An Annotated Translation of the

Madhyamakahdayakrik/Tarkajvl
Missing Verses 55-68
Paul HOORNAERT

*$$$. ffW$g$.
19 1999
127159

An Annotated Translation of
Madhyamakahrdayakuriku/Tarkajvulu V. 1-7

Paul HOORNAERT

Introduction

Nagarj una (c. 150-250 A.D.) is generally regarded as the first Mahayana philosopher
and as the founder of the Madhyamaka school, because he was the first to develop
philosophical arguments to substantiate the truth of the Mahayana teaching on the
absence of inherent existence (nilJsvabhavata) or the emptiness (sunyata) of all things as
taught in the Prajiiaparamita sutras and other early Mahayana sutras. It is however
important to keep in mind that Nagarj una only stated the fundamental principles of
Madhyamaka thought without elaborating a systematic doctrine.

In particular, the

doctrine of the two truths, namely the conventional truth (saytlVJ:tisatya) and the
ultimate truth (paramarthasatya), is one of the important Madhyamaka tenets which
Nagarjuna has not discussed systematically.

Nagarj una briefly refers to the two

truths (Mulamadhyamakakarika, XXIV.8-10) , but he does not define them.

And

although the distinction between the two truths is always present at the background of
his arguments, it is not explicated and therefore remains vague and liable to 'nihilistic'
misinterpretations.

The same should be said about the two main post-Nagarj una

Madhyamikas, Aryadeva (3rd ct.) and Buddhapalita (c. 5th-6th ct.) , because neither of
them has formulated a systematic Madhyamaka doctrine.
Bhavaviveka (6th ct.) was the first to elaborate Madhyamaka thought into a system
atic soteriology. He did so by formulating a systematic two-truths doctrine as the
cornerstone of his Madhyamaka thought. The transmitted texts give us indications as
to why Bhavaviveka committed himself to the task of systematization.

There is

indeed textual evidence that the lack of an elaborated Madhyamaka doctrine, and
especially the ambiguity of the two-truths tenet, had resulted in nihilistic interpreta
tions of Madhyamaka thought and had thus discredited Madhyamaka thought to the
extent that it had become the target of criticism by the Y ogacara. It was no doubt in
order to silence this criticism that Bhavaviveka took it upon himself to systematize the
-127-

Madhyamaka teachings.
Bhavaviveka not only systematized Madhyamaka thought, but he also used this
newly developed thought as the basis of an incessant and detailed refutati on of other
systems of thought, both Buddhist and non- Buddhist.

His main target was the

Y ogacara school which he criticizes in each of his works.

The Y ogacarins had

succeeded in integrating the maj or tenets of Abhidharmic scholasticism, their own

interpretation of 'emptiness' in terms of the 'three natures' tenet, and the original
Y ogacara tenets of 'eight kinds of consciousness' and 'mind only' into a coherent
Mahayana soteri ology. As a result, the Y ogacara school had established itself as the
main representative of Mahayana Buddhism in Bhavavivek a's day. Rivalry, envy, an
attempt to counter the dominancy of the Y ogacara school and the urge to vindicate
Madhyamaka thought agai nst the critique by the Y ogacarins were no doubt important
factors that fueled Bhavavi veka's aversion for the Y ogacara school. The main reason
for his sustained critique must however have been his sincere convicti on, as a
Mahayana Buddhist and teacher, that the Yogacara doctrine was based on a mistaken
interpretation of Reality (tattvam), of the knowledge of Reality (tattvajfiana), and of the
path (marga) leading to the knowledge of Reality or to Buddhahood.

In short,

Bhavaviveka must have been convinced that the Y ogacara soteri ology did not teach
the true way to Buddhahood.
Bhavaviveka's most extensive critique of the Yogacara is found in the Fifth Chapter
of his Verses on the Essence of the Middle Way (MadhyamakaJlJ:dayakclrika, abbreviated
as MHK hereafter) with the commentary called The Flame of Reason (Tarkajvcllii,
abbreviated as TJ hereafter) . The central chapter of MHK/TJ is the third chapter in
which Bhavaviveka sets forth his own view of Reality in terms of his two-truths
doctrine and explains the Madhyamaka path of reasoning (vicara) that needs to be
followed in order to attain the knowledge of Reality.

Based on his own view of

Reality, Bhavaviveka in the subsequent chapters discusses and refutes the views of the
Sravakayana (Chapter 4), the Y ogacara (Chapter 5), the Sarpkhya (Chapter 6), the
Vaise$ika (Chapter 7), the Vedanta (Chapter 8) and the Mlmarllsa (Chapter 9)
I here present the edited Tibetan text and an annotated English translation of verses
1-7 of Chapter Five of MHK/T J.

These verses constitute the pz2ruaj){zk:ja or the

introductory part in which Bhavaviveka briefly presents the basic Y ogacara tenets.
The remainder of Chapter Five (verses 8-114) consists of a detailed refutation of these
tenets.

128 -

Up to date, only one comprehensive study of the entire Fifth Chapter of M H K/TJ
has been made, namely Bukkyo ni okeru u to mu to no tairon by Susumu Yamaguchi.
This excellent study (considering that it was made more than fifty years ago!)
contains a Japanese translation of all the verses of Chapter Five and of large portions
of the commentary, accompanied by explanatory comment and references to the
relevant Madhyamaka and Yogacara literature. Yamaguchi's work remains an indis
pensable instrument for the study of Chapter Five of M H K/TJ and of the
Madhyamaka-versus-Yogacara dispute in general. I have therefore made extensive
use of this work in my notes to the translation. In addition, I have made special efforts
to explain the background and to identify the exact text sources of the Y ogacara
tenets as they are presented and criticized by Bhavaviveka.
The following brief outline of the content of the purvapakfia shows that Bhavaviveka's
presentation of the Y ogacara tenets is focused on the following three interrelated
themes, which are also the central themes in Bhavaviveka's own thought : (1) What is
Reality (tattvam)?, (2) What is the knowledge of Reality (tattvajntina)? (3) Which path
(mtirga) should be followed in order to attain the knowledge of Reality and thus

achieve Buddhahood? Bhavaviveka's main contention throughout Chapter Five can

then be summarized as follows: "The Y ogacara understanding of Reality is wrong.
H ence, the Yogacara understanding of the knowledge of Reality is also wrong. Hence,
the Y ogacara path is not a true means to attain the knowledge of Reality (or
Buddhahood). In sum, the Yogacara soteriology is not Mahayana Buddhism."

Synopsis of the Yogacara Doctrine (MHK/TJ Chapter Five, vv. 1-7) :

The basic assertion of the Y ogacara: "Our doctrine is the only true means to lead
people to the knowledge of Reality or to Buddhahood." (v. 1)
1. Definition and synonyms of Reality (vv. 2-3)
2. The path leading to the knowledge of Reality ( vv. 4-5)
2.1 The path leading to the non-apprehension of imagined entities (v. 4)
2.2 From the non-apprehension of imagined entities to the knowledge of Reality (v. 5)
3. The Yogacara doctrine agrees with reason (yukti) and scripture (tigama) (vv. 6-7)
3.1 Rational arguments for the existence of the dependent nature (v. 6)
3.2 Only the Yogacara doctrine is in accordance with the teachings of the Pra
jntiptiramitti sutras. (v. 7)

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List of abbreviations used in the footnotes to the translation

L 'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu, traduit en annote par Louis de la Vallee

AK

Poussin, Paris-Louvain, 1923-1931.

Bodhisattvabhumi (U. Wogihara ed., Tokyo 1936, repr. 1971).

BBh

DDVV

Dharmadharmatavibha1Jgam:tti (]. N ozawa ed., Studies in Indology and Bud

dhology , Kyoto 1955, pp. 9-49.)

M. David Eckel, "Bhavaviveka's Critique of Yogacara Philosophy in Chapter

Eckel

XXV of the Prajiiapradzpa," in Chr. Lindtner ed., Indiske Studier V, Miscellanea

Buddhica, Copenhagen 1985, pp. 25-75.
Madhyamakah;:dayakarika (Y. Ej ima ed.).

MHK

MS, Lamotte

Mahayanasarrzgraha, E. Lamotte ed. and trsl. , La Somme du Grand

Vehicule d'Asahga, Louvain 1938.

Mahayanasutralarrtkara, S. Levi ed., Paris 1907.

MSA
MVBh

Madhyantavibhagabha$ya, G. M. Nagao ed., Tokyo 1964.

MVK

Madhyantavibhagakarika, G. M . Nagao ed., Tokyo 1964.

MVT

Madhyantavibhagatzka, S. Yamaguchi ed., Nagoya 1934.

Prajiiapradzpamulamadhyamakav;:tti, Tib. D. Nr. 3853, Tsha 45b4-259b3 (DBU MA

PP

2); P. Nr. 5253, Tsha 53b3-326a6 (vol. 95, pp. 153-262) .

Schmithausen

Lambert Schmithausen, Alayavzjiiana, On the Origin and the Early

Development of a Central Concept of Yogacara Philosophy, The International Institute

for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo 1987.

Siddhi

Vijiiaptimtitrattisiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. Traduite et Annotee par

Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Paris 1928.

SNS, Lamotte
T.

Sarrzdhinirmocanasutra, E. Lamotte ed., Louvai n 1935.

Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo, ]. Takakusu and K. Watanabe ed., Tokyo 1924-1935.

TJ

Tarkajvala, Tib. D. Nr. 3856, Dsa 40b7-329b4 (DBU MA 3); P. Nr. 5256, Dsa

43b7-380a7 (vol. 96, pp. 19-154).

TrrK
TrBh

Trirrzikavijiiaptikarika, S. Levi ed., Paris 1925.

Trirrzikabha$ya, S. Levi ed., Paris 1925.

Yamaguchi

Susumu Yamaguchi , Bukkyo ni okeru u to mu to no tairon, Tokyo 1941,

rev. ed. 1964.

YBh

Yogacarabhumi, T. D. Nrs. 4035-4042, Tshi Ibl - H i 68b7 (SEMS TSAM 5-10) ;

P. Nrs. 5536-5543, Dsi la - Yi 70bl (vols. 109-111).

- 130 -

1. Edited Tibetan text of MHK/TJ V. 1-7

[Editions used : Cone (C.) Dbu-ma Dsa 199a6-202b4; Derge (D.) Dbu-ma Dsa 199a6202b4; Peking (P.) Dbu-ma Dsa 218b8-223a2J

de nas da ni rnal 'byor spyod pa'i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa la 'jug pas le'u lnga
pa brtsam par bya stel

rang gi lugs kyi nga rgyal gyislI

mkhas par rlom gzhan 'di skad smral I
de nyid bdud rtsir 'jug pa yanglI
rnal 'byor spyod pas legs bstan zer1 II (1)
[anye pracak$ate dhlral; svanltav abhimaninal;1
tattvamrtavataro 'pi yogacarail; sudesital; II(1)J

theg pa chen poz nyid kyi slob dpon thogs3 med dangl dbyig4 gnyen la sogs pa gzhan
dag ni de bzhin gshegs pas lung bstan cingl sa rab tu brnyes pa'i 'phags pa klu sgrub
kyis yang dag par rtogs pa'i theg pa chen po'i don gyi lugs gzhan du 'dren par byed cing
ngo tsha dang khrel med pa don rnam par m i shes pa de bzhin du rnam par5 shes shing
mkhas par nga rgyal byed pa dag 'di skad smra stel de kho na nyid kyi bdud rtsir 'jug
pa stel rab tu 'jug pa de ni bdag cag kho nas legs par bstan pa yin gyi/ dbu mar smra
ba pa rnams kyis ni ma yin zhes zer roll de'i mtshan nyid ni 'di yin tel

dngos po gnyis po med pa'i phyirII

gnyis dngos med pa'i yod pa nilI
yod la sogs pa'i6 blo yi yul/I
dam pa'i don du 'dod do loll (2)
[dvayabhavasya sadbhavad abhavad va dvayasya cal

Based on the Tibetan version of MHK (verses only) which accords with the Sanskrit (yogacarailj).

P : theg pa chen po pa

P : thog

The MHK/T J version reads: mal 'byor spyod par legs par bstan.

P : dbyigs

C, D, P : pa

P : pa

-131 -

sadadibuddhiviayal) paramartho matal) ki lall(2)J

[D. 199b2, C. 199b2, P. 219a5J gnyis ni gzugs la sogs pa gzung ba dangl mIg gI rnam
par shes pa la sogs pa 'dzin pa'ol I de gnyis kyi med pa'i ngo bo nyid med pa'olI med
pa'i dngos po de'i ngo bo nyid du rtag tu yod pa nyid kyi phyir dangl gzung ba dang
'dzin pa zhes bya ba gnyis su ni med pa nyid kyi phyir nal ji Itar gnyis kyi dngos por
med pa'i ngo bo yin pa de'i phyir ni yod pa'i blo yul yin lal gang gi phyir gnyis kyi ngo
bor med pa yin pa de'i phyir na 1 med pa'i blo'i yul yin tel rnam pa de Ita bu'i don dam
pa ni bdag eag rnal 'byor spyod pa pa rnams 'dod do zhes bya ba ni de'i bsam pa bstan
pa yin noll 10 zhes bya ba'i sgra ni bstan beos byed pa bdag nyid kyis mi 'dod pa bstan
pa yin tel de lta bu'i don dam pa ni phyis 'byung ba'i dpyad pa dag gis bsgrub par dka'
ba yin pa'i phyir roll
de dag gi don dam pa de'i grangs kyi tshig ni 'di yin tel

med pa'i dngos po bdag med pal I

de bzhin nyid dang ehos gnas dangl I
rnam par mi rtog blo'i gzung ste2 I I
de shes par ni bya ba yangl I (3)
[ abhavabhavo nairatmyarp tathata ea tathasthitil)1
nirvikalpamatigrahyarp tasyaivadhigamal) punal)1 I (3) J

[D. 199b6, C. 199b5, P. 219b2J zhes bya ba la med pa'i dngos po zhes bya ba ni gzung
ba dang 'dzin par btags pa gnyis med pa nyid3 kyi dngos po' ol I bdag med pa zhes bya
ba ni ehos dang gang zag bdag med pa nyid dol I de bzhin nyid ees bya ba ni phyin ci
ma log pa nyid dol I ehos gnas zhes bya ba ni rtag par de lta bu'i tshul nyid du gnas
pa nyid d04 I I rnam par mi rtog pa'i blo'i gzung ba stel zhes bya ba ni gnyis med pa
ni rnam par rtog pa thams cad dang bral ba'i phyir rnam par mi rtog pa'i blo gros kyi
gzung ba yin tel de nyid don dam pa'ol I de shes par ni5 bya ba yang zhes bya ba nil

dmigs pa Ia ni brten byas nasi I

gang gi phyir dngos por me d pa yIn pa de 'i phyir ni
B ase d on t he Tibe tan ve rsi on of MHK The MI- IK/TJ ve rsi on has 'de'
p. 'me d pa nyid' omitte d
p. 'chos gnas zhe s . gnas p a nyid do' omitte d
P : mi

I P:
2
.J
4
5

- 1:32-

mi dmigs pa ni rab tu sk yelI

mi dmigs pa la brten byas nasi I
mi dmigs pa ni rab tu skyelI (4)
[upalabdhirp samasritya nopalabdhil). praj ayatel
nopalabdhirp samasritya nopalabdhil). prajayatell(4)J

[D. 200a1, C. 200a1, P . 219b5J zhes bya ba stel 'di la kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes
bya ba de ni thog ma med pa'i dus nas zhugs pal thog ma med pa'i dus kyi spros pa'i
bag chags kyi gzhir gyur pal dmigs pa dang rnam pa yongs su ma chad pa yongs su
'dzin pal rgyun ma chad pa dangl rdzas dpag tu med pal rigs du ma dang lhan cig
skye zhing 'gag pa dang ldan pal nus pa'i bye brag mthar thug pa med pa thob pal
sngon po la sogs pa'i yul dpag tu med pa snang ba'i cha dang 'breI ba'i rnam par shes
pa'i tshogs drug bskyed nus pa'i mthu dang ldan pal nyon mongs pa can gyi yid kyis2
skye ba dang 'jig pa dang bral ba'i gnas pa'i3 rnam pas bdag tu yongs su btags pal bsod
nams dangl bsod nams ma yin pa dangl mi gyo ba'i sa bon yod pa'i phyirI khams
dang 'gro ba dangl skye gnas thams cad kyi sa bon dang ldan pal rnam par smin pa
dangl ngar sems pa dangl rnam par rig pa gsum yongs su 'gyur ba'i rjes su 'gro ba de
la dngos po skye ba dang ldan pa rnams 'bras bu'i dngos por kun du sbyor bar byed pa
stel len pa'i rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba yang de nyid yin tel reg pa dangl yid la
byed pa dangl tshor ba dangl sems pa dangl 'du shes btang snyoms kyi rnam pa dang
ldan pa 'di'i zhe'aml 'di na'o zhes 'jig rten pa'i mkhas pa rnams kyi yul yang ma yin
pas rnam pa yang dag par mi rig pa'olI
[D. 200a6, C. 200a5, P. 220a3J de yang rnam pa gnyis tel 'phen pa dang 'bras bur gyur
pa'ol I de la 'phen pa ni rnam par shes pa'i dbang gis4 'phen pa'ol I 'bras bur gyur pa
ni rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bur mngon par grub pa stel dper na chu'i yan lag gzhan
dang gzhan gyi rgyun las chu bo'i klung 'bab pa de bzhin du bsod nams dangl bsod
nams ma yin pa dangl mi gyo ba'i bag chags kyis bsgos5 pa'i kun gzhi rnam par shes
pa'i rgyun kyang 'khor ba j i srid pa'i bar du 'jug par 'gyur roll de la gnas pa'i las kyi
bag chags dangl gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i bag chags dangl lhan gcig tu6 lha dang mi'i

C, D: 'dang' omitted

P : kyi

P : 'gnas paT omitted

P : gi

P : bgos

C, D, P : lha dang gcig tu

-

133

Ius la sogs pa'i rnam par smin pa l ci rigs pa dag skyed par byed pa'ol I len pa'i rnam
par shes pa'i rgyun de yang dgra be om pa nyid thob pa na nyon mongs pa'i sa bon
thams cad spangs pas ldog par 'gyur tel de ltar de ni re zhig rnam par smin pa zhes
bya ba dangl de'i yongs2 su 'gyur ba ste gcig gol I
[D. 200b2, C. 200bl, P. 220bl] gzhan yang sems can rnams de la bdag tu sbyor bar
byed pas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya stel bdag dang bdag gi zhes bya bar
dmigs pa'i phyir roll rtag tu bdag tu rmongs pa dangl bdag tu Ita ba dangl bdag tu
nga rgyal ba dangl bdag la chags pa zhes bya ba nyon mongs pa bzhi po dag dangl
rang gi sa nas skyes pa'i reg pa dang yid la byed pa la sogs pa dag dang ldan pa yin
nol I nyon mongs pa can gyi yid de de yang dgra3 bcom pa la med del nyon mongs pa
thams cad spangs pa'i phyir roll de ltar de ni ngar sems dang zhes bya ba dangl de'i4
yongs su 'gyur ba stel gnyis pa'ol I
[D. 200b4, C. 200b3, P. 220b4] gzhan yang de ni 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa thams cad
kyi nus pa 'dun pa dang mos pa la sogs pa sems las byung ba thams cad dang bcas pa
kun gzhi yin pas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya stel rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa
zhes bya ba yang de nyid yin noll de las mig dangl gzugs dangl snang ba dangl nam
mkha' dangl yid la byed pa la sogs pa'i rkyen j i ltar nye bar gyur pa nal 'j ug pa'i rnam
par shes pa'i tshogs drug po dag 'byung stel dper na rgya mtsho las chu'i rlabs dag
rlung dang chu srin gyis bskyod pa la sogs pa'i rkyen gyis 'byung ba bzhin noll kun
gzhi rnam par shes pa de yang 'j ug pa'i rnam par shes pa de dag dang gcig pa nyid
kyang rna yin lal tha dad pa nyid kyang rna yin tel rgya mtsho dang chu rlabs bzhin
nol I yul la nye bar dmigs pa de dag kyang 'du shes med pa dangl 'du shes med pa pa
dangl 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa dangl gnyid l og pa dangl my os pa dangl brgyal
ba dag gi gnas skabs na ni med dol I de ltar de ni rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba dangl
de'i yongs su 'gyur ba stel gsum pa'ol I
[D. 201al, C. 200b7 , P. 221alJ sems de nyid rnal 'byor pa de la rab tu snang ba 'dzin
pa'i rnam pa dangl yul du snang ba gzung ba'i rnam par yongs su gyur cing snang ba
stel phyi rol gyi don med pas5 sems tsam du dmigs pa la brten nas6 yul mi dmigs pa
rab tu skye lal gzung ba med na de 'dzin pa dag kyang med pas gzung ba mi dmigs
C, D : m am par shes pa
C, D, P : phyogs
, D ' dag
1 C, D, P . de
5 C, D : pa
6 C, D : dmigs pa pa
7 P : ' de' omitt ed
I

134

pa la brten nasi 'dzin pa'i rnam par shes pa rnam pa drug po dag mi dmigs pa rab tu
skye tel ji srid du kun gzhi rnam par shes pa rang gi sems kyi chos nyid rnam par rig
pa zhes bya ba nyid la mi gnas shing dmigs pa la gnas pa de srid du gzung ba'i sa bon
mi ldog cingl mtshan mar Ita ba'i sa bon rna spangs pa'i phyir gnyis kyi bag chags mi
spong ngolI gang gi tshe gzugs la sogs pa dmigs pa dag sems las phyi rol du mi dmigs
pa de'i tshe nal rang gi chos nyid la nges par gnas pa yin tel gnas gyur pas sgrib pa
thams cad bsal ba'i phyir dangl chos thams cad la dbang sgyur ba nyid kyis1 rnam par
mi rtog pa'i chos nyid thob boll
[D. 201a4, C. 201a4, P. 221a 5J rnam par rig pa tsam nyid ces bya ba de bzhin gshegs
pa'i ye shes don thams cad la rnam par mi rtog pa de ni ngo bo nyid gsum yongs su
mi shes na mi rtogs pas2 de'i phyirI

brtags pa nye bar mi dmigs shinglI

gzhan gyi dbang yang gzung med paslI
de nyid mthong ba yongs grub pa'i/I
ngo bo nyid l a Ita ba yinlI (5)
[kalpitanupalabdhis ca paratantrasya cagrahal)1
svabhavarp parini$pannam ik$ante tattvadarsinal)II(5)J
[D. 201a6, C. 201a6, P. 221a7J zhes bya ba smras tel 'di la kun brtags3 pa dangl
gzhan gyi dbang dangl yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid gsum po dag ni kun gzhi rnam
par shes pa nyid kyi khongs su 'dus tel de la nang dang4 phyi rol gyi dbye bas tha dad
pa'i rnam par rtog pa gang dang gang gis gzugs dang byang chub kyi bar gyi dngos po
gang dang gang rnam par brtag par bya ba de ni de bzhin du yod pa rna yin tel yod
pa rna yin par sgro 'dogs pas brtags pa yin pa'i phyir tel de ni kun brtags pa'i ngo bo
nyid dolI khams gsum nas skyes nas5 sems dang sems las byung ba yang dag pa rna
yin pa kun rtog pa dge ba la sogs pa'i dbye bas tha dad pa ni gzhan gyis bskyed cing
dbang bya ba yin pa'i phyir gzhan gyi dbang ngolI yang na gzhan skyes pa la dbang
byed pas gzhan gyi dbang stel kun brtags pa dangl yongs su grub pa gnyis de'i gzhi
las kun brtags pa dangl yongs su grub par 'gyur ba'i phyir tel de ni gzhan gyi dbang
1

P : kyi

P : mi rtog pa

P : btags

P : 'dang' omitted

P : 'nas' omitted
-

13 5

gi ngo bo nyid dol I

gzhan gyi dbang de nyid gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo nyid du

kun brtags pa dang bral ba nyid gang yin pa de ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid dol I
de yang gzhan gi dbang dang1 gcig pa nyid kyang rna yin la tha dad pa nyid kyang rna
yin tel gal te tha dad par gyur na ni chos nyid tha dad par 'gyur roll ci ste gcig pa
nyid yin par gyur na ni des na kun nas nyon mongs pa'i bdag nyid du gyur pas rnam
par byang ba'i rgyur mi 'gyur roll
[Do 201 b3, C. 201b3, Po 221b5] gal te ngo bo nyid gsum po dag yod na j i ltar dngos po
thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa zhe nal kun brtags pa ni rang gi mtshan nyid stong pa
nyid kyi mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa yin pas nye bar mi dmigs shing gzhan gyi
dbang yang de la rang gi bdag nyid kyis skye ba med pa'i phyir skye ba ngo bo nyid
med pa yin pas gzung du med dolI yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ni kun brtags pa'i
chos rnams kyi don dam pa yang yin la ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang yin tel 'phags
pa'i ye shes dam pa'i spyod yul gyi don yin pas don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid
kyis ngo bo nyid med pa yin tel de nyid mthong ba don dam par shes pa dag yongs su
grub pa'i ngo bo nyid de la dmigs par bya ba dangl dmigs pa'i dngos po mnyam pa nyid
kyis2 Ita ba yin tel 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par mi rtog pa skyes pa'i phyir
ro zhes bya bar sbyar roll gnas gyur pa'i mtshan nyid de yang nyan thos rnams kyi
ni rnam par grol ba'i Ius yin tel zag pa thams cad dang bral zhing nyon mongs pa'i
sgrib pa spangs pa'i phyir roll de nyid de bzhin gshegs pa'i ni chos kyi sku yin tel las
dang gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i bag chags thams cad dang bral zhing shes bya'i sgrib pa
spangs pa'i phyir roll
[Do 201b 7 , C. 201b7, Po 222a2] gal te kha cig 'di skad ces kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid
ni 'j ig rten dang thun mong pa'i shes pa'i yul yin la yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ni
so so rang rig pa stel thub pa 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes kyi yul yin na gzhan gyi
dbang gi ngo bo nyid de shes pa gang gi yul yin zhing de3 yod par j i ltar shes zhes zer
na de'i phyir I

btags pa rgyu mtshan be as phyir dangl I

gzhan du gnyis po med phyir dangl I
kun nas nyon mongs dmigs pa'i phyir I I
gzhan dbang yod pa nyid du 'dodlI (6)
1
2
3

' dang' om itte d

kyi
P : 'de ' om i tte d

P:
po

136

[prajfiaptel; sanimittatvad anyatha dvayanasatal;1

sarpklesasyopalabdhes ea paratantrastita matall(6) J

ees bya ba smras tel 'di ltar sems dang sems las byung ba dag yod pa nyid du btags
pa gang yin pa de ni phyin ei log gi rgyu mtshan dang beas pa snang ba'i phyir tel
mtshan nyid des gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du rjes su dpag gol I gzhan du gal te
gzhan gyi dbang med par gyur na btags pa dang rgyu mtshan nam kun brtags dang
yongs su grub pa gnyis po med par thaI bar 'gyur ba'i phyir tel de gnyis ni gzhan gyi
dbang la rag Ius pa'i phyir roll gzhan yang gal te gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid med
par gyur na kun nas nyon mongs pa dmigs par mi 'gyur ba zhig na de dmigs pa'i phyir
tel kun nas nyon mongs pa ni sems dang sems las byung ba dag la brten pa yin lal de
dang bra 1 ba nyid ni thar pa yin pa'i phyir roll de'i phyir gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid
du 'dod dolI
[D. 202a5, C. 202a5, P. 222a8J de yang 'j ig rten las 'das pa'i shes pa rnam par mi rtog
pa'i yul yin pas yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid mngon sum du byas nas mthong stel
gzhan gyi dbang ni de'i rjes la thob pa dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes kyis rtogs par bya
ba yin pa'i phyir roll

shes rab pha rol phyin tshul 'di/ I

thams cad mkhyen nyid thob pa yinlI
skye dang 'gag la sogs pa dag1 I I
dgag pa lhur len rna yin noll (7)
[prajfiaparamitanitir iyarp sarvajfiataptayel
na tutpadanirodhadiprati$edhaparo nay al; I 1(7)J

zhes bya ba ni ehos 'di dag nyid kyis ehos rnams mngon par rlan par byedl yongs su
rdzogs par byedl yongs su gsal bar byedl yongs su dpyod par byed kyang2 'di la bdag
gam bdag gir bya ba med do zhes gsungs pa des ni bdag dang bdag gi rnam par 'dzin
pa dangl de la mngon par zhen pa med pa'i sgo nas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i yongs
su 'gyur ba bstan to I I sems de ni sems rna yin no zhes gsungs pa des ni gzung ba dang
'dzin pa med par bstan toll sems med pa nyid gang yin pa de ni bsam gyis mi khyab

1 C, D : dang
2 P: kyis

-137 -

bo zhes gsungs pa des ni rnarn par rig pa tsarn nyid bstan toll de bzhin du gzugs ni
rntshan rna'ol I byang chub kyi bar du yang rntshan rna'o zhes gsungs pa des ni rning
dang brdar btags pas kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid bstan toll skur pa gdab pa dangl
nye bar blang ba dangl gdags pa'i chos dangl byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos bstan
pas ni gzhan gyi dbang bstan toll de bzhin nyid dangl yang dag pa'i rntha' dangl
dben pa dangl 'bras bu dangl rnarn pa tharns cad rnkhyen pa nyid la sogs pa brj od pas
ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid bstan toll de ltar kho bo cag gisl bstan pa'i shes rab
kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i tshul 'di ni tharns cad rnkhyen pa nyid thob pa'i thabs yin gyil
dbu rna srnra ba rnarns kyi skye ba dang 'gag pa la sogs pa dag dgag pa lhur len pa
ni rned pa nyid du Ita ba dang rnthun pa nyid du 'gyur bas tharns cad rnkhyen pa nyid
'thob pa'i thabs rna yin no zhes zer tel de ni rnal 'byor spyod pa pa dag gis sbyar ba'i
phyogs snga rna yin noll [D. 202b4, C. 202b4, P. 223a2]

P:

gi
- 1 38 -

2. Translation

Let us now begin the Fifth Chapter in which the Yogacara [doctrine of] Reality
(tattvam) will be closely examined in order to ascertain its truth or falsity.l

Others, proud of their own doctrine and boasting of their erudition, say:
"The entrance into the nectar of Reality is surely explained well by the
Yogacarins [only] ." (1)
Others, such as Asanga, Vasubandhu, and so forth2, who are teachers of the same Great
Vehicle, erroneously (anyatha) interpret the meaning of the Great Vehicle, which was
correctly understood by the noble Nagarjuna whose future enlightenment was predict
ed (vytikrta) by the Tathagata and who entered the [first] bodhisattva-stage.3 They
know neither shame nor embarrassment.4 Although th.ey do not know the [true]
meaning [of the Great Vehicle] they nevertheless boast that they are experts who
'

The Sanskrit title of Chapter 5 ( Yogacaratattvaviniscayavatara) means "Entrance into (avatara) an

ascertained and hence conclusive judgment (viniscaya) [on the truth or falsity ] of the Yogacara
[doctrine of ] Reality."

'tattvam', here translated as 'Reality', literally means 'being just that' ( de kho na nyid). Sthiramati
explains the etymology of this term as follows: "[ The abstract term ] tattvam is construed as
follows. Since this is just that, it is 'that' ( tat ) . The being (bhava) of 'Gust) that' is 'being just that'

(tattvam)." (MVT 7.8-9: tattvam iti tad evedarrz tat, tasya bhavas tattvam ity arthaJ:t; de kho na zhes
bya ba ni 'di nyid de yin pas de 'o/ de 'i dngos po ni de kho na ste . . . ). See also Candrakirti's
Yuktisa5tikavrtti (C. A. Scherrer-Schaub, Yuktisa5tikavrtti, Melanges

explanation of 'tattvam' in

Chinois et Bouddhiques, Vol. 25, Bruxelles 1991, pp. 237-238.)

Reality, or the true nature of things, is misunderstood when one apprehends the unreal as real and
asserts that things are 'more than just that' or more than what they really are (

samaropa), or
apavada).
2 Yamaguchi (pp. 86-88) remarks that Bhavaviveka here does not mention Maitreya among the
Yogacara teachers, although he quotes from MVK further in the text (for example, MVK 1.6 is
=

when one apprehends the real as unreal and asserts that things are 'less than just that' (

quoted as MHK V. 4). This indicates that Bhavaviveka, unlike the later Tibetan tradition, did not
recognize Maitreya as the historical Yogacara author of MVK, etc. It also indicates that
Bhavaviveka, unlike his contemporary Sthiramati (d. MVT, 2.3-9), did not regard MVK as a work
of which Maitreya was the heavenly promulgator (pranet r) or creator (kart r) and Asanga the
human transmitter ( vakt r). It must have been unacceptable to Bhavaviveka that Maitreya, a
tenth-stage bodhisattva and future buddha, would have been the creator, or even the inspirator, of
Yogacara treatises which Bhavaviveka vehemently rejected as heterodox.
3

A<tcording to the Lankiivatarasutra (v. 165-166), Nagarjuna entered the first bodhisattva-stage called
'the stage of joy' (muditabhumi ).

Shame (hri) and embarrassment (apatrapya) are two good mental factors (kusalacaitta) that keep a
person from evil actions either out of self-respect or because of fear of being blamed by others.
They are therefore necessary accompaniments of all good states of mind (d. AK II. 25). Their
counteragents, non-shame and non-embarrassment, are secondary defilements (upaklesa) which
accompany all bad states of mind (d. AK II. 26cd, II. 32ab). Bhavaviveka thus passes a severe
judgment upon the Yogacarins: they lack the restraints of shame and embarrassment and are
therefore unable to control their impulses to do evil.
-

139

know [its true meani ng] and say : "The full entrance into the nectar of Reality

IS

correctly taught by us alone, not by the Madhyamikas. "

The definition of Reality [as understood by them] i s as follows :
Because [for them, Reality is] the nonexistence of the two and is also the
existence of the nonexistence of the two l , they think that the Ultimate2 is
the obj ect of a mind [that perceives] existence, and so forth. (2)
'The two' refers to the obj ects apprehended by consciousness (grahya), such as visible
form (ntpa) and so forth, and to the apprehending consci ousnesses (grahaka), such as
visual perception and so forth. 'N onexistence' is the inherent nonexistence of these
two.3 [Reality is] the permanent existence consisting in the inherent existence of this
nonexistence (abhavabhavasvabhava), and [ Reality is also] the nonexistence of the
duality of apprehended objects and apprehending consciousnesses. Therefore, inas
much as [ Reality] is the inherent existence of the nonexistence of the two (dvayabhava
bhavasvabhava), [Reality] is the object of a mind [that perceives] ex istence. And

because [Reality] is [also] the inherent nonex istence of the two, it is [also] the object
of a mind [that perceives] nonexistence. The purport [of the verse] is: "We Yogacar
ins assert that the Ultimate is like that." The word "10" (kila) [ in the verse] indicates
that I [ Bhavaviveka] , the author of this treatise, do not assert this. The Ultimate as
understood in that way is indeed difficult to be established, as will be shown by means
of the reasonings that will be adduced later.
The synonyms of the Ultimate, as understood by them, are the following :
'Existence of nonexistence', 'absence of self-existence', ' [always] being
thus', 'remaining as it is'4, and 'what is apprehended by the )ransworldlyJ

Base d on the de fi nition of 'e mptine ss' in MVK I l3ab c (cf Yam aguchi , p. 81): " Emptine ss is indee d

de fine d as the none x iste nce of the two and as the e x i ste nce of this none xi ste nce . It is nei the r
[simpl y ] e xi ste nce nor [simpl y ] none xi ste nce " ( dvayilbhiil'o hy abh ill 'asva bhilvaz sifn.vasya lak:;a
;;wm / na bhilz;o nilp z abh ilval)
2
pa rmn ilrtha' or ' obje ct of the highest knowle dge ' . He re use d as a synonym of 'Re ality' ( tat tv{lm) .
" Lite rall y : "Nonexistence is that the se two have the nature of none x iste nce "
N o ne xiste nce by nature is ab solute . inhe rent none x iste nce ( alyantilbhilva) or none x i ste nce through
out the three pe riods of time . It is to be dist ingUIshe d from rel ative none x iste nce , which is e i the r
none xiste nce prior to e X iste nce (= the none xi ste nce of future thl11gs) or none x iste nce afte r having
e x iste d ( the none x i ste nce of past thl11 gs) (See MVT. 47. 13-20.) According to the Y ogacara the ory
of the three nature s, the im agl11e d n ature is ab sol utel y or inhe re ntly none xiste nt and the refore l a cks
all indivi duating prope rtie s (lak:;mJaniISVabhilL'a), the de pe nde nt nature e xists, W ith ItS I11 dl viduat
ing prope rtie s, in the pre se nt onl y , and the pe rfectly e stabl ishe d nature e x ists pe rmane ntl y (See
ve rse 5 bel ow.)
4 ta th llst h itil (Sansk n t ve rsion) . The Tibe tan ve rsi on re ads dharmasthitll.
'

-- 14 0 -

nonconceptual awareness'.l
Further, as for the realization of that same [Reality] 2, (3)
'Existence of nonexistence' (abhavabhava) is the existence of the nonexistence of the
two which are conventionally designated as 'apprehended object' and 'apprehending
consciousness'. 'Absence of self-existence' (nairtitmyam) is the absence of self
established existence in things and persons. ' [Always] being thus' (tathatti) is irrever
sibility (aviparitata)3. 'Remaining as it is' means 'permanently existing in that way'.
'What is apprehended by nonconceptual awareness' means that the nonexistence of the
two is the object apprehended by the [transworldly] nonconceptual awareness, because
it is inaccessible to conceptual cognitions (vikalpa). As such it is [also] the object of the
highest awareness (paramartha).
That [Reality] is also to be realized, as follows :
The non-apprehension [of objects] arises as a result of perceiving [everything
as phenomena appearing only in the mind] . And the non-apprehension [of the
mind as an apprehender of objects] arises as a result of the non-apprehension [of

To be comp are d with MVK 1 1 4 -1 5 (d. Y amaguchi, p. 81) whe re the following synonyms of
'Emp tine ss' ( Re ality) are liste d and e xp l ained : tathaM (always be ing thus) , bhutakoti (that which
is fully re a l and can the re fore ne ve r be the cause of e rrone ous knowle dge or viparyiisa ) ; animittam
=

(without app re he ndable p rope rtie s) , paramiirthatii (obje ct of the ultimate aware ne ss of the aryas) ,
dharmadhiitu [ that which, when re alize d, functions as the base or cause ( dhiitu
hetu) of all the
=

sup re me qua litie s of the aryas]

The te rm nirvikalpamatigriihyam sugge sts that the Yogacara conce ive s Re ality as a hyp osthatize d
entity with app re he ndable p rope rties ( nimittam ). It the n foll ows that the aware ne ss of Re ality
(tattvajJiiina) , a lthough nonconcep tual, wil l st ill be an app rehe nding ( griihaka) or obje ctifying
( upalambha) cognition of Re ality and will in that se nse not diffe r at all from any ordinary
pe rcep tual cognition. This Yogacara unde rstanding of Re ality and of the aware ne ss of Re ality is
the ultimate targe t of Bhavavive ka's criticism throughout Chap te r 5 of MH K/T] .
2 A n alte rnative inte rp re tation would be that the last me mbe r o f this ve rse me ntions anothe r
synonym o f the U ltimate according t o the Yogacara. The me aning would the n be that the re aliz a
tion o f Re al ity i s nondistinguishable from Re al ity itse lf and is i n that se nse also the U lti mate
( paramiirtha). I he re follow the comme ntary in TJ whe re the l ast me mbe r of ve rse 3 is inte rp re te d
as a n introduction t o ve rse 4 which e xp lains the basic step s t o be followe d i n order t o re alize
Re al ity.
3 'tathatii' is usually glosse d as 'unchange ability' (ananyathii, 'ne ve r be ing othe rwise ') or 'always be ing
thus' (TrK 25c : sarviikiila'Y(l tathiibhiiva) . Be cause Re al ity is unchange ab le , i t is also irre ve rsible
( aviparita) in that it always manifests itse lf e xactly the way it is, and ne ve r as othe r than what it
is. O nly change ab le things are ap t to manifest the mse l ves in diffe re nt ways at differe nt time s.
Re ality is the re fore by de finition nonde cep tive (avitatha, amrsii): it is ne ve r the cause o f misapp re
he nsions ( viparyiisa) that would mistake it as some thing e lse than what it is. Also, whe the r it is
re alize d or not, Re ality (the mind's be ing e mp ty of the app re he nde d-app re he nding dual ity) a lways
re mains the same Re ality, be it at the le ve l of the unle arne d (P rthagjana), the le arne rs (saik:;;a ) or the
full y le arne d (asaik:;;a ) (d. TrB h 41. 29 ad TrK 25c) . Re ality is the re fore 'absolute ' in the se nse that
it is absolved from and unaffe cte d by its be ing re alize d or not be ing re alize d.
-

14 1

objects].1 (4)
In this world (iha) the so-called 'store-consciousness' (ttlayavz;nana) has been active
,

from time i mmemorial. 2 This consciousness is the receptacle-support (gzhi) of the

residual impressions (vttsana) of the conceptual and verbal differentiations (prapanca)
[that people have been making] from time immemoriaP Both its object (ttlambana)

Quot at I on of MVK 1.6 (d. Yamaguch i , pp

85-86). This verse exp l ains t he maj or st ep s o f t he

Yoga ca ra -p at h by whIch t he nonexist ence of t he app rehended-apprehending dua lity can be rea liz ed
( nilJlak:Yl1:zaprave.a-upaya), p rovided one reasons correct ly (ymll.om anasikara) in accorda nce with t he

fundament al Y oga ca ra t enet s of t he t hree nat ures, the corresp onding t hree absences of int ri nsic
existence ( nl",)vabh{IV(l), and t he nondual nat ure of the mind ( cz ttanultra)
A s will be sho'v vn in t he not es that foll o w , the p resent at i on of t he Y oga ca ra t enet s 111 t he TJ
comment ary on v erses 4 and 5 (t he eight k1l1 ds of conSCI Ousness, t he ult im ate nature of t he m111 d as
free frorn the app rehended-app rehending dua l it y , t he t hree nat ures , t he three absences of 111t nns i c
ex i st ence) i s almost ent i rely based o n TrK/ TrBh

Yamaguchi (pp

1 3 2 - 1 3 -! ) P01l1t s out that

B ha vaviveka's p resent at i on of t he Y oga cara t enet s mainly draws up on the Dl gnaga-Dharm apa la
l ine of t hought (emp hasis on the subst a nt I al exist ence of consciousness, t he 's(l/dim' nat ure of
consciousness, et c ) Y amaguchi therefore excl udes any dI rect dep endence o n St hiramatI' s Tr1l11.i/;:ablza!))la . This may be true, but it IS al so true that t he focus o f Y oga ca ra thought in Bhav av iv eka' s

day w a s the TriJ!1,z'i?rl, as IS eVI dent from t he 1 0 comment anes that were rep ort edly writ ten on
V asubandhu's t reat ise, two of whi ch were wntt en by Bhav aviveka's contemp oraries Dharmapal a
and St hiramat i It is o f course p o ssibl e that St hiramat i 's blza:;ya was not yet available in writt en
form at t h e time when TJ was comp o sed, but t he ideas and even the p hrases of TrBh were cert a inly
well known to t he author of TJ . as is evident from t he p arallel word1l1 g of many p a ssages (see t he
not es below)
Comp are WIt h t he charact eriz at ion of t he st ore-consciousness as "t he beginm ngless element and the
supp ort of all dharmas" in t he Mahayanablzzdlzanna :-,i7tra (quoted

111

MS, Lamott e II, p. 1 2 , TrBh 37

1 2 -13 , S iddh i, p 1 69) S ee a lso Y a maguchI , p 9 0

The TJ -comment ary st art s wit h a not very syst emat i c exp lanat i on o f t he st ore-conscIO usness in
general This is fo l l owed by a more syst emat i c expl anat i on of t he eight k inds of consciousness
based on Vasub andhu's theory of the 't hree t ransformat i ons' of t he st ore-c onsciousness in TrK and
on Sthlramatl 's comment ary in TrBh
j

S NS defines t he ment al imp ressions or t races which are app rop ri at ed by the st ore-conscio usness as
"t he imp ressions of the concept ual and verbal di fferent iat i ons (jJrapanca) which are t he habit ual way
( vyavahara) of [i dent i fyi ng] t he charact erist i c p rop ert I es ( nirnitta) of t hings and [ associat ing them

wit h] na mes ( naman) and concept s ( vi/la lj)(z) ( Lamott e, S NS V 2 , p 1 8 4 , Tib t ext p 55

mtslzan ma

dang mzng dang mam jJar rtog pa la tlw snyad 'dogs pa 'i spros pa 'z bag chags). 'prapai'iw' thus

refers t o the habIt ua l construct ion or sup erimp osit i on of t he different i at ed \v orld of everyday
experience , al l t he p ercept ions, emot I O ns and cogmt i ons of ordinary p eop le are affected by t he
ingra1l1 ed habIt of conceiving t he worl d as consist i ng of sep a rate, enduring subj ect s (I versus ot hers)
and sep arate, enduring obj ect s (d TrBh 1 9 1 2

rltmadivzkalpa vasana rfipadldharmavikaljJa v{l!>ana cal

These same i mp ressions are called " i mp ressl Ons of att achment t o the im agined nat ure of thi ngs"
(parikalj)ltasvabhava-abhinivesa-vasana) in YBh Vin. Samgr. (D. S ems Tsam 8, S h l 4a 1 , d. a lso TrBh

19 7 , S chmithausen, p 73 and not es) The ment a l habit of concept ual and verbal di fferent I at ion not
only const ruct s a nonex ist ent world, but is al way s accomp anied by att achment t o t he realit y and
ult i mate val ue of t he t hus const ru ct ed, di fferent i at ed worl d
-142 -

and its mode of apprehending its object (iikiira) are indistinct (aparichinna).l It is an
uninterrupted stream and an unfathomable (aprameya) real entity (dravya).2 It originates
and perishes simultaneously with [the birth and death of sentient beings] in the
manifold forms of existence (jiiti). It acquires an endless variety of potencies (sakti) and
has the power to produce the six consciousnesses which apprehend3 the innumerable
objects of perception that [uninterruptedly] appear in it, such as blue and so forth. The
defiled mind (kli!itamanas) conceives it as a self (iitman) in the sense of a [mental] basis
(iisraya) [of personal existence] which is free from birth and annihilation.4 Because

[this store-consciousness] exists as [the support of] the seeds (bija) of virtuous (pw'Jya),
nonvirtuous (apu1Jya) and immovable (iinifijya) actions, it contains the seeds of [rebirth in]
all the [three] realms of samsaric existence (dhiitu), the [five] states of migration

L iter all y: " It compr ise s (yongs su 'dzin pa, parigrhUa) an in dist in ct obje ct an d [ an in dist in ct ] mode
of appre hen ding ." On 'parigrhUa ' as use d in t he act ive sen se , see Schmit h ausen, n ote 1 47. The ter m
'parigrhUa ' in dicate s that ' having it s own obje ct an d it s own, un ique mode of appre hen ding
t hat obje ct' is an intr in sic pr opert y of t he st ore- con sciousness (d. TrB h 1 9.3- 4: na hi niralambanaYtl
nirakarattt va vijiianattt yujyate). The st ore -con sciousne ss is t heref ore a gen uine c on sciousne ss on it s
own, different fr om t he tr adit ion al si x con sciousne sse s.
The obje ct of t he st ore -con sciousne ss is def ine d in var i ous ways in t he Y oga car a te xt s (see
Schmithausen, pp. 89 ff.). Accor ding t o t he f ull y de vel ope d t he or y (e .g . TrB h ad Tr K 3 ab), t he
st ore -con sciousne ss is aware of t he f ol lowing obje ct s:
(1) An intern al obje ct con sist ing of (a) t he impre ssion s of one' s att achment t o t he imag ine d n at ure
of t hing s, (b) t he sen se org an s (subt le matter) an d t he ir supp ort (gr oss matter
t he body), (c) the
four n on -mater ial aggreg ate s (
naman, on ly in TrB h 1 9 .8, 1 9 .1 8 -20 ; d. Schmit hausen, p . 10 5) .
(2) An e xtern al obje ct: t he surr oun ding e xtern al worl d (bhajanaloka
sthana) .
Be cause t he intern a l obje ct s of t he st ore -con sciousne ss are e xtre me ly subtle (atisukfima), it s
awarene ss (vijiiapti ) of t he se obje ct s is in dist in ct ( asatttvidita
aparichinna); t hat is, t he se
intern al obje ct s are n ot kn own by a mode of appre hen si on (akara) t hat discern s t he m as "t his is
that" (TrB h 1 9.1 4 -1 5: so 'sminn idaYtl tad iti pratisatttvedanakareJJO asatttvidita). As f or t he e xtern
al wor ld, it s vastness e xcl ude s an y dist in ct awarene ss by t he st ore -con sciousne ss (d. YB h, D. Shi
3 b7) . In sum, t he st ore -con sciousne ss is t he un interr upte d but dim awarene ss of one' s habit ual
pr open sit ie s (viisana), one' s body, one' s ment al st ate s an d one' s U mwelt .
Yamag uchi (p. 90) refer s t o SN S where t he st ore -con sciousness is said t o be "pr of oun d ( gatttbhira)
an d subtle (sukfima)" (zab cing phra ba) an d " an un interr upte d stre am." ( SN S, T. vol. 16, 6 92c21 -23 ;
L amotte V.7; quote d in TrB h 3 4.3 -4, Siddhi p. 173) ; a lso Tr K 4d: tac ca variate srotasa oghavat).
Asvabha va quote s t his p assage fr om SN S in his comment ar y on MS (T. vol. 31, 3 83b29-c9; D. Ri
1 96 al ; MS, L amotte 1. 4, p . 1 4) an d e xp lain s 'pr of oun d' as "diff icult to f at hom by t he inte l l igen ce of
le arne d pe ople," an d ' subt le' as " diff icult t o kn ow e ven by t he Sra vakas."
B ha vavive ka here e mp hasize s t hat t he Yoga car in s vie w t he st ore -con sciousne ss as a sep ar ate, re al
con sci ousne ss (dravya). H i s own p osit i on is t hat on ly t he in st ant ane ous occurren ce s of con sciousness
are re al an d t hat ' c itt a' is j ust a n ame or de sign at ion of t he un interr upte d stre am (sattttana) of t he se
in st ant ane ous occurren ce s (see MH K V.46 ff .) .
L iter all y: ' which are conne cte d or j oine d wit h' (dang 'breI pa). The me an ing see ms t o be t hat t he
si x consciousne sse s (t he f ive sen se per cept i ons p lus t he sixt h ment a l per cept ion) are pr oduce d as
dist in ct appre hen sion s of some of t he inn umer able image s of t he e xtern al worl d which cont in uously
appe ar an d re appe ar in t he st ore -con sciousness but are on ly in dist in ctl y appre hen de d by t he
st ore -con sciousness it self ( d. n ote 1 above).
On t he st ore -con sciousness c on ce i ve d as 'titman' in t he sen se of 'iisraya ', see Schmithausen p . 11 9 -1 20.
=

-14 3 -

(gati) and the [four] modes of birth (yoni),l Its actualization [consists of eight different kinds

of consciousness] in accordance with2 the following three transformations (parifJama)

the transformation into [the consciousness that is the result of the] maturation (vipaka)
[of previous actions] , the transformation into the 'ego' thinking [consciousness] (manana),
and the transformation into the [six] object-manifesting [consciousnesses] (vijiiajJti).3
All the things that originate stick to that [store-consciousness] in the sense that they
[continue to] exist there as results [in the form of stored impressions] (phalabhavena).
The store-consciousness is therefore also called 'the appropriating consciousness'
(adanavijiiana).4 It is accompanied by [the five omnipresent mental factors, namely,]
1

2
3

Compare with TrBh 1 8 .26-1 9 .1 ( Yamaguchi , p. 90) : sarvadhiitugatiyonzjatz'U kusaliikusalakarmavipii

katviid Vlpiikaz: d also MS , Lamotte 1 . 21 with Asvabhav a's commentary
The three re al ms and the five st ate s of migration are : (1 ) The realm of desire or of impure matter
(kiimadhiitu) which includes hell -beings, hungry ghosts, animals and human beings, ( 2 ) the realm of
pure, subtle matter (niPadhiitu) and (3) the i mmateri a l realm (iirupyadhatu) where the gods dwell (d.
AK I I I , p. 11 ff.). The four m odes of birth are : (1 ) birth from an egg, ( 2 ) birt h from a womb, ( 3) birth
from exudation and ( 4) sudden appari tional bi rth (d. AK I I I , p. 26 ff)
V irtuous and nonvirtuous actions accomplished in the realm of desire are the causes of rebirth in
respectively a good mi gration ( either in the realm of desire or i n the realm of pure matter) or a bad
migrati on. ' Immovable acti ons' are vi rtuous actions accomplished in the realm of pure matter or in
the immateri a l realm; they are called ' i mm ovable' because their retribution is always a rebirth i n
the same samsaric realm. (S ee A K I V , p p . 1 06-1 08.)
Litera lly: 'It moves on ( or attains di fferent actua li zati ons) (gam) in accordance with (anu) . ' .
B ased o n TrK I d-2 ab: jJamJiimalj sa ca tndhiil I Vlj)iiko mananiikhyasca uijiiaptir ui,)(1yasya ca (Cf
Yamaguchi , p 91 )
Although the TIbetan text continues wi thout a paragraph break here (ljes su 'gro ba de la . ) , it
is better to insert a brea k between rjes su 'gro ba and de lao
A l l the actual instances of consci ousness produce impressi ons or traces (viisanii) by which their seeds
or potencies in the store-consci ousness are reinforced. After these instances of consci ousness have
perished , they ' stick' (kun du sbyor bar byed pa
ii-li) to the store-consciousness in the sense that
theIr i mpressi ons ( their result) remain stored there. When the store-consci ousness functions as the
cause of actual instances of consciousness, the store-consci ousness is said t o ' stick' to them as their
cause. O n the etymol ogi cal explanation of 'a laya' as ' stick ing', see S chmithausen, notes 1 81 -1 83 The
textual sources of this etymology are the following ( see Schmithausen, notes 1 36-1 3 7) .
(1 ) A verse from the Abhidharmasutra ( quoted in MS , Lamotte I . 2 and I.27 ; S anskrit text i n M V T
34.1 - 2 , S iddhi p 1 72) saying that this consciousness is t h e 'store' (iilaya) of a l l dharmas beca use " a l l
dharmas al ways stick to this consciousness (chos kun rnam par shes l a sbyor, sarvadharmii hi
iilinii uijiiiine) and in its turn this consciousness sticks to them , because they al ways exist as the
result and as the cause of each other."
( 2) MS , Lamotte 1.3 . " It is c a lled 'iilayavijiiiina' because a l l the i mpure dharmas that originate (skye
ba can) stick (sbyor ba) to it in the sense that they [ c ontinue to] exist there as results, and it sticks
to them as their cause." S ee a lso MVT 33 8-9 : iiliyante sarue siisravii dharmiis tatra phalabhiivena
lac ca te'5u hetubhiivenety ii layah.
( 3 ) TrBh 18.24-25 ( ad TrK 2cd) . " It is called 'iilaya' because a l l dharmas 'stick' (iiliyante, 'jug cing)
to it or are cl osely united with it (upanibadhyante, 'brel ba) in the sense that they [conti nue to]
eXIst there as results (kiiryabhiiuena), or because it itself sticks to all dharmas or is cl osely united
with them in the sense that it is their cause (kiiralJabhiivena)."
( 4 ) YBh-Vyiikhyii (based on MS 1.3 ; d. S chmithausen, note 81 7) expla ins 'alaya' as follows : 'byung
ba dang ldan pa'i 'du byed rnams de la 'bras bu'i dngos por sbyor bar byed pa 'ami de dag la de
rgyu'i dngo por sbyor bar byed pa 'z phyir kun gzhi zhes bya ba ... .
The store- consci ousness was origina lly a l so called 'appropri ating consciousness' because it appro
priates corporeal matter at the m oment of conception (pratisandhi) and keeps it appropriated
throughout lifetime, especially also during unconsci ous states (Schmithausen, p. 49). The account of
the 'appropri ating consci ousness' here in TJ follows S NS V.2 [the store-consci ousness a lso appro
pri ates the i mpressi ons of a l l the instances of conceptual and verbal d ifferenti ation (j)rapaiica)] or
TrBh 1 9. 11 ff. [ the impressions are the appropri ated content (upiidi) of the store- c onsciousness]
=

-144 -

contact (sparsa), attention (manasktira), feeling (vedana), volition (cetana) and concep
tualization (sarrzifiti) which are all neither painful nor pleasant (upekfjti).! The way in
which [these mental factors] apprehend (tiktira) [their objects] is not distinctly known
(asarrzvidita) [through clear cognitions] such as "it belongs to this" or "it exists there, "

because it i s beyond the scope o f [the knowledge of] even learned people.2
Further, that [store-consciousness] is twofold: it is the proj ection (tikfjepa) [of a new
existence] and it is the transformation into the result [of the maturation of previous
actions] (phalapari1Jtima).3 'Projection' is the proj ection [ of a new existence] through the
power of the [store-] consciousness.4 'Transformation into the result' is actualization

Cf. YB h Yin. Samgr ., D. Shi 4b2 ff. ; TrK 3 cd (the store- consciousne ss is always accomp anie d by
sparsa, manaskara, vit, sarrzifiia and cetanii) ; TrK 4abc (the fee ling that accomp anie s the store
consci ousne ss is ne ithe r p ainful nor p le asant, and the same is true of the othe r four omnip re se nt
me ntal factors) .
Sthiramati (TrB h 21.1 5 ff.) e xp lains that the fee l i ng associate d with the store consciousne ss is
ne ithe r p ainful nor p le asant be cause it is an indistinct ( aparichinna) fee ling, just l i ke the aware ne ss
p rope r to the store consciousne ss itse lf, and is the re fore unable to disce rn the favorable and
disfavorable characte ristics of its obje ct. M ore ove r, p ainful or p le asant fee l i ngs are accomp anie d
by dislike ( dve$(1) or de sire ( raga). The se two root de file me nts cannot p ossibly accomp any the
store consciousne ss and its me ntal factors, be cause the l atte r are morally ne utral ( avyakrta). The y
are moral l y ne utral be cause the y originate e xclusive ly a s the sp ontane ous and uninte rrup te d re sult
of the maturation (vipakaphala) of actions that we re pe rforme d during one' s previous life time .
Painful or p le asant fee lings only occur i n association with the six consciousne sse s, be c ause the se
originate or do not originate depe nding on the p re se nce or abse nce of agreeable or disagree able
obje cts during one' s present life time.
2 Since the author of TJ has alre ady me ntioned that the 'akiira' of the store consciousne ss is not
cle arly disce rnible (see p 1 43 above), the p re sent state me nt is be st unde rstood as re lating to the
'akara' of the five me ntal factors that accomp any the store consciousne ss. Comp are for e xamp le
with YB h Yin. Samgr ., D. Shi 4b3 -4 : chos de dag kyang rnam par smin par bsdus pa dang / 'jig rten
gyi mkhas pa rnams kyis kyang rtogs par dka ba'i phyir phra ba ... ["The se me ntal factors are a lso
subtle, be cause the y are fully include d in maturation (vipakasarrzgrhita) and be cause eve n le arne d
pe op le can hardly know the m ." ]
3 The e xp lanation o f the first o f the e arlie r me ntione d ' three transformations' starts he re .
4 The store- consciousne ss is the p roje cting cause (ak$epa, phen pa) of a ne w, future e xiste nce be cause
it store s and p re se rve s the ne wly p roduce d impre ssions of all one' s acti ons accomp lishe d during one's
p re se nt life time. It is also the p roje cte d ( ak$ipta, 'phangs pa) re sult of the maturation (vipakaphala)
of the actions accomp lishe d during one' s p re vious life time .
'ak$ejJa ' and 'vipaka ' are e xp laine d toge the r i n M S ( L amotte 1. 59) a s fol l ows:
(1) 'ak$epa' stands for the ne wly p roduced vipakavasana; if the se imp re ssions we re not store d in the
store- consciousne ss, the re could be no future re birth of a ne w store -consciousne ss (
vijiiana as
the third me mbe r of the twe l ve -me mbe re d chain of depe nde nt originati on) as conditione d by one' s
p re se nt actions (
sarrzskara as the se cond me mbe r) .
(2) 'vipaka' is the uninte rrup te d p re se nt e xiste nce of the store- consciousne ss in one of the state s of
migration (gati); this p re se nt e xiste nce is the re sult of t he maturation of the actions accom
p lishe d during a p re vious life time.
The Y ogacara te xts inte rp re t the twe lve me mbe rs of depe nde nt origination as a single p roce ss of
re birth consisting i n the p roje ction (ak$epa) and actualiz ation ( abhinirvrtti ) of k armic imp ressions.
For furthe r de tails, see the p ape rs by R. Kritze r in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 4 2. 2
(1 994), pp . (28) - (33) and 45.1 (1 996), pp. (1 5) - (20).
=

-145-

(abhinirm:tti) as the result of the maturation [of previ ous actions] (vipakaphala). ! Just

as a river continuously flows because of the contiguity of the different parts of the
water, just so the continuous flow of the store-consciousness -permeated (paribhavita)
by the impressions of virtuous, nonvirtuous and immovable actions- continues to exist
as long as samsara lasts.2 The impressions of [previous, not yet retributed] actions
(karmavasana) and the impressions of [the erroneous notions] of apprehended objects

and apprehending consciousnesses (grahyagrahakavasana) together produce a [new]

retribution in the form of a corporeal existence (lus

atmabhava) as a god, a human

being, and so forth, as it convenes in each case.3 This continuous flow of the appropriating
consciousness ceases to exist when one obtains arhatship, because all the seeds of the
defilements are then destroyed.4 So much for the so-called 'maturation' and the way it
develops [from the store-consciousness] ' This is the first [transformation of the
store-consci ousness] .
Further, [the store-consciousness] is also called 'alayavijnana ' in the sense that
sentient beings stick or cling to it (a-ll, sbyor bar byed pa) as their self (atman) , because

Yamaguchi (p . 93) refers to Tr B h 18.7-8 (ad TrK Id) : phalapariJ'pima/J ('bras bur gyur p a) punar
vipttkavttsanttvrttilttbhttd ttlayavzjiittnasya purvakarmttk$epaparisamttptau (snong gyi las kyis 'p hangs p a
yongs su rdzogs la) ytt mkttya;,abhttgttntare!iU abhinirvrttih (mgnon p ar 'grub p a). (" The transforma
tion i nto the result i s the actualization of the store-consci ousness in other hom ogeneous existences
when the p roj ective p o wer of p revi ous acti ons has been fully consumed and the imp ressions of
maturation acquire their op erational efficiency ")
Comp a re a lso with TrBh 1 8 . 1 6 - 1 7 (ad TrK 2 ab)

tatra kusalttkusalakarmavttsanttparipttkavasttd yathtt

k$eparrz U i ltar 'p hangs p a ) phalttbhimrvrttir ('bras bu mngon p ar 'grub p a) vipttkal;.

2

The store-c onsci ousness is not a unitary, nondiscrete entity (ekam, abhznnam), but is a continuum
(sarrztttna) of discrete, momentary (k;xllJika) menta l events (cf TrBh 2 1 25- 26).
The comp arison with a river is found in TrK 4d (lac-ca vartate srotastt oghavat ) There are close
p a rallels between the text of TJ here and S thiramati's commentary on TrK 4 d : tatra sroto (rgyun)
hetuphalayor nazrantaryelJa pravrtti/J. udakasamuhasya (chu'i tshogs) purvttparabhiigttvicchedena pravttha
( 'bab p a ) ogha (chu bo) ity ucyate yathtt hy oghas trlJttktt:;thagomayttdin ttkar:;ayan gacchati evam
ttlayavzjiittnam api PUlJyttpulJyttnenjyakarmavttsanttnugatarrz sparsamanaskttrttdin akarYlyat srotastt saY}'l
sttram avyuparatarrz pravartata iti. (TrBh 22 1- 5)

Comp a re with TrK 19, TrBh 36.23-37.3 (cf Yamaguchi, p. 94) : The i mp ressions of the erroneous
notions of app rehended objects and app rehending consci ousnesses (grtthyagrtthakagraha) (

the

mistaken idea that the objects of conscio usness exist in their own right sep arately from consci ous
ness and that consci ousness app rehends such sep arately existing objects) coop erate with (sahakarin,
lhan cig byed pa) the imp ressions of p revi ous actions (karmavasanti) in the p roduction of a new
ex istence (tttmabhava, Ius ), just as water is a necessary condition for the origi nation of a sp rout from
its seed. The imp ressions of p revious actions cannot p roduce their result , unless they are assisted
(anugrhita, zin pa) by the imp ressi ons of the two erroneous notions (grtthadvayavttsana).
4

Comp are WIth TrK 5a

tasya vyavrttir arhatve.

14 6

[their defiled mind (klitamanas)] objectifies it as 'I' (aham) and 'mine' (mama).l [ That
defiled mind] is always accompanied by the following four defilements : the ignorance
regarding the [nonexistence of the] self (iitmamoha), the erroneous view [that the
store-consciousness is] the self (tttmadrti), the pride of self (iitmamttna) and the love
of self (tttmasneha).2 It is [ also] accompanied by [the five omnipresent mental factors,
namely,] contact, attention, and so forth, which originate from the same stage (bhumi)
as that where the defiled mind itself exists.3 The defiled mind also does not exist in an
arhat, because [in an arhat] all the defilements are eradicated.4 So much for the
so-called 'ego' thinking [consciousness] and the way it develops [from the store
consciousness] . This is the second [transformation of the store-consciousness] '5
Further, that [store-consciousness] is also called ' ttlayavijflttna' because it is the
receptacle (gzhi, ttlaya) of everything in the sense that it contains the potencies of all
the forthcoming consciousnesses (pravrttivijflttna) and [hence also the potencies] of all
the mental factors such as aspiration (chanda), determination (adhimok$a) and so

Comp are wit h TrK 5bcd : tadasritya pravartate tadalambanaJfl manonama vijiitinaJfl mananatmakam.
(" The consciousne ss which is called 't hinke r' (manas) comes fort h wit h t hat [st ore -consciousne ss]
as it s supp ort and has it as it s obje ct . It has 't hinking' as it s nat ure .")
TrBh 22.23 -24 : satkayadr:;(yadibhi/:t saJflPrayogad ahaJfl mama ity alayavijiianalambanatvat . . . (" ...
be ing [const ant ly] accomp anie d by t he vie w of se lf and so fort h, [t he de file d mind] obje ct ifies t he
st ore -consciousne ss as 'I' or 'mine ' .")
O n t he et ymological me aning of 'alaya' as that t o which one st icks or clings, see Schmit hausen, pp .
24-26 , 57 . According t o Schmit hause n (note 137) , the olde st te xt source in which t he st ore
consciousne ss is e xp l aine d this way is M S ( L amotte I.3): "O r it is calle d 'alayavijiiana ' be cause
se nt ie nt be ings st ick t o it (sbyor ba, aliyante ) as t he ir se lf."

