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AIRCRAFTELECTRICALFIRES
Anaviationsafetyarticle
by
AlexPATERSON
http://www.vision.net.au/~apaterson/aviation/wire_types.htm
LastUpdated:22July2012
MASTERINDEXofarticleswritten,postedonline,orrecommendedbyAlex
Paterson
INTRODUCTION
This article provides a list of electrical wire types most commonly used in jet transport
aircraft. The articles lists both the positive and negative characteristics of each wire type and
the aircraft that these wires have been installed in. It needs to be understood that the article is
by necessity incomplete because aircraft manufacturers and airlines have historically given
scant regard to the potential dangers posed by different wire types when installing them in
their aircraft and therefore have not kept accurate records of what types of wire have been
installed in the same. Thecomplacencywithintheaviationindustrytowardsthedangers
posedbyelectricalwireisendemicandisbestsummedupbythecommentofUnitedStates
FederalAviationAuthority(FAA)deputyhead,TomMcSweeny,whoisreportedtohave
saidbeforeaCongressionalCommitteein19that"wireiswire".(moreonMrMcSweeny's
allegedcommentbelow)
NOTE:Thisisadraftwebpageonly,setupfordiscussionbetweencontributors.It
undoubtedlycontainsomissions,andpossiblysomemistakes.
Readersareinvitedtoagreewith,disagreewith,seekclarificationaboutorputtheirpointof
viewaboutanyoftheissuesdiscussedinthearticle.
AlexPaterson(May2007)
AIRCRAFTWIRETABLE
Thefollowingtablerelatestogeneralpurposeaircraftelectricalwire.Itisimportantto
understandthatalltransportjetandturbopropaircrafthaveamixtureofthefollowing
differentwiretypesinstalledinthem.Thewiretypeslistedinthetablerelatetothe
predominanttypeofwireusedineachaircraft.Itwouldappearthatevenaircraft
manufacturersthemselvesarenotcompletelysureastowhatwireisinstalledinindividual
aircraftastheirattitudetowardselectricalwireinthepasthasbeenthat"wireiswire".
TableColourcode:
DANGEROUSWIRE
SAFETYUNKNOWN
PROBABLY SAFE
SAFE WIRE
NOTE:Wireislistedinthetablebydateofintroductionintoaircraft,withtheoldestwire
typedlistedatthetop.
WIRETYPE
DESCRIPTION
AIRCRAFT
INSTALLEDIN
(some)
PVC/Nylon
(PolyvinylChloride)
FailsFar25
Weight6.8lbs.per1,000ft
(Heaviestandthickest)
Installedin
EarlyDC9supuntil
1979
Introduced1950s
SpecificationNo:5086
Ratedtemperaturelow:
105C
Flammableburnsreadily
creatingcopiousamountsof
thick,toxicsmoke
renderingitvirtually
impossibleforpilotstosee
theirflightinstrumentsor
breathe.(e.g.Valujet592)
Insulationwhenburning
turnstohydrochloricacid
whenexposedtowater.
Outgassesontoelectrical&
electroniccontacts
SoftSusceptibletochafing
Susceptibletoaginginthat
itdriesoutandbecomes
brittle.
BannedbyUSAirForce.
USAirForcehad800
autopilotanomaliesdueto
defectivePVCina6month
studyin?
Stillusedasgeneral
purposereplacementwire.
ImplicatedinValujetFlight
592DC9whichcrashed
intotheFloridaEverglades
on11May1996
(e.g.Valujet592)
EarlyB727supuntil
1976
EarlyB737supuntil
1976
Stillusedasgeneral
purpose
replacementwirebysections
oftheaviationindustry.
DangerousWire
Kynar
Introducedin1964
FailsFar25
Thickness:15microns
Installedin
DC9sfrom1970until
Specificationnumber:
81044/9
Kapton
(complexaromatic
polyamide)
ManufacturedbyDupont
ChemicalCo.
Introduced1966
SpecificationNumbers:
Weight5.5lbsper1,000ft.
