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Collusion and lack of governance

Emergency response issues


The government, the regulators, lacked the preparation and the mindset to efficiently
operate an emergency response to an accident of this scope. None, therefore, were
effective in preventing or limiting the consequential damage.
In the critical period just after the accident, they did not promptly declare a state of
emergency.

Approximately 150,000 people were evacuated in response to the accident...


Insufficient evacuation planning led to many residents receiving unnecessary radiation
exposure. Others were forced to move multiple times, resulting in increased stress and
health risks - including deaths among seriously ill patients.
"If there had been even a word about a nuclear power plant when the evacuation was
ordered, we could have reacted reasonably, taken our valuables with us or locked up
the house before we had left. We had to run with nothing but the clothes we were
wearing. It is such a disappointment every time we are briefly allowed to return home
only to find out that we have been robbed again." (Comment by a resident of Okuma,
from report appendices)
The Fukushima nuclear disaster showed us that nuclear reactors are
fundamentally dangerous.
cause significant damage to the environment
the health of populations and to national economies, the heavy
financial cost of a meltdown is inevitably borne by the public,
Millions of people who live near nuclear reactors are at risk.

The lives of hundreds of thousands of people continue to


be affected by the Fukushima nuclear disaster, especially
the 160,000 who fled their homes because of radioactive
contamination, and continue to live in limbo without fair,
just, and timely compensation. They have only a false
hope of returning home, yet the Japanese government is
eagerly pushing to restart reactors, against the will of its
people, and without learning true lessons from
Fukushima.

AyearaftertheWallStreetJournalreport,TEPCO
announcedthattheDaiichiplant'smeltdownhadreleased
2.5timesmoreradiationintotheatmospherethaninitially
estimated.
Theutilitycitedbrokenradiationsensorswithintheplant
asthemainreasonforthisdeficitand,claimedthat99
percentofthetotalradiationreleasedfromtheDaiichi
plantoccurredduringthelastthreeweeksofMarch2011.

Ayearlater,inJune2013,TEPCOadmittedthatalmost
80,000gallonsofcontaminatedwaterhadbeenleaking
intothePacificOceaneverydaysincethemeltdown.
InFebruary2014,TEPCOrevealedthatgroundwater
sourcesneartheDaiichiplantand80feetfromthePacific
Oceancontained20millionbecquerelsoftheharmful
radioactiveelementStrontium90pergallon(one
becquerelequalsoneemissionofradiationpersecond).
Eventhoughtheinternationallyacceptedlimitfor
Strontium90contaminationinwaterhoversaround120
becquerelspergallon,thesemeasurementswerehidden
fromJapan'sNuclearRegulationAuthorityfornearly
fourmonths.
Andlastmonth,TEPCOtoldreportersthat14different
ricepaddiesoutsideFukushima'sexclusionzonewere
contaminatedinAugust2013
meaningalmostayearhadpassedsinceemissionshad
beguntoaccumulateatdangerouslevelsinJapan'smost
sacredfood.
Whyhasacrisisthatisgainingtractionastheworstcase
ofnuclearpollutioninhistoryworse,emissionwise,
thanHiroshima,Nagasaki,orChernobylbeing
smotheredwithinternalcensorship?
"Japanproducespartsfornuclearreactors,likereactor
containmentvessels,"shesaidinaninterviewwithVICE.
"They'reheavilyinvestedinnuclearpower,eventhough
theyactuallyhaveaccesstoninetimesmorerenewable
energythanGermany."
WhatseparatesFukushimafromChernobylisthe
continuousleakageofradioactivematerial
"TheJapanesegovernmenttookthreemonthstotellthe
worldthattherehadbeenthreemeltdowns,eventhough
themeltdownshadtakenplaceinthefirstthreedays,"
"They'renottestingthefoodroutinely.Infact,they're
growingfoodinhighlyradioactiveareas,andthereare
storiesthatthemostradioactivefoodisbeingcannedand
soldtothirdworldcountries."
Latelastmonth,alongtermvicepresidentoftheKansai