2 Comp are with TrK 6. St hiramat i (TrB h 23 . 1 4 - 17) comme nt s t hat t he se four de file me nt s are inte rre
late d as follows. First , t he ignorance o f the t rue nat ure o f t he st ore -consciousne ss i s the cause of
vie wing t he st ore -consciousne ss as t he se lf. This misconcept ion of t he se lf le ads to se lf-p ride (

to

consider one se lf supe rior t o ot he rs) . Finally, t he se t hree de file me nt s p roduce att achme nt t o what is
imagined to be one 's se lf.
3

Comp are wit h TrK 7 a: t he four de file me nt s bel ong to t he same samsaric re alm ( dhatu) or st age
(bhumi ) as that whe re the de file d mind originate s (The re are nine samsaric st age s: the re a l m of
de si re , t he four me dit at i ons of t he re alm of p ure matte r, and t he four me dit at i ons of t he immate rial
re al m.) The same is t rue of t he five me nt al fact ors of t he de file d mind (TrB h 2 4 .6 : etair (

sparsa,

et c.) api yatra jatas tanmayair eva saJflPrayujyate nanyadhatubhumikai/:t; Siddhi, p . 266) . N ote that t he
re alm or st age in which t he de file d mind originate s is t he same as t hat in which t he st ore
consci ousne ss p rese nt l y e xist s, be cause t he de file d mind i s p roduce d from it s see ds i n t he st ore
consci ousne ss (TrB h 22.20 -2 1) .
4

Comp are wit h TrK 7b : arhato na tat; TrB h 24 . 1 4 : arhatas tavad ase;;aklesaprahalJat klis(aJfl mana

Comp are wit h TrK Sa: dvitfya/:t parilJamo 'yam.

naivasti.

- 1 47 -

forth. l It is [therefore] also called 'the root-consciousness' (mulavijnana) . The

SIX

forthcoming consciousnesses originate from it [either successively or simultaneously]

depending on the presence of [cooperating] conditions such as the visual sense organ,
visible form, light, space, mental attention, and so forth, just as waves arise from the
ocean depending on condi tions such as the wind, the stirring up of the water by the
seamonster, and so forth.2 The store-consciousness is neither identical with nor sepa
rate from these forthcoming consciousnesses, just as the ocean and the waves [are
neither identical nor apart from each other] 3. These [six] apprehensions of obj ects
(vi:;ayasya upalabdhayaJ:z)4 do not exist in the following special states (avastha) [ of the

store-consciousness] : existence as a divine being without concepti on (asaYfli;zika) , the

meditative state of non-conception (asarrz,jnisamajJatti) , the meditative state of cessation
[ of all conceptions and sensations] (nirodhasamapatti), deep [dreamless] sleep (midd-

O n the etymol ogy of 'alaya ' as meaning 'recep tacle' or 'abode' ( i ts standard Sanskrit meaning). see
Schmithausen. notes 1 38- 1 40
Comp are \i\'ith TrK 9-14 : Dep ending on the conditions, the si x forthc oming conscio usnesses can be
accomp am ed by any of a l l the existent mental factors . the five omnip resent menta l factors, the
mental factors which are determined ( vznzyata ) as to their sp ecific object ( chanda, adhirnokYl, etc ),
the eleven virtuous mental factors. the six fundamental defil ements, the twenty secondary def!le
ments ( upaklesa), and the four morally indetermined ( aniyata) menta l factors
N o te that the store-consci ousness is here exp l a ined as the 'basis of everythmg' in the sense that It
contains the seeds of all the instances of mind and of a l l the mental factors only, and not a lso the
seeds of the materi a l sense-faculties and thei r corp orea l basis (the body) nor the seeds of the
surrounding world According to Schm ithausen (pp . 6 2 -65), the st ore-consciousness was origina lly
concei ved as the 'seed of mind' only , the idea that i t a lso contains the seeds of corp orea l matter
and of the external world is a later develop ment.

Comp are w ith TrK 15 (the store-consciousness is the root of the five sense consci ousnesses) and
TrBh 33 2 0 ff. (cf Yamaguch i , pp 1 00- 1 0 1 ) The store-consci ousness is the 'root' in the sense that it
is the seed or the ever-p resent ca use ( hetupra tyaya) of the SIX forthcoming consciousnesses Dep end
mg on the conditI Ons. the latter arise either successi vely or simultaneously (in the case of two or
more heterogeneous consciousnesses) .
For the comp arison of st ore-consciousness /forthcoming consci ousnesses with ocean/waves. see al so
Lankauatarasltra as quoted in Siddhi, p. 1 7 5 (T. vol 31 , 1 4c E l )

'1

The neither- one-nor-different relati onship between the store-consci ousness a n d the forthcoming
consciousnesses is not menti oned in TrK/TrBh. It

IS

however discussed m Siddhl, p . 4 1 4 (T vol 3 1 ,

38c4 a d T r K 16) as a n app lication of the ocean/waves comp ari son in the Lankauatclrrtsfttra (cf
Y amaguch i . p . I O n
4

Comp a re with T r K 8 c (the si x forthcoming conSCl Ousnesses are 'vz:;ayasya l(PalabdhiI ' ) Sthiramati
gl osses 'upalabdhz ' as 'grahafJarn ' (,dzin p al or pratipatti ' (rtog p al (Tr Bh 25 2 - 3) The si x are also
defined as 'uzayauzjnal)tl ' (TrK 2b) beca use each of them lets its own sp ecific object app ear in the
mind ( vi:;ayapra(va uabhasatvat , TrBh 1 8 1 8 )
- 1 48 -

ha), insanity (mada?) and swoon (murcha). l So much for the so-called 'obj ect

manifesting consciousnesses' (vijiiapti) and the way they develop [from the store
consciousness] . This is the third [transformation of the store-consciousness] 'z
In the practitioner of yoga, these six consciousnesses3 [habitually] manifest themselves
as transformed into [two] aspects (ilkilra) : that of an illuminating4 apprehender of objects
(grilhaka) and that of an apprehended object (grilhya) or object-appearance (viayilbhtisa).

N ow, because external objects (bilhyilrtha) do not exist, the non-apprehension of objects
arises [in the yogin] as a result of (samilsritya) apprehending [everything] as mind only
(cittamiltra). And if the apprehended objects do not exist, then the [consciousnesses as]

apprehenders of these obj ects do not exist either. Hence, the non-apprehension of the six
kinds of apprehending consciousness arises as a result of the non-apprehension of objects.5
1

TrK 16 me ntions five of the se si x state s (e xcep t insanity) as states in which only the sixth me ntal
consci ousne ss doe s not originate. N ote that the TJ comme ntator is ve ry unp re cise he re , be cause it
is onl y in the state of asarrziiiika and i n the two samapatti states that all the six consciousne sse s do
not e xist anym ore (see Siddhi, pp . 400, 403).
DDVV (N oz awa e d. , 37. 13 - 16 ) me ntions 'myos pa ' , toge the r with deep sleep and swoon, as one of the
state s whe re concep tual thought ( vikalpa) is abse nt, but which should not be ide ntifie d with the
highe st nonconcep tual aware ne ss (nirvikalpajnana). See a lso YB h Vin. Samgr . XV, T. 30, 70 6b26 (D.
Zi 27 a 1 , P. Hi 29a5) : deep sleep , madne ss (myos pa) and intoxication (rab tu myos pa) are state s
whe re me ntal atte ntion (manasikara) i s abse nt, but which are not nirvikalpajnana.
According to the Yogacara, asarrzjnika and the two kinds of samapatti are state s which qualify the
store- consciousne ss ; the y are not sep arate ly e xisting factors dissociate d from the mind ( cittavi
prayuktasarrzskara) as the Sarvastivadins hold.
2 The comme ntary has thus far e xp l ained the Y ogacara the ory of e ight ki nds of consciousne ss in
te rms of the three transformati ons of the store -consciousne ss. As Yamaguchi (pp. 10 2- 103) obse rve s and
as has been shown in the notes, the e ntire account thus far was base d on TrK 1 - 16. The ne xt se ction
of the commentary goe s on to e xp l ain mind-only ( vijnaptimiitra) as the the ore tical basis of the
p rocess of re asoning and me ditation to be followe d in orde r to re alize Re ality as it is. This se ction
corresponds to the conte nt of TrK 17 - 1 9 (e stablishing the p rincip le of vijnaptimiitra) and TrK 26-30
(e xp laining the maj or step s of the Y ogacara p ath as base d on the guiding p rincip le of vijnaptimiitra) .
3 The te xt h a s "that same mind ( citta ) ", but the context shows that 'mind' he re re fe rs to the six
forthcoming consciousne sses that we re discusse d in the p re vious p aragrap h.
4 rab tu snang ba (prabha?). It is also p ossible that 'rab tu snang ba ' nee ds to be corre cte d into 'rang
du snang ba ' (svabhasa) in p ara l le l with 'vi:)flyabhasa '.
5 This paragraph summarize s TrK 26-28.
(1) The yogin, whose mind doe s not ye t dwe l l in its true non-dual nature ( vijnaptimiitratvam ) , has
not ye t re move d the p rope nsitie s (anusaya) of the two mistake n concep ti ons ( graha) (TrK 26).
TrB h (42 . 1 6) says that such a yogin sti l l has 'grahyagrahaka-upalambha ' . N ot having abandoned
(apraha;:ta) the pe rcep tion of e xte rnal things ( bahir-upalambha), he has a lso not abandone d the
obje ctification of his own mind as a pe rce i ve r (adhyiitmika-upalambha) of exte rnal things. He
the refore think s : "1 pe rce ive color with my e ye s, e tc. " (TrB h 4 2. 2 1 -23 ). This stage corresp onds to
the 'Stage of Accumulation' (sambharavastha) of the Y ogacara p ath.
(2) In the ne xt stage , the yogin abandons the pe rcep tion of exte rnal obje cts , but he still obje ctifie s
mind-only ( vijnaptimiitra), that is, he stil l thinks that the mind re ally e xists as a n app re he nde r of
obje cts (grahaka) (TrK 27 ). This corre sp onds to the first substage s of the 'Path of Sustai ned
Effort' ( prayogamarga) during which the yogin e ngage s in corre ct re asoning (yonisomanasikara)
and as a re sult acquire s the ce rtain knowle dge that e xte rnal obje cts (including the se lf) do not
e xist and that all the obje ct-image s that appe ar in his mind are the re sult of an inte rnal
de ve lop me nt of the mind itse lf.
(3) During the late r substages of the 'Path of Sustaine d Effort', the yogin re alize s that "when the
app rehe nded obje cts do not e x ist, the n consciousne ss as an app re he nde r of obje cts doe s not e x ist
e i the r." He conse que ntly abandons the app re he nsion of the mind as an app re he nder of obje cts
( vijnanagraha) (TrK 28). N ot app rehe nding any obje ct at all, he the n dwe lls in the true nature of
his own mind ( vijnaptimiitratvam, svacittadharmata). He the n for the first time obtains the highe st
nondual aware ne ss (nirvikalpajnana) in the ' Path of See ing' ( darsanamarga).
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149

As long as the store-consciousness does not stand firm in its own true nature which
is called ' [merely] letting appear' (vifnapti [ matra ] ), but still dwells in the perception
[of apprehended obj ects and apprehending consci ousnesses] 1 , just as long are the
impressions of the [apprehended-apprehending] duality (dvayavasana) not destroyed,
because the seeds [ of the appearance of] apprehended objects are then not yet removed
and the seeds of the perception of the characteristics (nimittadarsana

grahaka) [of

these objects] are consequently also not yet destroyed.2 But when [the mind] no longer
apprehends objects, such as visible form and so forth, as existing outside the mind, then it
stands firm in its own true nature (svadharmata).3 All the obstructions (avaraJJIl) are then
indeed removed because of the fundamental change of the mental basis (asrayaparavrtti).
The mind then obtains its true nonconceptual nature (nirvikalpadharmata) together
with the mastery (vibhutvam) over all dharmas.4
[The mind's true nature of] merely letting appear [the apprehended-apprehending
duality] (vifnaptimatrata)5, or the awareness of the Tathagata which is free from dual
apprehension (n irvikalpa) with respect to all things, cannot be realized unless one fully
understands the three natures. Therefore, [the Y ogacarins] say :
When the imagined [nature] is not perceived at all and the dependent
[nature] is not [erroneously] apprehended, then the seers of Reality see
the perfectly established nature [of the mind] . (5)

Compare with TrK 26ab : yavad vijnaptimiitratve vzjnanalfl na avati!)thatz. TJ here follows TrBh
almost word by word : yavac cittadharmatayalfl vijnaptimiitrasaJ1;lsabdztayan.1 vljniinalfl navati!)thatz
kim tarhi grahyagrahakoj)alambhe carati . (TrBh 42.16- 1 8 ad TrK 26ab).
Since the true nature of the mind consists in 'merely letting appear' a nonexistent apprehended
. .

apprehending duality, the meaning here is that the mind as vijnaptimiitra is intrinsically empty of
this duality (d. the expression 'advayalak:;;afJ e vijnaptimatre' in the fol lo wing note)
Compare with TrK 26cd : grahadvayasya anu,ayas tavan na vznivartate The text again closely
follows TrBh . yiivad advayalak.5afJe viJnaptimiitre yoginas cittaJ1;l na prati:;thitaJ1;l bhavatl. tavad
grahyagrahakanusayo na vinivartate (mi ldog) na prahiyata (mi spong) ity arthalJ. (TrBh 4 2 . 1 9 - 2 1 ad
TrK 26cd)
Comp are with TrBh 43 1 2 - 1 5 (ad TrK 28) . yasmin kale .. rupasabdadyalambanaJ1;l j1'iiinaJ1;l bahi,czttiit
nopalabhate na pasyatz na grhfJiitz nabhinivisate . . tasmin kale vzjnanagrahasya prahiilJOlfl sV(lcitta
dharmatayan:z ca prati:;(hito bhavati.
Compare with TrK 29 -30 and the commentary in TrBh
TrK 29 ' The supreme (niruttara) change of the store-consci ousness is its change mto nondual
awareness, which is fully rea l ized in the Buddhas ; this change is atta ined when all the seeds (bzja
dau:;thulya) of the two obstructions (the obstructi on consisting in the defilements and the obstruc
tion of the atta inment of omniscience) are removed.
TrK 30 : To obtain the nondua l nature o f the mind is to 'obtain the mastery over all dharmas'
(TrBh 4 5 . 1 . sarvadharmavibhutvalabhatas ). This is also called 'the dharmakaya of the Buddhas'
See note 1 above. Also TrK 25d : 'vijnaptimiitrata' is used as a synonym of 'tathata' (the unchange
able nature of the mind) and of 'parini:;pannasvabhava' (the ful ly accomplished nature of the mind)
=

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The three natures that are mentioned here -the imagined, the dependent, and the
perfectly established- are all included in the store-consciousness.l
Any thing (vastu) whatsoever, from visible form up to enlightenment (bodhi), which
is apprehended by any of the dual apprehensions (vikalpa) of either internal or external
things, does not exist the way it is apprehended. This is because it is [merely] a
construct (kalpita), produced by superimposing (samiiropa) a nonexistent [ on that which
really exists] . That is the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhiiva).2
The erroneous apprehensions (abhutaparikalpap -that i s to say, [all] the instances
of mind and [all] the mental factors which originate from [the store-consciousness in]
the three samsaric realms and which vary (bhinna) according to the distinction (bheda)
into good, [bad, morally neutral] and so forth- are dependent on others (paratantra)

This ide a is most p robably borrowe d from Asanga' s Mahayanasarttgraha (MS) in which the maj or
Yoga ca ra tene ts (the e ight kinds of con sciousness, the vijiiaptimiitra p rin cip le an d the three n ature s)
are for the first time in te grate d in to a syste matic sote ri ology. Chap ter 1 of MS discusse s the
store -consciousness as the ' basi s of e ve rything that can be kn own' (jiieyasraya), that is, as the
p roducing cause of a l l the depen den tly origin ated in stan ces of con sciousne ss. Chap ter 2 discusse s
the three n ature s a s three ' characte ristics' o f e verything that can be kn own (jiieyalak;;alJa) . It is

p robably in that sen se that the three n ature s are he re said to be ' in cl ude d in the store -consciousne ss' .
2 The e xp l an ation of the three n ature s he re an d in the following p aragrap hs is base d on TrK 20- 25.
The p re sen t p assage is base d on TrK 20 an d on the commen tary in TrB h (d. Yamaguchi, p. 113) .
TrK 20 : yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate! parikalpita eva asau svabhavo na sa vidyate// .
TrB h 3 9.10-1 2 : adhyatmikabiihyavikalpyavastubhedena vikalpyanam anantyartt pradarsayannaha, yena
yen a vikalpena iti. yad yad vastu prakalpyate, adhyiitmikartt biihyartt va antaso yavad buddhadharma
3

api . . .
The comp oun d 'abhutaparikalpa' can be in te rp re te d in two ways.
(1) First, when it is in te rp re te d as a de scrip tive comp oun d (karmadharaya), i t me an s 'con sciousne ss
which is e rrone ous'. In this in te rp re tation , 'abhuta' doe s n ot me an 'n one xisten t, n othin g' , but
me ans ' un true, false , de cep tive' ( abhuta, attatva, vitatha) . Consciousness is n ot true to re ality
(vitatha) be cause it doe s n ot exist the way it appe ars (yatha pratibhasate tatha na vidyate). The
Tibetan tran slators have followe d this in te rp re tation (yang dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pa).
One p roble m on which the Y oga cara school e ven tually got divide d, con ce rn s the e xact n ature of
the falsity of con sciousne ss. Is con sciousne ss in trin sically n on dual (nirakara) an d does its falsity
con sist in the fact that i t appe ars as a duality (
as a con sciousne ss of some thin g) ? Or is
=

con sciousness in trin sically dual an d doe s i ts falsity con sist in the fact that its subje ctive aspe ct
false ly appe ars as a se lf-iden tical kn owe r while its obje ctive aspe ct false ly appe ars as the image
of an exte rn a l world that see ms to e xist in depen den tly of con sciousne ss? According to the first
the ory, liberation is achie ve d when con sciousne ss has reje cte d its e rrone ous, but adven titious,
appe aran ce as a dua lity an d has re cove re d its true n on dual n ature . According to the se con d
the ory, liberation i s attaine d when con sciousness has reje cte d its false dua lity (or its false akara) .
(2) When 'abhutaparikalpa' i s in te rp re te d a s a depen den t comp ound (tatpurusa), i t me ans ' the con scious
ness in which n one xisten t duality ( abhutam) appe ars or by which n one xisten t duality is imagine d
to e x ist'. See e.g. MVT 22.10-11 : abhutam asmin dvayam parikalpyate 'nena va ity abhutaparikalpalJ;
MVT 46.20 -2 2 : dvayasya grahyasya grahakasya ca. abhutaparikalpe 'bhiltaparikalpena va parikalpitiit
makatvad vasturupClJiibhavalJ. In this in te rp re tation, 'abhuta' me an s 'n one xisten t' (abhava, asat )
(e.g. Trisvabhavanirdesa ve rse 5 : asatkalpa).
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151

because they are under the power (dbang bya ba) of others in the sense that they are
produced by others.l Or, [the samsaric mind and its mental factors] are paratantra ' in
the sense that they exert power with respect to the origination of others, because they
are the basis (gzhi) from which the [other] two [natures] -the imagined and the
perfectly established- come into existence as the imagined and the perfectly estab
lished [natures of the mind] .2 That is the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhava).
The fact that the dependent [nature of the mind] is devoid of (rahitata) what

IS

imagined (parikalpita) to be its apprehended object and its nature as apprehender, is the
perfectly established nature [of the mind] (parini:;pannasuabhava).3 This perfectly
established nature is neither identical with (ekatuam) nor separate from (p,thaktvam)
the dependent [nature of the mind] .4 If it existed separately, it would follow that the
true nature (dharmatil) [of the dependently originated mind] exists separately [from
the mind itself] . 5 On the other hand, if the perfectly established nature were identical
[with the dependent nature] , the former could not be the cause of the purification
(vyavadana) [of the mind] because it would then have defilement as its nature (sa'Y(l
klesatmakatvat). 6
1

Compare with TrK 2 1 ab . paratantrasvabhzluas tu uikalpal; pratyayodbhaval; ' TrBh 39.23-26 : tatra
pankalpal; fmsalakui5a lauyakrtabhedabhinnas traidhiitukascittacaittal;
( . . J parair hetujJ ratyayclls
tan tryata itz paratantra utpadya/a ity arthal. ( rgyu dang rkyen gzhan gYI dbang bya bas gzhan gyi
dbang ste/ sk yed ces bya ba'i tha tshig ste) (Cf Yam aguchi, pp. l l 4 - l l 5)
As Yam aguchi (p. l l 5) po ints out, this etymo l ogica l explanatIOn of paratan tra ' is not found in any
ext ant Y ogacara text. The idea that the dependent na ture of the mind is the basis of the other two
natures I S ho wever one of the central i deas 1 11 for example the MahayanasaY(lgraha ( MS). Asanga
there expla ins that the dependent nature is the basis of defi lement (s(lJ?klesa as the appearance of
the imagi ned nature in the dependently originated mind or as attachment to the imagi ned nature
by the dependently originated m1l1d , see note 3 on the previous page) and of purificat I On ( vyavadana
as the non-att achment to and the non-appearance of the Im agined nature in the dependently
origi nated mind or as the rea l i zation of the fully established nature of the mind) There i s no doubt
that the co mmentator of TJ here refers to this central i dea of MS
Compare with TrK 2 1 cd . n i,pannas tasya purve'f}a sada rahztata tu ya , TrBh 40.2-5 : tasmin vifw lpe
grahyagrahakabhaua parikalpital ( .J tena grahyagrahake'f}a paratan trasya sada sarvakalaY(l atyantara
hitata ya sa parinz$pannasvabhauah
Compare with TrK 22ab : ata eua sa nazva anyo nananyal; jJaratantratal;. The neither- i dentical -nor
different relation between the dependent and ful ly established natures is al so taught in the fo l l owmg
passages : S N S, T. vol. 16. 690a27-69 1b9 , MVK I I , I 1 3d, V . 1 9 , MSA VI 1 , XI 77 ; YBh Vzn
Samgr , T. vol. 30, 696c lO- 697a4 , DDVV 24-25 (VI) ; Si ddhi , T. v o l 3 1 . 46b14-2S
Compare with TrBh 40 8- 1 0 . rah itata ca dharmatcz dharman nanya nananya YUJyate. parz n i}pan nasca
j)aratan tradharmata ity atal; pa ratan triit parzn i,panno nanyo nananya zti boddhauyal , M V Bh 23 8 :
P rthaktve sati dharmad anycI dhannata iti na _vuivate.
Compare with TrBh 40 . 1 1 - 1 2 : atha ananya evam apz parin i$panno na uisuddhyalambanal; syiit
paratantravat saY(lklesatmakatuiit ; M V Bh 23.9 - 1 0 : ekatue sati vi.uddhyalambanam [fnana1?J na svat
Sthiramati ( M V T 48.24-25) expl ains 'vi.uddh l as 'that which punfies' and i dentifies i t with the
marga. Accordingly, 'cause of puri fication' in this context means the foll owing : If the perfect ly
establ ished nature were I dentIcal with the dependent nature, the former could not be the cause (in
the sense of func ti oning as the object) of the purifying consciousnesses that arise during the marga.
- 152 --

You may ask : "If the three natures exist, what then about [the Prajiiaparamitasutra
teaching that] all things lack inherent existence (sarvabhiivani/:tsvabhava)?"l [We
answer :] The imagined [nature] lacks inherent existence with regard to individual
characteristics (lak$alJani/:tsvabhava), because it has no characteristics of its own (svalak
$alJasunyata). It is therefore not perceived at all (anupalabdhi ) .2 The dependent

[nature] lacks inherent existence with regard to its origination (utpattini/:tsvabhiiva)

because it does not originate as a nature which is its very own (svatmana) [but as a
nature produced by others] ' It does therefore not exist the way it is apprehended.3
Because the perfectly established nature is the ultimate nature (paramartha) of all the
dharmas that are erroneously imagined (parikalpita) and is also the absence of intrinsic
existence (ni/:tsvabhiivata),4 and because it is the object (artha) of the supreme (parama)
awareness of the Superiors (aryajiiana),5 it lacks inherent existence in the sense of
being the ultimate absence of inherent existence (paramiirthani/:tsvabhavata).
Those who see Reality and know the ultimate nature [of the mind] are those who
see that perfectly established nature [of the mind] by means of [an awareness in
which] the perceived (alambya) and the perceiving (alambaka) are exactly the same
(samata). The reason [why they see it that way] is that the transworldly nondual

awareness (lokottaranirvikalpajiiana) originates [in them] .6 This [transworldly nondual

2
3

5
6

Comp are with TrBh 41 .2-3 : yadi dravyam eva paratantralJ katharrz satre sarvadharma nilJsvabhava
anutpanna aniruddha iti nirdisyante.
Compare with TrK 24a : prathamo lak$alJena eva nilJsvabhavo.
Comp are with TrK 24bc ; TrB h 41.17 -1 9 : na svayarrz bhava etasya mayavat parapratyayena utpattelJ.
ataSca yatha prakhyati tatha asya utpattir nasti iti 'sya utpattinilJsvabhavata ity ucyate. The me aning
he re is that the depe nde nt nature of the mind conce al s its own depe nde ncy on othe r conditi ons by
appe aring as if i t e xiste d in its own right. This is one of the re asons why ignorant pe ople
misapp re he nd it as an inhe re nt e xiste nce .
Comp are with TrK 24d-25a: apara nilJsvabhavatal I dharmalJam paramarthaSca sal ; TrB h 41 .22-24 :
sa yasmat parini$pannalJ svabhavalJ sarvadharmalJarrz paratantratmakanarrz paramarthalJ taddharmata
iti krtva tasmat parini$panna eva svabhavalJ paramarthanilJsvabhavata parini$pannasya abhavasva
bhavatvat.
Whe re as TrB h says that the pe rfe ctl y e stabl ishe d nature is the ul timate nature ( 'paramartha' or
'dharmata ' ) of all p aratantra-dharmas and consists in the i r none x iste nce ( abhavasvabhava) as
imagined (parikalpita) dharmas, the comme ntary in TJ inste ad says that t he pe rfe ctl y e stabl ishe d
nature is the ul timate nature of all p ari kalp ita-dharmas. The me aning is howe ve r the same, be cause
the dharmas that are imagine d (parikalpita) to e xist as app re he nde d obje cts and app re he nding
consciousne sse s a re the depe ndentl y originated (paratantra) instance s of mind.
Comp are with TrBh 41.1 9-20 : paramarrz hi lokottarajfianarrz niruttaratvat tasyarthalJ paramarthalJ.
Comp are with TrB h 43 .17 -1 8 (ad TrK 28) : grahyabhave grahakabhavam api pratipadyate, na kevalarrz
grahyabhavam. evarrz hi samasamalambyalambakarrz nirvikalparrz lokottararrz jfianarrz utpadyate.
S. L evi's te xt re ads 'samam analambyalambakarrz jfianam . . . ' , but the manuscrip t sugge sts
'samasama-alambya. . . ' as an al te rnative re ading [S o L evi, TrB h, note (5) p 43 : corre ct 'samamama
alambya . . . ' into 'samasama-alambya . . . ' ] . Comp are with the e xp re ssion 'samasamalambyalamba [ kaJ
jfiana ' in Abhidharmasamuccayabha$ya 85A, p . 76 (T. vol . 31, 682c8-9) . See al so Siddhi, T vol . 31, 49c21 .
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153

awareness is] the defining characteristic of the fundamental change of the [mental]
basis (asrayaparam:tti) [and] is also the state of liberation (vimuktikaya) of the Srava
kas, because they are free from all the contaminati ons (sarvasmvavigata) [produced by
the defi lements] and have thus removed the obstruction of the defi lements (klesavarar;a).
This very same (sa eva) is also the 'body that is the cause of all the supreme dharmas'
(dharmakaya) of the Tathagata because the Tahagata is free from all the impressions

of samsaric actions (karmavasana) and of the [grasping of] apprehended [ objects] and
apprehending [consciousnesses] (grahyagrahakavasana) and has thus removed the
cognitive obstructions UfieyavamlJa).l
Some may ask : "If the imagined nature is the object of worldly knowledge and the
perfectly established nature is the object of a personal realization (pmtyatmavid) ,
namely the transworldly awareness of the Muni, of which knowledge is the dependent
nature then the object, and [if it is not the object of any knowledge] how can its
existence be ascertained?"2 To answer this question, [the Yogacarins] say :
There are valid reasons to think that the dependent [nature] exists,
because conventional designations have a cause,
because otherwise the two will not exist ,
and because [the existence of] defilements is observed.3 (6)
The conventional designations (pmjfiapti) of existence [of the self or of consciousness
as an apprehender of external obj ects, and so forth] with respect to the mind and the
mental factors,4 do not occur without having [the mind and its mental factors] as the
causal base of erroneous imputation (viparyasa).5 Because [conventional designations]
have this property (lak$alJa) [of necessarily having the mind as their causal base] , it is
J

Compare with TrK 29-30 and the following passages in TrBh.

TrBh 44 .2427 : klesavaralJapraha1:ult sravaka;:tartl vimuktikayal. sa eva asrayaparavrtti1ak;;a1;lO dharma
khyo 'py ucyate. mahamuner bhiimiparamitadibhavanaya kle.5ajiieyavaralJaprahalJat asrayaparavrtti
samudagamat mahamuner dharmakaya ity ucyate . . .
TrBh 4 4 1 9 . 2 1 ' anasravo dhatur ity ucyate. nirdaU{)thulyatvat sa tv asravavigata ity anasraval:z
aryadharmahetutvat dhatul hetvartho hy atra dhatui{abdal:z.
TrK/TrBh distinguishes between the surpassab le ( sottara) change of the menta l basis of the
Sravakas and the unsurpassable ( niruttara) one of the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas 'anasrava ' applies
to both the S rava k a s and the Tathagatas 'dhatu ' in the sense of 'cause of a l l supreme dharmas'
applies to the dharmakaya of the Tathagata only.
Compare with TrBh 4 0 . 1 8-20 . yadi grahyagrahakabhavarahital:z paratantral:z katham asau grhyate,
agrhyamano va katham astiti vijiiayaie. (d. Yamaguchi , p. 146)
Quotation of a verse from Asanga's Xian-yang-sheng-jiao-lun (T. vol. 31, 558c2 5-26). See Yamaguchi ,
p 137 This verse i s also quoted i n P P (D. Tsha 243 a 1 , P. Tsha 304b23) , see Eckel, p . 52.
Yamaguchi ( p 1 36) refers to TrK 1 and translates this sentence as foll ows : " The designations [of
the nonexistent self and things] which are superimposed on the existent mind and ment al factors ".
Literal l y ' " . . appear [only] together w i th [or as the result produced by] the causal base of
erroneous imputation "

154

inferred that the dependent [nature of the mind] exists.l Otherwise, if the dependent
[nature] did not exist, it would follow that the two, that is to say conventional
designations and their causal base, or the imagined [nature] and the perfectly esta
blished [nature] , do not exist either, because these two depend on the dependent
[nature] .2 Further, if the dependent nature did not exist, the existence of defilements

This argument is stated more explicitly in M H K V.S2 S3ab. Bhavaviveka refutes it i n M H K V.

S3cdS4. H is own account o f 'conventional designati on' (prajnapti) is found i n M H K V.74 and SOab.
The same argument is formulated as an inference ( anumilna) in P P (see Eckel , pp 5354).
I interpret 'mtshan nyid des ' ( 'because o f [having] this property') as a predicate of 'conventional
designati ons' . This interpretation agrees with the formulation of this argument by Asanga him
self : "It should not be taught that all things are only conventional existences (prajnaptisat). Why?
Because conventional existences necessarily have a causal base ( nimitta) If there exist no rea l
entities ( vastu), conventional existences cannot exist either." (T. vol 3 1 , 55Sc27-2S) PP presents the
argument in the same way : "The dependent nature exists, because conventional designations have
a cause." Bhavaviveka replies that the argument is inva lid as it stands, because the logical reason
('having a cause') is a property of 'conventional designation', and not of the subj ect of the inference
('the dependent nature'), as it should be. (See Ec kel, p. 53.)
When 'mtshan nyid des ' is construed as a predicate of 'the dependent nature' [ ' Because the
dependent nature has this property (of being the causal base of erroneous imputation) . . J , the
.

argument becomes the fol lowing 'prasahga ' : "Conventional designation cannot exist if its cause
does not exist. The dependent nature [of the mind] is the cause of conventional designation.
Hence , the dependent nature necessari ly exists."
2 Four different interpretati ons of 'the two' are found in the texts ( M H K , TJ, PP, PPtlka).
(1) The first interpretation of 'the two' ( = conventional designations and their causal base) in TJ
is based on Asanga's Xian-yang-sheng-jiao-lun (T. vol. 3 1 , 55Sc2S-29). Bhavaviveka refutes this
argument in M H K V.S4.
(2) The second interpretation of 'the two' (= parikalpita and parini$pan na) is based on the idea that
the dependent nature functions as the base of the other two natures. This i dea occurs already in
embryonic form in the Bodhisattvabhumi (BBh 4 6 . 1 4 - 2 1 ; Tib. D. Wi 26a4-b3 ; Chin. T. vol. 30,
4SSc3- 1 0) : vastumiltra ( = paratantra) necessarily exists ; otherwise the nihil istic view of the
nonexistence of prajnapti ( = parikalpita) and of tattvam ( = parin i$pan na) will follow. The
clearest statement of the central role of the dependent nature is found in the opening verse of the
Madhyilntavibhilgakilrikil (MVK 1 . 1 ) : False consciousness (abhutaparikalpa = paratantra) exists as

the substratum in which imagi ned duality (= parikalpita) appears and in which emptiness ( =
parin i$pan na ) exists. Similarly, the Yogilcilrabhumi (T. vol. 30, 705cS-9) and the Xian-yang-sheng
jiao- lun (T. vol 3 1 , 50Sb 1 6 - 1 7) define the function ( las ) of the dependent nature as 'acting as the

support of the imagined and perfectly established natures.' The pivotal role assigned to the
dependent nature is moreover one of the characteristic features of the three-natures tenet in the
Mahilyilnasarrzgraha.

Bhavaviveka does not explicitly refute this argument in his rep ly (uttarapak!$a) in M H K/TJ.
Strictly speaking, this is not a real argument, because it is based on the premise that the
Y ogacara doctrine of the three natures is a sound doctrine. We can therefore assume that
Bhavaviveka refutes this argument indirectly in his refutation of the three natures in M H K V.
55- 1 1 2.
-

1 55

should not be observed. But their existence is observed. And since defilements have the
mind and the mental factors as their base, and since liberation consists in the absence
of defilements, the dependent nature is thought to exist . l

(3) A third interpret ation o f 'the tvw ' a s referring t o "defi lement (s(l}rzlde/{a) and purifi cation
( vyavadana)" is found i n PP (see Eckel, pp 54-5 6) The idea that the dependent nature of the mind
111

is the substratum of both defi lement and purification is not found

the early Y ogacara texts

(YBh, S N S , MVK, MSA. DDV) Accord ing to these early texts, the dependent nature is the baSIS
of defi lement only as opposed to the perfect nature ( sunyatti, tathatti, dharmadhatu) which is
identIfied with intrinsic purity (prakrtivi.i{uddha, prak,tiprabhasvam) , the intri nsi cally pure and
perfect nature of the mind is then seen as the locus of both adventiti ous ( agan tulw) defi l ement and
ad ventiti ous re-punficati on , i n this view. liberation is atta ined by the elimination of the depen
dent nature and not by ItS purification [see e g. S N S , T vol 16. 693c l -2 : vya uadr7J/a is reali zed
by the elimination of jHlratantm ; MVK 1 . 4 : mok0a IS achieved through the elimination ( I.:::;aya) of
abI1l7taj)unlwlj){l ]

The MalzayllnasW!lg mlza lI1augurates a majOr shIft m the Y ogacara doctrine by

assigning the central role in the process of defJ lement and punfication to the dependent nature
o f the mind whIch is now said to have two aspects , namely a defi led aspect and a pure aspect
(MS, T vol 3 1 , 140cl ff. ) LIberation IS then primari ly seen not as a tra nsform ation (extnnsic
punfl cation) of the perfect nature of the mind , but as a transforma tion (parawt ti) of ItS dependent
nature . Asanga defines this transformation as follows . " vVhen the counteragents [of the defile
ments] (jnn tipak :;a

lo/wttaramaJga) arise, the dependent nature of the mmd rejects its defi led

aspect and appropriates its pure aspect " (MS, T vol 3 1 , 1 4Sc l 7 - 1 S )
Bhavaviveka refutes this argument a n d states h i s o w n view regarding the eXIstence o f defil ement
and punficatlOn in M I l K V SOcd-S1
(4) Av alokitavrata's commentary on P P adds a fourth mterpretation of 'the two' which is based on
MVK I 1 : The dependent nature exists because, alth ough the erroneously ( anyath(7) imagined
apprehended- apprehending dual ity does not exist, abhz7taj)(lrikalpu should eXIst as the basis of the
appearance o f thIS duality See Ec k el . p 53, note 1 .
1

The prose commentary i n the Xiang-yang-sheng-jiao-Iun connects thIS thIrd argument with the
sec ond a rgument. as follows

"If

the two (that is, conventIOnal designati ons and their causal base)

do not exist, defilement a lso will not exist. But the existence of defi lement is clearly perceived.
Hence, the dependent nature necessarily exists " (T vol. 31, 55Sc29-559a2)
As menti oned in the previ ous note, this argument is typi cal of the early Y ogacara tex ts. It is for
example found in the Yogacarabhztlni ( Vin Samgr. IS) where it is asked what the undesi rable
consequence would be if the dependent nature did not exist The sastra answers that no effort would
then be needed to eradicate defi lement . simply because the latter would then not exist , and If
defi lement does not exist, purification will not exist either (YBh. T vol 30, 705b2S- c l , Tib D Zi
24a4-5) Another example IS V asubandhu's comment ary on MVK I 4. Vasubandhu there argues that
the erroneous consciousness (abhataparikatj)a), a lthough nonex istent

1 11

the way in which it appears,

nevertheless ex ists as a mere deceptive a ppearance ( bh n7n tiJ/1(/tra). The exi stence of the mmd as a
mere deceptive appearance cannot be denied because ' l iberatIOn is attained by the el imination of
this erronous consc i ousness' (MVK 1.4). If the erroneous consci ousness did not eXIst. there would be
no bondage ( bandha

')a/desa)

and hence al so no liberation ( Jnoh::;a

vyav(!d(7na) ( M V Bh 1 9 . 7 - 1 2 ,

i dem in MS, T vol. 3 1 , 1 3Sb26-c4).

For the refutation of this argument i n pp, see Eckel pp 57-59 The refutation m MHK is found a t
M H K V SOcd - S I (treated together with the refutatIOn of argument two)

156

The [dependent nature] is seen (drsyate) [as it is] after one has directly realized
(sak$atkr) the perfectly established nature which is the object of the transworldly

nondual awareness

(lokottaranirvikalpajnana).l

This

IS

because the

dependent

[nature] is adequately known by the subsequently attained pure worldly knowledge

(tatPr:;t halabdhasuddhalaukikajnana). 2

This doctrine of the Prajfiaparamita [siltras] , [as set forth by us]

is the means to achieve omniscience. Not so the [Madhyamaka] doctrine
which is intent on negating the [real] origination, cessation, and so forth
[of things] .3 (7)
I Comp are wit h TrK 22d : na adr!ite 'smin sa drsyate// (d. Yamaguchi , pp . 1 44 -1 4 5). To see t he
depe nde nt nat ure of t he mind as it is , is t o see it as similar t o a magical cre at ion (maya), a fat a
morgana (marici ) , a dre am (svapna), an e cho (pratisrutka) , et c. (TrBh 40.27 -28) , that is, as e mpt y of
t he app re he nde d- app re he nding dualit y which appe ars in it .
I follow Yamaguchi (p. 1 44) who re ads ' ... which is t he obje ct of t he t ransworldly nondual aware ne ss'
as a qua lificat i on of t he pe rfe ct l y e st ablishe d nat ure , and not of t he depe nde nt nat ure as t he Tibet an
te xt sugge st s. The latte r re ading can howe ve r not be e xclude d in vie w of t he Tibet an t ranslat i on
of t he comme nt ary in TrBh (see t he fol l owing note).
2 Comp are wit h TrBh 40 .23- 25 : nirvikalpalokottarajiianadrsye parini$Panne svabhave adr;;te apratividdhe
(rna rt ogs p a) asak;;atkrte, tatpr!ithalabdhasuddhalaukikajiianagamyatvat paratantro 'nyena jiianena na

grhyate. The unde rlined p ort ion diffe rs in t he Tibet an t ranslat i on : ' de ' i rje s la t hob pa dag p a 'jig
rte n pa dang 'j ig rte n las ' das p a' i ye she s kyi sp yod yul yin p as' (D. 16 8b6) .
The terms 'niti ' and 'naya ', he re t ranslate d as ' doct rine ' , de rive from t he root ni (le ad, guide) and
thus have t he connot at i on of 'a doct ri ne inte nde d to le ad pe op le t owards libe rat i on' . In t he p re se nt
conte xt , anot he r p ossible connot at i on might be 'a doct ri ne t hat has bee n fait hfull y e xt racte d from
(nita) the authorit at ive Script ure s. '
In addit i on, 'niti ' and 'naya ' are close ly re late d t o 'neyartha ' and 'nitartha ' . As is known from t he
famous p assage on t he ' Three Turnings of t he Whee l of Dharma' in t he Sartzdhinirmocanasutra
(SN S, T. vol. 16 , 6 97 a 23 -b9 ; Lamotte , VII.30) , t he Yoga ca ra inte rp ret s t he Prajiiaparamitasutra
te aching t hat all t hings lack inhe re nt e xiste nce as a non- de finit ive te aching which re quire s e xp lica
t i on ( neyartha) , and cl aims t hat it s e xp l icate d or de finit i ve me aning (nitartha) is p rovide d by the
Yoga ca ra te net s of t he t hree nat ure s and t he t hree abse nce s of inhe re nt e xiste nce. The Yoga ca ra
thus claims that it s own doct rine is not only in agree ment wit h t he te aching on e mpt i ne ss in t he
Prajiiaparamitasutras but also re ve a ls t he t rue , de finit ive me aning of that te aching. ( See also note
4 on p . 1 59 and t he comme nt ary t o MH K V.2Scd in TJ.)
In a re late d p assage (SN S , T. vol. 16 , 6 95cl 2-6 96 a2 ; Lamotte , VII .20) , t he sut ra crit icize s ce rt ain
Maha yana followe rs in t he following ve in : Some Maha ya nist s cling to t he l ite ral me aning ( yatha
ruta) of t he Prajiiaparamita te aching on e mpt i ness and asse rt t hat a l l t hings l a c k inhe rent e xiste nce
in e ve ry re spe ct and do not originate or pe rish at all ; t he y adhe re t o t he nihilist ic vie w that not hing
re ally e xist s and that all t hings are dep rive d of individuat ing characte rist ics (nil;lak:;aJJa) ; t he y de ny
the e xiste nce of t he depe nde nt and t he pe rfe ct l y e st ablishe d nat ure s of t hings and can t he re fore not
e xp l ain why t he imagine d nat ure is e rrone ously t a ke n for re al by t he ignorant . Paralle l p assage s
are found i n t he Bodhisattvabhumi (BBh 4 5 . 2 2 ff.) and t he corre sp onding comme nt ary in Viniscaya
saY[lgraha';Ji 1 5 (T. vol. 30 , 713 b2-1 S ; Tib. D. Zi 42b5-43 a4) . As H . Ui ( Yugaron Kenkyu, Tokyo 1 9 58,
pp . 60 f.) has argued, t he re are st rong re asons to be lie ve t hat t he se p assage s against the 'nihi list s'
are not inte nde d as a crit icism of Na ga rj una's thought or of M adhyamak a t hought in ge ne ral, but
are aime d at t he nihilist ic inte rp ret at ion of e mpt ine ss by some p ost -Na ga rj una or p ost -Aryade va
Ma dhyami k as.
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157

[The Yogacara here asserts the following.] The transformationl of the store
consciousness [which is accomplished] by not apprehending anything as 'I' ( aham) or
'mine' ( mama) and by the [resultant] absence of attachment to 'I' and 'mine', is taught
in the following words from scripture : "Although these very dharmas moisten, fully
develop ( pariptlrayanti), make manifest and set in motion (paricarayanti) all kinds of
dharmas, there exists nothing in them that can be conceived as 'I' or 'mine ' . " 2
The scriptural statement "That mind i s a non-mind" ( tac cittam acittam)3 teaches the
nonexistence of the apprehended ( grahya) and the apprehending (grahaka) [aspects of
the mindJ .
The scriptural statement "The state of non-mind ( acittata) is inaccessible to thought
( acintya)"4 teaches that only the mind [ as empty of duality] exists (vijiiaptimatratvam). s

The scriptural statement "Just so , visible form is an apprehendable property

(nimitta) and [all things]

up to enlightenment (bodhi) are also apprehendable

properties" 6 teaches about the nature which is imagined (parikalpitasvabhava) by

designating (btags pa, prajiiapti) [these apprehendable properties] by means of names
and semantic conventions ( san:zketa ) .

The Tibetan v()ngs

Sl

gyur ba ' suggests pa m Jilnw ' as the original Sanskrit equiva lent (cf

Y a m aguchi , p. 1 4 8), but the meaning here seems to be closer to 'p anlurtti ' (funda mental change)
2 I

could not identi fy this quotatIOn, but It is no doubt ta ken from one of the Prajnaparam ita sutras.

H ere and in the fol l owing paragraphs, the Y ogacarins quote SIX scri ptural statements to show that
the six tenets expla ined thus far (the store conscI Ousness and its transformati ons ; the nonexIstence
of the apprehended apprehending duality , the existence of the m ind as empty of duality ; the three
na tures) are a l l in agreement wIth teachings found in the Prajnaparamita sutras.
Yam aguchi (pp. 1 53 155) expl ains the meaning of the present quotatIOn as fo l l ows. DhaI-mas (or
instances of conscIOusness) , which habItually functi on as apprehenders of apprehended obj ects.
moisten the store-consciousness by leav ing their impressions there. These Im pressi ons mature and
deve lop i nto seeds From these seeds new dharm as ( = instances of consciousness) originate which
again produce impressi ons. and so forth. Th is whole process is however only the cause-effect
tra nsfo rmation of the mo mentary instances of the mi nd and no substant i a l self nor things possessed
by the self exist in it.
, Found for example in the Ji:;tasahasri/;:a Prajnaparamitasfltra (ed. P L Vai dy a. p 3 1 8) : tathiJ hi tac
c ittam acittan:z prakrtzs cz ttasya /Jrabha:, uara
4

Found in Satasclizas ri/ca and Pa nwvi111Satzsajzasn/;:a (see E Conze. The Large Sutnt of Pe1fect Wzsdom,

'i

According to the Sutra, 'not acceSSIble to thought' means that the true nondual nature of the mi nd

Moti l a l , Delhi 1979, p 97 note 8)

cannot be concei ved as ei ther 'existent ' or 'nonexistent ' (see E. Conze, ibidem ) . The Y ogacara
1 11terpretation, as presented here by Bhava vivek a . clearly deVI ates from the original i ntent of the
Sutra For the Y ogacara , 'i naccessible to thought' means that the true nature of the mi nd is not
conceIvable as an apprehended apprehending duality The Yogacara affirms however that the
mmd, as empty of that dual ity, exists and is mdeed the only ful ly established (parin i,spanna) rea li ty
6

From the Panwvi111Satzsajzas ri/;:a (see E Conze. o.c .. p. 1 0 1 )

1 58

The dependent [nature] is taught in the teachings about "the [real of which the
existence

is]

mistakenly

negated"

(apavadita?),

"the

[real]

substratum

[of

superimposition] " (upadana)! , "dharmas which are [bases of] designation" (gdags
pa 'i chos, prajiiaptidharma)2 and "dharmas which are members of enlightenment"
(bodhipakadharma) .

The perfectly established nature is taught in terms such as "being thus" (tathata),
"limit of Reality" (bhutakoti), "void of" (vivikta), "the fruit [of the Path] " (phalam),
"omniscience" (sarvakarajiiata), and so forth.3
Thus, the doctrine of the Prajiiaparamita [sutras] , as set forth by us, is the means
(upaya) to achieve omniscience. But [the doctrine of] the Madhyami kas which is intent

on negating the origination, cessation, and so forth [of things] , is equal to a nihilistic
view (nastitadrti) and is therefore not a means to achieve omniscience.4
So much for the viewpoints and objections (purvapaka) of the Yogacarins.

Cf. Yam aguchi , p. 1 59 : Just as a rope is the substratum or materi al cause of the illusive a ppearance
of a snake, just so the dependent nature of the mind is the rea l substratum of the illusive appearance
of the apprehended-apprehending duality.

Cf. Yamaguchi, p. 1 59. The mind and the mental factors are erroneously hypostatized and designated
as 'self' or as enduring subj ects apprehending enduring objects.

3
4

All these terms are frequently used in the Prajiiiipiiramita sutras.

There is textual evidence that the Yogacarins actually claime d that their doctrine was in conformity
with the teachings of the Prajiiiipiiramitii sutras. The main texts are the foll owing (see a lso
Yamaguchi, pp. 150- 1 53).
(1) In his commentary on MS, Asvabhava quotes two passages from the MaitreyapariPrcchii cha pter
of the Paiicaviratisiihasrikii as a scriptural source o r endorsement of the 'three natures' doctrine
(T. vol. 3 1 , 383c2- 1 0 and 399b28-cl3). See also the TJ commentary on M H K V.28cd.
(2) In his commentary on MVK 1 . 1 - 2 , Vasubandhu states that the Y ogacara teaching that everything
is neither empty (because the dependent and perfectly established natures exist) nor non-empty
(because the imagined nature does not exist), is in conformity with the Prajiiiipiiramitii teachings.
(3) In verse 27 of his PrajiiiipiiramitiipilJrjiirthasarrzgraha, Dignaga says that the Prajiiiipiiramitii
teachi ngs are based (samiisritya) on the tenet of the three natures (d. G. Tucci , "Minor Sanskrit
Texts on the Prajfiaparamita," JRAS 1947, p. 57).
(4) Sthiramati remarks that, according to some Yogacarins, the three natures are ta ught to convey
the essence of the Prajiiiipiiramitii without error. (MVT, 1 1 2.5-7)
(5) In the concluding lines of MVT (263.3-4 ; not found in the Tibetan translation), Sthiramati writes
that the core of the Paiicaviratisiihasrikii is taught in MVT.
According to Yamaguchi (p. 1 52), the reason why the Y ogacarins traced their doctrine back to
the Prajfiiipiiramitii sutras (the main scriptures of the Madhyamikas) , was prob ably that they
wanted or needed to show that their doctrine had a broader scriptural basis than just the Salfl
dhinirmocanasutra, and that they wanted to convince the Madhyamikas that the Yogacara
doctrine was a true Mahayana doctrine.
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1 59

Kanazawa

University

{t/R*X:g:lffifl
20

2000

1TJJJH' tg-

75-111

An Annotated Translation of
Madhyamakah!dayakiirikii / TarkajviiJii V.8-26

Paul HOORNAERT

Bhavaviveka first briefly introduces the maj or Yogacara tenets in MHK/T] V.

1-7 and then devotes the remainder of his work to a detailed refutation of these tenets
(MHK/T] V . S -114) . The following is a short outline of the content of MHK/T] V. S 114.

Synopsis of Bhavaviveka's refutation of the Yogacara

(uttarapaksa)

In

MHK/TJ V.8-114
Basic method: The refutation of the Yogacara tenets will be based primarily on infe
rential reasoning (yukti). (V. S - 9 )
Refutatio n of the Yogacara understanding of 'Reality' (tattvam) (V.10-13) and

1.

'awareness of Reality' (tattvajnanam) (V.14-16) . (Refutation of V. 2 - 3 )

2.

Refutation of the vijnaptimatra tenet (V.17-3S) . ( Refutation of V.4ab)

(2.1) 'vijnaptimtitra' conflicts with scripture and with common sense. (V.17)
(2.2) Refutation of the argument from dream consciousness. (V.1S-19)
(2.3) Refutation of four theories of consciousness as a twofold appearance (dvayiibhiisa). (V.20-26)

(2.4) Refutation of the samanantarapratyaya argument. (V.27-2Sab)

(2.5) Refutation of scriptural arguments. (V.2Scd-30)
(2.6) Refutation of the negation of the existence of atoms. (V.31-3S)

3.

Refutation of the Yogacara path (marga) (V. 39-54) . * * ( Refutation of V.4)

[**Although MHK V.39-54 is included in the vijiiaptimtitra section of MHK V, these verses are better
treated as a separate section dealing with the Yogacara marga. ]

( 3.1) 'vijnaptimatra' cannot explain how the awareness of Reality (nirvikalpajnana)

could ever originate. (V.39)
(3.2) Reply by the Yogacara and Bhavaviveka's rej oinder that the Yogacara theory of
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consciousness is an iitmaviida. (V.40-42)

(3.3) The awareness of Reality, as taught by the Yogacara, is not different from an or
dinary direct perception (pratyaa). (V.43-44)
(3.4) Bhavaviveka's own theory of consciousness can account for saJ?lklesa (bandha)
and vyavadiina (moka). (V.45-50)
(3.5) nirvikalpajiiiina can be accounted for if the existence of obj ects outside con
sciousness is accepted, but ' vijnaptimiitra, cannot account for it. (V.51-53) .
(3.6) Reply by the Yogacara and Bhavaviveka's rej oinder that the Yogacara path de
viates from the straight path to Buddhahood. (V. 54)

Refutation of the Yogacara tenet of the 'three natures' (V .55-112) . (Refutation of V.

4.

5)
4.1

Refutation of the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhiiva) (V. 55-6S)

(1) Refutation of the nonexistence of the imagined nature. ( V .55- 56)

(2) The origin of our attachment to the i magi ned nature . (V.57-5S)
(3) Proof for the existence of obj ects outside consciousness. (V. 59)
(4) Refutation of Dignaga 's 'apoha' theory. (V.60-6S)
4.2

Refutati on of the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhiiva) (V.69-S4) . (Refutati on of

V. 6 )
(1) The Y ogacara position: the imagined nature does n ot exist, but the dependent na
ture exists . (V.69-70a)
(2) General refutation: ex istence of the dependent nature is acceptable saJ?lvrtyii but
not paramiirthata. (V.70bcd)
(3) Refutation of utPattinisvabhiiva. (V.71-73)
(4) The dependent nature is the obj ect of thought and speech. (V. 74-75)
(5) The dependent nature does not exist paramiirthata. (V.76-79)
(6) The Madhyamikas can account for conventional designation (prajiiapti). (V. SOab)
and final l iberation (moka) (V.SOcd-S1) , and are therefore not nihilists. (V.S2-S4)
4.3

Refutati on of the perfectly established nature (parinannasvabhiiva) (V.S5-112)

(1) Reality, as taught by the Yogacara, is not the true Reality because it is not incon
ceivable (V.S5) , not inexpressible (V.S6) and not the obj ect of the true awareness of
Reality (V.S?) .
(2) Refutation of the theory of the intrinsic purity and the adventitious defi lement and
purification of Reality. (V.SS-90)
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(3) Refutation of the Yogacara understanding of 'awareness of Reality' and 'Reality'.

(V.91-98)
(4) Bhavaviveka's understanding of 'Reality' (V. 99-100) and 'awareness of Reality'
(V.I0I-I03) .
(5) Inferential reasoning (anumana) is indispensable for the elimination of false views
regarding Reality. (V.I04-110)
(6) Conclusion: the Yogacara doctrine of 'Reality' and 'awareness of Reality' deviates
from the teachings of the Buddha. (V.I11-112)
5.

General conclusion: Our Madhyamaka doctrine, as explained i n Chapter Three of

MHK/T], withstands the test of reason (yukti) . (V.113-114)

Note about the footnotes to the translation

For the abbreviations used in the footnotes, see the List of Abbreviations included in
my translation of MHK/T] V. 1 - 8 in Studies and Essays, Behavioral Sciences and Phi
losophy, Faculty o/Letters, Kanazawa University, No. 19 (1999) , p. 130. The following ab

breviations should be added to the list.

AP Alambanaparzk:;a/-vrtti, E. Frauwallner ed., "Dignagas AlambanaparIka. Text,

Ubersetzung und Erlaliterungen, " WZKM 37 (1930) , pp. 176-179.

MA (Bh)

Madhyamakavatara(ba), L. de La Vallee Poussin ed., Madhyamakavatara

par Candrakirti. Traduction Tibetaine. (Bibliotheca Buddhica IX) , St-Petersbourg, 1912 .

Tib. D. Nr. 3862, Ha 220bl-348a7 (DBU MA 7) ; P. Nr. 5263, Ha 264b8-411bl (vol. 98, pp.
108-166) .
PS (V) Prama1}asamuccaya (vrtti) , Tib. D. Nrs. 4203- 4204, Ce Ibl-85b7 (TSHAD MA 1) .
ViK ( ViV ) Vi'satikakarika (vrtti), Sanskrit text included in TrBh; Tib. D. Nrs. 4056-

4057, Si 3a4-10a2 (SEMS TSAM 14) , P. Nrs. 5557-5558, Si 3bl-11al (vol. 113, pp. 233-236) .

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1.

Edited Tibetan text of MHK/TJ V.8-26

[Editi ons used: Cone (C.) Dbu-rna Dsa 202b4- 207a6; Derge (D.) Dbu-rna Dsa 202b4207a6; Peking ( P.) Dbu-rna Dsa 223a2-228b4J
'dir bshad de bzhin gshegs bka' kunl I
kho bo cag gi tshad rna yinl I
tshad rna yid ches lung yin phyir I I
bzang po dag ni sgrub par byedl I ( 8)
[atrocyate prarnaarp na sarvarp tathagatarp vaca1
aptopadeaprarnayad bhadro hi pratipadyatel I ( 8) J
ces bya ba ni bde bar gshegs pa'i bka' tharns cad ni kho bo cag gi tshad rna yin tel de
dag ni de nyid gzigs pa rnarns kyis gsungs pa yin pa'i phyir roll dge legs kyi bsarn pa
can nyid dag ni de sgrub par byed cing rni rnthun par rni byed dol I
lung gzhan dag gis1 the tshorn dangl I
log pa'i blo can gzhan rni byedl I
de phyir de dag sgrub gzhug phyir I I
rigs pa ldan pa'i tshul btsal byal I ( 9 )
[nagarnantarasarpdigdhavi paryastarnati para1
tasrnat tatpratipattyartharp tanrnfgyo yuktirnanna ya1 I ( 9) J
[Co 202b6, D. 202b6, P. 223a4J zhes bya ba la lung las gzhan pa'i lung ni lung gzhan dag
gol I de dag gis2 the tshorn du gyur pa ni de yin narnl ' on te rna yin snyarn du the tshorn
za bar gyur pa'ol I log pa zhes bya ba ni grub pa'i rntha' 'di las gzhan pa dag la rnarn
par gyengs shing 'di la3 rni ltos pas de ni 'di Ita bu nyid rna yin no zhes log par zhugs
pa'ol I gang dag la de Ita bu 'i blo yod pa de dag ni lung gzhan dag gis the tshorn dang
log pa'i blo can dag stel sun 'byin par byed pa byung rgyal du srnra ba gzhan dag gol I
de dag gis tshad rna de sgrub par rni byed pas de'i phyi r de dag sgrub tu gzhug pa'i
phyir I srnra ba po rigs4 pa dang ldan pa'i tshul phyogs dangl gtan tshigs dang dpe'i
1

P . gi
p. gi
3 C : Ita
4 P rig
2

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skyon med pa gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa'i gnas su ma gyur pa'i mtha'i rigs pa'i lam
btsal bar bya'ol I
khyed kyis brtags1 pa'i gsung rab dangl skur pa 'debs pa j i skad smras pa dag gis ni
rigs pa mi bzod pas de'i phyir I

gnyis med pa yi dngos po nil I

rigs pa ma yin 'gal ba'i phyirl I
nam mkha'i me tog med dngos saml I
de dngos yin par brtag mi byal I (10)
[dvayabhavasya bhavo hi virodhitvan na yujyatel
khapu?pabhavasatta va na va tadbhavakalpanal I (10) ]
[C. 203a3, D. 203a3, P. 223bl] zhes bya ba smras tel gal te re zhig gnyis med pa dngos
po yin na ni j i ltar med pa yinl ci ste med pa yin na ni '0 na de Ita ni2 dngos po ma yin
nol I de'i phyir gnyis med pa'i dngos po ni r igs pa ma yin tel rang gi tshig dang 'gal ba'i
phyir roll gal te gnyis med pa'i tshul kho nar rtag tu nges par gnas pa'i phyir med pa
nyid dngos po yin no zhe nal de Ita na nam mkha'i me tog med pa yang dngos po yin
par thaI bar 'gyur rol I gal te nam mkha'i me tog med pa dngos po yin par mi 'dod na ni
gnyis med pa de yang dngos po yin par brtag par mi bya'ol I
ci ste 'di snyam du kho bo cag gi tshul nil rnam par rtog pa gang gang gisl I dngos po
gang gang rnam brtags pal I de ni kun brtags kho na stel I ngo bo nyid ni yod ma yinl I
gzhan gyi dbang gi dngos nyid nil I rnam rtog rkyen las 'byung3 ba yinl I de la rtag tu
snga ma shos4 I I bral ba nyid gang yongs grub yinl I zhes bya ba stel g zhan gyi dbang
gi ngo bo nyid de la rtag tu snga ma shos zhes bya ba kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi
gzung ba dang 'dzin par brtags pa'i5 dngos po dang bral ba nyid gang yin pa de ni yongs
su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid yin tel kun brtags pa dang gzhan gyi dbang la ltos nas med pa
gang yin pa de nyid yongs su grub pa la ltos nas dngos po yin pas de ltar na med pa
dang dngos po zhes bya ba gnyis dbyer med pa'i phyir tha dad pa nyid ma yin pas de'i
phyir 'gal ba med do snyam du pha rol p06 dag sems pa la brtags nas de dgag pa'i Ian
1

2
3
4
5
6

P:

btag s
na de I ta ni ' omi tted i n P.
P: byung
C: shes
P: mam par btag s pa'i
' po' omi tted i n P.
"

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yang gdab pa'i phyirl

gal te yang dag brtag med phyir I I
de la dbye ba med snyam nal I
mtshan gzhi mtshan nyid rnam gzhag lal l
de ni mtshungs phyir Ian rna yinl I (11)
[tattvata kalpitabhavat tadabhedo mato yadil
lak?yalak?avyavasthayarp tattulyatvad anuttaraml I (11) J
[c. 203b1, D. 2 03b1, P. 223bSJ zhes bya ba smras tel kun brtags pa dang gzhan gyi dbang
dag med pa nyid kyis yongs su grub pa la dbyer med du zi n kyang gang gi tshe mtshan
nyid kyi gzhi dang mtshan nyid rnam par gzhag pa byed pa na mtshan nyid kyi gzhi de
nyid ces bya ba de'i mtshan nyid ni gnyis med pa'i dngos po yin no zhes bya ba de'i tshe
nal gal te re zhig gnyis med pa'i dngos po yin na ni j i ltar med pa yinl ci ste med pa yin
na ni

'
0

na de Ita na dngos po rna yin no zhes 'gal bar sngar bstan pa de mtshungs pa'i

phyir pha rol po dag gis smras pa'i Ian de ni bzang po rna yin noll gzhan yangl
gal te de'i dngos rna btang gangl I
de ni de dngos yin ' dod nal I
de ltar dngos nyid mi gtong bal I
de phyir de ni dngos rna yinl I (12)
[svarupatyagita yasya sa cet tadbhava i?yatel
na ca bhavo 'ta evasau svaruparp na j ahati cetl I (12 ) J
[C. 203b4, D. 203b4, P. 224a4J zhes bya ba ni gal te pha rol po dag 'di skad ces gnyis med

pa'i dngos po nyid yongs su mi gtong ba gang yin pa de nyid dngos po zhes bya'i ngo bo
nyid gnyi s pa ni med do zhes zer nal de la 'di skad ces de ltar ngo bo nid mi gtong na
de'i phyir dngos po de ni med pa kho na yin pas de Ia dngos por brtag par mi bya'o zhes
brj od par bya'ol I de'i phyirl
des na de nyid gzigs rnams kyi/ I
mkhyen pa dngos med dmigs par 'gyur I I
de yang chos bdag med min tel I
med pa'i bio yi rgyu phyir rol I (l3)
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[abhavalambanarp jfianam evarp syat tattvadarsina1

na casau dharmanairatmyam asadbuddher nimittata1 I (13) ]
[C. 203b6, D. 203b6, P. 224a6] zhes bya ba ni theg pa chen po'i grub pa'i mtha'i1 tshul
gyis na sangs rgyas kyi ye shes ni dngos po yod pa dangl med pa'i mtha' gnyis las rnam
par grol ba yin par bzhed nal khyed 'dod pa ltar na de dnos po med pa l a dmigs pa yin
par 'gyur bas lung dang 'gal lol I gal te mi 'gal te gang gi phyir zhe nal kun brtags2 pa'i
chos rnams kyi bdag med pa'i dngos po ni bdag med pa nyid yin lal de la3 dmigs pa
nyid yin par khyed kyang 'dod pa'i phyir ro zhe nal chos bdag med pa ni mtshan rna
thams cad dang bral ba yin par 'dod na de yang med pa nyid kho nas med pa'i blo'i yul
yin pa'i phyir chos bdag med pa nyid du mi rung ngol I bdag gi sgra ni ngo bo nyid du
smra ba'i phyir dangl bdag med pa ni dngos po'i ngo bo nyid dangl dngos po med pa'i
ngo bo nyid gnyi ga'i ngo bo nyid med pa n yid yin pa'i phyir rol I
'dir pha rol po dag rnam par rtog4 pa ni 'ching ba yin par gsungs pas de dang bral na
grol bar sems shingl
gal te dngos med dmigs pa'i bIoi I
rnam par mi rtog yin 'dod nal I (14ab)
[abhavalambana buddhir avikalpa yadi?yatel (14ab) ]
[C. 204a2, D. 204a2, P. 224b3 ] zhes bya ba ni 'di skad ces chos thams cad ni dngos po
med pa'i ngo bo nyid du ro gcig pa'i phyir dngos po med pa la dmigs pa'i bIos ci zhig la
rtog par byed na rnam par rtog pa dang bcas par 'gyurl rnam par rtog pa med pa'i
phyir de ni don j i Ita ba bzhin yin no zhes zer na'ol I slob dpon gyis bshad pal
des na gzugs5 blo mi rtog pa 'angl I
dam pa yin pa nyid du 'gyurl I (14cd)
[tata evavikalpapi riipabuddhi samibhavetl I (14cd) ]
[C. 204a3, D. 204a3, P. 224b4] zhes bya ba ni gal te rnam par mi rtog pa nyid kyi blo don
1

'mt ha 'i' omitt ed in P.

bt ag s
P: ya ng
P: rt og s
P: g zung

2 P:
3
4
5

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ji Ita ba nyid yin par 'gyur na nil de Ita na 'j ig rten pa'i bIo gzugs la sogs pa rkyen las
byung ba rtog pa dang rj es su dran pa'i rnarn par rtog pa dang bra I ba yang don ji Ita ba
bzhin nyid thob 1 par 'gyur rol I ' dir srnras pal gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnarn par rtog
pa dang bral ba'i blo gang yin pa ni yang dag par na don ji Ita ba bzhin yin2 par 'dod kyi
I gzugs la sogs pa'i blo ni rnarn par rni rtog pa yin du zin kyang yang dag pa rna yin tel

gzung bar snang ba'i phyir zla ba gnyis la sogs pa rnthong ba'i blo bzhin no zhe na 'dir
bshad pal
gal te gzung bar snang 'dod pasl I
gzugs blo yang dag rna yin na l I
des na gtan tshigs 'khrul 'gyur zhingl/
dam bcas pa yang nyarns par 'gyur I I (15)
[grahyabhasataya ce?ta yadi bhiita na riip adhl1
hetu syad vyabhicary evarp pratijfia cavahiyatel I (15) ]
[c. 204a6, D. 204a6, P. 224b8] zhes bya ba la 'khrul zhes bya ba ni 'gal zhes bya ba'i tha
tshig stel ' di ltar gzugs kyi blo ni gzung bar snang ba nyid rna gtogs par logs shig ni3
ngo bo nyid rned pas gzung bar snang ba nyid du rjes su dpag pa yang dag pa rna yin pa
nyid kyis yang dag pa bsal ba 'i phyir chos can gyi ngo bo nyid log par bsgrub pas 'gal lo
I I ' dir dam bcas pa ni gzugs kyi blo yang dag pa rna yin pa' 01 I ' di la gzugs kyi blo

gang yin pa de j i ltar na yang dag pa rna yi n par 'gyur tel rnngon sum da ngl lung dangl
' j i g rten la grags pas gzugs kyi blo yang4 dag pa nyid yin par yang dag pa nyid rna yin
pa bsal ba'i phyir rj es su dpag pa dang 'gal lol I
de nyid rnthong ba yongs grub pa'i/ I ngo bo nyid la Ita ba yinl I zhes j i skad srnras pa
de la yang skyon 'di yod dol I
ngo bo nyid la drnigs yin nal I
ston pa'i byang chub rtog can dangl I
drnigs pa can du 'gyur ba dangl I
rnarn p ar rni rtog blor rni 'gyurl I (16 )
[savikalpa c a bodhi syac chastu salarnbanapi val
I

P: 'thob
C, D : rna yin
3
P . na
4 P: yang dag pa nyid rna yin pa gsal ba'i phyir rje s su dpag pa dang 'gal l a.
2

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nirvikalpapi dhlr na syat svabhavalambika satl/ I (16) J

[C. 204b2, D. 2 04b2, P. 225a4J zhes bya ba ni de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rigl par bya
ba yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ces bya ba 'i dmigs pa sgra j i bzhin rna y in pa'i ngo bo
nyi d gang yin pa de Ita bu cung zhig yod cingl ngo bo nyi d de la dmigs pa yin na ston pa
de bzhin gshegs pa'i byang chub kyi ye shes rtog pa can du 'gyur tel byang chub ni rtog
pa mi 2 mnga' bar bzhed dol I dmigs pa de la dmigs par byed pa yin na dmigs pa can du
yang 'gyur bas dmigs pa med pa nyid du yang mi 'grub stel byang chub ni dmigs pa
med pa nyid du bzhed dol I de nyid la ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rnam par rtog par
byed na rnam par mi rtog pa'i blor yang mi 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i tshig sbyar rol I
'di Ita ste khams gsum pa 'di ni sems tsam stel phyi rol gyi don med do zhes dam bcas
pa gang yin pa de la yangl
sems tsam du ni dmigs pa dangl I
gzugs la sogs pa mi 'dzin nal I
khas bl angs pa dang grags pa yisl I
dam bcas pa la gnod par 'gyurl I (17)
[cittamatropa lambhena rupadyagrahaarp na cal
abhyupetapra tltibhyarp pratij fia badhyate yata1 I (17) J
[C. 204b5, D . 204b5, P. 225bl] zhes bya ba la khas blangs pas gnod par 'gyur ba ni mig
dang gzugs rnams la brten nas mig gi rnam par shes pa 'byung ngo zhes gsungs pa'i
lung dang 'gal ba'ol I grags pas gnod par 'gyur ba ni 'j ig rten na gzugs la sogs pa'i don
med par mig la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa mi skye bar grags pas gnod par 'gyur ba'ol I
'dir smras pal gzugs la sogs pa'i don med par yang rnam par shes pa skye bar mthong
stel de Ita bur snang ba 'byung ba'i phyir dper na rmi lam na gzugs la sogs pa'i blo skye
ba bzhin no zhe nal de dgag pa'i phyir bshad pal
de ltar snang ba skye ba'i phyirI I
rmi lam gzugs sogs blo bzhin dul I
gzugs la sogs pa don med par I I
rnam par shes zhes byar mi rungl I (18)
1 P:
2

rig s
'mi' omit ted in P.