RatedTemperature:150C
(failstemperaturespec)
Poorfluidresistance
Nolongerused
FailsFar25
Thickness:8.4microns
(Verythin)
1976
Installedin
AirbusA310(all)
Weight:4.6lbsper1,000ft
(Verylightweight)
AirbusA320
(currently)2
Ratedtemperature:200C
AirbusA330
(currently)
'Explodes'andburns
AirbusA340
(currently)
B727(after1979,EB)
B737(after1979to
1990)
B747400(somefrom
19891991)
B757(upuntil1990)
B767(upuntil1991)
BAe146
(unconfirmedreports)
DC10
MD8x(all)
MD11(upuntilearly
1992)
fiercelyatflashoverduring
anarctrackingeventdueto
theproductionoffree
hydrogen,severely
damagingadjacentwires
andignitingsurrounding
structure.(i.e.behaveslike
detonatorfuse.)1
81381/11
BMS 13-51
(Boeing)
Highignitiontemperature
tostartburning(usually
associatedwithanelectrical
shortcircuitof5000C),but
whenitdoesfinallyigniteit
burnsveryfiercely
(explodes)creatingvirtually
nosmoke.
Fumesareclearandfairly
benign.
Susceptibletowetanddry
ArcTracking.
Susceptibletoaginginthat
itdriesoutforminghairline
crackswhichcanleadto
microcurrentleakage(i.e.
electrical'ticking'faults)
whichinturncaneventually
culminateinanexplosive
arctrackingevent.(i.e.
shortcircuit)1
Stiffness(straightline
memory)makesitproneto
vibrationchafing,(rubbing)
andstressedbybending.
Abrasivetootherwires.
(duetoitshardness)
Hygroscopic(i.e.absorbs
water)renderingit
susceptibletowetarc
tracking.
Installationdifficulties
(difficulttostripandmark)
Bannedby
*USAirForce
*USNavy
*Canadianmilitary
*Boeingin1992
*Bombardier?
A300600(with
Teflontopcoat)
L1011Tristar
ConcordeSST
B707(butnot
accordingtoEB)
DassaultMercure
CL600Series(but
notRJ/CL604or
GlobalExpress
(Challenger)
ShortsSD330
GulfstreamGII,GIII
HS125700
Bell212,214
SikorskyS61,S70B,
S76
Westland606
Plus31militarytypes
suchasP3,C130,F
14,F18,Hawkeye,
etc
VERYDANGEROUSWIRE
StillusedbyAIRBUS
inA319,A320,A330,A340
untilabout2005
(seefootnote2below)
Teflon
(Polytetrafluoroethylene
PTFE)
FailsFar25
Thickness:10microns
Weight5.43lbs/1,000ft.
Installedin
B747
Introducedin1969
Ratedtemperature:200C
SpecificationNumbers:
Longitudinalsplitting
problemdueto
manufacturingprocess.
Susceptibletocoldflow
(creepingofconductor).
Typeofinsulationfoundas
ignitionsourceonApollo
13
Typeofinsulationfound
splitinTWA800fueltank
wires[FuelQuantity
IndicatingSystem](FQIS)
Bannedbymajor
manufacturersin1983
22759/11
PolyX
FailsFar25
Manufacturedby
Raychem
81044/1629
Installedin
Thefirstexoticblendof
insulation(duetooil
embargo)
Early747s(e.g.TWA
800)
Thickness:10microns
EarlyDC10s
Weight:4.7lbs.per1,000ft
(Lightweight)
Ratedtemperature:150C
Susceptibletosolvents
Susceptibletoradial
cracking.Projectedservice
life60,000hrs/but
circumferentialcracks
foundafterjust2000hrsby
USNavy.
Susceptibletopremature
aging.BannedbyUSNavy
Introducedin1970
SpecificationNumbers:
BAe146
(alkaneimide)
anAliphaticpolyimide
in1978duetopremature
agingofinsulationafter
4000hrs
Brittle.Duetobrittleness,
1"barespotsnot
uncommon.
Susceptibletochafing.
FailsFAR25(airworthiness
testingstandards)
Caused323USNF14sto
berewired
BannedbyUSNavy.
ImplicatedbyEdward
Block(andothers)inthe
downingofTWAFlt800in
1996.4
Nolongerusedincivilian
aircraft.
DangerousWire
FailsFar25
Stilan
Introduced1972
SpecificationNumbers:
81044/20
Thickness:10microns
Weight4.7lbs.per1,000ft
(Lightweight)
RatedTemperature:150C
Insulationbreaksdownin
hydraulicanddeicingfluid
Microscopiccrazing
problemseenunder
microscope
Installedin
B747sbuiltinmid
tolate1970s
DC10sbuiltinmid
tolate1970s
Cracksunderstress
Foundtoarcover
Susceptibletospurious
signalgeneration(EMI
hazard)
Absorbswater(i.e.
hygroscopic)
Nolongerused
FailsFar25
Tefzel
(ETFE)
Introduced1972
Ratedtemperature150C
Softatratedtemperature
Specificationnumbers
F5
CrossLinkedTefzel
(XLETFE)
ManufacturedbyJudd
WireandRaychem.
