Journal Title: The Middle way.

Volume: vol. 53 Issue: no. 2

MonthNear: 1978Pages: 72-75
Article Author:
Article Title: Brian Galloway; Vijnana, Samjna,
and Manas'
Imprint: London; The Buddhist Society, 1943-

Vijnana, Samjna, and Manas

by Brian Galloway
HE THREE SANSKRIT terms with which we are here concerned (which
will be treated as Buddhist technical terms, without reference to any nonBuddhist usage) are generally translated as 'consciousness', perception', and
'mind' respectively. We intend to show that the first two of these translations
are incorrect, and that the third can be substantially bettered.
Some advocate that such technical terms should not be translated at all.
Quite aside from the fact that these three have already been translated (and, as
we maintain, translated incorrectly), it remains the case that leaving a word
untranslated does not guarantee that we understand it properly. Whether we
translate it or not, we are faced with the necessity of figuring out what it
means; after we have done so we may find that there is indeed a perfectly good
English word which fits the case. The figuring-out is best done by examining
(a) the usage of the word in the texts; and (b) the explicit definition of it, where
and when (and if) one be given.
Let us begin by examining the word 'consciousness'-solely as an English
word and without preconceptions as to whether it corresponds or not to the
range of meaning of the Sanskrit vijfiiina. 'Consciousness' has at least two implications: the feeling of 'I' or self, and the process of reflection and consideration,
or, in a word, thinking (vitarka-vicQra). The Oxford English Dictionary confirms
these meanings of 'consciousness', stating that it is
knowledge as to which one has the testimony within oneself; esp. of one's
own innocence, guilt, deficiencies, etc.
Thus consciousness is the perception of an internal (and intangible) object, and
has with it the feeling of 'I and mine'. It is. moreover,
4. Philos. . .. 'the recognition by the thinking subiect of its own acts or
affections' (Hamilton) . . . 1690 Locke Hum Undo ILL SS.19. Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a Man's own mind. 1707 S. Clarke
2nd Defense (1715)5 Consciousness, in the most strict and exact sense of
the word, signifies . . . [OED's ellipsis] the Reflex Act by which I know
that I think, and that my thoughts and Actions are my own and not anothers.
5. The totality of the impressions, thoughts, and feelings which make up
a person's conscious being.
Thus it is clear that 'consciousness' involves the feeling of self and discursive
thinking; and this is the way the word is currently used by those who speak
English today.
Now perception, on the other hand, has basically two meanings, which we
can draw out of the many definitions of this word in the OED. 'Perception 1',
as we shall call it for convenience, is given in OED definition 3: it is the same
as the 'consciousness' which we have already seen defined; but perception in this
sense, 'Perception 1 i.e. consciousness' has gone out of use today. Nonetheless
here is the definition: OED3:
sometimes practically = consciousness.
Locke calls it
thinking, having ideas;
and in definition 6 we find
1860 Mansel. Perception... has been used by various writers in a wider
or narrower sense-sometimes as synonymous with consciousness . . .
But it is not so used today. Instead, we are left with an unambiguous usage
in 'Perception 2' as we shall call it. This sense of the term is given by the
same Mansel as he continues:
sometimes as limited to the apprehensions of sense alone.

