

he

aware that there

is

And

BO

desire.

supreme

he from exalting himself into his object that his whole

endeavour is to sink and lose himself in it. No doubt the

far is

"

"
becomes a mystic more readily than the extrovert,"
but in the process he tends to disappear, and may indeed be

"

introvert

said to

"

become an

"

extrovert

of a peculiar kind.

experience of the

Or

shall

we

the arrogation of

mystic
say that the moral
to the claim, and- with a
attached
with
the
austerity
godhead
full sense of responsibility, as well as with the humility which
is

responsibility's better half

No term

is

is

more generally associated with mysticism than

that of ecstasy, and

on ecstasy that Eoyce bases his con-

it is

"

He regards ecstasy as giving a

mysticism.
certain limiting state of that finite variable which is called your
demnation

of

knowledge," and as being the zero into which consciousness

disembogues. The error in this judgment is in the assumption
that the ecstatic state in transcending consciousness annuls all
consciousness. What is unconsciousness with regard to us here
is

not necessarily unconscious to us there.

The

intuitive flash

subsumes ordinary consciousin

a
whole cognized synoptically.
differences

of genius, like the ecstatic vision,

ness,

and fuses

The

differences,

for

the

all

however, remain as moments in that whole

discursive

of

service

thought.

ready
Absolute

is

not only the goal but also the process.

ness

transition

is

stage

it

On

no Being at

the contrary,

lives in its

Conscious-

kinds of

it

true that the mystic supposes that

itself

different

borrows from the lower, and

transmits to the higher. It does not seem to be

Unconsciousness, but what

enriches,

between two

The mystic

all,

it is

is

illusory,

is

"

the finite search has of

Maya,

is

itself nothing."

an admitted mystic dogma that Eeality

appearances

that in the via negativa you strip off

what

the accidental only, so

not the whole of reality

is left

at every stage is real,

though
and that in the via eminentice you
T 2

W.

234
start with

what

is real,

GEIKIE-COBB.

F.

more

find

of

it

you climb, and

as

at the

retain what your discursive reason has

and
then
intuitively crown it in a synoptic view. The
garnered,

the ladder

of

top

mystic certainly does claim that his intuition puts him in touch
with the real, and in this his claim differs in degree only from
the claim of the poet that he is in touch with the real in the

But no mystic has ever claimed

sensuous.

that, discursively or

intuitively, he cognizes reality in its fullness and he adds that

he is not primarily concerned with reality under its aspect of
truth.
He differs from the physicist in method, but not in
;

principle

to both finality is impossible.

Lastly, the problem of the mystic is the metaphysical problem

of the nature of the self.
"
of impressions ; if it be

priating the past

or

if

If this be a

mere

"

bundle or collection

nothing but the present thought appro"

an average statistical resultant
it be

many conditions, but not an elementary force or fact," then

the mystical fact does not emerge. This fact stands or falls

of

with the fact of the transcendental

Of

self.

we have no
we have by

this self

sure knowledge by description, but I submit that

I think, and I can add to this that I think that

acquaintance.
I think
when I make the addition, as I do every day many
;

times, the

knower

of the object

becomes the knower

of the

In other words, he reveals himself as capable of

in
another capacity or form whereby the subject in the
activity
"
"
"
phenomenal world becomes an object in the noumenal."*
subject.

I,

the Self that

and

make

is

aware of

that the self which

aware

x,

am

also

aware of

my

is

aware

of the awareness.

is

identical with the self

In that case that

self

the phenomenal.

That

transcendental order, and as such

* This

it is

it

at

is

is

is

transcen-

member

home with

of

reality

" that
subject whose activity is the subject's
Lehrb. d. Psychologic, 4th ed., ii, 217.

self is

Volkmann,

is,

which

can and does

function in the phenomenal and in a world which

dental to

awareness,

the judgment on an intuition given by acquaintance

the

and

"

'

object,'

MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

with

its

two chief

235

If this be once granted the mystical

aspects.

experience would seem as natural as the sensuous.

"
however, to the mystic is not the apex of a
It
didactical pyramid," a cold abstraction reached by thought.

The

8.

soul,

thinks, of course, but its thought

is

informed by the passion of love.

is

dominance in mysticism

The

"

one

"
fire,

and

the soul

carried

is

away by

made

and

life

spirit

the

soul

between

the

spirit,
all

spiritual

source

and

things

and

Plotinus and Plato agree that

things."*
of

to

desiring

externals,

made

Good."

the

"

"

to

Love

love
is

between Spirit and

but

in experience.

Human

souls yonder.

It is

Three classes

is

all

friend

of

not a relation
It

Spirit.

So Eichard

is

known

the sacrament of the union of

the

Muses, and the lover.

and

the

The
'

'

love, are the three anagogic

"
Eolle says that burning of love into

intellect, aesthetic sensibility,

faculties."!

is

living

an activity

immortal, almost immortality itself.

men have their feet on the ladder

of

the

love

which

beginning,
life

unity in duality, the reconciliation of these opposites,

philosopher,

love.

which streams forth from the Absolute

light

one, the Absolute Good, that supreme principle which

gave

in

is

the fullest love, and the love comes from

fullest life is

the celestial

When

feeling."

takes

it

that mysticism has become

of love

identified improperly with

presence of the

not that of dry reason, but

And it is because of the

a soul truly taken all vices purgeth

for whilst the true
lover with strong and fervent desire into God is borne, all
.

things him displease that from the sight of God would run."|
Hence the mystic is able to solve in practical form the
He calls suffering the " gymnastic of
mystery of pain.
eternity,"

non
*

and says with & Kempis, "Gloriari in tribulatione

The vision of the Good enraptures

est grave amanti."

Plotinus, Enneads,

6,

7, 23,

131.

t Inge, ubi supra, p. 187

I

The Fire of Love,

i,

/.

xxiii.

and W. R. Inge, Gifford

Lectures,

ii,

MYSTICISM TRUE AND FALSE.

236
him, and he

cries

with

St.

because he has learned that

Teresa,

"

let

me

suffer or

die,"

the sense of the finite egowhich shuts off the soul from the incommutable Good, and
that

it

is

it

is

through suffering that this sense becomes a servant

instead of a master.

Hence the

air of unreality that is

cling round the ecstatic utterances

of

the

apt to

The

mystics.

explanation is that they are in love with eternal beauty and

that love makes every lesser object of little account.
Hence
"
"
"
too Pascal's vision of
Eenonciation
Feu ended with
totale
et

douce."

Amans

volat,

currit

et

Icetatur

liber

est

et

non

And when Dante at length attained

tenetur, says a Kempis.
to the vision of the Supreme Light, he could only speak of it as
loving and smiling, and give as his last word that it is Love
which moves the sun and the other
experience of Love,
is

it

would seem that

foredoomed to silence

reality.

stars.

Before this supreme

all discursive

thought

as a worshipper in the outer court of

237

TWO SYMPOSIA
Contributed to the Congress of Philosophy, Oxford,
September 24th-^-27th, 1920.
I.

SYMPOSIUM: THE PEOBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

MARCEL MAUSS, THEODORE KUYSSEN, KENE"

GILBERT
MURRAY, and SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK.
JOHANNET,

By ELIE

HALE"VY,

I.

By ELIE

HALE"VY.

SUR quel

fonder I'e'tablissenient de cette "paix

principe
a
durable,"
laquelle aspirent, ou disenb aspirer, tous les peuples
bellige'rants et tous les chefs qui les

gouvernent

La formule

qui a trouve* la faveur la plus re"pandne, c'est le formule de la

"
Le President Wilson en a
libre determination des peuples."

grand protagoniste il s'agissait pour lui non d'abr^ger la

guerre, mais de la prolonger au besoin afin de faire 1'e'conomie
etc* le

de guerres futures, et de la conduire jusqu'au moment ou tous

sous la pression des Etats-Unis, seraient
les bellige'rants,
obliges d'accepter

un remauiement de

pour

la

premiere

Laissons de

monde

fois
cote*

d'Europe, de la

la carte

carte du monde, conforme au principe des

nationalite"s, enfin

exacternent respecte*.
1'idee d'un remaniement de la carte du

et les problemes, infiniment complique's, qui portent sur

peuples d'Afrique et d'Asie. Laissons de cote* le probleme,

bien grave cependant, de savoir s'il n'y a pas contradiction

les

entre 1'idee de libre determination et

1'idee

d'une

Socie'te'

des

Nations qui implique une limitation de la souverainete, en

d'autres termes de la libre determination, de chaque nation.

Demandons-nous seulement dans quelle mesure ce principe

peut

etre,

com me

en lui-meme et a 1'exclusion de tout autre, consider^

constitutif des nations entre lesquelles

on vise a creer

La regie, c'est qu'aucun peuple,

d'equilibre et de paix.
ou
doit
etre
asservi
a un autre peuple, englobe
ne
grand
petit,
dans un autre peuple, contrairement a sa volonte et le principe,
un

ur.at

238

ELIE HALE>Y.

nonce sous cette forme, semble

etre d'une realisation

tres

tous

d'inviter

les
simple puisqu'il
pour 1'appliquer,
hommes d'une region donne*e a se re"unir pour voter, a la
majorite des voix, en faveur de leur inscription dans tel ou tel
suffit,

Demandons-nous s'il n'est pas trop simple.

groupe national.
Les ide*es simples sont des ide*es re"volutionnaires et guerrieres,
parce qu'elles ne peuvent se poser qu'a 1'exclusion et par la
destruction de toute autre idee.
Elles font violence a la

complexite des choses.

Elles ne travaillent pas pour la paix.

C'est sur d'autre principes

principe
se fonder

divers

le

nationaux.

qu'on avait jadis pretendu

les exigences de la justice les

admettre

Faudra-t-il

que

principe des nationality ait aboli ces vieux prin-

Les pacifistes aiment a rappeler qu'ils ont e*te frequemOui, si on a voulu se fonder sur

ment

pour repartir selon

territoires

vraiment
cipes

principe des frontieres naturelles,

de 1'equilibre europeen

des causes de guerre.

1'un d'entre eux, a 1'exclusion de tout autre.

sera de

meme, du principe des

II

nationalites.

en a

ete, il

Mais

il

en

semble

possible de demontrer que le principe des frontieres naturelles

et le principle de I'equilibre europeen sont, au

meme

titre

que

principe de libre determination, des principes constitutifs

ne
cl'ii
paix internationale durable.
le

II faut que les nations

Principe des frontieres naturelles.
on desire constituer une Socie"te pacifique

entre lesquelles
soient,
suffit

chacune prise en elle-meme,

Men

pas pour cela de la volonte, plus ou

constitutes

et

il

ne

moins unanime, des

citoyens qui les composent respectivement. II faut encore que

las nations soient enfermees dans des limites imposees en

quelque sorte par la geographic physique, qui constituent au

double point de vue militaire et economique, des frontieres
Les Alpes,

les Pyrenees, sont des frontieres

bien
parle
fran^ais et italien sur les deux versants des Alpes; Catalan et basque sur les deux versants des

indiscutables.
naturelles.

Pyrenees.
la

France

On

Si pourtant des guerres doivent eclater encore entre

et Tltalie, entre la

France

et

1'Espagne, ce sera

au

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

sujet de leurs possessions africaines,

non de leurs

frontieres

"

nature des

la

France et

alpestres ou pyr^n^ennes, qui sont fondees sur

choses."

II n'y

239

la

a pas de frontiere naturelle entre

De
I'Allemagne
la tant de perils de guerre. Dans 1'Europe Orientale les nations,
au sens ethnique du mot, sont a tel point enchevetre'es qu'il est
:

une fleuve

n'est pas

une frontiere naturelle.

impossible d'esperer que Ton puisse janiais effectuer la-bas un

partage permanent des territoires nationaux. Ne faut-il pas

admettre en consequence que ces regions

1'empire plutot que pour

Ce principe des
l^cole pacifiste

se

la nationality

sont

faites

pour

frontieres naturelles que les ecrivains de

a condamner,

plaisent

il

serait

facile

de

de"montrer que les pacifistes les plus notoires sont incapables de

Le principe suivant lequel chaque nation, pour
s'en passer.
etre bien constitute, aura droit a ses debouches maritimes, n'en
est qu'une

forme particuliere or
:

il

a ete range par le President

Wilson, au nombre des quatorze points de la Socie* te des Nation?.

C'est tkendre encore un peu plus 1'application du principe des

que d'amrmer la necessite pour une nation,

doit, etre viable, d'etre
une nation economiquement
si elle
"
"
et autonome.
Or M. Keynes, si severe pour
bien arrondie
frontieres naturelles

President Wilson, parce que celui-ci n'aurait pas su, a Ten

croire, imposer aux signataires du traite de Versailles le

le

admet que la Haute Silesie

allemande au m^pris du principe de libre determination,
parce que 1'Allemagne a besoin, pour la bonne organisation de

respect integral de sa philosophic,

reste

son economic nationale, des charbonnages silesiens. Nous ne

voulons ici ni justifier ni critiquer 1'attitude des deux pacifistes.

Nous nous bornons

a constater que les partisans les plus deter-

mines du principe de

libre

determination croient devoir, en

certains cas, faire appel, sous des formes detourne'es, au principe

des frontieres naturelles.

La paix c'est la justice et

Principe de I'dquilibre europe'en.
II
la justice, c'est I'^quilibre.
y a etat de droit et paix durable
au lieu de se heurter et
contraires
nationales
forces
des
quand

u 2

ELIE HALEVY.

de

tendre

reciproquement

Or

balancent.
II faut

se

s'an^antir,

limitent

et

se

deux conditions.

d'abord que les nations soient, chacune prise en elle& cela pourvoient les deiix principes

merne, bien constitutes

de

&

cet equilibre suppose r4alisees

la libre

determination et des frontieres naturelles.

II faut,

en outre, qu'elles soient, dans la mesure du possible, e*gales entre

Tous les systemes pacifistes depuis le Droit des Gens de
elles.
Grotius jusqu'a

la

Nations du President Wilson,

Soci^te des

*eposent sur cette fiction de Fegalite des nations.

pas,

pour que

ces systemes soient viables,

que

Ne

la distance

pas trop grande entre cette fiction et la realite ?

Brobdingnag est un Etat de cent millions d'habitants

faut-il

ne

soit

il

est

flanque", a droite, par la petite monarchic lilliputienne, avec

cinq cent mille habitants & gauche, par les vastes prairies des
;

Houhynnms, avec un million d'habitants. Un peu plus loin File

volante de Laputa compte vingt millions d'ames.
Supposons
que FEtat de Brobdingnag soit pris de velleites conquerantes
que peseront dans la balance Fintelligence des Lilliputiens, la

sagesse des

Houhynnms,

et tous les plans

qui s'elaborent dans File de

Le
loin

Laputa

cas est hypothetique assurement

cependant

de

ressembler

de paix perpetuelle

la

notre

realite

fable

est-elle

si

Essayons

nouvelle Europe, au
d'imaginer quelle figure pourra prendre
a
e'clate'
en
la
crise
et n'est pas encore
de
1914
eortir
qui
Voici la Eussie re"duite en morceaux. Dans sa partie
denoue"e.
la

occidentale,

une

s^rie

d'Etats

qui

peuvent eompter

grands, vingt millions, et les plus petits,

Farriere-plan,

un million

les

plus

d'habitants.

une Moscovie informe dont personne ne pent

deviner encore autour de

quel noyau elle se trouvera son

Au centre de FEurope, une vaste
organisation definitive.
Allemagne qui comptera quatre-vingt millions d'ames si les
Allemands d'Autriche, a qui nous accordons, par hypothese,
la libre

determination d'eux-memes, demandent a s'unir aux

Allemands du Eeich.
Noire et

Entre cette grande Allemagne et les Mers

Mediterrane"e, une s^rie d'Etats sans passe* politique,

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

'

241

sans frontieres naturelles:

que d'occasions a de victorieuses

incursions
Et que pe*seront centre cette masse les nations
Toutes
occidentales, meme appuye'es par le Grande-Bretagne ?
!

considerations de politique int^rieure mises a part, les pacifistes

regretteront alors la disparition d'une grande Autriche et d'une

grande Russie, capables de

faire equilibre a la

graude Allemagne.

Us reconnaitront que la philosophie de 1'equilibre europ^en s'est

justifie par un siecle de paix tel que 1'Europe n'en avait jamais
encore coanu.

Puissions-nous trouver, dans

formules d'un nouvel ^quilibre

les

c'est

que Ton

puisse,

comme

pacifistes, se de"sinteresser

Nous souhaitons

le

chaos actuel,

Ce que nous contestons,

paraissent le croire les e'crivains

de cette recherche.

n'y ait pas de me'prise sur le but

vers lequel tendenb les reflexions qui precedent.
Elles menent
a cette conclusion que la Soci^te des Nations repose rion pas sur
qu'il n'il

un principe simple mais sur une pluralite de principes, qui

doivent se computer Fun par 1'autre. Le pacifisme se fait tort
et

prend

le

la Societe

caractere d'une utopie,

des

Nations en

se

presume rationnel: pourquoi

quand

il

pretend r^organiser
fondant sur un seul principe

alors ne pa^

proceder par

des

voies plus simples encore, et r^aliser la paix europe"enne par la

? Mais
justement c'est I'lmp^rialisme qui,
etant donn^e la constitution ge"ographique et morale de 1'Europe,

conque"te et par 1'empire

en ces matieres, Tutopie par excellence. Combien de

1'Europe, au cours des siecles passes, n'a-t-elle pas e^e* epuisee

constitue,
fois

par 1'ambition des conque"rants, pour se trouver apres d'inutiles

massacres, de nouveau divis^e en nations qui savaient entretenir
des relations pacifiques sans etre fondues dans 1'unite

monarchic universelle
faillite

de 1'esprit de conquete,

moins utopique,

d'une

Le pacifisme, qui euregistre cette

est,

pour qui

la plus sage, la plus

sait

comprendre,

prudente et

la

la plus con-

Et qui sait si ce n'est pas la sa faiblesse ?

Car 1'imagination humaine est ainsi faite qu'elle a besoin de se
nourrir de chimeres.
11 faut done excuser 1'homme d'etat, ^pris

servatrice des doctrines.

de

1'idee pacifiste,

qui tente, pour seduire Timagination populaire,

MARCEL MAUSS.

242

de donner a cette idee 1'aspect d'une utopie. Ainsi a fait le

President Wilson mais alors, malheur a la paix Internationale
:

devenu un programme guerrier et maintenant, pour avoir voulu mettre a sa guerre le point final, le
voici victime des passions nationales qu'ii a lui-meme de'chaine'es.

Son programme

est

II.

Nous proposons

By MARCEL MAUSS.

de substituer

question abstraite des

la

question tout a fait concrete des nations, de

nationalites, la

leur place dans 1'histoire humaine, de leur role moral actuel,

de leurs rapports, et des principes ad verses du cosmopolitisme.

Nous parlerons ainsi de realites, car les nations sont des etres
d'avoir termine leur

considerables et regents, loin

Notre rnethode, dite sociologique, sera

ainsi

Evolution.

rigoureusement

pragmatique.
1.

Les Nations.

Nous demanderons d'abord qu'on nous accorde deux

tions

de

celle

la

nation,

un groupe d'hommes mvant

et

inde'pendant,

celle

de

la

La

soci^te*.

ensemble sur

un

d^fini-

socie'te'

est

territoire determine',

s'attachant a une constitution de'termine'e.

Mais toutes

ne sont pas des nations. II y a

actuellement, dans I'humanite, toutes sortes de socie'te's, depuis
les

les societes

com me

les

Australiennes, jusqu'aux plus

nos grandes democraties d'occident. Qu'on
nous promette d'utiliser la distinction classique de Durkheim
"
entre les socie"t3s " polysegmentaires
a base de clans, les
plus primitives,

eVoluees,

comme

societes tribales, d'une part

"

segmentaires

(Durkheim
sous le

nom

distingu^es.

et

ou

et d'autre part les society's

Parmi

inte'gre'es.

nous-meme avons

aussi

de nation, deux sortes de

Dans

les

unes

le

celles-ci

il

cette

erreur)

qui doivent etre

pouvoir central est extrinseque,

superpos^, souvent par la violence quand

ou bien

non

on a confondu

commis

socie"tes

"

est instable et temporaire

quand

il

il

est

monarchique

est democratique.

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

Celles la ne me'ritent que le

Dans

les autres, le

du

d' administration

et

citoyen

des droits

et

C?est

s'opposent et se competent.

de rfeerver

bien

le

nom

memes

Ton accepte

Si

de nations.

les edvrj des TroXet?

avaient d'elles

d'Etats, ou d'Empires, etc.

pouvoir central est stable,

systeme de legislation
des devoirs

nom

par

(1276,

cette

243

et

permanent

il

y a un

la notion des droits et

des devoirs de la patrie

ces societes,

que nous demandons

Aristote distinguait
le

fort

dej'a

degr4 de conscience qu'elles

a, 28, etc.).

definition,

le

nombre des nations

devient singulierement restreint. Elles apparaissent, surtout

les grandes, comme de belles fleurs, mais encore rares et
fragiles

de

la civilisation et

f urent petites,

ce furent les

du progres humain.
cite*s

grecques.