Knownbysomesections
oftheaviationindustry
as"Spec55"wire.
Apparentlythename
"Spec55"hasbeen
trademarkedby
Raychem.
Introduced1977
Installedin
Arcturus
TefzelwasfoundinSwiss
Usedasgeneralinstallation AirflightSR111'sInflight
EntertainmentSystem(IFEN)
wirebutshouldneverbe
mixedinbundlewithother whichwassuspectedasbeing
thecauseoftheinflightfire
wiretypesduetoits
andsubsequentcrashofthe
softness.
aircraftoffNovaScotiain
November1998.
FailsFar25
Thickness:10microns
Installedin
B737(currently)
Weight:5.0lbs/1000'(light
weight)
B747(currently)
Ratedtemperature:150C
B757(currently)
Wetarctracks
B767(currently)
Flammableproducing
copiousamountofDense
toxicsmoke(96%+
density)whenitburns
renderingitvirtually
impossibleforflightcrewto
seetheirflightinstruments.
B777(currently)
BAe146
AirbusA320
Specificationnumbers
MILW22759/34
Spec55
Spec55A
BMS1348
(Boeing)
NASAstateswillfail
flammabilityrequirements
in30%oxygen.
Toxicitytheworstofall
wires,bannedformanned
aerospaceusebymajor
manufacturer.(Grumman
Corporationbanneditin
1982andNASAfollowed
suitin1983duetoits
toxicity)
Softatratedtemperature
Losesmechanicalstrength
propertiesatrated
temperature
FailsFAR25(airworthiness
standardstest)
Projectedlife50,000hrs
Notchpropagation
problems
AirbusA330
AirbusA340
StillusedbyBOEINGin
B737,B747,B757,B767,
B777
andAirbus
DangerousWire
TKTBoeing
PassesFAR25
Installedin
Weight:5.0lbs.per1,000ft
(Lightweight)
B737sbuiltafter1992
Introduced1992
Arctrackresistant
B757sbuiltafter1992
BoeingSpecificationNo:
Abrasionresistant
Reportedbysome
LAMEstobepartly
installedin some
B747-400 aircraft
manufactured
between 1989 - 1999.
(Teflon/Kapton/Teflon)
MILW22759
Superbinsulationprotection
BMS1360
(Boeing)
Highheattolerance
Resistssmokingwhen
burning(lessthan2%
density)
Tufflitebrand
manufacturedby
Tensolite
NOTE:AirbusIndustries
nowusetheirownversionof
http://www.tensolite.com
TKT(Seebelow)
Displaysallthepositive
aspectsofKapton(i.e.
lightweight,resistanceto
burning,nofumeswhen
burningetc)withoutanyof
Kapton'snegatives.
Noknownproblems
SAFEWIRE
FAR 25 attributes unknown
KKF BAe
Two layers of Kapton
within a FEP laquer
topcoat.
Installed within the
pressure cabin of BAe
146 aircraft.
Installed in
Undoubtedly safer than Kapton if
only because it reduces Kaptons
propensity to dry out and form
cracks.
ResistancetoArcTracking
unknown.
BAe 146
Source:BAeStatement7July
1999
KT BAe
Single layer of Kapton
overlaid by single wrap
of PTFE (i.e. Teflon)
Installed outside the
pressure cabin of BAe
146 aircraft.
Note:Source of info:
BAe Statement dated 7
July 1999
Installed in
KTT Airbus
Safety Unknown
ASNE0261CF
TKT Airbus
Called by Airbus
PTFE/Polimide/PTFE
Note:
PTFE/Polimide/PTFE is
just another name for
TKT as
Teflon is a PTFE and
Kapton is a Polimide
Airbus Specification No:
EN2267-008
No known specifications
released by Airbus although
suspected to be very similar
to Boeing's TKT wire listed
above.
Probably Safe
Sources:
EdwardBlock(IASA)EdwardB.Blockisaninternationalexpertonaviationand
wiring,specialisinginaircraftcrashinvestigations.