ElectricPowerCompany(KEPCO),whichsourced
nearly50percentofitselectricityfromnuclearpower
sourceslikeFukushimabeforethe2011accident,
revealedtoJapanesereportersthatthecompany's
presidentdonatedapproximately$3.6milliontoseven
differentJapaneseprimeministersandotherpolitical
figuresbetween1970and1990.Theamountofficials
receivedwasbasedonhowmuchtheirincumbency
profitedthenuclearandelectricenergysectors.
Andifit'snotmoneythatliesbeneaththesemultifaceted
attemptsatobscuringinformationaboutFukushima,it's
thefearofmasshysteria.
itwasrevealedthattheUnitedNationsaffiliatedpro
nucleargroupInternationalAtomicEnergyAssociation
madeadealwithlocalgovernmentofficialsinFukushima
toclassifyinformationthatmightstokepublicconcern
(like,observersspeculate,cancerratesandradiation
levels),civilianfearsofacoverupcampaigncreptoutof
themischiefassociatedwithconspiracyandintothe
gravityofasituationthatfeelsmoreandmoresurreal.
TEPCOtheTokyoelectricalpowercompanythatowns
thefukishimaplants
Despitetheseefforts,plentyhascometolight.Asof
August2014,weknowthatradiationlevelsaroundthe
Fukushimaareacontinuetorise,evenafterthreeyearsof
containmentattempts.Weknowthatdoctorshavefound
89casesofthyroidcancerinastudyoflessthan300,000
childrenfromtheFukushimaareaeventhoughthe
normalincidencerateofthisdiseaseamongyouthsisone
ortwoforeverymillion.WeknowthatJapanese
scientistsarestillreluctanttopublicizetheirfindingson
Fukushimaduetoafearofgettingstigmatizedbythe
nationalgovernment.
WealsoknowthatUSsailorswhoplottedareliefeffort
inFukushimaimmediatelyafterthedisasterhave
reportedlybeenexperiencingawellupofdifferent
cancers,thatmonkeyslivingoutsideFukushima's
restrictedzonehavelowerbloodcellcountsthanthose

livinginotherpartsofnorthernJapan
OthersbelievethatJapanneedstolooknorthwest,
towardstheKremlin.ChernobylgaveRussiaandUkraine
alevelofexperienceinhandlingnuclearfailuresthat
standsapartfrommostoftheworld.
ButeventhoughtheecologicaleffectsofFukushima
continuetobehotlydebatedbyscientificorganizations
andthepublic,Dr.Kleinwantstotakeastepbackfrom
theconversationinordertomovetowardstheendgame.
"I'dliketoseeacompletelysafeoperation.It's
complicated,"heconcedes,"butweneedtohelpsupport
theJapanesecleanupeffortswheneverwecan."

After the 2011 magnitude 8.9 earthquake and


resultant tsunami, the stricken Fukushima Daiichi
Power Plant in North East Japan has suffered core
meltdowns, leaked thousands of tonnes of
radioactive water into the ground water of Japan and
the Pacific Ocean, and a series of other calamities.
The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)
responsible for the plant has appeared unfit to
manage the most complex clean-up operation in the
history of nuclear power. TEPCO are about to
engage in the removal of highly radioactive, unstable
fuel rods. If they make a mistake, we would witness
the worst radiological disaster in history.
TEPCOs clean-up is estimated to take 40 years and
cost 62bn. Worse, it is still the best case scenario.
The Japanese government has just admitted to the
160,000 evacuees of the 12 mile exclusion zone that
they will likely never return home.
Contaminating Groundwater and the Pacific Ocean

The disaster in March 2011 pumped 733,000 Curies of


radioactive caesium into the Pacific, the largest discharge of
radioactive material into the ocean in history. Fifteen months
later, 56% of all fish catches off japan were contaminated.
Since then, matters have steadily worsened.

When power was cut off during the tsunami, these pumps
were lost. So, ever since, groundwater runs down from
the higher land behind the reactors, through the
basements and contaminated groundwater around the
tanks, and, this newly highly contaminated water, then
runs straight into the Pacific Ocean.
In efforts to refill the fuel pools and cool the plant, TEPCO
workers poured thousands of tonnes of water onto the
reactors. This water then became radioactive and
needed to be stored until it was decontaminated. TEPCO
now has 1,000 tanks and other containers, holding
370,000 tonnes of highly contaminated water on site.
Strontium-90 (a radioactive by product that is easily
absorbed by the human body and causes bone cancer)
has been found at 70 times higher than legal limits.
The tanks continue to leak.
Beaches surrounding the area have been closed and all
fishing has stopped in this former fishing region. But
concerns are that the contamination is being carried well
beyond the exclusion zone, making it into the drinking
water and food being consumed in Japan by rain water.
Radiation has been found in waters off Alaska and the
West coast of the US, having spread over 2000 miles
across the Pacific.
The Next Chernobyl?