Les premieres

La premiere grande

Depuis, je ne compte guere que sept ou huit

et une douzaine de petites dans toute I'histoire.
nations
grandes
Pour donner un tableau complet des nations il faudrait

Eome.

fut

encore les classer entre

grandeur, en

force,

elles.

Car

elles

sont inegales en

en richesse, en civilisation, en age, en

II faut en effet, sentir la grandeur et la

maturit^ politique.
dignite" de ces oeuvres des homines et des temps que sont lea
grandes et vieilles nations. Elles furent aussi les plus fortes ;
elles

gagnerent

la

guerre ou manquerent la gagner.

Cette

reconnue par la pratique, autrefois de ce

Concert
European, aujourd'hui de ce qui est le
qu'on
d'
de
la Societe* des Nations.
Conseil Administration
ine'galite est d'ailleurs

appelait le

Telle est la description qu'on peut faire de

logique ou

est

parvenue

I'humanite.

l'e"tat

dernieres et les plus parfaites des formes de la vie en

Elles

sont

socio-

Les nations sont les

socle" te.

dconomiquement, juridiquement, moralement

les plus e'leve'es des soci^tes, et assurent

et

mieux

politiquement
qu'aucune forme pr^c^dente le droit, la vie et le bonheur des
individus qui les composent. Et de plus, comme elles sont
inegales entres elles, et

unes des autres,

d'etre termin^e.

il

comme

elles sont fort differentes les

faut concevoir que leur Evolution est loin

244

MARCEL MAUSS.

De

ces tres simples considerations de fait, nous

pouvons

deja tirer une premiere serie de conclusions pratiques.

Les unes sont de droit international public. La premiere
chose a faire est d'aider les socie'te's qui ne sont pas encore des

Or

nations a en devenir.
e'te'

devenir.

Pour

de paix ont

la

plupart d'entre

de

leur

realise*

nationalites a perdu
fait

ces socie'tes sont de

deux

sortes

les

autrefois des nations ou sont sur le point de le

unes ont

elles, la

inde'pendance,

une partie de son

guerre et
et

acuite"

le Traite"

probleme des
en Europe, par le
le

des tyrannies Allemande, Autrichienne,

la disparition

Hongroise et Turque. Ce fut un grand bien qui sortit d'un

grand inal. Les autres de ces socie'te's n'ont jamais 4te des
nations et quelques unes sont meme bien loin de ce grade.
Mais c'est une
celles-ci, les nations doivent leur aide.

nouvelle conception de droit qui vient de se faire jour: la

theorie des mandats, des tutelles destinies a mener les societes
a la

arrierees

liberte*

et

la

II

civilisation.

y a

o-

ra nde

difference entre ces doctrines et les anciens usages d'annexion,

"
de colonisation violente, de
Eaubwirtschaft,"
les

Allemands.

Malheureusement

la

comme

disent

des

zones

politique

d'influence est encore pratique"e dans 1'Orient proche par les

grandes puissances et par la Grece.

Au point de vue du droit public et prive, il y a aussi a faire
quelques constatations et a deduire quelques regies.
Xon seulement les nations sont in^gales entre elles, mais

aucune nation moderne n'a atteint un

ment qu'on
progresser
societe.

pendant

puisse
que sous

Les plus elevens,

la guerre, la

tel

point de perfectionne-

que
publique ne pent plus
une forme nouvelle et supe'rieure de

dire

sa

vie

celles qui se sont le

Grande Bretagne,

(j'entends celles qui ont le plus et le

mieux conduites

la

France, TAllemagne
mieux developpe* leurs

forces nationales) ne sont pas encore des nations parfaites ni

Elles ont fort a

e'galement perfectionnees sur tous les points.
faire avant d'etre parvenues a un e*quilibre d'heureuse centrali-

sation et d'beureuse decentralisation comparable a celui

oii

sont

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

245

deja parvenues de petites nations qu'on pourraifc prendre

telles

modeled,

que

la Suisse

ou

la

comme

Norwege.

dernierement, en Angleterre surtput, que

s'est fait jour Tid^e de la nationalisation, c'est-a-dire d'une forme
d 'administration, par la nation, des choses e"conomiques qui

Enfin

c'est tout

appartiennent a la nation.

C'est la la forme la plus re'cente

du

socialisme, et celle qui a vraisemblablement le plus d'avenir.

par deduite d'un ideal ou d'une critique dialectique

de la societd bourgeoise, mais d'une observation des faits et de

Car

elle n'est

l'ide"e

que

la

meilleure administration des choses est celle des

Or cette

inte'resse's.

nationalisation suppose 1'abandon de la notion

d'Etat souverain, qui, irresponsable, serait

eVidemment mauvai&

administrateur de biens econoruiques.

Elle suppose, bien au
contraire, la notion que la nation est un groupe naturel
d'usagers, d'interesses,

une vaste cooperative de consommateurs >

non

confiant ses interests a des administrateurs responsables, et

a des corps politiques recrutes, en general, sur des questions

somme

d'opinion, et en

Toute

la vie

a s'ebaucher.
nationale

sont

deVeloppements,

loin .d'avoir

meme

Le sens du

grandes.

incompetents.

^conomique des nations tend done avec peine

Mais c'est que tous les processus de la vie

ment a s'eveiller.
Le principe des

atteint

partout

dans de nations
social et

tres

leurs
vieilles

derniers
et

tres

du national commence seule-

nationalites, ou,

pour mieux

dire, la vie

des

nations ont done encore une longue carriere a parcourir, en

matiere de droit international, de droit public et prive. Les

nations ont devant elles un lointain et grand ideal, econoniique,

Avant 1'Internationale, il faut
esth^tique et surtout moral.
faire passer

dans

les faits la Cite ide"ale, et d'ici-la les

ne cesseront pas d'etre sources et

lois,

et

buts des

h^roiques.

sacrifices

les

fins

plus

du

droit,

noinbreux

nations

origines deset

les

plus,

MARCEL MAUSS.

246

2.

Cependant

il

TJ

un

est

Internationalisme.
certain

nombre d 'idees, de courants

sentimentaux, re"pandus dans des masses considerables et qui

semblent en contradiction avec cette vie nationale. On appelle

communne'ment
Mais

ces idees

du nom d'internationalisme.

language courant est vicieux. II confond en

deux sortes d'attitudes morales bien distinctes.
le

Nous proposons de reserver

C'est un courant
premiere.
tendent reellement a

le

nom

effet

de cosmopolitisme a la
de faits memes qui

d'idees et

la destruction des nations, a la creation

d'une morale ou elles ne seraient plus les autorites souveraines,

creatrices de la loi, ni les buts supremes dignes des sacrifices
consacre*s

dor^navant a une meilleure cause,

celle

de 1'humanite.

ne faut pas sous-estimer ce mouvement.

Mais si nous tenons a etre juste il ne faut cependant pas
lui donner une bien grande importance.
La vogue qu'il a
II

est celle d'une secte, renforce'e par Texistence d'un

muniste en Russie.

tat coin-

D'autre part
Elle cessera avec ces causes.
elles-memes sont de plus en plus attaches
Elles sont de plus en plus conscientes des

les classes ouvrieres

& leurs
inte'rets

nations.

e'conomiques
souvent

d'industrie

nationaux,
sont

elles

en

matiere

de

protectionnistes,

travail
ainsi

et

en

Australie, en Nouvelle Zelande.

Ces idees n'ont ni plus ni moins de chances de devenir des

que toutes les Utopies. Car elles ne sont que cela.

idees-forces

du temps present elles

d'aucune groupe naturel d'homines elles ne sont
Elles ne sont que le
1'expression d'aucun inte'ret de'fini.
dernier aboutissant de 1'individualisme pur, religieux et chr^tien,
Elles ne correspondent a aucune realite

ne sont

)e fait

ou metaphysique.

Cette politique de "I'homme citoyen

du

monde " n'est que la consequence d'un theorie ^therde de Fhomme

monade partout identique, agent d'une morale transcendante
a,ux

re'alite's

de la vie sociale

d'une morale ne concevant d'autre

patrie que 1'humanite, d'autres lois que les natur elles (Socrate,

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

Toutes

247

qui sont peutetre vraies a la limite, mais qui ne sont pas des motifs d'action,
ni pour I'immense majorite des hommes, ni pour aucune des
d'apres Plutarque, de Exilio, V).

ide*es

socie'tes existantes.

Le deuxieme courant

d'ide'es

a une toute autre

toute autre rationality une toute autre

realite".

une

force,

II

commence

d'ailleurs & se clarifier des e'le'ments adventices qui lui venaient

du voisinage du cosmopolitisme et des Utopies ou il etait

Nous proposons de lui garder le nom d'Internationalisme.
L'lriternationalisme digne de ce

cosmopolitisme.

II

ne nie pas

nom

la nation.

nation, c'est le contraire d'a-nation.

quent

contraire

le

du

et

pour

but de concevoir

Inter-

II la situe.

C'est aussi, par conse'-

qui isole la nation.

Ton veut bien accorder cette definition,

ensemble des id^es, sentiments

out

du

nationalisme,

L'Internationalisme est, si
I'

est le contraire

ne\

et

et regies et

diriger

entre les societes en general.

Ici

domaine de FUtopie mais dans

les

groupements

collectifs

rapports entre

les

qui

nations

nous sommes non plus dans la

au moins

celui des faits, tout

dans celui des anticipations du futur imme'diat. En realite, il

un mouvement de forces sociales qui tendent a
regler pratiquement et moralement la vie de relation des
existe tout

socie'tes.

Ces forces precedent &

la fac,on

dont autrefois ont

etc*

pro-

gressivement regies, & 1'inte'rieur des socie'tes a base de clans,

les rapports entre ces clans
dont, par exemple, la tribu
;

guerres prive'es ou a la fac^on dont, au de*but des

grandes formations d'fitats, les pouvoirs centraux eurent pour
principale tache de limiter severement la souverainet^ des

supprima

les

tribus, villes, provinces, etc.

toute la morale et la

des fitats
le

"

que ce
soit

comme

Prince

"

soit,

II est

pratique tendent a ne plus considerer

les etres

absolument souverains, ayant,

de Machiavel,

le droit

pour son propre bien.

II

comme

naturel de faire a tous quoi

pourvu que ce
existe maintenant une morale

y compris linjuste, et

Internationale.

certain que de nos jours

1'horrible

248

MARCEL MAUSS.
morale

Cette

certes

n'arrive

que

pe*niblement

&

son

plus pe*niblement encore a des sanctions, sauf

bien plus peniblement encore aux institutions qui
seules permettront a I'internation de devenir une r4alite\
Mais
expression,

diffuses,

nous ne voyons aucune raison de"sesperer.

II

y a au contraire

des faits considerables et nouveaux qui dominent actuellement

toute la vie de relation des socie'te's et qui ne pourront pas
manquer de s'inscrire dans la pratique et dans le droit.

La guerre

et la paix qui 1'a suivie ont, en effet, eu

deux

consequences qui ne sont contradictoires qu'en apparence. D'une

part elles ont consacre le principe de 1'independance nationale,
et d'autre

ont manifest^ un

part elles

domine toute

la vie

de relation des societes

paix

ont

de"pendance.

qui,

desormais,

celui de leur inter-

meme
Ce qui

est plus important encore, politiquement

et moralement,
sentie,

Les ruines de

guerre et la nature de
extraordinairement accru cette inter-

dependance croissante.
la

fait

c'est

voulue par

les

la

que cette interd^pendance est connue,

peuples eux-m^me.

Ceux-ci de*sirent tres

nettemerit qu'elle soit solennellement marquee dans les

lois,

dans un veritable droit international, public et prive, codified

Ici les peuples sont en avance sur leurs dirigeants,
sanctionne.
dont certains, vieillards sceptiques, font trop peu credit & leurs
Mais il n'est pas possible qu'un aussi
propres mandants.
fort

mouvement de

1'opinion publique ne soit fond^

realite et n'arrive a s'imposer en droit.

Aussi

bieri, 1&

dans

la

ou cette

opinion dtait forte et eclair^e et correspondait k des inte"rets

conscients et group^s, la Soci4t4 des Nations commence a etre

une

r^alit^

concernant

nous faisons allusion a

la legislation internationale
les

du

du

"

Covenant

"

travail et nous faisons

deux points dont, malgre

remarquer que
Am^ricains n'ont pas pu
International du Travail et
de

la partie

tout, les Senateurs

sont

Bureau

se

desinteresser,

la

Cour Permanente d'arbitrage

le

et

justice.

Nous pourrions a
Mais nous

la

rigueur nous contenter de cette preuve.

pre"ferons donner une enumeration des principaux

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

faits

des

d'interde'pendance

comment elles les

1. La guerre

societe's

modernes

socie'te's

dans

For-,

les

laisse

n'a jamais tant

di vision du travail

entre

Les publics,

et4 inoui'e

nationaux.

y a

il

On

les

n'a jamais

les

un

e"tat

d'inter-

marches locaux.

de"tentrices de matieres

Le ravitaillement des pays e'puise's,

devastes, sont pris en mains par
eut-

montrer

Le marche* mondial, surtout

doming

socie'te's

et societe's manufaeturieres

nationales.

et

con^oivent.

dtpendance e'conomique absolue.

celui de

249

e*te

pousse'e

plus loin.

organisations

pays

Inter-

gouvernements parlent, chose qui

six ans,

de monnaies, de credits inter-

^changes de marchandise par contrats

regie les

On admet

passes entre les nations.

le droit

des nations pauvres

a etre soutenues par les nations riches.

2. Interdtpendance morale conside'rablement

mouvements de

premieres

la reconstruction des

des

La

1'opinion

Les

accrue.

humaine prennent une generalite

L'Europe, puis le inonde entier, se

qu'ils n'ont jamais eue.
Bouleverent d'abord centre les guerres dynastiques, puis contre
certaines
gens.

f aeons

de conduire

L'opinion publique,

la guerre,

meme

au m^pris du droit des

celle des puissances centrales

re*pudie la diplomatic Machiave'lique, celle des traites secrets, de

C'est tout cela qu'expriment les fameux

au
President
Wilson, auxquels aucun fitat n'a
quatorze points
encore eu le courage de refuser d'adherer. Tant le philosophe
Tirrespetft des traites.

qui les formula a surement exprime la volonte* des peuples.

3. VolonU des peuples de ne plus faire la guerre. II a fallu

demobiliser tres rapidement.

"

Paix

principe Cretois de la paix qui est une guerre

non

4. VolonU
arme"e," le

des peuples d' avoir la paix, la vraie.

La

Les peuples
tort ou a raison. Mais il est eVident
veulent qu'on desarme.
qu'ils renoncent aux plus grands de leurs inte"rets plutot que de
rester sous les armes, comme on voit, en ce moment, en Orient

proclame'e (Platon, Lois, 626a) ont fait leur temps.

proche, la France

ambitions.

et

le

Eoyaume Uni renoncer

& bien des

MARCEL MAUSS.

250

5. Limitation

des Souveraintts nationales.

Ceci

est,

&

mon

moral et politique le plus notoire de la Paix, si

boiteuse qu'elle soit. Le Pacte de la Socle* t^ des Nations, meme

sens, le fait

une principe juridique nouveau:

absolu
et inconditionnel du principe
permanent,
II
ne
contient
d'arbitrage qu'il proclame.
plus ces reserves sur
1'honneur et les interets vitaux des Etats que contenaient les

-e'il

reste inapplique', a consacr^

c'est le caractere

trace's passes suivant les principes d'avant guerre.

Chose aussi

neuve et aussi importante, il est prevu que la Soci^te des

Nations sera elle-meme un organe d'enregistrement et d'appli-

En

cation des traites.

fait elle fonctionne, deja,

en cette

C'est elle qui a organist et ratifie les plebiscites.

qualite".

Elle s'est

substitute deja a bien des institutions qu'on croyait indispensables, elle a de*ji e"tabli bien des precedents, ces sources

Enfin, chose

mal connue,

elle a deja

du

droit.

commence a chercher

&

sanctionner ce droit ecrit et non ecrit dont elle est I'lnstrument.

Ces sanctions ne sont pas encore celles de la force. Elle a agi,

nombre de fois par une sorte de contrainte morale comme celle
qu'elle exerce

dans

les recours & la violence.

somme, empeche

moment

les regions a plebiscite,

oii,

c'est elle

qui

a,

en

Elle empeche en ce

Eappelons encore
Et espe'rons
de
droit
ouvrier.
en
matiere
preVues
Commission de Fondation de la Cour de Justice, qui
la violation

des droits des minorites.

les sanctions

que

la

fonctionne a la Have, va trouver les regies, les procedures et les

forces qui assureront le caractere executoire des de"crets souverains de cette Cour.

Tel est Tetat du

monde moderne

il

mouvement

d'internationalisme dans notre

ne tend pas vers une supra-nation qui

II est & peu de chose pres,

absorberait les autres nations.

legerement sup^rieur a celui de la Grece quand, pour e"tablir la

il
est
paix entre les rite's, elle fondait les Amphictyonies
:

presque identique & celui ou Socrate eut voulu voir les Grecs,
horreurs de la guerre du Peloponnese, il
souhaitait qu'ils se conside'rassent (Rep., 470 b) tous comme des
Hellenes et que leurs guerres ne fussent traitees que comme des

lorsque,

pendant

les

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

251

soulevements, des reVoltes chatie"es on apaise'es par les autres.

L'humanite veut etre peuplde de nations "douces, sages, et
philanthropes "; elle veut que la guerre ne soit plus qu'une le^on

de

"

prudents amis qui ne veulent ni 1'esclavage ni

la ruine

"

du

pecheur.
Conclusion.

3.

Ces tendances des peuples doivent trouver chez les philosophes le plus entier concours. Rien n'y est contraire aux

raison.

de I'mde'pendance nationale, ni au deVeloppement

nationaux.
Ceci se prouve par fait et par
La solidarity organique, consciente, entre les nations, la

division

du travail entre

principes

des

les

caracteres

elles,

populations, aboutiront &

suivant les

cree'r

sols, les

autour

climats et

une athmo-

d'elles

sphere de paix, oil elles pourront donner le plein de leur vie.

Elles auront ainsi sur les individualites collectives 1'effet
qu'elles ont
elles

feront

eu sur
leur

les

personality a

liberte\

leur

I'inte'rieur

leur

dignite\

des nations

singularite,

leur

grandeur.

Ensuite pourquoi les philosophes desespereraient-ils ? II y a

S'il n'existe pas encore de droit
deja une e"tape de franchie.
existe dej& une morale humaine, dont les plus
II existe deja des choses, des
tenir compte.
doivent
cyniques
et derriere ceci, il peut y avoir
groupes, des inte'rets humains
toute la masse de 1'humanite', capable de sanctions autrement

humain,

il

dures que la simple disapprobation.

Enfin

les

pourquoi

phiiosophes

On

1'a

ne

bien vu.
prendraient-ils

une position d'avant garde dans cette marche

prise

quand

il

s'est agi

Us

pas

1'ont bien

de fonder la doctrine des de'mocraties,

Anglais et Francois furent en avance

ne faut pas oublier ni Kant, ni Fichte.
Pourquoi choisiraient-ils de rester a Tarriere' garde, au service

et celle des nationality.

sur leur temps, et

des interets acquis

il

Leur voix n'eut jamais plus de chance

elle

est

Tout comme

d'etre

e'coute'e,

si

formules sages et n^cessaires.

au temps de la guerre du Peloponnese ou a celui

sincere

et

trouve

les

THEODORE RUYSSEN.

252

des formations des premieres dynasties chinoises, a celui de

Confucius et a celui de Socrate, les peuples se tournent vers

ceux

qu'ils appellent leurs

appellent des

que

lee r^actionnaires

sophistes."

By THEODORE KUYSSEN.

definirons la nationalite

Findependance

Ton veut,

et

sages

"

III.

Nous

"

"

un groupe ethnique prive de

politique et qui aspire a la conqu^rir

c'est, si

nation en puissance, mais assez consciente de cette

puissance pour tendre de toutes ses forces au droit de prendre
rang, en pleine e'galite', dans la Societe* des nations libres.
la

1.

aux

La contro verse au sujet du probleme des nationality met

prises un grand nombre de theories, dont les extremes

s'opposent terme pour terme.