CaptainJohnSampson(IASA)Isapracticingairlinepilotwithextensiveexperience
incivilairlineoperations,helicopterpilotingandmilitaryaviation.Waseditorof
AviationSafetyWeekforaperiodoftimeinthemid2000s.
MichaelMurphy.AviationsafetyauditorfromCanada.
PatrickPrice(deceased)ExemployeeofBoeingCorporationtaskedwith
investigatingaircraftelectricalwiringissues.
NOTES
FAR25 comprisesclausesmandatingaircraftdesignsafetyrules.However,thereareno
specificclauseswithinFAR25pertainingtotheflammability,toxicityorsmokevisibility
criteriaofelectricalwireinsulation.Thatsaid,FARSection601mandatesageneral
statementthat;
FAR25601:"Theairplanemaynothavedesignfeaturesordetailsthatexperience
hasshowntobehazardousorunreliable.Thesuitabilityofeachquestionable
designdetailandpartmustbeestablishedbytests."
Source: http://www.flightsimaviation.com/data/FARS/part_25-601.html
As argued in this document the suitability of aircraft electrical wire insulation materials are
"questionable", yet they have never been the subject of a comprehensive formal testing
program and as such are in breach of FAR 25-601.
OnlyBoeing'sTKTwirehasnoknownproblemsandmeetsFAR25requirements.Airbus'
versionofTKTprobablymeetsFAR25requirements.
NospecificstandardsspeltoutbyaircraftregulatoryauthoritiessuchasUSFAAor
EuropeanJARregardingaircraftelectricalwire.Specificallynostandardsdefinedorany
requirementtotestwirefor:
Propensityofwiretowetordryarctrack.
Propensityofwiretoburn.
thedensityofsmokeandtoxicityoffumeswhenwireburns.
Modernjettransportaircraftarerequiredbylaw(FAA25&JAR25)toensureallsafety
offlightitemsandaircraftsystemshaveadequatebackupsystemsinstalledintheeventofa
failureofthemainsystem,(andthatincludesaircraftelectricalsystems),yetnothoughtwas
giventothefailureoftheaircraftwiringsystemitself.
Wireisdeemedbymostintheaviationindustry(i.e.aircraftmanufacturers,pilots,airline
managementandregulatoryauthorities)asan"installandforget"item.Thisattitudeisbest
summedupbythecommentofUnitedStatesFederalAviationAuthority(FAA)deputyhead,
TomMcSweeny,whoisreportedtohavesaidbeforeaCongressionalCommitteethat"Wire
iswire".Thisattitudeignoresthefactthat:
Modernjettransportaircraftcontainliterallyhundredsofkilometersofwire.
Wireisoftendamagedduringmanufactureand/orinstallation.
Wireisoftenincorrectlyinstalledinaircraft.(i.e.incorrectlyroutednearhot
equipmentand/orbundledtogetherwithotherincompatiblewiretypessuchassoft
wirelayingadjacenthardwireetc)
Wire(boththewireanditsinsulation)deteriorateswithage.Withregardtothe
insulation,itdriesout,becomesbrittleformingcracksexposingtheconductor(i.e.
wire).Wireitself,oxidisesespeciallyassociatedwiththewidespreadelectrolysisthat
occursinaircraftleadingtopoorcontactsandthegenerationoflocalhotspotsinthe
wirewhichhasthepotentialtomeltthesurroundinginsulationmaterial.
Allwiredeterioratesinserviceduetoenvironmentalfactorssuchas:
o extremesofheat&coldexperiencedbyaircraftonthegroundandintheair.
(i.e.wirecanexperienceplus+200Cdowntominus70C),
o waterdamage,(hydrolysisandthefactthatsomewiretypesexhibit
hygroscopictendencies)
o saltdamageassociatedwithmarineenvironments.(allaircraftoperateinto
airfieldsadjacentmarineenvironmentsatleastsometimeintheiroperational
lives)
o contaminationbyaircraftfluidssuchasfuel,oil,hydraulicfluid,deicingfluid,
cleaningchemicals,toiletresidue,galleyspillageetc.
o inflightvibrationcausingchafingofwiresrubbingagainstotherwiresorthe
structureoftheaircraft.Thisisespeciallyaproblemwithhardwiresuchas
KaptonlayingadjacentasoftwirelikeTefzel.
o Allwireproductsdisplaydifferingpropertieswithregardtoaging,but
practicallyallwireinsulationmaterialdriesout,goeshardandthendevelops
hairlinefractureswhichallowtheingressofwaterandotheraviationfluids
leadingtomicrodischargesofcurrentthroughthecrackstosurroundingwires
ortheaircraftstructure.('ticking'faults)
o Allaircraftusetheirairframeastheirelectricalearthreturnpathwayresulting
insignificantconstraintsintheoperationofprotectiondevicessuchascircuit
breakerslocatedinthecockpit.(seeseparatepaperonthisissue)
AccordingtoEdBlock:"OnlyTKTwireinsulation(BMS1360)meetsFAR25
Standards."