The biggest crisis at Fukushima though are the impacts of


three meltdowns in reactors 1-3, and the fate of the fuel

pools. After prolonged exposure the fuel rods melt, forming a


boiling pool of radioactive fuel at the bottom of the vessel
containing the reactor. Reactors 1, 3 and 4 are believed to be
at this stage. However, it is clear that reactor 2 suffered a
breach of containment at its core. In fact, TEPCO still have no
idea where the cores of the four reactors are. In the worst
case scenario, the cores will continue to melt through all
material below them until they reach the groundwater, where
heat and steam will build until an explosion occurs, releasing
the entire nuclear payload of the four stations into the
atmosphere.

Removing spent fuel is done at any ordinary nuclear


power plant, and the equipment and methods well be
using here are not that different.
Now nuclear fuel is like cigarettes in a pack of
cigarettes. If the pack is new, you can pull a cigarette out
pretty easily. But if the pack is distorted and you pull too
hard, youll snap the cigarette. Same thing can happen
inside this fuel pool.
Removing the rods from the pool is a delicate task
normally assisted by computers according to Toshio
Kimura, a former TEPCO technician, who worked at
Fukushima Daiichi for 11 years.
Previously it was a computer-controlled process that
memorized the exact locations of the rods down to the
millimeter and now they dont have that. It has to be
done manually so there is a high risk that they will
drop and break one of the fuel rods, Kimura said.
These spent fuel rods contain Plutonium, the most toxic
material on earth trace amounts of which can kill a
human being.
Krypton 85 is also likely to be released into the air this
radiation is absorbed by the lungs, is fat soluble and
damages sperm and eggs resulting in genetic diseases
and deformities.
According to independent consultants Mycle Schneider
and Anthony Froggatt, writing in the recent World Nuclear
Industry Status Report:
Full release from the Unit-4 spent fuel pool, without any
containment or control, could cause by far the most
serious radiological disaster to date,, releasing three
times the radioactive material of the 1986 Chernobyl
disaster, or 14,000 Hiroshimas.
This piece of work starts this month.
If TEPCO, who have so far proven vastly incompetent,
somehow manage to pull off this unprecedented activity

without creating a nuclear holocaust, they still have to


perform the same effort with reactors 1 and 2, which will
be much more complex due to even greater damage to
the buildings.
This is a Nightmare

Its time for us to start focussing on whats happening in


Fukushima. It may seem a faraway matter, on a distant
continent but disaster at Fukushima could mean disaster for
us all. If any of the reactors fully dispatch their toxic contents
into the atmosphere, it is the end of Japan and a global
catastrophe.

The impacts are already being felt.


An average of 1.7 people per 100,000 in the general
population between the ages of 15 and 19 contracted
Thyroid cancer in 2007. This year, 12 per 100,000 people
younger than 18 at the time of the disaster in Fukushima
were diagnosed with the disease.
According to Physicians for Social Responsibility:
The precise value of the abandoned cities, towns,
agricultural lands, businesses, homes and property
located within the roughly 310 sq miles (800 sq km) of
the exclusion zones has not been established. Estimates
of the total economic loss range from $250[iv]-$500[v]
billion US. As for the human costs, in September 2012
Fukushima officials stated that 159,128 people had been
evicted from the exclusion zones, losing their homes and
virtually all their possessions. Most have received only a

small compensation to cover their costs of living as


evacuees. Many are forced to make mortgage payments
on the homes they left inside the exclusion zones. They
have not been told that their homes will never again be
habitable.
In spite of all this, TEPCO continue to turn a profit and
Japanese PM Shinzo Abe plans to restart Japans nuclear
power stations.