D'une

part, la the"orie libdrale

ment en France

et

ou Elective, soutenue principale-

en Angleterre, subordonne

doute, des criteres externes, mais facilement

conscience:

fait

de la

Elle invoque, sans

nationalite a la conscience des individus.

traits

le

accessibles a la

physiologiques tres apparents,

communaute'

de langue, de religion, de traditions

mais, en definitive, elle
fait dependre le sort des nationaux de leur volonte librement
;

exprimee.
D'autre part, la theorie autoritaire, qu'on peut appeler aussi
trudite, soutenue principalement en Allemagne, clans les pays
slaves et, dans une certaine mesure, en Italie, subordonne la
definition de la nationalite a raffirmation d'une autorite politique,

appuyee elle-meme sur

de certains erudits;
accessibles

la

la

elle

competence plus ou moins sincere

invoque des

conscience

criteres

nationale:

indice

^tymologie, pr^histoire ou histoire des origines.

sur la nationality le determinisme du passe.

difncilement
cephalique,

Elle fait peser

253

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

2.

M
miner

ne peut

1'une ni 1'autre de ces theories

suffire & de*ter-

la fonction politique de la nationality car ni

1'autre n'est

D'une

part,

il

Tune

ni

ni d'ailleurs entierement fausse,

entierement vraie

n'y a pas d'exemple d'une concretion nationale

absolument spontamie; la nationalite est toujours unfait avant

de devenir une ictte. La conscience qu'un peuple a de lui-meme
est

extremement

faible, pre*caire et

malleable

ne devient

elle

consistante que sous Faction d'une elite plus consciente,

inform ee, qui peut bien

fortifier les caracteres

mieux

nationaux, mais

qui peut aussi les alterer, les exalter de fa^on plus ou moins
arbitraire.
De sorte que le sentiment national est souvent un

sentiment

reel,

mais

par des moyens artificiels.

sous un re'gime d'autorite* incontestee,

vivifie'

il
D'autre part, meme
un
a
si
efficace
e"rudit
de
qui
puisse engendrer
n'y
pas
systeme
sentiment national, la ou ne subsistent pas certains facteurs

conscients ele'mentaires.

On

peut concevoir la synthese des deux aspects de la

Enrichir dans un peuple le sentiment national, sans

nationalite

lui presenter 1'ideal national

lui

meme, mais

comme un

comme un

fonction de la Societe Ge*nerale

absolu qui se suffise a

qui ne peut jouer qu'en

facteur

des

Nations.

En

definitive,

cultiver a la fois et harrnoniser le citoyen et 1'homme.

3.

Au

point de vue politique il apparalt manifestement

impossible de satisfaire inte"gralement toutes les aspirations
car on aboutirait a un
nationales, meme les plus sinceres
;

e*miettement des nations qui irait a 1'inverse du mouvement

moderne de centralisation lequel aboutit a la constitution de
vastes formations politiques.
II

est,

d'autre part, intolerable d'abandonner le sort

peuples a la tyrannic d'une

ide*e

nationale imposee

d'en haut par une autorite politique.

Le droit des

des

du dehors ou
nationality's,

RENE JOHANNET.

254

extension des droits de ITiomnie, ne peut concevoir que sur la

base democratique.

Le

conflit est

done inevitable entre

d'affranchissement

1'effort

et la tendance k la concentration, entre

nationalisme et

le

I'imperialisme.

Mais on peut concevoir une attenuation du conflit

1
Si les Gouvernements des nations imperialistes reduisent
:

Heurs prerogatives & la defense de leur securite et & la garantie de

Fordre publique, laissant aux nationalites leur pleine autonomie

politique et leur libre deVeloppement culturel

Si les nationalite*s renoncent a revendiquer les avantages

et les risques

sur

efforts

la

de la pleine souverainete et concentrent leurs

defense de leur autonomie locale et de leur

caractere culturel.

On

peut esperer que la Societe des Nations, en restreignant

1'importance de la souverainete politique des nations, rendra
plus facile le de*veloppement des nationality's autonomes, et Tori
doit,

en tout

listes

cas, s'efforcer

les nations

imperia-

en federations de nationalites, federations associees

memes en une
du

de transformer

libre confederation

mondiale fondee sur

elles-

la base

droit.

IV.

Voici

les idees qu'il

me

By KENE JOHANNET.
semble

I'heure actuelle, concernant

D'abord

c'est

un

fait.

les plus

opportun de degager a

le fait nationalitaire.

Que nous

le

voulions ou que nous

voulions pas, qu'il s'agisse de I'Allemagne ou du Canada,

de 1'Irlande ou de la Pologne, de la Grece ou de la Turquie, de

ne

le

V Arabic ou des Indes,

le type d'Etat qui tend & prevaloir est de

en
plus national, c'est-a-dire qu'il ne se rassemble plus
plus
sous 1'autorite d'un souverain, mais sous la tyrannic d'une idee,
1'idee de patrie nationale.

II

n'est pas

douteux non plus que

la

definition la plus

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

255

correcte de la patrie nationale est celle qui la fait de*pendre

consentement des

interesse"s

qu'ils ont d'appartenir &

Cela

pose",

aucun

de

meme

une

des

et

la

du

commune

nation.

problemes

nationalitaire n'est resolu, mais

conscience

souleves

par la crise

beaucoup d'autres apparaissent.

pas en effet de de"finir, il faut/aire vivre.

Un Etat sans frontieres, comine 1'Armdnie, la Pologne,
on la Tcheco-Slovaquie, est un monstre, un animal de voliere
II

ne

suftit

La

propagation de 1'id^e
nationalitaire tend d'autre part a cre*er du desordre a 1'etat
endemique, en sapant les bases des grandes communaute's

dont

1'existence

civilisatrices,

sera

dont

la

tragiqne.

besogne n'a pu se poursuivre qu'a la

faveur d'une hierarchisatiori des nations entre elles par 1'idee

imperiale et sa realisation empirique.

Des

the*oriciens peuvent s'imaginer la possibilite d'un

terme
ou viendraient se marier les deux idees, d'empire
moyen
La reussite vitale d'une pareille formule sera
et de nation.

tres rare.

L'ideV nationalitaire, une fois partie, tend irresistible-

ment a son terme, qui

est 1'independance natiouale.

Cette independance une fois assuree, la force des choses
contraint les dirigeants de cet Etat nouveau (ou renouvele) a

maximum de puissance en s'adjoignant par force ou

nations moins resistantes.
ruse
des
par
De la nation a Tempi re la difference de fait est seulement
realiser son

chronologique.

Seuls des

theoriciens,

confines

dans

le

plan

speculatif, peuvent jouir des differences essentielles qui les

Vivre, pour les
separent du point de vue philosophique.

Etats, ce n'est pas penser, c'est faire de la politique.

Seules ont chance de reussir intellectuellement les theories

philosophiques dont la politique mondiale a besoin.

inent,

je

veux dire depuis

le

XVP

siecle

Actuelle-

environ,

I'idfo

en fonction de la
ddveloppe
Et il semble
rivalit6 politique des grands empires modernes.
un regime
sa
a
fournir
seule
consiste
r^alite
que
objective
nationalitaire

se

de transition entre

intellectuellement

la periode

de

rivalite's imperialistes,

qui tend
x 2

RENE JOHANNET.

256

a son apogee, et la periode de retour a une unite comparable

a celle de Eome.

au philosophe de prendre une attitude simple

dans un raonde regi non par la

II est difficile

vis-a-vis

du

fait nationalitaire,

mais par
autrement facile
the'orie

La

les passions.

position

du

politicien est

Clemenceau ou Lloyd George peuvent du

ineme geste e"touffer et exalter deux nationality's. Wilson de
meme. Le theoricien, lui aussi, s'adjuge des facilites analogues.
!

Le philosophe est plus perplexe. Car il faut qu'il juge non

seulement la piece, mais les acteurs et les mobiles, le tout
formant un Uoc indissoluble. Les the'oriciens separent toujours
Ce n'est pas possible. Leur inexperience
les deux choses.
du politicien de fa^on absolue et non
la
rouerie
complete
relative

D'une part

ou adventice.

pas a utiliser les theories

le

si

elles

songerait

n'existaient

D'autre part cette theorie n'existerait pas sans politiciens.

pas.

pour 1'imaginer ou la nourrir.

Ce qui met le comble a I'imbroglio,
nationalitaires

se

politiciens croient
les

politicien ne

nationalitaires,

uns et

que

les the'oriciens

prennent pour des philosophes et que les

obe'ir, meme en rechignant, a des theories,

les autres s'estimant

leur partenaire.

c'est

Par exemple

capables d'occuper

le politicien se

le

plan de

juge supe*rieur au

theoricien et vice-versa.

question comme insoluble autrement que

pour la philosophic de 1'histoire, dans la mesure ou cette
philosophic n'est pas de 1'histoire tout court.

Je considere

la

Assure*ment ce ne sont pas de purs fantomes que les idees

de patries nationales, mais elles ne brillent de leurs couleurs
vraies

que lorsque on

impe'rialiste.

1920

dans une phase de devenir

vogue de 1'idee nationalitaire en

les situe

Pratiquement

la

est le signe d'une recrudescence de rivalite's imperialistes.

Nous devons nous representer

militariste par ce
s'est

que

1'avenir

tres nationalitaire.

vu depuis quinze cents

ans.

sous

un aspect

tres

Rien de semblable ne

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

By GILBERT MURRAY.

V.
1.

LIKE most terms

nationality

257

current political discussion, the term

For our
not susceptible of exact definition.

is

of

purpose a nationality

a self-conscious group which, in

is

its

on a common name

most typical form, bases

Greek
and a common feeling of kindred, however fictitious.
colonies drawn from mixed sources usually invented an eponyfeeling of unity

its

mous

And

ancestor,

who then became

the symbol of their unity.

psychologically the same tendency

contradicted by

known

survives, even if

still

For instance, Americans

facts.

"

most diverse origin tend to feel themselves

The typical nation is, or aspires to be, also a unity

When

cal organization.

this

unity

is

becomes immediately the main desire

"
or
The group demands " freedom
"

Such a demand

autonomy."

reaction in the larger body of

forms part,

demand

"

for

of the

true Americans."
of politi-

consciously absent,
of the national

it

group.
"

"

or
self-government
a
hostile
generally produces

which the

"

national

"

group

integrity," a resistance to

"

dis-

memberment."
2.

The emotion

of nationality

inspiring and dangerous than that

It is, or claims
economic unity.
reflection nor

unalterable.

even on

will,

Nationality

is

at

present

to be, a unity not based

but on physical

is

much more

of religious, geographical, or

fact,

on

profound and

normally a source of deep irra-

Normally every man is

proud of having been born where he was born, and of belonging
This pride is not
to the nation to which he does belong.
tional pride as well as fellow-feeling.

rationally justifiable, but

a cause of self-respect.

it is

in general a healthy stimulus

National feeling, to this extent, is a

a feeling that

human society. It produces

A man who has nothing else

valuable element in

and

Noblesse Oblige.
except that he belongs to some nation can

to be

proud of

feel at least that it is

more incumbent on him than on those born

in less distinguished

places to act according to a certain standard.

A man

with no

258

GILBERT MURRAY.

taste in literature or

art

learn that

may

pictures are characteristic of

his

books or

certain

and consequently

country,

enjoy them.

How

3.

of

is it

that this innocent and rather beneficent state

mind becomes a cause

disaster

widespread madness, crime, and

from
one of two reasons resentPractically always
of

ment against a common oppression, or the intoxication of a

common success. Germany and all the great conquering
nations have at one time or another become dangerous through
consciousness of success.
But the great conquering nations are
few in number, and much the commonest cause of intense
national feeling
oppressed, the

is

common

members

common emotions

When any

oppression.

of that

group

is

group are drawn together by

into a passionate unity (unless indeed the

persecution succeeds in actually breaking down the group altogether).

Begin to rob bakers or journalists or landlords as

and they

such,

Go through Mace-

will stand together as such.

donia pillaging the Vlachs, and the Vlachs, previously indifone another as well as hating you. Persecute

ferent, will love

and the same result

heretics,

difference

and

side

is

is

a great

between national and religious groups on the one

ordinary economic or vocational groups on the

all

The former have an

other.

But there

will follow.

ideal

and

irrational quality,

which

capable of swift and infinite expansion, leading to martyrdom

and fanaticism, whereas the economic groups stand on a

and finite base, and do not go much beyond it.
It

is

most instructive to notice how

solid

religious intolerance,

once one of the strongest collective passions, has practically died

out where there is no religious persecution whereas national
;

passion has increased to the point of insanity all over the

world.
The causes of this have probably been (1) the increase
of national pride in the great

conquering races, as the power

of nation over nation has increased, while the

over class has diminished.

of nations:

e.g.,

(2)

The more

power

of class

definite demarcation

the increase of elementary education, leading

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

259

greater consciousness of national language, literature and

history.
(3) The fact that oppression and violent injustice,
to

formerly sporadic, irregular, arid due to many causes, have of

late been largely concentrated in national forms.
For one
thing, empires

oppress and exasperate their subject nations,

while not venturing to stamp them out by massacre, as they

for another, the great armed nations,
might in the past
;

through their political and economic rivalries, have all threatened each other with such appalling dangers that each has very
properly and justly earned the fear and hatred of

Whatever may occur

bours.

all its

neigh-

in the future, of late years there

has been no reason for Catholics to dread Protestants, or for

employers to dread working men, at all comparable to the

reasons which Eussians had for dreading Germans or Germans

For example, employers and workmen do not

actually buy firearms and poison in order to kill each other.
Russians.

Can

4.

this dangerous increase of national feeling be

and checked

methods

To a great

of the so-called

"

League against

War

"

"

extent,

League

of

it

think,

can, by

Nations against War."

met
the

does not, of course, constitute in the

ordinary sense either a League or an Alliance.

chiefly a way of behaviour.

It constitutes

Nations at present hate each other, some moderately and

to the point of suicidal madness, largely because they have

some

been in the habit of (1) plotting secretly against each other

(2) competing against each other in matters of territory and

>

trade

and

(3)

when

the occasion seemed favourable, making

doing each other the maximum possible injury. The

Covenant of the League goes as far as it can towards the definite

war

i.e.,

prevention of

all

these things.

existing national units, as they

War, and then imposes

It

accepts

happen

provisionally the

to be left

by the Great

certain definite agreements

upon

all its

no secret plotting. The members

all meet regularly in common council; and all treaties and
agreements have to be laid openly before the whole League.

members.

(1) There

is

to be

SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK.

260
(2)

Though the League unfortunately cannot

directly protect

subject nationalities in parts of the world not affected

by the

has henceforth the duty of laying down the terms on

war,
which a governing State shall administer any territory which
And the prevention of grave
it receives as a result of the war.
it

abuses and

fiscal

exclusions in those territories will probably

have an influence in other colonial

League have

territories as well.

(3)

The

pledged themselves, and are

in the Covenant, not to
sanctions
further bound by strong

members

of the

all

attack each other by surprise.'

Whether these covenants can be carried out, whether the

majority of the great democracies have reached the necessary

standard of intelligence and decent feeling to wish them
carried

out, are points

open

to

discussion.

But

if

they are

carried out, the emotion of nationality will probably subside

gradually from

its

normal and healthy.

present inflamed condition to

Of course the cessation

something

of oppression will

not immediately produce a cessation of national hatred. Some

of the most extreme outbursts of national passion now taking
Still
place are in countries which are not oppressed at all.
oppression and the fear of oppression are the real roots of the
horse instinctively shudders at the smell of a tiger,
danger.

flies into fury at sight of a Bulgarian, who returns

the compliment. But if tigers became vegetarians, or if Serbs
and Bulgarians ceased for a few generations to behave to one

and a Serb

another as the worst criminals behave, the shudder and the

fury would cease.
for the

human

There

may

be difficulties with the

beings there should

VI.

By

Sir

-be at least

tiger,

but

some hope.

FREDERICK POLLOCK.

WHAT
of

do we mean by nationality ?
For the present purpose we may dismiss technical questions
Their solution is
political allegiance and its consequences.

technical and often highly artificial

they are the business of

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

261

lawyers and diplomatists. It would take us too far to consider

the influence of speculative theories on jurists, courts of

and ministries of foreign affairs. All we can do here

and rulers and publicists, if we can do so much, is to

justice,

for princes

warn them against being led captive by obsolete maxims

Erudimini qui judicatis terram.
superficial novelties.

We may

dismiss, again, as being remote

in hand, the older

and larger significance

which did not connote

political

or

from the purpose

"
word " nation

of the

unity as either existing or

desired.

Dictionary definitions will help us very little. They can

give only a condensed report of literary usage and if the
;

usage

vague the dictionary must be vague too.

constitute a nation in the sense of modern politics

is

To
must have

at least, I conceive, a

and compact and

body of people

so

we

numerous

so situated in other respects as to be capable

forming a self-governing community, not necessarily an

independent one. If they are not already such a community
of

there

must be a general

among them to become so.

community is or tends to be a

desire

Not that every self-governing

One and the same nation may and often does include
bodies having their own particular characters
autonomous
many
nation.

sharing in common the national characters which distinguish the whole nation from the rest of the world and are

but

all

on the whole more important than the differences of the

components. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the
Province of Quebec have each their marked individuality, but
no one calls either of them a nation.

The existence
region

is

of a nation at a

a matter of

fact.

given time and in a given

If the facts are obscure or under-

going a visible transformation there must be a corresponding

doubt or suspension of judgment.

How many
wreck

of the

nations, actual or potential, are there in the

Russian empire

Can any man

give a certain answer to Captain Macmorris's

262

SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK.

"

"

Is there one Irish nation or

question What is my nation ?
two, or one divided against itself ?
Is there an Indian nation in any intelligible sense ?
Will
there ultimately be one or several ?

few such questions are as good as many

the reader may add more if he will.

reflection

for stimulating

now

Let us

consider the elements of nationality as they are

commonly esteemed, and

say nationality

When

their relative importance.

"

refer to the political sense of

above mentioned, and exclude

nation

"

affinities of speech, culture

I
as

and

they have no direct political effect. A

citizen of the Canton of Ticino taken at random will probably
the like so far as

be

Eoman

manners.

man
we

religion

may

and North Italian

well be that he

is

But we must not

in

more

language

and

at ease with a

man

Milan or Venice than with a

of

Geneva.
if

in
It

Berne

of

ascribe Italian nationality to

or

him

are to use terms with

Most men,
factors

in

any tolerable exactness.

would
suppose,
agree in the list

national character.

They

are

race

of material

(in

include reputed as well as actual descent, and in the

which

common

mixed descent the predominant racial character),

It
language, religion, social custom, and political tradition.
is certain that no one of these alone will suffice to make or
case

of

preserve a nation.
necessary.

It

remains to be seen whether any one

is

Further, a certain measure of

must be assumed as essential

and the external pressure
government
tinuity

geographical confor the conduct of

of a

common danger

imposing union for defence may be decisive, and has been so

in at least one conspicuous example, that of Switzerland
though the same cause may have a very different effect in com-

pelling a multitude

other intents
First,

is

then,

to

tolerate a political

not national at
as

to

race.

It

demonstration that racial unity

condition of national union.

system which to

all.

We

is

almost too notorious for

is

by no means a necessary
an unmixed

shall hardly find

263

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

race in the civilized world.

Every great nation includes men

naked eye.

many stocks whose

You shall meet in Paris a Breton, a Burgundian, and a Provencal
who are all good Frenchmen in London, a Yorkshireman, a
man of Kent, and a Cornishman who are all good Englishmen
in Home, a Lombard, a Tuscan and a Sicilian who are all good
Italians.
Again, if we try to sort out British and French
citizens by racial characters we shall get Normans and Yorkdiversities are manifest to the

of

shiremen in one group, Welsh and Bretons in another. In the

United States as a whole there has never been anything like
days of independence, whatever may
be the case in a few of the older States, such as Kentucky and
racial unity since the first

Con-

Virginia, which have been less affected by Immigration.

versely, similarity in race, or, indeed, in the other characters, is

no warrant

of

union or even friendly relations.

to point to Chile

It is

enough

and Peru.

Language offers a more plausible test, plausible enough to

But it is far from
have been at one time fashionable.
conclusive.
official

very much a nation and has three

the Swiss codes are trilingual and all three

Switzerland

languages

is

Belgium and Canada have two. Such cases

no doubt exceptional, but they show that one common
language is not a necessity. The polyglot empire of Austria is
texts authentic.

are

broken, but multiplicity of tongues was perhaps the least of its

defects.
Inheritance of a common mother tongue, on the other
of itself

no security at

all for

union or peace. Not to

from the wars

hand,

is

speak

of civil wars, the witness of history reaches

of

Athens and Sparta to those of Austria and Prussia.

mother tongue would appear at first sight

A common

to be

almost a necessary condition for working up collective emotion

whether for good or bad ends. One cannot easily conceive a
Chauvinist Switzerland.
dogmatize.

Panslavism

and the Slavonic peoples

it is something
understanding one another's speech that a,

Pangermanism, but
are so far from

Nevertheless experience forbids us to

compact and less dangerous than

is less

264

SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK.

Pan Slavonic Congress

Moscow was

at

reported

many

years ago

to have found that the only tongue practically useful for its

proceedings was German.

Similarly lettered Indians of different

provinces often speak and write English among themselves.

Altogether, language is a more definite bond than race, and goes

deeper into men's lives (exceptions excepted) than religion

we cannot give it a dominant place.