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[napi rupadivij fianarp vinartheneti yuj yatel

tadabhasodayad yatha svapne rupadibuddhayatIlI (18)]
zhes bya ba ni de'i phyir pha ro1 po dag gis smras pa'i rj es su dpag pa de bzang po ma
yin nol I ei 'i phyir zhe nal
gang phyir rmi lam 1a sogs pa 'i f I
rnam shes ehos 1a dmigs pa'i phyir I I
de phyir dpe yang med pa dangl I
yu1 1a skur pa 'debs par 'gyurl I (19)
[yasmat svapnadivij fia narp dharma1ambanam i?yatel
df?antanyuna ta hy evarp ea vi ?ayapavadita l I (19) ]
[C. 205a2, D. 2 05a2, P. 225b5] zhes bya ba ni thog ma med pa'i dus nas gz ung ba dang
'dzin pa'i bag ehags kyis bsgos1 pa'i shes pa dang 1dan pa'i mig gis rmi lam na mthong
ba nyid kyi gzugs 1a sogs pa dag mthong ba yin gyi ma mthong ba ma yi n tel rmi lam 1a
sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa dag ni dmigs pa dang be as pa nyid yin tel sngon mthong ba
1a sogs pa mngon par brj o d pa'i phyir2 dran pa 1a sogs pa bzhin nol I dmus long gi mig
gi mthu gtan nyams pa 1a yang tshe rabs gzhan na mthong ba'i bag ehags kyi shugs
kyis3 rmi lam na kha dog dang dbyibs4 tha dad pa'i gzugs du ma dag snang bar 'gyur
bas de'i shes pa de 1a yang dmigs pa med pa ma yin tel ' di 1tar bzang skyong dmus long
des rmi lam na shes pa dang 1dan pa'i mig gis gzugs de dag mthong stel sha'i mig gis ni
ma yin no zhes gsungs pa Ita bu'ol I shes pa'i mig gis ni ehos 1a dmigs pa'i phyir rmi lam
1a sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa yang dmigs pa dang beas pa nyid yin pas khyed eag gi
sgrub pa 1a dpe med pa'i skyon nyid du 'gyur roll gzugs 1a sogs pa'i don gyi dngos po
se1 bar byed pa'i phyir yu1 1a skur pa 'debs pa nyid kyang yin nol I
khyed 'di skad ees rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang bar skye stel rang du snang ba
dang rnam par shes pa yu1 du snang ba'i phyi ro1 gyi yu1 gyi rnam par yongs su gyur pa
de rnam par shes pa rang du snang ba'i yu1 nyid yin no zhes zer na de'i phyir bshad pal
gal te yu1 du snang ba nyidl I
1 P: bg os
2 P 225b7 : la sog s pa 'l don pa r brjod pa'i phyir
3 p. kyi
4 C: dbying s
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sems kyi dmigs pa yin 'dod nal I

yul du snang ba ma gtogs parI I
sems kyi bdag nyid gzhan ci yodl I (20)
[visayabhasata cet syac cittasyalambanarp. matal
vi?ayabhasa tarp. projjhya cittatmanyo 'sti klda1 I (20) ]
[C. 205a7, D. 205a7, P. 226a5] zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar kho bo cag gis ni gzugs la sogs pa'i
yul du snang ba r skyes pa nyid rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid yin par mthong gi yul du
snang ba ma gtogs par rang du snang ba gzhan ma mthong ngol I gal te yul du snang ba
nyid las gzhan pa rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid gnyis pa zhig yod na de gang yin ston
cigl gal te de bstan pa'i phyir 'di skad ces rnam par shes pa la rang du snang ba dangl
yul du snang ba zhes bya ba 'i ngo bo nyid gnyis yod del rang gi ngo bor gnas pa'i phyir
dangl gzhan Ita bur skyes pa'i phyir shel gyi nor bu bzhin tel dper na shel gyi nor bu'i
ngo bo nyid las ni rang gsal lal sngon po la sogs pa'i nye bar gzhag1 pa 'i khyad par las
ni sngon po l a sogs par2 snang bar3 mtshon du rung ngol I de bzhin du sems rang4 du
snang ba'i yul gyi rnam par yongs su gyur pa l as yul du snang ba nyid du 'gyur ro zhe
nal de Ita na bsgrub par bya ba dang dpe nye bar gzhag pa mi mthun tel gang gi phyir
zhe nal
gzhan ltar skyes phyir de gnyis snangl I
shel dang ' dra bar mi 'dod del I
nye bar gzhag pas5 der skye bal I
shel gyi skad cig min phyir ro l I (21)
[ne?a sphaikavat tasya dvyabhatanyanibhodayatl
upadhanat tatha jato yato na sphaikak?a na1 I (21) ]
[C. 205b4, D. 205b3, P. 226b2] zhes bya ba ni shel gyi nor bu sngon po la sogs pa nye bar
gzhag pa'i k hyad par gyis6 rang gi ngo bor gsal ba nyid yongs su btang bas sngon po la
sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du yongs su 'gyur ba ni bden mod kyi/ shel gsal ba'i skad cig ma
I P:
2

3
4
5
6

bzhag
pa
P: ba
C, D : ra ng ra ng
P: bzhag la s
p. g yi
P:

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snga rna gang yin pa de ni 'gags par gyur pas sngon po la sogs par gyur pa rna yin nol I
de 'gags gzhan ni skyes pa lalI
de yi bl o ni 'khrul par 'dodlI (22ab)
[tadapaye 'nyathotpatter bhrantata tanmater matal ( 22ab) J
[C. 205b5, D. 205b5, P. 226b4J ees bya ba ni shel gsal ba 'i skad eig rna de 'gags pas na
nye bar gzhag pa'i khyad par gyis sngon po la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid skyes pa la shel yin
par dmigs pa'i blo ni 'khrul pa nyid yin nolI ngo bo nyid gnyis ni med del gang gi phyir
zhe nal shel nye bar gzhag pa dang bral ba na snga ma'i ngo bo nyid kho nar snang ba
ltar shes pa'i1 rnam par shes bya'i rnam pa dang bral ba shel gyi rnam pa nye bar gzhag
pa dang bral ba Ita bu ni nam yang gzung du med pa'i phyir rolI rnam par shes pa rang
du snang ba 'i bdag nyid ny ams su myong ba med kyang de yul gyi rna m pas nye bar2
kha bsgyur ba'i dmigs par snang ba'i yul du snang ba nyid yin par rigs3 pa dang ldan pa
rna yin noll dper na shel gyi nor bu nye bar gzhag pa'i tshon dang phrad pa na de Ita
bur snang bar mtshon du rung yang shel gyi nor bu yang nye bar gzhag pa'i ngo bo nyid
du mi 'gyur la nye bar gzhag pa'i ngo bo nyid kyang shel gyi nor bu'i ngo bo nyid du mi
'gyur tel shel gyi nor bu tshon yin pa 'ami tshon kyang shel gyi nor bu nyid yin par thaI
bar 'gyur ba'i phyir roll de bzhin du rnam par shes pa yang rkyen ji ltar nye bar gyur
pa'i yul du snang bar skye yangl rnam par shes pa yang rnam pa thams cad du gzugs la
sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur lal gzugs la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid kyang rnam par
shes pa'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur tel sa la sogs pa'i sems dang beas pa nyid daml sems
kyang4 sa la sogs pa bzhin du sems med pa nyid du thaI ba r 'gyur ba'i phyir/ rnam par
shes pa nyid gzung ba dang 'dzin pa nyid yin no zhes bya bar rang la byed pa 'gal ba'i
phyir de shel bzhin du gnyis su snang ba nyid du mi rigs sol I
[C. 206a3, D. 206a3, P. 227a4J ' dir smras pal yul du snang ba des5 rang dang rjes su
mthun pa'i ' bras bu bskyed par bya ba'i phyir rim gyis rnam par shes pa'i rgyun nus pa
dang ldan par byed eing Ian 'ga' ni de'i rnam pa'i nus pa r gnas solI Ian 'ga' ni nus pa
yongs su smin pa las rnam par shes pa yul du snang ba' i rnam par skye'olI rnam par
shes pa ni nus pa dang yul du snang ba de gnyis las geig pa nyid dang tha dad pa nyid
1

C. shes bya'i
'nye bar' omitted in P .
3
P. rig
4 P kyi
5 C, D. der
2

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du1 brj od par mi 'dod del rnam par shes pa nyid nus pa dang yul gyi ngo bo nyid gnyis
su snang ba yin no zhe nal ' di r bshad pal
gnyis su snang med nus pa nil I
tha dad min phyir yul snang bzhinl I (22cd)
[ saktyabhedan na ca dvyabha vi?ayabhasatatmavatl I ( 22cd) J
[C. 206a5, D. 206a5, P. 227a 7J zhes bya ba la rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang ba rna
yin zhes bya ba ni phyogs yin lal nus pa tha dad pa rna yin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ni
gtan tshigs yinl yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa'i bdag nyid bzhin no zhes bya ba ni
dpe yin tel rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa gzhan yin zhes bya bar yang de skye ba
na yul du snang ba kho na'i rnam par shes pa skye stel yul gyi rnam pa tha dad par
snang ba'i phyir dangl yul du snang ba 'khrul pa med pa'i phyir roll de 'gag pa na yang
rnam par shes pa'i rgyun dang ldan pa'i nus pa yul du snang ba nyid kyi rnam par shes
pa bskyed pa'i mthu dang ldan pa bzhag nas 'gag cing de yongs su smin par gyur pa las
yang yul du snang ba'i rna m par shes pa nyid skye bar zad kyi/ rang du snang ba'i
rnam par shes pa'i nus pa gang gis de bskyed par 'gyur ba bzhag pa ni 'ga' yang med
pas yul du snang ba nyid k yi rnam par shes pa la rang du snang ba nyid brtags2 pas ci
byal
[C. 206bl, D. 206b2, P. 227b4J ci ste yang 'di snyam du rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su
snang ba yin tel lhan cig tu 'dra bar ' byung ba'i phyir gzugs dang gzugs brnyan bzhin te
I gang la lhan cig 'byung ba 'i ngang tshul yod pa de ni lhan cig tu 'byung ba stel cig car
'byung ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig golI gang lhan cig 'byung ba dang 'dra ba'i ngang
tshul yod pa de ni 'dra bar 'byung ba stel l han cig tu 'dra bar 'byung ba'olI dper na
gzugs dang lhan cig tu gzugs brnyan 'dra ba r ' byung ba bzhin3 tel de la gzugs Ita bu ni
rang du snang ba nyid yin lal gzugs brnyan Ita bu ni yul du snang ba nyid yin par sems
nal ' dir bshad pal
sems ni rang dang gzhan snang bal I
lhan cig 'dra bar 'byung ba'i phyirl I
gzugs brnyan bzhin d u mi ' dod del I
1

'du' omitted in P.
btags
3 P: bzhin no

P:

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de phyi r gnyis su snang rna yinl I (23)

[svaparabhasata ne?a cetasa0 pratibirnbavatl
sahakaryanukaritvat tasrnad dvyabhasatasatfl I (23) J
[C. 206b4, D. 2 06b4, P. 227bSJ

zhes bya ba ni lhan cig tu 'dra bar 'byung ba nyid yin du

zin kyang gnyis su snang ba nyid du rni 'grub pa kho na yin tel gzugs brnyan ni dngos
po rned pa'i phyir dangl de'i blo yang 'khrul pa yin pa'i phyi r roll
'dir srnras pal rnarn par shes pa ni gnyis su snang ba kho na yin tel tshad rna dang
'bras bu yin pa'i phyir rol I de la tshad rna ni 'dis rj es su dpog pa'i phyi r tshad rna stel
rang du snang ba'i rnarn par shes pa' 01 I ' bras bu ni de'i yul so sor rtog pa stel yul du
snang ba nyid dol I yul du snang ba'i rnarn par shes pa 'ba' zhig la ni tshad rna dang
'bras bu dag 'thad par dka'o zhe nal ' dir bshad pal

gal te tshad rna 'bras yod phyirI I

gnyis su snang bar ' dod ce nal I
gzhan du ' ang1 de dag 'grub pa'i phyirl I
brtag pa de yang rni 'dod dol I (24)
[prarnaaphal atabhavad i ?a dvyabhasateti cetl
anyathapi hi tatsiddhes tatkJptir api ne?yatel I (24) J
[C. 206b7, D. 206b7, P. 22Sa4J zhes bya ba ni gnyis su snang ba nyid rna yin par gzhan du
yang tshad rna dang 'bras bu de dag 'grub pa' i phyir brtag pa de yang rni 'dod dol I de j i
ltar na gzhan d u tshad rna dang 'bras b u dag 'grub par 'gyur zhe nal de'i phyirl
yul du snang ba 'dzin pa yi/ I
rnarn par shes pa skye bzhin pasl I
gzhal bya gang yin 'j al byed pal I
des na de ni tshad mar 'dodl I (25)
[bibhrata j ayarnanena j fianena vi?ayabhatarnl
prarnfyate prarneyarp yat prarnaarp tena tan rnatarnl I (25) J
ces bya ba srnras tel 'di la2 yul du snang ba'i rnarn par shes pa zhes bya ba'i rnarn par
1

"

P:

ang' omitted in P
yid la

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'dzin par skye bzhin pa nyid kyis yul rnarn par rtog par byed pa'i phyir/ shes pa skye
bzhin pa nyid gang yin pa de tshad rna yin par 'dod dol I
de skyes pa na rnthong ba 'i phyir I I
de grub pa ni 'bras bur 'dodl I (26ab)
[tannirvrttau ca dr?tatvat tanni rvrtti phalarn rnatarnl (26ab) ]
ces bya ba ni rnarn par shes pa de skyes pa na yul rnthong ba'i phyir shes pa des rnngon
par grub pa ni 'bras bu yin pas yul du snang ba'i rnarn par shes pa nyid l a tshad rna
dang 'bras bu gnyis yod par 'dod del dper na shing la sta res gzas pa dang btab pa'i
rkyen gyis1 gnyis su gcod par byed pa nyid dangl de dum bu gnyis su chad par gyur pa
nyid bzhin no ll
bstan du rned pa'i ngo bo nyidl I
de bzhin rtog pa gang thob pal I (26cd)
[anidarsanarupasya tathaivadhigarno yata1 I ( 26cd) ]
[C. 207a4, D. 2 07a4, P. 228b2] zhes bya ba ni rnngon sum gyi shes pa dngos po'i rang gi
rntshan nyid tsarn la drnigs pa rtog2 pa dang rj es su dran pa'i rnarn par rtog pa dang
bral basi gzugs la sogs pa sngon po la sogs pa'i bdag nyid du bstan du3 rned pa'i ngo bo
nyid lal de bzhin du rned pa'i ngo bo nyid kho na bzhin du rang rig pa'i rnarn pas rtogs
par byed pa gang gi phyir de'i phyir yul nyid du snang ba'i rnarn par shes pa gcig pu
kho na la tshad rna dang 'bras bu gnyi ga yod pa'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don rna grub
pas rnarn par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang bar rtogs4 pa ni dgos pa5 rned dol I

I p. gyi
2 P: rtogs
3 'bstan du' omitted in P.
4 P: rtog
5 P: dngos po

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2. Translation

We reply : "All the words of the Tathagata are autho ritative for us, because the
teachings of a reliable person are authoritative. Good people accept that these
are true. " (8)
All the words of the Sugatas are authoritative for us, because they are spoken by those
who see things as they really are Uattvadarsin). People who strive after excellence ac
cept these words as true and do not contra dict them.
Others who have doubts and erroneous ideas from other scriptures, do not [ac
cept the truth of the Tathagata's words] . Therefore, in order to i nduce [such
people] to accept them as true, one should follow the path of reason. (9)
'Other scriptures' are scriptures which are other than [our Buddhist] scriptures. 'To
have doubts' is to entertain doubts as to whether it is so or not. 'Erroneous' means that
[one's mind] is confused by other [non- Buddhist] doctrines (siddhanta) , so that one
does not rel y on this [Buddhist doctrine] and thus commits the error of thinking that
this [Buddhist] doctrine is not right. People with this kind of mind are those who 'have
doubts and erroneous thoughts because of other scriptures '. They are 'the others' who
refute [the Buddhist doctrine] as they please. They do not accept the authority [of the
words of the Tathagata ] . T herefore, in order to induce them to do so, the [Buddhist]
teacher should follow the path of reason. T hat is, the [ Buddhist] teache r should pursue
the path of relentless reasoning [ by adducing arguments] consisting of impeccable
propositions (paka), logical reasons (hetu) and examples (dr.tanta) which are free
from the errors that might be pointed out by others.l
1

It is not clear from the context who 'the others' are. According to the interpretation I have followed
in the translation, Bhavaviveka has the non-Buddhists in mind and admonishes the Buddhist teachers
to use independent inferences (svatantranumana) to convince non-Buddhists of the truth of the Buddhist teachings.
'The others' could also refer to the Sravakas who, according to MHK IV.7, argue that the Maha
yana scriptures were not taught by the Buddha himself because they are not included in the three
'baskets' (siUra, vinaya, abhidharma) or because they teach a different path similar to that of the
Vedanta [see V. V. Gokhale, "The Vedanta-Philosophy described by Bhavya in his Madhyamakah
daya," Indo-Irantan Journal, 2 (1958) p 179J. Mahayana Buddhists should use logical arguments to
prove that their scriptures are the ipsissima verba of the Buddha (buddhavacanam). This interpreta
tion has the advantage of explaining why the verse emphasizes that all the words spoken by the
Tathagata, including the Mahayana scriptures, are true
Verse 8 can also be read as a direct reply to verse 7. ' The others' would then refer to the Yoga
dirins only. The purport of verse 8 would then be that the Miidhyamikas should use logical argu
ments to prove the truth of their interpretation of emptiness as taught in the Prajfi.aparamita sutras
Moreover, the scriptural statements quoted by the Yogacara in the commentary to verse 7 should be

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Since the doctrines put forward by you, as well as the accusation [that we
Madhyamikas commit the error] of overnegation (apaviida) 1, do not wi thstand reason,
we say :
[Your tenet of] 'the presence of the absence of duality' goes against reason, be
cause it is contradictory. Is the a bsence of flowers in the sky a presence? If not,
stop thinking that this [absence of duality ] is a presence! (10)
submitted to the test of reason in order to ascertain whether they can serve as valid corroborations
(pramii!la) of the Yogacara tenets. Bhavaviveka thus starts his uttarapaka with a general observa
tion on methodology: his analysis and refutation of the Yogacara tenets will be based primarily on
reasoning (yukti) and secon darily on scripture (agama) corroborated by reasoning.
Bhavaviveka's basic stand regarding the probative value of scriptural statemen ts in philosophical
debates is as follows.
(1) Scripture is not a means of valid knowledge in its own right, because all the knowledge conveyed
in scriptural statements is ultimately inferential knowledge. The MlmaI!lsa argues that scripture (sabda
agama) is an in dependent mean s of valid knowle dge, because scripture alone gives us knowledge
about objects beyond the reach of the sense organs, such as heavenly bliss (svarga) and final liberation
(apavarga) (MHK/TJ IX. 8 9; S. Kawasaki ed., Issaichi Shis6 no Kenkyii, Tokyo: Shunjusha,1992, pp.
376, 409). Bhavaviveka refutes this by arguing that the existence of heavenly bliss can be inferred as
being a special retribution produced by special causes (karman), and that the existen ce of final libera
tion can be inferred as being the absence of rebirth due to the extinction of the causes of rebirth (MHK
/TJ IX.5054; S. Kawasaki ed., pp. 383-384, 423424).
(2) If scripture were an independent means of valid knowledge, all the scriptures of all the philosophi
cal schools would be true simply because of their bein g 'agama', that is, simply because of their having
been handed down (agata) by tradition. If that were the case, when it comes to reasoning (vicara) about
the ultimately real (in distinction from conventional realities), it would be impossible to determine the
truth or falsity of scriptures which teach mutually incompatible doctrines. Reason (yukti) is therefore
the only reliable means to decide on the truth or falsity of the various scriptures. Hen ce, only scriptural
statements in agreement with reason are acceptable as means of valid knowledg e (pramii!la). (MHK/
TJ IX.1920; see also MHK/TJ V.107.)
(3) Only the scriptural statements which can be corroborated by means of an unmistaken inference
(anumana) are in accordance with reason. All the words of the Tathagata meet this requirement, be
cause they were spoken by somebody who sees things the way they really are (MHK V. 8 ) .To be
empty of inherent existence is the way things really are, as the Tathagata has taug ht in the Praji'ia
paramita sutras. Hence, the emptiness of all thin gs can an d should be proven by means of inferences,
provided that these are 'paramarthatah' inferences a la Bhavaviveka, because emptiness cannot be
known by direct perception, nor by 'conventional' inferences (which do not inquire about the ultimate
nature of things), nor by mere scriptural statements.
(4) Bhavaviveka is willing to accept the scriptures of other schools (for instance, the Vedanta) as
means of valid knowledge, provided that they do not contradict the teachings of the Tathagata. All
other scriptural statements are liable to doubt. Reason should be used to investigate whether they are
true or not. [MHK IV.56 replyin g to MHK IV.7; see V.V. Gokhale, "The VedantaPhilosophy described
by Bhavya in his Madhyamakahdaya," IndolranianJournal 2 (1958), pp. 179180].
In short, Bhavaviveka subordin ates scripture to reason. Strictly speaking, for Bhavaviveka, inferences
(qualified as 'paramiirthatah' ) are the only means of valid knowledge when it comes to reasoning about
ultimate reality.
1
See MHK V.7.
=

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If the absence of duality is a presence (bhliva), how can it be an absence (abhava) ?

Or, if it is an absence, then it is not a presence. Accordingly, [your tenet of] 'the presence of the absence of duality' does not accord with reason, because it is a contradic
tion in terms (svavacanavirodha). You might reply that the absence [of duality in the
mind] is [the true mode of] existence [of the mind] , because that absence of duality is
always and invariably there. If that is so, then the absence of flowers in the sky also
will necessarily be a presence. If you do not accept that the absence of flowers in the
sky is a presence, you have no reason to think that the absence of duality [in the mind]
is a presence.
You might reply that your basic doctrine is as follows : "All the things which are
conceived by any of the manifold constructive consciousnesses, are merely imagined
[things] . The own-nature [of such things] does not exist [at all] . The dependent nature,
on the other hand, is the constructive consci ousness [itself] which originates from con
ditions. The perfectly established [nature] is the permanent absence of the former
[imagined nature] in that [dependent nature] ."1 The permanent absence of the ima
gined nature [of the mind] -that is, the permanent absence of the imagined existence
of the apprehended and the apprehending [ aspects of the mind] - in the dependent na
ture [of the mind] is the perfectly established nature [of the mind] . In other words,
'
what is an absence as far as the imagined and the dependent [natures] are concerned,
that very same is a real presence as far as the perfectly established [nature] is con
cerned. Thus, [in this case] absence and presence are inseparable from each other (a
bhinna) and are therefore not two different things. Hence, there is no contradiction.2

Having explained the view of our opponents, we refute it again as follows:

1

Quotation of TrK 2021. "yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate/ parikalpita eva asau svabhiivo na
sa vidyate // paratantrasvabhavas tu vikalpah pralyayodbhavah/ nipannas tasya parve'(la sada rahitata tu
ya // " . Cf. Yamaguchi, p. 182.
There would be contradiction if the two contradictory attributes (laa'(la)' nonexistence' (or ' ab
sence') and 'existence' (or 'presence') were predicated of the same thing (lak sya) in the same respect
Such would be the case if the Yogacara for example asserted that the perfectly established nature
both exists and does not exist, or is both the existence and the nonexistence of the imagined nature
There is however no contradiction if one says that the perfectly established nature of the mind is its
permanent existence or presence as devoid of the imagined nature or of the dependent nature as ha
bitually misconceived by the ignorant.
The Yogacara position, as Bhavaviveka presents it here, is close to verses 18-21 of Vasubandhu's
Trisvabhavanird& (cf Yamaguchi, p 183) . Vasubandhu says there that the nonexistence of the
imagined nature, and the nonexistence of the dependent nature as it appears in the mmd of ignorant
people (yathii khyanam), are not different (abhinnalaana) from the presence of that nonexistence
(=the perfectly established nature), and vice versa Verse 13 of the same treatise puts it as follows:
" The perfectly established nature of the mind is both a presence (sat) and an absence (asat), because
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If you think that there is no difference [between absence and presence] because
the absence of the imagined [nature ] is the [ever-p resent] Reality l , the same [er
ror of contradiction] still occurs when one distinguishes between a definable [en
tity ] and its defining characteristic. Your reply is therefore not correct. (11)
Granted that the absence of the imagined a nd the dependent natures is not different
from the [presence of the] perfectly establ ished [nature] . Nevertheless, if one intro
duces the distinction between a definable entity and its defining characteristic, then the
definable entity here is "Reality" (tattvam) and its defining characteristic is "presence
of the absence of duality." Now, if [the thus defined Reality] is the presence of the ab
sence of duality, how can it be an absence? Or, if it is an absence, then it is not a pre
sence. Hence, the above contradiction occurs. The reply of the opponents is therefore
not to the point.2 Moreover,
Suppose you argue as follows : "When something never rejects a certain idenit is both the presence of nonduality (advayatvena asti) an d the absence of duality (dvayasya abhiiva)."
MSA IX.78ab phrases the same tenet as follows: "The very nonexistence [of the imagined n ature]
is the highest mode of existence." (ya avidyamiinata saiva parama vidyamanata). Similarly, MSA XI.
41ab defines the perfectly established nature of the mind as "absence, presence, an d the sameness of
presence and absence" (abhavabhavata ya ca bhiivabhiivasamanata). Vasubandhu comments: "The
perfectly established nature is the unchangeable nature (tathata) [of the mind]. And that is the abo
sence (abhavata) of all imagined things. It is also presence (bhavata) because it is the presence
(bhiiva) of the absence [of imagin ed things]. And it is also the sameness of presence an d absence be
cause [in this case] absence and presence are not separate from each other (abhinnatvat)." (MSABh,
65. 8 10)
The Yogacara tenet of the quasi identity of the absence of the imagined nature on the on e hand
and the presence of that absence on the other hand, is based on the following two premises: (1) The
absence of the imagined nature is an absolute and permanent absence (atyantabhava); (2) The abso
lute negation of the existence of the imagined nature is an affirming negation (paryudasaprati;; edha);
that is, the permanent absence of the imagined nature of the mind is affirmed as the only perma
nently present, true nature of the mind; in other words, the absolute absence of the apprehended/ ap
prehending duality in all con ditioned instances of mind is the beginningless and en dless presence of
the true nature of mind in each and every single instance of mind.
I Literally: " ... because the absence of the imagined [nature of the mind] pertains to the real nature
(tattvam) [of the mind]" (tattvata kalpitabhavat). This means that the permanent absence of the
imagined duality of the mind is the truly permanen t, noncon tingent n ature of the mind and is in that
sense the ever-present Reality (tattvam) itself.
2 The Yogacara has argued that "the presence of an absence" is not a contradiction because the per
fectly established nature of the mind is the permanent absence of the apprehended/apprehending du
ality in the mind. But to view the true nature of the mind that way is, at least in Bhavaviveka's opin
ion, a reification of the true nature of the mind. Reality itself is then seen as an entity (bhi'iva) which
can be known (jiieya) and objectified (alambya). And if Reality is an entity, it will necessarily have
an identity (svabhava, svariipa) which differentiates it from all other entities. Reality will then neces
sarily be a conceivable, definable an d expressible thing (laya). That is the reason why Bhavavive
ka here introduces the distinction between a definable entity and its defining characteristic. This dis
tinction has also been used by the Yogacarins themselves, for example in MVK 1.13 where "the
presence of the absence of duality" is said to be the defining characteristic (laa1!a) of Emptiness.

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tity, then it is [always] present as [not rejecting] that [identity] . " [We reply: ]
"If it does not rej ect that kind of identity [consisting in an absence], it can for
that very reason not be a presence. " (12)
Our opponents might argue as follows : "That which never ceases to be the presence of
the absence of duality, is[truly] a presence. It does not have [ another] second identity. " l
We reply : "If it does not rej ect that kind of i dentity, then for that very reason that [hy
pothetical] presence will be a mere [reified] absence. Hence, you should not conceive
it as a presence. " Accordingly2,
[From your view of Reality] it follows that the awareness of those who see Rea
lity will be a perception of [a reified] absence. Moreover, [Reali ty as conceived
by you] will not be the absence of self-existence, because it will functi on as the
cause of a perception of [reified] nothingness. (13)
According to a fundamental tenet of the Mahayana, the aw areness of the Buddhas is
free from [apprehending] the two extremes of [ inherent] existence and [inherent]
nonexistence. But your doctrine contradicts [the Mahayana ] Scriptures, because it as
serts that the Buddha-awareness is a perception of [inherent] nonexistence. Perhaps
you will say : "There is no contradiction [with the Scriptures] because the 'absence of
self-existence' (nairiitmyam) is the presence (bhiiva) of the a bsence of the self-existence
of all imagined things (parikalpitadharma). Moreover, you [Madhyamikas] also teach
that [the awareness of the Buddhas] apprehends that [absence of self-existence]."
We reply : "[The Maha yana] maintains that the absence of self-existence (dhar
manairiitmyam) [is a mere a bsence and therefore] lacks all apprehendable character

istics (nimitta) [such as 'exists, 'does not exist', and so forth] . [ But in your view] this
[absence of self-existence] is actually a [reified] nothingness and consequently funcBut if Reality is a real entity and hence possesses an identity, it surely cannot have contradictory at
tributes such as 'nonexistence' ('absence') and 'existence' ('presence'). It should then either exist or
not exist and cannot simultaneously possess two contradictory natures 'Presence of an absence' is
therefore a plain contradiction.
Bhavaviveka explains his own view of Reality on many occasions further in the text. He insists
that Reality is a pure absence and should therefore not be conceived as an entity. As a non-entity, it
has no apprehendable characteristics (animitta) and is therefore nondefinable (ala!?:;ya) and attri
buteless (nihlaksana).
1 In the preceding verse, Bhava viveka has pointed out that the Y ogacara understanding of Reality im
plies that Reality will have two contradictory natures or identities, namely existence (presence) and
nonexistence (absence). The Yogacara replies here that Reality, as they conceive it, has only one
identity, namely that of a permanent presence in the sense of a permanently present absence (paryud
iisa negation).
2 "Accordingly" here means " just beca use you conceive Reality as a reified absence. .
"

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tions as the o bj ect-cause (viaya) of a perception of nothingness. Hence , [your view]

does not agree with the [true meaning of] 'absence of self-existence'. As a ma tter of
fact, 'self-existence' (iitman) means 'inherent existence ' (svabhiiva). And the absence
of self-existence (nairiitmyam) is the absence of inherent existence with respect to both
presences (bhiiva) and absences (abhiiva) 1."
In this connection, our opponents think that liberation (moka) consists i n the ab
sence of all conceptual grasping (vikalpa) because Scripture says that conceptual grasp
ing is bondage (bandha). [Regarding that,]
If you maintain that the [Buddha- ] mind, when perceiving the a bsence [of all
imagined enti ties] , is free of conceptual grasping, ( 14ab)
They argue as follows. All [dependently originated] instances of mind2 have an 'identi
cal taste' (ekarasa) [in that they all have] the same nature consisting in the a bsence
(abhiivasvabhiiva) [of imagined duality] ' If the [Buddha- ] mind, when perceiving that

absence, apprehended [i t as] something [in differentiati o n from other things] , then it
would be accompanied by conceptual grasping (savikalpa) . But no such conceptual
grasping exists [in the Buddha-mind] . That [mind] is therefore in accordance wi th Re
ality (yathiibhiUii rtha).3
The teacher replies4 :
Then, for the s ame reason, the nonconceptual perception of visible forms will
also be the highest [transmundane awareness] 5 . (14cd)
If the [Buddha-] mind is in a ccordance wi th Reality just because it is free of conceptual
grasping, then any ordinary Uaukika) perception, originating from conditions such as
[the presence of] visible fo rms and so forth and free of conceptualization (nirupa1}iivi
kalpa) and recollection (anusmara1}avikalpa), will also be in accordance with Reality.6

[The Yogacarins] could obj ect as follows : "We maintain that a mind whi ch has
I

The presen ce or existence of dependently originated things (bhava) should not be conceived as an in
herent existence. But neither should the absence of inheren t existence (abhiiva) in all dependently
originated things be conceived as an inherent, reified absence.
2
The text has 'all dharmas', but for the Yogacara 'all dharmas' means 'all instances of mind'.
3 The Yogacara replies to the previous objection by denying that the enlightened Buddha-mind per
ceives a reified nothing ness. Although the Buddha-mind perceives the absence of the imagined nature
of mind, an d hence sees Reality as it is, it does not objectify that absence as 'non existence' or 'no
thing'.
4 The occasional occurrence of sentences like this, where Bhavaviveka apparently refers to himself as
'the teacher' (iiciirya), is one of the reasons why Bhavaviveka's authorship of TJ has been doubted.
See Y. Ejima, Chilganshiso no Tenkai - Bhiivaviveka Kenkyu, Tokyo 1980, pp. 13-15 ; id., "Additional
Note" in Chr. Lindtner, "Adversaria Buddhica," WZKS XXVI (1982), pp. 182-184.
5
Based on the Tibetan text. The Sanskrit text reads: " ... will be equal [to the highest awareness of a
Buddha in that it will perceive things as they really are.]"
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freed itself from all conceptua l grasping of apprehended obj ects and apprehending con
sciousnesses (grilhyagrilhakavikalpa) is truly in accordance with Reality. But a percep
tion of visible forms and so forth, although it is nonconceptual, does not accord with
Reality because images of [nonexistent, external ] obj ects appear in it, as is the case

According to the Abhidharma (Vaibha:oika) theory, the five perceptual cognitions are free from con
ceptualization and recollection. These two forms of apprehending belong to the sixth mental con
sciousness (manovijiiana) only Perceptual cognition perceives its object as it is, without conceptu
ally differentiating it from other objects (nirupa:zavikalpa) and without identifying it with previously
perceived objects (anusmara:zavikalpa). But perceptual cognition is still an objectifying and differen
tiating cognition (vikalpa) in as much as it grasps the individual identity (svalaa:za =svabhava) of
its object exactly as it is. [On these three kinds of vikalpa, as distinguished by the Vaibhasikas, see
AK 1. 33ab (pp 60-61), Siddhi p. 390.]
If Reality is conceived as a reified absence, as is the case in the Yogacara doctrine according to
Bhavaviveka, Reality will be an entity capable of acting as the producing object-condition of a
knowledge in its own right. The awareness of Reality (nirvikalpajiiiina) will then be a caused know
ledge (saY(lSk-:ta). And whether the Yogacarins accept it or not, that knowledge will necessarily have
to appropriate a visual image (abhasa, akiira) of Reality in order to perceive Reality as it is As a re
sult, that knowledge will be accompanied by svabhavavikalpa, just like any ordmary visual percep
tion. It will therefore not be the true non-objectifying awareness of Reality
The inference in MHK V. 14 is a prasanga inference. It reoccurs in the form of an independent syl
logism in PP, as follows : "K nowledge which apprehends an object cannot be called 'non
objectifying' (nirvikalpa), because it contains an image of an object (visayabhasa), even when it does
not identify [that object-image] through concepts, as in the case of visual cogmtion." (PP, D Tsha
247b2-3, P. Tsha 310b2-3, Eckel, p. 72.)
Bhavaviveka also criticizes the Yogacara view of the nonconceptual awareness of RealIty (lokotta
ranirvikalpajiiana) in his Karatalaratnasastra ( II *-*1trt]jiUJJ , T. vol. 30, 268a-278b) According to the
Yogacara, the transmundane awareness of Reality arises when the conceptual apprehensions of ob
ject and subject (grahyagrahakavikalpa) are completely eliminated (T. vol. 30, 276cl7 -19) Bha
vaviveka criticizes this position as follows: "Granted that, when that knowledge arises, it will be
free from conceptual apprehension in the sense just explained. Nevertheless, because that knowledge
produces an image of its formless object (=Reality), and because it is accompanied by a [nonconcep
tual] objectification of its object (svabhavavikalpa), and because it is conditioned (samsk-:ta) , it can
not be the [true] transmundane non-objectifying awareness [of Reality], just like any other [ordi
nary] sense perception (pratyaksa) which is accompanied by objectification (savikalpa) " (T vol
30, 276cl9-22; L de La Vallee Poussin, Madhyamaka, III. Le Joyau Dans La Main, MCB II (1932-33),
p. 128)
These texts clearly show that Bhavaviveka's understanding of nirvikalpajiiana is fundamentally
different from that of the Yogacara. For Bhavaviveka, nirvikalpajiiana is not a nonconceptual
awareness, a direct perception or a vision of Reality, but is merely the non-perception (anu
palambha) of everything that is not Reality. In other words, the negative term nirvikalpa functions as
a non-affirming (prasajya) negation, in which case it means "absence of each and every kind of obJec
tification." In contrast, in the Yogacara view of Reality - as Bhavaviveka understands it nirvikalpa
functions as an affirming (paryudilsa) negation It then means "the nonconceptual vision of Reality
which arises as a new knowledge in its own right after all the conceptual or nonconceptual apprehen
sions of things that are not ultimately real have been eliminated from the mind." The Yogacara un
derstanding of nirvikalpajiiiina is one of the main targets of Bhavaviveka's critique of the Yogacara
doctrine not only in Chapter Five of MHK /TJ, but in PP (see Eckel, pp. 72-73) and Karatalaratna as
well. As for Chapter Five of MHK /T], see also especially verses V 16, 43-44, 91-94, 97-98, 101-102, 111
-ll2.
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with the perception of a [nonexistent] second moon. " l

We reply :
If you argue that a perception of visible forms does not accord with Reality be
cause it contains an image of [nonexistent, external] objects, then the l ogical rea
son [in your argument] is mistaken and your thesis also collapses. (15)
'Mistaken' (vyabhiciirin) means 'contradi ctory' (viruddha). A [veridical] perception
of visible forms never occurs unless the image of the perceived object appears in the
mind.2

But you deny the veracity [of all perceptions of external obj ects] by inferring

that [any cognition in which] images of [ external] obj ects appear is not veridical .
Hence, [your l ogical reason] is contradictory because the reality of the subject of your
thesis (dharmin) is not properly established.3
The thesis (pratijfiii)i of your inference is : "A perception of visibl e forms does
not accord with reality. " But how could a [veridical] perception of visibl e forms not be
1

The Y ogacar a ad mi ts that an ordi nar y vi sual perce pti on i s i ndeed free fr om the c once ptual gr aspi ng
of the re al e xi ste nce of i ts objec t and of i tself as the appre he nder of that objec t. I t i s ne ver thele ss a
fal se ( abhuta) c ogni ti on, bec ause i mage s of none xi ste nt e xter nal obj ec ts appe ar i n i t. I n c ontr ast, the
nonc onceptual aware ne ss of Re ali ty i s not onl y free fr om the c once ptual gr aspi ng of none xi ste nt e x
ter nal objec ts b ut al so fr om the i mage s of none xi ste nt e xter nal objec ts.
Li ter all y : " A [ veridic al ] percepti on of vi sible f or ms has no sub stance or re ali ty ( ngo bo nyid ) apar t
fr om the appe ar ance of the i mage of the percei ved objec t [i n the mi nd] ."
Thi s par agr aph e xpl ai ns why the l ogic al reason in the Y ogac ar a i nfer e nce i s mi stake n As f ar as the
c onve nti onal tr uth ( saYj'lv;tisatya ) i s c oncer ned, Bhavavi ve ka f ol l ows the Sautr anti ka the or y of per
ce pti on. Acc ordi ng to that the or y, a veridic al perce pti on occ ur s onl y whe n the i mage of the percei ved
objec t appe ar s i n the mi nd . H e nce, the re ali ty or sub stance ( ngo bo nyid ) of a veridic al vi sual perce p
ti on i s " appe ar ance i n the mi nd of the i mage of the e xter nal objec t b y whic h that percepti on i s pr o
duced ." The l ogic al re ason i n the Y ogac ar a i nfere nce assume s howe ver that all the c ogni ti ons whic h
c ontai n an i mage of e xter nal obj.ec ts are fal se bec ause e xter nal objec ts d o not e xi st. And that l ogic al
re ason i s i n c ontradic ti on wi th the subjec t of the pr oposi ti on (" perce pti on of vi sible f or ms" ), bec ause
i t e xcl ude s the re ali ty or sub stance ( ngo bo nyid ) of vi sual perce pti on whic h c onsi sts i n " havi ng the
i mage whic h i s pr od uced b y and agree s wi th the percei ved e xter nal objec t. " By assumi ng that e xter
nal objec ts do not e xi st and that all c ogni ti ons i n whic h i mage s of e xter nal objec ts appe ar are c onse
q uentl y not i n acc ord ance wi th re ali ty, the Y ogac ar a si mpl y de ni e s the re ali ty of valid vi sual perce p
ti ons. The fir st of the three r ule s of the l ogic al re ason, whic h sti pul ate s that the l ogic al re ason should
be a pr oper ty of a re al subjec t, i s thus vi ol ated.
One c ould al so say that the i nfere nce of the Y ogac ar a i s mi stake n bec ause i t is tautol ogic al . I t si m
pl y says: "All the perce pti ons of vi sible f or ms are f al se, bec ause all the c ogni ti ons whic h c ontai n an
i mage of e xter nal objec ts are f al se [ gi ve n the f ac t that e xter nal objec ts d o not e xi st]. " Bha vavi ve ka' s
rej oi nder i n MH K V. 15 i s e xpl ai ned i n that se nse b y the Ge -I uk sc hol ar Jang-gya (17 17 -17 86): " . . .i t i s
not a c orrec t re ason bec ause the subjec t -an aware ne ss [ appre he ndi ng] f or ms- and the re ason
a percei ver of objec ts- are not differe nt bec ause whe n the me ani ng of the re ason i s e stabli shed, the
e nti ty of the subjec t i s alre ad y e stabli shed as fal se [bec ause the e stabli shme nt of the subjec t must be
se par ate fr om the e stabli shme nt of the re ason] ." ( see D. S. Lope z, A Study ojSviitantrika, Snow Li ons
Public ati ons, I thac a, New Y or k, 1987, p. 30 6). Correc t re asoni ng req uire s that the l ogic al re ason i s a
ge nui ne predic ate of the subj ec t of the the si s and d oe s not per mi t that the subjec t and the re ason are
ide ntic al . If the ide nti ty of subjec t and re ason we re all owed, Bhavavi ve ka c ould si mpl y i nver t the ar-

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in accordance with [conventional] reality ? As a matter of fact, your thesis "visual per
ception is not in accordance with reality" is contradicted by inference (anumiina) be
cause it can be refuted in virtue of direct perception (pratyak:;a), scripture (agama) and
the general opinion Uokaprasiddha) accordi ng to which any [veridical] perception of
visible forms is certainly in accordance with reality.]
Your sta tement "The seers of Reality see the perfectl y established nature [of the
,,
mind] 2 is also wrong for the following reason:
If the enl ightened mi nd of the Teacher perceives an inherent nature, it will per
ceive a definite entity. It wil l then also have an obj ect and will consequently not
be [the true] non-objectifying awareness [of Reality] . (16)
That inexpressible nature, which [accordi ng to you] is the obj ect to be realized person
ally (pratisvasa'f!lvedya) by the Tathagata and which you call 'the perfectl y established
nature [of the mind] ' (pariniannasvabhava) , must be something that exists. Accor
dingly, if the enlightened knowledge of the Teacher- Tathagata perceives that nature, it
will apprehend a definite entity (savikalpa) .3 But it is stated [in scripture] that an en
lightened mi nd does not apprehend anything. Further, if the enlightened mind takes
that [nature] as i ts obj ect, i t wil l also have an obj ect (salambana) and wi ll consequently
not be without obj ect. But i t is stated [in scripture] that the enlightened mind has no ob
j ect. And if the enlightened mind i dentifies that same object as 'absence of the [ima
gined] nature' , it will also not be [the true] non-obj ectifying awareness [of Reality] .
Likewise, regarding your thesis that "The three [samsari c] realms are mind only

2
3

gu me nt and say . " [Conve ntionally spe aking] , a ve rid ical visu al pe rce ption accord s with re ality, be
cau se the image of the pe rce ived obj e ct appe ars in it "
T his paragraph e xplains w hy the the sis is mistake n. T he Y ogac ara the sis can be re fu ted by the fol
low ing infe re nce . "A [ ve rid ical] pe rce ption of visible forms is in accord ance w ith re ality, be cau se
the contrary asse rtion violate s d ire ct pe rce ption, scriptu re and the ge ne ral opinion. " Or, the Y oga
cara the sis is mistake n ( pakabhiisa), be cau se it is contrad icted by d ire ct pe rce ption and the ge ne ral
conse nsu s (see Nyayamukha, T . vol 32, 1a15 -21, Prama1!osamuccaya III. 2).
For Bhavavive ka, an y pe rce ption w hich has the image of the obj e ct that produ ced it, is in accor
d ance w ith conve ntional re ality. Follow ing the S au trantika the ory of know led ge , Bhavaviveka ar
gues that the existe nce of su ch an obj e ct can be e stablished by an infe re nce which re asons from the
occu rre nce of an e ffe ct to the e xiste nce of its cau se . T he pre se nce of the image of an exte rnal object
in the mind at a particu lar time and place cannot be e xplained u nle ss the e xte rnal obj e ct to which
that image corre spond s actu ally e xists ou tside the mind and has acted as the produ cing cau se of that
particu lar image (see MHK V. 5 9). T he the sis of su ch an infe re nce is valid be cau se it is not contra
d icted by d ire ct pe rce ption, scriptu re and the ge ne ral conse nsu s. As for scriptu re , Bhavavive ka mu st
have the follow ing state me nt in mind . " Visu al pe rce ption originate s in de pende nce on the visu al or
gan and the pre se nce of visible forms." (Qu oted in the comme ntary to ve rse 17 be low)
See ve rse V. 5 cd .
T hat is, a s a pe rce ption of a de finite e ntity, it w ill ne ce ssarily be accompanied by svabhavavikalpa
(see note 6, p 96).
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(cittamiitram) . Obj ects outside the mind (biihyiirtha) do no t exist." :

It is also not correct that there is no perception of vi sible forms and so forth as a
result of perceiving [everything as] phenomena appearing only in the mind. 1
That thesis is refuted because it confli cts with the accepted [Buddhist] doctrine
and with common sense. (17)
[That thesis] is refuted by reason of the accepted [Buddhist] doctrine because it con
tradicts the following teaching from scripture: "Visual cognition originates in depen
dence on the visual sense organ and the [presence] of visible forms. "z

It is also refuted

by common sense, because peopl e in general agree that visual cogniti ons and so forth
do not originate when obj ects such as visible forms and so forth are not present [outside
the mind] .3
At this point [the Yogacarins] obj ect : " [Perceptual ] cognitions originate even
when [external ] objects such as visible forms and so forth are absent, because the im
ages of such objects appear in the mind [even when these objects are absent] , as is for
,,
example the case when we perceive visible forms and so forth in a dream. 4
To refute this, we say:
It is also not correct to argue as follows: "There is perception of visible forms
and so forth in the absence of [ external] objects, because images [of visible forms
and so forth] appear in the mind [even when external obj e cts are absent] , as is
the case when we perceive visible forms and so forth in a dream." (18)
This inference of our opponents is not correct. Why not?
[Your inference] lacks a correct example, because consciousness in a dream and
so forth apprehends [rea l ] phenomena. Moreover, you mistakenly negate [the
existence of] obj ects [outside the mind] . (19)
1
2

See verse V.4 ab.

Samyukta 9, 6 (qu oted in AK IX, p . 24 1) .
See n ote 1, p. 98. The thesi s i s mi stak en becau se i t con tradi cts an other accep ted Budd hi st ten et and
the gen eral con sen su s. Bhava vi vek a here chall en ges the Y ogacara to come up wi th valid argu men ts
to p rove the ' mind onl y' ten et becau se that ten et i s manif estl y in confli ct wi th Budd hi st d octrin e and
common sen se. In PP al so, Bhavavi vek a p oin ts ou t that the n on exi sten ce of ex tern al obj ects i s n ot
evid en ced by di rect p ercep ti on ( pratyaa) and should theref ore be establi shed by scrip tu ral argu
men ts (iigama) and inf eren ti al reasonin g ( anumiina) (see Eck el, p_ 61) .
The argu men t f rom d ream con sci ou sn ess i s f ound in MS (T. vol. 3 1, 13 8a20-25) and ViK 15 . The cl o
sest parall el to the p resen t argu men t i s ViK 1, ex cep t that the mi stak en p ercep ti on s of a 'tai mi rik a'
are there u sed as the ex amp le in stead of d ream con sci ou sn ess: " Thi s [en ti re tripl e world ] i s merel y
an app earan ce in the mind, becau se i mages of n on -p resen t obj ects app ear [in the mi nd] , as i s the case
when someon e who suff ers f rom cataract sees [n on -p resen t] sli n gs of hai r and so f orth." ( vijfiapti
miitram evedam asadarthiivabhiisaniit /yadvat taimirikasya asatkeso'!r!rakiididaiSanam/ /)
A si mi lar argu men t i s in trodu ced and refu ted in PP (see Eck el, p. 61) .
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It is not so tha t visible forms and the like are not perceived in a dream. In fact, they are
perceived by the cognitive eye (jniinacakus ) 1 which has been permeated (paribhiivita )
from time immemori al by the impressi ons (viisanii) of apprehended [external ] obj ects
(griihya ) and [their corresponding] perceptual cogniti ons (griihaka ) . Dream conscious

ness and the like do therefore have a [real] obj ect (siilambana ) . What is seen [heard,
smelt, etc.] in a dream is a reappearance (abhidhiina ) [ of the obj ects] that have pre
viously been perceived [heard, smelt, etc.] [during waking life] . Dream cogniti ons are
therefore simil ar to recollecti ons (smrti ) and the like.
Even in the dreams of people who are blind from birth and whose power of vi
sion is entirely impaired, many kinds of visible forms --colors as well as shapes- ap
pear by the power of the impressions (viisanii) of what was perceived by them in their
previous lives. Thus, even the [dream] consciousness of persons who are blind from
birth is not without object. This accords with the foll owing words from scripture:
"Protector of Virtue (Bhadrapala) , in his dreams a person who is blind from birth per
ceives these visible forms with his cognitive eye and not with his fleshy eyes. " Thus, be
cause [in dreams] the cognitive eye perceives phenomena (dharma ) , even dream con
sciousness and the like do have an object [that exists separately from the mind] . Hence,
your argument (siidhana ) is defective beca use it lacks a correct example.2 And since
1

The cognitive eye is the mental organ ( maJUlS) . It acts as the support (asraya) of mental perceptions
(manovijiiiina) which have mental phenomena (dharma) as their object. See Yamaguchi, p 23l.
Bhavaviveka here argues that, from the point of view of the conventional truth, the perception of
visible forms in a d ream is a mental cognition which has a real mental object (dharma) and is only
possible as a recollection of previous perceptions of real external objects in the waking world Bha
vaviveka thus uses the d ream simile to show that, conventionally sp eaking, both consciousness and
its object are real enti ties, each being a prod uct of its respective causes and each having a d e
pend ently originated own-being (paratantrasvabhiiva) In PP ( see Eckel, p 62) , he refutes the same ar
gument from the point o f view of both truths. First, if the Yogacara reasons about what is ult imately
the case (paramiirthatah) , the example of d ream consciousness is not established, because d ream con
sciousness - or any consciousness for that matter - ultimately d oes not originate from itself, from
others, etc And if the Yogacarin reasons conventionally, his ' mind only' thesis conflIcts with the
common-sense view (prasiddhabiidhii) that perceptual cognitions originate in depend ence on cond i
tIO ns which are not of the nature of mind such as external objects and sense organs
People with normally functioning sense organs perceive colors, shapes, sound s and so forth while
they are awake. According to Bhavaviveka, when such people perceive images of external objects in
their d reams, they perceive real mental phenomena (dharma) T hese phenomena have an existence
of their own because they originate from the impressions (viisanii) prod uced by the perceptions that
occurred d uring waking life. They are replicas of prevIO usly perceived objects. As real entities, they
act as the prod ucing object-cond ition of the mental cognition t hat cognizes them. Even the d ream
consciousness of people who are blind from birth perceives images of colors and the like Although
blind people cannot perceive colors while they are awake d uring their p resent existence, their stream
of consciousness has retained the impressions of the visual perceptions that occurred d uring theIr
previous existence ( s) when their visual sense organ was functioning normally. Hence, the example of
d ream consciousness is no evid ence f or the nonexistence of objects outside the mind . On the contrary,

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you deny the existence of [external ] obj ects such as visible form and so forth, you also
mistakenly negate (apavada) the existence of the obj ects (viaya) [of perceptual cog
nitions] . 1
You might argue a s follows : "Consciousness itself originates a s the [simultane-

the appe ar ance o f i mage s of co lor s and shape s in dre am co nscio usne ss is base d o n re co lle ctio n and
canno t be ex plai ne d unle ss re al ex ter nal o bje cts have bee n per ce ive d duri ng wak ing li fe ei ther in this
exi ste nce or in a pre vio us exi ste nce .
Sthir amati di scusse s the same pro ble m i n MVT 25 . 20-26.18 (d. Yamaguchi, pp. 231-232). He intro
duce s and re fute s three o bje cti o ns agai nst the Yo gacar a ar gume n t that wak ing co nscio usne ss is si mi
lar to dre am co nsci o usne ss i n that it ori gi nate s witho ut a re al e x ter nal o bje ct. The thir d o bje ctio n
(26. 8 - 10) says that the dre am co nscio usne ss o f peo ple wi th nor mal e ye si ght doe s have an o bje ct,
name ly the o bje ct that has bee n per ce ive d (anubhiltartha ) dur ing their wak ing life . I f the Yo gacar in
re fuse s to acce pt this, he will be unable to ex plain why the dre am co nscio usne ss o f peo ple who are
bli nd fro m bir th (jatyandha ) doe s no t per ce ive co lor s and shape s. Sthiramati re fute s this o bje cti o n as
fo llo ws (26. 10- 18). Fir st, image s o f co lor s and shape s appe ar also in the dre am co nscio usne ss o f per
so ns who are bli nd fro m bir th. Ho we ver , since the se per so ns canno t per cei ve re al co lor s dur ing their
wak ing li fe , the y are no t fami li ar with the li ngui sti c co nve ntio ns (saJ?'lketa ) . That is to say, the y do
no t k no w that the i mage s o f the co lor s the y per ce ive in their dre ams are co nve nti o nally de signate d
as "re d" , " blue" , and so for th. The y are there fore unable to co mmuni cate the ir per ce ptio ns o f co lor s
to o ther peo ple . Thi s ex plains why i t i s mistake nly tho ught that per so ns who are blind fro m bir th do
no t per ce ive image s o f co lor s i n the ir dre ams. Se co nd, the o ppo ne nt' s pre mise that o nly" pre vio usly
per ce ive d o bje cts are see n duri ng a dream, also applie s to the dre ams o f per so ns who are blind fro m
bir th, be cause such per so ns have had per ce ptio ns o f co lor s and the like dur ing the ir pre vio us ex is
te nce (s). Sthir amati thus use s the same ar gument as Bhavavi vek a, but he use s it to e stablish ' mind
o nly' where as Bhavavi vek a use s it to re fute ' mi nd o nly' . For Bhavavivek a, o nly per ce pti o ns in a
dre am or igi nate fro m impre ssio ns that were pro duce d by per ce ptio ns dur ing wak ing li fe , where as all
the per ce ptio ns dur ing wak ing life or iginate fro m ex ter nal co ndi tio ns and no t fro m i mpre ssio ns i n
the mi nd. For Sthir amati , all o ur per ce ptio ns ori ginate fro m impre ssio ns i n the mi nd ; all the se i m
pre ssio ns are pro ducts o f an intr a- me ntal pro ce ss o f tr ansfor matio n, and no ne o f the m i s the pro duct
o f pre vio us per ce ptio ns o f re al ex ter nal o bje cts.
Candraklr ti di scusse s the ' dre am simi le' ar gume nt i n MAV VI . 48- 5 5 . On that o ccasio n, he also
cr iticize s Bhavavivek a' s i nter pre tatio n o f the dre am si mi le i n MHK V. 19. Accor ding to Candr akir ti,
a Madhyamik a sho uld no t refute the ' mind o nly' te ne t by ar gui ng that, co nve nti o nally speak ing, ex
ter nal o bje cts are as re al as co nscio usne ss i tse lf. A tr ue Madhyamik a sho uld ar gue that bo th co n
scio usness and its o bje ct are ulti mate ly unre al. He voi ce s hi s cri tici sm o f Bhavavi vek a as fo llo ws:
"So me bo dy [ =Bhavavi vek a] re aso ns as fo llo ws: ' [I mage s] o f visi ble for ms are pre sent i n dre am
co nscio usne ss. The y are me ntal phe no me na and are appre he nde d by a me ntal co gni tio n (manovi
jfiiina ) . A co nscio usne ss wi tho ut o bje ct doe s there fore no t exi st anywhere .' This re aso ni ng [i s no t
o nly i nappro pr iate for a Madhyamik a, but i t] i s also wro ng, be cause in dre am co nscio usne ss the
three [ = o bje ct, se nse or gan, co nscio usne ss] do no t ex ist [ as se lf-e stabli she d e ntiti e s] . He mi ght say
that he affir ms [the ex iste nce o f o bje cts] for the pur po se o f re futing the do ctri ne o f o ther s [ =o f the
Yo gacar a] . I n that case , ho we ver , the ex ample will be me aningle ss [for the pur po se o f re futi ng the
Yo gacar a and e stabli shing the Madhyamak a the si s that all thi ngs lack inherent exi ste nce] . W hy?
Be cause yo u canno t sho w that the e ntitie s [o f the wak i ng wor ld] are unre al (alika, mrsa ) by me ans

o f an ex ample [ =dre am co nscio usne ss] o f which [ yo u assume] the o bje ct to be re al." (Co mme ntar y
o n MA VI .5 1cd-5 2a in MABh 143. 5 -13, D . Ha 265 a3-5 )
Thi s i s an e pi ste mo lo gi cal o bje ctio n. Ho w can per ce ptual co gnitio n or igi nate witho ut o bje ct? For the
Madhyamak a, e pi ste mo lo gical que stio ns de al wi th co nve ntio nal tr uths, i n casu the ori ginatio n o f
per ce ptual co gni tio n. Bhavavivek a' s po int is that the ' mind o nly' te ne t canno t acco unt for the ori gi
natio n o f per ce ptual co gni tio ns be cause it de nie s the co nve ntio nal tr uth that per ce ptual co gnitio ns
ar ise o nly whe n ex ter nal o bje cts are pre se nt.
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ous] appearance of two thi ngs (dvayabhasa) , namely the appearance of [consci ous
ness] itself ( svabhasa) [as an apprehender of obj ects] and the appearance of an image
of an [external ] obj ect ( viayabhtisa ) due to an [internal ] causal process (pari;:tama)
by which consci ousness assumes the form (akara) of an external obj ect (bahyaviaya) .
J ust this latter appearance is the obj ect ( vsaya ) of consciousness as self-appearance." l
1

The Yogacara replies to Bhavaviveka' s objection that the ' mind only' t enet cannot explain how per
ceptual cognitions originate Bhavaviveka adheres to the Sautrantika position that we never per
ceive external objects directly. W hat we perceive directly are only images of external objects (see
note 1, p. 98) The Yogacara says the same. But the Yogacara does not accept that the appearance of
these images in the mind is caused by the presence of real objects outside the mind For the Yoga
cara, both the perceiving consciousness and the images it percei ves originate simultaneously as the
outcome of a strictly internal causal process (vijiianapari1:ziima. see TrK 1 ) by which their respective
seeds in the store- consciousness obtain causal eff iciency Hence, f or the Yogacara, perceptual cogm
tions do have an object, but their objects are all of the nature of mind.
The terms svabhiisa and visayiibhiisa are most probably borrowed f rom D igna ga's Pramii:zasamuc
caya [PS] 1 . 9-10 (see M. Hattori, Dignaga, On Perception, Harvard U niversity Press, 1968, p. 28-29)
But D ignaga' s theory of knowledge in PS diff ers in three important respects f rom the theory which
Bhavaviveka introduces here First, D ignaga does not adhere to the 'mind only' tenet in PS. Second,
he does not teach that the subjective and objective aspects of consciousness are two separate entities,
each being produced by their own causes (see PS 1 . 10) Third, he distinguishes a third aspect of con
sciousness, namely that of self -awareness (svasa'J'!lvzttz ) . Strictly speaking, only D harmapala' s theory
of consciousness, as explained in the Vijnaptimatrataszddhz, seems to f it with the content of MHK/TJ
20ab.
S. Yamaguchi (pp. 237 -238) mentions MVK /MVBh/MVT as another possible text source of the
theory presented here. According to these texts, consciousness is intrinsically f ree f rom the subject
object (grahaka, grahya) duality. Nevertheless, as long as it is aff ected by def ilements and cognitive
obstructions (klesajiieyavara:za) , consciousness originates as a dualistiC subject-object appearance
(grahyagrahakapratibhasa). Perceptual cognition then not only has an image of external objects
(grahyapratibhasa grahyiikilra arthasattvapratibhii.')a), but it simultaneously manif ests itself as the
perceiver of such an image (grahakapratibhasa grahakakilra iltmavijiiaptipratibhasa) (MVK I 3 , see
also MSA X1 . 40) .
It is important to note that, at least prior to D ignaga, the doctrine of consciousness as a dual ap
pearance was taught as a purely soteriological doctrine and was not concerned Wi th epistemological
issues. The purpose of the doctrine was not to explain how perceptual cognitions originate, what
their object is, how their object is cognized, and so f orth. The purpose was to explain what def ile
ment (sa'J'!lklesa) is, how it originates and how it can be eliminated. Sthiramati, in particular, empha
sizes the point that any instance of def iled consciousness (abhillaparikalpa) necessarily (avas yam,
MVT 26. 1-2) originates as the appearance of an unreal subject-object duality, because one could oth
erwise not explain why and how people mistake the unreal f or real and thus become attached to the
imagined nature of the self (iltman ) and other things (dharma) If consciousness did not originate as
the appearance of unreal duality, the origination of sa'J'!lklesa simply could not be explained. The f ol
lowing passages f rom Sthiramati's MVT illustrate this point:
(1) The nature of def iled consciousness (vijnanasvabhava) consists in being a f alse consciousness (a
bhiUaparikalpa l, that is, a consciousness which produces images of unreal objects and simultaneously
manif ests itself as the apprehender of these images. (MVT 17 .7 -8)
(2) Because external objects do not exist, consciousness itself does not exist as the knower (vijnilt!)
of such objects. But consciousness does exist as the real cause and locus both of the appearance of
images of unreal objects and of the appearance of itself as the unreal apprehender of such objects.
This is because the nature of def iled consciousness (vijnanasvabhava) consists in ' appearance of un
real subject-object duality' (MVT 20. 1-5)
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We rej oin :
If you say that the images of [external] obj ects [ in the mind] are the object ap
prehended by the mi nd, we ask you what other nature (iltman) the mind could
have in additi on to [just] being the appearance [of images] of [external] ob
jects? (20)
To us [Madhyamikas] it is evident that, [conventionally speaking] , the nature (sva
bhilva) of consciousness consists in its origination as the appearance of [images of] ob

j ects such as visible forms and so forth. But except for the appearance of object
images, we do not see any other appearance [of consciousness] as itself (svilbhiisa). If
there exists a second nature of consciousness, other than the appearance of obj ect
images, you should tell us what it is. l
To show [what that second nature is] , you will perhaps argue as follows.2

Con

sciousness has two natures: it is the appearance of i tself (svilbhilsa) and the appearance
of obj ect- images (viaYilbhilsa) . This is because consciousness not only continues to ex
ist with its own nature but also originates [in various ways] as resembling other
[things] (anyanibha) , just like a crystal j ewel (sjJha.tika) . A crystal j ewel is by nature

(3)T he appea rance of t he un real sub ject -ob ject dual it y in con sc iou sne ss is t he ba sis or cau se
( kiira1!a, nibandhana ) of t he m istaken ident if icat ion ( niyama ) o r de signat ion ( abhilapanam ) of and
attac hment to ( abhinivesa ) t he ima gined e xistence of ob ject s and of it self a s t he selfsame app re hen
de r/o wne r of suc h ob ject s. ( MVT 17. 4-5, 17. 10-11, 26. 1-2, 2 18. 18-2 0).
Acco rd in g to Bhava viveka, t he natu re (svabhiiva) of con sc iou sne ss, o r t he spec if ic qual it y in virtue
of whic h somet hin g is a con sc iou sne ss a s d ist in gu ished f rom non -con sc iou s t hin gs, is t hat it o rigi
nate s a s an ent it y whic h po sse sse s an ima ge o r fo rm of an ob ject ( vsayiibhiisa) . 'To kno w an ob ject'
mean s 'to ha ve an ima ge of t hat ob ject' . But in add it ion to t hat, con sc iou sne ss doe s not ha ve an y
' second' natu re in virtue of whic h it would al so man ife st it self (svabhiisa) a s t he app re hend in g sub ject
of t hat ob ject -ima ge .
St hiramat i appa rentl y a gree s wit h Bhava viveka o n t he natu re of con sc iou sne s s : "In add it ion to
it s o riginat ion a s t he po sse sso r of an ima ge of an ob ject, con sc iou sne ss pe rfo rm s no othe r act [of
kno wled ge] in virtue of whic h it would app re hend t hat ob ject . . . " ( MVT 2 4. 14-16: na ca vayaprati
bhiisatmanotpattiY(l muktva vijiianasya anya kriya 'sti, yam kriyaY(l kurvat vijiianaY(l vsayam alam
bate . . . . ). T he a greement is ho we ve r onl y appa rent . T rue, St hiramat i sa ys t hat con sc iou sne ss doe s not
reall y app re hend it s ob ject -ima ge s. But he al so sa ys t hat con sc iou sne ss man ife st s it self (sviibhiisa)
as if it we re t he app re hende r of it s ob ject -ima ge s ( see note 1, p . 102) .
In t he ve rse s t hat follo w, Bhava viveka d iscu sse s and refute s fou r t heo rie s of con sc iou sne ss a s a dual
appea rance. T he o rde r of d iscu ssion is a s follo ws.
T heo ry 1: Con sc iou sne ss, alt hou gh int rin sicall y fo rmle ss ( niriikiira sviibhiisa) , a ssume s t he fo rm of
d ifferent ob ject s ( viaYiibhasa) (2 1ab ). Refutat ion of t his t heo ry (2 1cd -22ab ).
T heo ry 2: Con sc iou sne ss is bot h t he capac it y (sakti = sviibhiisa) to p roduce ob ject -ima ge s and t he ac
tual appea rance of ob ject -ima ge s ( viaYiibhiisa) (22cd ).
T heo ry 3: Con sc iou sne ss simultaneou sl y man ife st s bot h it self ( bimba = sviibhiisa ) and an ima ge p ro
duced by it self ( pratibimba = viayiibhiisa ) ( 23) .
T heo ry 4: Con sc iou sne ss is bot h t he in st rument of kno wled ge ( pramii1!a = svabhiisa) and t he con st i
tuted kno wled ge it self ( pramii1!aphala = viayabhiisa ) . Int roduced in 2 4ab and refuted in 2 4cd-26 .
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self-transparent (svaprakas a ) [and hence intrinsi cally colorless] ' but it can assume the
appearance of a blue thing and so forth, depending on the different [ colors of the]
things that are placed near to it. Similarly, the mind, whi le continuing to be the appear
ance of itself (sviibhiisa) , also becomes an obj ect-appearance (vi!iayiibhiisa) by assuming
the form (iikiira) of [various] obj ects. l
[We reply: ]

If you a rgue like that, your example i s not similar to the proposi-

tion you want to prove (siidhya). Why not?