What Three Mile Island,


Chernobyl, and Fukushima
can teach about the next
one
Following the accident at the nuclear power plant,
government authorities realized to their horror that their
existing plans for such an emergency were too vague to
address the challenges now facing them. Making matters
worse, technical experts disagreed about the state of the
crippled reactor and what might happen next. Some
confidently asserted that events were under control,
while others warned that ongoing radioactive emissions
might portend an imminent release of catastrophic
proportions. More worryingly still, no one could predict
the likelihood or timing of such a development
confidently enough to inform decisions about ordering
evacuations. Should the local population be evacuated, or
would that measure only incite unnecessary panic?
Proximity to the capital gave the situation extra urgency.
Might it, too, have to be evacuated, with all the
unfathomable costs that might entail? Without reliable
measurements of the total radioactivity released to the
environment or estimates of how large it might grow,
policymakers had no choice but to answer these fraught
questions on the basis of guesswork.
These events played out three timesat the US state of
Pennsylvanias Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in
1979, at then-Soviet Ukraines Chernobyl Nuclear Power
Plant in 1986, and at Japans Fukushima Daiichi in 2011.
During the accident at Three Mile Island, only

authorities' overly optimistic assessment of the damage


to the reactor forestalled them from ordering a general
evacuation of the surrounding area, which might have
included state capital Harrisburg. Several days after the
explosion of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4, the
sudden acceleration of radioactivity releases led the
Soviet government to fear that the Ukrainian capital of
Kyiv, 100 kilometers (62 miles) distant, might have to be
evacuated. In the course of the crisis at Fukushima
Daiichi, the Japanese government grappled with a
similar dilemma: Unable to predict how far serious
contamination might extend from the crippled plant, it
secretly pondered the prospect of evacuating Tokyo even
as official pronouncements assured the public that
events were under control.
In all three of these cases, uncertainty about source
termsthe quantities and characteristics of the
radioactive isotopes released in a nuclear event
hindered efforts to formulate an effective emergency
response. Source terms determine populations' ultimate
radiation exposure, and therefore decisions about shelter
and evacuation necessarily depend on assessments of
them. Experience has demonstrated that source terms
from nuclear reactor accidents are extremely difficult to
measure even after the fact, much less predict in
advance. While plant operators are generally aware of
the radiological inventory contained in the reactor core,
the myriad means and processes by which they could
escape during an accident are much more difficult to
understand and predict. Many aspects of the source
terms, including what radioisotopes are released, their
amounts, their chemical forms, and the rate and altitude
at which they are released, interact with the surrounding
environment to determine the total radiation doses
received by the population.
thanks to international efforts to detect illicit nuclear
testing, these measures do not determine either the
quantity or distribution of radioisotopes released by a
damaged reactora problem without a readily available
technical solution.

The releases from both Chernobyl and Fukushima defied


the source-term estimates used as the basis for
emergency planning for similar accidents in the United
States quantitatively and qualitatively, but were not as
bad as the most pessimistic predictions of the
radiological consequences of reactor meltdowns.
Incorporating insights from these examples and
improved practices in the remote monitoring of nuclear
plants into emergency planning for nuclear accidents
could offer a promising means of making such events
more manageable.
Reliance on guesswork. When the first nuclear power
plants were built in the United States, no one could
predict the source terms that would result from a serious
accident, encouraging a regulatory culture that sought
safety through prevention. During the 1950s and 1960s,
the US Atomic Energy Commission assumed that serious
accidents would have immense radiological
consequences, but that with adequate engineering
precautions they could be prevented with a very high
degree of assurance. Lacking a better analog, the Atomic
Energy Commission used assumptions from studies of
nuclear weapons fallout to estimate what the effects of a
nuclear power plant accident would be. In 1957 it issued
a report that made estimates of what would happen if the
contents of a power reactor core were released in a way
analogous to a nuclear weapon, which is extraordinarily
efficient at dispersing its radiological contents. The first
attempt to analyze the potential risks of a nuclear power
plant accident, the reports horrifying analysis predicted
3,400 people dead of radiation exposure, 43,000 injured,
the possible need to evacuate the population from an
area of up to 8,200 square miles (21,238 square
kilometers), and as much as 150,000 square miles
(388,500 square kilometers) of land placed under
agricultural restrictions due to long-lived radioactive
contamination. To forestall such outcomes, the Atomic
Energy Commission mandated that nuclear power plants
incorporate engineered safety systems to limit the
probability of fuel damage, and containment buildings to