As

to

religion,

the

reactions

of

political

and

but

religious

motives are exceedingly complex. It is certain that community

of faith and discipline has often furnished national sentiment

with potent symbols and vehicles, as on the other hand

the rivalry of churches and creeds has gone near to break up
flourishing

nations.

circumstances do

know

that

it

Uniformity of

much

religion

may

some

in

keep a nation together, but I do not

has ever made a new one. Christianity in its
to

various forms, and Islam, less free from variation than most

Western readers think, have

nations

at divers times converted

many

they have not created any.

The Sikhs, indeed, being

in their origin a purely religious

were put to self-defence by persecution, and from the

time of Gur Govind onwards developed their community into
order,

a militant and formidable power. That case is, I believe, unique.

In modern civilized states political unity and strong
patriotism are found quite compatible with wide religious
difference, not only in ecclesiastical

government and forms but

which are fundamental or at

least appear so to their

can
do nothing or next to
religious agreement
So long as the
nothing to check national or dynastic strife.
the
Father
himself was
was
a
power
Holy
temporal
Pa"pacy

in beliefs

adherents.

But

often at war with Catholic princes.

On

the whole

we must say

that religion has great power to reinforce national sentiment for

better or worse, but very little initiative.

It has to be national

first.

We

come then

to

the

factor of

common

tradition

and

custom, in which I include both social manners and public

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY.

any

of the others

and herein the

The most

stronger.

more important than

This, I conceive, is really

institutions.

effective

bond

265

element

political

the British

of

is

the

Common-

wealth of nations, holding together an infinite variety of race,

language, religion and culture, is our Common Law symbolized
in the King.

Further, this

seems truly indispensable.

is

the one kind of

community that

National custom, public or private,

course a complex affair to which the other elements

contribute in varying proportions.
But no multitude of men

is

of

can be called a nation unless and until

some

such

true

of

growth

however

traditions

national unity

it is

the

hampered or even

be

may

in possession of

Contrariwise

formed.

arrested by forms of government which are not really national.

The

French monarchy with

French, and accordingly much of
old

all

its

faults

its legal

was genuinely

and administrative

system has survived the Revolution. In Russia, Peter the

Great, with the best intentions, imposed a bureaucratic scheme

which was alien

Under

to the national spirit.

war, which consolidates and fortifies whatever

we have

is

the stress of

truly national,

seen Peter the Great's machine of government collapse

into chaotic ruin.

Neither race, language nor religion, not

together, will make a trustworthy bond

without organic public institutions.
So far I have done nothing but recapitulate notorious facts.
For this I make no excuse elementary facts are just those

even

of

all

them

which are apt to be overlooked in

the

higher
they point to any distinct conclusion, it is, in my
judgment, that the outstanding conditions of natural frontiers,
discussing

If

politics.

and physiographical relations in general and

their economic consequences, must still count for very much,

geographical

and in many cases be practically

led

by my own road

friend

hard

M.

Elie Halevy.

Thus

I find

myself
with
agreement
my
All formulas break down before the

the only true remedy is a general will for peace, a

must be cosmopolitan without ceasing to be national.

facts

will that

decisive.

to pretty complete

266

II.

SYMPOSIUM: IS THE EXISTENCE OF THE

PLATONIC EIA02 PRESUPPOSED IN THE
ANALYSIS OF EEALITY
?

By

M. JOAD,

C. E.

A. D. LINDSAY, Miss L. S. STEBBING, and

R. F. A. HOERNLE.

By

C. E.

M. JOAD.

IN discussing this question, I do not wish

what Plato meant by the

troversy as to

to raise the con-

e2So<?

or Form.

This

particular controversy belongs to the history of philosophy,

although
questions,

it

it

and

many interesting and important

does not necessarily raise the question which I

doubtless raises

namely, whether in the analysis of Reality we are

driven to assume that the existence of something very like

want

to ask,

Plato's Forms or universals is presupposed in our reasoning

about the phenomena we experience.
(1) Before I can proceed to answer this question, it will be

desirable to say a few words, in order to describe

what

mean

by a Form, provided that by doing so I can keep clear of the

further question of whether what I

mean

is

what

necessarily

Plato meant.

The kind
Form,

is

of entity I

that

wish to describe, when I use the word

which Professor Taylor

establish as the true

The Forms are

meaning

has endeavoured to

of the Platonic universal.

self-subsistent entities,

known by mind, but

not by the senses, and they constitute the pattern or model

which God used in creating the sensible world. They form, says
"
a supraphysical world of entities
and
Professor Taylor,
.

which are the objects with

these unchanging entities
which the definitions and universal truths of exact science are

it is

concerned."

The important thing

for

my

present purpose

is to

point out

THE PLATONIC

Forms are

that the

"in the soul."

in

no sense mental

They

They

are not

are the objects of thought and

know-

ledge, but they are not knowledge.

notion of the

human mind

(Lotze), nor

"

trace of the

mental

"

entities.

They are not

(Lutoslawski), nor

mystical essences
in.

267

EIAO2.

"

"

"

a kind of

valid truths

(Plotinus), nor have they

their constitution.

They are,

"

any

in Professor

Adam's words, " single, independent, separate, self-existing,

perfect, and eternal essences forming the objective correlate of
our general notions."

Not only

are the forms non-mental, but they are separate,

The
from their particulars and from one another.
importance of these two characteristics will be brought out
when we come to consider the nature of other entities, which
botli

have been put forward by philosophers as alternatives to Plato's

forms.

Now
in

be urged that Plato himself wavered

between
different conceptions of the
Dialogues
the Forms, there can, I think, be no doubt that as a
it

although

may

different

nature of

general rule he intended to signify, by the use of the word

Whether he
eZSo?, an entity such as that I have described.
did do so or not cannot be discussed any further here, nor can
I discuss the

vexed question

of the relation

and the various particulars in which

desire to do

it

is

between the Form

manifest: what I

to establish the fact that the particular con-

is

ception which I have indicated

is

necessarily involved in our

analysis of reality.
(2) I think that one of the simplest

the fact of their being

Forms

is

ways of establishing
the
by
process of elimination.

Let us consider such an object as a beautiful picture.

If
ourselves the question wherein the beauty of the picture

we ask

resides, I think that three

(a) That
(b) That

That

mind

possible.

it is

in the

it is

a relation between the

and the
(c)

answers are

it is

of the beholder.

picture.

in the picture.

mind

of the beholder

268

C.

(a) This

conclusion

is

M. JOAD.
repellent on

sufficiently

aesthetic

It can only lead to the establishment of a criterion

grounds.

which makes

of art,

E.

aesthetic value

work

intrinsic qualities of a

dependent not upon the

of art, but

upon the

effect pro-

duced by that work upon the minds of those who behold it.
If value is to be assessed solely in terms of quantum of appreciation,

we

are driven with Tolstoy to regard the greatest

which

of art as that

appreciated by most people

is

work

while for

the purpose of comparing the value of different works, we can

What are
only resort to the expedient of counting heads.
be
to
the
would
works
come
greatest
generally acknowledged
sadly according to this

off

by numbers

alone,

criterion,

infallibly

taste, counting
Ethel M. Dell to

public

preferring

Shakespeare.

The view that the opinion which is to form the standard of

value should not be assessed in terms of quantity only, but
that

we should

establish a standard of qualitative appreciation

by having recourse for our criterion to the consensus of opinion

experts fails to deliver us from the subjectivist impasse,

among
owing

both of distinguishing any agreed con-

to the difficulty

sensus,

and

count.

on this view we put the question,

If,
do we know that the Meistersinger is better than the

"

How

of agreeing as to the experts

whose opinion

is

to

for instance,

Merry Widow Waltz

"
?

the answer will be.

"

Because of the

If we ask,
opinion of the experts who unanimously prefer
"
Who are the experts whose judgment is to set the standard,"
"
You may know them from the
the only answer appears to be,
it."

fact that they

Merry Widow

unanimously prefer the Meistersinger to the

Waltz."

theory being repellent on aesthetic

not, however, a sufficient reason for discarding it.

The circumstance
grounds

is

A more important
me

of a

objection to this view, however, seems to

between the knowing

In this, as in all other

to lie in the confusion that it implies

subject and the object of knowledge.

philosophical

discussions,

the

strength

of

one's

arguments

269

THE PLATONIC EIAO2

I

depends ultimately upon the validity of one's own conception

fundamental things. In this way every philosophical

of certain

argument begs the question

in the sense that its validity pre-

supposes the truth of the philosophical position it endeavours

It is best, therefore, that I should at once state

to support.

dogmatically, since I have not space

to

defend the position

me

the possibility of my being able to know a

thing depends upon there being a thing for me to know, which
is something other than my knowing it.
here, that for

Thus

make

a distinction between the fact that two plus

my knowledge of the fact, on the ground

two makes four and

that
it

it is

that I

only because the fact is different from my knowing

am in fact able to know it. On similar grounds I

make

a distinction between the beauty of a picture and my

appreciation of that beauty, the former being an external
concrete fact which subsists independently of myself: the

mental occurrence which only happens because

I maintain that the two facts are fundamentally

latter a

I exist.
distinct,

only by regarding them as indistinguishable,

which means, in the long run, the same thing as identical, that

and that

it is

it

is

possible to assert that the beauty of the picture

mind

of the beholder.

mind, but

it is

The appreciation

only there because the beauty

If a beautiful picture

identical, I

am

of the

and

my

unable to conceive

beauty

it

in the

in the

is not.

appreciation of

how

is
is

it

are really

came about that they

were ever supposed to be different; admitting for a moment

that the difference is an illusive appearance only, it is impossible to

understand how out of perfect unity even the appear-

ance of difference can be generated.

(b)

The view that the beauty of the picture consists in a

between the mind and the picture, appears to me not

relation

only to be tainted with the subjectivism which attaches to the

former view, but to rest upon a similar confusion between

known

object

and knowing

subject.

Let us suppose that an admittedly beautiful picture, the

Y

270

C.

M. JO AD.

E.

Hound Madonna let us say, is being contemplated by x people

and let the amount of beauty which results from the number of
;

x people be termed y.
If the number of
is
increased
x
to
the
+
a,
contemplating people
beauty of the
relationships with the

will

picture

presumably

increase

proportionately

to

the

number of relationships and become y + 5. The value

or beauty of a picture therefore, instead of being constant as is

increased

commonly supposed, varies continually on this view, according

to the number of people who happen to be looking at it or
thinking of it.
Let us suppose further that the Eound Madonna
contemplated by the last intelligence in the universe
;

assert that

it

is

still

is

being

we may

beautiful because the necessary relation-

Let us then suppose that the last intelligence is

Is any modification made in the qualities

ship exists.

suddenly abolished.
of the picture

cannot see that

it is.

cannot see that the

picture has undergone any change in any of its properties,

save in the one respect that it has ceased to possess the

by intelligence. Its form,

and conception remain unchanged. Yet if

property of being contemplated

colour, grouping,
this

view

correct

is

the

fact

that the

relationship

of

con-

templation no longer exists means that the picture is no

This view is correct only if we assume that
longer beautiful
!

where

as

so

C,

is

a relation between

that by

abolishing

altered the qualities of C.

and

B we

Only

C,

is

really the

same

have at the same time

therefore on the assumption

contemplation of a beautiful picture is the same

thing as the beautiful picture contemplated, can we hold that

that the

beauty resides in the relationship between knowing mind and

known object and not in the object.
(c)

As

this

conclude that

assumption seems to me to be incorrect, I

are thrown back upon the third alternative,

we

namely, that the beauty is somehow an intrinsic quality of the

picture, that it is not therefore dependent for its existence

upon any mind or

collection of minds,

and that the picture

THE PLATONIC
would

be beautiful even

still

271

EIAO2.

if all

mind were eliminated from

the universe.

We may

What

Plato.

by

now have
is

recourse to the train of reasoning used

common

the

quality in virtue of which

both a sunset and a picture beautiful

call

that

common

Do you

all

by adding together
and saying that there

quality

objects in the universe,

outside or beyond their

the

common

partake
it

is

is

it

is

get at

the beautiful
is

no beauty

not rather true that

nature of which both the picture and the sunset

something outside and beyond them both, and that

and in

common

fact are, beautiful

nature that

we

quite simply, and not

is

Or

only in virtue of their participation in

called,

it

sum

we

of

And

are thinking

any

it

further,

that they are

is it

when we think

not of this
of

particular beautiful object

beauty
?
For

thought about beauty is a thought about

a thought about something which is other

clear that a

something. It is
than the thinking

it,

because

if

it

were a thought about

If beauty were nothing,

nothing it would have no meaning.

then when I think about beauty, I should think about nothing,
and there would be no difference between thinking about

beauty and not

difference, which
I

am

thinking

thinking
is

of

due

at

all.

But there

clearly

to the fact that in thinking of

something.

What

is

is

beauty

the nature of

that

something ?
(3) In answering this question I propose again to adopt
the method of elimination

to consider, that

is,

two alternative

views on this subject which are commonly entertained, of

which the

first is regarded
as rendering the existence of
Platonic universals as superfluous, while the second is sup-

posed to convict them of being erroneous.

(a) The first view is that commonly advocated by psychologists who regard the position which I have assigned to the
/[Srj as being adequately filled by concepts, which are subjective
mental creations, explained as being the " import of a percept in relation to systems which interest the perceiver."

T 2

272

C.

M. JOAD.

E.

Psychologists expressly warn us against the reification of such

concepts; i.e., the ascription to them of substantive existence

own

in their

What
It

from mind.

right apart

does this line of

argument involve

who

begins with Berkeley

denies

the

existence

abstract ideas, insisting that a thought of triangle

of

some one particular

is

of

a thought

we have known, while an

triangle

abstract thought of motion

is

impossible.

Modern psychologists have somewhat modified Berkeley's

Semon for example believes that we do have abstract
notion.
ideas which are formed somewhat as follows
First we have a generalized idea or image, which is not of
:

thing, but

any one
similar

is

The

things.

a vague reproduction of a

first

whiteness, beauty or triangle,

number

different

of

an abstract

stage to
is

number

idea,

e.g.,

of
of

a kind of blurred picture of a

of

impressions

different

instances

of

whiteness or beauty, which presents only the salient features

This generalized image forms
of these different particulars.
the basis of an abstract idea. What is needed in addition to

complete an abstract idea

concrete instances
additional

idea

abstract

of

content,
or

is

the generalized image.

therefore,

concept,

impressions of particulars,

some one

a definite image of some one of the

it

is

possible

by combining a

to

Without any
arrive at an

series

of

vague
with a definite fixed impression of

of the particulars.

may be vague and general

abstract ideas, which
general
general.
Vague
we possess in large numbers, are according to Ribot, turned
into definite general abstract ideas, by the addition of a parThese concepts or abstract ideas

or definite

and

ticular belief or

The

judgment as

complete

analysed into

to the object of the idea.

psychological

concept

therefore

may

be

(2)

A vague generalized image of a collection of particulars.

A definite image of some one of the particulars.

(3)

An

(1)

accompanying judgment or

belief as to the object of

THE PLATONIC

273

EIAO2.

the general abstract idea formed by the combination of (I)

and

(2).

Now

I am not prepared to
both
that we do have such
dispute.
probable
abstract ideas or concepts, and that they are formed in the way
described but the admission of their existence and the analysis
this

It

is

analysis

seems to

one which

me

ground

me

any more
indeexist
which
have objects
them and are different from them, than the fact

seem

of their constitution does not

to

to afford

for doubting that they

pendently of

we obtain a series of sense impressions from contact with

a table affords a ground for doubting that there is a table.
I wish to emphasize this point because the triumphant

that

by the psychologists of the mentally formed

often regarded as in some unexplained way doing

establishment

concept is
away with the necessity for anything so unpleasantly metaBut unless
physical and transcendent as a Platonic universal.

we

are to destroy the distinction between

mind and

which I have already referred as an article of

so far from rendering the other superfluous,
to

its object,

faith,
is

the one

necessarily

the concept being the mental correlate of the

universal, that by means of which the mind knows the
required by

it,

as

universal, just

the

which mind knows the

senses are the

medium by means

of

particular.

have not space to deal with what appears to me to be

the other chief alternative view to the theory I am advocating,
(&) I

the Hegelian view of concrete universals.

These

differ

from Plato's

eiSvj

in

two important respects

they are mental and they are not separate.

There is in fact only one true type of the concrete universal,

namely, self-consciousness, and as this, being partial, is not

truly real, we are left with only one universal, namely, the

Absolute

itself.

we

But

if

we adopt

the

methods

of

Hegelian

assume
compelled
that this view of reality is no more true than its opposite,
being itself tainted with the same element of partiality and
dialectic,

are

entitled,

or

rather

to

274

A.

D.

LINDSAY.

fragmentariness, which it uses to discredit rival theses of the

constitution of the universe.

The

field is therefore left

open for other theories which do

not in establishing themselves imply their own refutation and

I submit that the view which I have sketched above is open to
;

less objection

from the point

of

view

of a priori logic,

than

most a priori theories which seek to prove by reasoning what

the nature of the universe

II.

must

By

be.

A. D. LINDSAY.

I FIND myself in such fundamental disagreement with almost

if I were to take up every
makes
on
of
he
pain
point
being supposed to agree with what I
do not challenge, this paper would be interminably long. I
must content myself, therefore, with a statement of certain

everything in Mr. Joad's paper that,

he has taken up, in the hope that

Miss Stebbing, in dealing with these, will make the position of
the defenders of the thesis rather more precise, and I shall leave
difficulties in the position

it to

Professor Hoernle to develop a positive alternative.

Some

of

Mr. Joad's arguments

for the

Forms

are based on

the inadequacy of alternative positions. I should not accept

either his statement or his criticism of these positions, but I

could not elaborate

my

reasons for dissent without encroaching

on the part I have proposed to leave to Professor Roomie".

I shall follow Mr. Joad in assuming that we are not concerned with the correctness of his or other people's exegesis of

and I shall not pursue the tempting path of

whether
Plato himself in the Parmenides has not
asking
knocked the bottom out of the position which Mr. Joad is
Plato's doctrines,

defending.
describe

He

has defined the kind of entity he wishes to

uses the word Form, and I shall accept his
I note only that, in the sentence he quotes from

when he

definition.

Mr. Adam, the words

"

"

perfect

and

"

eternal

"

occur,

and that

THE PLATONIC
in his exposition

forms.

It

he says nothing of these characteristics of the

omit a discussion of the

will be fairer, therefore, to

difficulties, especially in

the ascription of

They

are

275

EIAO2.

regard to the reality of change, which

to the forms applies.

these characteristics

after

all

sufficiently

discussed

in

Plato's

later

dialogues.

Mr. Joad's thesis then

dent,

separate,

"
that there are
single, indepen-

is

essences

self-existing

correlate of our general notions";

forming the objective

that these are

mind and not by the senses; that they

known by

are non-mental; and

that they are separate both from their particulars and from one
another.

Before discussing this thesis, I must say something of the

general position Mr. Joad takes up when he says
that every philosophical argument begs the question in the

much more
sense that
position

it

validity presupposes the truth of the philosophical

endeavours to support. If this is really so, I cannot

its

see the purpose of arguing.

If,

after a little desultory sniping

from hastily made trenches which we do not mind abandoning,

and in which we cannot be really hurt, we are going each to
retire to the

impregnable security of the dug-out of prejudice,

I should prefer to avoid the

I

am

mud and

prepared, with Mr. Joad, to

possibility of

my

being able to

me

"

stay in the dug-out.

beg the question

"

But

that the

know a thing depends upon

there

know, which is something other than

my knowing it," so long as Mr. Joad is prepared not to beg the
question, but to argue whether his particular thesis follows from

being a thing for

to

his presupposition.
I

cannot

see,

supposition, either

however,

how

it

follows

(1) that the fact that

from Mr. Joad's

we know a

thing
proves that that thing is non-mental or (2) that the fact that
we use general notions in judgments implies that these general
"
notions have objects which exist independently of them and
;

are different from them."

The

first

point

is

surely simple.

If the fact that

what

276

D.

A.

know

is

not

my

knowing

it,

LINDSAY.

"

aware

how

of,"

reflecting on," or

the term "mental" can

mental will share the fate

then

falls to

that I

know

we know

implies that what

mental, then clearly we cannot

Mr. Joad uses the term " know

know what
"

in the wide sense of

"

discussing,"

"

it is difficult

mean anything

non-

is

mental, and as

is

at

all,

being
to see

and non-

The discussion

of its correlative.

the ground. I do not want to argue that the fact

a thing proves that it is mental (that seems to me

an alternative as its opposite), but simply that these

wide generalizations on the nature of knowledge, be they
idealist or realist, do not carry us any further.
For of three
as silly

things, (1) either the general notion

"

mental

"

is unmeaning,
and then there are general notions, which unsuspectedly turn
out to be unmeaning, and therefore have not a form as objective

counterpart; or (2)

what

we have not knowledge but something

else

mental, and then the general presupposition about

knowledge will riot show that all general notions have a form

of

is

as objective counterpart,

and we

shall

have

to ask

if

we know

general notions or their counterpart at all or (3), and this is

surely the right alternative, the distinction between mental and
;

non-mental

The

falls

within knowledge.

fatal result, as it appears to

me, of arguing from this

general presupposition, as Mr. Joad does

between subjective and

is

objective, illusion

that

and

all distinction

fact,

vanishes.

