ART.

VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 19921994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be
collected by the City of Davao.

A. LEGISLATIVE POWER (SEC 1)

1. PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October
18, 2011

The City of Davao v. The Regional Trial Court

G.R No. 127383
FACTS:
GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling
public bidding of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994,
amounting to the sum total of P 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently
reset by virtue of a deadline extension given by Davao City.
On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three
parcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that
same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or
Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC.
During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local
Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also
withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax.
RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.

Congress enacted several laws relevant to Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM). First is the Republic Act (RA) 6734, the organic act that established the ARMM
and scheduled the elections for the regional officials. Upon passing of the RA No. 9054, the
elections were moved to September 2001. The same law also requires that any amendment
to such law require 2/3 vote of the congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the
Local Government Code (LGC).

Held: No. In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.
As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of
the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore
existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it
did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent
laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No.
9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a
gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent
regular elections.

HELD:Reading together sec.133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing
powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on
the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs.
However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes
granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said
section, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily
follows that its exemption has been withdrawn.Regarding P.D. 1446 which laid down
requisites for repeal on the laws granting
exemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental law in Sec. 33, particularly the
amendatory second paragraph. Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the
competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This
places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal
laws. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the
amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored,
have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.
Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second
paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous
means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a
subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear
relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS.
Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that any tax
exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code
shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it.
The GSIS tax-exempt, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored

Another law, RA 9140, reset the elections to November 26 of the same year. RA 9333
further moved the elections to August 2005 and established that elections be made every
three years after. Following RA 9333, next elections should transpire on 2011 but upon
enactment of another law, RA 10153, it was moved to May 2013, to synchronize with the
countrys national and local elections.
Issue/s: WON RA 9333 and RA 10153 validly amended RA 9054 considering its
supermajority voting requirement

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the
supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by
requiring more than what the Constitution demands. Section 16(2), Article VI of the
Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to
conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally
sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds
(2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately,
in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher
than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the
plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. Thus, while
a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the

Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is unconstitutional because it is limiting the
plenary authority of the legislators.
League Of Cities V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008-11
During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component
cities were filed before the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33
bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th
Congress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government
Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20
million annual income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of
the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each
of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular municipality
from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Are the cityhood laws
converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
November 18, 2008 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional
because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into
the LGC and not into any other laws. The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the
Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units. The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly
followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the just share
of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes. (League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008)
March 31, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.
April 28, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.
December 21, 2009 Ruling
Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as
constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into
cities. It said that based on Congress deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the
then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of
PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any
retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a
municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as
such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the
enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what

they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. Thus, the imperatives of fairness
dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove
that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under
the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of
the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v.
COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, December
21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling already became final and executory and
was recorded in the SCs Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)
August 24, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of
the Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring
unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into
cities. Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18
November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying
reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a
tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision, the Court said. In the latest
resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that the Cityhood Laws violate
sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that no cityshall be
createdexcept in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. It
stressed that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in
the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the
increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. The
unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an
exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution.Congress exceeded and
abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being
violative of the Constitution, the Court held.
The Court further held that limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the
same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16
respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the
Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. (GR No. 176951,
League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec,
August 24, 2010)
February 15, 2011 Ruling
Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since
the High Court first resolved the Cityhood case in 2008.
April 12, 2011Ruling
Yes! Its final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We should not ever lose sight of the
fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending
during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local
Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress

undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded.
Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and
unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of
Congress, the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered
by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher
income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was
well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those
covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001,
when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt
the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the
House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to
Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001
from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said
Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution
No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which
again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed
in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably voted
upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of
both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the
Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and,
by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions
being embodied in the exemption
clauses.(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2011/04/04141101.php)
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local
sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of
local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be
justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC
despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the
LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant
national growth.
2. PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
a. Permitted delegation/power of subordinate legislation
ABAKADA vs Executive
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act.
Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government
from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective

January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT
rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is
not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the
sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within the purview of tariffs
under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable
upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods.
They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions
provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no
guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the
recommendation.
Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the
VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of
Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO
Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly,
or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be
delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall
take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its
enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its
exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1,
2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or nonoperation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the
fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL
connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be
evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the
specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a
fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP
of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two instances has occurred,
the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the
President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even
her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and
declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a
much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate
statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out
by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what
job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power
to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
KILOSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs. GARCIA
On June 26 1990, then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No.
90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus
operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the
LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.
On December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. An across-the-board
increase of eight and a half centavos (P.0085) per kilometre for all types of provincial buses
with a minimum-maximum fare range of 15% over and below the proposed basic per
kilometre fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare range applying only to ordinary,
first class and premium class buses and a fifty-centavo (P0.50) per kilometre fare for aircon
buses were sought. Later on, PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-theboard increase of six and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometre for ordinary buses.
Although opposed, the LTRFB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase.