72

The Middle Way

That is, perception is the taking in of data through the gates of the senses, as
for instance seeing forms with the eye. Mansel goes on to distinguish between
sensation (which, as it turns out, is the Sanskrit spada, contact) and perception.
This sense of 'perception' is further illustrated by the OED: it is
the taking cognizance or being aware of a sensible or quasisensible object.
1704 J. Harris. Lex Techn. I, Perception, is the clear and distinct apprehension of any object offered to us, without forming any Judgement concerning
them. 1808 N. Porter . . . [calls itJ in the technical and limited sense of
the term ... sense-perception [with reference to the five senses recognized
traditionally in the west], knowledge of material objects, and of the external
world. 6. In strict philosophical language (first brought into prominence by
Reid): the action of the mind by which it refers its sensations to an external
object as their cause. Distinguished from sensation, conception or imagination, and judgement or inference ... 1876 Maudsley Physiol Mind IV.221
Perception includes not only the internal feeling [spada!] but the "eference
of it to an external cause.
Now it should be clear that consciousness is the thinking and reflection of an
experienced 'self', while perception, as the term is now used, is exclusively
sense-perception, the cognition of external objects (or what are supposed, at
any rate, to be external objects-'consciousness' being totally in terna!) by the
sense-organs. The two terms do not mean the same thing at all! They cannot
both translate vijfiiina, a technical term with a strict and consistent scientific
meaning.
Now as for vijfiiina in its Buddhist usage: as can be seen in any number of
text'>, vijfiiina arises: when there is a sense-organ, an object of sense, and the
lack of obstacle between them; provided the mind is awake and working properly.
Vijfiiina then arises having the form of the object: and it is the first thing that
arises in the mind and is not the result of discrimination, thinking, etc.; and it
is the apprehension of an external object, not of the self. The English word
which expresses the same meaning is clearly perception. Vijfiiina is, according
to the Abhidharmakosa as quoted by Dr. Conze, "the naked, unadorned, apprehension of each stimulus";1 and Bhikkhu Riihula states that the term caksurvijfiiina
"is a philosophical expression denoting the same idea as is conveyed by the
ordinary word 'seeing'''! That is, it is sense-perception, by means of the eye
in this case. Vijfiiina on the other hand does not have anything to do with the
meanings of the word 'consciousness': the feeling of self and the process of discursive thought. Vijfiiina therefore must mean perception and this alone.
But there is another Sanskrit technical term, safT/ifiii, which we should
look at for a moment. The difference between safT/jfiii and vijfiiina is not
immediately obvious, and Gunaprabha, in his commentary on the Paficaskandhaprakara!7a mentions this possible confusion and takes care to distinguish the
two in his section on saf!7jfiii. Vijiiiina, he tells us, "grasps the mere object
(don tsam hdsinto)".' (This provides another confirmation of our thesis that
vijfiiina is simple perception). "Samjfiii [he continues], having discerned the same
object, grasps it with sureness (hdushes ni yut denyid yongssu bcadnas ngespar
hdsinpa ste)"! (We group the Tibetan syllables into polysyllabic words, something not done in Tibetan script, but we are here using Roman letters, in which
such grouping is customary; such grouping has to be made mentally in any
case when reading Tibetan). Vasubandhu's definition of sGf!7jfiii, on which
Gunaprabha is commenting, is this: "grasping an object by its sign (yul fa
mtshanpar hdsinpa).'"
Sthiramati, another commentator on this same text,
explains that "a sign is the particular of an object, blue, yellow, etc.; it is the
basis of classification of an object (lit. image). Grasping by a sign is thinking
'This is blue', 'This is yellow' (mtshanma ni yulgyi byebrag sngonpo dang serpa la
sagspa dmigspa rnampar gzhagpai rgyuo. dela mtshanmar hdsinpa ni hdi ni
sngonpoo. hdi ni serpoo zhes rtogpao).'"
Now all this is well out of the
The Middle Way

73

THEOSOPHY
Theosophy is a modern re-statement of the
eternal truths behind all the world's religions,
It is a comprehensive non-sectarian, nODdogmatic religious philosophy incorporating
a knowledge of many of nature's inner laws
and processes. It deals with both the objective and subjective realms, providing explanations of Spiritualh~tic and Psychic phenomena,
and of the after-death states. Theosophy is
con1plctely compatible with scientific knowledge. It embraces all that is true in the
modern teachings and practices of psychology.
It provides a comprehensive theory of all
valid Yoga practices.
It has sometimes been referred to as the

Secret Doctrine, the Ageless Wisdom and the

Wisdom Religion and so on. and has been
described as the synthesis of science, religion
and philosophy.
Every aspirant after Truth, all serious philosophical scholars and thinkers ought to be
acquainted with, at least, its basic principles.
For information, write to
THE BLAVATSKY TRUST (ll.
P.O. Box 16, London, W3 6HS.

~tb.a

<t JJj1zll:lt

May-day! May-day!
Buddha-day!
BOOKS WA2\'TE1'
At present an 'elite of the intellect'
is spawned out every degree-day,
blind to the light from the East.
Sadly, such elitism is pernicious and
its intellect is puny. Our philosophy, pinpointed in The Middle
Way, May 1978, p. 22, is the development, in the light of personal
experience, of prajiiii-paiifiii-wisdom.
'He who sees ... he sees'. The few
seeds being sown now, will mark a
certain harvest 'and where the vanguard camps today the rear shall
rest to-morrow'.
Tn the hands of students ready for
them, those Devaniigari summaries,
sutras, commentaries and transliterations hiding on your shelves
could build the Belfast and the
Dublin of the future. Please send
something. It will not be hidden
away.
E. M. STAUNTON
Karuna House, Sandyford
Co. Dublin, Rep. of Ireland