Mr. Joad chooses the example of beauty. The example is not

an easy one for him, as he is doubtless aware. If he can prove
his general contention in regard to beauty, he may well consider that

The

most

of his

facts with

work

is

done.

which we must

all start

are surely that in

contemplating certain objects we experience a certain

tinctive pleasure or emotion,

pleasure or emotion that

which we experience
call

we

and that

it is

dis-

in virtue of this

call the objects, in

contemplating

some such way as we

a coat or a chair comfortable, but with a difference.
The

difference

is

it,

beautiful, in

that whereas

if

a chair feels

comfortable,

it

is

THE PLATONIC
comfortable, and that

means

we

"

is all

feels comfortable,"

recognize that

it,

"

because

is

comfortable

to

have

is this

"

while in our appreciation of beauty

we may be wrong, may have aesthetic

where we ought not

How
ought to.
be explained ?

about

277

EIAO2.

it,

and may not have

it

pleasure

where we

objectivity of aesthetic experience to

cannot be explained so long as we

hold that the beauty of the picture consists in any relation
I cannot accept his
between the picture and ourselves.

Mr. Joad argues that

it

It seems to me an extraordinary doctrine that

argument.
there can be no kind of standard in ourselves, that we cannot

distinguish

between lower and higher

states

of

ourselves,

between the vulgar and the fine mind, in ourselves and in

I do not, however, press this point, because it
other people.
is the next stage in Mr. Joad's argument to which I wish

might criticize his positive answer to

the aesthetic question and ask how the assumption of an
independent beauty explains why some aesthetic appreciation
is right and some wrong, unless it can show that when I
to

call attention.

appreciate the Meistersinger I have seen beauty in itself, and

am comparing the Meistersinger with that standard, but when
I

appreciate the

Merry Widow

am

.not

making any such

We

need not, however, go into such questions

because Mr. Joad himself gives up the question of aesthetic
He says that " the circumstance of a theory
objectivity.
comparison.

being repellent on aesthetic grounds is not, however, a sufficient

reason for discarding it." I think myself that it is, but that
Mr. Joad's argument is that
is for the moment no matter.
"

the appreciation of the beauty

there because
picture

would

the

is in

the mind, but

and that

is

not,"
beauty
still
be beautiful even

eliminated from the universe."

Now

this

if

is

it

only

therefore

all

the

mind were

argument

is

based

on the mere fact of the appreciation of beauty, and will apply

to the appreciations of all the people who. prefer the

Widow and

Merry

the novels of Miss Ethel Dell to the Meistersinger

278

A.

D.

LINDSAY.

and Shakespeare.

Their appreciations of the beauty of these

"
would
inferior productions would seem to involve that these

be beautiful even

still

if

all

mind were eliminated from

the

universe," though both Mr. Joad and I agree that they are not
beautiful at all.
Further this principle is not confined, and
is
it

not meant by Mr. Joad to be confined, to aesthetic judgments

But if the fact that we make
applies to all judgments.

a judgment implies that not only what

we judge about

but also what

it,

we

are judging about,

exist independently of us,

judgments are right, and that is surely repellent not

only on aesthetic but on logical grounds.
The same point may be made of a later part of Mr. Joad's
then

all

where he accepts the

paper,

formation of

general

considerations

may

his

acceptance no

psychological

in

account of the

which subjective

process
obviously play a large part, but finds in
ground for doubting that such general

"

have objects which exist independently of them and

different from them."
Then the fact that men have had

ideas
are

ideas,

the general idea of phlogiston proves that there

counterpart of that idea existing

is

independently

an objective
us and of

of

other general ideas, and the same holds of all general terms
which are the expression of men's erroneous beliefs.
If all

mental operations are nothing but awareness

entities existing

tinction between

between true and

of

non-mental

independently of us, then not only the dismental and non-mental, but the distinction
false, is

unmeaning.

The fact that we use general terms such as phlogiston

which are afterwards discredited, shows that, if there are
"

forms

"

in the

sense defined by Mr. Joad, they cannot be

the objective of all our general notions, and that,

the theory, we
"
these forms ?

knowledge and the existence

because it proves too much.
fruitful

way

of

if

we

accept

must go on with Plato and ask, " Of what are

The general argument from the nature of
of

general notions will not do,

Another and perhaps a more

putting the same point is to say that the

THE PLATONIC

279

EIAO2.

general argument from the nature of knowledge is based on

the nature of awareness, and that its application to general
notions assumes that we are aware of them, or rather of their
counterparts, in

the same

way

as

we

are aware of objects.

"
Horse I see, but horseness
whole question
I cannot see."
We cannot discuss the implications of the
existence of general notions, if we omit the fact that they

But

this is the

are used in judgment, and fail to realize that the question

not what

we

are aware

of,

but what we mean.

This

is

the

is

answer to the point which Mr. Joad makes when he begins

beauty to beautiful objects.
It is clear that a thought about beauty is a thought about
It is a thought about something which is other
something.
than thinking it, because if it were a thought about nothing
his consideration of the relation of

"

would have no meaning.

If beauty were nothing, then

about beauty, I should think about nothing,
and there would be no difference between thinking about
The answer is that when
beauty and not thinking at all."

it

when

am

I think

am

thinking about beauty, I

thinking about

my

aesthetic

experience which I have expressed in judgments that this or

that is beautiful.
There is no such thing as phlogiston, but
I can think about
of

letters,

phlogiston.

but has a meaning, but

erroneous judgment about the

We
there

It is not just a collocation

its

meaning implies an

facts.

need not, however, in criticizing the doctrine that

"

are single, independent, separate, self -existing, essences

forming the objective correlate of our general notions," confine
ourselves to general notions

in

which an

error

Plato in the Parmenides asks whether there

is

is

"

implied.

form

"

of

He

gives no precise answer to the question himself, but

must not we make some such answer as implied in the remark
dirt.

"

"

If we take the
matter in the wrong place ?
"
"
various things which we call dirt and ask why we apply that
name to them, our answer must include the fact that we find

that

them

dirt is

disagreeable, that they are in the

wrong place

for

our

280

A. D.

LINDSAY.

If we eliminate our purposes, or at least our finding

the things disagreeable, then the various things which are united
under the term dirt, will be separated off according, say, to their
chemical constituents, and the term dirt will have no meaning.

purposes.

Of course, when we discuss beaut} or phlogiston, or dirt, as

distinguished from a beautiful picture, or a hot bath, or a dirty
7

face,

we

are aware of something which

awareness of

but that something

it,

is

may

independent of our
simply be the word,

a noise or marks on paper, but what we are aware of and

what these words mean are not the same. Mr. Joad talks

i.e.,

about objective correlates of our general notions. But if he

can talk about general notions as he does, are they not,
on his own showing, objective in his sense already ? Why,
then, should they have a counterpart.
as anything else

Why

should

it

my

have

a double

word

is

as objective

does not change it.

Not because
objectivity ?

hearing or seeing

it

the object of knowledge is independent of the knower, but

because it has a meaning. That meaning must have been

given to it, and the giving implies judgments, beliefs and

intentions which may be wrong.
I have been attacking the doctrine that all general notions
have forms as objective counterparts. It might be expected
that I should go on to examine a limited form of the thesis, and

ask whether there are any general notions of such a kind that
they have forms as counterparts. Clearly it is possible to hold

much
that, if we

that while

not

so,

we sometimes

"

classification is arbitrary or pragmatic, all is

often divide reality according to our purposes,

carve

it

at the joints."

The arguments which

have been advanced from the existence

of

subjective

discredited general notions will in that case not apply.

purpose
think,

if

of

and

The

the discussion will, however, be better served, I

I stop here, for the essence of

Mr. Joad's

position, as I

it, is that the mere use of a general term in judgment

form
He makes, and his
implies
corresponding to it.
him
allows
to make, no discrimination between one
argument

understand
a

THE PLATONIC

281

EIAO2.

notion and another, and it is just this failure to

discriminate which I think fatal to his position. I do not
know any argument for the existence of abstract universals

general

than

other

this

general

endeavoured to show

logical

invalid.

is

argument, which I have

no accident that

It is surely

one and the same dialogue that Plato raises the question,
"
of what are these forms ? and after criticizing the abstracted-

it is in

"

ness of the forms begins the construction of a

III.

"

PROVIDED that the words

the question raised in the

reply in the affirmative.

theory.

SUSAN STEBBING.

L.

By

new

"

the existence of
title of this

Nevertheless,

disagreement with Mr. Joad.

First, I

be deleted from

symposium,
I

am

I should

in considerable

do not consider that

the rejection of the two theories that he rejects constitutes

any proof of the positive thesis that in the analysis of Eeality

we

find

certain entities

non-existent,

and

which are non-mental, non-physical,

self-subsistent.

Adam's phraseology

Professor

Secondly, I should not use

in describing the

Platonic

etSrj

just because he includes the adjectives "eternal" and "perfect"

as

which,

Mr. Lindsay points

To

omits to consider.

agreement with

My

out,

Mr.

Joad conveniently

this I shall return.

Mr. Joad

is,

then, limited

assertion of the positive thesis stated above.

I shall,

to

the

however,

neglect minor points of difference, because in the short space

at

my

disposal, I

further

want

difficulties

and

to
to

attempt to reply to Mr. Lindsay's

indicate

briefly

the

reasons

for

asserting the thesis.

Mr.

Lindsay suggests that I should answer certain

I will
that Mr. Joad's paper has raised.
attempt

difficulties

to

do

so.

(1)

The

non-mental.

fact that

we know

Certainly

a thing does not prove it to be

that we may know mental

agree

282

L.

entities,

object of

STEB3ING.

S.

but the act by which an object is known is never the

This seems to me not an article of
any knowing act.

an analysis of thought, which requires emphasis only

some philosophers have failed to recognize the

faith but

because

simply assuming that the object is necessarily

All that I desire to assert
because
the act is mental.
mental,
distinction,

is

that no conclusion

from the

as

to

the status of an entity follows

fact that a given entity is the object of a

mental

act.

This being so, the burden of proof surely rests on those that
assert that universals are mental: prima facie they are not.

There

a possible interpretation of this statement in

which I should hold that it is true, but not in the precise form
(2)

in

which

he

gives.

is

asserted by Mr. Joad, nor for the reasons which

There are phrases in common use among philosowhich possibly no eZSos corresponds for example

it is

phers to

no eZSo? corresponding to the word "round-square,"

"
"
"
"
or
mental correlate
but, then, there is no
general notion
here there is the apprehension of a shape or noise, which is

there

is

a case of perception

he

no universal

is

concerned at

all.

Mr. Lindsay makes it a main criticism of Mr. Joad that

cannot discriminate between one general notion and

another, and that, therefore, the distinction between truth and

error,

and

illusion

what Mr. Lindsay

vanishes.

reality,

calls the

"

But even

unlimited thesis

"

if

we hold

that all general

notions imply objective counterparts, this criticism does not

seem to me valid, for it might well be that the elBrj must
themselves be discriminated and that the object of a true

which distinguish it from the

object
judgment, which characteristics are independent of their being known, and which may fail to be
Indeed it seems to me that this must be the
discriminated.

judgment has
of

characteristics

false

and that just because we do make erroneous judgments

follows that the fact that an object is known does not

case,
it

imply that it
What we need

is
is

real

(or

surely a

the

object

of

a true judgment).
of the

more careful examination

THE PLATONIC

283

EIAO2.

This is outside the scope of the

but
the
present discussion,
validity of Mr. Lindsay's criticism
rests upon the arbitrary assumption that such an examination
types of objects involved.

could yield no satisfactory result.

to

pursue

An
does
"

answer to the question we are considering

however, involve the assertion of Mr. Lindsay's

not,

as he seems to admit, some general

if,

"

notions have

forms as counterparts," then an analysis of

This is the
presupposes the Platonic universal.

reality

and

position I desire to maintain

If

me

affirmative

unlimited thesis," for

some

Space does not permit

this further.

which

for

wish to

offer

positive grounds.

we

such universals as red,

consider the nature of

just,

two, number, square, change, three alternatives seem possible:

(i) that they are mental
(ii) that they are physical
(iii) that
;

they are non-mental, non-physical entities, capable of being

known by a non-sensuous activity of mind, possible objects of
mental acts of knowing, but nevertheless independent of those

In other words, universals are ciSy or forms regarded

acts.

as non-mental self-subsisting entities.

Mr. Lindsay
accepts

rejects

(ii)

and

Some philosophers

(i).

(iii)

am

not sure

certainly do accept

it,

if

and

he
it

this that is to be primarily rejected in using the Platonic

is

term

eZSo?, or

the term

in the sense that

which

I personally prefer

universal

Mr. Eussell has made familiar.

Mr. Lindsay says that the distinction between mental and

non-mental falls within knowledge.
I am not sure what he

means by
"

he takes non-mental to be equivalent to

non-object-of-knowledge," then, of course, it does; but no one

has

this.

disputed

If

this.

If,

however, he means by non-mental

which is neither mind, nor quality

everything in the universe

or characteristic of a mental act, then surely

by

definition it

knowledge. Mr. Lindsay himself points out that

there are mental activities besides knowledge, and he has thus,

falls outside

it

seems to me, destroyed his own assertion.

284

L.

STEBBING.

S.

do not think that either Mr. Lindsay or Professor Hoernle is

likely to support the second alternative which I also reject.
I

I shall

then pass to the consideration of the third, which

That

alternative that I accept.

is,

is

the

that there are entities in the

universe other than mental entities and these entities are other

than physical entities. It will, I think, be admitted that there

is at least one property which characterizes certain entities in
virtue of which property these entities are called mental

and

there is at least one property which characterizes other

entities in virtue of which property these entities are called
physical.

There are also

think other entities that are charac-

by mental nor by physical properties, and these

what I mean by Platonic ei'Sr; or universals. I

terized neither
entities are

admit that I cannot point to the characteristic in each case on

account of which the one class of entities is described as mental

and the other as physical, but we all do use these terms as

though we thought that some sort of meaning attaches to them.
In the brief space at

my

disposal I can only say that both

mental and physical seem to

processes only,

i.e.,

me

characteristics of acts or time-

Thus

of events.

all these entities

events are either mental or physical

between mental and physical

within the temporal sphere

is

which are

hence the distinction

a distinction that falls wholly

timeless entities (that

is entities

having no position in time), are thus by definition neither mental

nor physical. The problem then is are there any such entities ?
It seems to me that it is these entities, possible objects of
:

mental acts

of thinking, that
"
"

The number
teristic

is

if

by

"

not itself a couple but

universals.

it is

a charac-

two things can be seen but twoness

similar remark applies to such a universal

of all couples

cannot be seen.
as horse,

two

we properly mean by

horse

"

we mean

characterize all horses.

the complex of properties which

There are universals the instances of

which may themselves be universals,

e.g.,

colour

is

a universal

having as its instances such universals as red, blue, and so on.

in each case the universal is not an object that can be

But

THE PLATONIC

285

EIAO2.

it is the object of a mental act but it is not apprehended

through the medium of the sense organs. Mr. Lindsay appears
"
to neglect this when he argues
Horse I see, but horseness I

sensed

cannot

see."

true, then

and

"

But

see

"

"

perceive by means

we could not

course

of

this is just the point, for

means

see

if

the statement

is

of the visual organs,"

horseness unless

it

were a

by sense qualities. But to

we
could
Mr.
keep
Lindsay's example,
apprehend horseness or,
to take an easier example, we do apprehend red we are not
confined to the apprehension of particular red things.
In this
particular existent characterized

"

"
red
no visual organ is conapprehension of the universal
cerned even to suppose that there is seems absurd, and leads
;

directly to the

"

third

man

"

difficulty.

In this connexion Mr. Joad makes an assertion that I

wholly unable to accept.

He

"

says,

between mind and

the distinction

unless

we

its object

am

are to destroy

....

the one

(the mentally formed concept) so far from rendering the other

necessarily required by it, the
concept being the mental correlate of the universal, that by

(the universal) superfluous,

is

which the mind knows the universal, just as the senses

are the medium by means of which the mind knows the

means

of

There seems to me not the remotest degree of

here
between the function of the sense organs in
parallelism
becoming aware of particular existents, and the function of
particular."

the psychological concept in the apprehension of the universal.

Mr. Joad's account surely makes the concept a tertium quid

between the mental act and the universal which

It

non-

is

moreover, this insistence upon

sensuously apprehended.
the correlation of the concept with the universal, and the
appears to justify,
parallel with sense knowledge, that
is,

on the one hand, Mr. Lindsay's criticism that there is no way of

distinguishing between a concept that corresponds to a real
object

and one that does

assumption that
in the

not,

and on the other hand, Mr. Joad's

we

same way

are aware of the counterparts of our concepts

as we are aware of sense-objects.
z

286

L.

S.

STEBBING.

opinion the whole case for the separate being of the

is not apprehended in any mode parallel to the apprehension of a particular
In

my

universal rests upon the fact that a universal

through the medium of sense, and yet that it is apprehended

as an entity distinct from the act of apprehension itself.
Mr. Joad has chosen to discuss only the universal beauty,

and in

doing he has raised questions that lie outside the

scope of our problem. Hence, I can only say here that I am
in complete disagreement with most of what he has said about
it.

to

so

Much of
me quite
shall

Mr. Lindsay's criticism of Mr. Joad here seems

main thesis, and consequently

Their preoccupation with such a

irrelevant to the

not discuss

complex universal

it.

as

beauty

arises,

think, from the fact

regard the Platonic eZSo? with undue reverence.

Thus Mr. Joad accuses his subjectivist opponents of being
that both

anxious

do

to

away with

"

the necessity

of

anything

so

unpleasantly metaphysical and transcendent as a Platonic

universal."
This whole mode of speech, and the attitude

from which

it

springs, is in

my

opinion mistaken.

we may have immutable, eternal,

contemplation, that we admit the reality of

It is

not

in order that

perfect objects

of

the universal

we

are forced

to

admit their reality because in attempting

an inventory of the entities in the universe we find

The contemplation of these
that we cannot leave them out.

to give

entities

give us the extreme satisfaction that Mr. Kussell

does, but it is not for this reason that we admit them.

may

says

it

If I

attempt to classify the kinds

become aware,

I find that

there

of objects of

are

which

I can

two well-distinguished

types: (1) those objects which I come to apprehend through

the sense organs, and (2) those which I cannot apprehend

But I do apprehend red, number,

and
so
on, and in apprehending red, for
beauty,

through the sense organs.

difference,

instance, I apprehend that quality, characteristic or attribute

common
What we mean by
which

is

That is a universal.
red things.
saying that anything is red is that it is-

to

all

THE PLATONIC
characterized by the adjective red,

universal red of which

participation

needs

it is

287

EIAOS.

it

i.e.,

an instance.

participates in the

The nature

discussion, but

further

it

of this

not

is

the

All that I am concerned to assert

question at issue here.
is that red as a characteristic, or universal (for these are
synonyms) is capable of being apprehended apart from the

now

existence of anything red, and that

of

the sense organs.

assert

is

it

Finally,

as

Platonic

my

"

reject

desires,

am

concerned to

only objection to describing these universals

is that to do so may seem to countenance

el'S??

both of which
Eternal

which

admitted.

Mr. Joad's inclusion

"

cannot be apprehended

is

in the sense in

of the universal

it

apprehended, i.e., by means

If tins be admitted, then the reality

same way as a red thing

in the

of the

two

adjectives, eternal

and

perfect,

should reject as being eulogistic adjectives.

"

seems to suggest " everlasting," which I desire to

"
seems to imply something that satisfies our
perfect

hence implies value.

element of emotion that

objections to Plato's

it

The intrusion
indicates,

seem

of value,

to

me

and the

the main

eiBrj.

Personally, I doubt whether Plato would accept the emasculated universal that I would substitute for his el&os.

IV.

FOR

By

various reasons,

E. F.

my

symposium on universals

ALFRED HOERNLE".

position

as

fourth

member

of

this

more than usually embarrassing.

our problem is not the one which I would have
is

The wording of
chosen and now that the papers of my fellow-symposiasts are
before me, I find that Mr. Joad and Miss
Stebbing have given
to the discussion a direction so different from the one in which
;

thinking on universals moves, that I hardly know whether

can say anything which they will think relevant. On the
other hand, I find that Mr. Lindsay proposes a division of work

my
I

z 2

288

R.

F.

HOERNL^.

A.

between himself and myself, of which I learn only through his

it is not unfair to
paper, and which
say throws the heavier
part of the burden on me. However, I shall do my best to play
the part assigned to me, though my performance must, in the
circumstances, be something of a tour deforce.