It is wrong to assert that [consciousness] is a twofold appearance because it
originates as similar to other things, j ust like a crystal. The moment at which [a
crystal] originates as a colored thing because some colored object is placed near
to it, is in fact not the [same as the previous] moment of that crystal. (21)
It is true that a crystal jewel, because of the special property of the obj ect that is placed
near to it, such as a blue object and so forth, loses its own transparent nature and
changes into a blue thing and so forth. But it is not the case that the previous moment
of the transparent crystal changes into a blue thing, because that previous moment has
then already ceased to exist.
1

Accordi ng to Yamaguchi ( p. 241 ), thi s the ory i s aki n to Di gnaga' s the ory of the three aspe cts of con
sci ousne ss i n PS. Yamaguchi i s wrong. The the ory i ntroduce d he re i s i n fact just the O ppOSI te of Di g
naga's the ory. Di gnaga holds that consci ousne ss i s i ntri nsi cally sakara (= vzayabhiJ1)a) The pre se nt
the ory howe ve r says that consci ousne ss i s i ntri nsi cally transpare nt, si mi lar to a crystal, and he nce
i ntri nsi cally free from obje ct-i mage s ( nirakara). Consci ousne ss be come s an obje ct-appe arance as
long as i t i s affe cte d by de fi le me nts and cogni ti ve obstructi ons, but all that whi le i ts i ntri nsi cally pure
nature re mai ns unaffe cte d by the se ex tri nsi c appe arance s. Thi s the ory i s thus close to the the ory of
the i ntri nsi cally pure but adve nti ti ously de fi le d nature of consci ousne ss, as taught i n MVK , MSAL
and DD V Bhavavi ve ka re fute s thi s the ory i n de tai l i n MHK V 88-9l .
Bhavavi ve ka's most li ke ly tex t source i s the SaY(ld hinzrmocanasutra whe re the compari son of the
crystal i s use d to ex plai n the re lati onshi p be twee n the three nature s (SNS, Lamotte VI. 8 -9, pp. 61 62; T. vol 1 6, 693b2-20) . Just as a crystal appe ars as i f i t we re a sapphi re , a ruby or an e me rald, de
pe ndi ng on whe the r the obje ct i t come s i n contact wi th i s blue , re d or gree n, just so the de pe nde nt na
ture of thi ngs appe ars as i f i t we re an i nde pe nde ntly e stabli she d nature. And just as a crystal re tai ns
i ts i ntri nsi cally transpare nt nature i n spi te of I tS colore d appe arance, just so the de pe nde nt nature i s
i ntri nsi cally e mpty of i nhe re nt exi ste nce i n spi te of the fact that i t appe ars not to be e mpty of i t.
Whe n re ad i n the li ght of the above passage from SNS, the pre se nt the ory says that consci ousne ss
i s i ntri nsi cally e mpty of obje ct-i mages (nirakara svabhiJ1)a) but ne ve rthe le ss be come s the locus
whe re obje ct-i mage s appe ar (sakara vi:;ayabhasa) as long as the condi ti ons of thi s false appe arance
are pre se nt.
The compari son wi th a crystal i s also use d i n a di ffe re nt contex t by Sthi ramati i n hi s commentary
on MVK V. 15 cd (MVT 21 7 . 20-218 1) (d. Yamaguchi , p 242). Sthi ramati says that false consci ous
ne ss (abhutapan'kalpa) ori gi nate s as a subje ct-obje ct appe arance (grahyagrahakakara), but not i n the
same manne r as a crystal whi ch assume s a colore d appe arance whe n a colore d obje ct i s place d ne ar
to i t. The purport of Sthi ramati ' s state me nt i s the followi ng. U nli ke a crystal whi ch be come s colore d
by an obje ct exi sti ng i n i ts own ri ght apart from the crystal, the subje ct- obje ct appe arance of con
sci ousne ss i s not cause d by ex te rnal obje cts but i s the re sult of i nte rnal cause s ( bija) pre se nt i n con
sci ousne ss i tse lf
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It is a mistake to think 'the same transparent crystal is still there' with respect to
a different thing that originates after that [crystal as a transparent thing] has al
ready ceased to exist. (22ab)
It is a mistake to think that the [same transparent] crystal is [still] there when, due to
the special property of an obj ect that is placed nearby, something having the nature of
blue and the like originates after that moment of the transparent crystal has ceased to
exist.l
The two natures [of consciousness, asserted by you,] do not exist for the follow
ing reason [also] . When nothing is placed nearby the crystal, only the former [trans
parent] nature of the crystal appears. But, whereas the form (iikiira) of the [transpar
ent] crystal can be observed [even] when nothing is placed nearby, one can never ob
serve the form of [consciousness as a] knower (jfiiiniikiira) u naccompanied by the form
of a known obj ect (jfieyiikiira) . And it is against reason to think that, although its na
ture as a self-appearance (svabhiisa) is [never] experienced [in isolation from an obj ect
-appearance] , consciousness could [at some time exist as a mere self-appearance and
subsequently] come to exist as an object-appearance (vaYiibhiisa) by assuming the ap
pearance of a known object (alambanabhiisa ) after the form of that obj ect (viayakara)
has been approached.2
I

Th e p oi nt of Bh avavi vek a' s r ef utati on i s as f oll ows. Th e i nstant at which a cr ystal tur ns bl ue b e
c ause of th e pr esenc e of a bl ue obj ec t i n i ts vici ni ty, i s diff er ent fr om th e pr ec edi ng i nstant at which
th e cr ystal exi sted as a c olor less, tr ansp ar ent enti ty. Simil arl y, th e i nstant at which c onsci ousness
m anif ests onl y i tself (sviibhasa) and th e i nstant at which i t c ontai ns th e im age of an obj ec t (vayii
bhasa) ar e two diff er ent i nstants of c onsci ousness and ar e th er ef or e two diff er ent enti ti es. C onse
quentl y, one c annot say th at one i nstant of c onsc i ousness h as th e twof old natur e of sViibhasa and
viayiibhasa. Bh avavi vek a th us sub stanti ates hi s own p osi ti on th at th e natur e of c onsci ousness c on
si sts onl y i n 'h a vi ng im ages of obj ec ts' (viaYiibhasa) . Ap ar t fr om th at, c onsci ousness d oes not h ave
any sec ond natur e i n vir tue of which i t would m anif est i tself (sviibhasa).
Af ter havi ng excl ud ed th e p ossibili ty th at c onsci ousness c ould at one and th e sam e i nstant h ave th e
twof old natur e of app eari ng as i tself and app eari ng as an ob jec t, Bh avavi vek a now c onsi d er s
wh eth er such i s p ossibl e at two c onsec uti ve i nstants. A s f or a crystal, w e c an ob ser ve i t as tr ansp ar
ent at one i nstant and as c ol or ed at th e next i nstant. But c onsci ousness, i n as f ar a s i t i s th e k nower
of som ethi ng and h enc e excl udi ng th e non- obj ec tif yi ng awar eness of Reali ty, c an never b e an obj ec t
less k nower at one i nstant and sub sequentl y appr eh end an ob jec t at th e next i nstant. In oth er word s,
c onsci ousness i s always obj ec t- app ear anc e (viayiibhiisa siikiira) and th at i s i ts onl y natur e acc ord
i ng to Bh avavi vek a.
Jang- gya (see D . Lop ez, A Study of Sviitantrika, p . 311)h as i nterpr eted th e pr esent p assage as a r ef u
tati on of self- awar eness (svasaJ?1vitti) . Th at, h owever, d oes not seem to b e th e tr ue p urp or t of th e
text. Th e text says th at a c onsci ousness wi th out obj ec t- im ages i s never exp eri enc ed, b ut i t d oes not
sp ecif y wh eth er such a c onsci ousness i s never exp eri enc ed b y anoth er c onsci ousness or b y th at c on
sci ousness i tself. Th e pr esent p assage c ould b e i nterpr eted as an explici t d eni al of self- awar eness
only if i t exp lici tly stated th at c onsci ousness i tself c annot exp eri enc e or appr eh end i tself as an ob
jec tl ess k nower . Mor eover, th e stand ard th eor y of self- awar eness, as d evelop ed b y Di gnaga, d efi nes
self -awar eness as th e c ap aci ty of c onsci ousness to exp eri enc e not onl y i tself as a k nower b ut al so i ts
k nown ob jec t!
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[ Further] , although it is true that a crystal j ewel obtains the quality of appearing
as a colored thi ng when it is placed near a colored obj ect, it is not the case that the [na
ture of the] crystal jewel actually changes i nto the nature of the nearby placed obj ect,
nor does the nature of the nearby placed obj ect change into the nature of the crystal
j ewel. If that were the case, it would absurdly follow that the crystal j ewel is a colored
obj ect or that the colored obj ect is identical with the crystal j ewel. Simi larly, although
a consciousness originates as the appearance of a nearby obj ect (visayiibhilsa) when the
[other necessary] conditions [of perception] are present, that consciousness in no way
changes into the nature of a visible obj ect and so forth, nor does the nature of the vis
ible obj ect change into the nature of consciousness. Otherw ise, it would absurdly follow
that earth and so forth are senti ent, or that the mind is insentient like earth and so
forth. [Moreover ] to say that one and the same consciousness is both the apprehended
'
obj ect (griihya) and the apprehending subj ect (griihaka) , is to state the contradiction
of 'a thing acting on itself' (sviitmani kriYiivirodha). It is therefore not right that con
sciousness is a twofold appe arance j ust like a crystal.)
At this point, the Yogacara objects as follows. [Consciousness a s an actual ]
obj ect-appearance gradually provides the stream of consciousness with the capacity
( sakti) for producing an effect similar to itself, and thus continues to exist for some

time as the capacity of such a [future] obj ect-appearance . At a [later] time, when that
capacity has fully matured, consciousness actually originates as having the form
(iikiira) of that obj ect- appearance. Now, one cannot say that consciousness is either

identical with or different from both the capacity and the [actual ity of] object
appearances. One and the same consci ousness is therefore a twofold appearance [in
that it appears both] as the capacity and as the actuality of object-appearances.2
1

This paragraph again exclu des the simu ltaneou s coexistence of two natu res I n consciou sness. The
crystal jewel and the colored object are two different things Similarly, the object apprehended by
consciou sness cannot have the natu re of consciou sness, nor can consciou sness ever exist in the mode
of an object. Bhavaviveka adheres to the Sau trantika position t hat consciou sness and its object are
two different things, each having its own natu re and existing independently of each other The na
tu re of consciou sness is to apprehend objects. That is, its natu re is to originate as object-appearance
Wh en there is no object-appearance, there is no consciou sness, as is the case du ring dreamless sleep
or non-objectifying awareness of Reality_
This is the second theory of consciou sness as a twofold appearance. The commentator in TJ intro
du ces it as a Yogacara reply to the objection that the theory of consciou sness as a du al appearance
implies the error of consciou sness being simu ltaneou sly su bject and object and thu s ' acting on itself'
( sviitmanz kriyal . That objection is obviou sly based on the premise that the object of consciou sness,
as one of the produ cing cau ses of consciou sness, shou ld exist prior to the consciou sness it produ ces
The Yoga cara reply focu ses on this prior-posterior relationship between the object of consciou sness
as a cau se and consciou sness itself as its effect.
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We reply :
[Consciousness] does not exist as a twofold appearance, because the capacity is
not different [from consciousness itself] , j ust as the nature (atman) of being an
object-appearance [is not different from consciousness itself] . (22cd)
"Consciousness is not a twofold appearance" is the thesis (paka) [of our inference] .
" Because the capacity [of an obj ect-appearance] is not different [from consciousness] "
is the reason (hetu). " Just as the nature of [ actually] being an obj ect-appearance [is
not different from consciousness itself] " is the example (d!.s.tanta) . You assert that con
sciousness as an appearance of itself (svabhasa) is different [from consciousness as an
object-appearance] . However, when a consciousness originates, it originates as an
object-appearance only, because it appears in various ways [in accordance with] the
form (akara) of its object, and because [such] an object-appearance is not erroneous
(avyabhicarin) . l And when that consciousness [as obj ect- appearance] perishes, it pe

rishes after having deposited in the stream of consciousness a capacity or power to pro
duce a [new] consciousness which will be an obj ect-appearance only. When that capaAs S. Yam aguc hi ( p. 25 0)has pointed o ut, t he pre sent t heor y i s fo un d in Di gn aga' s Alambanapank?a.
After havin g demon str ate d t hat t he o bject -con dition ( alambanapratyaya) o f a perce pt ual co gnition i s
t he o bject -im age appe arin g in con scio usne ss (AP, ver se 6 ) , Di gn aga con si der s t he followin g o bjec
tion : "How c an t he im age in con scio usne ss, w hile bein g a part o f con scio usne ss an d ari sin g sim ult a
neo usl y wit h it, be t he o bject -con dition o f con scio usne ss? " Di gn aga gi ve s t he fol lowin g two an swer s.
Fir st, one c an say t hat a c ause an d it s e ffect are sim ult aneo us in t he sen se t hat t he y always occ ur
to get her . Thus, alt ho ugh t he o bject -im age ari se s sim ult aneo usly wit h it s e ffect (t hat i s, wit h t he per
ce pt ual co gnition it pro duce s), one c an say t hat it i s one o f the c ause s o f perce pt ual co gnition be
c ause perce pt ual c o gnition never ori gin ate s un le ss an o bject-im age i s pre sent (AP, ver se 7 a).
Secon d, one c an also say t hat t he o bject -im age an d it s e ffect ( =t he perce pt ual co gnition it pro
duce s) do not e xi st sim ult aneo usl y but succe ssi vel y ( krame1!a, AP ver se 7 b). Thi s t heor y, fol lowe d
by Di gna ga him sel f, correspon ds e xact ly to t he secon d t heor y con si dere d here . Di gn a ga expl ain s it as
fo llow s. The o bj ect -im age ( arthavabhlisa vayabhlisa) appe arin g in a pre sent perce pt ual co gnition
de po sit s a c apacit y ( nus pa, sakti) in t he stre am of con scio usne ss from w hic h anot her perce pt ual co g
nition, havin g a simil ar o bject-im age, wil l ari se later . The o bject-im age o f t he initi al percept ual co g
nition i s t here fore t he o bject -con dition - vi a t he c apacit y it has de po site d in t he store -con scio usne ss
- o f a simi lar perce pt ual co gnition ari sin g at a later time .
In the concl udin g ver se s o f AP (vv. 7 c d- 8 ) , Di gn aga i denti fie s t he c apacities, from w hic h t he di f
ferent perce pt ual co gnition s act uall y ori ginate, wit h t he sen se or gan s ( indriya) . The se c apacities an d
t he o bject -im age s o f act ual perce pt ual co gnition s mut ual ly c ause e ac h ot her . Di gn aga adds t hat t he
c apacitie s an d t he o bject-im age s c an be re gar de d eit her as di fferent from con scio usne ss or as not di f
ferent from con scio usne ss.
In short, t he secon d theor y says t hat con scio usne ss i s a two fo ld appe ar ance bec ause it e xi st s bot h
a s a c apacit y ( s akti = svabhlisa) o f perce pt ual co gnition an d as an act uali ze d perce pt ual co gnition in
w hic h o bject -im age s appe ar ( viayabhlisa) .
For Bhavavi ve ka, t he con vention al tr ut h i s t hat e xtern al o bject s e xi st an d t hat an y perce ption in
w hic h an im age o f an e xtern al o bject appe ar s i s non -erroneo us. Error occ ur s w hen t hat im age i s con
ce pt uall y an d ver ball y mi si denti fie d, as i s t he c ase w hen we imagine to see a sn ake w hen t he im age
o f a ro pe act uall y appe ar s in o ur con scio usne ss. See al so MH K V. 15 abo ve .
=

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city has fully matured, a [new ] consciousness which is only an obj ect- appearance origi
nates. That is all there is to it. A capacity from which consciousness could originate as
an appearance of itself is never deposited [in the stream of consciousness] . It is there
fore useless to imagine an addi tional aspect of self-appearance in a consci ousness
which i s only an obj ect-appearance.
The Y ogacara might again obj ect as follows. Consciousness is a twofold appear
ance because [the obj ect- appearance] originates together with and in resemblance to
[the self-appearance] , as is the case with an original object (bimba) and its reflected im
age (pratibimba). When something has the natural tendency (sila) to originate together
[with something else] , then it originates together with it; that is to say, it originates si
multaneously. And when something has the natural tendency to originate together with
and in resemblance to [something else] , then it originates as similar to it. Thus, it origi
nates together with and in resemblance to [another thing] , as is for ex ample the case
when a reflected image ori ginates together with and in resemblance to an original ob
j ect. In the case of consciousness, its appearance as itself (svilbhiisa ) is co mparable with
an original object, and its appearance as obj ect (visayilbhiisa) is comparable with the re
flected image [of an original obj ect] . 1
We reply :
We do not assent to [ your argument that ] "Consciousness is both appearance of
itself and appearance as another, because [the latter] occurs together with and
in resemblance [to the former] as is the case with a reflected image [and an
'
original obj ect] . " Consciousness is therefore not a twofold appearance. (23)
Even if it were granted that [consciousness as an object-appearance] occurs together
1

Whereas theories 1 and 2 explam the su bject- aspect and object- aspect of consciou sness as consecu
tive instants of consciou sness, this third theory says that these two aspects arise simu ltaneou sl y_ Ju st
as an object (bimba) in front of a mirror simu ltaneou sly manifests both itself and a mirrored image
of itself (pratibimba ) , ju st so consciou sness manifests itself as a knower (svabhiisa) and simu ltane
ou sly produ ces an image of the known object (viayabhasa) _
This theory seems to be saying that the object-ima ge produ ced by consciou sness is an off- print or
copy of consciou sness itself. It is not clear from which Yogacara text sou rce Bhavaviveka has bor
rowed this third theory The bimba/ pratibimba simile is u sed m the vijfiaptimiitra section of the
Sar;r dhznirmocanasutra (SNS, T. vol. 16, 698a27 -bI 3, Lamotte, T ib. ed. , pp. 90-91 ) , bu t the context in
which it is u sed there is not that of the simu ltaneou sness of the two aspects of consciou sness The S I
mu ltaneou s origination of the two aspects of consciou sness is tau ght explicitly in AP (verse 7 a, see
note 2, p. 106-107) and in Asvabhava's commentary on the Mahiiyanasa r;rgraha (T vol . 31 , 4 01c5 -7) .
bu t the bimba/ pratibimba simile is not u sed in either of these texts. The most likely sou rce of this
third theory is perhaps DharmapaJ a' s theory that the object- images we perceive in ou r perceptu al
cognitions are copies of the original images of the ' objective' world which are constantly bu t only
dimly perceived by ou r store- consciou sness (see Siddhi, p. 445 and 44 7, T. vol. 31 , 4 0cl4 -21, 27ft . ) .

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with and in resemblance to [consciousness as an appearance of itself] , consciousness

would still b e unestablished as a twofold appearance. This is because a reflected image
is not a real entity (avastu) and because consequently also the perception of such a non
entity is erroneous.l
[The Yogacarins] object [again] : "Consciousness is certainly a twofold appear
ance because it is [both] the instrument of knowledge (pramii;:za) and the resultant
knowledge (pramii;:zaphalam) itself. The instrument of knowledge is that through which
[new, certain knowledge] is acquired (anumii) ; this is consciousness as the appearance
of itself (sviibhiisa). The resultant knowledge is the distinct apprehensi on of an object
by consciousness; this is [consciousness as] an object-appearance (visaYiibhiisa) . It is
difficult to account for [both] the instrument of knowl edge and the resultant k now
,,
l edge if consciousness were merely an object- appearance. 2
We reply :
If you assert that [consciousness] is a twofold appearance because it exists
[both] as the instrument of knowledge and as the resultant knowledge itself,
[we reply that] this theory also is unacceptable because [these two] are esta
blished even if it is otherwise. (24)
The instrument of knowledge and the resultant knowledge are established even if it is
otherwise, that is, even if [consciousness] is not a twofol d appearance. H ence, this the
ory also is unacceptable. If you ask us how the instrument of knowledge and the resul1

The me ani ng o f Bhav avive ka's re fut atio n here is not cle ar and is per haps not to t he poi nt . The Yog a
cara wo uld i n fact agree t hat obj e ct -images are not im ages o f real obj e cts o utside t he mi nd and t hat
all o ur per ce pt ual cog nitio ns are co nseque ntl y ill usio ns ( bhriinti, 'khrul pa) .
Accordi ng to Dig nag a (PS/PSV I . 8cd and I . 9cd ; M. H attori, Digniiga. On Perception, pp. 28-31) , t he
i nstr ume nt o f kno wledge and t he res ult ant or constit uted kno wledge are o ne and t he s ame e ntit y. On
Dig nag a's t heor y, a co nstituted k no wledge is a kno wledge whi ch possesses t he image o f an obj e ct . It
is kno wledge o f t his or t hat parti cul ar obj e ct, be cause it possesses t he im age o f t his or t hat parti cul ar
obj e ct . W he n a co ns ci o us ness possesses t he i m age o f a b l ue obj e ct, t his i pso facto me ans t hat it per
ceives a bl ue obj e ct and not a red or yello w object . I f 'to kno w an obj e ct' t hus means 'to possess t he
im age o f t hat object' , it follo ws t hat t he i nstr ument o f kno wledge ( pramii":la) cannot be an yt hi ng else
b ut t he act b y me ans o f whi ch co ns cio usness appro pri ates t he im age o f an obj e ct. Accordi ngl y, t he
co ns cious ness whi ch as a co nstit uted kno wledge ( pramii":laphalam ) possesses t he im age o f an obj e ct ,
is also the i nstr ume nt o f kno wledge be cause it itsel f has acquired kno wl edge o f t hat obj e ct b y appro
pri ati ng t he image o f t hat obj e ct . The co ns cio us ness i n whi ch t he image o f an obj e ct appe ars is t here
fore bot h t he co nstit uted kno wledge and t he i nstr ume nt al cause o f t hat kno wledge .
Dig naga adds ho wever that t hese t wo as pe cts o f cog nitive co ns cio us ness are disti ng uished for t he
s ake o f e xpl anatio n o nl y. I n re alit y, e ach i nst ance o f a cog nitive co ns cio us ness is a unitar y e ntit y. It
does not co nsist o f t wo i nde pe ndent parts . Si nce the t heor y i ntrod uced i n MH K V. 24 ab hypost ati zes
t he pramii":la and pramii":laphalam as pe cts i nto t wo re al parts o f cog nitive co ns cio us ness, it does not
corres po nd to Dig nag a's t heor y i n PS/PSV. The most l i kel y t arget o f Bhav avive ka's critique is
t here fore ag ai n D harm apal a's t heor y as set fort h in the Vijnaptimiitrafiisiddhi (d. p. 1 02, note 1 ) .

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tant knowledge are established when [consci ousness exists ] otherwise, we say :
The act of apprehending a knowable obj ect is performed by consciousness when
it assumes [the form of] an obj ect-appearance at the very moment of its origina
tion. Hence, that [nascent consciousness] is considered to be the instrument of
knowledge. (25)
At the very moment of its origination, consciousness assumes the form (akara) of [con
sci ousness as] an obj ect-a ppearance and in doing so it makes an obj ect distinctly
known. We therefore hold that consciousness at the very moment of its origination is
the instrument of knowledge (prama;:za).
And when that consciousness has originated, [the obj ect] is actually perceived.
We therefore hold that [the actual perception of the obj ect] which is thus accom
plished, is the resultant knowledge. (2 6ab)
When that consciousness has originated, the obj ect is perceived. Hence, that which has
been produced (abhinirv!tta) by that [nascent consci ousness] is the result (prama;:zapha
lam). We therefore hold that both the instrument of k nowledge and the resultant

knowledge exist in one and the same consciousness which is an obj ect-appearance
[only] . This is similar to the cutting of a tree with an axe: there is the act of cutting
the tree into two halves through the downward movement of the axe, and there is [the
result consisting in the tree's] having been cut into two halves.1
[It is the resultant knowledge] because [consciousness] has [then] acquired
knowl edge of the nondefinable nature [of its obj ect] exactly as i t is. ( 26cd)
A perceptual cognition (pratyaajfiana) apprehends only the individual characteristics
(svalaka;:za) of i ts obj ect and is free from conceptualization and recollection.2 Thus, by

means of a strictly individual and direct awareness (svasaJ?1vedanakara) 3 , it knows the

1

2
3

Bhavaviveka's position is in short as follows. Cognitive consciousness is object-appearance only.

Wh en a cognitive consciousness originates (jayamana), it appropriates the image of an object and
thus acts as the instrument of knowledge (prama':la) (V 25 ). And when that consciousness has origi
nated, it possesses an object-image, which is to say that it knows an object and is thus a constituted
knowledge (prama1!aphalam) (V. 26ab). Hence, consciousness as object-appearance (viayabhasavi
jnana) only is both the instrument of knowledge and the constituted knowledge itself (V. 26cd).
See p 96, note 6.
For Bhavaviveka, 'svasar:zvedana ' does not mean 'self-awareness' in the sense that a cogn itive con
sciousness would be directly aware of its own act of apprehending an image of an object It rather
means that consciousness is the dir ect and strictly individual (sva ) awareness of the image of the ob
ject itself. Just because consciousness is object-appearance only according to Bhavaviveka, the ap
pearance of an object-image is itself already the awareness of that object- image. T here is no sepa
rate act of awareness of an object in addition to the appearance of the image of that object And con
sciousness certainly has no awareness of itself as an apprehender of object-images For Bha
vaviveka' s rejection of 'self-awareness', see also MHK V. 95

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[individual] nature of visible forms and so forth, which cannot be i dentified as 'blue'
and so forth, exactly as such a non-i dentifiable nature. H ence, both the instrument of
knowledge and its result exist in one and the same consciousness which is object
appearance [only] . Since the meaning of the reason [in your argument] 1 is thus not es
tablished, your theory of consciousness as a twofold appearance is unfounded.

Re fe rence to the logic al re as on of the ar gu men t in ve rse 24.

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1TJh4 *i

21-f} 2001if. 149-190

An Annotated Translation of

Madhyamakahrdayakiirikii/Tarkajviilii V .27 -54

Paul HOORNAERT
1.

Edited Tibetan text of MHK/TJ V.27-54

(Editions used: Cone (C.) Dbu-rna Dsa 207a6-214bl; Derge (D.) Dbu-rna Dsa 207a6214bl; Peking (P.) Dbu-rna Dsa 228b4-237b8)

yang pha rol po dag gi bsarn pa gzhan bsal ba'i phyir bshad pal

gal te srnra 'dod bsgrub bya ball

phyi don serns kyi dngos nyid del I
rnarn par shes pa'i yul yin phyir I I
dper na de rna thag bzhin noll (27 )
(cittasvabhavo bahyartho yadi sadhyo vivakl?italfl
vijiianavil?ayatvena tad yatha sarnanantaralfll(27)

zhes bya ba 'di la phyi rol gyi don ni chos can noll de serns kyi ngo bo nyid yin par
sgrub pa ni de' i chos solI rnarn par shes pa'i yul yin phyirl zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs
kyi don du phyir zhes srnos sol I dper na de rna thag pa'i rkyen bzhin no zhes bya ba
ni dpe stel serns dang serns l as byung ba rntshungs pa de rna thag tu 'gags pa rnarns
ni de las gzhan pa'i serns dang serns las byung ba rnarns skye ba'i rkyen gyP dngos por
'gyur bas de rna thag pa'i rkyen zhes bya 'olI gal te de yang rnarn par shes pa'i yul yin
pa'i phyir serns kyi ngo bo nyid yin pa de bzhin du phyi rol gyi don yang rnarn par shes
pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir serns kyi ngo bo nyid yin no zhe nal

des na serns byung so so yis2 I I

gtan tshigs 'khrul pa nyid du 'gyurl I (28ab)
(pratyekacaitasair hetolf syad eva vyabhicarital (28ab)

1
2

P : gyis
P : yi
- 149 -

zhes bya ba ni des cF re zhig rnarn par shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir de rna thag pa'i rkyen
bzhin du phyi rol gyi yul yang serns kyi ngo bo nyid yin par 'gyur rami 'on te rnarn par
shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir tshor ba la sogs pa serns las byung ba so so dag serns kyi
ngo bo nyid rna yin pa bzhin du phyi rol gyi yul yang serns kyi ngo bo nyid rna yin par
'gyur ba'i gtan tshigs rna nges pa nyid dol I
Cc. 207b4, D. 207b4, P. 229a3) ci ste yang 'di snyarn du de ni lung gis 'grub stel 'di Ita
stel kharns gsurn pa ni serns tsarn rno zhes gsungs par serns nal 'dir bshad pal de ni
rigs pa rna yin tel lung gi don yongs su rna shes pa'i phyir roll gang gi phyir zhe nal
rndo las serns tsarn gsungs pa nil I
byed po za po dgag phyir roll (28cd)
Csutre ca cittarnatroktil). kartbhoktniedhatal).1 I (28cd))

zhes bya ba ni gzhan rnu stegs can dag gis rnarn par shes pa las gzhan gyi byed pa po
dang za ba po yod par brtags2 pa sel bar rndzad pa'i phyir sangs rgyas dangl byang
chub serns dpa' rnarns kyis serns tsarn zhes bstan pa rndzad pa yin gyi/ phyi rol gyi yul
bsal pa'i phyir ni rna yin nol I gang gi phyir zhe nal sa bcu pa'i rndo sde lasl byang chub
serns dpa'i sa drug pa la byang chub serns dpa' rten cing 'breI par 'byung ba lugs su
'byung ba dangl lugs su 'byung ba rna yin pa la rnarn par blta ba 'di snyarn du serns
tel rna rig pa la sogs pa yan lag bcu gnyis pa las3 sdug bsngal gyi phung po 'ba' zhig
pa byed pa po dangl tshor ba po dang bral ba 'di 'byung zhing sdug bsngal gyi shing
Ijon pa rnngon par 'grub par 'gyur ro snyarn du de Itar nges pasl kye4 rgyal ba'i sras
dag 'di Ita stel kharns gsurn pa 'di ni serns tsarn stel serns kyis rnngon par 'dus byas
pa dangl serns kyis bris pa yin gyi5 I serns las gzhan pa'i byed pa po dangl za ba po ni
'ga' yang rned do zhes gsungs pas phyi rol gyi yul rned pa nyid du rni 'grub boll
Cc. 208a1, D. 208a1, P. 229b3 ) 'dir srnras pal de ni shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las
kyang gsungs tel byarns pa byang chub serns dpa' gzugs kyi bye brag gdags pa ni rnarn
pa gsurn gyis6 khong du chud par bya stel 'di Ita stel 'di ni kun brtags pa'i gzugs sol I
'di ni rnarn par brtags pa'i gzugs sol I 'di ni chos nyid kyi gzugs so zhes bya bas sol I

"ci" omitted in P.
P : btags
3 P : pas
4 P : kya
5 P: gyis
6 P : gyi
1

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de la kun brtags pa'i gzugs gang zhe nal gzugs zhes bya ba ni rning dangl 'du shes
dangl gdags pa dangl tha snyad la brten nas gzugs kyi ngo bo nyid du rtog pa gang
yin pa del de ni rdzas su rned dolI de la rnarn par brtags pa'i gzugs gang zhe nal rnarn
par rtog pa la brten nas gang la rning dangl 'du shes dangl gdags pa dangl tha snyad
kyi gzugs zhes bya ba la sogs par rnngon par brj od pa nyid del 'di ni rnarn par rtog pa
rdzas su yod pa nyid la brten nas rdzas su yod pa yin gyi/ rang dbang du 'jug pa las
ni rna yin noll de la chos nyid kyi gzugs gang zhe nal kun brtags pa'i gzugs des rnarn
par brtags pa'i gzugs de la rtag tu ngo bo nyid rned pa nyid dangl chos bdag rned pa
nyid dangl yang dag pa'i rntha' la sogs pa gang yin pa stel de la rdzas su yod pa yang
rna yin lal rdzas su rned pa yang rna yin tel rnarn par brtags pa'i don gyis stong pa nyid
dangl rnarn par shes pa yod pa'i phyir ro zhes gsungs so zhe nal bshad pal

gal te rnarn brtags don stong paslI

rnarn par shes pa sgrub byed nail
brtags pa rna yin don yod phyirI I
yul rned par ni rni 'gyur roll (29)
(vikalpitarthasunyarp. ca vijfianarp. yadi sadhyatel
akalpitarthasadbhavan na syad arthanirakriyal I (29)J

(c. 208a7, D. 208a7, P. 230a2J zhes bya ba ni rnarn par shes pa la rnarn par brtags pa'i
don gyis stong pa nyid yin yang de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rig par bya ba'i chos
nyid kyi gzugs kyi don yod pa'i phyir sgra ji bzhin gyi ngo bo nyid rna yin pa'i dngos
po gang yin pa de yod pas brtags pa rna yin pa'i don yod pa'i phyir yul yod pa kho na
yin par rnarn par shes pa tharns cad du yul gyisl stong pa yin par rni rigs solI
dbu rna'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar bal bam po bco brgyad pal
gzhan yangl

rrni lam la yang brtags min pa'i/ I

ngo bo nyid bIos rna nges 'gyurlI (30ab)
(svapne buddhisvabhavenakalpitenapi saf!1saya!:t/ (30ab))

(C. 208b2, D. 208b2, P. 230a5J zhes bya ba ni kharns gsurn pa ni serns tsarn ste/ .gzugs

P:

gyi

151

la sogs pa'i don gyis stong pa 'i phyirl rmi lam la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa bzhin no
zhes bya ba de la 'di ltarl rmi lam la yang brtags pa rna yin pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi blo'i
cha yod pa'i phyir des na ci re zhig rmi lam la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa bzhin no zhes
bya ba de rmi lam gyi rnam par shes pa brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi skyes bu la sogs
pa'i don gyis stong par 'gyur rami 'on te rang! gi cha la dmigs pa brtags pa rna yin pa'i
don gyis mi stong par 'gyur ba'i gtan tshigs rna nges pa nyid du 'gyur roll

dmigs pa med par2 mi 'dod delI

dpe ni rab tu rna grub phyir I I (30cd)
Cna niralambanapIta dtantasyaprasiddhita!:I1 I (30cd)J

Cc. 208b4, D. 208b4, P. 230a8) zhes bya ba ni brtags pa'i don gyis stong pa'i phyir ro
zhes bya ba 'i dpe rmi lam blangs pa der yang brtags pa 'i don sel bar byed kyi brtags
pa rna yin pa'i don gyi cha sel bar mi byed pa3 des kyang sems tsam nyid du mi 'grub
pa'i phyirl dmigs pa med par mi 'dod del dpe bsgrub par bya ba'i phyogs gcig dang mi
ldan par rab tu rna grub pa'i phyir roll rmi lam gyi shes pa'i chos nyid kyi gzugs kyi4
don la dmigs pa'i phyir dmigs pa med pa nyi d rna yin noll 'di ltar rmi lam ni yang dag
pa rna yin pa'i phyir gtan la dbab par na de dpe nyid du mi rung ngo zhes bya bar bsams
soil
'dir smras pal
ci ste blo yul rnam pa gnyisl I
gcig dang 'dus pa yin snyam nal I
rigs pas yongs su brtags pa nail
de ni gnyi gar mi rigs sol I (3 1)
Catha syad viayo hy eka!:I samuho va bha ved dhiya!:I1
yuktya parIkyamal!as tu sa dvidhapi na yujyatel I (31))
Cc. 208b6, D. 208b7, P. 230b4 ) zhes bya ba ni pha rol po dag na re ci ste phyi rol gyi
don yod par smra ba dag blo'i yul rnam pa gnyis su 'dod del rdul phra rab gcig pu 'ba'

1
2
3
4

P: gang
C, D : pa
P: pas
"gzugs kyi" omitted in P.

15 2

zhig yul du 'dod darnl 'on te rdul phra rab 'dus pa yul du 'dod do snyarn nal gnyi ga
yang rigs pas yongs su brt ags pa na 'gal ba'i phyir de ni gnyi gar rni rigs tel bzang po
rna yin no zhes zer roll rigsl pa de yang gang zhe nal de'i phyir srnras pal

de la gzugs rdul gcig pu nil I

gzugs blo'i spyod yul rna yin tel I
de snang nyid du rni 'gyur phyirI I
dbang gzugs spyod yul rna yin bzhinl I (32)
CtatraI).uruparn ekarp tu rupabuddher na gocaraJ:11
atadabhataya yadvad akaruparp na gocaraJ:11 I (32)

Cc. 209al, D. 209a2, P. 230b7) zhes bya ba la gzugs kyi phra ba nyid kyi rnthar thug pa
ni rdul phra rab boll gcig pu zhes bya ba ni 'ba' zhig ces bya ba'i tha tshig gol I gzugs
kyi rdul gcig pu ni zhes bya ba ni chos can yin lal de gzugs kyi blo'i spyod yul rna yin
te zhes bya ba ni de'i chos tel chos can dang chos bsdus pa ni phyogs yin noll de snang
nyid du rni 'gyur phyir zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs tel de snang nyid du zhes bya ba ni
yul gyi dngos po nyid du snang ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig gol I de snang ba nyid du rni
'gyur zhes bya ba ni de blo la snang ba nyid du rni 'gyur zhingl yul gyi dngos po nyid
du rni 'gyur ba stel gtan tshigs kyi don gyi phyir zhes bya ba srnos so I I dbang gzugs
spyod yul rna yin bzhin2 zhes bya ba ni dpe stel dbang po zhes bya ba ni dbang po lnga
rnarns tel de rnarns kyi ngo bo nyid yul kha dog gzugs dang ba nyid du yod pa yin yang
de snang ba nyid du rni 'gyur ba'i phyirl dper na de gzugs kyi blo'i yul rna yin pa de
bzhin du rdul phra rab kyang gzugs kyi blo'i spyod yul rna yin noll

phra rab gzugs ni du rna stell

serns kyi spyod yul yin rni 'dodl I
rdzas su yod pa rna yin phyir I I
dper na zla ba gnyis bzhin noll (33)
Canekarn api cittasya naiva tad gocararp rnatarnl
ruparp hi pararnaI).unarn adravyatvad dvicandravatl/ (33)

Cc. 209a5, D. 209a6, P. 231a5) zhes bya ba ni rdul phra rab kyi gzugS du rna de dag 'dus
I
2

rig
"bzhin" omitted in P.

P:

153

pa de yang serns kyi spyod yul yin par rni 'dod del ci'i phyir zhe nal rdzas su yod pa
rna yin pa'i phyir roll 'di ltar rdul phra rab k yi gzugs 'ba' zhig pa ni rdzas su 'dod lal
de dag 'dus pa ni drnag1 dang nags tshal la sogs pa bzhin du rdzas su yod pa rna yin
pas de snang bar 'gyur du zin kyang serns kyi spyod yul yin par rni rigs tel dper na rab
rib can gyi mig skyon gyis nyarns pas zla ba gnyis pa2 la sogs pa yang dag pa rna yin
par rnthong ba bzhin no3 I I 'dir bshad pal

de la gal te pha rol polI

bsags pa rnin4 pa'i gzugs serns kyi/ I
spyod yul min par sgrub byed nail
der ni grub pa nyid sgrub 'gyurI I (34)
Ctatrasarp.citarupasya cittagocarata yadi/
prasadhyate pareJ)api siddha eva prasadhyatel I (34))

cc. 209bl, D. 209bl, P. 231blJ zhes bya ba ni gal te pha rol po dag bsags pa rna yin pa'i
gzugs rdul phra rab gcig pu serns kyi spyod yul nyid rna yin par sgrub par byed na
phyogs snga rna der grub pa nyid la sgrub par 'gyur tel kho bo cag kyang de ltar 'dod
pa'i phyir roll

ci ste bsags pa'i gzugs la nil I

gtan tshigs rna grub nyid 'gyur tel I
gzugs gzhan dag gi bsags5 pa nil I
der snang blo ni skye phyir roll (35)
Catha sarp.citarupasya hetor evarn asiddhatal
rupantarair upaktais tannirbhasodayad dhiya!:tl I (35))
Cc. 209b2, D. 209b2, P. 231b3) zhes bya ba ni ci ste rdul phra rab kyi rigs rnthun pa
bsags pa'i gzugs phyogs su byas nas de la rdzas su yod pa rna yin pa nyid gtan tshigs
su brj od na nil de Ita na gtan tshigs gang yang rung ba la rna grub pa nyid du 'gyur

dmags
"pa" omitted in C, D.
3 "zhe na" added in P.
4 C, D : med
5 P: bsams
1

P:

15 4

tel ci'i phyir zhe nal 'di Itar rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa'i gzugs gzhan dag gis de la
bsags shing kun nas sbyar ba na1 de yul gyi dngos por khas blangs shing der snang ba'i
blo rdul phra rab 'dus pa'i rnam par skye ba'i phyir roll kho bo eag ni rdul phra rab
rigs mthun pa'i bsags pa bum pa la sogs pa nyid dang phra rab kyang kun rdzob pa'i
rdzas su 'dod del 'di ltar rdul phra rab ni rdzas brgyad 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pasl de
yang rdzas nyid yin par 'dod lal de bzhin du bum pa la sogs pa 'dus pa'i bdag nyid
kyang 'rdzas nyid yin tel 'ba' zhig pa ni rdzas su rna grub pa'i phyir roll
de ni dmigs nyid yin 'dod delI
der snang blo yi rgyur 'gyur phyirlI
'dod ehags bzhin te de yi phyir I I
khyod dam beas la rjes dpag gnodl I (36)
C tasyalambanata eeta tadabhamatihetutal).1
ragavad badhyate tasmat pratijiia te 'numanatal)1 I (36))

Cc. 209b5, D. 209b6, P. 23lb8) ees bya ba ni rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa bsags pa'i gzugs
de ni dmigs pa nyid yin par 'dod del ei'i phyir zhe nal 'di ltar rdul phra rab bsags pa
de ni bsags pa'i gzugs der snang ba'i blo'i rgyu'i dngos po nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir tel
gang dang gang der snang ba'i blo'i rgyur 'gyur ba de dang de ni bsags pa la dmigs pa
yin tel dper na 'dod ehags yul la ehags pa'i mtshan nyid de2 ni bud med kyi gzugs la
sogs pa bsags pa nyid la dmigs par 'dod pa bzhin tel de'i phyir khyod kyis bsags pa'i
gzugs ni dmigs pa rna yin no zhes dam beas pa de la rjes su dpag pa 'dis gnod par 'gyur
rolI rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga'i gnas dangl dmigs pa ni bsags pa yin no zhes
gsungs pa'i lung3 dang yang 'gal 101 I
CC. 210al, D. 2l0al, P. 232a4) 'dir smras pal blo ni dmigs pa med pa kho nar skye stel
rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa'i sa bon las skyes pa'i phyir yid k yi blo bzhin no
zhe nal 'dir bshad pal
gal te rang blo dmigs med del I
rang gi sa bon las skye'i phyirl I
yid blo bzhin 'dod btags min phyir I I
1
2
3

C : ni
"de" omitted in P.
P : Ius

155

khyod kyP drnigs bcas nyid du 'gyurl I (37)

Cyady analarnbata svasyalf svabljad udayad dhiyalfl
rnanodhlvad akalpatvat syat te salarnbata nanulI (37)J

zhes bya ba ni yid kyi rnarn par shes pa la 'ang btags pa rna yin pa'i rang gi don du
snang ba'i cha yod pa'i phyir khyod kyi blo drnigs pa dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ro
gzhan yangl
drnigs pa rned pa rjes dpog pas I I
de ni blo nyid rna yin 'gyur I I
'dus pa dam ni rna bcas pas I I
de 'gog pa ni gnod pa medii (38)
C analarnbanurnanad va taddhltvasya nirakriyal
sarnuhasyapratijfianat tanniedho na badhakalflI (38)J

CC. 210a4, D. 210a4, P. 232a8J ces bya ba ni drnigs pa rtogs par byed pas blo zhes bya
ba yin na drnigs pa rned pa nyid rjes su dpog pas blor 'dod pa de blo rna yin pa nyid
du gyur pas blo de ni blo nyid rna yin par bsal ba'i phyir chos can gyi rang gi ngo bo
log par bsgrubs pas dam bcas pa nyarns par 'gyur roll khyod kyis 'dus pa ni drnigs pa
rna yin no zhes srnras pa gang yin pa de la yang kho bos kyang 'dus pa drnigs pa yin
par dam rna2 bcas tel

'

na j i !tar dam bcas she nal rdul phra rab bsags pa ni drnigs

pa yin par dam bcas pas khyod kyis 'dus pa drnigs pa rna yin par de 'gog pa ni kho bo
la gnod pa rned dol I bsags pa dang 'dus pa zhes bya ba gnyis la khyad par ci yod ce
nal rdul phra rab rigs rnthun pa dag gzhi gcig la brten pa ni tshogs pa zhes bya'ol I
glang po che dangl rta la sogs pa dangl skyer pa dangl seng ldeng la sogs pa'i rdzas
rigs rni rnthun pa gzhi tha dad pa 'dus pa la drnag dang nags tshal la sogs par gdags
pa ni 'dus pa zhes bya'ol I
'dir srnras pa I

'
0

na kho bo cag gi drnigs pa brtag pa'i skabs sui

phyi rol don ni rned par yanglI

nus pa3 dang ni yul gyi dngosl I
1
2
3

kyis
"rna" omitted in P.
"pa" omitted in P.

P:

156

gnyis po phan tshun rgyur 'gyur basi I

thog rna med pa'i dus nas 'jugl I (39)
(asaty api ea bahyarthe dvayam anyonyahetukaml
saktir viayariiparp. ea tannivrttil). kuto matal I (39)J

ees bya bas phyogs 'di brtan 1 por bzhag zin to zhe nal bshad pal tshig le'ur byas pa
de'i rtsa ba bzhi pal ji ltar de ni ldog par 'dodl ees bya ba 'dis rjes nas brgal zhing brtag
par bya stel phyi rol gyi don yod pa la ni yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa skye ba
de'i dag pa tshol ba'i rnal 'byor pas yul ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rtogs par gzung
ba dangl 'dzin pa ldog pa'i phyir 'jig rten l as 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par m i rtog pa skye
ba rigs2 pa kho nar 'gyur gyi/ khyed yul med pa la ni dang po nas kyang phyi rol gyi
don med lal phyis kyang med pa bzhin du gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo nyid du 'jug
par 'gyur ba de3 phyis rgyu gang gis ldog cing 'j ig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par
mi rtog pa skye bar 'gyur ba'i thabs ei yang med dolI yul med par smra ba la ni 'jig
rten las 'das pa'i lam skye ba'i thabs med pas nus pa dang yul gyi ngo bo nyid kyi rnam
par shes pa thog rna med pa'i dus nas 'jug pa de ji Itar ldog pa'i rigs pa brj od par bya
dgos solI
(C. 210b4, D. 210b4, P. 233a3J gal te khyod 'di snyam dul

mi rtog blo ni4 spang min telI

'phags phyir rnam par mi rtog phyirl I (40ab)
(aryatvad avi kalpatvad aheya nirvikalpadhIl).1 (40ab)J

zhes bya bar sems na zhes bya ba ni gal te 'khor bar 'jug pa'i rgyu gzung ba dang 'dzin
pa'i rnam par rtog pa gnyis spangs su zin kyang rnam par mi rtog pa'i blo ni spang ba
rna yin tel 'phags pa'i phyir dangl rnam par mi rtog pa'i phyir skye bar 'gyur ba nyid
yin tel ldog par mi 'gyur bar sems na'ol I de Ita nal

de skye thar pa ga la yodl I

de yi sa bon rn a be om phyir / / (40ed)

1
2
3
4

P : bstan
P : rig
P : de'i
P : na

157

Ctadutpadat kuto mokas tadblj anupaghatatal).1 I (40cd)J

zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar rnam par shes pa'i sa bon 'jug pas ni 'khor bar 'dod lal de bcom
pas ni thar par 'dod pa yin na ji srid du rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa 'ami rnam par
mi rtog pa'i shes pal skye ba yod pa de srid du thar pa ga la yodl de'i phyir sems tsam
du smra ba khyod la thar pa yang mi 'thad par 'gyur roll
Cc. 210b7, D. 210b7, P. 233a7J ci ste 'di snyam du rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i shes
pa skye ba ni 'ching ba yin lal rnam par mi rtog pa'i shes pa skye ba ni thar pa yin
par sems tel ci'i phyir zhe nal 'di ltarl

gnyis kyi 'du shes 'jug pa nail

sna tshogs snang ba rab tu skyelI
de yi sna tshogs snang gang danglI
de rang sa bon las skye'i phyirl I (41)
Cdvayapravttau saITljnaya visvabhasal). praj ayatel
visvaITl tadabhata yasyal). tadutpadat svabljatal).1 I (41)J

zhes bya ba stel gzung ba dang 'dzin pa gnyis kyi rnam par shes pa 'jug pa nal gzugs
la sogs pa yul sna tshogs kyi rnam par snang ba rab tu skye stel de'i rnam pa sna
tshogs snang ba de yang gang zhe nal rnam par shes pa yul gyi rnam par yongs su 'gyur
ba gang yin pa' 01 I de dang rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa de yang rang gi sa bon
yul du snang ba'i rnam pa de las skyes pa'i phyir roll

zha ba de la nus phul dangl I

rang bdag nyid dang gzhan las solI (42ab)
Dayal). saktyarpaI?-at tasya svatmany evanyato 'pi val (42ab)J

Cc. 211a3, D. 211a3, P. 233b3J zhes bya ba ni 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa de dag 'gag cing
bag la zha ba na yang rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa de la 'jug par 'gyur tel gang gi nus
pa phul ba'i ngo bo nyid du gnas pa yin noll rang gi cha la dmigs pa rang gi bdag nyid
dangl yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa gzhan 'gag pa las kyang de la zha bar 'gyur
ro zhes bya bar sbyar bar sems nal 'dir bshad pal de ni 'jig rten yid ches par bya ba

1 P: adds "de" after "pa".

- 1 58 -

tsam la bden mod kyi/ skyon 'di yod del

rnarn par shes pa'i rning gis nil I

de la bdag tu btags par 'gyurl I (42cd)
Cnanu vijfianaparyayad atrnaivayarp niriipitaJ:11 I (42cd)J

zhes bya ba ni bdag tu srnra ba dag kyang yul sna tshogs 'byin pa'i bdag gcig pu la
thams cad kyi 1 nus pa rab tu bsags par sems pas2 khyod kyis kyang rnarn par shes pa
zhes bya ba'i rning tsam gyi rgyu thabs kyis de nyid la bdag tu btags par 'gyur tel des
na bdag med pa nyid du smra ba yang nyams solI
CC. 211a6, D. 211a6, P. 233b8J khyed kyis3 rnam par grol bar btags pa yang 'khor ba
las khyad par rned pa nyid du 'gyur tel ji Ita zhe nal 'di la serns tsam du srnra ba'i rnal
'byor pa 'khor ba dang thar pa'i sems tshul la serns pa nal
gnyis yod sgyu rna Ita bu danglI
zad can rna zhi bdag rned dangl I
gnyis med rni zad yang dag4 dangl I
'chi med go 'phang rnchog rtogs nasiI (43)
de la 'dra bar med pa'i phyirl I
rnarn par rtog pa rnam ldog pasI I
rni rtog bIos ni dmigs byas5 pa'i/ I
grol ba khyad par rned par 'gyurlI (44)
Cdvaitarp mayopamarp matva kayy asantam anatma cal
advaitarp cakayarp bhiitarn amtarp paramarp padarnlI (43)
samanyabhavatas tatra kalpanavinittitaJ:11
nirvikalpadhiyalambyo rnokabhedo 'pi vidyatelI (44))

zhes bya ba stel gnyis yod ces bya ba ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa rnarn pa gnyis kyi
dngos por gnas pa stel de ni sgyu rna Ita bu dangl zad pa can dangl rna zhi ba dangl
bdag rned par rtogs so zhes bya bar sbyar rol I sgyu rna Ita bu zhes bya ba ni yang dag
1 C, D : kyis
P : dpas
3 P : kyi
4 C, D, P : yang yang
5 C, D, P : byed. Corrected into "by as" according to the commentary in T].

159

pa rna yin pa'i rnam par rtog pas skyed pa'i phyir roll zad can zhes bya ba ni de la
zad pa yod pas zad can noll rna zhi zhes bya ba ni skye ba dang 'chi ba la sogs pa'i
bya bas 'phangs pa'i phyir roll bdag med ces bya ba ni gzhan mu stegs byed pa dag
gis yongs su btags pa'i bdag med pa'i phyir dangl rang yang ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir
rol I gnyis med ces bya ba ni gang gi tshe gzugs la sogs pa dmigs pa rnams sems las
phyi rol las mi snang ba de'i tshe nal rang gi sems kyi chos nyid la nges par gnas pa'i
sems ni gnyis med ces bya stel de ni mi zad pa dangl yang dag pa dangl 'chi ba med
pa dangl go 'phang mchog yin par rtogs nas zhes bya bar sbyar roll mi zad ces bya
ba ni de la zad pa yod pa rna yin pa'ol I yang dag ces bya ba ni mi slu ba'ol I 'chi med
ces bya ba ni skye ba dang 'chi ba la sogs pa dang bral ba'ol I go 'phang mchog ces bya
ba ni mthar thug pa'i gnas sol I rtogs nas zhes bya ba ni gnyis yod pa dangl gnyis med
pa dag tshul de ltar rtogs nas sol I de la 'dra bar med pa'i phyirl I zhes bya ba ni gnyis
med pa de la gzung ba dang 'dzin pa dag ji ltar 'khor ba'i gnas skabs na med pa bzhin
du thar pa'i gnas skabs na yang de dang 'dra bar ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir roll rnam
par rtog pa rnam ldog pasl I zhes bya ba ni de la gnyis po 'dra bar med par rtogs pa'i
phyir rnam par rtog pa rnam par ldog pas so I I mi rtogl bIos ni dmigs byas pa'F I I zhes
bya ba mngon sum gyi shes pas sgra ji bzhin gyi ngo bo nyid rna yin pa dangl rnam
par mi rtog pa'i bIos kyang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid dmigs par byas pa'i rnal
'byor pa la'ol I de lal grol ba khyad par med par 'gyurl I zhes bya ba'i skyon 'dir 'gyur3
tel de la skye ba dang dmigs pa dang bcas pa nyid sngon dang 'dra bar yod pa'i phyir
sngon gyi shes pa rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa las thar pa khyad par med pas beings
pa dangl thar pa gnyis khyad par med par 'gyur roll
(C. 212al, D. 212al, P. 234b6J gzhan yangl
yang na sems tsam bsgrub pa'i phyirl I
sems las byung rnams sems las nil I
tha dad med par khas blang byalI
yang na rnam rig tsam mi 'grubl I (45)
(cittamatraprasiddhyartharp na eittad vyatirekh:lalfl
caitta vabhyupagantavya na va viji'iaptimatratal I (45 ) J

1
2
3

C, D, P: Idog
P: bcas pa
C : 'byung
- 160 -

ces bya ba ni yang na khyed sems tsam nyid du 'dod pas sems tsam nyid sgrub pa'i
phyir sems las byung ba dmigs pa rnam pa sna tshogs tha dad rnams kyang sems las
tha dad pa med par khas blang bar bya'ol I yang na sems las byung ba rnams sems las
tha dad par rtog na ni sems las byung ba rnams mang ba'i phyir rnam par rig pa tsam
nyid du mi 'grub pol I

yang na tshor sogs 'dus pa lal I

sems su gdags par 'dod par gyisl I
des na gzhan gyi rjes smra dangl I
rang gi gzhung yang btang bar 'gyurI I (46)
Cvedanadisamuhe va cittaprajiiaptir if?yataml
tatha paranuvada syat svanltityagitapi cal I (46))

Cc. 212a4, D. 212a4, P. 235aI) zhes bya ba ni yang na khyed kyis tshor ba dangl sems
pa dangl reg pa dangl yid la byed pa la sogs pa 'dus pa mdung khyim Ita bu dangl sa
dang chu dang me dang rIung dang 'dus pa la sogs pa Ita bu dangl gzugs dang dri dang
ro dang reg pa dang ldan pa'i bum pa la sogs pa Ita bu la sems su gdags par khas blang
bar bya'ol I gal te de Ita bu nyidl yin no zhe nal des na khyed gzhan dbu rna smra ba'i
rjes su smra ba dangl rang gi gzhung yang btang bar 'gyur tel kun gzhi rnam par shes
pa gcig pu kho na las rkyen j i Ita ba las rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga 'byung ba dangl
sems las byung ba rnams kyi yongs su 'gyur ba yang khas blangs pa'i phyir roll
gal te 'di snyam du 'di la tshor ba la sogs pa 'dus pa nyid la sems su brtags na sems
rdzas su yod pa nyid rna yin par 'gyur zhing des na kun nas nyon mongs pa dangl rnam
par byang ba dag gi gzhi ci yang med par 'gyur bas tshor ba la sogs pa tha dad pa dag
la ni re re las de rdzas su yod pa nyid yin pas kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par
byang ba dag gi gnas nyid du rigs tel ji skad dul thog rna med pa'i dus ldan khamsl I
sa bon kun gyi gnas gyur pal I de yod pas na 'gro kun dangl I mya ngan 'das pa thob
par 'gyurlI zhes gsungs pa Ita bu'o zhe nal 'dir bshad pal

kun nas nyon mongs rnam byang lasl I

gal te sems ni rdzas 'd od nail
tshor sogs de bzhin skye ba'i phyirI I

de grub pas na gnod pa medii (47)

1

"nyid" omitted in P.

161

Csa!!lklesavyavadanac ced dravyasac cittam i9yatel

vedanadeh tathotpadat tat prasiddher na badhakamlI (4 7)J

Cc. 21 2b1, D. 2 1 2b2 , P. 235a8J ces bya ba ni 'di ltar nyon mongs pa dangl nye ba'i nyon
mongs pa'i yid la byed pa dang bcas pa dag sems dang lhan eig 'byung ba nyid na beings
pa yin par 'dod lal nyon mongs pa dang bral ba na1 shes rab mtshungs par ldan pa dang
bcas pa sems dang lhan eig nyid du grol bar 'dod pas sems nyid kyi gnas skabs gzhan
dangl gzhan dag la sems las byung ba dag tu gdags pa yin gyi/ gang gis2 sems 'ba' zhig
pa yin na rdzas su yod pa nyid du 'gyur pa'i sems dang sems las byung ba phan tshun
tha dad par gnas pa ni med dol I de'i phyir tshor ba la sogs pa dag nyid beings pa'i rnam
pa dangl thar pa'i rnam par de bzhin skye ba'i phyir tshogs pa las 'byung bas sems
dang sems las byung ba dag 'dus pa'i ngo bo nyid du yod pa de rab tu grub pas na khyed
sems rdzas su yod pa nyid du rtogs pa des kho bo cag la gnod pa med dol I
Cc. 2 1 2b5, D. 212b5, P. 235b5 J gal te de ltar sems 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pas rdzas su
yod pa nyid rna yin nal j i ltar de las srid pa'i rgyun dang thar pa 'thob par 'gyur zhe
nal de'i phyir bshad pal
utpala rtsa ba nus mang lasl I
10 rna la sogs rgyun 'byung ltarl I
de bzhin sems rdzas med pa lasl I
rgyun rnams sna tshogs 'byung bar 'gyurl I (48)
C yatha parJ)adisa!!ltana!!l saluke bahusaktikatl
tathadravyasatas eittac ei trasa!!ltativttayal:I1 I (48)J

zhes bya ba lal utpala rtsa ba zhes bya ba ni utpala'i rtsa ba la stel de la rtsa ba'i 'breI
pa gzhan med par yang nus pa mang po dang ldan pa las mtsho ei tsam du rgya che
ba dag 10 rna dang me tog la sogs pa'i rgyun gyis kun du khyab pa 'byung bar 'gyur
ba ltar de bzhin du sems rdzas su med pa las kyang sems can rnams kyi 'khor ba'i
rgyun gyi bye brag 'khams dangl 'gro ba sna tshogs kyi rnam pa tha dad pa dag3
'byung bar 'gyur roll
Cc. 2 1 2b7, D, 212b7, P. 235b8J rgyun gyi bye brag de dag kyangl
1
2
3

C, D : bral na
P: gi
P: mam pa tha dad pas tha dad pa dag...
- 1 62 -

gnyen pos skye bar mi 'gyur zhinglI

byed rgyu yod na skye bar 'gyurlI (49ab)
(pratipakad anutpattir utpattii:t karal].e sati/ (49ab)J

zhes bya ba la gnyen po zhes bya ba ni 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad pa stel de skyes
pa na rgyun rnams skye bar mi 'gyur zhingl byed rgyu zag pa zhes bya ba dag yod na
skye bar 'gyur roll yang nal lnga po'i rtsa ba'i rnam shes lasl rkyen1 bzhin du ni
'byung bar 'gyurlI zhes khyod kyis gang smras pa de la rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa med
par yang sems 'dus pa'i bdag nyid kyi rkyen gyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi gnyen po yod
pas ni skye bar mi 'gyur lal byed rgyu gzugs dangl snang ba dangl nam mkha' dangl
yid la byed pa la sogs pa'i rkyen yod na ni skye bar 'gyur roll

'di las2 sna tshogs skyes la sogslI

btags pa mi 'dod rdzas med phyirI I (49cd)
(adravyatvan na catreta visvotpadadikalpanal I (49cd)J

zhes bya ba ni khyed kyi rnam par shes pa yongs su gyur pa 'di las rnam par smin pa
dangl ngar sems pa dangl rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba gsum po dag gi sna tshogs skye
ba la sogs par btags pa ltar ni kho bo cag mi 'dod dolI gang gi phyir zhe nal sems
rdzas su med pa'i phyir roll 'di ltar sems kyi gnas skabs kyi bye brag las de dag tu
gdags par3 ni mi 'dod dol I
(C. 213a4, D. 213a4, P. 236a6J gzhan yangl

de la dmigs pas mi 'grol tel I

blo 'gag4 med pa 'ang rna yin pas I I
de phyir kun rdzob don dam du 'angl I
bdag tu smra dang 'dra mi 'gyurlI (50)
(na tad alambya nirmoko napi noparatir dhiyai:tl
satptya tattvato vapi natmavittulyatasty atai:tl I (50)J

1 C, D, P : rgyun.
P : la
3 P : pa
4 P : 'ga'

Correction in accordance with TrK 15a.