realm of mere perception, which does not think anything. Thus this sarrzjfiii
can happen only after vijfiiino has already taken place, and we are told in
Abhidharma works that samjfiii is one of the five ever-present mental elements
(sarvatragacaittadharma) which arise in dependence on vijfiiina. Buddhaghosha
states that the sign (he defines sarrzjfiii just as Vasubandhu does) is like the
mark a carpenter places on wood to remind him of what kind of category the wood
is; when he sees the mark later he recognizes the wood as something previously
seen and classified.' This recognition, then, is the proper translation of samjfiii,
"grasping by a sign, grasping again with sureness." It is something seen before,
now seen again, and known as having been seen before. Riihula uses the term
recognition in his explanation of samjfiii (though he himself translates it conventionally as 'perception'! But if it means recognition, and it is clear from his
explanation that it does, then surely it ought to be translated as recognition).
Contrasting it with vijfiiina, he states (we restore Sanskrit terms here):
When the eye comes into contact with a colour, for instance blue, caksllrvijfiiina arises which simply is awareness of the presence of a colour; but it
does not recognize that it is blue. There is no recognition at this stage.
It is sarrzjfiii (the third Aggregate discussed above) that recognizes that
it is blue.'
If we replace caksurvijfiiina with 'eye-perception' and samjfiii with 'recognition',
this passage makes perfect sense. If we replace them with 'eye-consciousness' and
'perception' respectively it does not make sense. In short:
correct translation
formerly prevailing translation
vijfiiina
perception
consciousness
sarrzJna
recognition
perception
But it may also be argued that vijfiiino may also have the meaning of 'consciousness' is some usages at least, that it has (interestingly enough) the same
duality of meaning as 'perception', with an older, looser sense (,consciousness')
74

The Middle Way

and a newer and exact, technical sense ('sense-perception'). But this older meaning of vijiiiina has, like the older meaning of perception, gone out of use, and in
this case the reason is a deliberate decision on the part of the Buddha himself to
lise vijfiiina only in its strict technical sense of 'perception'. So while the monk
Sati defined vijiiiina as
that which expresses, which feels, which experiences the results of good and
bad deeds here and there
i.e. as consciousness, a feeling of self-experience, the Buddha replies (we restore
the Sanskrit terms into Rahula's quotation of this passage):
To whomever, you stupid one, have you heard me expounding the doctrine
in this manner? Haven't I in many ways explained vijiiiina as arising out of
conditions: that there is no arising of vijiiiina without conditions? Vijiiiina
is named according to whatever condition through which it arises: on account
of the eye and visible forms arises a vijiiiina, and it is called eye-vijfiiina (and
so on)."
It is clear that the Buddha does not want the term used as Sati uses it. He
wishes to define it strictly, very technically, and is by worldly standards rather
sharp with a monk who fails to understand this point. Thus the non-technical
meaning of vijiiiina went out of use in Buddhism because the Buddha himself
chose to use it in its strictest technical sense and would not have it used otherwise.
Again, we can only conclude that perception is the only correct translation
of vi jiiiina.
Manas is usually translated as 'mind', but this latter word is needed for
citta (citta can mean 'thought' as in bodhicitta, or 'intention', but it also indicates
the sum total of non-physical (rupaka) elements in a sentient being, i.e. 'mind'.);
moreover manas is only a partl of the citta/mind. The mind, in Buddhism, is
seen first and foremost as a group of perceptions (vijfiana); manas is one of
them, and is defined by Vasubandhu as
rtagtu bdag tu rmongspa dang, bdag lu llaba dang, bdag lu ngargyal dang,
bdag la chagspa la sags par mtshungspar ldanpai rnamparshespa ste,
That perception which is constantly bound up with the delusion of self, the
view of self, the egoism of self, and the lust for self (iitmamudhi i.e. iitmiividya,
atmadrsti, iitmamiina, iitmaragii-iividya, drsti, miina, and rii.ga being four of
the six passions (klesa) according to the Yogacarins), etc. ('etc.' refers to the
five everpresent mentals or san'atraga, i.e. spada, vedanii, cetanii, samjiiii.
and manaskara).
Thus manas corresponds exactly to 'consciousness'.
NOTES
1

1973.
2

Edward Conze. Buddhist thoughc in India. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan,

p. 189.
Walpola Riihula. l\7hat the Buddh,a caught. New York, Grove Press, 1959.

p. 23

,
6

Desge Tanjur si Ibl-31b7.

Ibdi.
P.aiicaskandhaprakaTal1a. Tib. tr. in Derge Tanjur shi llb4-17a7.
Derge Tanjur shi 195b5-250a7.

Or ibid.

Visuddhimagga.

, Riihula loco cit.

, Riihula op. cit. p. 24.

The misery I have 10 endure in realising

Enlightenment is measurable:
It is like probing a wound
To stop the pain caused by what is lodged therein.
Santi Deva Bodicaryavatara VII, 22.
The Middle Way

75