prevent the release of radioactive material should those


fail. Confident that a serious accident would be
prevented, in the 1960s and early 1970s the Commission
did not require reactor operators or local governments to
plan for a nuclear accident with off-site consequences.
During the 1970s the potential perils of this
overconfident attitude became apparent, leading to the
development of the assumptions that still undergird
planning for nuclear accidents in the United States.
Widely publicized concerns originating from within the
Atomic Energy Commission itself that important
engineered safety systems might not perform as
intended, as well as a continuing lack of assurance that
containment buildings would prevent a major
radiological release in an extreme accident, helped
encourage major reforms in the regulation of nuclear
power. These included the formation in 1975 of an
independent agency, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, to oversee the civilian nuclear industry, and
the increasing adoption of probabilistic risk-assessment
techniques to estimate the likelihood of a serious nuclear
accident and its effects. During the late 1970s, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission worked with the
Environmental Protection Agency to develop a
theoretical basis for emergency management in nuclear
accidents.
The EPA quickly recognized that different radiological
releases called for radically different emergency
management tactics, but the absence of confident sourceterm estimates made comparing the relative merits of
shelter and evacuation difficult. In many circumstances,
evacuating populations from areas around a damaged
reactor appeared most effective at reducing individuals'
radiation exposure, but this measure also had numerous
downsides. For instance, a particularly extreme accident
that dispersed large amounts of radioactivity quickly
might not provide nearby populations with sufficient
time to evacuate. Presciently, EPA analysts also
recognized that evacuation stood to be expensive and
disruptive, and that in less-extreme accidents these

considerations might outweigh the benefits of lowered


radiation doses.
Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and EPA
attempted to set conservative standards for emergency
management planning around nuclear power plants, the
lack of practical experience with nuclear accidents and
expert disagreement about their possible consequences
forced the two agencies to make policy based on only
approximate estimates. In 1978, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and EPA agreed on the concept of
emergency planning zones, which remain a prominent
feature of US plans to ameliorate the consequences of
reactor accidents. The agencies recommended two sizes
of zones in anticipation of qualitatively different
radiation hazards: one with a radius of 10 miles (16.1
kilometers) to address whole-body radiation exposure,
and another with a radius of 50 miles (80.5 kilometers)
aimed at preventing ingestion of radioactivity in food
and water. On the basis of the most sophisticated
analysis then available, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and EPA concluded that an accident
creating radiation hazards dire enough to require
evacuation more than 10 miles from a plant was
extremely unlikely, and recommended that relocation
plans only address the 10-mile zone.
The minimal external impact of the accident at Three
Mile Island Unit 2 in 1979 helped dispel some of the
worst fears about the consequences of nuclear accidents,
but also demonstrated Americas unpreparedness for a
radiation emergency. Although only relatively minor
radiological releases occurred, Three Mile Island
revealed both the inability of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to handle a crisis situation and the
weakness of US emergency management in general. At
the time of the accident the Commission was directly
responsible for overseeing plants emergency
management planning, and had only just begun
implementing the recommendations it had developed in
conjunction with the EPA. In the course of the crisis, it
became apparent that no usable plans were available to

evacuate the area around the plant, and Pennsylvania


enlisted the assistance of federal civil defense officials to
redress this inadequacy as quickly as possible. Three
Mile Island also stoked demands for reforms to nuclear
safety regulation, one of which was transferring oversight
of nuclear plants emergency management plans from
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the newlyestablished Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). The new agency was required to approve
nuclear power reactors emergency management plans
before the reactors could receive operating licenses.
Despite these administrative changes, US emergency
planning for nuclear accidents continued to follow the
framework developed prior to Three Mile Island, even
after information emerged challenging it. The discovery
several years after the accident that much of the reactors
fuel had melted without causing either the reactor vessel
or the containment building to fail, as many theoretical
studies predicted, demonstrated that engineered safety
measures could sometimes prevent even extreme nuclear
accidents from becoming catastrophes. Some analysts
concluded that the source terms from a nuclear accident
would be limited, making emergency planning relatively
manageable. At the same time, the fact that this type of
accident occurred at all, when most analyses prior to
Three Mile Island considered it infinitesimally
improbable, challenged existing assumptions about
nuclear safety.
Learning from the past. The explosion of Chernobyl
Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4 on April 26, 1986 and its
disastrous aftermath both demonstrated the challenges
of protecting populations from the consequences of
nuclear accidents and the complexity of the source-term
problem. In the days after the accident, the Soviet
government found itself unable to gauge the amount of
radioactive material escaping the destroyed reactor,
much less predict how much more might be released and
how far it might spread. Moreover, like at Three Mile
Island seven years before, no usable evacuation plans
were availableonly this time, they were desperately