163

zhes pa la de la drnigs pa zhes bya ba ni rang gi serns snang ba tsarn nyid du rtogs pas
sol I rni 'grol te zhes bya ba ni srid pa'i rgyun las solI blo 'gag rned pa 'ang rna yin
pas I I zhes bya ba lal

'

na ci zhe nal blo 'gag par 'gyur ba 'ang yod pa kho na yin tel

dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo yongs su rna grub pa nyid du rt ogs pa'i phyir dangl kun gzhi
rnarn par shes pa la rni rtog pa'i phyir roll de'i phyir kho bo cag serns rdzas su yod
pa rna yin zhing 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin par srnra ba ni kun rdzob dangl don dam par
yang bdag tu srnra ba dang ' dra ba nyid du rni 'gyur gyi/ de las bzlog pas khyed serns
tsarn du srnra ba dag la ni skyon de dag 'byung ba nyid du 'gyur roll
Cc. 213a7, D. 213a7, P. 236b3J khyed kyis11 drnigs pa la ni brten byas nasiI rni drnigs
pa ni rab tu skyelI rni drnigs pa la brten by as nasi I rni drnigs pa ni rab tu skyel I zhes
gang srnras pa de la yang kho bo cag rni drnigs pa gorns par byas2 pa nyid gzhan du
rni 'dod del ji Ita zhe nal

gzugs la sogs pa stong pa stell

ngo bo nyid kyis3 rna skyes phyir I I
rdzas su rned phyir 'jig pa'i phyirl I
sgyu rna bzhin gorns chags rned 'gyurlI (5 1)
Csvabhavato 'py ajatatvad adravyatvad vinasatai:I1
rupadi sunyaf!1 rnayavad i ty abhyasad araktatalI (51)J

zhes bya ba tel gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rgyu dang rkyen du snang ba las byung
ba yod pa kho na yin pa rnarns ni stong pa stel rgyu dang rkyen gyi tshogs tha dad
pa dag la yod pa rna yin pas ngo bo nyid kyis rna skyes pa 'i phyir 'dus pa'i bdag nyid
yin pas rdzas su rned pa'i phyir dangl yun ring du rni gnas pas 'jig pa'i phyir I dper na
sgyu rna bzhin du drnigs su rned par gorns par byas pas chags pa rned pa nyid du 'gyur
ba4 yin gyil phyi rol gyi yul rnarn pa tharns cad du rned pa ni rna yin noll
Cc. 213b4, D. 213b4, P. 236b7J gzhan yangl

gzugs la sogs pa yod kyang nil I

yang dag ji bzhin rtogs gyur pal I
de yod rna yin de yi tshel I
I
2
3
4

P : kyi
P : bya
P : kyi
C, D, P : mi 'gyur ba
-16 4 -

log 'dzin ci phyir mi ldog 'gyur/ / (52)

Csadbhave 'pi ca rupader yathabhutavabodhatal:I1
vyavartate hy asadgrahas tadabhave na kilTl tadalI (52))

zhes bya ba ni dper na sngar sgyu rna byung ba lasl skyes bu'i ngo bo nyid yod par
btags pa la phyis 'di ni sgyu rna byas pa yin tel 'di la ngo bo nyid ci yang med do zhes
bya bar rtogs pa'i tshe nal skyes bu'i blo Idog par rigs kyi ri bon gi rva sngon dang
phyis kyang gtan med pa la ni de Ita bur 'gyur ba ni mi rigs sol I de bzhin du gzugs la
sogs pa yod kyang kun rdzob kyi shes pas gzugs la sogs pa 'di dag ni ngo bo nyid yod
pa yin no snyam du btags pa lal phyis yang dag pa'i ngo bo nyid med par yang dag pa
ji Ita ba bzhin rtogs par gyur pas ngo bo nyid de2 yod pa rna yin par shes pa de'i tshe
log par 'dzin pa ci'i phyir Idog par mi 'gyur tel Idog pa kho nar 'gyur ba yin pas khyed
kyis3 so so'i4 skye bo de nyid shes pa rna skyes pa dag la dang po kho nar gzugs la sogs
pa phyi rol gyi yul med par btags pas don ci zhig 'grub par 'gyurl de bzhin dul
gnyis su rnam par rtog pa daglI
sems dang sems byung s pyod yul na5 I I
gzugs la sogs pa dgag byas kyangl I
'jug par mi 'gyur mi rigs sol I (53)
Cnaiva dvayavikalpas ca cittacaitasagocaral:I1
pratil?edhe 'pi rupadau na pravartitum arhatilI (53))

cc. 214al, D. 214al, P. 237a5) zhes bya ba ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa gnyis su rnam par
rtog pa gang dag yin pa de dag khyed sems dang sems las byung ba'i spyod yul yin par
'dod cing gzugs la sogs pa'i phyi rol gyi yul rnams dang 'breI ba yin par mi 'dod nal
de la khyed kyis6 gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rnams rnam pa thams cad du dgag
pa byas kyang gnyis su rnam par rtog pa de dag 'jug par mi 'gyur bar mi rigs sol I

'
0

na j i Ita zhe nal 'jug par 'gyur ba kho nar rigs tel sngon dang phyis kyang gzugs la sogs
pa phyi rol gyi yul rnams la mi Itos par khyad par med pa'i phyir roll
1 P : la
2 "de" omitted in C, D.
3 P: kyi
4 P : so
5 P : ni
6 P : kyi
- 165-

gal te 'di skad ees gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rnams dang ma 'breI ba' i rnam par
rtog pa gnyis po dag spang ba kho na'i phyir kho bo eag gis rnam 1 grangs gzhan gyis2
phyi rol gyi yul rnams rnam par shes pa'i eha nyid yin par rnam par bzhag stel de'i 'og
tu rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes skyes pa na rang dang gzhan du snang ba'i eha bsal
bas yul de dang de la 'dzin pa dag 'gag par 'gyur ro zhe nal 'dir bshad pal

gal te de ni dgag pa'i phyir I I

sgrub gzhan yongs su 'dzin 'dod nail
'dam rdzab 'khru bar byed pa basiI
ma reg par ni bsrings na bzanglI (54)
Ctanniedhaya saeed ito vidhyantaraparigraha1
prakalanad dhi pankasya durad asparsanarp varamlI (54)J

cc. 214a5, D. 214a5, P. 237b3J zhes bya ba ni gal te khyed snying nas phyi rol gyi yul
med par 'dod na nil de rnam par shes pa'i eha nyid yin par btags pas kyang ci bya stel
gal te de3 rnam par shes pa'i eha nyid yin par rnam par bzhag nas phyis de dgag pa'i
phyir rnam par shes pa'i eha nyid yin par sgrub pa gzhan yongs su 'dzin par 'dod na
nil des nal ' dam rdzab 'khru bar byed pa basi ma reg par ni bsrings pa bzangl zhes
bya ba'i dpe 'di don mthun pa nyid du 'gyur tel mi smyon pa blun po 'ga' zhig gis lam
gtsang rna bor tel mi gtsang ba'i 'dam rdzab kyi klung du zhugs pa na gzhan dag gis
de la dris pal ei'i phyir khyod lam bor te 'dam rdzab tu zhugs4 I des smras pal yang
bkru bar bya'ol I gzhan gyis smras pal glen pa gal te gdon mi za bar bkru bar bya dgos
na snga nas 'dam rdzab kyis ma reg pa thag bsrings na ehes bzang ngo zhes bya ba Ita
bur 'gyur roll

I P : rnams
2 P : gyi
3 "de" omitted in P.
4 P : zhugs pa

166

2. Translation
N ext, to refute another reasoning1 of our opponents, we say:
If you want to prove that a ( so-called) external object has the nature of mind,
because it is an object of consciousness, just like the immediately preceding
(condition) ,

"

(27)

In this inference, 'external object' is the subject of the proposition (dharmin).

Its

property to be proven (dharma) is that it has the nature of mind (cittasvabhtiva).

'Because it is an object of consciousness' is stated as the reason (hetu).
immediately preceding condition' is the example (d1."!llnta).

'Just like the

An instance of mind

(cittam) together with its accompanying mental factors (caittll) which perishes in the
immediately preceding moment (tadanantara) becomes a real condition for the (pre
sent) arisal of another but similar (sama) instance of mind with its mental factors.
The former is therefore called 'the immediately preceding condition' (samanantara
pratyaya).

If you Yogacarins argue that, just as this (immediately preceding condi

tion) is of the nature of mind because it is an object of consciousness, just so external

objects are of the nature of mind because they also are objects of consciousness,2

Another reasoning (bsam pa) by which the Yogacara attempts to prove that all the objects of

consciousness, including the so-called 'external objects' or objects of the sense consciousnesses, are
themselves mental phenomena.
2 This inference says that the immediately preceding condition of a consciousness is of the nature of
mind because it is an object of consciousness . Neither the commentary in TJ nor the parallel
passages in PP (Eckel, pp. 64 -65) and in Avalokitavrata's commentary elaborate on this point; they
apparently treat it as an established tenet, accepted by both the proponent and the opponent.
Yamaguchi (p. 365) refers to the Abhidharma tenet that any instance of consciousness which
functions as the immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya) of the next instance of
consciousness is a lso the object-condition (iilambanaPratyaya) of that new instance of consciousness
(see MahiivibhiisaSiistra, T. vol. 27, 1 09a10- 1 1) . This is the same as saying that all the instances of
consciousness are accompanied by an awareness of the immediately preceding past.
Note that this general tenet takes on a different meaning in the Yogacara doctrine. According
to the Y ogacara, the store - consciousness functions at each instant as the immediately preceding
condition and as the obj ect- condition of all the other kinds of consciousness which originate in the
next instant (see TrBh 34.5 - 1 1 ad TrK 15). The store-consciousness is the uninterrupted, indistinct
awareness of the 'objective' world of which it constantly creates the images within itself. These
images are the primordial objects of our sense perceptions an d of the conceptual apprehensions
proper to the mental consciousness (manovijfiiina). The defiled seventh consciousness
(kli!'ftamanas), on the other hand, has the uninterrupted world-awareness of the store-consci ousness
as its object and misconceives this awareness as an enduring subject or self. The store
consciousness thus functions as both the immediately preceding condition and the object-condition
of all the other kinds of consciousness. This specific Yogacara understanding of
samanantarapratyaya/ iilambanapratyaya is however not applicable to the present inference because it
is not approved by the Madhyamaka.

167

Then the reason (in your inference] is erroneous, because mental factors exist
separately (from the mind] . (28ab)
Your inference either proves that external objects have the nature of mind, because
they are obj ects of consciousness, just like the immediately preceding condition; or it
proves that external objects do not have the nature of mind, because they are obj ects
of consciousness, just as separately existing mental factors (caittii) such as feeling
(vedana) and the like do not have the nature of mind.

Hence, the reason (in your

inference] is inconclusive (anaikiintika).l

You may think that (your thesis that external obj ects have the nature of mind]
is established by scripture, since it is in fact taught that "The threefold world is mind
only."2 We reply that this is not correct, because you do not understand very well the
meaning of this scriptural statement.

If you ask us why, we say:

"Mind-only" is taught in the Sutra in order to negate the existence of an agent

or enjoyer (other than the mind] . (28cd)
The Buddhas and bodhisattvas have taught "mind-only" in order to refute the theory
of other non-Buddhists (tfrthika) who maintain that there exists an agent and enjoyer
other than the mind.

They have not taught it in order to negate the existence of

Bhavavivek a's rej oinder is b ased on the Yogacara tenet that an instance of mind (cittam) and its
accompanying mental factors (caitta) are separate entities, each having its own nature. See also
the parallel passage in PP (Eckel, pp. 64-65). As Yamaguchi (pp. 367-369) remarks, the Yogacara
was divided on this issue. In his introductory commentary on MSAL XI. 34 -35 (D. No. 4034,
Mi1 84al-3) Sthiramati says that, according to some Yogacarins, "vijiiaptimtitra" means that only
the mind and its mental factors exist as separate entities whereas external objects do not exist as
separate from the mind; according to others, "vijiiaptimtttra" means that only the mind exists and
that neither ment al factors nor external objects exist as separate entities apart from the mind.
The first position is explained as follows in MVK I. 8cd: the mind apprehends the substance of the
object, while the mental factors ap prehend special qualities of the obj ect (ttitrarthadr:?tir vijiianarrt
tadvisee tu caitasa). The Vijiiaptimatratttsiddhisttstra, representing the view of Dharmapala, also
defends the first position that mental factors have their own na ture (svabhava) different from that
of the mind itself, but specifies that this is true from the point of view of the conventional truth
only. From the point of view of the highest truth, the mind and the mental factors are nei ther
different nor identical. (T. vol. 31, 36c22-37all; Siddhi, pp. 395- 397).
Bhavaviveka's position on the ontological status of the mind and the mental factors is explained

in MHK/T] V. 45-46. Bhavaviveka follows the Sautrantika thesis that cittam and caitta are not
separate real entities, but are only names or design ations (upadaya prajiiapti) of the different mental
functions that occur within the unitary stream of consciousness of a person.
2 cittamtitram idarrt yad idarrt traidhatukam (DaSabhumikasutra, J. Rahder ed., p. 49, E). This
statement is quoted for the first time as a scriptural argument for the mind-only tenet in the
Mahayanasarrtgraha (MS, T. vol. 31, 138b3-4). Vasubandhu quotes it in a slightly different form in
his Virrtsatika (as restored into Sanskrit by S. Levi in ViV 3.2-3 : cittamtitrarrt bho jinaputra yad uta
traidhatukam). The Vijiiaptimtttratttsiddhisastra also quotes it as one of the scriptural arguments
for the mind-only tenet (T. vol. 31, 39a6-7).
- 168 -

objects outside the mind.

This can be known from the following passage in the

DaSabhumikasiUra: "A bodhisattva in the sixth bodhisattva-stage reflects on dependent

arising in forward (anuloma) and reverse (pratiloma) order and thinks as follows: 'Only
the aggregates of suffering, devoid of an agent (karaka) and an experiencer (vedaka),
arise from the twelve limbs (of dependent arisingJ , starting from ignorance and so
forth, and thus the immense tree of suffering (dul}khaV1:ka) is brought into existence. '
o Sons of the Conqueror, because it is definitely that way, it is thus: these three

(samsaricJ realms are mind only; they are produced and constructed by the mind and
nowhere does there exist an agent or enj oyer other than the mind." l Thus, (this SutraJ
does not establish the non-existence of external objects.
At this point (the YogacarinsJ object: "But (the non-existence of external
obj ectsJ is also taught in the Prajnaparamitii(sutra), as follows: "Maitreya! A bo
dhisattva should realize that perceptible form (riipam) is (correctlyJ conceived (pra
jnapti) by distinguishing the following three aspects: "This is imagined form (pari
kalpitariipam)," "This is form as it appears in consciousness (vikalpitarupam)2" and
"This is the true nature of form (dharmatariipam)."

What is imagined form?

It is

that which is (mistakenlyJ imagined to be the nature of form in dependence on the

name, the concept, the designation and the conventional term "rupam".
imagined form is not a real entity (adravyam).

That

What is form as it appears in con-

1 Cf. DaSabhumikasutra (J. Rahder ed., p. 49.5-9) : "evam ayartZ kevalo dukhaskandho dukhav,,:"ko
'bhinivartate karakavedakavirahita iti. tasyaivartZ bhavati karakabhinivesata kriya prajiiayante. yatra

karako nasti kriyapi tatra paramarthato nopalabhyate. tasyaivartZ bhavati cittamatram idartZ yad idartZ
traidhtitukam." Parallel text in PP, D. Tsha 245b4-7, P. Tsha 308a3-bl (Eckel, pp. 63-6 4).
Bhavaviveka quotes the context of the "mind-only" statement in the DaSabhumikasutra to show
that the Sutra teaches "mind-only" in order to negate the existence of an enduring self as the agent
of actions and the experiencing subject of karmic retribution. Accordingly, "mind-only" in the
Sutra means that only the mind as a non-enduring entity is the agent and enj oyer of a person's
actions. The Sutra does not i ntend to say that external objects do not exist and that only the mind
exists. Bhavaviveka is no doubt right here, because the context shows indeed that the Sutra
teaches "mind-only" in order to negate the ex istence of atman (see also section " N " on page 52 in
Rahder's edition).
2 E. Conze translates vikalpitarupam as "discerned form" (The Large Sutra on Per/ect Wisdom, p. 648)
and R. Thurman as "constructed form" (The Speech 0/ Gold, p. 356). The terms 'discerned' and
'constructed' do however not clearl y indicate howvikalpita differs from pankalpita which both Conze
and Thurman translate as 'imagined'. vikalpa is a dual consciousness, bifurcated into a perceiving
subj ect and a perceived object (in this case, the image of an external form or rilpam). vikalpitarilpam
is therefore the image (abhasa, pratibhasa) of a seemingly external form as it appears in a
consciousness which is habituated to the dualistic apprehension of such images. According to the
Yogacara, people in general misapprehend these internal obj ect-images as replicas of real external
objects outside the mind ( parikalpitarilpam) due to their familiarity with names, concepts and
everyday language.
=

- 169 -

sciousness?

It is that to which verbal expressions such as the name, the concept, the

designation

and the conventional term "rupam" are applied in dependence on the

(dual) consciousness (vikalpa) Gn which images of perceptible form appear) .

Since

this (aspect of form) is supported by the reality of the consciousness (in which it
appears) , it itself is a real entity, but not in the sense that it originates through its own
power.

What is the true nature of form?

It is the permanent absenc e of the reality

of imagined form in form as it appears in consciousness.

It is the absence of self

existence (dharmanairiltmyam), the limit of reality (bhatako!i), and so forth.

It is

neither a real entity nor mere non-existence, because (consciousness) is empty of

imagined objects and because consciousness itself (as empty of such objects) exists. "l

Quotation from the Maitreyapariprcchii (The Questions of Maitreya) section o f the Paficavi'J?'!
satisahasrikaprajfiaparamitiisutra. See S. !ida, "Agama (Scripture) and Yukti (Reason) in
Bhavaviveka, " Kanakura-hakushi Koki-kinen, Indogaku-bukkyogaku Ronshu, Kyoto 1966, pp. 8591. Sanskrit text in E. Conze, S. !ida, "'Maitreya's Questions' in the Prajfiaparamita," Melanges

d'Indianisme Ii la Memoire de Louis Renou (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Fasc.

28), Paris 1968, pp. 229-242; English translation in E. Conze, The Large Sutra On Peifect Wisdom,
University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1975, repr. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1979,
pp. 644-652; japanese translation by N. Ha kamaya, " Mirokushomonsho Wayaku,"
Komazawadaigaku Bukkyogakubu Ro nshu (1975), pp. 190-210. For Tsong-kha-pa's discussion of this
passage, see R. Thurman, The Speech 0/ Gold: Reason and Enlightenment in the Tibetan Buddhism,
Princeton Univ. Press 1984, repr. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1989, pp. 355-363.
The Sanskrit text of this passage can be reconstructed as follows (based on the Sanskrit text
edition by E. Conze and S. I ida, pp. 237-238) :
"tribhir M aitreya akarair bodhisattvena riipaprabhedaprajfiap tir anugantavya, yad uta ida'J?'!
parikalpita'J?'! riipam, ida'J?'! vikalpita'J?'! riipam, ida'J?'! dharmatarupam iti. tatra katamat parikalpita'J?'!
riipa'J?'!. ya riipam iti namasamjfiaprajfiaptivyavahiira'J?'! nisritya riipasvabhavataya parikalpana. ida'J?'!
parikalpita'J?'! riipam. idam adravya'J?'!. tatra katamad vikalpita'J?'! riipa'J?'!. yasmin vikalpapratftya
abhilapanata namasamjfiaprajfiaptivyavahiiro riipam ityadi. ida'J?'! vikalpasya sadravyatam upadaya
sadravya'J?'! na tu svatantravrttita. tatra katamad dharmatariipa'J?'!. yat tena parikalpitarii pe1'}a tasya
vikalpitariipasya nitya'J?'! nivabhavata dharmanairatmya'J?'! bhutakotyadi. tan naiva adravya'J?'! na
sadravya'J?'! vikalpitarthaSunyatvad vijfianasattvac ca (rnam par brtags pa'i don gyis stong pa nyid
dang rnam par shes pa yod pa'i phyir ro)"
There are three Y ogacara texts in which the three aspects of rupam are discussed in a very
similar way as in the Maitreyapariprcchii. They are the following: (1) MVK III. 16cd, MVBh 44.1519 (Teaches that one should develop the skill (kausalya) to distinguish these three aspects for each
"
of the five aggregates (skandha) as an antidote (pratiPaka) against the mistaken belief in the
existence of an enduring self (titman). (2) A bhidha rmasamuccaya , T. vol. 31, 672b20-27 (Says the
same as MVK III.16cd and is most probab ly based on it). (3) Asvabhava's commentary on
Mahiiyanasamgraha, T. vol. 31, 399b29 -c13 (Commenting on the definition of the three natures,
Asvabhava quotes a text, identical with the Maitreyapariprcchti passage quoted in Tj, and identifies
it as a quotation from the Mahiiprajfiaparamitasutra. )
It is clear that these three texts deal with
the three natures, and not with mind-only (cittamtitra, vijfiaptimtitra). The same should be said
about the Maitreyapariprcchii passage quoted in Tj, except for the last line (underlined in the
Sanskrit version above). That last line is however not found in the original text which reads
"paramarthaprabhavitam" instead. My assumption is therefore that the author of Tj
(Bhavaviveka?) has added the last line to the original text in order to relate this passage to the
- 170 -

We reply:
If you argue that (only) consciousness (exists) because it is empty of imaginary
objects, then the existence of objects is thereby not refuted,
because a non-imaginary object (of consciousness) really exist s ( according to
you) . (29)
Although consciousness is empty of imaginary objects, the true nature of perceptible
forms (dharmatarapam) which is the object (artha) to be realized by the strictly
individual awareness (pratylitmasarrzvedanfya) of the Tathagatas, does exist ( according
to you) .

Since this inexpressible (ayathtiruta) reality exists ( according to you) , a non

imaginary object (akalpitartha) exists.

Hence, an object (of consciousness) actually

exists and it is not correct that consciousness is in every respect empty of objects.l

topic of MHK V.28cd-30 which is "mind-only" and not "the three natures." Furthermore, the
commentary in TJ interprets MHK V.29-30 as Bhavaviveka's reply to the use of the Maitreyaparipr
eehii passage as a scriptural argument by the Yogacara. Although the content of MHK V.29-30 is
not entirely unrelated to the Maitreyaparipreeha passage, it does not fit in well as a reply to the use

of this passage as a scriptural argument by the Y ogacara, as will be shown below. The general
impression therefore is that the Maitreyapariprechii passage does not fit in the context of MHK V.
28-30 and may have been added by a later author who has revised and expanded Bhavaviveka's
original TJ (this would corroborate Y. Ej ima's thesis about the existence of an "Ur- Tarkaj vala"
that was later expanded into the present TJ).
Verse 29 can be interpreted in the following two different ways.
(1) In verse 29, Bhavaviveka rej ects the opponent's thesis of " mind-only" by arguing that a non
imaginary object of consciousness, also called 'the true nature of form', really exists and is the
object apprehended by the Tathagata's unmistaken awareness of Reality. S. Yamaguchi (pp. 397 398) follows this interpretation, but rightly observes the problem i t involves. It i s indeed hard to
accept that Bhavaviveka, who throughout Chapter Five of MHK/TJ insistentl y rej ects the idea
that the true nature of things is itself an entity capable of functi oning as the object-condition of the
Tathagata's knowledge, would be saying here that the 'true nature of form really exists' and is the
object apprehended by the awareness of the Tathagatas. Jang-gya focuses on the same problem
in his interpretation of verse 29, but he uses an obscure reasoning (see D.S. Lopez, A Study of
Svatantrika, p. 313) in an attempt to rescue Bhavaviveka from literally saying that 'the ultimate
nature of form really exists'.
(2) The problem can be avoided by assuming that the reason of the inference in verse 29 ("because
a non-imaginary object really exists") is not asserted by Bhavaviveka himself, but by the Y ogacara.
I have added " (according to youJ" in my translation to indicate that I favor this interpretation of
verse 29. On this interpretation, Bhavaviveka uses the Y ogacara premise about the real existence
of the true nature of things against the Yogacara argument for the non-existence of objects outside
consciousness. His reasoning in verse 29 is that the Yogacarins contradict their own doctrine if
they argue that objects outside consciousness do not exist while maintaining at the same time that
the inexpressible, ultimate nature of things is an objective reality and functions as the object
apprehended by the non-conceptual awareness of the Tathagatas.
This interpretation of verse 29 is substantiated by the important observation that the textual
basis of MHK V.29 is not the Maitreyapariprcchii, as the quotation in TJ leads us to believe, but is
rather Vasubandhu's Vimsatikakarika/-vrtti (ViK/ViV). This can be argued as follows;
(i) The idea that imaginary objects (kalpitartha) do not exist, but a non-imaginary object
- 171 -

(Eighteenth section of the MadhyamakahrdayaV'}:tti-tarkajvala]

Moreover,
(The reason in your inference] is uncertain, because even in dreams conscious
ness (has an object of which] the nature is non-imaginary. (30ab)
As for (your inference,]

"The threefold world is mind only, because (consciousnessJ

is empty of (external] objects such as perceptible form, as is the case with the
consciousness in a dream and the like, " the truth is that, even in dreams, there exists
an (objectiveJ aspect of consciousness which has a non-imaginary nature.

Thus,

when you say "as is the case with the consciousness in a dream," you argue either that
the consciousness in a dream is empty of (external] objects which are merely imagi
nary, such as a (real] man and the like, or that consciousness - as the perceiver of its
own (objectiveJ aspect- is not empty of objects which are non-imaginary.

Your

reason is therefore inconclusive.l

(Your proposition that consciousness] has no object is not acceptable, because
the example (of your inferenceJ is not established. (30cd)
Even if (the consciousness inJ a dream is approved as an example of ( the reasonJ
"because (consciousnessJ is empty of imaginary objects, " (that example] negates (the
existence ofJ imaginary objects (only J , but it does not negate that part (of conscious
nessJ which is its non-imaginary object.
that only the mind exists.

Thus, that (exampleJ also does not prove

( Your propositionJ that (consciousnessJ has no object is

(akalpitiirtha) exists, is explicitly stated in the following passage of Vi V: "na khalu sarvathii dharmo
nasty ity evaJ!l dharmanairiitmyapraveso bhavati. api tu kalpitiitmanii yo btllair dharmiifJiiJ!l svabhiivo
griihyagriihakiidi parikalpitas tena kalpitena iitmanii teiiJ!l nairiitmyam. na tv anabhiliipyena iitmanii
yo buddhiiniiJ!l viaya iti." (ViV, 6. 14-18 ad ViK 10d) ("One does not understand the absence of self
existence in things by claiming that things do not exist in all respects, but Cone und erstands it
correctly by seeing that they do not existJ with respect to their imagined nature. Things lack self
existence in the sense that they lack the imagined nature which ignorant people identify as
'apprehended obj ect', 'apprehender' and so fo rth. But things are not empty of the inexpressible
nature which is the object Cof the awarenessJ of the Buddhas. ")
( ii) The reasonings in the verses preceding and following MHK V.29 are all refutations of tenets
which are found in ViK/Vi V.
MHK V.28: Refutes the Yogacara interpretation of the 'cittamiitra' teaching in the Dasabhumi
kasiitra. This agama is quoted in ViV 3.2-3.
MHK V.29: Inference based on ViV 6. 14- 18.
MHK V.30: Refutes the 'dream simile' argument found in ViK 3a/4a.
MHK V. 31-38: Refutes the arguments for the non-existence of atoms found in ViK 1 1-15.
1 According to Bhavaviveka, the consciousness in a dream perceives real mental phenomena which
are its internal 'objective aspect' (see MHK/TJ V. 19). One such real phenomenon is for example
the image of a man seen by the consciousness in a dream. This image is the non -imaginary object
of that dream consciousness. Its imaginary, nonexistent object is a real man of flesh and blood.
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therefore not acceptable.

This is because (yourJ example is not correctly established,

since it lacks a part of what you want to prove. 1

The consciousness in a dream is not

without object, because it has the true nature of form (dharmaflirilpam) as its object.2
In short, the meaning here is that (the consciousness in] a dream is not a correct
example and should therefore not be used as an example when it comes to correct
reasoning.
(The Yogacara] obj ects again as follows:
The object of a (sense] perception is thought to be either a single (atom] or an
aggregation (of many atoms] .

But when one examines this by means of

correct reasonings, ( the existence of] such an object is in both cases not
possible. (31)
Some (Yogacara] opponents object as follows: "Those who claim that external objects
exist, conceive the obj ect of a (sense] perception in two ways.

They say that the

object (of a sense perception] is either a single atom or an aggregation of (many]

atoms.

But when one examines this by means of correct reasonings, both propositions

appear to be against reason, and are therefore not correct, because both contradict
(what is actually the case] ."

To show what these correct reasonings are, they say:

(First,] a single atom is not the actual object of a sense perception, because it
does not appear as that, j ust as a physical sense organ is not the actual object
(of a sense perception] . (32)
An 'atom' is the smallest particle of matter. 'Single' means 'alone' (or 'all by itself'] .
(In this inference] , 'a single atom' is the subject of the proposition (dharmin).

Its

property to be proven (dharma) is that it is not the actual obj ect of a sense perception
(rapabuddhi).
a).

The combination of this subject and its property is the proposition (pa

'Because i t does not appear as that' i s the reason (hefu).

'appear as the actual object On a sense c onsciousness] '.

'Appear a s that' means

'It does not appear as that'

means 'It does not appear in a (sense] consciousness and is (therefore] not the actual
object (of a sense consciousness] .' 'Because' indicates that this is stated as the rea
son.

'Just as a physical sense organ is not the actual obj ect (of a sense perception] '

is the example (dr!iinfa).

1

'Physical sense organ' (indnya) stands for the five sense

That is, you intend to prove that consciousness has no object at all, but your example proves only
that it has no imaginary object.
Bhavaviveka uses the same strategy as in verse 29 (see note 1, p.23). As in verse 29, it is again the
Yogacarins, and not Bhavaviveka , who assert that the non-imaginary, true nature of the objects of
dream consciou sness exists as a reality in its own right, independent of consciousness itself.
- 173 -

organs.

Although the sense organs are objects of knowledgel and are colored, trans

parent matter (rilpaprasttda), they do not appear (in a sense consciousnessJ as the
actual object (of that consciousnessJ and are therefore not the actual object of a sense
perception.

In the same way, a (singleJ atom is not the actual obj ect of a sense

perception.
It is also not right that (an aggregation of] many atoms is the actual object of
a (perceivingJ mind, because (such an aggregationJ is not a real entity, just like
a double moon. (33)
It is also not right that an aggregation (samaha) of many atoms is the actual object of
a (perceivingJ mind.

This is because (an aggregationJ is not a real entity.

In fact,

although it is held that individual atoms are real entities (dravya), aggregations of
atoms are not (considered to beJ real entities, j ust as an army, a forest and the like
(are not real entitiesJ .

Therefore, although the form of an aggregation (of atomsJ

certainly appears (in a sense consciousnessJ , an aggregation cannot be the actual

obj ect of a (senseJ consciousness.

This is similar to the mistaken perception of a

double moon and so forth by somebody who suffers from cataract (taimirika).2
I

According to the general Abhidharma theory, the sense organs are objects of knowledge (yul
viaya), but they are not objects of sense percep tion because they are invisible, inaudible, intangible,
etc. Their existence is known by inferential knowledge.
The two main Yogacara texts in which it is argued that atoms, either one by one or in aggregated
form, cannot be the actual object of a sense perception are Vasubandhu's ViK 1 1 - 1 5 (ViV 6. 25-8.22)
and Dignaga's A lambanapan-kii (A P). Other Yogacara texts which discuss the same issue, but
=

depend on ViK/ViV and AP, are: PS/PSV I ; TrBh 16.18-17.7 ; MVT 25.1- 1 7 ; Siddhi, T. vol. 31,
4a10-b25. Bhavaviveka's exposition of the Yogacara arguments in M HK V.32-33 is based on AP.
In AP, Dignaga examines whether external objects function as the object-condition

(iilambanapratyaya) of the sense perceptions. His discussion is based on the following definition of
'obj ect-condition' : " COnly) the entity which produces the perc eption in which the form of that
entity appears can be said to be the actual object of that percept ion" (AP, 1 76.17-18 : don gang zhig
rang snang ba 'i rnam par rig pa bskyed pa de ni dmigs pa yin par rigs te. . . ). This definition
stipulates that an entity should meet the following two conditi ons in order to Qua lify as the actual
object of a sense perception. First, that entity must be one of the producing causes of that
particular sense perception. This implies that the entity must really exist, because unreal things
cannot function as causes. Second, the form (iikiira) of that entity must appear in the co nsciousness
it produces. If this second condition were not sti pulated, other producing causes of the sense
perceptions, such as the immediately preceding instant of consciousness or the sense organs, would
also be objects of the sense perceptions.
The theory considered in verse 32 says that single atoms are real entities and that each single
atom of a gross object functi ons as the object- condition of the perception of that object. Kuei -chi
attributes this theory to the o ld Vaibhaika school (see his commentary on Siddhi, T. vol. 43, 270c4).
Dignaga refutes this theory as follows (verse 1 of AP). Single atoms, in as far as they are thought
to be real entities, can produce a sense percep tion. But they cannot be the object-condition of a
sense perception because they do not meet the second condition mentioned above. That is to say,
the form or image which appears in a sense consciousness is never an image of individual atoms one
by one, but is always an image of a gross object.
- 174 -

We reply:
If the opponent intends to prove that non-aggregated matter is not the actual
object of a (perceivingJ mind, he ends up proving what is already proven. (34)
If the opponents intend to prove that a single atom of non-aggregated (bsags pa

rna

yin

pa, asa'f!Zcita) matter is not the actual obj ect of a (perceivingJ mind, then their thesis
(purvapaa) will (have the error ofJ proving what is already proven (siddhasadhana),
because we also assert this.
But if (the opponents intend to prove thisJ with respect to aggregated matter,
the reason Un their inferenceJ will not be correctly established, because an'
aggregation of different atoms (of the same kindJ produces (a consciousness in
whichJ the form of that (aggregateJ appears. (35)
If the subject of the proposition Un verse 33J is matter as an aggregation of atoms of
the same kind (sajati) and you state as the reason that it is not a real entity, then that
reason will not be established for both parties.

In fact, when different atoms of

matter of the same kind are accumulated and conj oined, that (aggregateJ is acknow
ledged as an actual object ( of perceptionJ because the consciousness in which it
appears originates as having the form (akara) of aggregated atoms.

We assert that

The second theory (verse 33) says that aggregations of atoms, and not single atoms, are the object
of the sense perceptions. Kuei -chi attributes this theory to the Sautrantika (T. vol. 43, 267a8-13,
270a13-bll).

This theory is refuted (AP, verse 2ab) on the ground that aggregations of atoms do

not have the power to produce a sense perception because they are merely nominal things
(prajiiaptisat) and not real entities (dravyasat), j ust as a non-existent second moon cannot be the
producing cause of the mistaken perception of two moons.
Dignaga introduces a third theory (AP, verse 3ab) which says that each single atom of a gross
object possesses the form of the gross object of which it is a constituent part. This gross form,
inherent in each atom, is a real entity ( dravyasat). Hence, individual atoms as parts of a gross
object meet the two conditions for being the object-condition of the consciousness which perceives
that gross object. Kuei -chi attributes this theory to Sarpghabhadra and the new Vaibha!?ika school
(T. vol. 43, 271a9- 10). (See also Siddhi, T. vol. 3 1 , 4b16-18; T. Tillemans, Materials for the Study
of A ryadeva, Dharmapala and Candrakfrti, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde
Heft 24.1, Wien 1 990, note (227), pp . 247-249.) The main point of Dignaga's refutation of this third
theory (AP, verses 3cd-5) is the following. If the form of a gross object, as perceived by a sense
consciousness, inheres in each of the atoms of that object, the absurd consequence will be that all
the objects which consist of atoms of the same kind ( for instance, a pot and a cup) will be perceived
as identical (AP, verse 4ab) because the gross form inherent in each of their atoms is identical.
Bhavaviveka does not mention this third theory in his presentation of the Yogacara arguments
in MHK V.31 -33. According to S. Yamaguchi (pp. 404-405), this indicates that Bhavaviveka's
target in MHK V.31 -38 is not Dignaga's epistemological theory as set forth in A lambanapana
(although the phrasing of MHK V.31 -33 follows AP), but is rather Vasubandhu's argumentation of
the ontological issue of 'mind-only' in ViKiViV where only the first two theories are explained and
refuted. However that may be, another and perhaps a better explanation of Bhavaviveka's silence
about the third theory might be that his own position on this issue, as explained in verses 35-36, is
very close to this third theory.
- 1 75 -

both an aggregation of atoms of the same kind, such as a pot and so forth, and the
CindividuaU atoms (of such an aggregateJ are real enti ties (dravya) for conventional
thought (sa'f!Zvrti).

In fact, just as we assert that an atom is a real entity because it is

an aggregation of eight real entities, just so (we assert that J aggregations (of atomsJ ,
such as a pot and so forth, are real entities (for conventional thoughtJ because isolated
atoms are not approved as real entities (by conventional thoughtJ .1
Just that (aggregation of atoms of the same kindJ is the actual obj ect (of a
sense perceptionJ , because it functions as the cause of a consciousness in which
its form appears, as is the case with desire.
Your thesis is therefore refuted by (thisJ inference. (36)
We assert that matter, as an aggregation of atoms of the same kind, is the actual
object (of the sense perceptionsJ .

Why? Because such an aggregation of atoms

functions as the actual cause of the consciousness in wich the image of that aggregated
matter appears.

Whatever functions as the cause of a consciousness in which its

image appears, is observed to be an aggregate, just as it is agreed, for example, that

desire which has the character of attachment to an object perceives indeed an aggre
gate, such as for instance the body of a woman.

Your thesis, "Aggregated matter is

not the actual object (of a sense perceptionJ ," is thus refuted by this inference.2

1 Bhavaviveka follows here the Abhi dharma theory that each atom is an aggregation of at least eight
particles: four elementary particles (mahabhiltiini; earth, water, fire, wind) and four composite
particles (bhautikii; color/shape, odor, taste, tangible) (see AK II. 22, p. 145). These eight particles
are real entities but they never exist in isolation. Atoms, as aggregations of real entities, are
themselves real entities. Atoms also never exist in isolation (AK, 1. 13, p. 25) but o nly in aggregated
form. Bhavaviveka's 'conventional' reasoning here is that, j ust as atoms themselves are real
entities because they are aggregations of particles which are real entities, just so aggregations of
atoms of the same kind are real entities because their constituent atoms are real entities. An
aggregation of atoms of the same kind thus meets the first condition for being the actual object of
a sense percept ion; that is to say, such an aggrega tion is a real entity and is therefore capable of
functioning as one of the producing causes of a sense perception. And it also meets the second
conditi on, because its form appears in the consciousness it produces.
2 Verse 36 is an inference based on conventional thought or common sense, premised on the general
belief that both atoms and aggregati ons of atoms are real entities. The Yogacara's denial of the
existence of external objects is thus refuted on the ground of contradicting common sense.
Bhavaviveka's position, as explained in verses 35-36, is close to the third theory rej ected by
Dignaga in AP (see note 2, p. 27). It is however not stated clearly in verses 35-36 that the form of
a gross object which appears in a sense consci ousness bel ongs to each of the constituent atoms of
that object. The parallel text in PP is much clearer in this respect (see Eckel, p. 66). Bhavaviveka
explicitly states there that all the atoms of an aggregate cooperate to produce a consciousness in
which the form of that aggregate appears, so that one may also say that each single atom of an
aggregate produces a consciousness in which the form of that atom itself appears (gcig pu yang
rang gi bdag nyid snang ba 'i blo bskyed pa yin pa 'i phyir).

176

Moreover, (your thesis) also contradicts the scripture which says that the supporting
facultiesl and the objects of the five (sense) consciousnesses are aggregations (of
atoms) .2
(The Yogacara) replies : "A (perceiving) consc iousness certa inly originates
without (apprehending an externaIJ object, because it originates from the seeds
(produced by) a (past) consciousness which had an object-image similar to its own,
just like a mental perception. "

We reply :

If you argue that a (sense) consciousness apprehends no (externaIJ object,

because it originates from its own seeds just like a mental perception, then (your
reasoning implies that) a (sense) consciousness will surely apprehend an
(externaIJ object because (a mental perception also apprehends its own) non
constructed (object) . (37)
Because a mental perception also has an ( objective) aspect which is the appearing of
its own non-constructed object, the (sense) consciousness you are arguing about will
(consequently also) apprehend (its own externaIJ object.3
Also, by inferring that (a sense consciousness) has no (externaIJ object, you
deny that it is a (sense) consciousness.
Since we do not assert that an aggregation (is the object of a sense perception) ,
your refutation of that does not damage us. (38)
Something is called 'consciousness' because it makes an object known.

But since you

infer that (a sense consciousness) has no (externaIJ object, that which you assert to
be a (sense) consciousness will not be a (sense) consciousness.

' (Sense) conscious

ness' (in the thesis of your inference in verse 37) is thus negated in that it does not have
I asraya ( = the five physical sense organs)
2 See AK I. 35d (scriptural source not mentioned).
3 For the Y ogacara, mental perceptions are produced from the seeds that were deposited in the store

consciousness by previous mental perceptions. They are not produced by mental objects that
would exist independently of the mind and would function as their object-condition. The mental
perceptions of non- Buddhas are conceptual cognitions which identify/differentiate the internal
obj ect-images of the five sense perceptions and misc onceive them as i mages of real objects outside
consciousness. Similarly, the five sense perceptions are not produced from real external objects
but from seeds that were produced by previ ous sense perceptions of the same type. The sense
perceptions are non-conceptual cognitions. Hence, unlike mental perceptions, they are not
misconceptions. Nevertheless, the sense perceptions of non- Buddhas are misrepresentations of
reality because they perceive images of unreal external objects.
According to Bhavaviveka, however, mental perceptions apprehend mental phenomena which are
real entities in their own right, and not just c onstructs or fabrications of the m ind itself (see the
commentary on MHK/TJ V.19). And j ust as mental perceptions apprehend real mental objects,
just so the sense perceptions apprehend real externa l objects.
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the nature of a (senseJ consciousness.

Hence, your thesis (pratijfitt) is invalid because

the reality of the subj ect of the thesis (dharmin) is not correctly established.l
Regarding your thesis (in verse 33J "An aggregation is not the object of a sense
perception," we also do not assert that an aggregation (samaha, 'dus pa) is the object
(of a sense perceptionJ .

What we assert is that a conglomeration (sarrzcita, bsags pa)

of atoms is the object (of the sense perceptionsJ .

Hence, when you argue that an

aggregation is not an object of perception, you do not inflict any damage on us.
then is the difference between a conglomeration and an aggregation?

What

When many

atoms of the same kind have the same supporting base, we call it 'a conglomeration'.
When dissimilar things with different supporting bases, such as elephants and horses
or harita trees and khadira trees, are gathered together and are called 'an army' or 'a
forest', then that is what we call 'an aggregation'.
(The Y ogacaraJ objects: "The thesi s (that a sense consciousness does not
apprehend any external objectJ is firml y established by what is said in our
Alambanaparfkti: "
Even though external objects do not exist,
(the sense perceptionsJ have been originating fro m time immemorial,
because the capacities (of perceptionJ and the forms of objects (appearing in
actual sense perceptionsJ mutually cause each other.
(We reply : J (If so,J how will the cessation of these (sense perceptionsJ ever be
possible?2 (39)
The inference in verse 37 sets out to prove that a sense consciousness does not apprehend any
external object. Bhavaviveka points out that the thesis of this inference is self-contradictory
because the property to be proven ("does not apprehend any external object") annuls the reality of
the subj ect ("sense consciousness"). Self-contradiction or self-a nnulment (for example : "All
statements are false.") is mentioned as one of the five fallacies of the thesis (pakiibhiisa) in the
Nyiiyamukha (T . 1628, vol. 32, 1 a 19-20).
2 This verse is not found in the Tibetan translations of MHK (verses- only text) which are presumably
based on a Sanskrit manuscript in which this verse was lacking. (On the Sanskrit manuscripts of
MHK, see Y. Ej ima, Chugan Shiso no Tenkai - Bhavaviveka Kenkyu, Tokyo 1 980, pp. 261 -264.)
Since this verse occurs in the Sanskrit manuscript of MHK discovered by R. Sank:tyayana, as well
as in the Tibetan vers ion of T], it shou ld be counted as verse 39 of the fifth chapter of MHK (see
y. Ejima, "Daij 6 -sh6 -chinron no Yugagy6-gakusetsu-hihan," in Takasaki Jikido Hakushi Kanreki
kinen- ronshu. Indogaku Bukkyogaku Ronshu, Tokyo 1988, p. 21 1 note 1.)
Verse 39 is an adapted version of verse 8 of AP. Bhavaviveka has substituted the first line of verse
39 ("Even though external objects do not exist") for the first line of AP 8 ("It is not a contradiction
to say that the capacity Cof future sense perceptions] resides in consci ousness (itself] ") in order to
relate verse 39 to the topic discussed in the previous verses. As the commentary in T] says, the
last line in the Sa nskrit version of verse 39 (" How will the cessation of these ever be possible?") was
substituted for the original in AP 8 ("have been originating from time immemorial") as an
immediate rej oinder to the opponent's argument. For the meaning of AP 8, see the commentary and
notes to MHK V. 22cd.
1

- 178 -

We reply.

The fourth line of this verse " H ow will the cessation of these (sense

perceptions) ever be possible?" is an immediate rejoinder (to the opponent's argument)

and should be understood as follows.
When external objects are present, (sense) consciousnesses originate in which
images of these objects appear.

The yogin who aims at the purification of conscious

ness, comes to realize that these objects lack inherent existence.

Because he thus

(gradually) removes (all) apprehended objects (grahya) and (all) apprehending (graha
ka) (from hi s mind) , it is but right that the transmundane non-dual awareness (of
reality as it is) (lokottaranirvikalpajfliin a) will originate (in him) .
But for you, who assert that objects (outside consciousness) do not exist (at
all) , external objects do not exist at first and also not later.1

In that case, there exists

no cause by which one could later eliminate the (habitual) functioning (of conscious
ness) as an apprehended-apprehending (duality) , and there exists thus no means
(upaya) by which the transmundane non-dual awareness could ever originate.

Since a

means for the origination of the transmundane non-dual awareness does not exist if
one asserts that (external) objects do not exist, you should explain how that beginning
less functioning of consciousness (based on the mutual causation) of capacities and
object-forms will ever cease!2
1 According to Bhavaviveka's view, which is based on the Madhyamaka tenet of 'two truths',
external objects exist 'at first' but do not exist anymore 'later'. That is to say, external objects
exist for the conventional thinking (sa'f?'l vrti) which does not inquire into the ultimate-reality status
of things. But they no longer exist for those who have become Madhyamaka yogins and are using
Madhyamaka reasonings to examine whether things are ultimately real in the sense of having an
inherent existence (svabhiiva). Bhavaviveka's position on this i ssue is explained in detail in MHK/
TJ V.51-52.
2 The Yogacara distinguishes the following stages in the path that leads to the attainment of the
transmundane non-dual awareness: (1) Through correct reasoning one can acquire the certain
knowledge that external objects do not exist and that all the sense data are products of the mind
itself. (2) In accordance with this knowledge, the concentrated mind of the yogin gradually
empties itself of all the images of external objects. (3) Finally, the mind of the yogin ceases to exist
as an apprehender of objects. (For the deta ils of this process, see the commentary and notes to
MHK/TJ V. 4.)
The point of Bhavavivek a's obj ection here, and also in verse 53 below, is that the non
apprehending of external objects will never come about if, as the Yogacara says, the content of all
our sense perceptions is determined by the mind alone and not also by real external objects.
Because the Y ogacarins teach that the appearance of object-images in consciou sness is the result
of a beginningless intramental process and is not conditioned at all by the presence of real objects
outside the mind, they cannot reasonably argue that the knowledge of the non-existence of external
objects will lead to the non-perception of external objects or to the non-appearance of obj ect
images in consciousness. The knowledge of the non-existence of external objects is therefore not
a true means ( upiiya) by which the yogin could ever eliminate the perception of external obj ects. In
short, the yogin who follows the Yogacara path will never succeed in emptying his mind of the
images of external objects a nd will therefore never attain the true non-dual awareness of reality
as it is.
- 1'Z9 -

You might argue as follows:

N on-dual consciousness [itself) is not abandoned, because it is (the awareness)
of the superiors and because it is (consciousness as) free of dual apprehension.
(40ab)
You may think as follows.

(Only) the dual apprehension of a perceived object and a

perceiving subject, which i s the cause of one's existence in samsara, is abandoned.

But consciousness as free of that dual apprehension is not abandoned.

(On the

contrary) , it truly originates and does not cease to exist because it is (the awareness
of reality) proper to the superiors (arya) and because it is (consciousness as) free of
dual apprehension.
(We reply: ) If so,
As long as (that consciousness) originates, how can there be liberation?
(Liberation will be impossible) because the seeds (of consciousness) are not
subdued. (40cd)
It is agreed that samsara is caused by the activity of the seeds of consciousness, and
that liberation (from samsara) is attained when these seeds are subdued.

If so, how

can there be liberation as long as consciousness, either with or without dual apprehen
sion, originates? l

Therefore, you who assert 'mind-only' cannot account for (the

possibi lity of) liberation either.

You may object as follows: "In our view, the origination of a consciousness
which is accompanied by dual apprehension is bondage (bandha) and the origination of
consciousness as free of dual apprehension is liberation.

Let us explain why that is so.

When the dual apprehension is active, diverse obj ect-appearances originate (in
consciousness) .

This is because these diverse object-appearances and

(consciousness) itself originate from the own seeds (of consciousness) . (41)
When consciousness functions as having both an apprehended aspect and an apprehen
ding aspect (grahyagrahakavijiiana), appearances (abhasa) representi ng the forms
(akara) of various objects, such as colors and shapes (rupa), originate (in conscious
ness) .

Now, what is this appearance of diverse forms in consciousness?

It is an

[internal) causal process (parir;ama) whereby consciousness assumes the form (akara)
of (diverse) objects.
1

This is because both this (appearance of object-images) and

This reasoning is based on the Y ogacara theory that an actual consciousness, upon perishing, leaves
its own impression or trace (viisana) behind in the store-consciousness; these impressions mature
into seeds (bfja) from which new instances of the same kind of consciousness will originate later.

180

consciousness as the appearance of itself (svllbhitsa) originate from (consciousness']

own seeds (which were produced by previous instances of consciousness as] an
appearance of obj ect-images. 1
In fact, when (a consciousness] perishes, it deposits a potency in that (store
consc iousness] . (This happens through the perishing] of (both consciousness]
itself and (consciousness as the appearance ofJ an other (than itself] . (42ab)
When these active consciousnesses (pravrttivijflllna) perish and disappear, they enter
into that root-consciousness which is the place where their potency remains deposited.
The meaning here is that (their potencyJ gets hidden2 in that (store-consciousness]
through the perishing of (consciousness'J own-nature (svlltman) as a perceiver of its
own obj ect3 and also through the perishing of 'an other (than itselfJ ' (anya), that is to
say, also through the perishing of consciousness as an appearance of obj ect-images (vi
aYllbhitsa)."
We reply. That may be true only as a theory which pleases the ears of common
people (loka)4 , but it succumbs to the following error:
What you designate by the name 'consciousness' is really conceived as a 'self'.
(42cd)
Those who say that the 'self' exists also think that the potencies of everything are
accumulated (pracita) in a single self which generates a variety of obj ects.

You also,

under the guise of5 what is merely the name 'consciousness', end up conceiving that
(consciousnessJ as a 'self'.

Thus, you also negate the (BuddhistJ doctrine of no-self.6

1 For the meaning of this paragraph, see the commentary and notes to MHK/TJ V.20 ff.
2 zha ba (Sanskrit : l'i).
3
4

5
6

rang gi cha la dmigs pa (equivalent with consciousness as svabhiisa). See also MHK/TJ V.22cd.
Bhavaviveka insinuates here that the Yogacara is trying to attract common people to Buddhism by
softening the radical 'no self' stance of Buddhism. Commoners wi ll be pleased to hear that the
Buddhists affirm the existence of a 'store-consc iousness' as the enduring basis of a personal
existence both in samsara and in nirvana!
rgyu thabs kyis (Sanskrit : vyajena).
The Yogacara teaches that the store-consciousness contains all the seeds of defilement (sa'f!'lklesa,
siisrava) and of purification (vyavadana, aniisrava). When the seeds of defilement are subdued and
the seeds of purification have fully matured, the store-consciousness is transformed (paravrtti) into
a pure mental substratum fro m which the non-dual awareness of reality uninterruptedly originates.
According to Bhavaviveka, this theory of consciousness is not different from the titmavada of the
non-Buddhists. J ust as the non-Buddhists teach that the eternal, unchangeable self (titman) is the
subj ect of bondage and liberation, j ust so the Y ogacara affirms the existence of the store
consciousness as the selfsame subj ect of defilement and purification. Bhavaviveka explains his
own theory of co nsciousness in MH K/TJ V.45-50.
In fairness to the Yogacara, it should be added that the store-consci ousness differs from the 'self'
of the non- Buddhists because the former is conceived as an uninterrupted but continuously
changing stream of consciousness. The Y ogacarins were in fact aware that, especially because of
- 18 1 -

Moreover, what you conceive as 'liberation' (vimukti) will not be different from
samsara.

Why? Because, when the yogin who follows the 'mind-only' teaching

reflects on what the mind is like in sam sara and on what it is like in the state of
liberation, then:
(That yogin] understands that the duality (of consciousness] is similar to a
deception (maya), perishable, not appeased, and without self-existence.
And he understands that the absence of dua lity is imperishable, true to reality
(bhuta), immortal and the highest abode. (43)
Because the absence (of dual ity] is the same (in both cases] , liberation will not
be different (from bondage in the yogin who] perceives (that absence of
duality] by means of non-dual awareness after (allJ the apprehensions of
duality have been removed. (44)
'Duality' means that (consciousness ] functions as having two forms (akara), that
is to say, the form of an apprehended object and the form of an apprehender (grahyagra
hakakara).

The verse says that this (duality] is understood to be similar to a decep

tion, perishable, not appeased, and without self-existence.

This duality is similar to

a deception bec ause it is produced by a deceptive consciousness (abhutavikalpa). l

perishable because it is subj ect to perishing.

It is

It is not appeased because it involves

birth, death and so forth which are the retribution of ( past] actions.

It lacks self

existence because it does not exist as the 'self' conceived by the non- Buddhists, and
also because it itself has no inherent exi stence (nilJsvabhiiva).2
'Absence of duality' means that, when sense objects such as col ors and shapes
are not perceived anymore as (objects] outside the mind, then the mind stands firm in
its own true nature (svacittadharmata).

Such a mind is ca lled 'non-dual' .

The verse

says that this (absence of duality] is understood to be imperishable, true to reality,

immortal and the highest abode. 'Imperishable' means that it never perishes. 'True to
its characteristic of uninterruptedness, the store-consciousness was likely to be misunderstood as
a kind of permanent self. This concern is for example expressed in the following verse from the
Sa1?1dhinirmocanasiltra: "The consciousness which appropriates all existence (iidiinavijiiiina) is
profound and subtle. Carrying all the seeds Cof existenceJ , it flows like a stream. I have refrained
from teaching it to ignorant people for fear that they misconceive it as a 'self'. " (SNS, T. vol. 16,
692c21 -23 ; Skt. text in Tr Bh 34.3 -4). In addition, the Y ogacara distinguishes a special kind of
consciousness, ca lled the 'defiled thinker' (klitamanas), which has the store-consciousness as its
object and misconceives it as a permanent, unchangeable self.
I On abhiltavikalpa or abhutaparikalpa, see note 3 to my translati on of MHK/TJ V.5.
2 The apprehended object and consciousness as its apprehender are merely imaginary (parikalpita)
things and therefore lack inherent existence with regard to individual characteristics
(laka1JaniJ:tsvabhiiva).
- 182 -

reality' means that it is not deceptive (am!$a). 'Immortal' means that it is free of birth,
death, and so forth. 'Highest abode' means that it is the state of consummation (ni
$thiivasthii).
' (That yoginJ understands' means that duality and absence of duality are
understood that way. 'Because the absence (of duality J is the same On both casesJ '
means that, just as the apprehended and the apprehender do not exist in the state
(avasthii) of samsara, just so they do not exist in the state of liberation. 'After (allJ the
apprehensions of duality have been removed' means that (the yoginJ has removed the
apprehensions of duality by realizing that both (the apprehended and the apprehender J
do equally not exist.

' On the yoginJ who perceives (that absence of dualityJ by

means of non-dual awareness' refers to the yogin who through direct perception
(pratyak$ajiiana) perceives the inexpressible (ayathiiruta) nature (of the objects of
perceptionJ and who also perceives the perfectly established nature (parini$1Jannasva
bhiiva) ( of the mindJ through non-dual awareness.

In that case, the error will be that

'in that (yoginJ liberation wil l not be different (from bondageJ .'

This is because that

non-dual awareness originates and apprehends an obj ect, just like the earlier (forms
of consciousness in samsaraJ . (Consciousness inJ the state of liberation will thus not
be different from the earlier forms of consciousness which were accompanied by the
apprehension of duality.

Hence, there will be no difference between bondage and

liberation. l

A direct sense perception (pratyakajfiiina) is an instance of a samsaric consciousness which is free

of the conceptual apprehension of its object. A direct sense perception does not conceptualize or
identify and differentiate its object by means of names. It perceives the 'inexpressible' nature of
its object as it is; that is to say, it produces an exact mental copy of i ts obj ect. It originates from
conditions (in particular from the presence of a perceivable object in the vicinity of the sense
organs) and it apprehends an object without subsuming it under a concept or name. Hence, it is
still characterized by the apprehender-apprehended duality. It is still vikalpa. If the true nature
of the mind, as the Yogacara conceives it, is an inherent existence (pariniannasvabhiiva) or is the
permanent presence of the absence of duality (see MHK V.2), then the transmundane non-dual
awareness which apprehends that presence, will not be different from a samsaric direct sense
perception. That is to say, the transmundane non-dual awareness will be a consciousness which
originates from the presence of an object and apprehends that object. In short, the transmundane
non-dual awareness of the Yogacara may be non-dual (nirvikalpa) in the sense of 'without
conceptual apprehension and without conceptually apprehended obj ect', but it is still a dual
consciousness (vikalpa) bifurcated into an apprehender and an apprehended object. It is therefore
not truly non-dual in the sense of 'free of any apprehension whatsoever' (sarvopalambhopaama).
See also MHK/T] V.14.
- 1 83

Moreover,
In order to establish 'mind-only', you should admit that mental factors are not
separate from the mind.

Or else, 'mind-only' will not be estab lished. (45)

Since you assert that only the mind exists, in order to establish mind-only, you should
admit that the mental factors, even though their respective objects (dmigs pa) and
cognitive forms (rnam pa, akar a) are different (from those of the mind itself] , do not
exist separately from the mind.

Or else, if you think that the mental factors are

separate from the mind, 'mind -only' will not be established because the mental factors
are many. l
Or, if you assert that 'mind' (cittam) is [only] a name for a collection of [mental
factors] such as feeling and so forth, you will corroborate what others are
saying and you will forsake your own doctrine. (46)
Or else2, you will have to admit that the name 'mind' is used to designate a collection
of [mental factors] such as feeling, volition (cetanti), sensation (spara), mental atten
tion (manaskar a) and so forth, similar to a frame for leaning spears against (mdung
khyim), or similar to an aggregation of [the four elementary particles] earth, water,
fire and wind, or similar to a pot and the like consisting of [the four composite
particles] color/shape, odor, taste and the tangible.

If you admit that, you will

corroborate what others - in casu the Madhyamikas - are saying.

And you will also

forsake your own doctrine, because your doctrine says that the five [sense] con
sciousnesses originate from a single store-consciousness in accordance with the
conditions3, and that the mental factors are also transformations (parit:zama) [of the
store-consciousness] .
You may think as follows: "If 'mind' is [only] a name for a collection of [mental
factors] such as feeling and so forth, the mind will not be a real entity (dravyasat), and
a real basis of defilement (sarrzklesa) and purification (vyavadana) will consequently not
exist anywhere.

But if fee ling and so forth are separate [entities] , each of them will

be a real entity and will consequently be suited as the support of defilement and
purification.

And that [position] agrees with the following words from Scripture:

. "The beginningless element is the support of all the seeds.

Because this [beginning

less element] exists, all the states of samsaric existence exist and there is also
1
2
3

See p. 20, note 1 to verse V.28ab.

That is, if you do not accept the two alternatives mentioned in verse 45.
Reference to TrK 15ab (paiictintiytz miilavijiitine (?) yathtipratyayam udbhava).
- 184 -

attainment of nirvana."l
We reply:
If because of (the need to explain] defilement and purification, you assert that
the mind is a real entity, then (your thesis] does not refute our position.

(Our

position] 2 is in fact established because feeling and so forth originate that way.
(47)
(We] hold that bondage (bandha) is the state where mental activities (manaskara)
(which produceJ
mind.

primary and secondary defilements arise simultaneously with the

And (weJ hold that there is liberation when these defilements are removed and

the associated wisdom (samprayuktaprajfiil) arises simultaneously with the mind.

Thus, different states (avastha) of the same mind are designated as (different] mental
factors.

It is therefore not the case that the mind is a single (substratum] and that

the mind and the mental factors are real entities (dravyasat) which exist separately
from each other.

Because mental factors such as feeling and so forth do themselves

originate that way, as associated with bondage or associated with l iberation, they
originate from the collection (kaya) (of mental and material aggregates] . (Our posi
tion] that the mind and the mental factors exist as aggregates (samaha) is therefore
well-established.

Hence, your theory of the mind as a real entity does not damage us.3

This verse from the Mahiiyiiniibhidharmasatra is quoted in MS (T. vol. 31, 133b15- 16), TrBh 37.12- 13,
and Siddhi T. vol. 31, 8a24-25 and 14a13-14. It is also quoted in PP (see Eckel, p. 55). TJ has

substituted 'all seeds' for the original 'all dharmas'. The Sanskrit version in TrBh reads as follows:
aniidikiiliko dhiitu sarvadharmasamiiSraya1 tasmin sati gati sarvii nirvii1'}iidhigamo 'pi viii I.
2 I follow the commentary in T J where "tat" is explained a s referring t o Bhavaviveka 's position o n
the nominal ex istence o f the mind and the mental factors. Alternatively, " tat " may also refer to
'defilement and purification'.
3 According to Bhavaviveka, only the individual, momentary instances of consciousness in the life
stream (samtiina) of what we call 'a person' or 'a self' are, conventionally speak ing, real entities
. (dravyasat). 'Mind' is only a nominal existence (prajfiaptisat), a name used to designate a
homogeneous series or aggregate (samaha) of instances of consciousness. Depending on the object
and the sense organ from which it originates, a particular instance of consciousness is designated
as 'visual consciousness', 'aural consciousness' and so forth. Mental factors such as 'feeling',
'volition' and so forth are also mere names referring to particular mental functions that are
abstracted from the individual instances of consciousness. 'Mind', 'sense consciousness', 'mental
consciousness', 'mental factors', etc. are thus nominal existences, conceived in mutual dependence
and in dependence on the real, inconceivable and inexpressible instances of consci ousness.
Similarly, 'defiled' is merely a name for an instance of consciousness occurring in a stream of
consci ousness which is accompanied by defilements, and 'pure' designates an i nstance of
consciousness in a stream of consciousness which is free of defilements. Defil ement and
purification can thus be explained without postulating a real, individual mental substratum
( = store-consciousness) and mental factors as real entities proceeding from that substratum.
- 185 -

You may ask: "If the mind is thus an aggregate and not a real entity, how can
the stream of samsaric existence (bhava) and the attainment of liberation come forth
from such a mind?" We answer:
Just as the series of leaves and other series arise (from a lotus-rootJ because
many potencies are present in a lotus-root, just so a variety of series come forth
from the mind wich is not a real entity. (48)
'saluka' is the root of the lotus.

Although the connection with the root is not different

(for all the effects that proceed from itJ , the entire surface of the lake gets covered
with series of lotus-leaves, lotus-flowers and so forth, because that root has many
potencies.

In the same way, the diverse streams of samsaric existence of living

beings, which are of different kinds in accordance with the different realms (dhatu) and
states of migration (gati), arise from a mind which is not a real entity.
And these different kinds of life-streams
Do not originate when their counter agent is present, and do originate when their
producing cause is present. (49ab)
'Counteragent' refers to the eight-membered Holy Path.
samsaric life-streams do not originate anymore.

When that is born, the

But they do originate as long as

defilements (tis rava), which are their producing causes, exist.

Or, regarding your theory that "the five (consciousnessesJ originate from the root
consciousness in accordance with (the presence or absence of their J conditions" l, (we
say thatJ even if the root-consciousness does not exist, (the five consc iousnessesJ do
not originate when their counteragent, which conflicts with the conditions for the
arisal of the mind as an aggregate, exists.

And (the five consciousnessesJ do origi

nate when perceptible form (rupa), which is their producing cause, and conditions such
as light, space, mental attenti on and so forth are present.
The idea that a variety (of consciousnessesJ originates from that (store-con
sciousnessJ is not acceptable, because (the mindJ is not a real entity. (49cd)
We do not accept your theory that three different types (of consciousnessJ , which you
call 'the (consciousness which is the result 00 maturation', 'the 'ego' thinking (con
sciousnessJ ' and 'the (sixJ object-manifesting (consciousnessesJ '2, originate from the

1 Quotation of TrK 15ab (see the commentary to MHK V.46).

2 See the commentary to MHK V.4.

- 186 -

transformation of (the store- J consciousness.

entity.

Why?

Because the mind is not a real

And (the existence of] these (threeJ cannot be ascertained on the basis of the

different states of the mind (citttivasthii). l

Further,
(For us, unlike for you,J there is no non-liberation by perceiving that, and there
is also no non-cessation of consciousness.

(Our doctrine isJ therefore not

similar, both conventionally and ultimately, to (the non-Buddhist doctrinesJ

which teach the existence of the self. (50)
'By perceiving that' means 'by understanding (that everythingJ is only an appearance
in one's own m ind'. 'Non-liberation' means 'non-liberation from the stream of samsa
ric existence'.2

'There is also no non-cessation of consciousness'3 means that con

sciousness really ceases to exist (for one who follows our systemJ because one
understands

that the

inherent

existence

of

things

is

not

truly

established

(aparinianna) and because one does not affirm (the real existence ofJ a store
consciousness.

Therefore, our doctrine which says that the mind is an aggregate and

not a real entity, is both conventionally (sa'?'lvrfya) and ultimately (param[jrthata) not
similar to the doctrine of those who affirm the existence of the self.4

But because you,

advocates of 'mind-only', assert the contrary, these faults really occur in your doctrine.
Next, regarding your statement "The non-apprehending (of external objectsJ
arises as a result of apprehending (everything as mind-onlyJ .

And the non-apprehen

ding (of the mind as an apprehended arises as a result of the non- apprehending (of

1 As Yamaguchi (p. 383 ff.) observes, Bhavaviveka follows the Sautrantika view of consciousness.
On this view, consciousness is a homogeneous series of causally connected instances or states of
mind (cittilvasthii ), in which each instance is different from the previous instance. A a result of this
continuous transformation (pari:l}ilma), the causal potencies (sakti) of the instances of consciousness
within a particular mental series keep on changing. The residues of defilements and actions are
also accumulated as potencies until the last instant of a particul ar mental series acquires the special
capacity (visa) to produce the first instant of a new mental series in another samsari c existence.

2
3
4

Bhavaviveka does therefore not accept the Yogacara view that the liberati on from samsara
consists in a fundamental transformation (parilvr!ti) of the selfsame store-consciousness into a pure
mental substratum. For Bhavaviveka, liberation means that the transformation (pari1}ilma) of the
stream of consciousness has come to an end, because the instances of consci ousness have gradually
lost their capacity to produce a new existence due to the presence of counteracting forces (pratipa
ka, ilryamilrga).
Reference to MHK/TJ V.39.
Reference to MHK/TJ V.40cd.
Reference to MHK/TJ V.42cd.
- 187 -

external objects) " \ we also do not assert anything else but the necessity to cultivate
non-apprehending (anupalambha).

How (do we understand this cultivation) ?

One becomes free of attachment (to external obj ects) by the repeated practice
of this (type of reasoning) : " (External obj ects) such as colors and shapes and
so forth are empty (of inherent existence) , because they do not originate as
inherent existences, and because they are not real entities, and because they
perish, j ust like a magical apparition." (51)
External obj ects such as colors and shapes and so forth, which do exist as things that
originate when their causes and conditions are present, are empty (of inherent exis
tence) because they do not originate by their own nature since they do not exist apart
from the collection of their causes and conditions (hetupratyayasamagrl), and because
they are aggregates and not real entities, and because they do not continue to exist for
a long time but perish ( immediately) , just like a magical apparition.
learning not to apprehend them, one becomes non-attached.

By repeatedly

But it is not the case that

external objects do not exist in every respect!

Furthermore,
Although colors and shapes and so forth do exist, they do not exist (ultimately)
for someone who has come to understand things as they really are.

Why would

the mistaken apprehension (of these things) at that time not be removed? (52)
When someone, upon seeing a magical apparition (of a man) , at first thinks that it is
a real man, but later realizes that this is (only) an illusory appearanc e (mayak1J;a)
without any reality to it, then it stands to reason that the perception of a man will
disappear (from that person's mind) .

But such is impossible with respect to (the

perception of) the horns of a rabbit which do not exist at all, both at first and later.
The same is the case (with the perception of external objects) .

Although colors and

shapes and so forth exist (as dependently originated things) , conventional knowledge
(sarrzv1J;ijflana) conceives them as inherently existing things.