On March 30, 1992, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and

Communications Pete Nicomedes Prado issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining the
policy framework on the regulation of transport services. Relevant portions to this case are:
In determining public need, the presumption of need for a service shall be deemed in favor
of the applicant. The burden of proving that there is no need for a proposed service shall be
with the oppositor(s).
Passenger fares shall also be deregulated, except for the lowest class of passenger service
(normally third class passenger transport) for which the government will fix indicative or
reference fares. Operators of particular services may fix their own fares within a range 15%
above and below the indicative or reference rate.
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation
policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of
the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit
of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.
Said increased fares were to be made effective on March 16, 1994.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward
adjustment of bus fares.
On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for
lack of merit.
ISSUE: W/N the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a
fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and
minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without
having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. YES
HELD: The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of
fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is
likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section
5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve and
periodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to
the operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles.
Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to
adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. With this authority, an administrative body
and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling
in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time or competence to provide.
However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC
and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport
operator, or other public service.
In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set
a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is
tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari
potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated.

A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in
violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. This would
leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every
hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they
deem it "necessary" to do so.
One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. If
transport operators will be authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalent
to 20% over and above the authorized fare over a period of time, this will unduly prejudice a
commuter who will be made to pay a fare that has been computed in a manner similar to
those of compounded bank interest rates.
The present administrative procedure, to our mind, already mirrors an orderly and
satisfactory arrangement for all parties involved. To do away with such a procedure and
allow just one party, an interested party at that, to determine what the rate should be, will
undermine the right of the other parties to due process. The purpose of a hearing is
precisely to determine what a just and reasonable rate is. Discarding such procedural and
constitutional right is certainly inimical to our fundamental law and to public interest.
Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of
the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the
death penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied
both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death
penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him
under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being
violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international
covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by
respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated
powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection,
as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal
injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply
(than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No.
8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177
confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice,
Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.

The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus
Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegarays arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the
petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c)
being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
Issue: 1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
Held: No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
Ratio:1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be
used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the
procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its
implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the
court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and
suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in
administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the
details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or
inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of
R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of
administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the
time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death
convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is
the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered
fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to
the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any
uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of
execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last
sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be
carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time
the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to
the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the
death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment

imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive
clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and
untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned,
renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is
unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the
expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be
administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States
wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for
the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires
that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the
performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the
implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is
calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the
convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does
not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the
Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not
the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of
the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This
penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious
crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was
adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed
nor ratified said document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its
limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A.
No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as
during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient
to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all
personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the
performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served

by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a
criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In
this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the
administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious
flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in
Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure.
It was supposed to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum.
The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on
the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a
mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice,
the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the
imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making
authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility
renders the said paragraph invalid.
4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for
being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by
respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution
by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following
the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70)
years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal
Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for
being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner
insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended,
without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a
woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over
seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or
within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1)
year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and
adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This
addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory
basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead
remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.

NPC DAMA vs. NPC

September 26, 2006

G.R. No. 156208

Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Power Industry Reform act of 2001 (EPIRA Law), was
approved and signed into law by Gloria Arroyo on June 8, 2001 and it took effect on June
26, 2001. The EPIRA law states that it will provide an orderly and transparent privatization
of assets and liabilities of the NPC. Under this law, a new National Power Board of Directors
was constituted with the new chairman and members.

their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the NPC. Resolutions were
declared void and without legal effect.

The Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) promulgated the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA Law, pursuant to Section 77. The Restructuring Committee
proposed a new NPC Table of Organization which was approved by the NPB to serve as
the overall organizational framework for the realigned functions of the NPC mandated under
the EPIRA Law. They also reviewed the proposed 2002 NPC Restructuring Plan and
assisted in the implementation of Phase I (Realignment), and recommended to the NPB for
approval the adoption of measures pertaining to the separation and hiring of NPC
personnel.

The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the Nursing Board

Examinations on June 11 and 12, 2006. Licensure applicants wrote to the PRC a report that
handwritten copies of the examinations were circulated during the examination period. The
examinees were provided with a list of questions and answers of the exams. PRC admitted
the leakage and traced it to 2 Board of Nursing members. The results of the exams were
released but the CA restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the
passers.

The NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which provided for the Guidelines on the
Separation Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of Personnel in the NPC
Table of Organization. Under this, all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on 31
January 2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits. A memorandum circulated to all
NPC officials and employees providing for a checklist of the documents required for
securing clearances for the processing of separation benefits of all employees who shall be
terminated under the Restructuring Plan.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from implementing NPB
Resolutions. Since only 3 of the 9 members voted, petitioners conclude that the questioned
Resolutions have been illegally issued as it were not issued by a duly constituted board
since no quorum existed and that the resolution be void. Petitioners also argued that if ever
there is abolition in their positions, it should require the endorsement of the Joint
Congressional Power Commission and the approval of the President of the Philippines. The
Resolution will have an adverse effect on its employees and contrary to the mandate of the
Constitution to promote full employment and security of tenure.
Respondent argued that while it is true that only 3 members of the NPB were not the actual
signatories but they were represented by their respective alternates. Respondents claim that
the validity of such administrative practice whereby an authority is exercised by persons or
subordinates appointed by the responsible official has long been settled. Respondents
further contend that Section 48 of the EPIRA Law does not in any way prohibit any member
of the NPB from authorizing his representative to sign resolutions adopted by the Board.
Issue:
Whether or not the implementation of the NPB Resolutions are void and without
legal effect since the votes casted were not from the actual signatories.
Ruling: The petition was granted. They lack the necessary number of votes for their
adoption.
Since the votes were only casted by 3 out of 9 members favor of the adoption of the said
Resolutions, it must not be considered in determining whether or not the necessary number
of votes was garnered in order that the assailed Resolutions may be validly enacted. It is the
representatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments and not the
secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution. This
violates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to employ

Review Center Associations vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 180046

President Arroyo replaced all the members of the PRCs Board of Nursing and ordered the
examinees to re-take the board exams. She issued EO 566 which authorized CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers in the Philippines. CHED,
through Chairman Carlito Puno, approved the CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of
2006 (IRR).
The Review Center Association of the Philippines, petitioners, asked CHED to amend, if
not withdraw the IRR arguing that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will
effectively abolish independent review centers.
Chairman Puno stated that if they will suspend the implementation of the IRR, it would be
inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566. The petitioners comments and suggestions would
be considered revisions to the IRR.
There was a dialogue between petitioners and CHED for the revisions and the RIRR were
approved. Petitioner filed a Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations in amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers from the
coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers
to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHEDs
coverage to public and private institutions of higher.
CHED issued a resolution that if they will exclude the operation of independent review
centers from the coverage of CHED would contradict the intention of EO 566. In the request
to clarify what is being meant by tie-up/ be integrated with an HEI, it just means to be in
partner with an HEI.
Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus praying for the annulment of the
RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional and the prohibition against
CHED from implementing the RIRR.

Issues:
1.
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative
power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction.
2.
Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.

Ruling: EO 566 and CHED Memorandum Order No. 30 are declared void and
unconstitutional. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR expand the CHEDs coverage under
RA 7722. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review
centers and similar entities. CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private
institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private postsecondary educational institutions.
The review center under EO 566 covers the operation or conduct of review classes or
courses provided by individuals whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure
examinations given by the PRC. A review center is not an institution of higher learning as
contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it
under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
The OSG argues that President Arroyo was merely exercising her executive power to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The exercise of the Presidents residual powers
under this provision requires legislation. There is no law granting the President the power to
amend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA 7722 through an
Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power. The President has no
inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.
b.

Tests for permissible/valid delegation

People vs Dacuycuy
GR No. 45127 May 5, 1989
several pubic school officials of Leyte were charged for violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta
for public school teachers).These officials motioned to quash the charges against them for
(1)lack of jurisdiction (2) unconstitutionality of Section 32. This motion was denied for lack of
merit. The private respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of First Instance of
Leyte.They added to the grounds of unconsttutionality of Section 32 the following reasons:
(1) it imposes a cruel and unusual punishment (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, for the duration of penalty of the imprisonment is left to the discretion of
the court. Judge Dacuycuy, the respondent judge denied the motion saying that RA 4670
particularly Section 32 is valid and constitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 32 of RA 4670 is constitutional
HELD: NO. Section 32 is unconstitutional since it provides an indeterminable period of
imprisonment. Too much discretion was left by the legislature to the court, making it undue
delegation of power of the legislature. Section 32 did not pass the test of sufficient standard.
If section 32 will be allowed, it will violate not just the rules of separation of powers but also
the delegability of legislative powers.
Nota Bene: The charge against the public school officials will still be remanded to the
municipal court where it was first filed. RA 4670 ontains a separability clause in Section 34.
Although Sec 32 was declared unconstitutional, other parts are still valid.
Emmanuel Pelaez Vs. Auditor-General (1965)

This is a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunctioninstituted by
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives andagents, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of the EOs issued by the President creating
33 municipalities and/or any disbursementby said municipalities.
In 1964, the President, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Codeissued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three(33)
municipalities.Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void on the ground
thatsaid Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 andconstitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power.When RA 2370 (The Barrio Charter) provides that
barrios may "not be created ortheir boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by
Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the
voters in theareas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality
ormunicipalities.Section 68 of RAC, which said EOs are based, provides that the President
maydefine or divide the boundary or boundaries of any province, sub-province,municipality,
municipal district XXX as the public welfare may require provided, thatthe authorization of
the Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained.Petitioner argues that the President
under the new law cannot create a barrio, howmuch more of a municipality which is
composed of several barrios.Respondent answered that a new municipality can be created
without creating newbarrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the
newmunicipality. This answer however overlooks on the main import of the
petitionersargument, which questions the Presidents authority to create
municipalities.Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities
underthis section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relyingupon
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan.
ISSUE: WON the President has the legislative authority to issue the EOs
creatingmunicipalities.
DECISION: The Court declared the EOs null and void. The Auditor General
permanentlyrestrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementationof said EOs or any disbursement by the created municipalities.
RATIO: The Court said that the respondents argument based on Cardona vs.
Binangonanis untenable because the case do not involve a creation of municipality but
atransfer of municipality. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
Legislative in nature. Itis strictly a legislative function. The power to fix such common
boundary, in order toavoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities,
may partake of an administrative nature in the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities.Although
Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation
of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate .
(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Without the

aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,

whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but
worse, to adopt measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
The Court said that Section 68 of the RAC does not meet these well settled requirements for
a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. It can be noted that
the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the
municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress . A better proof of the fact
that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions
can hardly be given
BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY
476 SCRA 188 November 25 2005
In 1994, Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into
law. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and by regulating blood banks in our country, and was approved by the
President Fidel V. Ramos on the same year . On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was
promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All
commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the
effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary.
Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all
commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of
two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the
result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.
In 1994, petitioners are operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517,
entitled An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the
Establishment and
Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories. The law, which was enacted
on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood
banks and blood processing laboratories, wherein their licensed had expired in the year
1998. They then filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the constitutionality and validity of the of the said Act and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All
commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two years after the effectivity
of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two years by the Secretary, constitutes
undue delegation of legislative powers.

HELD: No. According to Article VI, Sec 1 of the Phillipine Constitution The legislative power
shall be vested in the congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a senate and a
house of representative, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum. The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No.
7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. in which the Secretary did not go
beyond the powers granted to him. Therefore, there is no undue delegation of legislative
powers since the congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations so long that the delegating law be complete in itself, and
has a fix standard.
Here, the RA No. 7719 law is complete in itself and has a fixed standard. The provision is
clear that the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to protect the health of the people
and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. Also, the law has sufficiently
provided a distinct standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its
provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of
blood through voluntary blood donation.
TATAD VS. SECRETARY
281 SCRA 330 1997
FACTS: In 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than
those dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the
market without any government interference. In 1971, the country was driven to its knees
by a crippling oil crisis. It created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the
business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining,
storing, distributing, marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas and other
refined petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the market prices of
petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to
regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry.
In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil
industry. It enacted R.A. No. 8180 entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act
of 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase
any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or
own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or
use the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of
Energy, wherein the president Fidel V. Ramos affirmed.
The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes." First, section 15 of
R.A. No. 8180 Act deregulating the downstream oil industry and for other purposes
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of
Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A 8180 states that Implementation of Full Deregulation. - Pursuant to
Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the Departmen of Energy (DOE) shall, upon
approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not
later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when

the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when
the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation
of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and
the following laws are deemed repealed
ISSUE: Did Sec. 15 of R.A 8180 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
power for allowing DOE implement the R.A 8180?
HELD: NO, Sec. 15 of R.A 8180 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of power. To determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, there are two kinds of test to be done; the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. First, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
The Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end
of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of
March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Second, Section 15 of R.A 8180 lays down the standard to guide the
judgment of the President; he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil
and petroleumproducts in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the
peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

B. COMPOSITION, QUALIFICATIONS, TERM, ELECTION (Sec 2-9)

THE SENATE
PIMENTEL, JR VS COMELEC G.R. No. 126394. April 24, 1998
Petitioner filed a case against Election board of canvassers and pertinent persons
responsible in the tally of votes during the senatorial; election in 1995. There were
discrepancy between the Provincial Certificate of Canvas for Ilocos Norte and its supporting
Statement of Votes per precinct or municipality for the province as shown bellow:
Candidate
Votes appearing in the
Votes appearing in the
Increase
Statement of Votes
Provincial Certificate
of Canvas
Enrile
65,343
95,343
30,000
Drilon
48,726
78,726
30,000
Mitra
42,959
62,959
20,000
Comelec ordered investigation on the matter. Petitioner contends that the discrepancies in a
violation of Section 27b of RA 6646. COMELEX resolved to file criminal and administrative
cases against respondents. However, COMELEC reversed its decision and dismissed the
complaint for lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to prosecute criminal
case.
Petitioner then filed for certiorari which the Solicitor General also manifests a motion
favoring petitioner which was held by the Supreme Court as unnecessary. COMELEC
contends that Section 27b gives a remedy to the erring official only when such official
refuses to correct his act will he be prosecuted. Respondent did not deny the error in
canvassing but claim honest mistake or simple error.