needed. Forced to improvise, the Soviet authorities first


evacuated the city of Pripyat, a few kilometers from the
damaged plant, and then progressively expanded the
evacuation to encompass areas within 10 kilometers (6.2
miles) and finally 30 kilometers (18.6 miles). Even
beyond this area, isolated areas of contamination
necessitated evacuations of populations as far away as
western Russia. Nor were the chosen evacuation zones
optimalpeople were removed from some areas with
only light contamination, while they remained in others
where it was quite heavy. Less severe radiological
contamination afflicted large areas of the Western USSR,
threatening to expose Soviet citizens to radiation via food
and drink. Effective protection of the population from
radiation hazards demanded accurate assessments of the
radioactivity released from Chernobyl, but the Soviet
state discovered through hard experience the extreme
difficulty of this task. To this day the Chernobyl source
term, and consequently estimates of the radiation doses
received by surrounding populations, remain the subject
of acrimonious expert debate.
Even with the benefit of a quarter century of
technological progress, during the crisis at Fukushima
Daiichi in 2011 the Japanese government also found
itself without the information necessary to make
emergency management decisions due to the problem of
source-term uncertainty. Deprived by the devastating
tsunami of the power essential to run their emergency
cooling systems, the cores of three of the plants six units
experienced extensive fuel damage in the following days.
With pressure building up within the stricken reactors
containment buildings, the plant operators faced a
terrible choice between intentionally venting an
uncertain amount of radioactivity, or risking the
possibility of the containment buildings failing and
losing all control. They chose the former, only to have
hydrogen released along with contaminated steam,
producing dramatic explosions in Units 1 and 3 of the
plant. Furthermore, the uncertain status of Unit 4s spent
fuel pool caused considerable concern. The pool

contained many years worth of irradiated fuel


assemblies and a much-greater quantity of long-lived
radionuclides than the failing reactors. In theory, if the
level of water in the pool fell below the fuel it might
create conditions in which the assemblies zirconium
cladding could burn, threatening to spread an immense
amount of radioactivity over Japan. Without any
experience with such a scenario, however, the Japanese
government could neither ascertain how likely it might
be to happen, nor determine how to best protect its
citizens. It chose a precautionary approach to the
releases from the damaged reactors, evacuating the area
within twenty kilometers of the plant before substantial
radiation releases took place, but elected to wait and
see about the possible spent fuel pool fire.
As happened after Chernobyl, these arrangements both
evacuated large numbers of people from relatively
uncontaminated territory while leaving some in areas
with substantial radiation hazards. While favorable wind
conditions blew most of the radioactive material released
from Fukushima Daiichi over the Pacific, an area of
serious contamination extended outside the evacuated
zone (even after it was expanded to a 30-kilometer
radius) to encompass the village of Iitate, 39 kilometers
(24.2 miles) from the plant. Following protests from the
IAEA, the Japanese government recommended the
evacuation of this area in late April 2011, more than a
month after the disaster. Meanwhile, the evacuation
caused immense stress to the population that may have
been greater than the health benefits it produced through
lowered radiation doses. Although even during the
accidents immediate aftermath some argued that
computer models of the spread of radiological
contamination should be utilized to plan evacuations and
other protective measures, these programs can only
make realistic predictions when provided with accurate
source-term estimates. Not only did the Japanese
government struggle to produce real-time estimates of
the radiological releases, available information about
conditions within the damaged reactors was too sparse to