Later, when one comes

to understand correctly that there are no inherent existences, one knows that (external
objects) are not inherent existences.

Why would the mistaken apprehension (of

external objects) at that time not cease to exist?

exist.

The truth is that it really ceases to

In contrast, what use is there in proclaiming from the very beginning, to

ordinary people (p1J;hagjana) in whom the knowledge of reality (tattvajflana) is not yet

1 See MHK V.4

- 188 -

born, that external obj ects such as colors and shapes and so forth do not exist?l
Similarly,
If the consciousness which functions as an (apprehended-apprehendingJ duality
is (entirelyJ confined to the range of the mind and the mental factors, then it is
impossible that that consciousness will cease to function even after one has
negated (the existence ofJ external objects. (53)
You argue that the consciousness which functions as an apprehended-apprehending
(grahyagrahaka) duality is (entirelyJ confined to the range (gocara) of the mind and the
mental factors and is not conditioned2 by external objects such as colors and shapes.
In that case, there is no reason why that dual consciousness will not continue to
function even after you have entirely negated (the existence ofJ external objects such
as colors and shapes.

On the contrary, that dual consciousness will certainly continue

to function because there is no difference as to (how consciousness functionsJ indepen

dently of external objects such as colors and shapes both before and after (one has
negated the existence of external objectsJ .3
You might obj ect as follows.

It is precisely in order to get rid of the dual

consciousness, which is not conditioned by external obj ects such as colors and shapes,
that we (firstJ proceed in another way (antarer;a paryayer;a) by teaching that the (so
calledJ external objects are a part of consciousness itself.

And later, when the non

dual awareness (nirvikalpajfiana) originates, the (twoJ parts of consciousness as a self

appearance (svabhiisa) and as an obj ect-appearance (anyabhiisa) are removed so that
both that object4 and the apprehending of that object cease to exist.
1 For the Yogacara, external objects are similar to the horns of a rabbit in that they do not exist at
all. Bhavaviveka questions here that position as follows. If external objects do not exist at all,
it cannot be explained how the perception of external objects originates in the first place. And if
external objects are not perceived, the issue of how their perception can be removed becomes
irrelevant. Alternatively, if a non- entity can produce a perception, it will continue to produce that
perception irrespective of whether the perceiver does or does not realize its non-exi stence. In
other words, if one perceives non-existent external objects at first, one will never be able to get rid
of that perception later. See also p. 31, notes 1 and 2 to MHK/T] V .39.
For Bhavaviveka, external obj ects are not similar to the horns of a rabbit. They are similar to
a magical apparition. Like a magical apparition, they exist as the products of causes and
conditions. Hence, they can act as the object-condition of a perception and can deceive a
'conventional' mind, wich does not inquire into the ultimate-reality status of things, into perceiving
them as inherent existences. But when one follows the Madhyamaka path of reasoning ( vicara)
and examines whether the perceived external objects exist ultimately (tattvatal}, paramarthatal}) or
as inherent exi stences (svabhii vatah), one understa nds such not to be the case. As a result, one
gradually eliminates not only the a ttachment to such objects but also the perception of such objects.
2 Literally : "is not connected with" (sambandh).
3 Bhavaviveka repeats here the same point as in MHK/TJ V.39.
4 'That object' refers to 'the object as a part of consciousness itself' (viayabhiisa, anyabhiisa).
- 1 89 -

We reply:
If you think you should take a different course in order to negate that (later] ,
(we say that] you would be much cleaner by staying far away from the mud
than by washing it off (later] . (54)
If you really want to argue that external objects do not exist, then what's the use of
(first] arguing that (external objects] are a part of consciousness itself?

If you think

you should take this different course of (first arguing that external obj ects] are a part
of consciousness in order to negate (that lat er] , then the following comparison applies
here: "One is much cleaner by staying far away from the mud than by washing it off
(later] !" Imagine an insane and stupid man who walks off the clean road and enters
a dirty, muddy swamp. Somebody else asks him: "Why did you get off the clean road
to enter into the mud?"

He answers: "I 'll wash it off later."

To which the other

replies: "You fool! If you really need to be clean, you'll be much cleaner if you don't
touch the mud and stay far away from it from the very beginning. "l

1 Parallel passage i n P P (see Eckel, p. 70) . The point o f Bhavaviveka's criticism here i s that the
Yogacara path is a 'detour' from the straight and clean Madhyamaka path. The Yogacara path
starts with the negation of external objects and the affirmation of 'mind-only'. The 'mind-only'
tenet locates the object of the sense consci ousnesses in the mind itself (viayiibhasa) and thus claims
to explain how the sense consciousnesses function as an apprehended-apprehending dua lity even in
the absence of real external objects. This, according to Bhavavive ka, is the 'muddy swamp' to
which the Yogacara path leads people, under the pretext that the mud can be washed off at a later
stage of the path (the time when the apprehended-apprehending duality disappears and the non
dual awareness of reality originates). The Yogacara path misleads people because the negation
of external objects conflicts with the conventi onal truth, while the 'mind-only' dogma violates the
ultimate truth by attributing ultimate-reality status to the mind as a single privil eged entity. The
Madhyama ka path, in contrast, is straight and clean. It starts out by affirming the conventional
truth: both external objects and consciousness exist as dependently originated things. The
Madhyamaka follower then engages in a sustained reflection (viciira) in pursuit of ultimate
existences (svabhtiva). Not finding any ultimate existences, the Madhyamaka follower negates
both all the apprehending consciousnesses and all the apprehended objects as not ultimately real
and consequently abandons all attachment to and all apprehending of these 'empty' thi ngs.
- 190 -

*$$$. W$$=
22i} 2002$ 113 - 137

An Annotated Translation of

MadhyamakahrdayakiirikaITarkajviilii V.69-84
Paul HOORNAERT
1. Edited Tibetan text of MHKITJ V.69-84

[Editions used: Cone (C.), Dbu-rna Dsa 2 1 8a4-22 1 b7 ; Derge (D .), Dbu-rna Dsa 2 1 8a4-22 1 b7 ;
Peking (P.), Dbu-rna Dsa 242b4-247a6]

'dir srnras pal kho bo cag gi tshul ni rni rigs pa rna yin tel rigs pa dang rni ' gal ba'i phyir roll ji
Ita zhe nal kho bo cag ni dngos po marns ngo bo nyid rned del rning du rnngon par brjod pa'i
bdag nyid kyis stong pa' i phyir ro zhes bya bar 'dod del rnngon par brj od pa' i bdag nyid de nyid
rna skyes pa yin lal skye ba rned pa del kho na' i phyir rna ' gags pa yang yin noll rnngon par
brj od pa dang ldan pa'i dngos po gang yin pa de yang marn pa gang gis rnngon par brjod pa' i
marn pa de Itar yod pa rna yin tel brda tsarn du zad pa'i phyir roll 'di ltar gal te dngos po de
rnngon par brjod pa' i spyod yul du ' gyur du zin na rne2 zhes brjod pa kha tshig pa' i skyon du
'gyur roll de bzhin dul kun brtags dngos po yod rna yinll gzhan gyi dbang ni yod pa yinll zhes
bya bas gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du khas blangs pa'i phyir ro3 II 'dir bshad pal

dngos marns ngo bo nyid rned dell

rnngon brjod bdag nyid stong phyir roll
de nyid kyis de skye rned phyirll
rna skyes pa dang rna ' gags nyidll (69)
gang phyir rnngon brjod ldan dngos nill
j i Itar brjod pa de ltar medii
de phyir chos marns dngos rned nyidll
ces bya la sogs rnang srnras dangll (70)
gzhan dbang yod pa nyid srnras pall
kun rdzob tu ni grub pa sgrubll
gal te don dam dpe rned cingll
gtan tshigs4 ' gal ba nyid du ' gyurll (7 1 )

[abhiHipiHrnasunyatvad bhavanarp nil).svabhavata!

I

2
1

'de' omitted In P.
P : mes
C, D : ... phYlf ro zhe naJ
p. tshlg

113

tena lva capy anutpadad anutpannamruddhataJl (69)

yato 'bhI lapavadvatu na tatha kathyate yathaJ
avatukatvarp dharmal,lam lty adi bahu coditamll (70)
paratantrastitokta u ca arpvrtya slddhasadhanaml
tattvatas cen na dr!anto hetos capi vl ruddhatrt!1 (7 1 )J

[ c. 2 1 8b2, D. 2 1 8b2, P. 243a2 J ces bya ba m de dag thams cad kun rdzob tu sgrub na ni grub pa
la sgrub pa ym tel kho bo cag kyang de dag thams cad kun rdzob kyi bden pa 'i tshul du 'dod
pa ' i phyir roll gal te de don dam par sgrub na ni don dam par gzhan gyl dbang yod pa nyld du
grub pa la dpe med del de yang ngo bo nyid kyisl stong pa ' l phylr roll de bzhin nyid2 du
mngon par brj od pa ' i bdag nYld kyis stong pa ' i phYlr zhes bya ba ' i gta n tshigs ' gal ba nyid du
yang ' gyur tel mngon par bqod pa ' l bdag nyid kYIS' stong pa nyld du rj es

I.,U

dpog pas bljod du

med pa ' i dngos po yod pa nYld kYlS dngos po mam s ngo bo nyid med pa nyld bsal ba ' i phyi r
chos can g y i rang gi ngo b o log par bsgrubs pa ' i p h y l r roll
ci ste yang 'di nyam du kho bo cag gi gzhan gyl dbang g l ngo bo nyid ni skye ba ngo bo nyld
med pa ym tel yod par gyur pa las ma skyes pa 'i phyir "gy u ma bzhin tel de yang ngo bo nyid
kyis4 stong pa' i phYlr gtan tshigs kYI don ' gal ba nyid du mi ' gy u r bar sems nal 'di r bshad pal

gal te gzhan dbang ngo bo nyidll

skye ba ngo bo nyld med dell
yod par gyur las ma -;kyes mill
skye ' gag la sogs 'gal sgrub yi nll (72)
[ utpattiniQ vabhavatvarp sadbhutajatlto yadll
nan utpadam rodhadl pratIedha samarthanamlI (72)]

rc. 2 1 8bS , D. 2 I 8bS , P. 243a7] zhes bya ba m de I ta na kho bo cag gi 'dod pa nyld bsgrubs pa
y i n tel kho bo cag kyang rgyu dang rkyen ngs' mthun pa ' i bdag nyid las skyes pa ma ms ni rang
gi bdag nyid las ma kyes pas ngo bo nyld kYll., stong pa dangl skye ba dang 'gag pa la sogs pa
med par 'dod pa'l phyir roll tshul 'dl ni l u ng dang yang mi ' gal tel j l I ta zhe nal

rkyen ma ms las ni gang skyes pall

de skye med par thub pas gsungsll (73ab)
I

'kYl' Ol1llttcd In P
' nYld ' omitted In P
P kYI
P kYI
C, D ng

- 1 14 -

[pratyayair j ayate yo hi tam ajatarp jagau munil).1 (73ab)]

zhes bya ba' i phyir roll rigs pa gang gis zhe nal
don dam du na dngos nyid laslI
de yi skye ba dgag phyir roll (73cd)
[svabhavatas tadutpadaniedhat paramarthatal).11 (73cd)]

zhes bya ba stel gang rkyen mams las skyes pa de ni don dam par na skye ba med pa nyid yin
par thub pas gsungs tel rgyu dang rkyen gyi l tshogs tha dad pa' i dngos po dag la de' i ngo bo
nyid dmigs su med pa'i phyir roll de Itar yang 'di skad dul gang zhig rkyen las skyes pa de rna
skyesll de la skye ba'i ngo bo nyid med dell gang zhig rkyen la Itos2 pa des stong gsungsll gang
gis stong nyid shes de bag yod yinll zhes gsungs pa Ita bu' oll gzhan yangl

chos mams yang dag nyid min phyirll

de dag kun rdzob blo dang sgra311
sna tshogs rang spyi' i spyod yul dull
' gyur ba la ni ' gal ba medii (74)
[abhiltatvac ca dharma1)-arp te svasamanyagocaral).!
sarpvrtya na virudhyante citradhisabdavrttayal).!I (74)]

[C. 2 1 9a2, D. 2 1 9a2, P. 243b5] ces bya ba ni gang kho na' i phyir chos mams yang dag pa nyid
rna yin pa de kho na' i phyirl de dag kun rdzob tu blo dang sgra sna tshogs kyi rang gi mtshan
nyid kyi spyod yul dangl spyi' i mtshan nyid kyi spyod yul sngon po la sogs pa dangl gzugs la
sogs pa dangl bum pa dangl snam bu zhes bya ba la sogs pa dag tu ' gyur ba la ' gal ba med doll
gal te dngos po mams yang dag pa nyid yin par gyur na ni des na nam mkha' la sogs pa bzhin
du ngo bo nyid gcig pa kho nar4 gyur pas blo sna tshogs dangl sgra sna tshogs kyi yul du mi
' gyur ba zhig na de Ita rna yin noll
de la gzhung lugs gnyi ga la grags pa' i lung yang yod del gang zhe nal

ming ni gang dang gang dag gisll

chos mams gang dang gang brj od pall
de la de ni yod min pall
t

"

P . gyis
P : las bltos
C, D . p. 'dra. The Tibetan version of the verses-only text has 'sgra' In accordance wIth the Sansknt.
C, D : bar
- 1 15 -

de ni eho mams eho nyid doll (75)

[ yena yena hi namna vai yo yo dharmo 'bhdapyatel
na a sal11Vi dyate tatra dharmaljarp sa ca dharm ataJl (75)1

[ C. 2 1 9 a5, D. 2 1 9a5, P. 244a I ] zhes bya ba yin tel mmg

gang dang gang dag glsll zhes bya

ba ni ran g dang spyi ' i brjod pa'i mmg dangl yi ge sna tshogs kyi ngo bo nyid dag gi s <;011 ehos
mams gang dang gang brJod pajl zhes bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa mngon par brjod par bya ba
dag gi th lgl gi brjod pa'oll de la de ni yod min pajl zhes bya ba

chos de la m m g du mngon

par brjod pa de yod pa rna ym pa stel c hos mams m y l ge med pa'i ngo bo nyid ym pa'i phyir
roll 'di Itar y u l gyi kad dangl nges pa'i tshlg sna tshogs dag gis dngos po gcig kho na la mam
pa du mar m ngon par brjod pa dper na chu la paniya dangl apa dangl sanil a dangl m ra zhes bya
ba la sogs pa dag tu brjod pa de la gal te de sgra gCIg glS mngon par brjod pa'i ngo bo nyld yin
par gyur na ni de la gra gzhan dag 'jug par ml ' gyur zhingl sgra de dag gis mngon par bljod
par yang ml nus pa zhlg na de Ita rna ym noll de ni ehos mams chos nyid doll zhes bya ba nJ
mngon par brjod du med pa de ni ehos mam kYl don dam pa nyid yin pa'oil kun rdzob tu ni
ngo shes par bya ba'i phyir mmg du 'dog pa dangl brda dag byed del de dag gis kyang dngos
po de'i khyad par l as 'di ni ba lang yin gyl2 Irta dang mi rna yin no zhes bya ba l a ogs par
yongs su shes par byed doll ngo bo nyid de

blo'i y u l yin tel gang g l phyir zhe nal Ikugs1 pa

dangl 'on pa la sogs pa yi ge dang brda mi shes pa de dag glS kyang bum pa la sogs pa'i dngos
po ngo she pa dang ba l ang l a sogs pas kyang dri dang mig gis rang dang gzhan gyi be' u la
sogs pa ngo shes pa'i phylr roll de I ta bas na don ni mam pa thams cad du mmg gis stong pa
nyid ym pas des dngos pO ' 1 ngo bo nyid mngon par rjod.J par mi byed pa ni yu bu cag gnyi ga l a
yang 'dra' oll

CI ste rkyen byung ngo bo yis'll

gzhan gyl dbang l as skye 'dod nail
sgyu bzhm yang dag nYld min pasll
'dod pa sgrub par byed pa yinll (76)
[atha pratyayasambhutasvabhavene!asadhanaml
utpattl paratantryae cen maya yadvad abhutata/I (76)1

[ C. 2 1 9b4, D. 2 1 9b4, P. 244b2] zhe bya ba ni ci ste gzhan gyl dbang gi rkyen 'du pa l as byung
I

P
P

I
,

P
P
P

tS,hlg
gyl
I kog
brJod
yl

- 1 16 -

ba' i ngo bos ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin tel de ni gzhan gyi dbang las skye ba yin pas don
dam pa ni rna yin par 'dod nal ' dir bshad pal '0 na de ltar de gzhan gyi dbang las skye bar 'dod
na sgyu rna bzhin yang dag pa nyid rna yin pas de la ngo bo nyid ga la yod del de ltar na khyed
kho bo cag gi 'dod pa sgrub par byed pa yin noll de ltar sgrub pa ji skad bstan pa des nal

gzhan gyi dbang yang gzung rned pall

ngo bo nyid kyis rna skyes 'dodlI (77 ab )
[paratantragrahas capi svabhavajatito rnata!)1 (77ab)]

ji Ita zhe nal 'di ltarl

don dam du ni skyes pa lalI

log par snang ba rni rigs phyirll (77cd)
Uatasya paramarthena rnithyakhyanaIp na yujyatell (77cd)]

zhes bya ba ni khyed kyis gzhan gyi dbang ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa' i ngo bo nyid dang bral
ba nyid kyi phyirl gzung du rned par srnras pa de yang gal te ngo bo nyid kyis skyes par gyur na
ni log par snang bar ' gyur ba rni rigs pa' i phyir tel gang gi phyir de' i ngo bo nyid kyisl rna
skyes pa de kho na' i phyir tel de log par snang bar ' gyur roll gzhang yangl

gal te ji Itar snang ba ltarll

der snang bdag nyid yod gyur nail
ji ltar snang ba de yod phyir211
chos marns j i ltar sgyu rna bzhinll (78)
[yatha khyanti tatha santi tadabhasatrnana yata!)1
yatha khyanti tatha sattvad dharma rnayoparna!) katham/I (78)]

[C. 220a l , D. 220a l , P. 244b8] zhes bya ba ni gal te dngos po 'di dag rgyu dang rkyen gzhan
gyi dbang gi bdag nyid las ji ltar dbang po' i yul nyid du snang ba ltar der snang ba'i bdag nyid
yod par gyur na ji Itar snang ba der yod pa'i phyir chos marns ji Itar sgyu rna Ita bu nyid yin par
' gyur tel 'di ltar sgyu rna ni skyes bu la sogs pa' i bdag nyid du snang yang de' i ngo bo nyid
drnigs su rned del sgyu rna ni skyes bu la sogs pa' i ngo bo nyid kyis' stong pa' i phyir roll de ltar
gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yod par rtogs4 pa yang rigs pa dang Idan pa rna yin noll
1

2
1

' kYlS' omItted In P.

P . spyod
P : kYI
P : rtog

- 117 -

de nYld kYl de skye med phYlr// rna skyes pa dang rna 'gags nyid// ces gang smras pa de yang
'di Itar ches rigs par snang ste/

rna skyes pa dang rna 'gags dang//

dngos med ngo bo nyid med1 pa 'ang//
yod pa nyid l as rna skyes dang//
rdzas su yod pa rna y i n phyir// (79)
[sadbhutenatmana-ajater anu tpannaniruddhata!
avastutvasvabhavatve drgasyadravyasattvatal)// (79)J

[ C. 220a4, D. 220a4 , P. 245 a4] zhes bya ba n i dngos po 'di dag n i rgyu dang rkyen ngs rnthun
pa'i bdag nyid las s kye ba y i n gil yod pa nyid las2 skye ba n i rna y i n tel rgyu dang rkyen gyl
tshogs tha dad pa'i dngos po gna pa'i dus na' ngo bo nyid dU'1 rdu l phran tsam yang dmigs su
rned pa'l phyir roll de'i phyir rna skyes pa dang rna 'gags pa ny id dang/ dngos po rned pa nyld
dang/ ngo bo nyid rned pa nyid kyang yod pa nyld l as rna skyes pa'i phylr ro// dngos po 'di dag
gl ngo bo nyid dang rgyu dang rkyen rigs mthun pa'i bdag nYld l as snang bar drnigs par snang
ba gang yin pa de yang sa dang/ chu dang/ me dang/ rlung dang/ gzugs dang/ dri dang/ ro dang/
reg pa zhe-; bya ba'i rdzas brgyad 'du s pa yin tel de yang dmag dang/ n ags tshal la sogs pa bzhin
du rdzas su yod pa rna yin pa'i phyir rna skyes pa dang rna 'gags pa nYld dang/ dngos po rned
pa nyid dang/ ngo bo nyid rned pa nyld kyang yin par khong du chud par bya' 0 zhes bya ba'i
tshig gi don toll
'dir gal te 'di s nyam du khyed la dngos po rned pa'i phYlr cho gdags pa dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro
zhes bya bar serns n a 'dir bshad pal

gdags la skyon chag nyid rned dell

marn rig tsam du rntshungs phyir ro// (80ab)
[vljfiaptirnatrat u lyatvat prajfiapter nasti du!ata! (80ab) 1

[C. 220bL D. 220bl, P. 245b21 zhes bya ba ni bdag dang bdag gi rtog pa dang bral ba'l marn
par rig pa tsam du y ang kho bo cag dang khyed du rntshu ngs pa nYld" y i n la/ phyi rol gyi don
mam par shes pas bskyed pa'i la kYlS" mngon par 'du s byas pa rdzas su med pa la yan g phYI
nang gl chos 'dogs pa'l phyir kho bo cag gl phyogs la nyes pa rned doll khyod ky i phyogs l a ni
j

"

'med ' omitted In C. D

C, D la
C . 0 na
'du' omItted In P
'nYld' omitted In P
p. kYI

lIS

spang ba dang spong byed yod pa'i phyirll

yongs shes sogs yod gang gir 'dodll (80cd)
[heyaprahatrsadbhavat kasyetaf!1 nirvidadi s at/I (80cd)]

ces bya ba ni gal te sdug bsngal l a sogs pa spang ba dangl spong bar byed pa lam skyes p a
bsgom p a goms par byed pa'i 'du byed kyi tshogs dag m a m par shes p a'i c h a nyid gzh an gyi
dbang g i cha nyid du yod pa nyid yin nal ngo bo nyid l a ni gzhan du 'gyur b a med pa'i phyir
dangl gnas ' gyur ba med pa'i phyir sdug bsngal yongs s u shes p a l a sogs p a 'ji g rten las 'das
pa'i rkyen gzh an gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yod par 'dod pa de gang gi y in p ar 'dod del 'ji g rten
pa dang 'Ji g rten l as 'das pa'i gnas skabs la 'gyur ba med pa'i phyir gang l a ji l tar 'byung bar
'gyur zhes bya bar tshig khong nas drang ngoll
gal te 'di skad ces ' 0 na khyed l a yang rdzas su med pa'i phYlr thar pa med par mi ' gyur ram
zhe nal de'i phyir bshad pal

de ni gang phyir rdzas med kyangll

mam rtog bral bas thar par ' gyurlI
rdzas yod nyid na 'ang skye med p hyirll
'di l as gzhan du brtagl mi 'dodll (81)
[vikalpoparaman m uktir adravyatve 'pi sa yatal)1
dravy asattve ' py ajatatvan nato ' nya kalpaneyatelI (81)]

[C. 220b6, D. 220b6 , P. 245b8] ces bya ba ni dngos po mams rdzas s u yod pa rna y in pa kho na
yin pas 'jig rten pa'i shes pa mam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i mju g thogs su 'ji g r ten l as 'das
pa'i ye shes mam par m i rtog pa 'phags pa skye bas thar p ar rigs kyil rdzas su yod pa ngo bo
nyid mi ' gyur ba mams la mi rigs p as thar pa de ni gang gi phyir dngos po mams rdzas su med
kyangl mam p ar rtog pa dang bral bas thar par ' gyur ba nyid doll
gal te mam pa 'ga' zhig gis de dag rdzas su yod pa nyid du2 'gyur yangl de Ita na 'ang ngo bo
nyid kyis' skye ba med pa'i phyir mam par rtog pa dang bral ba kho nas thar par rigs s oil de'i
phyir tshul 'di las gzhan du yongs su gru b pa'i ngo bo nyid la dmigs pa'i ye shes yod p ar brtags
pas ci bya stel sngar y angl ngo bo nyid la dmigs y in nail ston pa'i byang chub rtog can dangll
dmigs pa can du ' gyur ba dangll mam par mi rtog b lor mi ' gyurll zhes bstan zin pas de ni mi
'dod doll
I

C, D, P rtag CorrectIOn based on TIbetan versIOn of the verses-only text.

P ' du yang
P : kYI
- 119 -

'dir pha rol pos rang gi tshul nyes par smras pa'l gnad du bsnun pa shIn tu 'khams1 nas gtum"
tshlg rtsub mo smras pal

dngos mam ngo bo nyid med nal/

gdags pa 'ang yod par ml 'gyur basil
de nI med par Ita ba dag//
mi gleng bsten' par bya min dang// (82)
rang yang ngan song gzhol b a dang//
gzhan yang phung bar byed pa y in// ( 83ab)
[prajfiapter apy asadbhavo svabhave vastuno 'satJ/
taddr!irnastiko 'kathyal) sa hy asarpvasya eva cal/ (82)
svay amapaYlkatve 'sau parqarpsca vipadakal)/ (83ab)]

rc. 22 1 a3, D. 22 1 a3, P. 246a7] zhes bya ba nil de dag na ref kho bo cag rnal 'byor pyod pa pa
la ni phyi rol gyi y u l med du ZI n kyang rnam par shes pa tam nyid't re zhig yod pas mam par
shes pa yong'" su gyur pa'i rnam par phyi rol gyi yu1 yang dmigs su yod lal yongs su grub pa'i
ngo bo nyid de de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rig par bya ba yang yod kyi/ dbu rna smra ba la
ni re zhig kun rdzob tu yang sgyu ma I ta bu nyid du 'dogs pas 'jig rten pa'i chos rnams la skur
pa 'debs pa dang/ don dam par yan g rnam par ",hes pa yang med la1 mam par shes par' bya ba
yang med pas ci yang med del dngos po rnams n go bo nyid med par skur pa 'debs pa'i phylf
chos gdags pa yang yod par mi 'gyur bas de med pa'i phyir de med par I ta ba nyid dang mthun
pa dang/ sus kyang mi gleng mi brJod pa dang/ l han cig 'grogs pa' i dngos pos brten par mi bya
ba yIn tel de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis kyang dge s long dag khyed kyis deng phyin chad 'jig
rten rgyang pan pa gsang tshig sna tshogs kyi spobs pa can dang bsten par mi bya bnyen par mi
byal bsnyen bkur mi bya' 0 zhes gsungs pas khyed n i dam pa rna yin pash yongs su spang bar
bya ba' de'i gnas su shIn tu gyur pa dang/ dam pa'i cho spong" ba'i p hyir rang yang ngan song
la gzhol ba dang/ I ta ba 'dZIn pa'i chu sri n 'dzIn khn la mngon par zhen pa la mos par byed pa'l
phyir gzhan yan g phung bar byed pa y i n no zhes zer ro// de la slob dpon gyis bshad pal

,
l

,
-,
"

P kham
C, D ' gtun
C, D
bqan, P brtan Correction baed on the occurrence of "b5ten" In the TJ-commentary to thl<' verc
The clme<,t equIvalent of the Sansknt '\ar)lva<," <,eem to be "b<,nyen pa" (approach, a<,oclate w Ith) whIch alo
occur In the TJ-commentary
P
nJ
P : pa
P
pa
' ba' om Itted In P
C, D l()ng
1 20
-

zhe sdang sha rul sgregs pa dell

nga rgyal rna zhu ston pa yinll (83cd)
[iti dvearniodgaro ' bhirnanajlfl:tasucakal).11 (83cd)]

[C. 22 1 b2, D . 22 1 b2, P. 246b6] zhes bya ba ni khyod kyi khro tshig de ni dper na sha rul gyi
sgregs pas rna zhu ba nyid ston par byed pa de bzhin du zhe sdang gi tshig gis rnngon pa'i nga
rgyal can nyid du ston par byed pa yin no zhes bya ba' i tha tshig goll de la zhe sdang nyid sha
rul yin tel de' i sgregs pa Ita bu ni khyod kyi tshig de yin noll rnngon pa' i nga rgyal can nyid rna
zhu ba Ita bu yin tel sha rul gyi1 sgregs pas rna zhu ba nyid ston par byed pa2 de bzhin dul zhe
sdang gi tshig kyang khyod nyid rnngon pa' i nga rgyal can nyid du ston pa yin gyi kho bo ' i Ita
ba ni skyon ci yang rned pa kho na yin noll zhe sdang gi sha rul gyi sgregs pa des bdag nyid
rnngon pa' i nga rgyal rna zhu ba nyid du ston par zad kyil dbu rna pa la de Ita bu' i skyon yang
dag pa rned par') ji Itar nges par bya zhe naf de' i phyirl

chos marns sgyu rna bzhin 'dod dell

ngo bo nyid ni rned phyir danglI
byis pa rrnongs pa' i rgyu phyir dangll
rna byung ba las 'byung phyir roll (84)
[asadbhutasvabhavatvad balasarprnohahetutal).1
abhutva bhavatvad vapi dharma rnayoparna rnatal).11 (84)]

[c. 2 2 1 b5, D. 221b5, P. 247a2] zhes bya ba ni kho bos dngos po marns marn pa tharns cad du
rned pa nyid yin no zhes rna srnras tel 'di Itar kho bo cag ni kun rdzob tu chos marns rgyu dang
rkyen rigs rnthun pa las ' byung ba sgyu rna bzhin du yod pa nyid du 'dod de ngo bo nyid rned
pa'i phyir dangl skye bo byis pa Ita bur rrnongs pa' i rgyu yin pa'i phyir dangl sngon rna byung
ba las byung ba'i phyir ro zhes srnras pa de' i tshe ji ltar gdags pa yod par rni 'gyur tel gdags pa
yod pa kho na' i phyir kho bo la khyed kyis srnras pa'i skyon gyis gnas rni thod doll chos marns
ngo bo nyid rned pa gang yin pa de ni4 don dam pa yin par yod5 pa dangl rned pa'i rntha' gnyis
spongs6 pa' i phyir kho bo cag rned par Ita ba nyid dang rnthun par ga la ' gyur tel de' i phYlr
khyod kyj7 tshig de ni zhe sdang gi sha rul gyi sgregs pa nyid yin noll
I
2
1

4
6

p. gYlS
P : rna zhu ba nYld du ston par byed pa ..
P : pa
p. nYld
P . 'dod
P : spangs
p. kY1S
-121-

2. Translation

The Yogacara obJect:

"Our doctri ne i not incorrect, because it doe not contradict reason

(yukti). Why is that so? We asert that things l ack i nherent exi'itence (niZ]sl'abhliva) because they
are empty of the identities (litman) [ expreed by ] the words that are u sed to name them. Thoe
very identities [expressed by J words do not ongmate. And just because they do not onginate,
they do not peri sh e ither. Any thing with which a word I" associated, doe not exit the way it is
expreed by that word, becaue [ words] are only larbitraryJ conventions (s{//!lketamcltra). In fact,
if thing were the actual referents (gocanl) of words,1 one would get hurt by burning one\
mouth when uttenng the word ' fi re ' .2 Moreover, r our doctnne al"o agree w i th cnpture
(c7ga ma ) ] because the eXItence of the dependent nature IS endored by the fol lowing tatement
lfrom scr i pture]: "ImagIned thing" do not eXi st, but thIngs that depend on others do exist. '"
We reply :
"Things l ack I nherent eXi stence because they are empty of the identItie
[ expresed by] the word [ that designate them]. And just because things do not
origi nate a having that identity, thmgs neither orIgmate nor peris h. (69)
Any thing w ith which a word i s asocIated, doe not ex i st the way it i
expressed [ by that word ]. Things are therefore not real [ i n that sense ]."
Thu and I n many other ways they argue. (70)
And they also say that the dependent [ nature] eXi sts.
If lthis I arguedJ w ith reference to the conventIOnal [truth ] , [ the error of] proVIng what I
already proven wi l l occ ur. I f [ it i s argued J with reference t o the u ltimate ltruth J , then there
is no example and the reason i contradictory. (7 1 )
I f you lIltend to prove all that as conventional l y rtrue ] , you w i l l prove what i already proven, be
cause we also aert al l that a the conventional truth. B ut If you i ntend to prove it as the u lti
mate rtruth] , then there is no exampl e to prove that the dependent lnature 1 exit" u ltimately, be
caue that lnatureJ also IS empty of i nherent existence [ u lti mately],4 Moreover, the logical reason

,
"

Or " 1 1' the real Identity of thll1g were expresed by the word that are ued to deSIgnate them "
For thl example, ee Mah(/vlbhaa,;'al'fm, T vol 27, 73aII fT. (Reference 111 C Cox, DlIpufed D/wl/l1m f(//-i)
Buddhll'f Theollel O/l E>:l,lfel1c e, The Internat Ional I ntltute tor B uddhl\l Studle, Tokyo 1 995, p 40I. note 23 )
QuotatIon of L(I/,1kc7wlf(/ra,llllm I I. 19 1 ab /lell'tl I'm "a/pLf() bhavo/! 1)({rctt0l1tml co vldvOIe Alo quoted In PP
(Eckel, p 56)
Parallel tex t 111 Koraf% raI110,1(/lfm " 1 1'. havll1g 111 mll1d the ll1 h erent eX I stence that are known to the unedu
cated mll1d of cowherd, and the l Ike. you argue WIth reference to the conventIonal )truth) that condItIoned
thI ngs such as the VIsual sene organ and so forth have theIr own ll1herent eX I tence, then you provc what IS al
ready proven B ut If you mgue WIth reference to the ultImate )truth ]. then there IS no accordant example (l. cI
dharmvodnicll1{(l)" (T vol. 30, 269c 1 -3 ): "If you argue that the dependent nature eXI,ts WIth reference to the
conventIOnal )truth ] , you prove what IS already proven If you argue that It eXIt WIth reference to the ultimate
truth, then there IS no accordant example " (T vol 30, 272 b 1 2-1 3 )
)

1 22

"because [things] are empty of the identities [expressed by] words" is contradictory (viruddha).
In fact, by inferring that [things] are empty of the identities [expressed by] words, [you implicitly
affirm] the existence of their inexpressible nature and thus negate [your thesis] that things lack
inherent existence. The nature (svariipa) of the subject of your proposition (dharmin) is therefore
not correctly established. 1
You might argue as follows: "The dependent nature, as we understand it, lacks inherent
existence with respect to its origination (utpattinisvabhava) because it does not originate from
[itself as] already existent, j ust like a magical apparition (maya).2 Thus, because that [dependent
nature] also is empty of inherent existence, the meaning of the reason [in our i nference] is not
contradictory."
We reply:
If [you say that] the dependent nature lacks inherent existence with respect to its origma
tion because it does not originate from [itself as] already existent, isn' t it then clearly es
tablished that its [ultimate] origination, perishing and so forth are thereby negated? (72)
If so, then exactly our view will be established. In fact, we also assert that things which [conven
tionally speaking] originate from the nature (atman) of appropriate causes and conditions, are
[ultimately] empty of mherent existence and [ultimately] lack origination, perishing and so forth,
because they do not originate from their own nature (svatman). And this view agrees also with
The nature attnbuted to the subject of the Yogacara propositIOn ("thmgs") IS "lacking inherent eXistence [ulti
matelyJ." ThiS predicate is however contradicted by the logical reason which says that thing lack the Identities
that are Imputed to them by words, Without thereby excludmg that each thmg ultimately pos<;esses Its own eXIs
tence and ItS own inexpressible nature which are the products of ItS own causes and conditions. ThiS own-nature
IS not imputed and cannot be imputed by words simply because it IS not expressible by words. As the Yogacara
u nderstands It, "dependent nature" means that each real thing is produced by causes and conditions that are
other than itself (paratantra ) and nevertheless possesses an eXistence and an essence that are stnctly ItS own
(sva-hhava ) precisely because each thing IS the product of causes and conditIOns that are exclUSively ItS own.
ThiS strictly indiVidual nature cannot be mcluded Within a class, category or universal and IS therefore never the
object of conceptual knowledge or speech. "To have a dependent nature" thus means "to own an inexpressible,
other-produced mherent eXistence and essence" or "to be the exclUSive owner of an eXistence and an essence
that were produced by others "
Although Bhavavlveka agrees to thiS as far a<; the conventional truth is concerned, he does not accept that
such an other-produced existence IS an inherent existence (svahhava ) In the ultimate sense (paramarthata ) , be
cause only somethmg that is "unmade (akrtaka, akrtrima ) and not dependent on others (paratrant rapek.'a )"
(MMK XY.2) can be an mherent existence In the ultimate sense for the Madhyamaka. Madhyamaka rea<;onings
m search for ultimate eXistences should therefore exclude the dependent nature as non- ultimate. ThiS exclUSIOn
of mdivldually owned eXistence, although at first theoretical, is foremost a matter of meditatlOnal practice (hha
vanii). Its final outcome IS an enlIghtened mind charactenzed by the non-perception (anupalamhha ) of indiVid
ual entities, that IS to say, of entities that would own a part of bemg in their own nght.
The cruCial problem in thl connection ii> the fol lowmg. What exactly does Bhavavlveka mean when he says
that the Yogacara attnbutes ultimate eXistence to the dependent nature of things? And is he nght In attnbuting
this view to the Yogacara? I Intend to diSCUSS thiS problem on another occasIOn. For Tsong Khapa 's approach to
thiS problem, see R. Thurman, The Speech of Gold , Motilal B anarsldass 1 9 89, pp. 2 1 8-223
Thl IS the standard definitIOn of utpattintsvahhava In the Yogacara texts (SN S , T. vol. 1 6, 694aI8-20; YBh, T.
vol. 30, 702b2 1 -23; Xiang-yang-sheng-jiao-lung , T vol. 3 1 , 557b 1 9-20, 559a8-9; TrBh 4 1 . 1 6- 1 7 ad TrK 24 Ina
svayan:zhhiiva etasya ( paratantrasvahhiivasya ) miiyavat parapratyayena utpatte 1. Paral lel text:;, In PP (Eckel,
pp 59-60); *Karatalaratna,<;iistra , T vol. 30, 27 I c22-25.
=

- 1 23 -

Scripture, because
"The Lord of the world has taught that whatever originates from conditions does not
origi nate [ u ltimatel y 1," (73ab)
Why IS that so?
Because its origi natIon a<; an i nherent existence In the ultimate seme is negated. (73cd)
The Lord has taught that someth Ing wh Ich originates from condition I> does not ongmate u ltimately (paramarthatal), because the nat ure of that thing I S not seen [to existJ m that thmg [it
selfl apart from the collection of ItS causel> and conditions (hetupratyayasamagrl). S i m i l arly, [ the
LordJ has taught: "Whatever ongmates from condItions does not originate. Origination

its

own right IS not found there. Whatever dependl> on conditions is I>aid to be e mpty. Whoever
knows emptmess IS free of deluslon."1 Furthermore,

A trcquently quoted vcre from the Anuvutuptahradapal({}!lkral11w.lc/llltra

no talva utpcldll Ivuhhclvato 'sfl

}(l1 pmtvayc7dhlnu IC/ Illl1ya ukto

val

")'al pratWlVatr layatl la h} allito,

l[ill.'yatcll?l Icll1atl so 'pramatta I}"

(eL

YamaguchI, p 5(7 ) Abo quoted I II K R (T. vol 30, 269a 1 1 - 1 2, L. de La Val lee POUIIl . Le In,vall dal/I' ta
MOln, p 74) The Sansknt text 1<., found III for exam ple Prwanl1apada. L. de La Val lee POU1 Il ed . 239 10 - 1 3
and Bodhicarvclv{[tlimpail/ika, P L Vmdya ed . 1 72 1 1 - 15)
There I a fundamental dItlerence between the Yogacara and the Madhyamaka under'>tandlllg'> of "lIpattl
/ul,1vahhliva" The Yogacara ays that the dependently onglllated nature of each lIl<,tance of mllld I not an 1 Il
herent or u l ti mate n ature III the ene that It IS not a ,>elf-produced nature Neverthele, an other-dependent na
ture II1 heres exclm,lvely 111 each partIcular mstance of mind, and I III that sense an exclusively-owned Inherent
nature or an ulti mate eX Itence that must not be negated, but ,>hould be retall1ed a" a genull1e remall1der (ell'a
\zl!am) of reality. hy and 111 the mll1d" of thoe who de'>lre to know and ee reality a'> It I. I n hort, for the Yo
gacara "ulpat1/111l,lvabhclV([" mean both ",IVa{([-lllpC/ttl-llllIVabhclV([" (ultllnate abence of a el f-produced II1he
rent nature) and "parala-Ulpaltz-salvabhava" ( u ltI mate pre'>ence ot an other-produced m herent nature)
For B havavlveka. however. a nature that ongll1ates 111 dependence on others need" to be negated and excl uded
a non-on g m ated and as abolutely non-exl"tent m the ultImate ense B havavlveka therefore reJect "ulpaf
lll71lSVahlulva" 111 the Yogacara sense of "thll1g" u ltllnately lack mherent eX I<.,tence only to the extent that they
,.
do not ongll1ate from themelve I ntead, he a,>er[<, the much more radical Madhyamaka POSItion of "onutpal
tZI1lsvabhava" (thll1g ultimately l ack IIlherent eX Itence becau'>e u l tllnately they do not ongll1ate at all) B ha
vavlveka\ vIew I!> mot clearly '>tated 111 hl<, reply to the fol lowll1g Yogacara objectIon 111 the 'Kamtatarafl1([iil,
tro

"You IMadhyamlka'> I argue that conditioned entities are ultimately (tattvatal) empty lot II1herent eXi stence I
because they an'>e trom condltlon I f you II1tend to "ay that conditioned entltle are empty 111 the ense that
they lack I Ilherent eX I<,tence WIth respect to their ongll1atlon (ulpatt/l711Svablulv(/) because they ane from con
ditIons and do not eX I t by themelves, then your arg ument e<;tabll<,he,> the Yogacara POSItion and I'> perfectly 1 11
conformity W ith reason" (T vol. 30, 2 7 1 c22-25)
Bhavavlveka repl i es a" fo llow"
"What do you mean when you ay that condItIoned entitle:', are empty 111 the "ene that they lack I I1herent ex
I stence With repect to their ongll1ation becaue they an<;e from conditIOns and do not eX i st by themelves?
I f you mean that condItIOned, dependently ongll1ated thll1g such a, the VIsual en"e organ and so f orth arc
empty 1 Il the ene that the uncondItIoned, permanent and I mpen<;hable nature (Ivahhclva) of the vlual "ene
organ and '>0 forth IS ab,>olutely ab<;ent 111 them, then you attempt to prove omethll1g that need no proof
(I/(Idh(/\(/dholla) Thl" I Il1deed accepted by the B uddlmt chool", the Samkhya, the Vatqlka, and o forth.
SlI1ce It I taught that the V1'mal !>eme organ and o forth are not made empty but are empty by nature
(prakrtvcl .llill)'U )-"'" , you <;hould ay that th1l1gs are empty 111 the en!>e of "ahence of II1herent eX Itence hecaue
of non-ongll1atlon" (}lK ttJ1f:tt , C/1111tpatltn/1SVubhal'Cl), and not 111 the sen'>e of "abence of Il1herent eXI <;tence
becau<;c of I other-dependent I on gll1atlon ('ct.:1!M"l, utpattznl1SV{1bh(/va)" I f thll1g, at the time of then ongllla
tlon, ongll1ate a havll1g an I I1herent eXI'>tence 111 the u ltllnate <;ene (p(/ramclrthotal), how can you "ay that they
lack Il1herent eXI5tence WIth repect to theIr onglllation (utpoflll1l,1 vobl7(lv(/)'7 l You hould be COlN<.,tent and say
that they ongll1ate 111 the ultimate ene (litpattlsa,\ vabhava) I On the other hand, If they do not really ongll1ate
and have no '>ub'>tance at all, you houlcl not <;ay that their true nature I ' mll1d o n ly'. B u t I f you accept thl" al-

- 1 24 -

The fact that things are not ultimately real explains perfectly well why, conventionally
speaking, their individual and general [properties] function as the objects of different cog
nitions and words. (74)
Just because things are not ultimately real, we can explain the fact that, conventionally speaking,
they function as the objects of different cognitions and words [which apprehend or designate]
their individual and general properties such as blue and so forth, form and so forth, or pot and
cloth and so forth. If things were ultimately real, then like space they would have j ust one undif
ferentiated nature and could therefore not be the obj ect of different cognitions and different
words. But that is not the case.l
In this connection, there

IS

also the following scriptural statement which

IS

approved by

both [the Yogacara and the Madhyamaka] systems:

Such and such a name is used to express such and such a thing, but these [names] do not
exist therein. That is the ultimate nature of things.2 (75)

ternative, you wIll commit the error of contradlctmg your own doctnne (abhyupetabadha ).
If you mean that things are empty and non-existent because, arising in dependence on others, they lack a
self-produced nature, then you again commit the error of attempti ng to prove something that needs no proof.
But you assert that things which depend on other condltlOns do ongmate [ultimately] and are really non-empty'
Hence, you shouldn't say that they are empty' Our VieW IS different. How then can you suggest that [our view]
corroborates the Yogacara pOSItion?" (T. vol. 30, 272aI4-26)
l ** See Kasyapaparivarta, A. Von Stael-Holstem ed., Section 63, p. 94' yan na sunyataya dharma .unya karotl
dharma eva sunya.]
Accordmg to Bhavavlveka, the Yogacara argument that the dependent nature of things eXlst as the substratum
of conventlOnal knowledge and speech (cf. MHK y'6) imphes that the dependent nature is not ultimately real.
In his view, the dependent nature of thmgs compnses stnctly mdlvldual propertIes (svalakafJa ) whIch are the
objects of non-conceptual and non-verbahzed direct perception (pratyaka ), and general properties
(samanyalakafJa ) which are the objects of conceptual knowledge and speech and are an integraL real part of
the dependently produced Identity of each thmg (see MHK Y.62). If the dependent n ature were an mherent eXIs
tence m the ultimate sense, as the Yogacara asserts accordmg to Bhavaviveka, it should be one, unchangeable
and undIfferentiated, and could not functlOn as the object of many different cognitions and words See also
Bhavavlveka's account of "prajfiapti" m verses 80ab and 82-84 below.
From the Aryabhavasa'!lkrantzsutra (cf. YamaguchI, p 5 1 1 -5 1 2). Also quoted in PP (Eckel, p. 56) The pre
Bhavavlveka Yogacara texts where this vere I quoted are B B h (48. 1 2- 1 3) and Vasubandhu's Vyakhyayuktl (D.
Sems Tsam 14, Si 1 1 0b3 ff.).
The author of BBh quotes this verse to substantiate hiS view that the true nature of all things IS mexpresslble
(mrabhilapyas vabhiiva ) and explams Its meamng as follows (BBh 48. 1 5-22). The Identity (atman) that I S ex
pressed by for mstance the name "rlipa" does not eXist in the real thmgs to which the name "rlipa" IS applIed
(rupadlsa'!ljfiaka dharma
prajfiaptlvadasraya
vastumatra ). And the fact that things exist (vldyamanata )
as mexpressible (that IS, as lacking the IdentIty which words attribute to them) IS their ultimate, true nature
(paramarthata svabhiivadharmata )
Vasubandhu's interpretatlOn of thIS verse m Vyakhyayukti focuses more on the necessary eXistence of "the
real things that have an mexpressible nature" (brjod du med pa 'i mtshan nYld kYI dngos po, anabhzlapya
lakalJavastu ). These real thmgs are the substrata of Imagmed things ( the identitIes Imputed by words) and of
an ultImate mexpressible nature (dharmata
pa rmipannasvabhava ). As Vasubandhu says, if thoe real things
did not eXIst, the verse would not say "na sa saf!1Vldyate tatra" nor would It say "dharmanam sa ca dharmata"
=

1 25

' S uch and ,>uch a name' mean

names that express the mdlvIdual and general [properties of

thing 1 and consist of a nu mber of s y l lable (ak.yara)'. ' To express such and such a thing' refer
to the verbal expression of the th mg that are objects of speech (ahhidheya), uch a color and
shapes (nipa) and so forth. ' These [ names 1 do not eXist therein' means that the expression in the
form of a name doe,> not exi'>t in the thing [to which it is applied] because the nature of thi ngs
doe not conist of yllables. I n fact, one and the same thing is expressed i n many different way
depending on the vanety of local l anguages (deahha.ya) and word-derivat ions (niruktl). Water,
for mstance, IS called "paniya", "ap" , "sali la" , " nira", and so forth. Now, if water had the nature
of the verbal expression (abhidhana) effected by one of these words, then the other words woul d
not be app licable to i t and could not express It. B ut that i s obviousl y not the case.
' That IS the u ltimate nature of thmg' mean that 'being mexpressible' (l1irabhilapya) i the u lti
mate nature (paramarthata) of thing. Peopl e i n the world C\W!lvrti) i nvent name and estab l ish
connect ions between name and th ings (sClI?1keta) for the sake of Identlfy mg and recogl1lzing
(pratyahhljilci) lthings ]. Based on the charactentic (vI5e'a) of a particular thing, these name
make it known that this thing is for m <;tance a cow, and not a horse or a h uman being. The iden
tity [ of the thing designated as 'cow ' I IS an object of knowledge (buddhivi.yaya). Why? Because
even people who do not know syl l ables and do not understand poken l anguage, such a mute
and deaf peopl e, recogl1lze thmgs uch a pot and the l i ke, and even COW" recognize their own
and others' cal ves by mean:;, of me l l and eye'>lght.1 B ecaue things are thus in a l l respech empty
of [ the nature on names, both of u:;, agree that names do not express the nature of things.2

A Yamaguchi (p 5 1 tl, note 6) oberve, "the Identity (ngo /Jo 11."ld) [of the thIng delgnated a 'cow'!" rerer
to the general property (Ie/me/nya) 'cow' For B havavlveka. the general property 'cow' IS an objectIve reality I n
herent 1 11 each partIcular cow C d M H K/TJ V 6 2 tT) B ut t h e word ' cow ' , comltll1g of yl lable, doe<; n o t eX I \t
In any partIcu lar cow It I therefore not necessary to know word" 111 order to be able to Identify and recogn17e
a particular ani mal a a 'cow', B ecaue the general property 'cow' I I1here 1 11 each partIcu l ar cow, even deaf and
mute people can Identi fy cow,> by eye\lght or touch (d TJ ad M H K V 63 on the perceptibility of general prop
ertIe) and can entertall1 the notIOn or Idea 'cow' even though they are not able to connect that Idea With the
word 'cow' S i m I l arly, al1lmal" h ave a recognIZIng and notional knowl edge of 'my calf ' , 'food', etc (ee al<;o
TJ ad M H K V 58)
"In al l repect" mean "both conventional ly and u l llmately " Although the text ays that both the Yogacara and
the M adhyamaka agree that thll1g are 1 11 all repect empty of the nature ot name. the way thl I undertood
by each I fundamental ly different. For the Yogacara, the dependent nature of thll1g" I'> a real (dwvv(/.\ut), 111qantaneou'> (k{[JJl"-([), "tnctly I I1dlvldual (lV a /a"- w.l([) and lI1expre<;lble nature Word" refer to general proper
tle or IdentltIe\ (lclmc/11\C//ak.(l/7a) that are Il1lagll1ed to be real (panka/plta) but are actual ly only nomll1al eX I
tence (pWji/aptl.l'at). The IdentltIe that are delgnated by word" are therctore not only ulumately but abo con
ventionally unreal (adw\,\({) In contra"t, for B havavlveka, dependently on gll1ated thll1g are. convent ional ly
peakll1g, empty of the nature of the word that de<;lgnate them for the qU Ite I mpllllc reason that thll1g, u n l ike
words, are not made up of <;yll able But thl doe" not mean that the general propertle<; or IdenlltJe (\e/I/1e/11}([/ak)o '70) to which word ref er are only n0Il1111al eX I tence or Imag1l1ed Identities A we have ob,>erved
agam and agall1 , B havavlveka hold that general propertle are dependently on glllated propertle'>, and are 111 that
ene real propert I e, I Ilherent In and contltutlllg an lI1tegral part of the I I1dlvld ual nature (I vohhav([) of each
dependently on glllated thlllg But mce the<,e llldlvidual nature" depend on caues and condltlon", they do not
eX I t ultlll1ately That I to ay, they are excl uded trom the true realtty a\ een by an enl Ightened mll1d An en-

1 26

If you argue that [the dependent nature] originates by the power of others because it

IS

an

inherent nature (svabhava) that arises from conditions, then like a magical apparition it is
not [ultimately] real (abhuta) and you end up proving our position. (76)
You might argue as follows: "The [dependent] nature exists only as a nature that arises from a
col lection of conditions in the power of others. Since it thus originates by the power of others, it
IS

not the ultimate reality (paramartha )."

We reply: "If you argue that it originates by the power of others, then it is not [ultimately] real,
j ust like a magical apparition. How can it then be an [ultimate] inherent existence? Thus, you end
up proving our position. 1
If [our position] is thus proven, then
[Your statement that] the dependent [nature] does not exist the way it is apprehended2 also
implies that it does not originate as an inherent existence [ultimately] . (77ab)
Why is that so? Because
Something that originates in the ultimate sense cannot be a deceptive appearance. (77cd)
You say that the dependent [nature of the mind] does not exist the way it is [normally] appre
hended because it lacks the nature of an objective aspect and a subjective aspect (grahyagra
hakasvabhavavirahitatvat). Again, if [the dependent nature of the mind] really originated as an

l Ightened mind remains necessanly silent, for It has elIminated all notIons and perceptIons of i ndividual eXIs
tences that could have general propertIes (samanyavadvastu ) and could be expressed by words. It sees realIty as
It is through a knowledge that IS non-conceptual, non-differentIating and non-dual (ntrvlkalpaJiiana )
If I understand the text correctly, the Yogacara pOSitIOn, as it IS rendered here, says that notwIthstanding its de
pendency on others the dependent nature eXists ultImately (paramarthata) in the sense that, for the Yogacara,
an enl Ightened mind st!ll has a differentiating perception of the individual, dependently ongInated nature of all
thing. But Since the dependent nature IS a condItIOned and Impermanent nature, It IS not the unconditIOned, un
changeable, ultimate realIty (paramartha ) Itself. "UltImate reality" In thiS context is a synonym of emptiness C
sunyatii), absence of self-existence (nairatmyam, niJ:tsvabhavatvam ), perfectly established nature (parinipan
na:,vabhava ) and other terms mentioned In MHK Y.3.
"abhitta" In verse 76 does not mean "nonexistent" or "unreal" It means "deceptive," "not eXisting the way It
appears to eXist," "apparently non-empty but ultImately empty," "Inherently eXistent for a common non
enl Ightened mind, but absolutely non-existent for an enlightened mi nd." For Bhavavlveka, the dependent nature
of things IS deceptive In that It so to speak hides its dependency on others and takes on the appearance of a
i>elf-estabhshed, truly ultImate existence. The Yogacara asserts the same, but whereas Bhavavlveka excludes the
indIVIdual, dependent nature of things from the realm of true reality, the Yogacara retaIni> It as a genuine reality
to be known as It is by an enlightened mind.
"paratantragraha" In verse 77ab IS a reference to "paratantrasya cagraha" In verse 5ab.

- 1 27-

Inherent eXIstence, it could not be a deceptive appearance. Hence, it IS J ust becau se It does not
originate as an inherent existence that it

IS

a deceptIve appearance! I

Furthermore,
If [thIngs] really had the nature they appear to have, they wou ld eXIst exact l y as they ap
pear. How could they then be simi l ar to a magical apparition?2 (78)
If the things whose nature depends on other causes and condItIons and which appear [ i n our
mind] as objects of the senses, really had the nature they appear to have, they would ex ist ex
act l y as they appear. How could things then be simi l ar to a magIcal apparition? A lthough a magi
cal apparition appears to have the nature of a [real] man and so forth, that nature IS not obser
vabl e because the nature of a [reall man and <.,0 forth is absent I n a magical apparition. I n the
same way, there are no valid reasons to believe that the dependent nature exists [u lti matel yJ.
A lso, your statement "And J ust because things do not ongInate as having that ident ity,
things neIther onginate nor perish"] sounds much more reasonab l e [If it is expl ained] as fol l ows :
Because [these things 1 do not orIgInate from [their own nature as already] existent, and
also because they are not real entItles (adravya), they do not ongInate, do not perish , are
not real (avastu) and have no Inherent nature (asvahhava). (79)
The-.e thIngs.) onginate from the nature of appropri ate c auses and condition s and not from [theIr
own nature as already ] eXistent, because not any inherent nature -not even that of a single atom
- is seen to eXI st at the t i me when things are apart from the collection of theIr causes and conditions. Things do therefore not origi nate and do not perish. And because they do not ongInate
[ from their own nature as already] existent, things are al so not real and have no inherent eXlstence [ u ltimatel y ].
In add Ition, the nature of these things and also their form (ahhasa) which appears as an object

The compan"on of the dependent nature o f thlng With the deceptlve nature of magical phenomena I'; al<,o dl"
cu,,';ed In PP (Eckel , p 60) and In KR (T vol 30, 269a2-7; 2 7Ia9-bI9). The argument of ver"e 77 I" repeated
a'> fol low In KR " I f mag ical phenomena Isuch a the appearance of a horse or an elephant created by a ma
giCian I real l y eXisted I n one way or another With that nature lof a real elephant or a real hor"e, they cou l d not
deceive andl mltaken perceptlOn (vlparya.\a) of them would be I mposlbl e." (T vol 30,269a6-7 )
To a n ord i nary percelVlng m i n d , all dependently ongInated t h ings appear a s If they were self-e<;tab l I "hed indi
Vidual eX Itences, haVing their own border" and contour" that Isolate them from other thll1gs I n that sen:-,e. de
pendently ongInated thlng eXIt as thll1g'> which do not have the nature they appear to have Accordll1g to B ha
vavlveka, to eXist that way disqual I fies them from bell1g ultimately real. Common mll1ds, percelvll1g Isolated,
ll1dlvld ual eX istences, perceive correctly a" far as common <,en<;e (lw!1vrfl) I" concerned. B ut when It comes to
the u lti mate truth, one should say that common mll1d5 are bell1g deceived 111 that they are 5t1 1 l <;eemg unrealI tie5.
To be compared With Catu\ata"(/ X I I I 23cd ( 323cd). See J F Ti lleman5, Malenall 10/ the Studi' 01 An
ac!evo, Dhwmapll/a and CalldrakTrtl, Wlen 1 990, Vo lume I, pp 1 70- 1 7 1
Reference to ver"e 69cd
''The5e thll1g"" refers to the " b/ulva" 111 the Yogacara argument 111 verse 69ab
=

"

- 1 2R -

[of perception] and originates from I the nature of appropriate causes and conditions, are aggrega
tions (samuha) of the eight real entities (dravya) earth, water, fire, wind, color and shape, odor,
taste and the tactile. Because [such aggregations] also are not real entities [ultimately ] , j ust as an
army, a forest, and so forth [are not real entities even conventionally], one should realize that
they do not originate, do not perish, are not real and have no inherent nature [ultimatelyV Such
is the meaning of the verse.
Here you might object as follows: "Because in your view things do not exist [at all] , you cannot
account for the conventlOnal designation of things (dharmaprajfiapti)."
We reply:
We are not at fault as to the [real basis of] conventional designations, because we assert
the same as [you who advocate] consciousness-only. ( 80ab)
Regarding consciousness-only as free from the [mistakenly imputed] notions of "1" and "mine",
there is no difference between you and us . [In fact, we say that] the conventional designations of
external and internal things occur with respect to things that are not [ultimately] real (adravya)
and are created (abhisaf[lskrta) by actions originating from a consciousness that perceives exter
nal objects. Hence, there is no fault in our view.3 But your view [involves the following problem] :
Since [consciousness] exists as the thing to be eliminated and as the eliminating agent as
well, where will the perfect knowledge [of suffering] and so forth (parijfianadit exist?
(80cd)

Literally: "and appears from ..." ( .. .las snang bar).