RECOMMENDATIONS
Theaviationindustryasawholeneedstoacknowledgethattheshortcomingsassociatedwith
differentelectricalwiretypesareaseriousissueandpotentiallyverydangerousasevidenced
bytheinformationpresentedinthispaper.Thenotionheldbymanywithintheaviation
industrythat"wireisjustwire"isirresponsible.
Practicalstepsthattheindustryshouldtaketobegintoaddressthesituationinclude:
Aviationregulatoryauthoritiesneedtospecifyrigorousperformancestandardsfor
electricalwiresothattheyconformtoFAR25inthat"insulationmaterialisnotused
thatishazardous,unreliable,orcontributessmoke/fire".Anypromulgatedstandards
forelectricalwirewouldneedtoberigorouslyenforced.
AcknowledgethatKaptonwireisaparticularlydangeroushazardtoaircraftandinsist
uponitsitsremovalfromaircraftwherepractical.(thisstatementacknowledgesthe
factthatthecompleteremovalofKaptonwirewillbeinmanycasesanimpossibility)
Insistthatelectronic'FlybyWire'(FBW)aircraftbefittedwithacompletelyseparate
'virgin'emergencyelectricalbustoallowpilotstoremoveallelectricalcurrentfrom
all'normal'electricalwirecircuitsintheeventofanelectricalfire.Formoreonthis
subjectsee'VirginElectricalBus'
GLOSSARY
Agingisthedeteriorationofwiringinsulationwiththepassageoftime.Tocertain
extentagingisanaturalprocessassociatedwiththepropensityofmostmaterialsto
breakdownintotheirconstituentpartsovertime.(e.g.rust)Mostelectricalinsulation
compoundstendtodryoutovertime,becomebrittleandcrack.Agingofwiring
insulationisexacerbatedbyaircraftvibrationcausingchaffing(seebelow)and
exposuretoawholeraftofchemicalswithintheaircraftsuchashydraulicfluid,
engineoil,toiletchemicals,saltsprayandmoistureetc.Fluorinationandother
treatments(suchastopcoating)mayacceleratetheagingprocess.
Arctrackingistheprocessbywhichelectricalconductancecanoccurthroughand
alongtheinsulatingcoating,ratherthanjustthewireconductor.Thisismadepossible
bytheformationofcarbonalongcrackswithintheinsulationmaterialandbecause
carbonisanelectricalconductor,onceformedthecarbontracktendstogrow
associatedwiththelocalisedheatthatisgeneratedalongthetrackbytheelectricity
leakingthroughit.Theheatgeneratedbythecurrentflowleakagecausesachemical
breakdownoftheinsulatingmaterialadjacenttothecarbontrack,formingmore
carbonalongthetrack.Inotherwordsonceinitiatedtheformationofacarbontrack
becomesselfpropagatingandthereforecontinuestogrowwiththepassageoftime.In
otherwords,oncestarted,arctrackingiscapableofselfpropagationthroughthe
virtualinstantcreationofitsowncombustioninducedcarboncharleadingtoa
massiveleakageofelectricalcurrentthroughthecarbontracksoformedandthe
damageofadjacentwiresinthesamewirebundle.Thisprocessiscalled'flashover'.
(seenext)
Theinitiatorofarctrackingcanbeaflawintheinsulationcausedbyimprintlabeling,
radialcracking,chafingbetweenwiresorcontactbetweenawireconductorandthe
airframe,hygroscopicabsorptionofwater,saltandothercontaminantsoranelectrical
shortcircuit.Itcanalsobeprecipitatedbyundetectedshortingdamageininaccessible
areasorbyuseofinappropriatetypesofinsulationinSWAMPareas(severeweather
andmoistureproneareassuchaswheelwells).
NOTE:Seealso'TickingFaults'listedbelow.