make confident predictions about possible future


developments. Once again, source-term uncertainty
proved a critical obstacle to emergency planning.
Although the experiences of Chernobyl and Fukushima
seriously challenge the assumptions that have remained
central to emergency planning for nuclear accidents in
the United States since the late 1970s, they offer few easy
lessons for emergency managers. While Chernobyl and
Fukushima failed to fulfill the worst fears about the
consequences of nuclear accidents, their source terms
differed qualitatively from those that formed the
rationale for 10-mile and 50-mile emergency planning
zones. Such simplistic geographic categories failed badly
in both cases, as evacuations proved necessary in areas
well beyond a 10-mile radius. Despite the clear example
set by these cases, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
continues to insist that evacuation and communication
planning for areas more than 10 miles from nuclear
plants is unnecessary. At the same time, Chernobyl and
Fukushima also demonstrated that the costs of
evacuation sometimes outweigh the benefits, and suggest
that if possible, populations should only be relocated as a
means of last resort. Weighing the relative benefits of
evacuation and possible alternatives, however, is
extremely difficult in the absence of reliable source-term
estimates.
Fortunately, measures exist that demonstrate how
emergency managers can reduce the impact of sourceterm uncertainty. Illinois, which hosts more nuclear
reactors than any other state, possesses its own Division
of Nuclear Safety within the Illinois Emergency
Management Agency. Established after Three Mile
Island, the Division of Nuclear Safety operates a
Radiological Emergency Assessment Center colocated
with the State Emergency Operations Center, which aims
to help Illinois make the hard decisions about shelter and
evacuation during a nuclear accident. The Radiological
Emergency Assessment Centers computers are directly
linked to the instrumentation of all the nuclear plants in
the state, as well as to radiological monitoring systems in

the areas surrounding themmaximizing the


information available to decision-makers during a crisis.
Illinois demonstrates the feasibility and affordability of
these measures, and emulating them could provide
emergency managers in other parts of the country with
the means to make the best possible decisions to protect
the public following a nuclear accident. This type of
integration between remote monitoring and emergency
management could be made even more effective with
improved instrumentation and analytical techniques to
produce better source-term estimates. Although in the
past research in this area was hobbled by a lack of
experience with serious accidents at light-water reactors,
ongoing technical studies of the Fukushima releases
should help alleviate this problem. Should the United
States ever face a radiological emergency, investments in
these areas could pay for themselves many times over.

Nuclearcrises:Howdo
FukushimaandChernobyl
compare?
Japanhasraisedtheseveritylevelofitsnuclearcrisis
fromfivetothemaximumseven,puttingtheemergency
attheFukushimaDaiichipowerplantonaparwiththat
atChernobylin1986.MarkTranlooksatthedifferences
betweenthetwodisasters

Whatistheseveritylevel?
TheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency's(IAEA)international
nuclearandradiologicaleventscaleranksnuclearand
radiologicalaccidentsandincidentsbyseverityfromoneto

seven.Untilnow,the1986Chernobylaccidentwastheonly
nuclearaccidenttohavebeenratedalevelsevenevent,which
theIAEAdescribesas"amajorreleaseofradioactivematerial
withwidespreadhealthandenvironmentaleffectsrequiring
implementationofplannedandextendedcountermeasures".
OfficialsfromJapan'snuclearandindustrialsafetyagency
(Nisa)estimatethattheamountofradioactivematerialreleased
totheatmospherefromFukushimaismuchlessthanChernobyl.
AspokesmanforNisasaidthenewrankingdidnotmeanthe
Japaneseplantposedthesamethreattopublichealthor
involvedsimilarlybigreleasesofradiationastheChernobyl
disaster.

Whatisthemaindifferencebetweenthetwo
accidents?
AtChernobyl,explosionsdestroyedareactor,releasingacloud
ofradiationthatcontaminatedlargeareasofEurope.At
Fukushima,whichwasdamagedbyanearthquake,thereactors
stillhavemostlyintactcontainmentvesselssurroundingtheir
nuclearcores.JapaneseofficialspointoutthatatChernobyl,the
reactoritselfexplodedwhilestillactive.AtFukushima,the
magnitudenineearthquakeandtsunamicrippledtheplant's
coolingsystem,leadingtoapartialmeltdownofthereactor.
Earlierattemptstocoolthereactorbyhosingwaterfromfire
enginesandhelicoptersleftpoolsofcontaminatedwaterand
floodedbasements,hamperingthecontainmentoperationand
effortstorestartthecoolingpumps.Tomakeroomformore
highlyradioactiveliquid,theplant'soperator,TokyoElectric
pumpedtonnesofcontaminatedwaterintothePacificbut
stoppedafterthemovewascriticisedbySouthKorea.Tokyo
Electricappearstobenoclosertorestoringcoolingsystemsat
thereactors,criticaltoloweringthetemperatureofoverheated
nuclearfuelrods.