The present passage IS dIfficult to understand, unless one reads It m combmatIOn WIth the commentary on the
verses Y.35-36 and 3S. These verses deal exclusively with the conventIOnal truth. They say that the followmg
are conventIOnal truths : ( l ) Atoms, as aggregations of the eight real entities, are themselves real entitles (dravy
asat), (2) An aggregatIOn, or rather a conglomeration (sa,!!cita ) of atoms of the same kmd m a single object,
such as for instance a pot, is a real entity, (3) AggregatIOns of diSSimIlar object at the same place, such as an
army or a forest, are only nominal entIties (pra}fiaptisat).
It is therefore clear that in verse 79 B havavlveka is reasoning from the point of view of the ulti mate truth and
m that sene negates what was Said m verses 35-36, 3S. The point of verse 79 is that a real entity m the ulti
mate sense cannot be compOSite, but should be strictly one. The same reasonmg could of course be used to ne
gate the ultimate eXIstence of the "elght real entIties" too.
S YamaguchI (pp. 527-529) apparently has not understood the meaning of verse SOab. His commentary mIsses
the point. Bhavaviveka mtends to say the followmg The Yogacara teaches that the dependent nature of con
sciousness, although empty of a substantIal self (atman) and of self-establIshed mental factors (cmtta ) or exter
nal objects (vl,yaya ) that are habitually grasped as "mine", necessarily eXists as the substratum to which the
fal se notIOns of "I" and "mme" are applIed But, says Bhavavlveka, we Madhyamlkas also pOSit conSCIOusness
as the only onginal subtratum of conventIOnal deSignatIOns, except that consciousness for us IS also conscIOUS
of real external objects. ConSCIOusness, being the only agent (cf. MHK Y. 2Scd), IS the origin of al l the actIOns
by WhICh all thmgs are created The thus created things are not ultimately real (adravya
abhuta m verse 74)
and can therefore functIOn as the objects of conventional deSIgnations.
Based on the Tibetan text. The Sansknt text reads mrvldadi ("dIsregard of the world and so forth")
=

- 1 29 -

[ In your v iew L both the th ings to be e l i m i nated, uch a suffering and so forth, and al l the ac
tions (saJ?1skc7di) of cultivation (bhc7vanc7) from which the path of e l i m i n ation (praha '.1 a111c7rga)
onginate, exist a parts of consciousness and as parts of the dependent [nature of consciousness]. N ow, since [thatl i nherent nature (svabhc7va) doe not change and I S not ubject to fu ndamental transformation (a,{nlyaparc7vrtti), where do you think wI l l the conditions of tran smundane
[ mental states ] uch a the perfect knowl edge of <.,uffenng and o forth, which in your opin ion
exit as the dependent nature rof conscioune5s1, exi t? The fol loWI ng IS meant here. S I nce [the
dependent nature of consciouness ] does not change in both its mu ndane (lauklka) and transmun
dane state (/okottarc7vasthc7), where and how will [the transmundane mental states] ever arise?l
In cae you object and ask: "Isn't It so that fi nal l iberation (mukti) is nonexi stent for you al so,
becaue [ in your View, thIngs] are not rea l entitles (adravya)?", we repl y:
It IS a l so U ust] because [th Ings I are not real entities that [true] fi nal l IberatIon I attai ned
through the cessation of dual conciousne,, (vikalpa). Even If [things ] are real entities,
they [st i l l ] do not ori g i n ate [by theIr own nature]. Any v iew [of fin al l Iberation] other than
ours IS therefore unacceptable. ( 8 1 )
Just because things are not real entities, the birth of the supenor tran smundane non-dual know
ledge (c7rya/okottaranirvlkalpqji1c7na) fol lowing upon [the e l I m in ation of a l l the form of] mun
dane dual knowledge (laukikasavikalpqjFic7na) i fit to be the [true state of] l I berat ion. B ut that
wou l d not be the cae If there existed real entitie with an unchangeable nature. Hence, It I also
J ust because thIngs are not real entities that l iberation I S [true] l iberation when dual consciousness
has been abandoned.
Even if thing are In some way rea l entities, they [ ti l l ] do not ongInate by their own nature.
Thus, in that case al so, only the absence of dual consciousness is fit to be the rtru e ] l Iberation.
So, what good i s there in adhering to a d i fferent view [than our 1 by assert1l1g the exi-,tence of a
knowl edge that perceive the perfectl y establ ished nature (parini,}palUUlSvabhc7va) [of thi ng p2
S uch [a view J is unacceptable also because of what we have aid before, namely : "If the enhghtI

Thl commentary eem to be l I1formcd by Mfilamadh)'omakakanka X X I V 26- 2 7 where NagalJ una pomt (lut
that thc pcrfect knowledge of u lTen ng, the e l l ll1 1 natlOn of Ih cau"e (.lwJ/uda vupralul,!o ). the cultl Valion of the
path (margohhavol1a) and the reahzatlon of ti nal hberatlon (I1 lrodha,lc7k )c7tkara '!CI ) Wil l be I Inposslblc If t h l llg
eXIt l l1hcrent ly ( l Vahhc7vata ) In Nagarjuna \ own word " I f 1 conCloune 1 ha [ at ti rtJ by Ib own nature
no perfect knowlcdge [of unenng, etc I. how can It then cver 1 atta1 l1 1 that pcrfect knowledge') hn't It o that an
1 I1herent nature I unchangeablc')" ( M M K X X IY.26)
Vere 8 1 and Its commentary are one of the mot dlfticult paages 111 Chapter 5 Othcr tran "latJon than the
one I offer here are certa1l11y pOlble In my lllterpretallon, B havav lveka cntlC1 Les hcre the Yogacara u nder
tandlllg of hberatlllg knowledge or "Iokottarall l rv i kalpajfiana" III connectIon W Ith the Yogacara vIew that the
dcpendent nature and the perfcctly etabhshed nature of thlllg CXl st ulti mately If thee two nature l eally eX ht
u lti mately, the h bcrat1l1g knowledge w t l l havc to know them a they arc 111 order to bc the truly hbcrat1l1g
knowledge of reahty a It 1\ In that ca\e. howcver, the h beratlllg knowledge w t l l not bc non-dual (11 Irvlkalpo )
but wtll tt l l be a dual or object J 1 Y l llg (.I ([vlk.alpo ) know ledge of t h l 11g, that CXIt ll1herently I n contraq, the hb- 1 30 -

ened mind of the Teacher perceives an inherent nature, it will [still] be a dual consciousness
(savikalpa). It will then also have an object and will consequently not be [the true] non
objectifying awareness [of reality as it is] .,,1
Our opponent, extremely agitated because of [our] very cutting criticism of his views,
now utters these furious words:
If things have no inherent nature, conventional designations also will not exist. He [who
propounds this]

IS

a nihilist to whom one should not talk and with whom one should not

dwell together. (82)

Not only is such a [nihilist] himself destined for an unhappy existence, but he also leads
others to misery. (83ab)2
They say: "For us Yogacaras, objects outside consciousness do not exist. Nevertheless, because
consciousness alone really exi sts, the perception of external objects in the form of images
(iikiira) that are [internal] transformations (parifJiima) of consciousness [itself] also exists. And
the perfectly established nature [of consciousness] , which is realized individually (pratyiitmave
dya) by the Tathagata, also exists. You Madhyamikas, however, first of all negate the existence of
the things in the world because you say that, even according to the conventional [truth] , [things
are] similar to magical apparitions. And when it comes to the ultimate [truth], nothing exists [for
you] because neither consciousness (vijiiiina) nor its object (vijiieya) exists. Since you thus ne
gate the inherent nature of things [in all respects] , the conventional designation of things (dhar
maprajiiapti) also will not exist. And since [even] that does not exist [for you], your view is the
same as that of the nihilists, and nobody should talk or discuss with you, nor should any true fel
low [Buddhist] (sahaciirin) rely [on you ] . That is the reason why also the Blessed One has said:
"Monks, from this day forward, you should not rely on, not approach, and not respect the
Lokayatanas who are experts in all kinds of secretive language (mantra)." Accordingly, you, who
are evil (asat), ought to be shunned by all means.3 Because you reject the true teaching

erating knowledge of realIty will be truly non-dual If, as the Madhyamaka says, not a smgle mherent nature ex
Ists ultimately. The IIberatmg knowledge Will then consIst m the mere removal of all forms of dual objectifying
conscIOusness and not m the birth of a new knowledge m its own right that would see or perceive an objectified
absolute nature of things. See also note 6 to my translatIOn of MHK/TJ Y. 14.
Reference to MHK Y. 1 6
The content of verses 82-83ab IS repeated, almost word by word, m KR, T. vol. 30, 272a5-7. Veres 82-83ab
are based on the fol lowmg passage agamst the ' nihIlists' in the Bodhisattvabhuml : "te,ya'!l pra]fiaptyadhi!j[hii
nasya vastumatrasya abhavat Salva prajiiaptl sarvefJa sarva'!l na bhavatl. kuta puna prajiiaptlmatra'!l
tattva'!l bhavLyyatl tad anena paryayefJa tais tattvam apl prajiiaptir apl tadubhayam apy apavadita'!l bhavatl
prajiiaptltattvapavadacca pradhano nastlko vedltavya sa eva'!l nastlka sann akathyo bhavaty asa'!lvasyo Vl
jiiana'!l sabrahmacarifJam. sa atmanam api vlsa'!lpadayati loko 'pi yo 'sya d!!j!yanumata apadyate." (BBh
46. 1 4-2 1 ; T. vol. 30, 488c3- 1 O)
Literally : "You are an extreme case (sthana ) of what needs to be avoided [accordmg to the j Ui>t quoted words
of the Blessed OneJ "

- 131 -

(saddharma) [of the B uddha] , you yourself are destined for an unhappy eX Itence. And s ince you
Incite lathers ] to become attached to the evil demon (graha) of [extreme ] views, you make oth
ers fal l i nto mi sery a wel l."
The teacher replies:
Thoe word are the vomiting of the putrid meat of hatred. They betray your undi gested
pri de. (83cd)
Just a the vomiting of putrid meat i ndicates an indigestion, jut so your hateful words i ndicate
that you are full of pride. S uch is the mean ing of the words lof the teacher]. You r hatred i !-' lI ikeJ
vomited meat. You r word are l ike the vomiting of that [meatl. Your being fu ll of pnde I l I ke
hav ing an indigeStion. J ust as the vomiting of putrid meat indicates an indi gestion, J ust so your
hateful words i ndic ate that j ust you are fu l l of pnde, while there IS no fau lt at al l in our view.
The vomitll1g of the putnd meat of ] your ] hatred merely betrays ryour] Indi gested pride of self.
If you ask why we are sure that the error lof n i h i l isml does not occur I n the M adhyamaka, we
say :
In our V iew, things are S i m i lar to a mag ical apparition, because they have no rIndependent] own-nature, and because they are the cause of the bewi lderment of ignorant people,
and because they come I n to ex i stence after having been non-exi "tent. (84)
We [Madhyami ka 1 do not ay that things do not ex ist In every respect. In fact,

111

our View,

thi ng that arise from appropriate causes and conditions do eXist for conventI Onal thought in the
same way as a m ag ical apparition, because they l ack an lindependentJ own-nature, and because
they are the cause of the bewi lderment that is oberved in Ignorant people, and because they
onginate after hav i ng been non-ex Istent. So, how could it be that the existence of conventi onal
des i gnations I S not accounted for lin our doctri ne]? S i nce conventional deIgnations do indeed
exist lfor us 1 , the error you point out doe!-' not appl y to us. On the other hand, the fact that thi ngs
l ack an [independent] own-nature IS the ultimate [truth for m]. S l l1ce the two extreme!-' of exi s
tence and non-existence are th u !-' excl uded [in our doctn ne] , on what grounds could our v i ew be
s i m i l ar to the n i h i l I stic view?' Those word !-' of yours are therefore merely the vom iti ng of the pu
trid meat of [ your1 hatred.
A more extenlve defene agamt the accuatlon of ' nlhlhm' I found m '<KaraW/ora/1l0 ,1(/ I / U/ , T vol 30. 2 7 1 c
22-272cI 0 ( L d e l a Val lee Poum, Le Jovou DonI La Mo m , M C B I I , 1 9 32-33. p p 93-99)
Thl long "dlgrelOn" , a B havavlveka hlmelf cal l It. contaI n5 some crUCial paage that I I1form u about
how the Yogacara and Bhavavlveka dlagreed on the meanmg of "that of wh ich somethmg 1\ empty"( \,ella 1 [/
/1 )'0/11 ) and "that w h ich I empty" ( \,a/ l ilIlYWI1 )
The Yogacara mterpret " v ena ,I [II1 Vam, yar I ltn mm " II1 term 01 Ih three-nature tenet II1 which the allirma
tlOn of the ultlmatc eX I tence of thc dependent naturc play<, a pivotal role B hav,lVlveka rendcr the Yogacara
pOltlon as fol low
"The Yogacara <,ay ( ) Moreover, the foll owlI1g , <, taught 1 m cnpture I "When thiS r =A 1 I empty 01 that 1
B I . then that I =B I cloe not eXIt When tim I =A I I cmpty. then th, I =A I really eX I\t<, It I exactly thu\ that

- 1 32 -

the Teacher of gods and men has taught emptiness " Now, the meanIng of thIs statement is as follows. The
imagIned nature does not eXIst at all In the dependent [nature of thIngs] , because the dependent [ nature [ does
not have that [lmagIned1 nature. Because things that are designated by words (abhidheya ) do not have the na
ture that IS expressed by words (abhldhana ), and because words do not desIgnate the nature of the things they
refer to, the Imagined nature does not exist at all In the dependent nature. "Empty of that" (yena ,unyam ) refers
to lthese] mIstakenly ImagIned thIngs that do not eXIst at al l "This is empty" (yat sunyam ) refers to the de
pendently ongInated entIties that are real natures If thIS does not eXIst, not anything wIll exist. What could then
be empty of what? ThIS real thing that anses from conditions IS what we call ' the dependent nature'." (T. vol.
30, 27 1 c22-272a4)
Bhavavlveka's source for the above passage is obVIOusly the folloWIng text in the Bodhlsattvabhumi
"How IS emptIness (.unyata) Incorrectly understood (durgrhlta )? EmptInes IS Incorrectly understood when a
S ramal}a or Brahmal}a does not accept that of which somethIng is empty (tac ca necchatl yen a ,unyam ) nor
that which is empty (tad apl necchati yat ,unyam). The reason IS the folloWIng. EmptIness IS [properly] estab
lI shed because of the non-existence of that of which somethIng IS empty and because of the real eXIstence of
that whIch is empty. But If everything does not eXist, what WIll be empty of what'7 (sarvabhavac ca kutra ki'!1
kena sunya'!1 bhavlyati ) It IS against reason that somethIng would be empty of Itself (na ca tena tasyaiva
,unyata yujyate ). Therefore, emptiness is incorrectly understood If It IS understood that way
How then IS emptiness correctly understood? When one correctly sees that this [=A1 is empty of that r=B1 be
cause that l =B I does not eXIst In thiS [=AJ (yataka yad yatra na bhavati tat tena 'unyam iti samanupa ,\'yati )
and when one correctly knows that what remains In thIS [=A] reall y eXIsts here (yat punar atrava,5l5!a'!1 bhavati
tat ,sad lhastltl yathabhuta'!1 prajanati ), then that IS called the correct and unmlstaken understandIng of empti
ness." (BBh 47 S-20)
The author of BBh defines the 'real remaInder' as the [dependently originatedJ real entIties (vastumatra )
whIch function as the support of conventional deslgnation (prajiiaptlvadasvabhava ) and of the ultImate real Ity
(tathata = mrabhilapyasvabhavata = sunyara). It IS easy to see that vastumatra, prajiiaptlvada,\ vabhava and
tathata are the precursors of the three natures paratantra, partkalpita and parllllpanna respectIvely The most
expliCIt definitIOn of 'the real remaInder' IS found in the later Madhyantavlbhaga texts. Vasubandhu quote the
B Bh-passage on the 'real remaInder' In hiS commentary to MVK 1. 1 -2 and clanfies its meamng as follows.
" rEvery thing] IS not empty because emptIness and false conscIOusness (abhutapartkalpa ) eXIst. lEverything] IS
not non-empty because the dualIty of object and subject does not exist." (MVBh IS. 1 0- 1 1 ) Sthiramati's sub
commentary puts It most clearly "What then IS the [real] remaInder here? [Answer:] False consciousness and
emptIness." (MVT 1 4. i 2- 1 3 )
Bhavavlveka gives us also hIS own Interpretation of "yena sunyam, yat sunyam", as follows' "Next, as for the
teaching "When this IS empty of that, then that does not exist When this IS empty, then thiS reall y eXists, etc.",
rthe meaning IS as follows.1 When the thIngs that anse from conditions and are taken for real by all the people
In the world, such as the eye and so forth, functIOn as the object (gocara ) of the minds of unI ntellIgent people,
then rto those people who perceive and thInk] according to the conventional truth (samvrtya ), these thIngs ap
pear a If they had an Inherent nature (sasvabhava ). But when the [supenorJ mInd examines [these thIngs] as to
their ultimate reality (paramarthasatya ) , it is found that they have no real inherent nature at all, Just as a man
created by magic (mayapuru,a ) [does not have the nature of a real man 1. It IS therefore SaId "When thIS IS
empty of that, then that does not exi st." ThIS is taught to ward off the error of faIlIng Into the extreme of eter
nalism (Sa,\: vatan ta ).
And just as that is SaId to be nonexistent In order to ward off the error of eternalIsm, Just so it IS SaId that
thi" eXIsts In order to aVOId the extreme of nihilIsm (ucchedanta ). That I S to say, thIngs that anse from condi
tIons, such as the eyes and so forth, are Included among the conventional realItIeS (samvrtlsatya ) and do have
an Inherent nature (svabhava ). Unlike flowers in the sky, they are not completely nonexistent It is only from
the POInt of view of ultImate reality (tattvata ) that they are said to be empty. It IS therefore SaId "When thl IS
empty [of an Inherent nature In the ultImate sense], then this real ly exists [for conventional thoughtJ. It I S ex
actly thus that the Teacher of gods and men has taught emptiness." If you say that the dependent nature eXists
In that sense, then I agree. Indeed, I also accept that such a rdependently ongInated] Inherent nature eXIsts "(T.
vol. 30, 272a26-bS)
For Bhavavlveka, "yat sunyam" thus stands for all the dependently originated things that are real for com
mon sense Note that thIS also Includes the general propertIes of thIngs (samanya , see MHK Y.60 ff.) whIch the
Yogacara dismIsses as ' I magined' (partkalpita ). Only imaginary thIngs, such a<.; flowers In the sky or any other
thIng that common sense unammously rejects as unreal, are excluded from "yat ,5unyam". A conventIonal mInd,
not concerned WIth questI OnIng things as to theIr u ltImate-realIty statu s, SImply thInks that dependently ongl
nated things have theIr own eXIstence and theIr own nature, and perceives them that way. A supenor mind, on
the other hand, negates all "own existence" and "own nature" of conditIOned things because It searches for an
ultImate realIty that would not be dependent on anythIng else For Bhavavlveka, "yena ,5unyam" refers to thIS
ultImate-reality status of which conditIOned thIngs are empty in vIrtue of theIr beIng dependent on others. And
the 'real remainder' for Bhavavlveka are those same condItioned things, stnpped of any "own(ed) nature", as
they are seen by an enlIghtened mInd.
- 1 33-

APPENDIX : Notes on the Sanskrit text of MHK Chapter 5, verses 1-84

A lthough my translation of Chapter 5 of M H KlTJ is based on the Tibetan text, I have of

course also made use of the S an skrit text of M H K Chapter 5. In the prevIous Install ments, a
well as I n the present one, I have i nserted the Sansknt text for each of the veres In my edition
of the Tibetan text. For the S ansknt text of the verses 1 -68 , I have used the fol lowing two
ources :
( 1 ) Shrikant S. B ahulkar, "The Madhyamaka- Hrdaya-Kiirikii of B havaviveka: A Photographic
Reproduction of Prof. y.y. Gokhale's Copy," Nagoya Studies In Indian Culture And Buddhism,
SUf[lbhii.yii , Vol. 1 5 , 1 994. (Chapter5 is on the pages 28-34.)
This is a photographic reproduction of Y.Y. Gokhale's own handcopy of R. Sankrityayana's hand
copy of the Sha-lu manucnpt. Gokhale's handcopy contains h l own corrections and addition
(in case of l acunae), for which he also made use of the Tucci photographs of the same manu
script.
(2) An unpublished critical edition of the Sanknt and Tibetan texts of M H K Chapter 5 by Y.
EJ i ma, which he u sed i n h is classes and distributed among his students. It bears the title
"Madhyamakahrdayakarika V:

Yogacaratattvav i mscayapanccheda of B havlveka. Sanskrit text

col l ated w ith its Tibetan version." There are abundant textcntical notes, but there i no I ntroduc
tIOn (at l east not in the copy I have) S i nce the notes refer to "Ms" and "SG", we can assume
that EJ i ma's main sources were the Tucci photographs ( Ms) and the Sankrityayana-Gokhale (SG)
handcopy. In case of l acunae in M s or doubtful readIng'>, Ejl ma has fol lowed SG, the Tibetan
text and often also Gokhal e 's emendations.
For the verses 1 -68 , I have mostl y fol l owed Eji ma's edItIOn. I am however not competent
to form a judgment on its accuracy, i nce I am not an expert in the reading of manu scripts nor In
verse metre. For the preent i nstall ment (verses 69 -84), I have al so consulted Chr. Li ndtner's edi
tion of the Sansknt text of M H K Chapter 5 I n his article "Bhavya's M adhyamakahrdaya (Paric
cheda Five) Yogacaratattvav i n i scayavatara," The A dyar Library Bulletin 59 ( 1 99 5), pp. 37-65 . ( I
a m very grateful t o Annette Heitmann o f the Un iversity o f VIen na who i nformed me about thl
edition and kindly sent me a copy of i t ). L i n dtner 's edItion is based on the Chmese photographs
of the Sha- l u man uscript which were publ ished by Prof. Jiang ZhongxIn I n h is "S anskrit
Tarkajviilii-Sutra M anuscript Copy" ( i n ChInese) m Papers in Honour of

Dr.

Ji Xianlin on the

Occasion oj' His 80th Bi rthday , Jiang Xi, C hIna, 1 99 1 .

I have compared L i n dtner's edition ( L) of verses 1 -84 with the Sankrityayana-Gokhale

handcopy (SG) and With Ejima's unpublIshed edition (E), and have compiled the below l ist of
1 34

variant readings. Without i ntending to make definitive j udgments, I have i n many cases indicated
the apparently correct or preferable reading in bold letters and have added an (x) after readings
that are in my j udgment definitely incorrect. When none of the variants is indicated in bold, it
means that either reading is possible without significantly altering the meaning of the verse or
half-verse. Although the variants are many, they are on the whole not important enough to make
substantial changes necessary in the translation of the verses I have published thusfar.

Verse
lc

E : ' pi (based on Tib. "yang") ; SG, L : hi

5ab

SG, E : kalpitanupalabdhisca paratantrasya cagrahal)

L : kalpiUinupalabdhesca paratantrasya cagrahat (based on Tib.)

7d

SG, E :

l Id

SG, E : tattulyatvad; L : tattulyavad (x)

1 2ab

SG, E : yasya sa; L : yasya sa

1 2c

E : na ca (based on Tib.) ; SG, L : tacca

13b

SG : tatvadarsanam (x) ; E : tattvadarsina (x) ; L : tattvadarsinaIp (based on Tib.)

1 4c

SG : na tveva ; E : tata eva (based on Tib.) ; L : nanvevam

1 4d

S(?), E : samibhavet ; G, L : sati bhavet (based on Tib.)

15a

SG: naia ; E : cea (based o n Tib.) ; L : caia

1 8c

(S?)G:

..

. paro nayal); L : . . . parayaa (based on Tib. "lhur len")

tathabhasodayad yacca ;

E:

tadabhasodayad yatha ;

L : tathabhasodayad

yadvat
1 9d

E : ca viayapavadita (based on Tib.) ; L : vastuno ' py apavadita

21c

SG, E : upadhanat tatha ; L : upadanat tatra

22c

SG : canyaya (x) ; E : ca dvyabha ; L : dvyabhata

23c

SG: sahakaryanukaritvat ; E : sahakaryanukaritvat ; L : sahakaranukaritvat

26ab

SG: tannivrttau . . . tannirvrtti ; E : tannirvrttau . . . tannirvrtti ; L : tannivrttau. . . tannivrtti

26c

E : anidarsanariipasya; L : anirdesyasvarupasya

27a

E : bahyartho ; SG, L : bahyo 'rtho

28c

SG : sastreva(?) (x) ; E : siitre ca ; L : sutreu

28d

G, E : niedhata ; (S?), L : niedhita

30ab

G, E : svapne buddhisvabhavena-akalpitenapi saIpsayal) ; S (?), L :

svapnabuddhisvabhavena-akalpitabh avasarpsaya

34b

SG, E : cittagocarata ; L : cittagocarata (x)

34d

SG : siddhim eva ; E : siddha eva ; L : siddhir eva

-

1 35

37a

E : yady anaI ambata vasyal) ; SG, L : yady analambana sadhya

37d

E : salambata ; SG, L : salambailla

38b

E : va taddhitvasya nirakriya (based on Tib. ) ; SG, L : va na dhItvadi n i rakriya (x)

39a

E : bahyarthe ; SG, L : bahye 'rthe

41b

E : vivabhasaJ:! ; SG, L : visvabhasaIp

4 1 cd

E : yasyal) tadutpadat (based on Tlb. ) ; SG, L : yaya tadutpadal)

43b

SG : krtnasyadvaltasantata (x) ; E : kayyi asantaBp. anatma ca : L : kul)l!am aanty

anatma ca

44cd

E : dhiyalambyo mokabhedo 'pi ; L ' dhiyal ambya m u ktyabhedo ' p i

46c

SG, E : paranuvadaJ:i syat ; L : paral)uvadal) syad

47a

SG : sar!1k l esavyavadana ced (x) ; E :

sm:pklesavyavadanac ced ; L : sat!lkl eavyava

dhanac ced (x)

47c

SG : vedana vitathotpada (x) ; E : vedanadeJ:! tathotpadat ; L : vedanaditathotpadat

48ab

SG :

yatha parl) l)adisantana salil

(ka) aktlka (x) ;

E : yatha parl)adisarrttanarrt sal u ke

bahusaktikat ; L : yatha parl.ladismptanai) saliikabahu saktital)

48cd

E : tatha-adravyasatas cittac cltrasarrttativrttayal) ; L : tatha dravyasata (x) clttac citral)

sarrttatIVrttayal)

49d

SG, E : vi svotpadadlkal pana : L : citrotpadadikalpana

SOc

SG, E : saIpvrtya ; L ' sarrtvrtya (x)

5 1d

SG : ara

5 3c

SG, E : pratlslddhe ' p l ; L : pratiedhe ' pi

54a

E : tanl1J edhaya saced i go vidhyantaraparigrahaJ:! ; S G (?), L : tannirasaya ceo ito

...

E : araktata ; L : asanglta

v idyantaraparig rahal)
5 5 ab

SG : ne!a bhuJ agavac casarrtka1pltatvatal) (x) ; E : netarp. bhujagavac disat kalpitaIp

kalpitatvatal) (based on Tlb.) ; L : neo bhujagavac casan Sat11kalpal) kalpitatvatal) (x)

55d

E : pratTt l r vapi ; L : pratTtIr apl

57c

SG, E : abhilapaparokal.laIp : L : abh i lapaparokaQarrt (x)

58a

G : rOpadhTrJ anmato ; E : rupadher janmato ; L : rupadhTjanmato

5 8d

SG, E : kamam ; L : kaQam (x)

5 9d

SG, E : gocaram (x) ; L : gocarai)

60c

E : nabhilapatmasunyatvam (based on Tlb.) ; SG, L :

63a

Correct "nasrayasyagrahe" i n my text i nto "nasrayasyagrahe".

63d

S G : ce!arrt prthag bhave (x) ; E : ceaIp prthag na ca (based on Tlb.) ; L : ne!ar:l

prthag bhavet (x)
1 36

nabhI l apyatmasOnyatvam (x)

64ab

SG : abhedasatvadravyabhyam ekato ' nekavrtyapi (x)

E : abheda-adravya-sattvabhyam ekam anekavrtty api
L : abhedasattvadravyabhyam ekato 'nekavrtyapi

65a

SG, E : aniianutpalabhinnariipeJ)a ; L : anIl anutpalabhinnarupel).a (x)

67b

E : kalpyatvavacyatve ; SG, L : kalpyatvavacyate

67d

E : vacyatadi ; SG, L : vacyatvadi

68a

E : tasyato bhinna . . . ; SG, L : tadanyabhinna . . .

68cd

E : na yukta-evam ato 'yukta yogacaranayoditil).

SG, L : na yukt(y)aiva manoyukta yogacaranayaditi (x )

74b

E : te svasamanya . . . (based on Tib.) ; SG, L : tatsvasamanya . . .

76b

SG : svabhave ce!asadhanam (x) ; E : svabhavenetasadhanam ; L : svabhave

neHasadhanam (x)

76d

SG : mayavan any [v?] abhutatal) ; E : maya yadvad abhutata (based on Tib.) ; L : ma

yavan nanv abhutata

78b

E : yadi (based on Tib.) ; SG, L : yatal).

79d

SG : dr. . . vyasattvatal). ; E : drtasya-adravyasattvatal). (based on Tib. "snang ba") ;

L : tathapy adravyasattvatal)

80c

E : heyaprahatrsadbhavat (based on Tib.) ; SG, L : heyaprahatryasadbhavat

82b

SG : vastvabhave bhave sati ; E :

svabhave vastuno 'sati (based on Tib.) ; L : vastv

abhave bhavet sati

82c

SG : na dr!ir nastiko ; E : nastitadr!iko (based on Tib.) ; L : taddrtirnastiko

83ab

SG : svayamapayikatvasau pare . . . padakal) ; E : svayamapayikas casau parearrs ca vipadakal) ; L : svayamapayikatve 'sau parearr ca vipadakal)

83d

SG, E : ajirJ)a ; L : aclrl).a (x)

84c

SG, E : bhavatvad ; L : bhavanad (x)

84d

SG, E : mata(I).) ; L : matal) (x)

- 1 37 -

m***$. fiW* *.
*23-j} 2003if. 139 - 1 70

An Annotated Translation of

MadhyamakahrdayakarikaITarkajvala V.S5- 1 14
Paul HOORNAERT
1. Edited Tibetan text of MHKffJ V.85-U4

[Editions used: Cone (C.) Dbu-ma Dsa 22 I b7-227a7 ; Derge (D.) Dbu-ma Dsa 22 I b7-227a7 ; Pe
king (P.) Dbu-ma Dsa 247a6-25 3b7]

khyod kyi' chos kyi de nyid ni nam mkha' dang mtshungs pa nyid kyis2 mam par mi rtog pa
nyid du 'dod pa de yang mi rigs tel ji Ita zhe naf

mam par mi rtog dngos po nilI

mkha' dang mtshungs pa nyid mi rigsll
mam rtog 'du shes sna tshogs kyill
go skabs rab tu ' byed phyir roll (85)
[nakasasamata yukta nirvikalpasya vastunal).1
nanasarpjfiavikalpanam avakasaprabhavanatll (85)]

zhes bya ba ni nam mkha' ni mam par mi rtog pa dang ldan pa yin du zin kyang sngon po dang
yangs pa dangl dag pa dang rna dag pa la sogs par mam par rtog pa' i 'du shes sna tshogs kyi go
skabs rab tu ' byed par byed doll gal te chos mams kyi de nyid kyang de dang 'dra bar gyur na
ni de yang dag pa dang rna dag pa la sogs par mam par rtog pa' i 'du shes sna tshogs kyi spyod
yul yin pa' i phyir mam par mi rtog pa nyid nyams par ' gyur roll
gzhan yang khyed cag yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid brjod du med pa nyid yin par 'dod ces
grags pa de la yangl

skyes pa brj od med nyid mi rigsll

dgag pa gong du bstan phyir roll
brj od du med nyid yin gyur na ' angll
kun rdzob la ni de nyid norll (86)
U ate nanabhilapyatvarp pratikepat puroditatl
saty apy anabhilapyatve sarpvrtau tattvavibhramal).11 (86)]
I

P : khyed
P: kyi

- 1 39 -

[Co 222a4, D. 222a4, P. 247b3 ] zhes bya ba ni yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid skyes pa la ni
brjod du med pa nyid mi rigs tel de' i dgag pa nil brjod bya spyi ldan dngos po stell der snang
blo yi rgyu yin phyirll de ni de' i bdag nyid yod pasll brjod med nyid du mi rigs soli zhes bya ba
la sogs pa gong du bstan pa' i phyir roll ci ste yang mam pa 'ga' zhig gis brjod du med pa nyid
yin par gyur na yang de Ita na yang de kun rdzob pa yin pas kun rdzob pa de la de nyid yin par
nor bar mi bya' oil
gzhan yang/

de la de nyid gzhan med phyirll

gal te de nyid mthong 'dod nal/
bum la ' ang bum pa gzhan med pasll
ci phyir de nyid mthong mi 'dodll (87)
[tattve ' nyatattvasadbhavad yadItarp tattvadarsanaml
ghate ' pi dvighatabhavat kirp netarp tattvadarsanaml/ (87)]

ces bya ba ni gal te don dam pa de la don dam pa' i de nyid gnyis pa gzhan med pa'i phyir gal
te don dam pa stong pa nyid des de nyid mthong bar 'dod na de Ita na bum pa la ' ang bum pa
gnyis pa gzhan med pas de mthong bas kyang ci' i phyir don dam pa' i de nyid mthong bar brtag
par mi 'dod del/
ci ste yang 'di snyam du mam par mi rtog pa ni brjod du med pa nyid yin yang chos kyi dby
ings ni2 chu' i khams dang/ gser dang nam mkha' dag pa bzhin du dag par 'dod pas de dag pas
sems la yang dag pa yod pa kho nar sems na de la kho bos dgag pa bshad par bya ste/

khyod kyi3 tshul skyon sba phyir gyi4 II

de ni nyon mongs byang mi 'gyurll
gser la sogs pa rkyen mams kyill
rjes su 'gyur ba yin phyir roll (88)
[na nIticchidraguptyartharp tatsarpklesavisuddhite/
syatarp te kanakadlnarp pratyayanuvidhanatal).11 (88)]

[Co 222b2, D. 222b2, P. 248a2] zhes bya ba ni chu' i khams dang/ gser dang/ nam mkha' dag las
rdul dang gya' dang sprin la sogs pa rkyen dag yod na dri rna dang bcas pa dag tu snang lal
rkyen de dag med na dag pa dag tu snang zhing yang dri rna can du 'gyur ba dang/ de nas yang
I

3
4

'de' omitted in C, D .
C, D: na
P: kyis
P : te

1 40

dag pa dag tu ' gyur ba bzhin du gal te chos kyi dbyings kyang de kho na bzhin na Ian ' ga' mam
par dag pa dangl Ian 'ga' dri rna dang bcas par ' gyur bas de ni khyod kyi l tshul gyi skyon de sba
ba tsam de kho na' i phyir smras par zad kyil chos kyi dbyings de ni kun nas nyon mongs pa
dangl mam par byang bar mi ' gyur lal gser la sogs pa ni rkyen mams kyi rjes su ' gyur ba yin
pa' i phyirl gser la sogs pa' i dpe de dag gis chos kyi dbyings mtshon pa' i don mi ' grub boll
,
di ltar na ni rigs pa dang ldan pa nyid du ' gyur tel

nam mkha' rtag tu mam dag stell

mig ni dag dang rna dag paslI
dri bcas dri med mkha' 'dod dangll
chos mams chos nyid de bzhin noll (89)
[yathakasuddhyasuddhibhyarp. khyati kharp. samalamalaml
visuddharp. ca sadakasarp. dharmal).arp. dharmata tatha/I (89)]

[C. 222b5 , D. 222b5, P. 248a6] zhes bya ba ni ji ltar rab rib can dbang po nyams pas nam
mkha' kun du skra shad2 dangl sbrang rna dangl sbrang bu yang dag pa rna yin pa' i dra ba dag
gis dkrigs3 pa mthong zhingl de nyid kyis kyang rab rib sel ba' i mig sman bsten pas mig dag
pas4 na nam mkha' skra shad5 dangl sbrang rna dangl sbrang bu dang bral bar kun du mthong
yang dbang po nyams pa dang rna nyams pas nam mkha' de rna dag pa dang dag par mthong
ba' i tshe nam mkha' la ni ' gyur ba med pa de bzhin du chos nyid rang bzhin gyis mam par dag
pa la yang byis pa blo gros kyi mig yongs su rna dag pa mams kyis6 dri rna dang bcas par
mthong zhingl 'phags pa stong pa nyid la Ita ba' i mig sman bsten pa blo gros kyi7 mig mam par
dag pa mams kyis ni dri rna med pa nyid du rtogs kyang blo dri rna dang bcas pa dangl dri rna
med pas chos nyid rna dag pa dang dag par mthong ba' i tshe nal chos nyid la ni ' gyur ba ' ga'
yang med do zhe nal de' i phyir bshad pal

rna dag la sogs blo ' khrul tell

byed pa' i chos yin las kyi minll (90ab)
[tatkli!atvadidhIbhranti kartur dharmo na karmal).a (90ab)]

[C. 223a2 , D. 223a2, P. 248b3] zhes bya ba ni dper na nam mkha' rna dag pa dang dag par
snang bas blo 'khrul pa de ni byed pa po Ius dang dbang po mam par shes pa dang bcas pa' i
I

P : kyis
P: bshad

P: dgrigs

P: pa

P: bshad

P: kyi

P: kyis

141

blo' i tshogs kyi chos yin gyil narn rnkha' la sogs pa marn par shes par bya ba' i las kyi chos rna
yin pa de bzhin du chos kyi dbyings rna dag pa dang dag pa zhes bya ba ni yang byed pa po log
pa' i shes pa dangl yang dag pa' i shes pa dang ldan pa' i chos yin gyil chos kyi dbyings marn par
shes par bya ba' i chos rna yin pas khyed kyisl de ni dri bcas dri rna medii ces srnras pa de ni rni
rigs soil
gzhan yangl

de la drnigs pa dag rna yinlI

de nyid drnigs byar rni 'dod doll (90cd)
[na tadalarnbana suddhis tattvarp nalarnbyarn iyatell (90cd)]

zhes bya ba de ni chos kyi dbyings de la drnigs pa' i ye shes ni dag pa yin par rni rigs l tel de la
drnigs na ye shes de marn par rni rtog pa nyid du rni ' grub pa' i phyir roll chos kyi dbyings de
nyid kyang drnigs par bya ba yin par rni 'dod del don darn par chos kyi dbyings zhes bya ba de
nyid drnigs su rned pa' i phyir roll
gzhan yangl

de nyid rdzas su yod yin nail

skyon ni snga rna bzhin du ' gyurll
'jig rten 'das pa marn2 rni rtogll
de blor rni 'dod 'jig phyir roll (9 1 )
[dravyasattve c a tattvasya purvavad doasarpplava1
lokottaravikalpa ca tadbuddhir na rnata vyayat/I (9 1 )]

[C. 223a5, D. 223a5, P. 248b8] zhes bya ba ni chos kyi dbyings de nyid rdzas su yod pa nyid du
rtog na de la skyonl kun nas nyon rnongs marn byang lasll gal te serns ni rdzas 'dod nail tshor
sogs de bzhin skye ba' i phyirll de grub pas na gnod pa medii ces bya ba dag 'dir yang snga rna
bzhin du 'byung bar ' gyur roll
'jig rten las 'das pa' i ye shes kyi tshe na yang gang chos nyid la drnigs pa marn par rni rtog pa
de skye'o zhe nal de Ita bu ' i blo skye ba yod par rni 'dod del de skyes rna thag tu 'jig pa' i phyir
roll des na 'jig rten las 'das pa'i blo de ji Itar 'jig par rni ' gyur zhes bya bar shes par bya' oll
gzhan yangl

ji srid shes bya'i rj es 'jug pall

I

P: dag par mi rigs

C, D: rnams

1 42

de srid blo ni rab rib canll (92ab)

[tavat satirnira buddhir yavaj jfieyanukaril)II (92ab)]
gal te des skyon cir 'gyur zhe nal

ji srid shes pa drnigs yod pal II

de srid shes bya' i rjes 'jug nyidll (92cd)
[yavad utpadyate jfianarp tavaj jfieyanukarita/I (92cd)]

ces bya bar ' gyur tel des na yongs su grub pa' i no bo nyid la drnigs pa 'jig rten las 'das pa' i blo
yang rab rib can nyid du yin par ' gyur tel shes bya ' i marn par shes pa' i rjes su 'jug pa' i phyir ro
II

'

na ji Itar rigs par ' gyur zhe nal blo rab rib dang bcas pa de nyid shes bya'i marn pa' i rjes su

'jug pas ni 'khor ba 'byung bar ' gyur lal des gang gi tshe shes bya' i ngo bo nyid yongs su rna
grub par shes pas drnigs pa rned pa de' i tshe na nil 'khor bar rni ' gyur bas de ni chos marns kyi
de nyid yin par bsarns soil
khyed rang byung gi ye shes skad cig gcig dang ldan pa nyid du 'dod pa gang yin pa de yang
'di ltar rni ' thad del

tharns cad rnkhyen nyid cig car rninll

shes pa rang la 'jug pa nill
rned phyir ral gri so bzhin danglI
rang rig ' gog par byed phyir roll (93)
[svatrnanlvasidharaya j fianavrtter asarnbhavatl
svasarpvittiniedhac ca na syat sarvaj fiata sakrt/I (93)]

[C. 223b4, D. 223b4, P. 249a8] zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar shes bya marn pa tha dad pa du mas tha
dad pa yin yang chos nyid ngo bo nyid gcig pa' i phyir tharns cad rnkhyen pa des skad cig gcig
gis dbyer rned pa'i sgo nas rnkhyen par rung gil gang la ye shes skad cig rna yin pa de la ni
tharns cad rnkhyen pa nyid des shes bya marn pa tha dad pa dag cig car yongs su rnkhyen par
rni rung stel shes pa rang la 'j ug pa 'gal ba' i skyon du ' gyur bas de Ita bu rned pa' i phyir tel
dper na ral gri rang gi so gang yin pa de nyid kyis de nyid la gcod par rni byed pa la sogs pa
bzhin noll de'i phyir gal te de ye shes skad cig rna don dam par yod pa nyid yin na shes pa' i
skad cig rna snga rna yongs s u shes par bya ba' i phyir shes pa' i skad cig rna gnyis p a l a Itos
dgos soil
gzhan yang chos nyid ni ci yang rna yin pa' i phyirl dngos po ' i rang gi ngo bo nges par rni 'dzin
I

D: na

1 43

pas rang rig pa yang ' gog par byed pa' i phyir thams cad mkhyen pa nyid skad cig gcig dang
ldan pa nyid du mi 'grub bolll kho bo cag 'dod pa ltar na de yang ' grub stel ji Ita zhe nal

mam par mi rtog ' phags blo ' i gzungll

mam pa kun du brjod med nyidlI
sngar bzhin skye ba bkag pa' i phyirll
skye med rdzas su yod min phyirll (94)
[pragvaj j atipratikepad ajatadravyasattvatal]1
nirvikalparyadhlgrahyo ' nabhilapyasca sarvatha/I (94)]

[Co 224a l , D. 224a l , P. 249b5] ces bya ba ni mam par mi rtog pa 'phags pa' i blo ' i gzung ba ni
'dzin pa med pa' i tshul gyis gzung ba yin tel sngar de nyid shes2 pa tshol ba' i rab tu byed par
bstan pa bzhin skye ba bkag pa' i phyir skye ba med pa' i phyir dangl kun rdzob tu rgyu dang
rkyen rigs mthun pa las 'byung ba' i phyir bdag nyid rdzas su yod pa rna yin pa' i phyir roll de ni
mam pa kun du brjod du med pa nyid kyang yin tel ngo bo nyid stong pa'i phyir roll de lta bu' i3
ngo bo nyid ni don dam pa yin par sbyar roll
gzhan yang khyed 'dod pa ltarl

yod dang med pa' i dngos nyid kyill

ngo bo don dam nyid yin nail
sgro 'dogs pa dang skur mtha' lasll
grol ba khyod la ji ltar yodll (95)
[bhavabhavasya bhavo 'pi svabhaval] paramarthikal]!
samaropapavadantamuktis te vidyate katham/I (95)]

ces bya ba ni 'di ltar sgro 'dogs pa dangl skur pa 'debs pa' i mtha' gnyis las grol bar 'dod pas ni
yod pa dang med pa' i mtha' gnyis yongs su spang bar bya ba yin na khyod ni yod pa dang med
pa' i dngos po nyid kyi ngo bo ni yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid kyi don dam pa nyid yin par
'dod pas de la yod pa nyid yin na sgro 'dogs pa' i mtha' las mi ' grol la med pa nyid yin na skur
pa 'debs pa'i mtha' las mi ' grol pas mtha' gnyis spangs pa' i phyir grol ba khyod la ji ltar yodl
kho bo 'dod pa ltarl

yod min de nyid skye med phyirll

med min de yod rna yin phyirll
I

P adds ' zhe na' .

C: zhes
C: bus

144

yod dang med pa gnyis spangs paslI

der 'dod de phyir gnyis su medii (96)
[na bhavas tattvato 'jater nabhavas tadabhavata1
bhavabhavadvayapetam i!arp tattvam ato 'dvayarn/I (96)]

[Co 224a6, D. 224a6, P. 250a4) ces bya ba ni yod pa rna yin tel don dam pa' i de nyid du dngos
po thams cad skye ba med pa' i phyir roll med pa rna yin tel yod pa de yod pa rna yin pa' i phyir
tel yod pa yod na de las bzlog pas med par 'gyur ba yin na yod pa de yod pa rna yin pa' i phyir
med par yang mi ' gyur ba' i phyir roll de ltar yod pa dang med pa gnyis spangs pasl gnyis su
med pa ni de nyid yin par 'dod pas de' i phyir gnyis su med pa de ni rigs pa dang mi 'gal ba yin
noll
khyod 'dod pa Itar na skyon chen po gzhan 'dir yang ' gyur tel

ston pa dmigs med mi ' gyur tell

de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i phyirll
byang chub mnyam nyid mi ' gyur tell
de nyid rang snang tha dad phyirlI (97)
[niralambo na sasta syat tathatalambanatvata1
na capi samata bodhes tattvasvabhasabhedata// (97)]

zhes bya ba ni yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid kyi de bzhin nyid ces bya ba la dmigs pa yod na
ston pa sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das dmigs pa med pa nyid du mi ' gyur tel de bzhin nyid la
dmigs pa' i phyir roll des na lung lasl sangs rgyas nam mkha' i mtshan nyid dell nam mkha' la
yang mtshan nyid medii mtshan gzhi mtshan nyid nges grol ball dmigs med khyod la phyag
'tshal loll zhes gsungs pa la sogs pa dang ' gal loll ston pa de' i byang chub kyang mnyam pa
nyid du mi ' gyur tel gang gi phyir zhe nal yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid ces bya ba' i de nyid
gcig dang rab2 snang ba' i ye shes gnyis tha dad pa' i phyir tel de ltar gnyis yod na ngo bo nyid
gnyis mngon par rtogs pa de ji ltae mnyam pa nyid du 'gyurl
gzhan yangl

de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa' i bloll

nus pa rna bzhag ga las byungll
nam mkha' i me tog snang ba' i bloll
nus pa rna bzhag mi rigs bzhinll (98)
I

P. adds ' gnyis pas' after ' pas' .

C, D: rab tu
C, D: srid

1 45

[tathatalambana ya dhIJ:1 kuto ' nahitasaktikaJ

na khapupabhadhlr yukta yathanahitasaktikaJ/ (98)]

[C. 224b4, D. 224b4, P. 250b3] zhes bya ba ni khyed cag kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni thog rna
med pa'i dus dang ldan pa yin pa' i mig la sogs pa 'jug pa' i rnam par shes pa thams cad skye ba
dang ' gag pa na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la yang nas yang du rang rang gi nus pa 'jog par
byed cing/ nus pa de dag yul dang dbang po dang rnam par shes pa sna tshogs pas yongs su
smin par gyur pa ni ' khor ba ji srid pa' i bar du kun gzhi rnam par shes pa las mngon par grub
par' 'dod ces grags pas des na so so' i skye bo de nyid ma2 mthong ba la de bzhin nyid la dmigs
pa' i blo nam yang rna skyes pa la de yang skye ba med pa' i phyir/ rna skyes pa la ' gag pa yang
med na mi ' gag pa gang gis kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la nus pa gang bzhag pa yongs su smin
par gyur pas de bzhin nyid mthong ba' i blor ' gyur ba' i nus pa gzhog pa yang med doll de ltar
nus pa rna bzhag par de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa' i blo rgyu med pa de dag ga las ' byung bar
' gyur tel dper na nam mkha' i me tog tu3 snang ba' i blo la nus pa skyes pa med pa' i phyir sngon
nam yang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la nus pa rna bzhag pa des phyis kyang nam mkha' i me
tog mthong ba' i blo skye bar mi rigs pa bzhin noll
gzhan yang/

rang tshul sbed pas khyod kyis nill

.
de nyid gcig nyid gzhan mi ' grol// (99ab)
[naikatvanyatvamuktarp vas tattvarp svanayaguptital)/ (99ab)]

[C. 225a l , D. 225a l , P. 25 1 a l ] zhes bya ba ni khyod yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid dang/
gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yod par 'dod cing/ de gnyis gcig pa nyid kyang rna yin lal tha
dad pa nyid kyang rna yin par brjod pa yang rang gi tshul sbed pa tsam du zad pas des kyang
yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid kyi de nyid ces bya ba de gcig pa nyid dang gzhan nyid las mi
' grol loll dbu rna shes pa' i tshul gyis4 rjes su ' brang ba la nil

rdzas med dmigs su med pa'i phyirl/

nged la ji skad smras de rigsll (99cd)
[adravyanupalabhyatvad yuktarp nas tad yathoditam// (99cd)]

zhes bya ba ni rdzas su med pa kho nas ngo bo nyid las dmigs su med pa' i phyir nged la ni
sngar ji skad srnras pa' i gcig pa nyid kyang rna yin lal tha dad pa nyid kyang rna yin par des rigs
I

C, D: pa
' rna ' omitted in P.
P: bzhin du
P: gyi
'de' omitted in C, D.

- 1 46 -

pa kho na' oll

kho bo cag 'dod pa ltar nam mkha' la sogs pa'i dpe yang 'thad del j i Ita zhe nal

nam mkha' 'dra ba ' ang skye med pasll

khyad par med phyir rna gos phyirll
shin tu brjod du med nyid kyangll
bIos ni mam kun gzung med phyirll ( 1 00)
[aj ater nirviseatvat khatulyatp capy alipyatal).1
atyantanabhiHipyatp ca sarvathapy agrahad dhiya/I ( 1 00)]

[C. 225a4 , D. 225a4, P. 25 1 a5] zhes bya ba' i don dam pa' i de nyid ni narn mkha' dang 'dra stel
de ' ang 'di Itar dngos po skyes pa la ni mam pa' i khyad par las sna tshogs nyid du dmigs par
'gyur gyil dngos po rna skyes pa la ni skye ba med pas khyad par med pa' i phyir dangl spros
pa'i rtog pa thams cad kyis gos pa med pas rna gos pa' i phyir nam mkha' dang 'dra' oll de ni
shin tu brj09 du med pa nyid kyang yin tel 'di Itar bIos gzung ba'i dngos po la ni mngon par
brjod pa 'jug par ' gyur gyi l I de ni bIos mam pa kun du gzung du med pa' i phyir shin tu brjod
du med pa nyid du rigs soil
gal te de shin tu gcig tu rna skyes pa nyid yin na de j i ltar 'jig rten las 'das pa2 zhes bya ba la
sogs pa'i tha snyad du ' gyur zhe nal de' i phyir bshad pal

skye ba rab rib bral ba' i bloll

'jig rten 'das pa yin par 'dod/I
'jig rten las sgroI don phyir dangll
'jig rten shin tu 'da' phyir roll ( 1 0 1 )
[vigatotpadatimira matir lokottara mata/
lokad uttaraI)arthena lokatikramato 'pi va/I ( 1 0 1 )]

[C. 225a7, D. 225b l , P. 25 1 b l ] zhes bya ba ni skye ba nyid rab rib stel de dang bral ba'i3 blo
gang la yod pa de ni skye ba rab rib dang bral ba'i blo 'jig rten las 'das pa yin par 'dod del ci' i
phyir zhe nal 'jig rten las sgroI ba' i don gyi phyir dang 'jig rten las shin t u 'da' ba' i phyir te4 I j i
skad d u de n i 'jig rten lass gyo b a dang bskyod p a dang 'da' ba' i phyir 'j ig rten las 'das p a zhes
bya'o zhes gsungs pa Ita bu' oll gzhan yangl

de ni mi rtog dmigs rned dangl

1

4
5

P: gyis
C, D: pa' i
'ba'i' omitted in P.
P: dang
P: la

1 47

mtshan rna med cing de yis nil

rang gzhan chos nyid cig car dul
rtogs I med tshul gyis2 mnyam nyid rtogsl ( 1 02)
[nirvikalpa niralamba nimimitta ca sa taya/
abodhasamatabodhat svanyadharmataya salq1l1 ( 1 02)]

zhes bya ba la blo de ni mam par mi rtog pa yin tel rna skyes pa kho nas mam par rtog pa
thams cad dang bra I ba' i phyir roll dmigs pa med pa yang yin tel dngos po thams cad mi dmigs
pa' i phyir roll mtshan rna med pa yang yin tel yul la mtshan mar mi 'dzin pa' i phyir roll blo des'
shes pa rang gi chos nyid dang shes bya gzhan gyi chos nyid cig car du rtogs4 pa med pa' i tshul
gyis mnyam pa nyid du rtogs pa yang yin tel kho bo cag ni skad cig gcig gis mngon par rdzogs
par byang chub par mam par 'jog pa' i phyir roll
:jig rten las 'das pa' i ye shes kyi shes bya brtag pa' i phyirl

chos mams skye ba med pa nill

chos bdag med pa nyid ces byalI
de la rtog dri ' i mtshan rna daglI
' byung ba med pa snga rna bzhinll ( 1 03 )
[anutpado h i dharmal)arp dharmanairatmyam ucyatel
na kalpanakalankankasarpbhavas tatra piirvavatlI ( 1 03)]

[Co 225b5 , D. 225b5 , P. 25 1 b7] zhes bya ba smras tel chos mams skye ba med pa nyid gang yin
pa de nyid chos bdag med pa nyid ces bya stel de la rtog pa'i dri ma' i mtshan rna dag 'byung ba
med pa ni de nyid shes pa tshol ba'i le'ur bstan pa snga rna bzhin tel rtog pa nyid dri rna yin te
snang ba' oll de nyid mtshan rna ste5 mngon rtags6 soil de la de dag mam pa thams cad du
' byung ba med doll
'dir smras pal mdo sde lasl don dam pa ni rtag tu med pa dangl rtog ge ' i spyod yul rna yin no
zhes gsungs pas mngon sum gyi yul yin par gsungs pa yin na khyed kyis ni don dam par rtogs
par bya ba rna yin par bstan pas rtog ge' i spyod yul yin tel mtho ris la sogs pa bzhin no zhes
smras pas lung dang ' gal 10 zhe nal pha rol po dag gi bsam pa de bzlog pa' i phyir bshad pal

gal te de nyid rtog ge yilI

spyod yul min phyir rjes dpag pasll
I
2
,
4

,
6

C, D: rtog
P: gyi
P: de'i
C, D: rtog
C, D: de
C, D: rtogs

1 48

de mi rtogs l pa de yi phyirll
ehos mams ehos nyid brtag min nail ( 1 04)
[tattvasyatarkagamyatvat tadbodho nanumanata!)1
natas tarkel}a dharmal}arp gamyate dharmateti eet!I ( 1 04)]

zhes bya ba ni gal te pha rol po dag de ltar sems na' oll

'di la rjes dpag skyon med pa2 II

lung gi rjes su sgrub byed pasll
brtags3 pa' i mam rtog ehu bo dagll
sna tshogs rna Ius bsal mdzad nasll ( 1 05)
[ihanumanan nirdoad agamanuvidhayina!)1
kalpitaseavividhavikalpaughaniralqte!)11 ( 1 05)]

zhes bya ba ni 'di la beom ldan 'das kyis dang por rjes su dpag pa' i shes pa skyon med pa lung
gi rj es su sgrub par byed pas rang dang gzhan gyi gzhun lugs kyis yongs su brtags pa' i mam par
rtog pa' i ehu bo sna tshogs rna Ius pa dag bsal bar mdzad nas de' i ' og tul

sangs rgyas mam rtog mi mnga' ball

dgongs pa mkha' mnyam ye shes kyislI
shes bya mtha' dag j i bzhin dull
[ehos mams gzhag pa nyid rtogs shingll
ming la sog pa thob pa nyidll] ( 1 06t
[sakalajfieyayathatmyam akasasamaeetasal)l
jfianena nirvikalpena buddha!) pasyanty adarsanat!1 ( 1 06)]

[C. 226a3 , D. 226a4, P. 25 2a7] 'das pa dangl rna ' ongs pa dangl da Itar byung ba dangl brjod
par bya ba rna yin pa dangl 'dus rna by as zhes bya ba shes bya mam pa lnga po mi dmigs pa ni
nam mkha' mnyam pa' i sems soil mam par mi rtog pa' i mngon sum gyi ye shes kyi skad eig
ma' oll nye bar brtags nas gzigs pa zhes bya stel gzigs pa med pa' i tshul gyis soil

P; rtog
P: pa'o

P: brtag

The Tibetan translation has five verse feet, but the last two feet do not correspond with the extant Sanskrit
manuscript. When reconstructed from the Sanskrit, the fourth foot in Tibetan should read something like " gzigs
med tshul gyis gzigs so " .
-

1 49

des na rjes su dpag pa' i yuIll

de nyid yin par sgrub mi nusll
de nyid shes pa' i mi mthun phyogsl/
gang yin de ni des zlog byedlI ( 1 07)
[ato ' numanaviayarp na tattvarp pratipadyatel
tattvajnanavipako yas tasya tena nirakriya!I ( 1 07)]

mam par mi l rtog pa' i de kho na nyid kyi shes pa' i mi mthun pa'i phyogs brtags2 pa zhes bya ba
de ni rjes su dpag pa' i shes pa 'dis zlog par byed pa yin gyil rjes su dpag pa' i spyod yul du de
kho na nyid sgrub par byed pa ni rna yin no zhes sbyar bar bya' oll
yang gal te rjes su dpag pas mi mthun pa' i phyogs j i ltar bzlog par bya zhe nal srnras pal

lung gi khyad par tha dad pasll

tha dad gyur pa' i blo la cill
lung gi dbye ba med pa lalI
rtogs par gyur pas gzhan c i yodll ( 1 08)
[agamantarabhedena bhedayatasu buddhiul
abhede ' py agamasyanya ka parlkakamo vidhi1 ( 1 08)]

[C. 226a7, D. 226a7 , P. 25 2b4] lung las gzhan pa' i lung ni lung gi khyad par tel de ni rgol ba
sum brgya drug cu rtsa gsum gyi dbye bas shes pa' i bye brag skye bar ' gyur ba' oll gang dag tha
mi dad par 'dod pa de dag la ni thabs gzhan gyis brtag par rigs pa rna yin gyil gzhan du phyogs
dang gtan tshigs dang dpe dang ldan pa' i rjes su dpag pas yin noll ci' i phyir zhe nal gang gi
phyirl

mi mthun phyogs ni spang bya ball

dam bcas tsam gyis j i Itar 'dodll
mam par rtog pa rna spangs pariI
mam par mi rtog blo ji ltarll ( 1 09)
[pratijnamatraka ne!a pratipakanirakriya!
aniiddhe vipake ca nirvikalpa mati kuta// ( 1 09)]

mam par rtog pa thams cad 'gegs par byed pa na dam bca' ba 'ba' zhig gis byed par nus pa rna
I

mi' omitted in P.
P: btags
,

1 50 -

yin tel mi mthun pa' i phyogs brtags pa zhes bya ba rna spangs kyi bar du mam par mi rtog pa' i
blo ' byung bar ' gyur ba rna yin pas dam bca' ba smras nas gtan tshigs brjod par bya' oll dpe
yang brjod par bya' oll mngon par 'dod pa' i don sgrub pa ni sgrub par byed pa'i rjes su dpag pa
tshang ba yin pas soil

thub pa bden pa gzigs pa yislI

'di ltar bden pa gnyis su gsungslI
tha snyad la ni brten nas sull
de nyid don ni rtogs ' gyur phyirll ( 1 1 0)
[satyadvayam atas coktal1l munina tattvadarsina!
vyavaharal1l samasritya tattvarthadhigamo yata!:tll ( 1 1 0)]

[Co 226b4, D. 226b4, P. 253a2] rjes su dpag pa gang gis mam par brtags pa 'gog par byed pa de
ni yang dag pa' i kun rdzob tu tha snyad kyi bden pa zhes bya ba la brten nas byed pa yin noll
tha snyad kyi bden pal de la brten nas de ni rim gyis mam par mi rtog pa brjod du med pa' i don
dam pa rtogs par ' gyur tel ji ltar kun rdzob kyi chos la rna brten par don dam pa rtogs par mi
nus so zhes gsungs pa Ita bu' 011
dbu rna pa' i lugs la rab tu grags pa' i de kho na nyid mam par bzhag cing mal 'byor spyod pa
pa' i de kho na nyid la skyon dang bcas pa nyid du srnras pal

de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa' i bloll

dmigs dang bcas phyir brdzun yin tell
rmi lam sogs yin de shes byall
des na de nyid yin mi rigsll ( 1 1 1 )
[salambanatvad vitatha tathatalambanapi dhI!:t1
svapnadidhlvat tadgrahyal1l natas tattval1l ca yujyatell ( 1 1 1 )]

de kho na nyid la dmigs pa' i blo zhes bya ba ni chos can noll de ni brdzun pa yin te zhes bya
ba ni de' i chos te2 bsgrub par bya ba' oll chos dang chos can bsdoms pa ni phyogs soil dmigs pa
dang bcas pa' i phyir zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs tel gang dang gang dmigs pa dang bcas pa yin
pa de dang de ni brdzun pa yin tel dper na rrni lam gyi shes pa bzhin zhes bya ba ni dpe' oll
gang gi phyir de brdzun yin pa de' i phyir des gzung3 ba de ni de kho na nyid do zhes bya bar
rigs pa rna yin tel de yang brdzun nyid du thaI bar ' gyur ba' i phyir roll
gzhan yangl
I

The underlined text is missing in P.

C: de
P: bzung

151

gzung du med pa brjod med pall

shes pa' i spyod pa mam spangs pall
thub pa' i dbang pos gsungs pa' i chosll
de yis 'di Itar 'di la gnodll ( 1 1 2)
[agrahyo 'nabhilapyas ca dhlpracaravivarjitaJY
dharma ukto munlndreI]a sa caivarp. sati badhyatell ( 1 1 2)]

[Co 227a 1 , D. 227a2, P. 253a8] blo 'i yul nyid yin pa' i phyir gzung du med pa nyid dangl brjod
du med pa nyid yin par mi rigs tel 'di ltar chos nyidl de ni gzung du med pa dang brjod du med
pa' o zhes bya ba dangl de bzhin du don dam pa' i bden pa ni gang la shes pa 'jug pa med pa'o
zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa dang ' gal ba' i phyir roll
rab tu byed pa yongs su rdzogs nas shin tu spangs pa'i don dang reg par bya ba' i phyirl

de Itar lung rigs ldan pa yilI

de nyid gang zhig sngar bstan pall
rigs pas yongs su brtags na yangll
de las nyams pa med par gnasll ( 1 1 3 )
[ato yuktyagamopetarp. tattvarp. yat prag udahrtam/
parlkyamaI]arp. yuktyaivarp. tadevavyahatarp. sthitam/I ( 1 1 3)]

gang mal ' byor spyod pa pas yongs su brtags pa' i de kho na nyid ni mam par brtags pa na
dpyad bzod pa rna yin noll

kha cig phung po ' i ljon shing chags2 II

kha cig mam shes rgya la thogslI
yang dag mtha' yi gyang sar yangll
rna lhung rgyal ba'i thugs sras rolll ( 1 1 4)

de Itar na de kho na nyid gang de nyid shes pa tshol ba' i rab tu byed par lung dang' rigs pa
dang ldan par bdag gis 'di skad dul shes bya mam kun rna grub phyirll gang la mam par mi rtog
pa' ill blo yang skye bar mi ' gyur lall de nyid mnyam med de mkhyen gsungsll zhes bya ba la
sogs pa' i gzhung gis bdag dang gzhan gyi rtog ge pa mams kyi rjes su dpag pas kyang bskyod
1

' nyid' omitted in P.

C, D: chag
C : rab tu dbye par lung dang; 'dang' omitted in P.
- 1 52 -

'
par nus pa rna ym par yang dag par rab tu gnas pa ym noll dbu rna' l snymg PO l ' grel pa rtog ge

' bar ba lasl mal ' byor spyod pa pa' l de kho na nYld gtan la dbab pa la 'J ug pa ste le'u lnga pa'ol
I [C 227a7, D 227a7, P 253b7]

1 53

Notes on the Sanskrit text of MHK V.85- H 4

The fol l owmg I d l I "t o f the vanant readl l1g o f MHK V 85 - 1 1 4 that are found m the Sankrtya
yana-Gokhale handcopy (SG). EJ lma\ unpublIhed ed ition (E). and Lmdtner\ editIOn ( L ) Ap
parently correct or preferable read mgs are mdlcated m bold An (x) ha" been added after l eadmg"
that .11 e m my J u dgment mcorrect

85d

SG ava

86a

SG Jata':;Yd n (a)bhI l apyatva, E J ataya na hi al apyatvaJ11 , L jate nanabhilapyatva

86c

SG. L "aty apy anabh I l apltve, E saty apy anabhiHipyatve

87a

SG, E tdttve ' nyatattva"adbhavad , L tattve ' nyatattvasadbhavad ex)

87c

S G gha!e ' pi h i gha!abhavat, E gha!e ' py anyagha!abhavat, L ghate ' pi dvighaabhavat

90b

S G , L karq dharmo, E kartur dharmo

93a

SG, E watmanTvasldharaya, L vatmanTvaldhal aya

94b

SG, L aJ atadravya"attvata , E aJatyadravya"attvata

94d

SG. L ' nabhIl.1pyaca, E ' nabh I l apyaca

95a

SG, E bhavabhavasvabhavo 'PI, L bhavabhavasya bhavo ' pi

97cd

. E avakJaprdbhedanat , L avakasaprabhavanat

G bodhe" tatvavabha"abhedata , E bodhes tattvaprabha5abhedata ,

L bodhl:-' tattvasvabhasabhedatah
98c

SG na khap u )pa ca dhTr, E n a khapu)pabhadhTr, L na khapupabha dhir

1 00..1

SG, E atyantJn abh Ilapyam , L atY.1ntanabh I l lpya111 (x)

I 05b

E agamanuvldhyaymah, SG, L agamamnidhayinaJ;t

- 1 54 -

2. Translation

You say that the true nature of thmgs (tattvam) IS not an object of differentIatmg
thought (mrvlkalpa) because of ItS simllanty WIth space That IS agam not correct Why?
It IS not correct that the non-differentlable realIty IS sImIlar to space, because
gIves way to all kmds of differentlatmg concepts

[space]

(85)

Although space IS not dIfferentIable, It gIves way to all kmds of differentIatmg concepts such as
' blue' , 'wIde' , 'pure ' , 'Impure ' , and so forth If the true nature of thmgs IS SImIlar to space, It
also wIll be the object of all kmds of dIfferentIatmg concepts such as ' pure' , ' Impure ' , and so
forth, so that ItS non-dIfferentIable nature WIll be dented
Furthermore, you say that the perfectly establIshed nature [of thmgs]
(partmpannasvabhiiva) cannot be expressed by words (anabhlliipya) Regardmg that tenet also,
we say
Somethmg that has ansen Viita) cannot be beyond the scope of words, because that has
already been refuted Even If It were beyond the scope of words, a conventIOnal eXIstence
( 'laf!1vr{l) WIll be mIstaken for the true nature of thmgs (86)
It IS not correct that the perfectly establIshed nature, bemg somethmg that has ansen, IS beyond
the scope of words 2 We have already refuted that, as follows "The referent of a word IS any real
entity WhICh possesses the general property [expressed by that word] , because any such [entIty] IS
the cause of the conSCIOusness m whIch ItS own Image appears And because that [general prop-

B havavlveka's refutatIOn of the Yogacara understandIng of the true nature of thIng (tattvam, dharmatii, pannl l
pannasvahhiiva, paramiirtha, tathatii) and o f the correspondIng non-dIfferentIatIng and non-objectIfYIng know
ledge (mrvlkalpajiiiina ) start here and contInues up to verse 1 1 2 The Yogacara texts often compare the true
nature of thIngs With "pace to Illu')trate Its absolute IdentIty or UniformIty (ekarasa )
For the Yogacura, the perfectly establI')hed nature of thIng IS an uncondItIOned (a amskrta ) real Ity Bhavavlveka
argues here that, If the perfectly establIshed nature IS the I nherent nature (svahhiiva ) of dependently amIng
thIng'), It wIll anse together With the thIngs In whIch It Inheres Hence, 11 WIll be a condltloned thIng WIth an
Intnnslc IdentIty that can be Identified and dlfferentlated from other thIngs (verse 85) and that can be expreed
by word (vere 86)
In verse 85 - 1 1 2 Bhavavlveka u.,e a number of key terms, whIch In hI') vIew I mply each other aq follows To
anse from condItIOns Viita, utpanna ) - to be a real entlty (dravya wt, vastu ) accordIng to conventIonal thought
- to have an Intnnslc nature ( vahhiiva ) consistIng of IndiVidual and general propertIes ( va- , iimiinyalahar:a )
- to be a potential object (vl wya, jiieya, griihya, iilamhva ) of both nonconceptual (pratyaksa ) and conceptual
(kalpana ) dual knowledge (vlkalpa ) - to be a potentIal object of peech (ahhzliipya ) All of the')e ImplIcatIOns
are negated when the true nature of thIngs IS at ')take (tattvatah, paramiirthata ), as follows What anse') from
condltlOn does not really an')e - IS not a real entity - lacks an Inherent nature - cannot be the object of
e1lher nonconceptual or conceptual dual knowledge - cannot be expres')ed by words
QuotatIOn of MHK Y 6 1 AccordIng to the Yogacara, pannlspannasvahhava 15 the universal of universal s, the
mot general property Inherent In all thIngs ( iimiinvalabana , see SNS , T vol 1 6 , 690c 1 9 , M Y K , Y 1 9)
Whereas all other general propertIes are only names or deSignatIOns (prajiiaptlwt, namamiitra ), pannlpan
navahhiiva 15 the ultImately real nature of all thIngs and IS therefore the only real general property If parznl l
panna l vahhiiva I understood In that way, then Bhavavlveka's reasonIng In MHK Y 6 1 ImplIe5 that It cannot be
Inexpre')slble by words

- 1 55 -

erty J 1 <., [part of] the IdentIty of <.,uch [ entItIe ] , It I'> not correct thdt [ redl entItI e<., ] dre mexpre,><.,Ible '" Even If r omethmg that ha<., al l "en j wel e m <.,ome way or another beyond the <.,cope of
word<." It w I l l "tI l l be a conventIOnal eXI '>tence and you "houl d not mI<.,takenly IdentIfy s>uch a
conventIonal eXI "tence wIth the true nature 01 thmg"
Furthermore,
I l' you argue that [to <.,ee the perfectl y e"tab i i <.,hed natlll el l '> to "ee the true ndtul c of
th mg" becdu<.,e there eXI <.,t<., no other true nature m that [true ndtlll e j , why not '><ly that [ to
ee a pot l I to ee the true nature of rh1l1g" becau'>e III

,1

pot al<.,o there eXI<.,!<., no "ec()Jld

pot ') (87)