A.

Miss Stebbing having re-stated Mr. Joad's thesis in a more

some comments on her position.

restricted form, I will begin with

Our problem,

as I understand

it, is

to determine

whether a

analysis
reality requires us to acknowledge the
subsistence of universals realistically conceived.
For Miss
of

correct

Stebbing, to analyse reality means to "give an inventory of

the entities in the universe," to " attempt to classify the kinds
of objects of which I can
her, a universe

become aware."

The

result

is,

comprising only three kinds of entities,

(1) physical entities, (2)

mental

are neither physical nor mental.

entities, (3) universals,

for

viz.,

which

Physical and mental entities

are further grouped together as events, and thus as temporal,

"
whereas universals are timeless. Of the " self-subsistence of

which is their one positive attribute in the opening

Miss Stebbing's paper, I can find no further mention,
unless the obiter dictum that red is capable of being appreuniversals,

passage of

hended apart from the existence of any red thing, is intended

So far, then, the principium divisionis in
to bear on the point.
the inventory of entities appears to be time. Particulars which
exist in time, and are either physical or mental, stand over

which subsist timelessly.

Yet presently
Miss Stebbing goes on to offer a fresh inventory, based on our
manner of apprehending objects, which may be either " through
against

the

universals

medium
This

is

of the sense-organs

"

or

the position which I shall

"

non-sensuous."

now attempt

to criticize.

(1) Miss Stebbing apparently regards her two inventories as

Particulars exist in time and
furnishing identical groupings.

are apprehended through the senses.

Universals are timeless

THR PLATONIC

289

EIAO2.

But is
and are apprehended by a non-sensuous mental act.
Miss Stebbing really prepared to assert that minds, which she
as

classes

particulars,

perceived by the senses

are

she quite sure that even every

perceptible by the senses, e.g., an electron

again,

is

is

not

"

"

what

for her,

is

it ?

physical
used to be described as imperceptible.

"
?

Or,

"
is
physical entity
Or, if an electron

Even the old atom

It

would not mend

Miss Stebbing's case to say that the fault lies with our sense
a conorgans, for, apart from the obvious answers to such
tention,
of

we must hold Miss Stebbing

classifying

of

entities

all

according to the

manner

strictly to

her enterprise

which we are actually aware,

of our

Now

awareness of them.

she must, I think, say that we are aware

She

of electrons.

Hence
will hardly claim that we perceive them by the senses.
she cannot but put them, together with minds and universals,
But
non-sensuously apprehended.
this result destroys the whole point of her scheme, and with
it what she explicitly offers as one of the strongest arguments
into the class of objects

for the recognition of self-subsistent universals.

(2) But, further, I

would

like to question the

view which

Miss Stebbing shares with Mr. Joad, that universals cannot

"
"
It is
mind."
be apprehended by
sense," but only by
to

plausible

say that,

cannot see redness.

whilst

But

we can

see

a red thing,

we

would remind Miss Stebbing and

Mr. Joad that they agree in holding the particular thing to

be red only because of its relation to the universal redness.
Whatever language they may use about this relation, they
admit that the universal

what

it is.

what

it is,

But

is

involved in the particular being

the perception of the particular as being

cannot leave out the universal. If the redness of a
if so,

red object, being a universal, is not perceived by the senses,

what is perceived by the senses ? If whatever there is of
character or quality in an object of perception is universal, and
"
if no universal is apprehended
through the medium of sense
organs,"

what

is

there left

for

the sense organs

to

do

290

R.

F.

A.

HOERNL&

would urge upon Miss Stebbing and Mr. Joad that they cannot
an intelligible account of the perception of particulars

offer

without offering also an intelligible account of the relation of

At

particular to universal.

present neither of them furnishes

theory on either of these two points, and I suggest that

their attempt to do so would soon convince them that the
a

facile

distinction

between particulars as perceived by sense

and universals as apprehended by pure thought

We

shall all agree, of course, that

we can

cannot be seen, and that

will not work.

redness, in the abstract,

think of

it

without at the

moment seeing any red thing. But these facts do not seem to
me to bear the theory of universals which Miss Stebbing and
Mr. Joad seek

For

me

to erect

upon them.

the moral of the discussion, so

an account

one, that (a) without

"

and universal such an

and Mr. Joad

offer,

analysis of reality

"

the two-fold

as Miss Stebbing

and

lacks all plausibility;

the

to

far, is

of the relation of particular

in

entities

(&)

that

the

the universe

comprised
attempt
classify
according to our manner of apprehending them is a failure.
(3) So far I have been examining the internal consistency
But I am bound now to say that
of Miss Stebbing's position.

I find myself in complete disagreement with her whole conof

ception
really

what an

startling

to

"

analysis

think

that

of

"

reality

modern

It

is

Gfegenstandslehre

is

requires.

shrinking the task of a genuine Phcenomenologie to the dimensions of

an

"

inventory of entities."

It is

more

startling still

to find that every entity is apparently to be placed in one

of the three pigeon-holes

nor-physical.
of

mental, physical, neither-mental-

cannot help wondering whether, as a student

Miss Stebbing really finds this the most

philosophy,
illuminating way of dealing with the manifold realities which
enter into her experience.
How, for example, does she fit
into her hard-and-fast
living beings
plants, animals, humans
Or what does she do with such things as a
pigeon-holes ?
One might have hoped that Kant and
state, or a church ?

THE PLATONIC

291

EIAO2.

the post-Kantian idealists had, at least, awakened us from

the Descartes-ian nightmare of making all analysis of reality
revolve round the antithesis of material and mental.

know how

to

convey to Miss Stebbing

direction of philosophical effort in her

my

I hardly

sense of the mis-

programme.

B.

In turning to Mr. Joad's paper, I gladly record

stantial agreement with Mr. Lindsay's criticisms.
wish that Mr. Joad, in framing the
and in his own paper, had omitted

title

all

of

my
I

sub-

could

our symposium,

reference to Plato's

It would have saved him from the paradox of forbidding

eiSrj.
"
us to discuss what Plato meant by Form," and yet bidding us
"
somediscuss whether we must not assume the existence of

thing very like Plato's Forms." To Mr. Lindsay's just observation that Mr. Joad omits to discuss the perfection and eternity
of

his

Forms,

Mr. Joad's
"

would add that even more remarkable

is

Forms

as

failure to enlarge

the patterns or models which

upon the function

God used

of

in creating the sensible

have thought a fuller explanation of

this point highly relevant to an analysis of reality, especially
"
from a professed apostle of " common sense in philosophy. I
world."

I,

for one, should

agree with Mr. Lindsay's point that Mr. Joad, by ignoring the
function of universals in judgment, has cut himself off from
It
distinguishing between real and unreal, fact arid illusion.
this
criticism
if
I
enforce
as
a
Mr.
Joad
to
realist,
by
may appeal

a reference to Mr. Bertrand Eussell's similar argument against

Meinong in his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* And,
finally, I

would add

logical theory of universals, I feel

Mr. Joad's attacks.

do not hold the psychono call to defend it against

that, as I personally

On

the other hand, I cannot but think that

Perhaps I may be forgiven for referring here also to

Contemporary Metaphysics, pp. 85 ff.

my

Studies in

292

R.

his brief

thing more than

But

"

"

remarks on the
"

F.

A.

HOERNLE.

concrete universal

"

suffer

from some-

lack of space."

may, perhaps, offer some observations on Mr. Joad's

realism," with which Mr. Lindsay has dealt only in passing.
I

(1) First of all, the

reminder

may

not be out of place that

not one of the well-known philosophical theories of fine art

Schopenhauer's, for example, or Hegel's raises about beauty

kind of question which Mr. Joad raises (" wherein

the beauty of the picture resides "), or attempts to answer
it by offering to beauty the choice of
three residences, viz.,
the

the beholder's mind, the picture, and a relation between the

I would suggest to Mr. Joad, what above I ventured to

two.

suggest to Miss Stebbing, that if he were not obsessed with the

notion of parcelling out the universe among the pigeon-holes
"

mental

"

"

and

non-mental,"

it

would never occur

to

him

to

ask any such question about beauty, or any other universal.

Whatever locus he may assign to beauty in accordance with his'
scheme, is he prepared to say that his answer helps him, or

anyone

else, to

as to justify,

understand better what beauty

e.g.,

own

his

is,

in such a

way

preference for the Meistersinger over

Merry Widow Waltz

?
The problem of aesthetic philosophy
concerns
this
objective standard operative in sesthetic
surely
experience and judgment, and no amount of argument about

the

the locus of beauty in mind or out of mind throws any

light on the nature of that standard, which is the genuine

Form

There

or essence of beauty.

which I agree with Mr. Joad, and

his sort of

problem at

all,

it

we should keep beauty and

"

locating beauty

in

"

is

is

only one point here on

this

is,

that

if

we

essential that in our

raise

answer

the picture together and avoid

"
"
subjective
feelings of a

the mind, as

spectator, whilst leaving the picture

"

outside

"

the

mind

as a

"

Any sane theory is bound to refuse such

physical object."
a divorce of sesthetic quality or value and aesthetic object,

but

sane

theory

will

equally

refuse

the

foolish

choice

between locating both beauty and the picture outside mind

THE PLATONIC
and locating them both
irrelevant.

They

293

EIAO2.

These antitheses are wholly

funda-

inside.

cannot but think, from a

result, I

mentally false orientation. The philosophical study of the

realm of reality which we call fine art demands a qualitative
the experience of beauty in the products of the

analysis of

typical forms of art.

....

less

Nothing

than this whole phrase,

datum, of
will
the
lead
and
inquirer into
nothing
philosophy,
notion
than
the
a blind alley more surely
that, because
"
"
has been mentioned, his first and main task is
experience
"experience

art," will describe the field, or

aesthetic

to sort out

what

(2) This

"

is

of

is,

Miss Stebbing

mental

as

from what

the

course,

too,

"

good

point

is

"

non-mental."

where Mr. Joad, and

realists will

with a

issue

join

charge of confusion of, or failure to distinguish between, the

"mental
"

act"

of

apprehension

non-mental object."

my

possibility of

there being

than

other
clusion

that

for

my knowing

as

the

being able to

a thing

to

or

appreciation

and

me

know

to

a thing

"
it

(Mr. Joad)

or

the

depends upon

which

know,

the
"

They remind us elaborately that

is

something
"
no con-

that

status of an entity follows from the fact

"
entity is the object of a mental act

the

given

(Miss Stebbing).
Personally, I find these statements, within their
corners, eminently respectable and innocuous.

own

My

is

to think

who can be

the

"

four

trouble

philosophers," vaguely referred

by Mr. Joad and Miss Stebbing, who have been recklessWill Mr. Joad and Miss Stebbing in
enough to deny them.

to

our oral discussion please oblige with chapter

and verse

Does Mr. F. H. Bradley, for example, argue anywhere that

because x is the object of a mental act, therefore x is to be
classified as

"

mental

"
?

Or does Dr. Bosanquet,

let alone

Hegel, anywhere say that we can know something without

Not even
there being anything there for us to know ?
Mr. Laird
as
kind.
With
of
the
him,
Berkeley says anything
in

Mind some

years ago pointed out, the distinction of

"

act

""

294

and

R.

"

"

object "idea" and speaks

cally denies that

knowing mind

is

it

and

"

of it as

"

And though

fundamental.

is

object

HOERNLE.

A.

F.

mode

"

he does

in the mind,"
of

mind,

i.e.,

call the

he emphati-

a state of the

least of all, of course, is it for

Berkeley

"
fact, the adjective
mental,"
knowing
as used by our realists in framing their indictment of the
The three theories,
idealist, covers a multitude of ambiguities.

the act of

In

itself.

for example, that the object exists only so long as

hended by a mind
activity

that

that

it is

it is

it is

appre-

a product of the mind's synthetic

a state of the

mind

are quite different

served by calling the
all three theories.
More-

from each other, and no purpose

"
"
object indiscriminately mental in
over, realists have not, so far as I

itself,

is

know, furnished a satisfactory

account of the part played by mental activity

and
light

bald

by judgment
by synthesis and construction in bringing to
the real nature of an object. To such an inquiry the
distinction between mental act and non-mental or

inference,

independent object makes no contribution.

And, in turn,

own
all

plausibility diminishes greatly for any mind which

alive to the problems presented by mental activity.

In general,

it

terms too cheap,

seems to
i.e.,

me

is

its

at

that Mr. Joad gets his realism on

by ignoring complications the recognition

which would, I think, shake its foundations. He proposes

"
"
the Eound Madonna to be
the experiment of
supposing
the
last
contemplated by
intelligence in the universe, and that
of

"

intelligence to be then abolished.

in the qualities of the picture

Is

any modification made

cannot see that

it is."

This,

seems to me a purely verbal argument, for everything

depends on the meaning, i.e., the theories, we connect with the
terms employed. I suggest to Mr. Joad that, if he really
I confess,

wishes to put the matter to the test, he should appeal, not to

a supposititious but to an actual experiment. This is not an
invitation to

him

to

commit

suicide in the interests of philo-

sophy. There are less fatal ways of separating one's intelligence

from an

object.

The story goes

at

Harvard

that,

on his

visit

THE PLATONIC
in 1914,

295

EIAO2.

Mr. Bertrand Russell made the experiment

of leaving

the lecture-room and inviting his class to watch whether they

could perceive any modification in the desk as a consequence of
his withdrawal.

case

the

The experiment,

withdrawal

what /

of

grant, shows that in this

makes no

another spectator

visible

But what is the relevance of this ?

The really crucial experiment would bear on the question
whether what I see is modified by my withdrawal.
The
difference in

see.

experiment cannot be made, and the matter becomes one of

argument and theory, into which far more complicated considerations enter than Mr. Joad's common sense permits him
to

remember.

relativity,

To mention only one point

which led Mr. Russell

what

of the facts of

to construct his theory of

physical thing as a system of sensibilia, which become actual

sense-data whenever one of an infinite number of perspectives is

occupied by an actual mind ? On Mr. Russell's theory, then,

"
there is a modification," for the presence of a mind results in
the difference between a sense-datum and a

not help Mr. Joad to reply

Mr. Russell's theory, but there
:

"

Yes, there

is

sensibile.

is

It

would

a modification on

none on mine."

For the whole

that his experiment yields different

point
my
results according to the different theoretical contexts in which
it is conducted, and therefore it is indecisive for, or
against, any
of

criticism

is

one theory in particular.

In so far as these criticisms throw doubt on the sufficiency
of Mr. Joad's realism in general, they weaken his argument
for

independent Forms which, on

its

positive side,

is

a special

application of his realism.

C.
It would not be fair, however, if I, too, played the canny
Scot and contented myself with criticizing Miss Stebbing and
Mr. Joad, without giving them something to fire at in return.

Hence

I shall

now attempt

kind of theory of the

should wish to defend.

to sketch the

place of universals in reality

which

296

R.

When

on the part played by universals in the

"
of reality," in
reasoning about the phenomena

I reflect

"

analysis

we

do not, as I have

experience," I

kind

to the

HOERNLE".

A.

F.

said,

myself led

find

which Mr. Joad asks about beauty,

inventory-work which attracts Miss Stebbing.

of question

or to the kind of

about the phemomena of experience" as I find

actually practised, and try to determine the nature of universals
from the part they play there. Without universals Mr. Joad
I take "reasoning

it

concede

will

to

this

be

sound

and especially

The laws which they

natural sciences.

no

sentiment

Platonic

I look, then, to the sciences,

science.

to the

discover, the classin-

catory systems which they trace, will be acknowledged

be universals.
The chemist investigating the properties

an

element

zoologist

new

with

concerned

is

who determines

So

universal.

to
of

the

is

the characteristics and life-history

and its evolutionary affinities.

So is every
formulates a law concerning the causal (aliter
That scientists do not
functional) correlation of phenomena.
of a

species,

scientist

who

talk in terms of
is,

of

course,

"

"

Forms," or

irrelevant.

But

it

is

"

of reality

whether a universal like oxygen

non-mental, or whether

it

Universals,"

how

relevant to note

utterly foreign to a scientist's analysis

question as

"

Essences," or even

is

is

such a

mental or

perfect, or eternal, or timeless,

is

"

(as Miss Stebbing has it), or whether it

served as a pattern to God in creating.
And the same is
true of philosophical analysis when engaged upon some

or

non-existent

concrete phenomenon.
for

The philosophical theory

of the state,

example, studies a universal very deeply involved in our

being.

Has

it

any occasion

to ask

about the state as a universal

And more:

any

of the

above questions

the universals which in

the

concrete

world of ours come everywhere to

"

"

separate

or

"

"

independent

or

this

study of
light, are

"

self-subsistent,"

if

not

these

terms mean either (a) that universals are separate from each
other ;(= Mr. Joad's "Pluralism") or (&) that they are

THE PLATONIC
separate

has

from

"

"

particulars

(as

297

EIAO2.

Miss

Stebbing

especially

it).

(a) The separateness of universals from each other is, I

should have thought, sufficiently disproved by every scientific
More in detail
law, a law being a correlation of universals.

it

is

common ground between

"

quality or

nature

"

of

us,

an object

is

understand, that every

I hope the
universal.

general fact of implication is likewise common ground. But

implication means that one thing is what it is because certain
other things are what they are, and vice versa, so that a change

nature of one necessarily brings with it changes in

On this " mutual responsiveness " (to use Bosanquet's
term) of universals depends the very possibility of reasoning
about the phenomena of our experience at all.
in the

others.

(b)

The doctrine

the separateness of universals from

a pure illusion begotten by abstraction,
differently, by a failure to remember the categorical
concepts, however abstract, which are framed in

particulars seems to
or, to

put

it

basis of all

of

me

It is superficially
obedience to a genuine cognitive interest.
plausible to think that, because we can talk of redness or

humanity in the

abstract,

and because these words have a

meaning, that meaning must be construed as a peculiar sort

"
"
of
object
subsisting timelessly in the Eealm of All Entities

And

Whatsoever.
sense

we may

pocketing the affront to common

even extend this doctrine to cover phlogiston

then

In the face of such a view

and unicorn.

it

is

refreshing to

be able to quote Mr. Bertrand Eussell's reminder that a sense

vital in inquiries of this kind.

of reality

is

of dealing

with the situation

is,

The proper way

surely, to discriminate

among

concepts those which are deliberate fictions of imagination,

those which, from the point of view of fuller knowledge, are
recognized as errors, and those which in serious judgment are
"
These latter
referred to reality," i.e., are asserted to be true.
constitute

the

'

real

"

or

"

true

"

nature of objects, to the

discovery of which the effort of knowledge

is

directed.

But in

298

R.

such

attempting

F.

A.

HOERNLE.

we

discrimination,

shall

our way

lose

we

begin with the recognition that the minimal datum

"
of experience is never a mere
particular," but always a thisunless

"
ever meet with any phenomenon in experience
which does not hold our attention and affirm itself in its

>r

Do we

such.

environment

of other

phenomena by

Specify any actual

it

its

determinate nature

is

and

is

phenomena:
always
Yet the character or nature of any phenomenon,
exhibited on any one occasion, is commonly a mere fragment
its whole nature, which has other sides not now exhibited
this,

it

always such.
as
of

which varies with

different settings;

which has ramifications

Here the cognitive

manifold to be explored.

interest in the

analysis of reality takes hold, following the clues of difference,

and

identity,

and identity

in difference

interconnexions of universals
reality,"

of

i.e.,

predicating them

which every
In

its

thrill of

tracing the systematic

and always

"

referring

them

to

of this actual world, the existence

experience attests.

general outlines this view

sented in modern philosophical

is,

of course, so well repre-

literature

that

need not

I will only add, with reference to

enlarge upon it here.
"
"
concrete universals," that
selfMr. Joad's allusion to

subsistence" surely cannot be predicated of any abstract

"
"
divorced from " this," of a quality or
such
universal, of
nature or form not embodied in actual existence. At any rate,
the general formula for the analysis of reality

is

that

it is

the

attempt to determine, and express in judgments, the nature (or,

"
you like, the form ") of that which exists. The contradic-

if

tory judgments which occur in the course of this attempt bring

home to. us the experience of error, as a result of which we

knowledge emphatically as the true, or real,

"
Thus the term " reality covers
that which exists.

define the goal of

nature of

both

existence

and truth

and an analysis

of

reality

yields

always a theory, i.e., a judgment claiming to express the true

nature of that which exists.