Flashoveristheselfpropagationandcatastrophicescalationofanarctrackingevent
throughtheinstantcreationofamajorcarboncharpathwayassociatedwiththeheat
thatisgeneratedduringtheinitialarctrackevent(i.e.carbonisproducedwhenthe
insulationmaterialstartstoburn)Theresultingescalationofthearctrackevent
associatedwithflashovercanbeexplosive(especiallywithKaptonwire)andthe
nakedflamescancausedamagetoadjacentwirebundlesandthermalacoustic
insulationwithintheairframe.(e.g.Mylar)Verticalwirerunsaremoresusceptibleto
flashover(becausenakedflamesnaturallyrisevertically).Howeverflashovercan
alsooccurhorizontallyor,lessexplosively,inadownwardverticalsense.Unlikea
straightelectricalshort,theconductor'stemperatureitselfmaynotrisehighenoughto
tripthecircuitprotectivedevice(CPD)meaningthearcingphenomenamaynot
necessarilycauseathermalcircuitbreakertotrip.Thearctrackingphenomenonis
basedupontheabilityoftheconductivecarbonchartoheatadjacentwiringandself
propagate,particularlyalongawirebundlemoresothananindividualwire.Notethat
thephenomenainducedinthepresenceofsignificantmoistureiscalled"WetArc
Propagation"(asagainst"DryArcPropagation").Wetarcingismorelikelyto
producetheflashoverendresult.
Chafingoccurswhenwiresvibrateandrubagainsteachother(orthestructureofthe
aircraft)causingtheinsulationlayersurroundingthewiretoberubbedawayexposing
theelectrical.Thevibrationcausingthechafingisusuallythecumulativeeffectofthe
highfrequencyvibrationwhichnaturallyoccursinflightassociatedwithaerodynamic
andenginevibrations.Thetendencyforwiretochaffisexacerbatedbyinsufficient
tensioning,insufficientoffsetorthetighteningofawireagainstanairframe
component(especiallyaroundcorners).Overtensioningofwiresand/orinsufficient
supportintervalscanleadto"strumming"ofwires(causingthemtocontactother
surfaces).Scrapingcausedbypullingwirethroughnarrowareasduringinstallation
cancauseasimilareffecttochafing.
Coldflow(creepingoftheconductor)isanypermanentdeformationduetopressure
ormechanicalforce,withouttheaidofheatsoftening.
EMI:ElectromagneticInterference.Wiringthatisunshieldedissusceptibletostrong
electromagneticfieldsstemmingfromsystemsandmodulesthatarenaturalemitters
suchasGPS,DME(DistantMeasuringEquipment),radios,weatherradars,radar
altimetersetc(pluscellphonesandGameboysetc)
FBW:FlyByWire.Inconventionalaircraft,flightcontrolisactuatedbypushrods
andcablestohydraulicactuatorsdrivingtheprimarycontrolsurfaces(i.e.ailerons,
rudders,spoilers,canards,elevonsandelevators).InFBWaircraftthephysical
connectionsofcablesandpushrodsarereplacedbyproportionatecomputergenerated
digitizedsignals.
Fluidresistance:Resistancetoawiderangeofcommonlyusedsolvents,fluidsand
lubricantsusedinaircraft.
Hydrolysis:(noun)thechemicalreactionofasubstancewithwater,usuallyresulting
indecompositionofthesaidsubstance.(Source:OxfordDictionary)
Hygroscopic:(adjective):Ahygroscopicsubstanceisonethattendstoabsorb
moisturefromtheair(Source:OxfordDictionary)
NotchPropagation:Thetendencyofawireinsulationtopropagateacrackthrough
totheconductorwithongoingbendingcycles.Usualrequirementisexpressedasan
acceptablelimit.e.g.Thewireshallnotpropagateacracktotheconductorfollowing
aminimumoftenbendcyclesofthevnotchedarea.
Outgasses:Someinsulationmaterialsarevolatile.Inmanycriticalaerospaceand
semiconductorapplications,lowoutgassingmaterialsmustbespecifiedinorderto
preventcontaminationinhighvacuumenvironments.Outgassingoccurswhena
materialisplacedintoavacuum(verylowatmosphericpressure)environment,
subjectedtoheat,andsomeofthematerial'sconstituentsarevolatilized(evaporated
or"outgassed").Outgassingisrelatedtoconductortemperatures(i.e.loadcarrying
capabilities).