I t you <.,ay "In that u ltImate realIty (paranulrtlw ) there eXIt" no other, <.,econd tl ue nature of the
u ltI mate real Ity S1I1ce the u l tImate redi Ity 1 <., thm empty [ of another u lt lI11 dte rea l I ty j [ to <.,ee the
In VCI e 8 7db the YOgdCdl d I cp l I c thdt PUI l I l l IP(/IIII(/ 1 1O hhc/ \ a I thc u ltI mdte redl I ty (po/ {//71c/I t/I({ ) dnd not I Lht
d convcntIondl eXI tencc ( IClI7I1,i ll ), becdu'>e It I '> the only non-dl l'>cn tI ue IMtLll e 01 thl l1g'>
In d pdIdllel pd'>'>dgC 111 the K(// u((//{/ / a/l1o c7 /m (KR) Bhdvdv lvekd II1troduce'> the tol l ow l I1g YogdCdI d ObJCl
tIon dg,lIn'>t h i dl gu mcnt tOl the nonexl '>tence o t unconditIoned ( 0 1(//71 l k r/O ) t h l l1g'> (d Ydllldguchl P 1 98
553 ) 'The YOgdcdl ,I" dl gue d\ tollow" Thcl c CX I'>h no othel [ "t I l l mOl c ultlmdte l ultl l11dte l edlIty (P(I / (/llIcll t/W )
I II the u l tl l11dte l edht) The lI ue ndtu I e (!athu/(l ) l o t t h l llg'> I I " the ult l l1Mte I Cdl Ity (pwumC/I /!za ) 01 thll1g'> 11 you
I B h dvdv lvekd l ,u guc that ultll11dtely (parall1({! I/w[ClIz ) the lI ue lMtuI e 01 t h l l1g ( [(l[/7oli7 ) 1\ cmpty [ 01 dnothcl
tl UC ndtu l e I you I PI OP0'>ltlon I'> 111 conjoI l11lty with I edon But 11 y ou deI t that thc tl UC ndtUI e [ ot thll1g\ I
doc'> not l e,t lly eX It YOlll pI OpoItlon I'> not 111 contoll11lty W ith l ed"on How I I1dccd lould It be 1 11 conl clI Il1 Ity
With rCd<;on to a'>\Cl t th,lt the "upral11 unddne nondu,tI k nowledge (l1 l f l Ika/palllclI lU ) dnd the \ub"equently dtt,lIncd
PlllC munddne knowlcdge (fU/PI 1 //1O /o/xl/w luddha/ullkdoji'icll1a ) hdve noth1l1g nc",> .1'> thclI obl ec['I Th,lt 1\ dcfi
I11tely not 1 11 con l o l ll1lty W ith l edon ' ( T vol 3 0 274b2S-c 3 )
B hdv.1vlvekd l ep l I c\ "Juq ,1'> I t I " not COl l ect t o \ d y thdt mund,lI1e knowledgc h,I'> noth 1 l1gne\, ,I', It'> ohlect
lu'>t '>0 It h not COl l CCt to '>dy [ d'> you do l th,lt thl\ [ '>Upl dl11unddne I know ledge hd\ ,I I Cdl entity d\ I h oblCLl To
c l I ng to the view thdt the tl ue ndture 0 1 thll1g\ I '> d redl entIty I " not COllect bCldU'>C I h ndtu l e 01 be 1 l1g ,I l edl
"
cntlty I very dI f tic u l t to plove ( 274d -5) ( ) Reg,u d 1 l1g YOlll qdtement There eXhh no uthcI ultl mdtc l edl
Ity 111 thc U l t l l11dtC rCdl lty', It '>tatel11ent'> I I kc the,e mean thdt ,ol11eth 1l1g I '> empty heCdU'ie thl\ doe'> not eX I "t 111
thdt, then ,>hephel d,> dnd the l i ke w I l l all h dv e to be cdl lcd '>eer\ 01 thc tl llth becdu<,e they dll kn ow thdt the l e
CXI "t" no othcr '>I 1 k cloth 111 a "Il k cloth Fll l t hermoi c el11ptI ne,,, ' " tdught 111 OI del t o el I l11 l 11 dte I11I'>tdken v iew"
But .I I11I'>tdk.en view ,>uch d\ ' Thele eX I '>h another ultll11dte l edl Ity 1 11 the ultI l11dte l edlIty ' hd'> nevel been pI O
pounded by 'lI1ybody E lllpt \ l1e,> I'> theI e l O i e not tdught \ 11 ordcl to l e tutc a view l i ke that ( 274c I 4- 1 9)
The textudi ou l ce 01 thc YOgdCdl d tdtelllent 'ThcI C eXI'>h no othcl u ltl mdte I e,llIty 111 the u ltlllldte redhty 1\
!1l0t pI Obdbl y the jol l owl l1g paagc j rom the SOl7ld/1l1l11 1l10WI1 0 I L/[/ (/ ' I I thc tI ue ndtul c oj thll1g ( iO[/W/([ )
the u l tIl1ldte l edl ity (pOI Wllcll t/W ) OJ the db<,encc ot I I1 helent CXI\tence 111 th \l1g (dh(II Il1UIlOl } ({["l WIl1 ) h,ld ch l 1cl ent chal dcten'>tIC'> I t would hdve CdUC .mel would dl l '>C 1 1 0m CdllC I t I t dll'>C\ h om l du'>e'> It w I l l be ,[
conditioned l th l I1g l ( 1(/}11 IkJ /a ) 1 1 It I'> londltIoned It W I l l not be thc ultl l1ldte l edllty It It I'> not the Ultll11dtC I C
,I l ity, one w I l l hdve to earch tOl '>Ollle othcl ultlmatc I Cdl n y (dOli dall1 po gzholl z/lig HlIIg I I II bflo/ dg(l \ P(I I
g \ 1 I 1 / 0 ) SlIbh ul1 , becaue the true natu l e the ultll1Mte l e dhty 01 the dbencc 01 I I1hel cnt cXI'>tence I II a l l thll1g\
hd'> no CdUC, doe,> not dl l '>e h om CdU'>C ,lI1d l not conditIoned It cel tdll1 l y I thc l only l ultll1Mtc ledlIty Oncc
one hd I CdlIzed thl'> ultl l1ldte redhty thel e 1\ 110 nced to e,lI c h tor dnothel ultl m,lte truth ( dOli dum po de I dOli
dum pu gZ/7(/}l \ 0 11[;1 IU h/ I([/ 17m hw 1111 dgO l ) Whcthel a Tdthdgdtd dppedl '> 111 the woI ld 01 not thc 1I ue I1d
tlll e 01 dll thlI1g'> I ctab l I hcd pel l11anently dnd eteI ll ally dnd thc l edlm 01 l edhty (d/7(// madl1({tLl ) pCI I'>h '
(Tl dn,>ldlion bd\ed on thc Ch1l1e'>e text, T vol 1 6 692<1 1 1 - 1 9 , SNS Tlb Llmotte cd I V 1 0, pp 5 1 - 52 Y B h T
vol ')0, 7 1 7 d2 1 - 2 9, Y B h, 0 Scm" T\,[m 9 ZhI 52b l - 'S )
The Pd"dgC I n S N S '>dy thdt thc true ndtUl e 0 1 t h ll1g<, hd'> ,[ l Ilgle td\le (eku / (/ I C/ ) Cdnnot bc the ohlcct 01
d d l e l entldtll1g thought dnd I'> tl LI Iy ultl Illdte beCdU\C I t 1\ thc only un c onditIOned I Cdhty Accol c1 l 11gly, thc PUI
pOl t ot thc YOgJCdl d thcI'> 1 I1 l! oduced 111 M H K V 87 db and 111 the pdl dllel Pd\dge 111 KR CCI11'> to bc that the
u lti mate ndtu l e 01 thl l1g<, I empty 01 dnothel t I l I mO l e ultI mate I1dtLI I C, but I '> not cmpty oj Itc l f bccau'>e It I
thc only u ncondltI oncd l edhty beyond w h ich thcl c 1 \ n o othcl I t tl1cll ultI mdte Ildtul e wel e empty 0 1 It'>c l t I t
would not CXI\t ,lI1d would be equdl to nothll1gnc,>,>

- 1 56 -

perfectly establIshed nature] IS to see the true nature of thmgs," then why not say that to see a
pot IS abo to see ultimate realIty because m a pot also there eXIsts no other, second pot,)4
You mIght also argue as follows "Although the non-dIfferentiable [realIty] IS beyond the
scope of words, stIll the realm of realIty (dharmadhatu) IS thought to be pure (s uddha ), J ust as
water, gold and space are pure And because the [realm of realIty] IS pure, the mmd ['>eemg It] IS
also pure "S We refute that as follows
It cannot be that the defilement and punty of that [realm of realIty] eXIst Just for the sake
of conceahng the errors m your own theory As a matter of fact, [the defilement and pu
nty] of gold, and so forth, occur m conformIty wIth condItIons (88)6
Pure water, gold and space appear to be contammated (samala ) when [pollutmg] condItIOns such
as dust, rust, and clouds are present, and they appear to be pure (Suddha ) when these condItIOns
are absent Thus, they sometImes get contammated and afterwards they get pure agam If the
realm of realIty were exactly lIke that, It would sometImes get pure and sometimes get defiled
[Smce that IS ImpOSSIble] , your statement merely attempts to conceal the errors m your own the
ory As a matter of fact, the realm of realIty does not become defiled and does not become pure
[m the same manner] , because gold, and so forth, change m conformIty wIth the conditIOns The
examples of gold, and so forth, do therefore not establIsh the meanmg [of defilement and punty]
you attnbute to the realm of realIty
[The Yogacara obJects ] [Our theory] proves to be correct when It IS understood as follows
Space IS always pure, but IS seen as eIther contammated or uncontammated dependmg on
whether the eyes are Impure or pure The true nature of thmgs IS Just hke that (89)
You mIght object as follows A person who suffers from partIal blIndness (talmmka ) and whose
VIsual sense faculty IS ImpaIred sees space as obscured by a net of unreal haIrs, msects and flIes
When hIS eyes have become pure after the applIcatIOn of an eye medlcme that cures partIal
bhndness, he sees space as entIrely free from haIrs, msects and flIes However, when hIS Im
paIred Visual sense faculty [first] '>ees space as Impure and hIS cured VIsual sense faculty [later]
sees It as pure, no change at all occurs m space Itself The same IS true of the mtnnslcally pure
(Prakrtya vl s uddha ) true nature of thmgs Commoners (bala ), whose mental eye IS Impure, see It

as contammated (samala ) Supenors (arya), whose mental eye has become pure by applymg the
)

"

The Yogacara replies that seeIng a pot IS not seeIng ultImate truth, because a pot IS not the object ot pure
knowledge Only the true nature of thIngs IS the object of a pure mInd (vluddhyalambana ) that '>ees redlity a'>
It IS
Veres 88 -90ab Introduce and refute the Yogacara theory of 'the u ltImdte nature of the mInd a<; Intnmlcally
pure, but adventItIOusly defiled and punfied'
The companson of the Intnn<;lcally pure nature of the mInd WIth the Intnmlc punty ot wdter, gold, dnd space I
used In e g MVK 1 1 6 , MSA X I 1 3 , XIII 1 6, 1 8 , YBh, T vol 30, 70 I b28-c3, 748b 1 3- l 8 The parallel passage
In PP quote<; MVK 1 1 6cd and MVK 1 2 1 -22 (see Eckel, pp 57-59)
- 1 57 -

eye medlCl l1e of ' the vI<;lon ot emptl l1e<;<;' ( jjl7 \ CltadQJ \ af1o), "ee I t d" u ncontaml l1ated (amo/a )
However, when the contdml l1ated mll1d [ fir"tJ ')ee" the tI Ue l1dture of thll1g" a Impure and the un
contam ll1ated m l l1d "ee" I t a" pure [later] , no change at all occur" 1 11 the true n atUl e of thll1g" It
"elf 7
To refu te thl", we "dY
The delu,)lon of the m l l1d, which "ee lp<Ke] a" defiled [fl r"t and a undefiled l atel j , I " a
pi operty ot the [knowl l1gJ agent dnd not of the known object (90db)
The de lu"lOn of the mll1d to which "pdce appedr" d" deti led [ fir')tJ and a" u ndefI led [ Idte r ] , I"

property of the agen t That I to "dY, It I') d property of the mentdl contll1 uum (dhik({ya) dctmg m
Ul1 l ')on with the body dnd the '.eme COmCIOU'.ne<;e'. (mdrz WlvI/ii({I1C7 ) I t I " not a pl Operty ot the
known object'., "uch d" "pace, and ,,0 forth S l lm l arly, [the appearance on the realm ot l eal ity a"
Impure or pure

I"

abo a property of the dgent who ha" enhel en-oneous knowledge 01 correct

knowledge It I'. not a property ot the realm of reahty, WhICh I" the known object m thl" ca:'.e
Thel efOl e, your theory that the l eal m of real I ty It')elt I" contammated 01 u ncontamlI1ated

not

con ect
Furthermore,
The perceptIon of thdt [ redl m ot real Ity] I'. not pure, dnd It I" not accepted thdt the true
natU l e of thmg" I " d perceivable object ((/amb\ (!) (90cd)
The knowledge that perceive') the realm of redl Ity cannot be pure, becdu"e If that knowledge per
ceive" the real m ot l ealIty, I t cannot be [a tru l y J non-objectlfYll1g (I1lrvlkalpa) [knowledge]
MOl eover, the real m of l ed l I ty It"elf cannot be d pel celvable object, becdu')e u lti mate l y (po / ([marthatah) the tI ue n ature of thmg'), cal led ' the real m of I eahty ' , I " not d perceivable object
F urthel more,
If the true nature of thll1g,', I" a ub"tdntldl entity (drav) a s at ), the ame errol a betore
w i l l OCCUI [aga m ] And the [tru l y 1 "upramundane non-objectlty mg knowledge cannot be
the knowledge of "uch [ a "ub"tantral entity J becau"e huch a knowledge I penhe" (9 1 )
it you conceive the realm of real Ity or the true nature of thll1g" d" d 5ub'-tantJal entity, the 1 01 l0w
mg error, dh eady pOlI1 ted out before, w i l l OCCUI agdll1 "If, became o f [the need to explcu n ] de
filement and punficdtlon, you a')')eI t that the m l l1d

I"

a ub"tdntlal entity then I YOll l pO"ltion I

doe" not refute our po"Itlon [OUI pO"ltlOnl I " l I1deed e"tab h"hed becdll5e feel 1 l1g, and "0 forth,
7

The YOgdCdl d II1tlOdu(c hel e the d l t l l1(UOn between the pel n1dnent, I ntl lnl ( (P/{/ I I \ (7 ) punty oj the re,lIm oj
l ediity ,mel 11\ extl l l1IC 01 del ventlUou (iigal1lua ) defilement ,1I1d pun ticdt lon 111 ordel to how thdt the COIl1Pdl l on WIth "pdce dnd () lorth do dPp ly to the l edl ll1 of l ediity The 1l1d1l1 YOgdCdl d text" on the I I1tl ln"l( pu
I Ity ,md eAtn nIC delilement/pUl dicdUon of the I11l 11d ,li e the j ol lowmg MVK I 16 I 2 1 -2 2 I I 1 5 V 20-22
MSA V I I , IX 22-23 37, 56, Xl 1 3 X I I I 1 6, U - 1 9 DDVV 44 1 -45 8 YBh T vol 30 70 1 b25-c9, ASBh (N
Tdt l d ed ) 1 4 9- 1 7
- I SS -

anse that way [as eIther defiled or pure]

"x

You mIght say "Even when [the level of] supramundane knowledge (lokottaraJfiana) [has been
attamed], the nondual (nzrvlkalpa) perceptIOn of the true nature of thmgs (dharmata) does anse "
[We reply ] The ansmg of such a [percelv1Og] m10d IS not approved [at the level of supramun
dane knowledge], because that m10d wIll pensh ImmedIately after ItS ansmg You should there
fore ascertam how that supramundane mmd could pOSSIbly not pensh

Moreover,
As long as knowledge arIses, Just as long does It functIOn 10 conformIty with knowable
objects 10 (92cd)
If you ask what error follows from that, we answer
As long as the m10d functIOns 10 conformIty WIth knowable objects, JU'lt as long IS the
m10d obscured by partIal bl10dness

II

(92ab)

That [error] wIll follow Accord1Ogly, the supramundane m10d that perceIves the perfectly estab
lIshed nature [of thmgs] wIll also be obscured by partIal blmdness (satzmlra), because It func
tIons as [any other] obJectlfymg knowledge of a knowable obj ect The correct VIew [about nzrvl
kalpaJfiana ] IS as follows Samsara anses because the obscured mmd functIOns m conformIty
with the form (akara) of knowable objects When that m10d realIzes that the 10herent nature
(5 vabhava) of [all] knowable objects IS not truly establIshed (apartnzpanna), It no longer perx

Quotation of MHK V 47 ThiS ver<;e, as quoted In the present context, rejects the Yogacara view that It I:' nece:,
<;ary to conceive the true nature of the mInd ( the realm of realIty) as a substantial entity In order to account
for the transformatIOn ot a defiled mInd Into a pure mInd AccordIng to B havavlvekd, defilement and punfica
tlOn can be explaIned perfectly well when the mInd 15 understood a:, a nomInal entity For the detaIl .;; , <;ee the
commentary to MHK V 47
Paral lel pa-;sage In KR "The knowledge that gra<;ps the true nature of thIngs (tathata ) a<; an object I:' not the
true, supramundane, non-objectifYIng knowledge, because It grasps an object and becau<;e It I'> conditIOned
( 5amkrta ), Jut like any other mundane, objectifYIng knowledge " (T vol 30, 274c5-7)
Bhavavlveka's POInt IS that ntrvlkaipa)fiana, dS the Yogacara understands It, perceives or objectifies the true
nature of thIng,>, because the Yogacara mlsconcelve<; the true nature ot thIng:, a:, d perceivable reality If the true
nature of thIngs IS a reality In It'>elf and has ItS own Identity ( vabhava ), It wIll act d:, the objective condition of
ntrvlkalpclJfiana The latter wIll then be a conditIOned ( 5aml krta ) knowledge and wIll pensh Immediately dtter
ItS ansIng, JU'>t lIke any other ordInary, mundane knowledge of '>peclfic objects It can therefore not be the truly
unconditIOned (a 5amkrta ) dnd non-objectifYIng supramundane knowledge of realIty as It IS
For B havavlvekd, true supramundane knowledge I'> an unconditIOned state of mInd, charactenzed by the ab
'>ence of all dIfferentiatIng and objectifyIng forms of mundane knowledge It 1<; not a new knowledge In It<, own
nght that would anse by graspIng, :,eeIng or perceivIng a speCific object, VIZ the true nature of thIng:, a:, d real
Ity In It'ielt Adequdte supramundane knowledge IS necessanly non-obJectifYIng, Imply because the true nature
of thIng') I') not d perceivable realIty, dS the folloWIng pd:,:,dge trom the Pra)iiapradrpa clearly under<;cores
"The true nature of thIng<; (tattvam ) IS that they are In every re<;pect not establIshed la:-, haVIng then own Intnn
SIC Identltle<;] (aparmlpanna ) SInce that [true nature IS a mere absence andJ IS never present In front [of the
mInd] as a perceivable object (vl5aya ), It cannot be an actual object of perceptIOn (alambana ) " (PP, D Tsha
247b7-248a l , P T:,ha 3 1 I a2-3)
"
TranslatIOn ba<;ed on the Samknt text (yavat utpadyate jiianam ) The Tibetan text reads )1 md Ihe \ pa dmlgl
yod pa " (As long as knowledge eXists as a perceptIOn of somethIng )
I follow Yamaguchi (pp 564-565) who nghtly observes that verse 9 2 sound5 more natural when the order ot
92ab and 92cd IS reversed Note aho that the half-verse 92ab 1<; missIng In the Tibetan ver<;lon ot the ver'>e.,
only text ThiS Indlcdtes that somethIng must have gone wrong With the transml.,.,lon ot the text
=

I II
II

- 1 59 -

celve rmdlvldual l y etab l t hed object,> ] Becau<;e at that time <;am<;ara no longer al l <;e", that rab
encc of mhel ent natureJ I " thought to be the true n ature (tam all1 ) of thmg"
Moreover, your thel<; that the [ om n I c lentl knowledge of the Lord (Sva vamhlni) occur" m
a " mgle m "tant I " al'>o not e'>tab l t '>hed for the fol lowll1g rea<;on
OmnI"CIenCe cannot be m tantaneou'l [ m your doctn neJ , becau"e knowledge doe" not act
on It"elf, and becau'.e [the eXI <;tence of] 'lelf-aware ne,>,> (\ va \ClI71Vltfl) I negated (93)
A l though the knowable th mg" are manIfold becau '>e of theIr many difterent 1 0rm, theIr true na
ture (dharmata) I '> an undIff erentIated nature The Oml1lClenCe lof the LOi dl can therefore know
leveryth mg ] m a '>mgle m 'ltant wIthout makmg any dItmctIOn'l

12

But I f 1 0ml1 l '>clent] knowledge

I" m '>tdntaneou, O m l1l'>Clence cannot '>lmultaneou,> l y know the dlfterent form'> of rai l ] knowab le
thmg

I,

Othel WIe, the contradictIOn that know ledge act<; on Itself w I l l fol low

[ Knowledge 1

:;,urely doe not dct that WdY, j u'>t a" the edge of a "word doe,> not cut Ihel1 Theretore It <;uch an
ll1'ltantaneou knowledge eAIt ul ti mately (paral71arthatah), one w i l l have to I el y on the next mstant of know ledge m order to ful l y know the prev Ious m tant of knowledge Moreovel , '>mce the
true nature of thmg" (dharmata) I :;' not any thmg at aIL [ m Oml1 l '>CIence a'. we u nder:;,tand It]
there 1<; no po<;ltIve gl a'>pmg of the Identity C\ vabJu]va) of a real thmg, and lmce thel e 1<; no
gra<;pmg of "omethmg, the eXIstence of] elt-awaJ ene,> [a,> the awarene,>,> by con'>clou<;ne"" ot It'>
own act of grapll1gJ I '> therewIth al"o negated S mgle- m,>tant Oml1 l "ClenCe I '. thel efore not e<;tabI t '>hed [m your yteml It I'> however e"tabl t '>hed m OUI "y"tem, a" fol l ow,>
What I gra'.ped by the <; upenor non-obJectlfymg mmd can m no way be expl e,,<;ed by
WOl ds, becaue the an'>mg lor m heren t eXI"tence'.] I '> n egated as we have expl amed betore, dnd becau'>e thmg'> that do not ane (a}ata) [a,> mhel ent eXI <;tenCe '. ] are not real (a dravvmat) r u l tI mately ] (94)
What

J"

gl asped (gn'ihya) by the s u penor non-obj ec tIfymg mll1d (ntrvlkalparyadhi) IS graped by

way of non-grapll1 g (agraha)'ogena) Th l I becau e there

I"

[ ultllnatelyJ no an "lI1g [of l I1herent

eXI "tence that could be gra<;ped] The an m g lof mherent eXI"tence<;]

I '.

mdeed negated a'> we

have already demon '>trated m Chapter [Th l ee] Tattv(ljllan(l/ \C/J.1a M oreover, becau'>e thmg,> con-

I'

1 1

Thl I B h avdv lvekd dccount 01 omIll'>ll ence 'WIthout ma"-mg d n y dltll1ctIOn' medn wIthout pel celvll1g
dny l l1dlvldudl IdentI tle'> of t h l l1g' See dlo vel e 1 02 and 1 06
Bhdvdv lvekd reJ ect,> the YogdCdl ct view t h at the B uddhct\ omIl l Cl ence Cdn knO\\ dll the v drIelIe'> of thmg 1 11 <I
l l1gle m Unt Thl" view I '> tdught 111 tOl eXdmple M S A IX 3 1 <md I X 3) (ct Ydnldguch1, p S 6 X) See dlo
Sthll dnldtI '> commentctl Y on M S A/ M S A B h I X 33 When the knowledge of the B uddhd know the knowdbl e
th l l1g " It l not the Cde that 1 t know,> '>ome thll1g'> w h I le not knowl l1g othel " nOI l It the cae thdt It know"
'>ome th mg fil t dnd other t h l l1g I dtel It "-now <ti l the val letIe'> o f know<lble t h l l1g "uch d'> the dggl egctte"
(,kol/dlw ) , the con'>tI tuent'> of cogIl l tlon ( dhc7tu ), dnd '>0 t Oi th all dt once (dl/ I gC lg Ill ) " (0 MI 1 23ct l -2 )
Bhdvdvlvekd' vIew I '> tlMt omnlClence Cdn 1 n d ll1gle l l1tdnt "-now dl l thll1g" <l undlfferenlloted but d l tt el
ent1dted t h l l1g Cdn only he known 111 m<my conecutIve m'>tdnt\ (ee dl,>o vel e,> 94 1 02 1 06 )

- 1 60 -

ventIOnally speakmg (samvrtya) anse from appropnate causes and condItions, theIr nature (at
man) IS not a real entIty (adravyasat) [ultImately] Now, that [absence of mherent nature] can m
no way be expressed by words, because It IS eqUIvalent to the absence of self-IdentIty ( vabha
vasunya)

14

It should be added that Just that kmd of own-nature (svabhava) [consIstmg m the ab

sence of an mherent nature] IS the object of the hIghest knowledge (paramartha)

I)

Moreover, m your doctnne,

The mherent nature (svabhava) that IS both eXIstence (bhava) and the presence of nonex
Istence (abhavasya bhava) IS the ultImate [nature of thmgs] If so, how can your doctnne
be free from the extremes of affirmmg too much (samaropa) and negatmg too much
(apavada)'7

(95 )

Whoever seeks lIberatIOn from the two extremes of affirmmg too much and negatmg too much,
14

Accordlllg to the TJ-commentary, verse 94 explalll how the Madhyamaka can account for the poslbll lty of
slllgle-mstant omnISCIence A<; I understand It, Bhavavlveka reasons a follows Only when the object of the
hlghe<;t knowledge (paramartha ) I understood as the absence of perceIvable and exprelble mdlvldual entItIes
(dravya mt), can omnI<;clence be a <;mgle-illstant knowledge, because It then just mlrror<; all thlllg wIthout
' graspmg' any llldlVldual entltle If omnISCIence I a ' grasplllg' of mdlvldual entItIes, that ' gra<;plllg' wIll also
need to know It own act of ' graspmg' m order to be truly omnIClent (that IS, In order to be the knowledge of
everythmg , mcludmg knowledge of Itself) Moreover, If that ' graspmg' IS a sIngle-mstant knowledge, Its act of
,
grapmg' wlll need to be known eIther by Itself or by a SImu ltaneous act of self-awarenes, whIch are both ex
cl uded by Bhavavlveka (ee verse 93) On the other hand, If the true nature of all thIng IS that they have no
IndlVldual IdentIty that could be grasped, then true omnISCIence doe not grasp 'any thmg' and IS In that sene
not a genUIne act of knowledge Or, a<; B havavIveka says, ' It grasps by way of non-grapmg' If true omnI
sCIence I thm not a ' gra<;pmg' of somethmg, the questIon as to how that ' graspmg' could al<;o know Itself be
comes Irrelevant
Bhavavlveka reject the eXI<;tence of self-awareness not only In the case of supramundane knowledge but alo
m the case of all ordmary, mundane perceptIOn (see MHKlTJ V 20-26) In hIS VIew, an object 1 <; adequately
perceIved when an Image of the perceIved object appear<; m the mmd (vl\ayabhasa ) Consequently, there eXlsb
no eparate act of comCIOunes<; ( vabha m ) that could be known by a sImultaneous act of elf-awarenes The
dIfference between the supramundane knowledge of the true nature of thIngs on the one hand and ordmary,
mundane perceptIons on the other hand I then as follows OrdInary perceptIOn I S only vl sayabhasa (no sva
bha la and hence no self-awarenes) Supramundane knowledge IS not even vlsayabha:;a (because It doe not
grap any obj ect) and IS IpSO facto not svclbha:;a (hence not accompanIed by self-awarenes) In hort, upra
mundane knowledge I In all respect a formles knowledge (mrakara ) because It lacks both an objectIve and a
subjective form
"
Compare With MHKlTJ V III 89 "The fact that thmg [ultimately] do not anse (ajatata ) IS theIr [true] own na
ture ( I Vabhava ) becau<;e It I not fabncated (akrtnma ) And because that [natureJ does not decay, It I abo
called 'the [truel elt' (atman ) [of thmg] " (See 0 Qvarnstrom, "The Vedantatattvavmlcaya-chapter of
Bhavya' Madhyamakahrdayakanka," WZKSA 34 ( 1 990), p 1 95 )
See al<;o M H K V 2-3, 1 0- 1 2 and m y notes to these verses Accordmg t o BhavavIveka, the Yogacdra mIscon
ceIve the ultImate n ature of thmgs as an mherently eXIstmg nature and, even worse, as a reified nothIngne<;, be
cause they understand the negatIon of the I magmed nature of thIngs as an affirmative negatIOn (paryuda \ a ) and
not as an abolute negatIOn (pra mJ Va ) BhavaVIveka put It as follows "If the negatIon 'the two do not eXIst' IS
understood as an absolute negatIOn (med par dgag pa ), It wlll exhaust It power m the mere negatIOn of the ex
Istence of the two In that case, the error of [relfymg] nonexi stence wlll not occur ThIS IS becaue [ the nega
tIonJ wlll then pnmanly functIOn as a negatIOn lonly] and wlll not [affirml an ultimate nonexltence Thm, [ the
,
extreme of] negatmg too much by saymg [The ultimate nature] IS the [permanent] preence of the absence of
the two' (dvayabhava:;ya bhava ) w1l1 not occur If, on the other hand, the negatIOn I understood as an affirm
lllg negatIOn (ma ym par dgag pa ), affirmatIOn will be ItS pnmary functIOn and It wlll affi rm [the presence of]
nonexltence That I unacceptable, because It IS the extreme of negatmg too much (apa vadanta ) The nonexlt
ence of the horns of a rabbIt abo [IS a mere ab<;ence and] IS not a [reified] non-entity (abhava ) If the ulti mate
[ nature ot thmg] were lmllar to such a [relfiedl nonexistence, It Will result m a nIhll lStlC view (uahedadntl ) "
(PP, D Tsha 247 a6-b2, P Tsha 3 1 Oa6-b 2 , Eckel, p 7 1 )

16

- 161 -

.;,houl d completel y e l immate the two extreme::, of [affirm1l1g 1I1herent l eXi stence and [mherent]
nonexl '>tence You , however, hold that an 1 I1herent nature that I both eXI .;,tence and the pre'>ence
of nonexl::,tence, IS the perfectly e.;,tab l I shed, u ltI mate n atll I e of thlOg'> If that [ultI mate n aturel I '>
eXI .;,tence, y o u are not free from t h e extreme o t affirm1 l1 g too much I f It I nonexl 'Itence , y o u are
not free trom the extreme of negat1l1g too much How then can l IberatIOn , WhICh 1::' attaIned by
the e l I mlO atl on ot the'le two extreme, eXI t lo YOllI doctl lne')
AccordlOg to our doctn ne, It I a fol l ow.;,
[The true nature of thmgl,] I S not eXItence, becdul,e ultImately (tattvata) there I no

aJ

11,

l I1g [of th1l1gs1 It I [al::,ol not nonex Istence, became It I not [a real] eXI .;;t ence [lo the
fmt place] SlI1ce thl ab"ence ot both eXI '>tence and non-eXl'tence I'> thought to be the
true ndture of thlOgs, [ the true nature of thlOg'l] 1'1 [truly] non-dual (96)
[The true nature of thlOgs] I S not eXI.;; t ence, becau.;,e ultI matel y cll l th1l1g'> do not dl l"e I t I '> [al'>o 1
not noneX I '>tence, becau::,e the eXI "tence [that could be negated] I ';; not [ real] eX i stence [111 the fi r.;; t
p l acel

If the eXIstence [of thlOg'>] were [a real] eXI "tence, th1 l1g.;; could become nonexItent

through the ce.;; s atI On of that [eXIstence I However 'I1l1ce the eXI'>tence [ of th 1 l1gs] I '> not [a real ]
eXIstence, th1l1g" d o n o t [real l y ] become nonexistent

17

We a'>sert that the non-dudhty (advayam)

comlstll1g m the absence of both [ 1 l1 herent] eXI 'Itence and [1 l1herentl non-exl'ltence, I the true na
ture of th 1 l1g::, Therefore, that non-dual I ty does not contradict rea.;,on

1\

Another .;,enou .;; error fol l ow from your doctrine

[The m1l1d of] the Teacher w i l l not be a non -obJectlfYlOg [ m l Od ! , becau'Ie It WI l l have the
true nature (t([thata) [of thlOg.;; ] a.;; Ib object The enl I ghtened m1l1d w i l l then not be charactel lzed by the amene.;; 1, ( wmata) [of peI ceIver and perceIved] , becduse the true nature
17

1\

Compcll e w i t h M"I/amadl1 \ ulI1akaklinka X V 5 and X l I I 7 ' I f thel e I no I l l1herent l eX l qenee, thel e I al\o no
I l l1herent J nonexl..,tence People I l1deed ay that thel e I.., noneXI \tence when dn eXI\tence hd.., changed mto ..,ome
thll1g el ..,e ' (bhava \ WI ced api a lddhll abhav() natva I ldh \ Utl hhc7vo n ({ h\ ({I1 V({Thahhal'all1 ahhawl1l hi llvatc
Janclh) " I t any non-empty thll1g eX l ..,ted, empt l l1e..,.., woulu .11<;0 be ..,omethll1g I edl ! namely lI1hel ent noneXl ..,t
ence 01 ,ubtantJal noth l l1gne, a.., the oppm lte of l I1 hel ent eXl tence J S l Ilce not ,my non-empty thll1g eX I t..,
how could empt l l1e.,.., eXIt') ' (\ O(Il a l ill1 wl11 bha'vet kllnClt n CI( (/11111 \ (//11 apl kll71C una na klll1Ud ({ I f\ ({ Iiill
\ u111 (a kuTah I lll1vam bhavl \ wtl) See al..,o M H K I I I 263 "Emptl l1e 1<; empty o f the l I1 herent natlll e of empti
ne..,, and <;0 fOi th A w ise per<;on therefOi e doe<; not even <;ee emptl l1e<;' 111 emptllle..,.., '
I t t h e negation ' not eX I..,tence' were , m dffi l m l llg negdtlon (pun udc/ \(/ ), It would I m p l y t h e dtti I IndtIon ' hence
noneX I <;tence whIle the negdtIOn ' not nonexl .,tence' would I l11ply the df ti rnldtlon hence eX I\tenLe' In thelt ca..,e
It w I l l he I l11po"'Ible to 'Imul tdneouly a..,..,ert ' not eXI tence dnd not nonexhtence' wIthout tal l l l1g Into contl d
d IctIOn., M ddhYdInaka reaonl l1g undertand.., both negdtiOll'> a.., ab..,olute negatIOn.., (pm WI \ a) beUIU\e It aI m.., at
negatlllg both l I1herent eXl <;tence .tnd I I1 hel ent nonex l tence In other WOl d.." tor the Mddhyamaka m hel ent eX I..,
tence ,mu l I1 herent nonexl qence are not contrddlctone.., I t they were u)!1trdd lctoI lC\ one of both wou ld hdve to
be truc They dI e contrane They cannot both be nght but they I11dY both be wl Ong J u ..,t d.., "x I .., not bl ue"
doe\ n ot I mp l y ' X I.., w h I te" ( I f X happen to be yellow, both \ldtemenh w I l l bc wl Ong l ) ( ,ec PP 0 T..,ha
94d7-b l COl11mentdl Y on MMK V 8 ) Thc Madhyamakd cldlm, th,1I only the negdlIon ot both Inhcl ent eX I \lence
,lI1e1 I l1herent noncxl ..,tence I.., true non-duality 01 the true Inlddle way A l though the Yogdcdl a aho ac l b that
the ullI mdte nature ot thll1g I.., ' ne l thel eXI ..,tcnce nO! nonexl qence the YOgdCdl cl undel tdnd l l1g ot thl non
dU,lhty 1\ bd..,CU on ' PdrYllddel negdtlOn\ emd theretOi e con tl ddlLh red..,on (ee M H K/TJ V 1 0- 1 2 )

-- 1 62 -

and the conSCIOusness that perceIves It (sviibhiisa) wIll be [two] separate [thmgs] (97)
If [the mmd of] the Teacher Buddha-Bhagavat perceIves what you call the perfectly establIshed
and true nature of thmgs, It wIll not be non-obJectIfymg, because It wIll have that true nature as
ItS object That wIll contradIct scnptural statements such as "The Buddha has the charactenstics
of space Space also has no [vIsIble] marks (lakalJa) Homage to You who, not bemg vIsible
(lakya) and havmg no vlSlble marks (lakalJa), cannot be perceIved 1 , , 1 9 Moreover, the enlIght
ened mmd of the Teacher wIll not be charactenzed by the sameness [of perceIver and perceIved]
Why? Because the true nature (tattvam) you call ' the perfectly establIshed nature of thmgs' , and
the knowledge m WhICh an Image [of that nature] appears (prabhiisajfiiina), will be [two] sepa
rate thmgs If these two eXIst m that way, how can such a two-natured (ngo bo nYld gnYls) reali
zatIOn (abhlsamaya) be [charactenzed by the] sameness [of perceIver and perceIved] ?20
Furthermore,
From what could the mmd that perceIves the true nature [of thmgs] anse If Its potency IS
not deposIted [m conscIOusness ] ? [It cannot anse,] Just as a mmd that perceIves flowers m
the sky and whose potency IS not deposIted [m conscIOusness] cannot anse (98)
Accordmg to your doctnne, vIsual conSCIOusness and the other kmds of forthcommg conscIOUS
ness (pravrttlVljfiiina) functIOn m UnIson WIth a begmnmgless store-conscIOusness (iilayavlJfiiina)
and deposIt their respective potencies (svasaktl) m the store-consCIOusness each time they anse
and pensh When these potencIes, m theIr vanous forms of perceIvable objects (vlaya), sense
facultIes (mdnya) and perceIvmg conscIOusnesses (vljfiiina), have matured, [new conSCIOUS
nesses] come forth (abhmlrVrt) from the store-conSCIOusness as long as samsara lasts
If that IS true, a mmd that perceIves the true nature of thmgs will not anse m commoners
(Prthagjana) who are not seers of realIty (atattvadarsm) and m whom a mmd that perceives the
true nature of thmgs (tathatii) has never ansen before As there can be no penshmg of somethmg
that has not ansen, the potency of the mmd that perceIves the true nature of thmgs cannot be de
posIted, for what potency could a non-pen shed thmg deposit m the store-conSCIOusness so that It
could [subsequently] mature there? Smce ItS potency IS thus not deposited, the mmd that per
ceives the true nature of thmgs Will be WIthout a cause, and from what could such a mmd ever
anse? ThIS IS SImilar to the potency of a mmd that perceIves flowers m the sky Smce that po
tency IS never produced, It IS ImpOSSIble that, from a potency that has never once before been de19
20

Also quoted In PP AvalokItavrata Identifies It as a quotatIOn from the Ar'yasarvabuddhavl IayajFliinii!okalam

kiirasutra (see Eckel, p 73)
See also MHK V l 3 ab, 1 6 ' S amenes [of perceiver and perceived] ' In thiS context means ' non-duality' or ab
sence of a perceived object and of a perceivIng comclOusness that would conform to It by repre<;entmg ItS form
(iikara, iibhii m )

- 1 63 -

pO"lted

1 11

the "tore-COl1',ClOmne".." a perception of flower" 111 the "ky would an"e lettel

cl

Furthermore,
The tl lle n ature of th111 g 'l, a you under..,tand It, I" not beyond Identity and dlttel cnce, be
cau..,e [ 111 ..,aY 111 g ..,01 you [merelyJ conceal [the el ror" of ] y ou r own doctnnc (99clb)
You 'lay that the perfectly e..,tabli ..,hed nature and the dependent natlll e [of th 1 11 g'l ] I eal l y eXI..,t ,
a n d that the..,e two are neither Identical n o r dlffel e n t 2 2 Howevel 111 "ay111 g "' 0 , y o u merely conceal
[ the error'l of] your own doctnne No mattel what you 'lay, the perfectl y etabli "hed n dture you
cal l 'the true n atlll e' of th111 g" I" not free from Identity and difference

2'

When one follow" the

doctnne of tho..,e who know the [ true 1 middle [ way 1 then

What wa.., ,,<lId [ about neIther Identity nor differen ce] hold.., 111 our doctn ne, beCdU'le [ tO i
u'> the true nature o f th 111 g " ] I .., n o t a real entity (ad/ {/vva) and I " [thel el Ol e [ n o t pel celvable (anupalabh va) (99cd)
jmt becau ..,e [ fOi u" the tl lle nature of th111 g"J I not a real entity (adrav\ (/ \at) , It

not percel-

vdble a'l hdV 111 g an Identity of It'-> ow n ( svab/ulva ) Therefore what wa.., "'cud before, namely thclt

I t 1111 \ lleu/jJo/i1(II7C1 I el percelv l l1 g concloune J U I.,( l ike the I A k l l1u oj 1 00 thcom l llg conl1oune the Yo
gJCJl d w d l h elv e to CX pldlll how I t Celn ell 1 e 1 10 m It potency 01 eeu III the qore-concloune,s Bh Jv<lvl veLI
dl gue thelt uch potency cannot eX11.,( I II the tOl e-COnl1oune unle, It ha been depolted the l e by pl ev lou
l Iltelnce, 01 1 1 1 1 \ llea/pu/lliiIlO The YogJcJrel pOltlon thu I I1\'ol ve the VICIO U, C I I CIe th<lt I1 l n lleo/po/lWIlO hould
dl i e<ldy eX I t 1 11 01 del to be elble to <lI le f Ol the fi "t time
One p()'lble l eply to Bh Jvdv lvek.el , objection would be thdt the potency 01 1 I 1 1 \'lleo/pa/llclllo " <In I I1n<lte
ndtul dlly g iven potency (d/Ul I l1wtclp/{{ll/ahd/w P} ({IeUI It/wgot/ {{ ) thdt Cdn be ueveloped t h I Ough pl l l tUdl prelc
tlce untd an elctudl l l1tdnce ot 111 1 \'lleo/pajl1clIlO dl "e, h om It 1 01 the fil t time I ,ee B B h 3 -4, 3 1 S- 1 1 9 MSA
1 I I 7 D S Ruegg 1 0 Theol l(, dll Tathagatagw h/w el du GotJ (l Pell \ 1 969 pp 73- 1 00 ] Howevel tIm theOl y
leelve the tol lowlllg pl Oblems un,olveu ( I ) A potency thdt w i l l eventu dlly deve lop I Ilto the u l l ec. t Cdu,e of dC
tUdl enli ghtenment Ill U<,t Ihel l be conul tl Oneu 01 Cdu<,eu ( 1{/I1 1 I 1e 1 til ) becdu<,e eln u nconult loned thll1g Ldnnot dc.t
d d Cdue So, what I the ong l ll 01 Celue ot that l l1nelte potenc y 7 ( 2 ) I I the potency 01 enl lghtenlllent I I I1ndte
I It In ndte l l1 ,ti l hUllldn bel llg') II not why,) If o why do not ,til hu meln belI1g dc.tudl ly dttdlll enlightenment '
( 3 ) I the potency thdt will eventudl ly uevelop IIlto the u l l ec.t Cduse of ,Upl dll1 Unddne (/oIeOllu l O ) dnu pUl e
(uml l l ({ l,a ) tdte, 01 m l lld Ihelt ,uprdlllu nudne <md pUl e 0\ I" It mund,me dnd ImpUl e ( lalllelleu, 1(/ 1 / (/\ (/ ) Cdn d
mu nddne ,md I ll1pUl e potency be the remote C<lU e of <,upl dmun ddne pUl e qdte.., 01 ml l1cP
The dmblgulty of A dngd notIon 01 I l11pl e..,,,on, of i 1 ten l l1g to dnd un del qdndll1g the Mdh JyJnd tedc h l l1g'
( 1 l l l tm cl lOl1cl ) uel lve trom the Lil t that It ,lttempt to anwel dll of the,e quetlon A dngd dy thdt the tOl e
conu()une<, of bodh l dttVd LOntdll1 the 1Il1 p l e<'lon of i 1 ten l l1g to dnu COl i euly undel tdnd1 l1g the MdhJ
yJnd tedch 1 l1g He define thee I mpl eW)\1 ,l f o llow ( I ) They die not I I1ndte but die out l l ow (111 I vOlldo )
of the completely pLll e ({{(II I \ l/(/dh{{ ), uPJ amu nddne I edl m ot t l Uth (dlza I lI1Cld/Ultll ) Altel ndtlvely the B uddhd
tedc h l llg di e out l low 01 the upl ,lmunclane I e<ti m of tl llth ,mu the 1 1 /ltC/ \ {/ \(/l1cl di e dcg u l l ed ( hence not 1I1flate)
by bod h I dttv,l who ,Iltudl ly tuuy dnd unueI tand thoe tedc h l llg ( 2 ) The l Inpl elon elle not I l11pLlle ( Icl l
/ (I V({ ) dnd <II e thel dOl e exll ancou to ,md not dn 1 I1 tegl al pdI t of the qOl e-concloune ( 3 ) Although the 1 111pI e"on dl e thel11el ve.., mu nddne they c,m be developed 1I1to the Cdu,e, of Upl dl11und,me "tdte of m l lld I See
MS Lll11otte, TOl11e I I 1 44-49 pp 64-70, D 'i Ruegg, op Cit pp 490-492 Schl11 lthduen pp 77-)50 IU
WZK'iA 1 7 ( 1 97 1 ) P 1 42 note 2 2 ]
FOI t h I tenet, ee my lI dnldtlon dnd note, to M H K/TJ V 5 III Sludlel ({} {{I EI I({\ I, Be/l(/ \ fI}/ {/! S( lell( C I (//1(/
F'hl/O l op/1 \ Fdc ulty 01 LWel , KdndLdwd U n lvel Ity 19 ( 1 999) P 1 5 2
I I th l l1g hdve two In herent ndtul e one cond ItI Oned (pO} ({tOIl I I ({ ) ,mu the other u nconc! l tlO ned (pm llll lj){lIl1w )
thee two ndtlll e will nece"dl l l y be el lher Identlcdl 01 (! I tf erent no I1ldttel whdt the YOgJCJl d dy' Thl I be
Cdue d nelthel Idenllc,ti nOl d l tl e l ent' rel ,ltlon between two IIlhel ent l1eltLl l e I I lllpo,,,ble d NJgJI Ju n,1 ,ly
When two thlllg uo not eXl q elt hel d IdcnllCdl (do ) 01 d dltlele nt (11({1 111 ) how could thee two thlng be
eqdbi l hed I d IIlhel ently eXItlll g thln g ] 7' ( M M K I I 2 1 )

- 1 64 -

[the true nature of thIngs] IS beyond IdentIty (ekatvam) and dIfference (ntintitvam )/4 1& surely accounted for In our doctnne
Moreover, In our doctnne, the similanty [of the true nature of thIngs] wIth space, and so
forth, IS also accounted for, as follows
[The true nature of thIngs, as we understand It,] also resembles space, because distInctIOns
do not eXIst where there IS no ansIng, and because [the true nature of thIngs] cannot be
defiled (altpya) It can also never be expressed In words, because the mInd cannot gra"p
It In any possIble way 2S ( 1 00)
The ultImate, true nature of thIngs IS SImIlar to space for the folloWIng reason If things anse,
they are perceIved as mamfold In accordance wIth theIr dIStInct forms (tiktira) But If thI ngs do
not anse [ultImately] , there IS similanty with space, because distInctIOns do not obtaIn where
there IS no ansIng Since defilement by dIfferentiatIng thought and "peech (prapaiicavlkalpa)
does [therefore] not obtain at all, [the true nature of things] cannot be defiled, Just like space It
can also never be expressed by words for the follOWing reason Speech functIOns wIth respect to
things that are grasped by the mInd, but the true nature of things [as we understand It] cannot be
grasped by the mind In any way Therefore, the fact that [the true nature of thIngs] cannot be ex
pressed by words IS [also] accounted for [In our doctnne] 26
You mIght obj ect "If [the true nature of thIngs] IS that they do not anse at all , how do
you explaIn that It IS expressed by terms such as 'supramundane' (lokottara), and so forth')" We
reply
A mInd that IS free from the partIal blIndness (tzmzra) of ansIng (utptida), IS thought to
be supramundane (lokottara), because It delIvers from the world and because It surpasses
the world ( 1 0 1 )
AnsIng Itself I S a partIal blindness A mind that has ceased to anse I S thought to b e a supramun
dane mind that IS freed from the partial blIndness of ansIng ThIS IS because such a mind delIvers
from the world and surpasses the world, as It IS Said In the scnptures "Thl& IS called 'supramun
,,
dane' because It IS free from the restlessness and agItatIOn of the world 27
Furthermore,
2"

See MHK I I I 1 1 (vlgatazkatvananatve tattve ), MHK IV 67 (nanatvazkatvarahttam tattvam)

Verse 1 00 contrast with ver"es 85-86 and 88 (the true nature, as understood by the Yogacara, 1<; not <amilar to
space and not Ineffable)
Verse 100 follows NJgarjuna's fundamental teachIng about the ultimate truth and the adequate knowledge of
the ultimate truth In MMK XVIII 7 The true nature of thIngs (dharmata) cannot be the object of a percelVlng
mInd (IU vrtta uttagoLarah ), becaue It 1<; not somethIng that anses and penshe<; (anutpanna, amruddha ) And
j ust because It cannot be the object of a perceivIng mInd, It cannot be an object of speech either (Illvrttam ahh l
dhatavyam )
"
QuotatIOn not Identlf'ied Ver<;e 1 0 1 should be read together With ver<;e 92
"

26

- 1 65 -

1 hat [ m Ind [ 1<; non-pel celVlng (11 l 1 t'lka!pa )

non-obj ectIfYIng (1lIrCi!wnha ) and free of

obJect- l m1ge:;., (I1lnw711!!a ) It "> I lllu l taneou<;]y ( \(/"- rt ) and non-dual l y ( \ (/ma!a ) real Ize">. by
way of non -realIzmg, the true natU l e of It:;.,elf and of othel "> ( 1 02)
That mmd I "> d non-percelvmg mmd. becau">e It I free from all perceptlom '.mce It doe,,> not dn'.e
[ from obJect,,> thdt could act 1:;" I h objectIve condItIon]

It I al">o a non-obJectIf Y1 l1g mmd, be

came It doe" not obj ectIfy any thmg (hhavCl ) It I" al"o f ree of obJect-I mage,,>, becau">e It doe,,> not
gra,,>p the marh ( 11 ll71ltta ) of dny perceIvab le object (\'nava ) That mmd 11 ">0 re1lIze slmultaneou,,>ly and non-dua l l y, [ whIch 1 ::- to ::-ay] by W1Y of non-realI zmg, the true n1ture ( dharmatci ) of It
"elf a" knowledge (jllii na ) and the true natUl e of [al l l othel [ thmg::- [ a"> the known (jlleya ) [ We
a'."ert thIs ] becau">e m our vIew perfect enlightenment ( abhnw}lhodhl ) occurs m a <;lI1gle m tant

'\

To m1ke cledl what 1 <; known (}lle} Clm ) by supram u ndane know ledge , [the next verse ]

The non-an ">mg of thmgs I S cal led ' absence of an II1herent n ature m thmgs

(dhcll

lI1ana z rcitm yam ) WI th re<;pect to that, the stmm of perceptIon ("-a!puncl ) do not anse as
wa ">ald before ( 1 03 )
The ver">e "ay'. th1t the very non-anmg o f thmg,,> I the absence of an I l1herent nature 1 11 thll1 g
The ">telll1 '. of pel ceptlon do not an ">e there. a<; wa'. <;aId m Chapter [Th l ee I Tatt'vajllallaz'i(//la
"PerceptIon Iheli I'. defilement, an appearance ( abha \(/ ) [ of ultImately unreal thmg<;] I t I :;" [ the
an"mg ofJ obJect-Images (T1 lnlltta ) and the I dentIfIcatIon of mdlvldudl mark/, (ahll l!a "- .\ L/J.w )
The">e do not an ">e at all wIth respect to that [true nature of th m gJ

'

2Y

[The Yogadira [ obJects " The "utI a teaches that ultI mate I eell I ty (pa rctmiirtiza ) I S an object
of d I rect real IzatI on (siikatkaraJla ) , becau'.e It ,,>ay::- that u l tImate realI ty I"> a permanent non
eXI "tence (rtag tu med pa ) 1nd I not acce:;""> lble to logIcal l ea">ol1lng (ta rkiigoc ara )

liJ

FOI you ,

however, [uItI m1te realIty J 1 " an obj ect of l ogIcal rea<;ol1lng, l u'.t l Ike [the eXItence of J heaven
( , varga ) and o forth , ' 1 becau ">e you argue that [ultImate l eahtyJ 1<; ultImately (jJaramiirthat(lI )
not :;.,omethll1 g that can be real Ized (hodhav) (l ) Hence. you contradIct ,,>cnpture " To refute th l ">
ohJectlon of O U I opponent<;, we '.ay
If [you say] " S lI1ce the true nature of thl l1g (tattv([ln )

not acce">">lble to logIcal rea<;on

lIl g (t(/f k([ ) , It cannot be known through mferentwl l eaonll1g (Lll1 l1miina ) ThelefOl e. the

"
-')
'II

See thc r e mar k" dbout the po,>" rbtlrty of <, ll1gle-ll1 ,>tdnt Ol1ll1 l <,Cle ncc I II the note" to ver '>e<, 93 ,\l1d 94
My tr an'>]dtron I'> bd'>ed on the Pek1 l1g edltron Cd Y,ll11dguchl p 594) Notc thelt thr " ver "e I" not f ound III
EJ 1 l11d \ edi tion of Chdpter Three or M H K
The Yog:ic:ir,! r e ter '> 1l10',\ probably to one of the PIO/iWpii l Oll1ll(/ \ /II I Ll \ Ol to clllothcl utr a that I'> appr oved by
both thc Yogdc:ira ,llld the McldhYdll1elka
See thc r e fel Cnce to M H KrI J IX 50-54 rn note I to my tI dnlatr ()n of lVI H K V -9

- 1 66 -

,,
true nature of thlOgs (dharmata) IS not understood by logIcal reason 109 12 ( 1 04)
If our opponents thlOk lIke that, we reply
Here, by means of flawless lOferentIal reasonlOg 10 conformity wIth sCrIpture, [Bhagavat]
has [first] turned back all the floods of mIstaken thought ( l 05)
Here, by means of flawless lOferential knowledge 10 conformIty wIth sCrIpture,'1 Bhagavat has
first turned back all the floods of mIstaken thought that are conceIved by the BuddhIst and non
BuddhIst doctrInes After that,
The Buddhas, theIr mlOds sImIlar to space, by means of non-dual (mrvlkalpa) knowledge,
see by way of non-seelOg all the knowable thlOgs exactly as they are 14 ( 1 06)
'A mlOd sImIlar to space' IS a mlOd that does not perceIve any of the five knowable thlOgs,
whIch are the past, the future, the present, lOexpressIble thlOgs (anabhllapya), and uncondItIOned
thlOgs (asaf!1skrta) [That mlOd] IS a [slOgle] lOstant of non-dual (nzrvlkalpa), dIrect (:,akat
karalJa) know ledge It IS called 'seelOg' for the purpose of desIgnatIOn (upacara) [only], because
[It sees] by way of non-seelOg 1\
The object known by lOferentIal reasomng IS therefore not the true nature of thlOgs [It
self] [InferentIal reasonlOg] does however elImlOate everythlOg that opposes (vlpaka) the
knowledge of the true nature of thlOgs ( 1 07)
Inferential knowledge elImlOates everythlOg that opposes the non-dual knowledge of the true na12
11

14
1\

TramlatlOn ba,>ed on the Sansknt text

On the relatIOn between scnpture and reasomng according to Bhavavlveka, see note I to my tramlatlOn of
MHKlTJ V 8-9
TramlatlOn based on the Sansknt text
'Seeing by way of non-seeing' IS the usual Madhyamaka way of charactenzlng the knowledge ot reality a'> It
I Thl<; knowledge IS 'non-seeing' because It IS the absence of al l the ordinary dual perceptIOn.., of thing,> Ne
verthele<;.." It 1<; the only true 'seeing' of reality as It IS The most extemlve dl<;cu5.lon of thl<; <;eemlngly para
dOXical 'seeing without seeing' IS found In KR I Intend to translate and comment on this long pa<;<;age on an
other occasIOn The following are some other pas<;ages where Bhavavlveka attempt<; to put this apparent paradox
Into words "The highest knowledge (piiramiirthlkT prcljiiii ) move,> toward<; the ultimate nature of thlng<; without
really moving toward5. It (apraciirapraciira )" (MHK III I I ), "[The true nature of things1 <;hould be realized by a
mind that sees It 1<; <;een by way of non-<;eelng (taddaranam adarsaniit, mthong ba med pa de mthong Yin ) "
(MHK III 246cd) [Commentary on III 246cd In TJ, D Dsa 1 1 6b5 ' It IS <;een by way of non-seeing' mean"
that the very ab<;ence of seeing [In the ordinary sense of a dual perceptIOn] 1<; conventIOnally called 'seeing'
(mthong ba med pa de mthong ba yin no zhe mthong ba med pa n)zd mthong ba 'o zhe nye bar gdag l te I ,
"The nondual knowledge of the wise anses b y way of non-anslng 0iiyate ajiitl } ogena mrvlkalpa maflh la
tiim ) " (MHK III 26 1 cd) [Commentary on III 26 1 cd In TJ, D D<;a 1 2 1 a l -2 "Because knowable thmg" 0Fieyam ),
haVing elther eXlstence or noneXl <;tence as thelr nature, do not eXl'>t at all, the mind that does not perceive l exls
tence or nonexltence] al'>o doe,> not anse The non-anslng of this mind IS conventIOnally called (upacuryate )
' ansmg' because this mind realizes the non-percelvable lrealityJ (dmlg su med pa ) Its non-an'>mg l a'> a dual
perceptI On] I'> Ib non-dualIty (mrvlkalpatvam ) " 1 , "The Wise, whose eye [of knowledge] ha" become free h om
the darkne<;s (tarna l ) and partial blIndne'>.., (tuntra ) of the afflictive and cogmtlve obstruction,>, does not <;ee any
thmg (na pa syatl klmut) " (MHK III 252), "Whoever realize'> that rtrue nature of thmg!> (tattvam) ] without dny
knowledge an'>mg, I'> called ' awakened' (huddha, cl ang rgya ) m the true sense of the word, becau'>e he hd'>
de'>troyed ( \ang ) the sleep of dual perceptIOn (vlkalpa ) by realizing In the manner of non-reahzlng (ahodhabo
dhatah ) " (MHK III 267 ) , "Here words come to an end Thl<; IS not an object of [dualJ thought Dual thought
come" to an end and the silence of knowledge ame 0Fiiinamaunam W jiiyate ) " (MHK III 2 8 3 )

- 1 67 -

ture ot thll1g", but the object that I undertood by lI1 ferentlal reaon ll1 g I '> [ Itelfl not the true nature ot thl l1g'>
I t you a5k how lI1ferentlal rea'>onll1 g can ehmll1ate that which oppo'>e<; [non-dual know l edge I we
dn'>wer
When thought<; d l tfer becau<;e of the dlver<;,lty of other <;cnptu re<; and al '>o when the ame
[ B uddhl ,>tl cnpture<; are followed , what other meam rbut lI1fel entIdl reasonll1g1 can be
"u lted for examll1 m g [ truth and fal "Ityp 'r, ( 1 08 )
Other <;cnpture<;' ( agwlUil1tara ) are <.,cnptUl e<; that are dlfTel ent from the l BuddhI <;,tl <;'cJ lpture"
The'>e [ other cnpture 1 give me to dIfferent way'> of th ll1kll1g that denve from the thl ee hundred
and s I x ty-thl ee POll1ts of dl<.,pute (vlvada) Even among those who adhere to the ame [ B uddh l"t]
'>cnpture'>, there 1 <; no othel propel mean<., to examme rtruth and fdl <;Ity l except mferences that
con'>I'>t of a Pl Opo<;Itlon (paka) , a logical rea<;on and an example Thl I'> "0 tor the fol low ll1g

How could one l efute opposite vlew by merely '>tatl l1 g one's own the'>l (pratt/lia r) And
how cou ld non-dual knowledge dn<;e a long a'> mltaken thought'> al e not ehmll1ated 7 ,7
( 1 09)
Whoever want'> to refute all [ m l"taken 1 thought'> cannot do '>0 by merely '>tdtI ng a the'>I'>, cll1d
nondual knowledge doe<; not an"e a long a'> the mhtaken thought that oppoe It al e not elim i
nated TherefOl e, after one ha'> '>tated a the'>I'>, one <.,hould <;tate a rea'>on, and one <;,hould abo
give an example Thl'> I'> becaue [ only I a demomtratIve lI1ference ( ,adhaI1CI17111nal1([) can fully
e<;tablI,>h the tI lith of 50methll1 g one hold to be true
That I'> why the M UI1l , the Seel of Truth , ha5 taught two tl uth<;, for It I by relyll1 g on the
conventIonal l truth] that one come to real i ze the tI lle nature of th 1l1g'> ( tattvclf fha) ( 1 1 0)
The lI1 ference<; that ehm1l1ate m l<;taken thought,> are based on what I called ' the cotTed conven
tIOnal truth' ( tath) a\am H'tl v\ avalu7rm atva) By relYll1 g on that conventIOnal truth , one gradually
come'> to realize the hlghe"t [truthJ (paramar tha) , whIch I " not an object of thought (1111 vlkalpa)
and <;peech (ol1abhzlap) 0 ) " Th h agl ee'> WIth the fo llow1l1g teachll1g [from "cnptUl e] "WIthout
'I,

"
"

TI ,m \Llt lon bd'>cd on thc S,m\k] It text

T] an\ldt]On bd\ed on the TI betdn tcxt
Scc M H K/TJ I I I 7 - 1 2 The corrcct dl'>ccl nment (p/ O\ 1 \ eA.a ) 01 dl l the thll1g\ that l edl ly eXI\t (h/ullii l t/w M H K
I I I 7 ) dCCOI dll1g to convcntlO ndl thought ( \O/11V/ ll \amero ) I I, .In l I1dl '>pe n\dblc fi l '> t <'!cp behlI e onc pl Oceed\ to
eXdIl1l11e the ultll1ldte-l ealtty ch dfdcter of convc ntIonal ly I Cdl t h l l1g\ by Il1edn<, ot M dclhy an1dkd l ed\Onll1g (\ /
( {Ira ) Thl'> I'> beCdU\C thel c 1\ 110 nced to cumlne the u l t l l11dtc-rcalIty ch,u dctel of th111g\ th,lt do not eX I <,! dC
cOl d l l1g to conve ntI ondl thought \uch d'> Il1dny 01 the t h1l1g\ that B uddhl "t dnd non-B uddh l \t phI lo\ophel \ con
celvc to be l e,d On the othel hand oil thc th1 l1g'> thdt do eXI"t accOl dll1g to conventIonal thought \uch d\ ex
tel n,t! Ob)ech (wh I C h the Yogdcdra dl'>ml '><'c'> d<, u l1l e,t! wIthout ch \l1 nguI "hl l1g between the two l1 uth, , ll1U\t be
CX dIl1 lned 111 ol dcI to ,]\Cel tdl l1 the MddhYdll1dLl PO\ltlon thdt not dny 01 them 1 \ Ul tl l1ldtcly IC,t!

- 1 6 -

relymg on the conventlOnal truth, one cannot realIze the hIghest [truth] "
Vmdicatmg (vyavastha) [the meanmg of] ' ultImate realIty' (tattvam) that IS explamed well
(praslddha) m the Madhyamaka doctnne, [the condudmg verses] say that theYogacara [under
standmg of] ultimate realIty IS replete wIth errors
The knowledge that perceIves a true nature (tathata) IS deluded, because It grasps an ob
Ject, J ust like [knowledge] 10 a dream Consequently, what IS known by that knowledge
cannot be the true nature of thmgs (tattvam)

19

(1 1 1)

' The knowledge that perceIves the true nature of thmgs (tattvam)' I S the subject of the proPOSI
tion (dharmm) ' That [knowledge] IS deluded ' IS the property of that subject (dharma) and 1 5 the
thmg to be proven (sadhyam) The subject and ItS property together form the propositlOn
(paka) 'Because It grasps an obj ect' IS the reason (hetu) ' Any know ledge that grasps an object
IS deluded, as for mstance knowledge m a dream' IS the example (d!ranta) Smce that know
ledge IS deluded, the thmg that IS grasped by It (tadgrahyam) cannot be the true nature of thmgs
(tattvam) OtherwIse, the absurd consequence WIll be that the true nature of thmgs IS also unreal
Furthermore,
The truth (dharma) that was taught by the Great Sage IS not an object of graspmg, not an
object of words, and maccessible to [obJectIfymg] knowledge40 If It I S so, then that [truth]
IS vlOlated (badhyate) [m your doctnne] ( 1 1 2)
Because [the true nature of thmgs] IS an obj ect (vlaya) of knowledge [10 your doctnne] , It can
not be beyond graspmg and beyond words Thus [your doctnne] contradIcts the teachmgs [of the
Buddha] , such as "The true nature of thmgs IS not an object of graspmg and not an object of
words," and "The ultimate truth IS that with respect to whIch [even] knowledge does not come
forth (apracara) ,,-li
In order to remmd42 [the reader] of the doctnne (artha) that was thoroughly negated by
completmg thIS chapter, [the final verse says ]
Thu s, even If the true nature of thmgs, whIch has been explamed before 10 conformIty
1Y

4()

41
4'

Parallel pasage<; abound "What they [= the Yogacara] conceIve as the true nature of thIng (tathata ) 1<; not the
true ultImate realIty (paramartha ), because It I') an object of perceptIon (alambana ), j Ut lIke color and '>0
forth " (KR, T vol 30, 274c I 3 - 1 4) "What they [= the Yogacal a] conceIve a<; the formles') (anll1utta ), Inexpre'>'>
Ible (anabhtlapya ) true nature (tathata ) or ultImate realIty (paramartha ) cannot be the [true I ultImate realIty,
becau'>e It IS an object of perceptIOn (iilambana ), J ust l Ike <lny other object of perceptIon [ I ,) not ultImately
real I " (KR, T vol 30, 276c22-24) "The knowledge that perceIves the true nature of thIng'> (tathata ) cannot
have ultImate realIty (paramiirtha ) as Its object, because It IS condItIoned (Iamskrta ), lIke vl<;ual perceptIOn
(whurvlJfiiina ) Llkewl,>e, the thu<; perceIved true nature of th Ings IS f<ll se (moladharmaka ) and IS not tl lle re<l
II ty (tattvam ), J u'>t lIke color " (PP, D T<;ha 248a3-4, P Tsha 3 1 I a7-b l , Eckel, p 73)
The expreSSIOn dhlp rae iira Vl varjltam ' 1<; also used In MHK I 2 See V V Gokhale, "Madhyamahrdayakanka
TarkaJvaIa Chapter I," In Chr LIndtner ed , Mmellanea BuddhlW (Indlske StudJer V), Copenhagen 1 98 5 , p 8 1
Ft om the AkJa'yamatlmrdeSa lttra Also quoted m PP (Eckel, p 72)
TentatIve translatIOn of 'reg par bya ba' l phYlr'
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with l eaon and 'icnpture, I.., careful l y examined by mean<., of I atl Onal argument,> (vuku ), It
5>tand'i ao;, I t I '> without being defeated [ by tho'>e argu ment..,l ( 1 1 3 )
When one carefu l l y exammeo;, the Yogdcara under5>tandmg of the true nature of thing" (tattvam).
l one tInd" that ] It doe" not w lth5>tand ratIOnal analY'>I" (vluim)
Some are attached to the foreo;,t of the aggi egate
Other" are Impeded by the ocean of comclOu<;ne..,o;,
The Son of the VIctor, who doe.., not even fal l I I1to the aby.;,s of the l im I t ot reality (blul
takott), amu:-,e.., hlm.;,elf ( 1 1 4 t,
Th u". the true natu re of thI n g:-, (tattvam) - a" I have explamed It In conformity with <;cnptUl e and
l ea"on 111 the [ Third] chapter Tattv([jiictnCll) ClI.1ct m tor example the fol lowmg way "Became [UltI
matelyJ not dny knowable thl11g eXI5>t:-" that with re5>pect to WhICh even the non-dual knowl edge
l of the B uddha] uoe:-, not al l <;e. that 1" the unequdl led true nature of thl11go;" k nown by H i m who
,,
know" the truth, 44 - that true natu re of thI ngo;, :-,tand" fi rmly a" It I" without bel11g ..,haken even by
the l 11ference" of B u ddhl:-,t and non-Buddhl<;t phIlo'>ophers (tarklA.a ) al i ke
[ Here end,, ] the fifth chapter of the 7(lrA.([jvalct -commentaI Y to the Madhv([/1/akahrda v([ , called
' Entry I I1 to an do;,certal 11ed J udgment lon the truth or fal '> l ty ] of the Yogacara [doctn ne of] ReaI I ty' ( YogctulmtattvaVlIll\Wwlvattim)

T h l vel e I lackmg I II the ext.lIlt Sdnkl lt text It occur d'> ver'>e I 1 3 1 11 the TIbetan vel lOn 0/ the vel '>e'>-on ly
text 01 M H K V where I t I '> loll owed by MHK I I I 2 6 6 ( nmtdke nly added a:" ve l '>e 1 1 4 ) Note that the TJ
lommen tdl Y thdt f ol low,> ,tltel ver'>e 1 1 4 I '> d colllmental Y on vere 1 1 3 , ,lIld not on ver'>e 1 1 4 M y gue,>,> I'>
theretore that ver'>e 1 1 4 Wd not l I1c1 uded 111 the Ol l g l l1.t1 S,lI1knt tex t 0/ M H K V It I '> 1110"t PI Obdbly d ljUOtd
tlon 0/ ,111 ul1 I dentl fied '>utrd thdt Wd'> added a'> the conc l udll1g vel '>e ot Chapter FIve by ,] Idtel edltOl
Y EJ lllld on the othel hdnd, con'>l der'> ver'>e 1 1 4 ' tOl the t l lne bell1g to be the lond udll1 g VCI C ot Chaptcl
FIve (n ote to ver'>e 1 1 4 III hI'> unpubiJ,>hcd edItIOn 01 the S an<;knt ,lI1d Tlbetdn text'> ot M H K V) Not l llg that
tho'>c who dre dttdched to the dggregdte'> dre the Valbhd'>lkd<; whtle rho'>e who di e I mpeded by comc l ou<,ne,>,>
dI e the YOgdCdl d'>, he conclude,> " I n the p l ev l Olh chdpter B h dV lvekd hd retuted the v Iew of the Vdlbhd'>lk,h
.lI1d I'> now c1olI1g the Cl ltlCdl lhdptel on Yogdldrd theory In thl'> en,>e k 1 1 4 dgl ee'> With [ the l duthOl ' ,> own
I Iltentlon '
QUotdl lon of M H K I I I 266 jiieH/I \(/ lonOilu/l /ddhel /1 // vlko/papl wtl ([ dhThl llotp({c/\'({te tad otu/WI/1 t({tt\ ([/ll
{([ttVO V{(/o

Idu h ll

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