Mr. Joad and Miss Stebbing

will probably reply that in

THE PLATONIC

have said nothing relevant

all this I

299'

EIAO5.

main contention,

to their

the "realistic" thesis that universals are "non-mental,"

viz.,

"

"
separate," at least in the sense that
independent," or
than
the
acts of mind by which they are
are
other
they
"
and
subsist (or
exist," as Mr. Joad has it)apprehended,

or

whether or no they are apprehended by any mind at

am

This contention I
to

(a)

all.

ready to concede, subject, however,.

an interpretation, and

(b)

neither

qualification,

of

which, I fear, our realists will accept, and which together will
probably deprive for them my concession of all its virtue.
(a)
is

The

an exaggerated way

judgments.
it,

It is so,

that the so-called

is

interpretation

"

independence"
our

of expressing the claim to truth of

we

and was

say,

so before

we

discovered

and would have been so had no one ever discovered

all.

what they
But this,

Things are

aware of them.

way of saying
we should not

are,

it

at

whether or no any mind

is

submit,

is

once true, always true

only a picturesque-

and in saying

this,

forget that actual judgments are, in varying;

relative
and subject to revision or amplification with,
degrees,

advancing knowledge.
abstract
of

If it

amuses

principle that there

any mind's apprehension

realists to lay

subsist

of them,

universals

and

down the

independent

to apply this principle

indiscriminately to everything from redness to unicorns, well

and good.
But I submit that no amount of argument in

support of this position has the least relevance to the settlement of the kind of problem which is typical of the concrete

such a problem as what being red implies

in the context of the actual world, and whether any object
analysis of reality

which we
(b)

call

And

red

is really

red as tested by these implications.

is that when we thus plunge into

the qualification

the analysis of reality as presented in actual experience, we

cannot divorce the question of universals, or of anything else,

from the question of the truth

the nature of objects

is

judgments through which,

expressed, and from the experience
of the

which underlies the judgments.

If

the,

terms

experience,

THE PLATONIC

300

EIAO5.

expression, judgment, give occasion to realists to insist

distinguishing between
good.
to the

"

mental

But, once again, what

main question, which

is

is

"

upon
and non-mental," well and

the relevance of this distinction

whether we have good reason

to

trust that the nature of things reveals itself in the data of our
"
experience, and controls, as the logic of facts," or as

"

are obliged to think," our judgments and endows

what we
them with the

The abstract

distinction of

value of truth and knowledge

"

"

"

non-mental," so far from throwing light on this

rather
to obscure it.
tends
It directs our attention
question,

mental

and

away from what

really matters.

301

ABSTRACT OF THE MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS

OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE
FORTY-FIRST SESSION.

November 3rd, 1919.

The President

Prof. James Ward, President, in the Chair.

delivered the Inaugural Address on " In the
discussion was opened by Prof.
'

....'" A

Beginning
H. Wildon Carr, and there took part in it Prof. J.
Mr. Fox Pitt, Prof. Hicks, and Miss Stebbing.

S.

Mackenzie,

Prof.

Ward

replied.

December

H. Wildori Carr, Vice-President, in

was
read by Mr. Gerald Cator on " The
paper
Nature of Inference."
A written communication from
Dr. Bosanquet was read.
The discussion was opened by the
Chairman, and Dr. Wolf, Dr. Ross, Miss Stebbing, Dr. GoldsMr. Cator
brough, Mrs. Duddington, and others, took part.
1st,

the Chair.

1919.

Prof.

replied.

Prof. A. N. Whitehead in the Chair.

1919.
Moore read a paper on "External and Internal
The discussion was opened by the Chairman, and
Relations."
was continued by Prof. Carr, Mr. Norton, Mr. Shand, Dr. Nunn,

December

15th,

Dr. G. E.

Miss Stebbing, Mr. Joad, Mrs. Duddington, Dr. Ross, Mr. 0.

Dr. Moore replied.
Strachey. Mr. Cator and Dr. McGovern.

Wildon Carr, Vice-President, in the

Smith read a paper on the " The Philosophy
The Chairman opened the discussion
of Giovanni Gentile."
and there took part in it Prof. Whitehead, Mr. PickardCambridge, Mr. Douglas Ainslie, Miss Oakeley, Prof. Hicks,
Mr. Ginsberg, and others. Prof. Smith replied.

January 19th, 1920.

Chair.

Prof. H.

Prof. J. A.

February 2nd, 1920. Prof. G. Dawes Hicks, Vice-President, in the

Chair.
Mrs. N. A. Duddington read a paper on "Lossky's
Intuitive Basis of Knowledge"
Mr. Shaw Stewart, Mr. Douglas
Mr.
Prof.
Ainslie,
Cator,
Carr, Dr. Thomas, Miss Stebbing,
Mr. Davies, Mr. Mead, Dr. Stanton Coit, Dr. Goldsbrough,
the Chairman, and others, took part in the discussion.
Mrs. Duddington replied.

2 A

302
February 16th, 1920.

Miss Beatrice Edgell in the Chair.

Mr. A.

Shand read a paper on " Impulse, Emotion, and Instinct."

The discussion was opened by the Chairman, who was followed
by Prof. Carr, Dr. Eoss, Prof. Hicks, Miss Hazlitt, Mr. Hooper,
Dr. Stanton Coit, Miss Chosidov, and Mr. R. J. Bartlett.
Mr. Shand replied.
F.

March

8th,

1920.

Prof.

H. Wildon Carr, Vice-President,

in

the
"

" Is
there a General Will ?
paper on the question
was read by Mr. Morris Ginsberg. A discussion was opened
by the Chairman, and there took part in it Sir Francis Young-

Chair.

husband, Dr. Coit, Dr. Thomas, Prof. Hicks, Mr. PickardCambridge, Mr. Davies, Mr. Shand, and others. Mr. Ginsberg
replied.

March 22nd, 1920. Prof. H. Wildon Carr, Vice-President, in the

"
Prof. Clement C. J. Webb read a paper on
Chair.
Obligation,
Autonomy, and the Common Good." The Chairman opened the
discussion.
The following members took part Mr. Matthews,
:

Mr. Cator, Mr. Delisle Burns, Dr. Stanton Coit, Mr. Joad,
Mr. Cole, Mrs. Duddington, Mr. Douglas Ainslie, Mrs. Stephens

and Dr. McGovern.

Prof.

Webb

replied.

A symposium
was held on the question: "Is the 'Concrete Universal' the
true type of Universality?"
The writers of the papers,
Mr. J. W. Scott, Dr. G. E. Moore, Prof. H. Wildon Carr and
Prof. G. Dawes Hicks explained the main points of their

April

12th, 1920.

respective

Dr. C. D. Broad in the Chair.

contributions.

Dr.

Schiller,

Mr.

Menzies,

the

Chairman, and others took part in the discussion, and the

authors of the papers replied.
Prof. H. Wildon Carr, Vice-President, in the
April 26th, 1920.
Chair.
Dr. W. Montgomery McGovern read a paper on " The

Development of Buddhistic Metaphysics in China and Japan."

The Chairman opened the discussion, and ^there took part in it
Mr. Fox Pitt, Mr. Stanton Coit, Mr. Mead, Dr. Thomas,
Dr. McGovern replied.
Prof. Hicks, and Dr. Nunn.

May

A discussion
10th, 1 920. Prof. A. N. Whitehead, in the Chair.
"
on " Bergson's Mind-Energy was opened by Prof. Carr. The
Chairman continued the discussion, and there took part in it
Prof. Nunn, Mr. Shand, Mr. Hooper, Dr. Stanton Coit,
Dr. Goldbrough, and Mr. Mead.

Prof. Carr replied.

303
June

7th,

1920.

Prof.

H. Wildon

Carr, Vice-President, in the

"
paper was read by the Rev. A. E. Davies on The
Problem of Truth and Existence as Treated by Anselm." The

Chair.

Chairman opened the discussion, and Mr. Walker, Mr. Cator,

Mr. Mead, Miss Edgell, Mr. Shaw Stewart, and Mr. Ginsberg
Mr. Davies replied.
Mr. A. F. Shand, in the Chair. A paper was
read by Miss Beatrice Edgell on " Memory and Conation."
The Chairman opened the discussion, and there took part in it
took part.

June

21st, 1920.

Prof. Hicks, Miss Hazlitt, Mr. Ginsberg, Prof. Carr, Dr. Brough,
Mr. Mead, and others. Miss Edgell replied.

July 5th, 1920. Prof. T. Percy Nunn in the Chair. The Financial
Statement for the Session was presented by the Treasurer, and
was adopted. The Secretary read the Report of the Council on

The following
the work of the Session, and it was adopted.
nominations by the Executive Committee for the next Session
were approved
President, the Very Rev. Dean W. R. Inge ;
:

Honorary Treasurer,

Prof.

T. Percy

Nunn;

Librarian,

Miss

L. S. Stebbing; Honorary Secretary, Prof. H. Wildon Carr.

Resolved that Mr. Morris Ginsberg, Prof. Hicks, Miss Oakeley,
Mr. A. F. Shand, Dr. Thomas, and Prof. A. N. Whitehead, who

had been duly nominated, be elected members of the Committee.

Dr. G. F. Goldsbrough and Mr. G. R. S. Mead were appointed
The Chair was then taken by Prof. H. Wildon Carr.
Auditors.
A paper was read by the Rev. Dr. W. F. Geikie-Cobb on
"
The Chairman opened the
Mysticism True and False."
discussion, and Mr. Mead, Mr. Shaw Stewart, Prof. Hicks,
Mrs. Duddington, Dr. Coit, and others took part. Dr. Cobb
replied.

304

MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS

OF PHILOSOPHY AT OXFORD, SEPTEMBER 24TH-27TH,
1920.

The following

Societies

took

in

part

the

Congress

The

American Philosophical Association, the Aristotelian Society, the

British Psychological Society, the Mind Association, the Oxford
University Philosophical Society, the Societe Fran9aise de Philosophic, the Societ^ Franchise de Psychologic.

Congress were accommodated in New

College, Corpus Christi College, Queen's College, and St. Hugh's
About two hundred and fifty members were present at
College.

The members

of

the

the meetings.
The meetings were held
and in the Holy well Music Room.

At

September 24th.
Prof. Henri
" Prevision et

8.30

p.m.

in the

Lord Haldane

Bergson delivered the

la Nouveaute."

At 10

Examination Schools

in the Chair.

Inaugural Address on

Prof. A. N. Whitehead in the

on
"The
Philosophical Aspect of the
Symposium
General Theory of Relativity," by Prof. A. S. Eddington,
Mr. W. D. Ross, Prof. C. D. Broad, and Prof. F. A. Lindemann
was discussed.
The writers of the papers introduced the

September 25th.
Chair.

a.m.

Chairman, Lord Haldane, Prof. Louis Rougier,

Mr. Thomas Greenwood, and Prof. Wildon Carr took part.
discussion, the

At
on "

2.30 p.m.

Prof. T. P.

Nunn

in the Chair.

A Symposium
"

Thinking merely the Action of Language Mechanisms ?

and Mrs. F. C. Bartlett, Prof. T. H. Pear, Prof. G. H.
Mr.
by
Thomson, Prof. A. Robinson, and Prof. John B. Watson was
Is

discussed.

Bartlett, Prof. Pear, Mr. Bartlett, Prof.

The
Prof. Robinson introduced the discussion.

Mrs.

Thomson and

Chairman and Prof. Alexander took

part.

At 5 p.m. Dr. W. H. R. Rivers in the Chair. Dr. Henry

Head read a paper on " Disorders of Symbolic Thinking due
to Local Lesions of the Brain."

paper by Dr. R. Mourgue

305
was communicated.
In the discussion the Chairman, Prof.
Bergson and Prof. Wildon Carr took part, and Dr. Head
replied.

Lord Hakhine in the Chair. The subject

8.30 p.m.
"
Present Tendencies in American Philosophy was introduced by the delegates appointed by the Philosophical

At

of

"

Association of America.

Prof.

W.

P.

New

Montague spoke on the

and Prof.

Kealism, Prof. 0. E. Boodin on Pragmatism,

Hoernle on Idealism.

At

September 26th.

Chair.

2.30 p.m.

Mr. Arthur

J.

Symposium on "The Relation

Ethics," by Baron von

Balfour in the
of

Religion to

Chevalier, Prof. J. A.

Hiigel, Prof. J.

Smith, Principal L. P. Jacks, and Prof. H. Wildon Carr was

discussed. The writers of the papers introduced the discussion,

and the Chairman followed ; Monsieur G. Belot and Monsieur R.

Lenoir also took part.

At 8.30 p.m.
Symposium on

H. Wildon Carr in the Chair.

in Art," by Mr.

Prof.

"

Mind and Medium

A
C.

Marriott, Mr. A. B. Walkley, Dr. H. J. Watt, Mr. E. Bullough,

and Prof. C. W. Valentine was discussed.

September 27th. At 10 a.m.

Monsieur Xavier Leon

Mr. Arthur
read

Balfour in the Chair.

" Fichte centre
paper on
J.

I'Impe'rialisme."

Afterwards a Symposium on " The Problem of Nationality,"

by Prof. Elie Halevy, Prof. Marcel Mauss, Prof. Theodore
Ruyssen, Monsieur Rene Johannet, Prof. Gilbert Murray,
and Sir Frederick Pollock was discussed. The Chairman took
1

part in the discussion.

At

Prof. J. A. Smith in the Chair.

2.30 p.m.
Symposium by Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, Hon. Bertrand Russell, and
Prof.

Mr.

Prof. Nicod defended

H. H. Joachim was discussed.

Russell's position in his absence.

At

5 p.m.

in the Chair.

The Very Rev. W. R.

A Symposium on "

EIAO2 presupposed

in the

Inge,
Is

Dean

of St. Paul's,

the Existence of the

"

Analysis of Reality 1
Miss L. S. Stebbing
Mr.
D.
Mr.
A.
E.
M.
Jo
C.
ad,
Lindsay,
by
and Prof. R. F. A. Hoernle was discussed.
Platonic

306

At
at

7.30 p.m.

New

College.

College, presided,
to the Congress.
of

the

Congress

The members of the Congress dined together

The Rev. Dr. Spooner, Warden of New
and expressed the welcome of the Colleges
Mr. Arthur
for

the

Balfour expressed the thanks

hospitality it had received from
J.

Lord Haldane proposed the toast of the French and

American members, guests of the Congress.
Prof. Bergson
replied on behalf of the French, and Prof. Montague on behalf
of the American members.
Monsieur Xavier Leon proposed
Oxford.

the thanks of the Congress to the organizers.

307

LIST

OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FOR THE

FORTY-SECOND SESSION, 1920-1921.
THE COUNCIL.
PRESIDENT.

VEBY REV. W.

R.

INGE, D.D. (Dean

of St. Paul's).

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

BERNARD BOSANQUET,

M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1894-1898).

G. F.

STOUT, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1899-1004).

VERT REV. DEAN HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., F.B.A.

(President,

1904-1907).

HALDANE OF CLOAN, O.M., K.T., LL.D., F.R.S.,

F.B.A. (President, 1907-1908).
S. ALEXANDER, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President,, 1908-1911).
HON. BERTRAND RUSSELL, M.A., F.R.S. (President, 1911-1913).
G.
HICKS, M.A., PH.D., Lirr.D. (President, 1913-1914).
RIGHT HON. ARTHUR J. BALFOUR, M.P., LL.D., F.R.S. (President
RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT

DAWES

1914-1915).

H.

WILDON CARR,

D.LiTT. (President, 1915-1918).

MOORE, Sc.D., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1918-1919).

JAMES WARD, Sc.D., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1919-1920).
G. E.

VICE-CHAIRMAN.
PROF. G.

DAWES

HICKS.

TREASURER.
PROF. T.

PERCY NUNN,

London Day Training

College,

M.A., D.Sc.,

Southampton Row, W.C.

1.

LIBRARIAN.

Miss

L. S.

STEBBING,

46, Belsize Park,

N.W.

M.A.,
3.

HONORARY SECRETARY.
PROF. H. WILDON CARR, D.LITT.,
107, Church Street, Chelsea, S.W. 3.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.
MB. MORRIS GINSBERG.
PROF. G. DAWES HICKS.
Miss HILDA D. OAKELEY.
MR. ALEXANDER F. SHAND.
DB. F. W. THOMAS.
PBOF. A. N. WHITEHEAD.

2 A 3

308

HONORARY MEMBERS.
F. H.

BEADLET, M.A., LL.D., Merton

College, Oxford.

W.

R. DTJNSTAN, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., 38, Cranley Gardens, S.W.

Prof. Sir HENEY JONES, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D., F.B.A., The University,

Prof.

Glasgow.
Prof.

JAMES WAED, Sc.D.^ LL.D.,

D.Sc.,

F.B.A.,

Selwyn Gardens,

6,

Cambridge.

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
MARK BALDWIN,

Prof. J.

New
Prof.

c/o Harris

Forbes

&

Co., 56,

William

Street,

York.

HENEI BEEGSON, 31, Rue d'Erlanger, Paris.

BOUTEOUX, 5, Bond-Point Bugeaud, Paris.

Prof. iSiniLE

M. CATTELL, Garrison, New York.

BENEDETTO CBOCE, Trinita Maggiore 12, Naples.
JOHN DEWEY, Columbia University, New York City.

Prof. J.

Senator
Prof.

M. H. DZIEWICKI, 11, Sczcpariska, Cracow, Poland.

HAEALD HOFFDING, Carlsberg, Copenhagen.
Prof. E. B. TITCHENEE, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
Prof.

MEMBERS.
Elected.

1915.

1885.
1919.

1913.

DOUGLAS AINSLIE, B.A., Athenaeum Club, S.W. 1.

Prof. S. ALEXANDEE, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., Vice- President,

Street,

W.C.

Prof. J. B. BAILLIE, M.A., D.Phil.,

1908.

Right Hon.

1915.
1918.
1915.

Bruns-

Gower

1.

1916.

1912.

24,

wick Road, Withington, Manchester.

G. ANDEESON, M. A., 552, Lonsdale Street, Melbourne.
Rev. FEANCIS AVELING, D.D., Ph.D., .University College,

Norwood, Cults, Aberdeen.

BALFOUE, M.P., LL.D., F.R.S., Vice-president,
4, Carlton Gardens, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
Prof. SUEENDEA NATH BAEAL, M.A., Gaurisankar-Sffiter Lilleelvedalen,
Norway.
Miss B. C. BAEFIELD, Bicknell, Athenaeum Road, Whetstone, N. 20.

AETHUE

J.

C. J. BAEEEE, Fir Lodge, Rose Walk, Purley, Surrey.

F. C. BAETLETT, B.A., 32, St. Barnabas Road, Cambridge.

1893.

ROBEET J. BAETLETT, 4, Lancaster Road, N.W. 3.

Mrs. MAEGEIETA BEEE, M.A., 65, College Court, Hammersmith, W.
E. C. BENECKE, 182, Denmark Hill, S.E. 5.

1913.

Col. E.

1888.

H. W. BLUNT, M.A.,

1913.

Prof. A.

1886.

Prof.

1919.
1907.

H. BETHELL,

18,

Hyde Park

183,

Square,

W. 2.

Woodstock Road, Oxford.

BONUCCI, Perugia.

BEENAED BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., D.C.L., F.B.A.,

President, The Heatli Cottage, Oxshott, Surrey.
BOUT WOOD, Charity Commission, Whitehall, S.W. 1.

1890.

A.

1919.

W.

1919.

Rev.

1914.

Prof. C. D.

ll.

V. BEADE, B.A., 34, Kingsmead Road, Tulse Hill, S.W.

W. O. BEIGSTOCKE,

B. A., Royal Societies Club,

BEOAD, M.A.,

D.Lit.,

The

St.

rice-

2.

James's, S.W.

University, Bristol.

1.

309
Elected.

1889.

1917.
1919.
1913.

BROUGH, LL.D., Hampden Club, N.W. 1.

Miss ELSIE M. BRYANT, B.A., Mayfield Hostel, Arbroath Road,
Dundee.

Prof. J.

BUTLER BURKE, M.A., Royal Societies Club, St. James

S.W. 1.
C. DELISLE BURNS, M.A., 3, Keats Grove, Hampstead, N.W. 3.
J.

Street,

1906.

Rev. Preb. A. CALDECOTT, M.A., D.D., DJ.it., Great Oakley Rectory,

Harwich.

1920.

1881.

MARY WHITON CALKINS, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.,

U.S.A.
Prof. E. T. CAMPAGNAC, M.A., Greengate, Dingle Lane, Liverpool.
Prof. tf. WILDON CARR, D.Litt., Vice- President and Hon. Sec.,

1918.

GERALD CATOR,

1918.

Prof. G. C. CHATTERJI, B.A., Central Training College, Lahore, India.

Miss CHATTOPADHYAZ, Hyderabad, Deccan, India.

1918.

Prof.

107,

1916.

Church

Street, Chelsea,

S.W.

3.

67, Castleton Mansions,

S.W.

13.

1913.

E. C. CHILDS, M.A., 68, North View, Westbury Park, Bristol.

Miss M. E. CLARKE, M.A., 40, Callcott Road, Brondesbury, N.W.
Miss H. CLERGUE, Albemarle Club, 37, Dover Street, W. 1.
Prof. ALBERT A. COCK, B.A., University College, Southampton.
J. F. O. CODDINGTON, M.A., LL.M., 42, Bank Street, Sheffield.
STANTON COIT, Ph.D., 30, Hyde Park Gate, S.W- 7.
G. D. H. COLE, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.