Radialcracking:Thiscanoccuraroundawire'scircumferenceandexposethe
conductorandcause'tickingfaults'.(seebelow)Causesofradialcrackingcanbe
naturaldeterioration,insufficientbendradiiordamageatinstallation.Oversignificant
stretchesofwireruns,thecausewillnormallybethedegradationsduetoaging,
coupledwithtopcoatflaking.Thislatterphenomenonisthenaturalbreakdownofa
shellaclikesubstanceappliedtoprotectaromaticpolyamide(i.e.Kaptontypes)in
particularfromhygroscopicactivity.Radialcrackingcanbeinitiatorsofticking
faults.
Ratedtemperature:Themaximumtemperatureatwhichagiveninsulationorjacket
maybesafelymaintainedduringcontinuoususe,withoutincurringanythermally
induceddeterioration.Ratedtemperatureofawiringinsulation/conductorgagemay
notremainconstantforthelifeofaninstallationduetotheagingprocess.
'Ticking'faults.Thisisanintermediateprocessofwiringinsulationbreakdown
wheresufficientconductorexposure(perhapsduetoradialcracking)coupledwiththe
earlyphaseofoutercarboncharringallows"arcinginminiature"(i.e."ticking")to
occur.Thinkofitassparklingalongtheoutersheath.Oncesufficientlyadvanced,this
processwillhavebuiltupasufficientcarboncharforfullblownselfpropagatingarc
trackingtooccur.Ifwetted(bysayagalleyortoiletleakorrampmoistureingress),
theconditionmayallowanearlier'flashover'event.
FOOTNOTES
1.KaptonArcTrackingandFlashover:AccordingtoDrArminBruningofthe
LectromechanicalDesignCompanyofDulles,VirginiaUSAacompanywhichhasbeen
contractedbytheUSNavyamongstotherstoinvestigateKaptonarctrackingthereason
Kaptonexplodesduringanarctrackingeventand'flashover'isbecause"thearcwillcausea
temperatureof5000degreesCelsius...andinthisconditioncarbonisvaporizedandfree
hydrogenisliberated."
Source:emailfromArminM.BruningLectromechanicalDesignCotoAlexPatersondated5
May2001
ItwouldappearthatencapsulatingKaptonbetweenlayersofTeflon[i.e.TeflonKapton
Teflon(TKT)]preventstheKaptonlayerfromdryingoutandcracking,aswellsuppressing
theproductionofhydrogenduringashortcircuit,renderingtheTefloncoatedKapton(i.e.
TKT)relativelybenignfromanarctrackingpointofview.
___________________________
2.AirbusIndustriesbeganusingahybridversionofKaptoncomprisingKaptoncoatedwith
Teflon(TK)madebyDupontinsomepartsofitsFlybyWireaircraftinthelate1990s.
However,accordingtotheAmerica'sforemostindependentaircraftwireexpert,Edward
Block,thistypeofwireis"justKaptonwithacosmeticcoatingofTeflonwhichisusedfor
markingpurposesonlyanddoeslittletoreduceKapton'spropensitytoexplosivelyarctrack".
However,seenote3below.
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3.Asofmid2006AirbusIndustrieshavestartedtoinstalltheirownversionofBoeing's
TKTintheirnewAirbusaircraft.ThiswireisdesignatedAirbus Specification No: EN2267008. This wire would almost certainly be much safer than bare Kapton, but Airbus Industries
refuses to disclose the performance attributes of this wire so it is difficult to determine for
certain how safe this wire actually is. See main wire table above for more details about this
wire.
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4.Source:AssertionmadebyEdwardBlockin'AerospaceTestingInternational'magazine
datedJune2009onpage39.
RELATEDWEBSITES:
AircraftWireArcTrackingbyPatrickPrice(deceased)Aresourceguidetoaircraft
wiring.
InternationalAviationSafetyAssociation(IASA)Aresourceguidetoaircraftsafety
andaircraftwiring.
RAFreportintoKaptonWiringpostedonlinebyIASA
AnAnalysisOfTheConventionalWireMaintenanceMethodsbySusanJeruto
Kiptinness(PDFfile1mb)
'AircraftDesignFeaturesthatEnhanceSafety'byAlexPaterson
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ABOUTALEXPATERSON
AlexPATERSONisanAustralianairlinepilot.Hewritesarticlesandadvisesonissues
pertainingtoaviation,politics,sociology,theenvironment,sustainablefarming,history,
computers,naturalhealththerapiesandspirituality.
Hecanbecontactedat:
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