Howmuchradioactivematerialhasbeen

releasedatFukushima?
Japan'snuclearsafetycommissionhasestimatedthatthe
Fukushimaplant'sreactorshadreleasedupto10,000
terabecquerelsofradioactiveiodine131perhourintotheairfor
severalhoursaftertheyweredamagedinthe11March
earthquakeandtsunami.Itsaidemissionssincethenhad
droppedtobelowoneterabecquerelperhour,addingthatitwas
examiningthetotalamountofradioactivematerialsreleased.A
terabecquerelequalsatrillionbecquerels,ameasurefor
radiationemissions.ThegovernmentsaystheChernobyl
incidentreleased5.2mterabecquerelsintotheairabout10times
thatoftheFukushimaplant.

WhatweretheeffectsofChernobyl?
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Fiftyemergencyrescueworkersdiedfromacuteradiation
syndromeandrelatedillnesses,4,000childrenandadolescents
contractedthyroidcancer,nineofwhomdied.Morethan
100,000peoplewereimmediatelyevacuated,andthetotal
numberofevacueesfromcontaminatedareaseventuallyreached
350,000.Theexplosionsthatdestroyedtheunitfourreactorcore
releasedacloudofradionuclides,whichcontaminatedlarge
areasofEuropeand,inparticular,Belarus,theRussian
FederationandUkraine,andaffectedlivestockasfarawayas
ScandinaviaandBritain.Hundredsofthousandsofpeoplewere
exposedtosubstantialradiationdoses,includingworkerswho
tookpartineffortstomitigatetheconsequencesoftheaccident.
TheIAEAsaidthesituationhadbeenmadeworsebyconflicting
information,exaggerationinpresscoverageand
pseudoscientificaccountsoftheaccidentreporting,forexample,
fatalitiesinthetensorhundredsofthousands.

Whathavebeentheeffectssofarat
Fukushima?

Thedeathtollfromthetsunamiismorethan13,000,
butnoradiationlinkeddeathshavebeenreportedand
only21plantworkershavebeenaffectedbyminor
radiationsickness,accordingtoJapaneseofficials.
About70,000peoplelivingwithina12mileradiusof
theplanthavebeenevacuated,while130,000living
between12and20milesfromtheplanthavebeen
toldtoleavevoluntarilyorstayindoors.The
government'schiefspokesman,YukioEdano,saidthe
currentevacuationzonewouldbeextendedtofive
othercommunities,includingthevillageofIitate,
whichlies25milesfromtheplant.Someexpertshave
criticisedtheraisingoftheseveritylevel."Ithink
raisingittothelevelofChernobylisexcessive,"said
MurrayJennex,associateprofessoratSanDiegostate
university."It'snowherenearthatlevel.Chernobyl
wasterribleitblewandtheyhadnocontainment
andtheywerestuck.Their[Fukushima]containment
hasbeenholding,theonlythingthathasn'tisthefuel
poolthatcaughtfire."

How does Fukushima


differ from Chernobyl?
Japanese authorities have raised the severity rating of
the nuclear crisis at the damaged Fukushima Daiichi
power plant to the highest level, seven.
The decision reflects the ongoing release of radiation, rather
than a sudden deterioration. Level seven previously only
applied to the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, where 10 times as
much radiation was emitted.
But most experts agree the two nuclear incidents are very
different. Explore the table below to find out how they
compare.

Fukushima and Chernobyl compared

Category

Fukushima Daiichi

Date of accident

11 March 2011

Accident details

A magnitude-9.0 earthquake and r


damaged the plant's power system
cooling systems to fail. A series of
followed

Severity rating

Level 7 - major accident

Number of reactors

Six; but only three of concern, plus


spent fuel

Type of reactors

Boiling-water reactors. Japanese a


that unlike at Chernobyl, the conta
at Fukushima remain intact. Also,
Chernobyl, the reactors at Fukush
a combustible graphite core

Radiation released

370,000 terabecquerels* (as of 12

Area affected

Officials say areas extending more


miles) to the north-west of the plan
40km to the south-southwest have
levels exceed annual limits

Evacuation zone

20km; 20-30km voluntary zone. Fi


beyond the existing evacuation zo
been evacuated

People evacuated

Tens of thousands

Related deaths

No deaths so far due to radiation

Long-term health damage

Not yet known, but risks to human

thought to be low

Current status

Engineers have brought the plant


shutdown condition", a key milesto
under control. It will take decades
completely however.

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