1920.

F. C. CONSTABLE, M.A., Grenville, Lansdown, Bath.

1917.

Right Rev. C. F. D'ARCY, D.D., Archbishop of Armagh, Primate of

1912.

Ireland, The Palace, Armagh.

Prof. WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON, M.A., LL.D.,

1908.
1918.
1920.

1912.
1907.
1895.

6.

1912.

8, Queen's Gardens,
Aberdeen.
Rev. A. E. DAVIES, M.A., 48, Blenheim Gardens, Cricklewood, N.W. 2.
E. T. DIXON, M.A., Billy Dun, Half -Way Tree, Jamaica.
Miss L. DOUGALL, Cutts End, Cumnor, Oxford.

1918.

Rev.

1916.

1896.

JOHN DRAKE, M.A.,B.D.,Serampore

College, Serampore, Bengal,

India.

1918.

JAMES

DREVER, M.A.,

B.Sc.,

D.Phil.,

Roselea,

Gullane,

East

Lothian.
1899.

1911.

J. A. J. DREWITT, M.A., Wadham College,' Oxford.

Mrs. N. A. DUDDINGTON, M.A., 13, Carlton Terrace, Child's Hill,

N.W.
1910.
1916.
1917.

1915.
1919.
1914.
1912.

1914.
1920.

2.

Miss BEATRICE EDGELL. M.A., Ph.D., 15, Lyon Road, Harrow.

E. J. R, EDWARDS, M.A., 20, Christen urch Road, Hampstead, N.W.
Rev. A. E. ELDER, 10, Montague Road, West Ealing, W. 13.
T. STEAHNS ELIOT, M.A., 18, Crawford Mansions, Crawford Street,

W.

H. FARLEY, Laurence College, Appleton, Wisconsin, U.S.A.

ERIC FARMER, M.A., Moulton, Northamptonshire.
G. C. FIELD, M.A., D.Sc., The University, Liverpool.
Prof. J.

Miss
Miss

MARY FLETCHER, Newnham

I.

College, Cambridge.
FLINN, Ormond College, Melbourne.

3.

310
Elected.

1919.

1920.

1918.

Mrs. FORMAN, 18, Drayton Gardens, S.W. 7.

Sir JAMES G. FHAZER, D.C.L., D.Litt., F.B.A.,
Temple, E.G. 4.

1,

Brick

Court,

TING Fu, M.A., " Corahynn," Warstock, King's Heath, Birmingham.

MADGE FULLER, 79, Gloucester Terrace, Hyde Park, W. 2.

1918.

Miss

1914.

Miss MARJORIE

1919.

E. GARCKE, Ditton House, near Maidenhead.

GAB A IN, The Manor House, Bushey,

Herts.

1918.

Miss H. GATIN, 46, Belsize Park, N.W. 3.

W. F. GEIKIE-COBB, D.D., 40, Cathcart Eoad, S.W. 10.
Prof. W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, M.A., Lichfield, Wallace Avenue, Torrak,
Melbourne.
Mrs. MARY H. GIBSON-SMITH, Ph.D., 15, Speedwell Road, Edgbaston,

1911.

Prof. C.

1916.
1919.

1897.

Rev.

Birmingham.
1913.
1900.
1912.

1920.
1918.

M. GILLESPIE, M.A., The University, Leeds.

MORRIS GINSBERG, M.A., Teacher's Guild Club, 9, Brunswick Square,
W.C. 1.
G. F. GOLDSBROUGH, M.D., 125 Herne Hill, S.E. 24.
Prof. FRANK GRANGER, D.Litt., 37, Lucknow Drive, Nottingham.
THOMAS GREENWOOD, L. es L., 45, Gresham Road, S.W. 9.
ALBERT GRESSWELL, M.A., M.D., Louth, Lincolnshire.
r

1912.

M. A. HAFEEZ, M.A., 9/2, Kyd Street, Calcutta.

J. C. HAGUE, M.A., London Day Training College, Southampton Row,
W.C. 1.

1883.

Right Hon. Viscount

1920.

HALDANE OF CLOAN, O.M.,

F.B.A., Vice-president, 28,

1917.

1915.
1920.
1920.

1920.

1919.
1913.
1919.

K.T., LL.D., F.R.S.,

Queen Anne's Gate, S.W.

1.

HALDANE, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., Cherwell, Oxford.

Miss S. ELIZABETH HALL, 6, Prince Arthur Road, N.W. 3.
Miss M. HAMMOND, The University, Birmingham.
THOMAS W. HAND, The Librarian, Public Library, Leeds.
A. H. HANNAY, B. A., 28, Thurlow Road, Hampstead, N.W. 3.
Rer. R. HANSON, M.A., B.D., 30, Holroyd Road, Putney, S.W.
J. S.

15.

R. P. HARDIE, M.A., 13, Palmerston Road, Edinburgh.

Mrs. E. THURLOW HARRISON, 3, Devonshire Terrace, Hyde Park,

W.

2.

1912.

Miss VICTORIA HAZLITT, M.A., Bedford College, N.W. 1.

A. E. HEATH, M.A., The University, Manchester.
Principal H. J. W. HETHERINGTON, M.A., University College, E xeter.
Prof. G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., Vice-Chairman, 9,
Cranmer Road, Cambridge.
Rev. EDWARD W. HIRST, Lynton Villa, The Firs, Bowdon, Cheshire.
Prof. R. F. A. HOERNL, M.A., B.Sc., Armstrong College, Newcastle-

1918.

MICHEL G. HOLE AN, Rhodesia

1916.

Rev.

1916.

Very Rev. Dean

1918.
1918.
1915.
1890.

1919.

on-Tyne.
S.

E.G.
1913.

Court, 29, Harrington Gardens,

E. HOOPER, M.A., 48, Fitzgeorge Avenue, W. 14.

W. R.

INGE, D.D., President, The Deanery,

4.

ALEXANDER

C. IONIDES, jun., 34, Porchester Terrace,

W.

2.

St.

S.W.

Paul's

311
Elected.

1919.

Miss

H.

E.

TiiKi.AM),

Sunnysidt-,

Aluwick

Hill

Koad, Liberton,

Midlothian.
1919.

N. ISAACS, 61 Leigh Koad, Highbury, N.

1911.
1918.

Principal L. P. JACKS, M.A., LL.D., P.D., Shotover Edge, Heudington,

Oxford.
Rev. J. G. JAMES, M.A., D.Lit., Brynlryfryd, Andover Road, Southsea.

1904.

Principal

1915.
1918.
1919.
1892.

F.

B.

JEVONS, M.A.,

5.

D.Litt.,

Bishop

Hatfield's

1912.

Mare, Somerset.
Rev. TUDOR JONES, M.A., Ph.D., 14, Clifton Park, Bristol.
Miss E. F. JOURDAIN, D. es L., St. Hugh's College, Oxford.

1912.

J.

1916.

Prof. J. LAIRD, M.A., 4,

1911.

1881.
1911.

Hall,

Durham.
C. E. M. JOAD, M.A., 2, Squires Mount, Hampstead, N.W. 3.
C. B. JOHNSON, M.A., 2, King's Bench Walk, E.G. 4.
JAMES JOHNSTONB, D.Sc., The University, Liverpool.
Miss E. E. CONSTANCE JONES, D.Litt., Meldon House, Weston-super-

N. KEYNES, D.Sc.,

6,

Harvey Road, Cambridge.

Cranmore Gardens, Belfast, Ireland.

A. F. LAKE, Wrangaton, Sundridge Avenue, Bromley.
Prof. GEO. H. LANGLEY, M.A., 43, Palmer Park Avenue, Reading.

1897.

ROBERT LATTA, M.A., D.Phil., The University, Glasgow.

LAZARUS, B.A., Balliol College, Oxford.
Miss MARJORIE LEBUS, B.A., 11, Netherhall Gardens, N.W. 3.
Captain A. E. I. LEGGE, Kingsmead, Winkfield, Windsor.
A. D. LINDSAY, M.A., 2, Fytield Road, Oxford.
Rev. JAMES LINDSAY, M.A., B.Sc., D.D., Annick Lodge, by Irvine,

1912.

Ayrshire.
Prof. THOMAS

1898.
1919.

1915.
1918.
1908.

1920.

1909.

Prof.
S. C.

LOVEDAY, M.A., University College, Southampton.

Rev. A. A. LUCE, Trinity College, Dublin.
ARTHUR LYNCH, M.A., 80, Antrim Mansions, Haverstock Hill,

N.W.
1911.

Prof.

3.

WM. MACDOUGALL,

M.A., F.R.S., Harvard University, Cam-

bridge, Mass.

MACE, B.A., Ivy Lodge, Dereham Road, Norwich.

1916.

C. A.

1918.

Miss E. M.

MACK AY,

1916.

Prof. J. S.

MACKENZIE,

1910.

Sir

S.W.

W.

Skucritten House, Oban, Scotland.

Litt.D., 56, Bassett Road, North Kensington,

10.

LESLIE

MACKENZIE, M.A., M.D.,

4,

Clarendon

Crescent,

Edinburgh.
26, Parkfield

Road, Princes Park, Liverpool.

1918.

Prof. A.

1917.

ABDUL MAJID, Gola

1919.

Miss JESSIE A. MALLETT, 29, Lnunceston Place, Kensington, W. 8.

B. K. MALLIK, B.A., 22, Farndon Road, Oxford.
Rev. W. R. MATTHEWS, M.A., B.D King's College, Strand, W.C. 2.
Miss MAKGARET MCFARLANE, B.A., Ladies' National Club, 30, Philbeach Gardens, S.W. 5.
Rev. WM. MONTGOMERY McGovEKN, Ph.D., School of Oriental Studies,

1919.
1916.

1918.
1918.

MAIR, M.A.,

Grinj,

Lucknow,

Finsbury Circus, E.C.

2.

India.

312
Elected.

LEWIS MC[NTYEE,

N.B.

1899.

J.

1912.

R. M. MclVBR, \T.A., The University, Toronto.

G. K. S. MEAD, B.A., 47, Campden Hill Road, W.

1914.
1912.
1920.

1915.

1889.
1919.

D.Sc., Abbotsville, Cults,

8.

H. MELLONE, M. A., D.Sc., Dunedin, Victoria Park, Manchester.

E. MILLEE, M.A., 33, Oxford Mansions, Oxford Circus, W. 1.
P. CHALMEES MITCHELL, M.A., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S., Zoological
Rev.

S.

Society, Kegent's Park, N.W". 8.

R. E. MITCHESON, M.A., 46, Ladbroke Square, W. 11.
Rev. WILFRED MODE, B.A., Ph.D., St. John's Seminary,

Wonersh,

G-uildford, Surrey.

E. MOOEE, Sc.D., LL.D., F.B.A., Vice-President, 17, Magdalene

1896.

Gr.

1915.

Cambridge.
E. MOOEE, 17, Magdalene Street, Cambridge.
Prof. C. LLOYD MORGAN, LL.D., F.R.S., 5, Victoria Square, Clifton,
Street,

1910.

Mrs.

Gf.

Bristol.

1912.

DAVID MOERISON, M.A., The University, St. Andrews, Scotland.

K. C. MUCKHERJEA, B.A., Jesus College, Oxford.
J. MURRAY, M.A., Christ Church, Oxford.
C. S. MYERS, M.D., Sc.D., F.R.S., 30, Montagu Square, W. 1.

1904.

Prof. T.

1912.
1918.
1913.

PERCY NUNN, M.A.,

College,

1908.

1918.

W.C.

London Day Training

1.

Miss HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., Mary

Place,

1918.

D.Sc., Treasurer,

Southampton Row, W.C.

Ward

Settlement, Tavistock

1.

Captain HERBERT J. PAGE, 26, Half Moon Street, Piccadilly, W.

Mrs. HERBERT J. PAGE, 26, Half Moon Street, Piccadilly, W. 1

1917.

HERBERT J. PATON, M.A., Queen's College, Oxford.

Miss E. A. PEARSON, 52, Westminster Mansions, S.W. 1.
W. A. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE, M.A., Worcester Cottage, Oxford.
ST. G-EORGE LANE Fox PITT, Travellers Club, Pall Mall, S.W. 1.
Hon. ELEANOR M. PLUMER, M.A., Passmore Edwards Settlement,

1913.

Prof. A.

1919.

1903.
1916.

1916.

Tavistock Place,

1916.

Row, W.C.
1914.

W.C.

1.

PRINGLE-PATTISON, LL.D., D.C.L., F.B.A., 16, Church

Hill, Edinburgh.
Miss M. PUNNETT, B.A., London Day Training College, Southampton
S.

1.

ADAM RANKINE,

Newstead, Monkham's Avenue, Woodford Green,

Essex.

1918.

Very Rev. Dean HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., F.B.A.,

President, The Deanery, Carlisle.
Rev. H. MAUEICE RELTON, D.D., The Vicarage, Isleworth.

1918.

C. A.

1918.
1920.

Tyne.
Captain GTEOEGE PITT-RIVERS, Hinton St. Mary, Dorset.
Mrs. URSULA. ROBBETS, 19, Woburn Square, W.C. 1.

1895.

Prof.

1889.

RICHARDSON, B.A.,

ARTHUE ROBINSON,

25, Victoria Square,

Vice-

Jesmond, Newcastle-on-

M.A., D.C.L., Observatory House, Durham.

313
Elected.

1920.
1919.

Miss VERA A. ROSENBLUM, M.A The University, Melbourne.

Mr?. MARGARET Ross, Grays House, Wellgarth Road, Humpstead,
,

N.W.8.
1908.
1919.

Or. R. T. Ross, D.Phil., Rangoon College. Burma.

Miss E. M. ROWELL, M. I., Royal Holloway Collegp, Englefield Green,

Prof.

Surrey.
1912.

Prof. SATIS

CHANDRA ROY,

B.A., Dyal Singh College, Lahore, Punjab,

India.

1896.

Hon. BEKTKAND RUSSELL, M.A.,

F.R.S.,

rire-PrftMent, 70, Orer-

strand Man.Mons, Pattersea.

1918.
1905.
1912.

1918.

Miss ALTX SARGANT-FLORENCE, 41, Gordon Square, W.C. 1.

F. C. S. SCHILLBR, M.A., D.Sc., Corpus Christ! C .liege, Oxford.
Prof. J. W. SCOTT, M.A., D.Phil., University College, Cardiff.
W. E. G. SKKYI, MA., Anibok Chambers, Cape Coast, Gold Coast,

1920.

West Africa.
ALEXANDER F. SHAND, M.A., 1, Kdwnrdes Place, Kensington, W.8.
G. BERNARD SHAW, 10, Adelphi Terrace, W.C. 2.
Mrs. BERNARD SHAW, 10, Adelphi Terrace, W.C. 2.
A. T. SHEARMAN, M.A., I). Lit., University College, Gower Street,
W.C. 1.
H. S. SHELTON, B.Sc., 151, Richmond Road, Twickenham.
Prof. CONRAD ALFRED SCUIRMER, 1146, Reaney Street, St. Paul,

1910.

Miss F. ROSAMOND SHIELDS, M.A.,

1892.
1917.

1917.
1901.

1911.

Minn., U.S.A.

Green, E.

St.

Margaret's House, Bethnal

2.

LUDWIK

1908.

SILBERSTEIN, Ph.D., The College, Rochester, New York.

Miss MAY SINCLAIR, 1, Blenheim Road, St. John's Wood, N.W. 8.
W. G. SLEIGHT, M.A., D.Litt., 16, Eardley Road, Streatham, S.W.
HENRY H. SLESSER, 11, King's Bench Walk, Temple, E.G. 4.
Prof. J. A. SMITH, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.

1917.

Prof.

1920.

Rev. T.

1919.
1917.
1907.
1919.

16.

NORMAN K. SMITH,

1911.

D.Phil., LL.D., The University, Edinburgh.

SMITH, The University, Melbourne.
E. SHARWOOD SMITH, M.A., The Grammar School, Newbury, Berks.
Prof. W. R. SOKLEY, MA., Litt.D., LL.D., F.B.A., St. Giles, Chesterton Lane, Cambridge.
K. J. SPALDING, M.A., Stoneways, High Wycombe.
Miss H. M. SPANTON, 1, The Paragon, Blackheath, S.E. 3.
Prof. CAROLINE F. E. SPURGEON, D. es L., 19, Clarence Gate Gardens,

1910.

Miss L.

1912.

Gordon Square, W.C. 1.

J. MCKELLAR STEWART, B.A., D.Phil., The University, Melbourne.
Rev. C. R. SHAW STEWART, M.A., 6, Queen's Elm Square, S.W. 3.

1916.
1886.

1908.
1908.

J.

N.W.

1919.

1918.
1887.

Mrs.

1915.

1915.

STEBBING, M.A., Librarian, 46, Belsize Park, N.W.

ADRIAN STEPHEN,

3.

50,

G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., ru-e-President, Craigard,

Andrews, Scotland.
OLIVER STRACHEY, 96, South Hill Park, Harnpstead Heath, N.W. 3.
E. H. STRANGE, M.A., 25, Leicester Road, Wanstead, E. 11.
Prof. KOJIRO SUGIMOUI, University of Waseda, Tokyo, Japan.
Prof.

St.

1912.

1.

S.

314
Elected.

1910.
1904.
1908.

W. E. TANNEE, M.A., Fordlynch, Winscombe, Somerset.

P. TAVANI, 92, Loughborough Road, S.W. 9.
Prof. A. E. TAYLOR, M.A., D.Litt., F.B.A., 9, Dempster Terrace,
St.

1915.

1919.

Andrews, N.B.

W. THOMAS, M.A., Ph.D., The Library, India Office, S.W. 1.

Kev. Prof. W. H. THOMPSON, LL.D., St. Stephen's Vicarage, West
F.

Ealing,
1917.

1916.

W.

13.

M. THORBURN, 160, Greenvale Eoad,

ALGAR L. THOBOLD, M.A., Savile Club,
J.

S.E.

9.

107, Piccadilly,

W.

1.

1900.

Prof. C. B.

1917.

W.

1919.

EUGENE VIRPSHA,

1918.

Miss F. VOISIN, B.A.,

L918.

MARION E. WAKEFIELD, M.A., 58, Belsize Park Gardens,

Hampstead, N.W. 3.
Eev. LESLIE J. WALKER, M.A., Campion Hill, Oxford.
JOSEPH WALKER, M.A., Pellcroft, Thongsbridge, Huddersfield.
J. T. WALLEY, M.A., Wooldale, Chardleigh Green, Chard, Somerset.
SYDNEY P. WATERLOW, M.A., Parsonage House, Oure,Pewsey, Wilts.
HENRY J. WATT, M.A., Ph.D., D.Phil., Alton, Chapeltoii Avenue,

1920.
1902.
1917.

1908.
1912.

1919.
1890.

1896.

E.

UPTON, B.A., B.Sc., St. George's, Littlemore, near Oxford.

URWICK, M.A., 5, Wild wood Eoad, Golders Green, N.W.4.

3,

Miss

Bearsden, Glasgow.
M.A., The University, Manchester.
Prof. CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, M.A., Holywell Ford, Oxford.
Prof. E. M.
WENLEY, M.A., D.Phii., D.Sc., Litt.D.,

FRANK WATTS,

509, East

1912.

Park Gardens, N.W. 3.

Wymering Mansions, W. 9.

74, Belsize

H.

A.

Madison

WHEELER,

Street,

B.A.,

LL.D.,

Ann

8,

Arbor, Mich., U.S.A.

Eiverdale Terrace, Petersham

Eoad,

Eichmond, Surrey.
1907.

Mrs. JESSIE WHITE, D.Sc., 49, Gordon Mansions, W.C.

1915.

Prof. A. N.

1919.
1919.

1900.

1.

WHITEHEAD, D.Sc., F.E.S., 14, Carlyle Square, S.W. 3.

T. NORTH WHITEHEAD, B.A., 14, Carlyle Square, S.W. 3.
Miss A. L. S. WISE, 16, West Kensington Gardens, W.
A. WOLF. M.A., D.Lit., 12, Kewferry Eoad, Northwood, Middlesex.
John's Seminary, Wonersh. Guildford.

1919.

Eer. A.

1911.

1917.

ARTHINGTON WORSLEY, Mandeville House, Isleworth.

Miss E. M. WORTHINGTON, 75, West Cromwell Eoad, S.W.
Miss DOROTHY WRINCH, Girton College, Cambridge.

1916.

Miss L. K. YOUNG, B.A., Oaklea,

1910.

Sir

1918.

Madame ZARCHI,

1918.

WOOD,

D.D.,

St.

FRANCIS YODNGHUSBAND,
20,

Eue

HARRISON & SONS, Ltd., Printers

Silverhill, St. Leonards-on-Sea.

Litt.D., 3,

Buckingham Gate, S.W.

Chalgren, Paris,

in

5.

1.

XVIe.

Ordinary to His Majesty,

St.

Martin's Lane.

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