ISSUE: Whether respondent can be held liable for tampering election results under Section
27b of RA6646?
Ruling: Yes. Section 27b of RA 6646 states that: Any member of the board of election
inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers increases or decreases the votes received
by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses offer proper
verification and hearing to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes. The or
is disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from the other
things enumerated. Therefore said official can be prosecuted for said tampering.
Is the senate/the house of congress a continuing body?
Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
The Senate is investigating pertinent government purchases of two parcels of land, known
as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. Apparently the senate found quite irregularity of the
governments payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum
of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought
to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was
one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the
investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom
he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was
committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers
the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme
Court questioning the validity of his detention. the petitioner contented that the power may
be abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison
for life.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session?
RULING: YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session. The senate is a continuing body and which does not
cease to exist upon periodical dissolution of the Congress.
Garcillano vs. The House of Representatives
G.R. No. 170338 (Dec. 23, 2008)
The case involves the Hello Garci scandal in which Garcillano was allegedly told by then
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to manipulate the 2004 elections results in her favor.
The investigation to this scandal started on June 8, 2005, with a privilege speech delivered
by then Minority Floor Leader Francis Escudero. The hearings were however suspended
indefinitely on August 3, 2005.
In her privilege speech 2 years later (Aug. 28, 2007), Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
recommended the continuation of hearings on the said scandal. Co-petitioners Santiago

Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction, praying for the barring of the Senate from
conducting the inquiry. Petitioners argued that the current Senate has no authority to
continue the legislative inquiry on the Garci tapes because the Senate is not a continuing
body.
Issue: Whether or not the current Senate has the authority to continue with the inquiry on
the Hello Garci scandal.
Held: No. The Court ruled that the Senate has no authority to continue the said inquiry
without its duly published Rules of Procedure, as required whenever the terms of the
previous (half) set of Senators expire. This is in accordance with Sec. 21, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. This is because the Senate is considered a non-continuing body, which
means that each business each set of Senators have is non-binding to the next set, unless
the rulings of procedure of each are duly published.
In this case, the previous set of Senators was not able to publish its Rules of Procedure
regarding the inquiry of the Hello Garci scandal (as it was suspended indefinitely, and was
not finished by them). Therefore, they (the present set of Senators) should not be allowed to
continue the inquiry regarding the said scandal, as they do not have the authority to do so.
League of cities, supra

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

1. DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE: APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS
Mariano vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 (March 7, 1995)
The Congress enacts R.A. 7854, which will make Makati a highly urbanized city. The
provisions of this law also include the addition of one legislative district into the city,
effectively giving the City of Makati two legislative districts. Petitioners assailed the said law,
as it is in violation of Sections 5(3) and 7, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners
contended that (1) enactment of the law alters or restarts the three term limit of the elected
officials, in violation of Section 7, Art VI, and (2) the current population of Makati was
450,000, thus it should only have one district pursuant to Section 5(3), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 7854 is unconstitutional.
Held: No. In response to the first contention of petitioners, the Court held that such
contention lacks merit. This is because the petitioners only raised this contention out of fear
that the incumbent officials (i.e. Mayor Binay) will run for re-election, which is not an actual
issue in this case at bar. Thus, there was no ground to this contention as to make the
provisions of R.A. 7854 in violation of Sec. 7, Art. VI.
On the other hand, the Court held, in response to the second contention, that the provision
of Sec. 5(3), Art. VI merely states that each city with at least 250,000 is entitled to at least

one representative. The provision of this section pertains to the city population, not the
required district population.
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and
MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
G.R No. 188078
March 15, 2010
This case is about the declaration of R.A. 9591, creating a legislative district for City of
Malolos, Bulacan. It was alleged that such R.A. violates the minimum population
requirement stated in the constitution. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act
through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos
City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor
Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population
of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, An act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least
250,000 actual or projected.
Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being
violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987
Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional
Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was
declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to
issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135
as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official
by the Natl Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the
document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the
Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the
Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August
1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N.

TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 189793
April 7, 2010

stated in the by-laws of COCOFED that The Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority,
an administrative agency of the government, shall be a member of their National Board.
This amounts to participation of the government in the affairs of this group.

The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as
unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First
(1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.
Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President MacapagalArroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned
districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of
176,383 population count.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard
with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section
5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if
population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for noncompliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.
Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first,
error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 9716.

Issues:

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and
void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
RULING: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction
between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of
the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was
mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first
be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to
two additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance,
other than population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors
were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.
2. THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM
Republic Act No. 7941 An act providing for the election of party-list representatives
through the party list system and appropriating funds therefor
Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 147589 & 147613 June 25, 2003
The Comelec, in compliance to the directions issued by the Court last 2001,
conducted hearings and qualified the list of party-list organizations according to the eightpoint guideline provided by the Supreme Court. The Comelec was refrained from
proclaiming the winner until they have fully complied with the directions. The Comelec then
submitted its compliance reports in 3 sets, declaring 44 organizations as qualified party-lists
organizations. The OSG then recommended for BUHAY and COCOFED to be included in
the list of qualified party-lists. The Comelecs contention was that BUHAY was a mere
extension of El Shaddai and that COCOFED was an adjunct of the government. It was

There were 2 issues raised in this case as follows:

1.
Whether BUHAY and COCOFED should be qualified
2.
Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were disqualified for having
failed to meet the eight-point guideline of the Court should be deducted for the total votes
cast for the party-list system during said elections
Held:
On the first issue, the Court concurred with the OSGs recommendation that
BUHAY and COCOFED should be included in the list of qualified party-list organizations.
Comelecs report on BUHAY was not supported with substantial evidence and was merely
anchored on speculations. Further, the bylaws of COCOFED making the chairman of the
Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of their board has already been deleted
as early as May 1998. Hence, a total of 46 qualified party-list groups has been declared by
the Court.
On the second issue, Sec. 10 of RA 7941, which governs the party-list elections,
clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, sectoral organization or a coalition not
entitled to be voted for shall not be counted. Therefore the total votes cast for the 46
qualified party-list participants served as the basis for computing the two-percent threshold
for victory and number of seats the winners are entitled to.
a.

Who may participate in the party-list election

Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147589 & 147613
June 26, 2001
On March 26, 2011, the Comelec issued Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 where it
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party-list elections.
On April 10, 2011 Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC for the deletion
of some of the organizations in the list it issued. Subsequently, Bayan Muna-Youth and
Bayan Muna filed the similar cases challenging the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and
Bayan Muna filed a petition in the Supreme Court. They seek the disqualification of these
party-lists arguing mainly that they do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
The Court consolidated the two petitions herein.
Issues:
There were 4 issues raised in this case as follows:
1.
Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More
specifically, is there no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law?
2.
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3.
Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors ang organizations.

4.
Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
the Omnibus Resolution No 3785.

rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination
based on sexual orientation.

Held:
On the first issue, the Court deemed it proper that the petitioners brought such
challenge in the Court. Note that the petitioners filed the case before the Comelec but the
latter failed to act on it. Further, the case was one that is of public interest and with extreme
urgency for it potentially involves the composition of 20% of the House of Representatives.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that political parties may participate in the party-list
elections. Sections 7 and 8, Article IX of the Constitution provides that political parties may
be registered under the party-list system. Further, Sec 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a
party-list system registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations thereof,
xxx and Sec 3 expressly states that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or
a coalition of parties.
On the third issue, the Court ruled that parties or organizations that will participate
in the party-list elections must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system. As laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941, party-lists shall be filled by election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other
sectors as provided by law except religious sector. The intent of the Constitution is clear and
that is to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have
less in life, but more so
by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the
party-list system will prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it failed to apply the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. The Court cannot
accept the submissions of the Comelec that the party-list system, without qualification, is
open to all on the grounds cited above.
The case was remanded to the Comelec, which was directed to conduct summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants subject to the
guidelines ordered by the Court.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress
their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also
stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its
Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held: Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC
to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that
government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful
as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as
any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under
the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to
be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and
a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest.
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary
General George FGBF George Duldulao, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. [G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system
through its resolution, denying also the latters motion for reconsideration, in accordance
with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among
others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of
merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate
Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,
it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain,
clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8)
of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore
simply cannot stand.

(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to due process was not violated for [it]
was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC
resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be
heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice
and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was
not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The
doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to
follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in
a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SCs] judicial system from the
doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary
violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in
general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an
erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case
law.
G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered
and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The petitioners were included, but the COMELEC disqualified them from the May 2013
party-list race for various reasons.
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme
Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its
assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among
others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and

underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly
representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some
of the petitioners application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the
rest. They also lamented the poll bodys denial to accord them due process in the
evaluation proceedings.
The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was
tasked as the Member-in-charge of the case.
Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status quo
prior to the disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or only 41
petitions were able to secure a mandatory injunction, directing the Comelec to include their
names in the printing of official ballots.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or
lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political
constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record
of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral
wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized
and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the
BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of
the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the
party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for
the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system
itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower
house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
areeconomically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies as
they are ideologically marginalized.
b.

Determination of the 20% allocation for party-list member

VETERANS v. AKBAYAN, 342 SCRA 244

FACTS: Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:Sec. 5. (1) The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.(2) The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by

selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector. Resolution of COMELEC was assailed regarding the May 11, 1998 election for
party-list representative. COMELEC en banc proclaimed 13 party-list representatives from
12 parties and organizations which had obtained 2% of the total number of votes cast. RA
7641 or the Party List Law provides that only parties with at least 2% of the total votes cast
for the party-list are entitled to one seat in the House of Representative, but no party can
have more than 3 seats even if it gets more than 6% of the votes. Based on the formula,
however, after the 1998 elections, only 14 party-list representatives could be proclaimed
instead of 52, which constitute the 20% allocated by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 20% allocation under Sec. 5 (2), ART. VI of the Constitution is
mandatory or merely a ceiling, and whether or not the 2% threshold and 3-seat is a
constitutional limitation.
HELD: Sec. 5 (2), ART. VI of the Constitution is not mandatory that all seats be filled, it is
merely a ceiling .2% threshold and 3-seat limitation are constitutional.
RATIONALE: Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple
message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down
only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for
party-list representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted
RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional
representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos
belonging to the marginalized and under represented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and
coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in
the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law
provides:(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.Considering the
foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2),Article VI of
the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in
Congress.
CIBAC vs COMELEC
BANAT v COMELEC
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made
a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners
at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula
from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of
the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a partylist candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision
that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill
the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the
3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD: I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally,
the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be
from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the
number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were
220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats
Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow
that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those
which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50
parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself
even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the
votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of
the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats
to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment
of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than
2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters)
are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were
able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus
17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in
the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number
of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a twopercenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats
because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there
are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and
those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the
likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from
the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in
the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the
marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7
other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the
Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and
the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in
the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.
BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELECG.R. No. 147589 - June 26, 2001
Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petitionunder
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by
theCOMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties,including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek
thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system
wasintended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream politicalparties
, the none-marginalized or overrepresented.
Issues: a. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections b.
Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations.
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELEC
which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of

the Constitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC to
refrain proclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until
after the COMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance
.a. Yes b. No.
Rationale:
a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections
. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of
the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system
. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3
expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties."
b.

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution
and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.
The provision on the party-list system is not self-executory
. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided
by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution.
Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.
2.

QUALIFICATIONS
a. District Representatives

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.
March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a petition
for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did not meet
the residency requirement.
March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the
COMELECs head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was the
result of an honest misrepresentation and that she has always maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile or residence.
April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that
found Montejos petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos corrected certificate of
candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled.

May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution drafted on April 24.
May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos proclamation to the
office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes.
However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended
even if she did win.
May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of the
said Congressional election.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus
candidate, of the first district of Leyte. Yes.
It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which out to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the constitutions residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framers
of the constitution)2. The confusion of the honest mistake made when filed her
Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is
immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the
residence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections.
This honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the
First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after
marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only
actual residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was required to
change residences and apply for voters registration in these cited locations. When
she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated
in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to transfer residences to
wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or
intend to lose the wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her
choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG
chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and
their farm in Olot, Leyte.
(2) WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78
of the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction
to the House of Representatives. Yes.
The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other
quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground
of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any
event, Sections 6
2. As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo
and Mr. Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.
3. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of
the Republic.
4. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to

Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of
B.P. 881 even after the elections.
(3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over
the question of the petitioners qualifications after the elections. No.
The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives.
Aquino v COMELEC (1995)
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative
District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of
the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10
months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCDUMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground
that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which
under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one
year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his
certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a
resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8
May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the
latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission
resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant
the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence
(not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile
not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court
cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is
it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:

This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was
domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at
times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and
actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning of
domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain,
i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs
of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to
place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for
him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he established
a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior
to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was
a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years
prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his
COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of
origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement
of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in
Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short
length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in
Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect
a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of
one year residence in the district.

Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the
candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of
Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with
the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the
elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR
Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate
its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has
to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year
against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one
year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts
which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four
months in the case of petitioners district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered
the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine
that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser
and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new
political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their
genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one
year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.
Domino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in
the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents
filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that
Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much
less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Thereafter,
the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack
of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate
of candidacy based on his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as 24
Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections
Held: The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and
for elective office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime
in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of
candidacy for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May
1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in
Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.
A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not
adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos
intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required
to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result
in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in
Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period
of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his
residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City.
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of
residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.
Bengzon vs HRET
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he
is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino
parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence,
he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An
Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District
of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the
duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in
the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited

provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Mitra vs. Comelec July 2, 2010
Mitra was the incumbent representative of the 2nd district of Palawan and resided in Puerto
Prinsesa. Before the end of his second term, Puerto Prinsesa was reclassified as highly
urbanized city and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. An
effect of this declaration would be the ineligibility of the residents of Puerto Prinsesa to run
for provincial posts. More than a year before the 2010 elections, with the intention to run for
the position of Governor, Mitra transferred his voters registration record to the Municipality
of Aborlan and subsequently filed for his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) as Governor of
Palawan, as a resident of Aborlan.
Respondents Gonzales and Balbon, Jr. filed a petition to cancel Mitras COC on the grounds
that Mitra cannot claim that he was a resident of Aborlan on the following claims:
1.
Mitra bought a parcel of land in Aborlan, to which a house he constructed was not
yet completed
2.
Documents that show Mitras residence is in Puerto Prinsesa (i.e. Document of
Sales, Building Permit, tax certificate
3.
Affidavits of witnesses attesting that they had not seen Mitra in the municipality of
Aborlan
Mitra, on the other hand, claimed that his residence in Aborlan was in a residential portion of
a Maligaya Feedmill in Aborlan and presented the lease contract, attestations from some
neighbors that he resided in Aborlan , ID issued by the House of Representative that his
address is in Aborlan.
Comelec canceled his COC on the grounds that the evidences presented by Mitra is not
enough to sufficient to prove that he abandoned his domicile of origin and that physical
presence must be established to prove that he established his new domicile in Aborlan.
Issue:
Whether the Comelec exercised grave abuse its discretion by cancelling Mitras COC on the
grounds that there was false material misrepresentation in his declared residence
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court found that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material
misrepresentation in his COC. From the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his
residence from Puerto Prinsesa to Aborlan to comply with the residence requirement. The
law recognizes implicitly that there can be a change of domicile or residence, but imposes
only the condition that residence at the new place should at least be for a year, which Mitra
has complied. There was no falsity as Mitra transfer his residence within the period required.
Comelec has also failed to present any legally accepted basis to conclude that Mitras
statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation.
REP. DANILO RAMON FERNANDEZ VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and JESUS VICENTE, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009

Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the
Province of Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he
indicated his complete/exact address as No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision,
Barangay Balibago, Sta.Rosa City, Laguna (alleged Sta. Rosa residence). "Private
respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to
and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification before the Office of
the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. He claimed that Fernandez made material
misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past
elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan is located in
the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise
claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also
outside the First District. On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo
warranto before the HRET, docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034 , praying that petitioner be
declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing
the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void. The HRET ruled in favor of private
st
respondent and held that Fernandez was not qualified to be the representative of the 1
District of Laguna since he failed to comply with the residence requirement under Section 6,
Art. VI of the Constitution.
Issue: Is Fernandez a resident of Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he does not even a house there
th
in because his house is found Pagsanjan, Laguna, which is within the 4 Legislative District
of Laguna?
Held: Fernandez does not deny that his domicile of origin is Pagsanjan in the Fourth District
of Laguna. Pagsanjan is his domicile of origin, or since his birth, where he formerly ran for
provincial Board Member of Laguna in 1998, for Vice-Governor of Laguna in 2001 and for
Governor of Laguna in2004. In all his Certificates of Candidacy when he ran for these
positions, he indicated under oath that his domicile or permanent residence was in
Pagsanjan in the Fourth District of Laguna, not in the First District where he later ran in the
last elections. Petitioner alleges that in the questioned Decision, the HRET added a new
qualification requirement for candidates seeking election to the position of Member of the
House of Representatives, and that is, they must be real property owners or must have a
house to reside in the legislative district where they seek election. We find the interpretation
of the HRET of the residency requirement under the Constitution to be overly restrictive and
unwarranted under the factual circumstances of this case .The HRET puts undue emphasis
on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in
Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other places has been taken to
mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or that he
had not abandoned his domicile of origin. Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is
not necessarily the domicile of choice of a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or
our election laws which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired
home in one district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to
qualify for a congressional seat in that other district. Neither do we see the fact that
petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a barrier
for him to run in that district. Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional
candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he
resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property
in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies
that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court

would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which
property requirement would be unconstitutional.
b.

Party Nominees

Banat vs COMELEC, Supra

4. TERM OF OFFICE
Dimaporo v. Mitra
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur
during the1987 congressional elections.Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the
position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of
Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of theOmnibus Election
Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties
andfunctions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to
regain his seat in theCongress.Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a
Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 isnot operative in the present constitution,
and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress.Grounds may be termed to be
shortened:1.Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision,
agency, orinstrumentality thereof.2.Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly
behavior3.Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an
election contest4.Voluntary renunciation of office
ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has
filed for anothergovernment position
HELD: No.In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers.
In the 1935Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers
should serve with the highestdegree of responsibility and integrity.If you allow a Batasan or
a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for anoffice other than
the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the
mandateof the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered
ipso facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or
abandoning or relinquishing his mandateto the people and he should therefore resign if he
want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service

FILLING OF VACANCY

ARTURO TOLENTINO AND ARTURO MOJICA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

SENATOR RALPH RECTO AND SENATOR GREGORIO HONASAN
G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004
Facts: Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the
Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the
regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be
elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the Senatorial candidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former

Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.

On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13
candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of
6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant
petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005.
Issue: Whether or not the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified: (1) for
failure to give notice by the body empowered to and (2) for not following the procedure of
filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Held: (1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but
empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition
precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and
failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice
of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient
number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice
misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special
election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC
conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the
COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the
votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is
mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of election, if
necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on
May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No.
84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad
made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona
would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to
amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the senatorial cabdidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

C. SALARIES, PRIVILEGES, INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE, PROHIBITIONS

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay (G.R. No. L-25554)
Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines
and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from
authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134
to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of
the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10)
of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963,
and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30,

1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said
Act expired on December 30, 1965.
Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must
have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to
all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a
single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the
Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not
the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the
purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in
the singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and
the House, underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the
fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that
enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become
operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and
House that approved it will have expired.

LIGOT vs MATHAY
Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from
December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965),
RA 4134 fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the
national government was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July
1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased
under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided
that said increases shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for
retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least
twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein
provided in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected
officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. HOR granted his petition however, Velasco,
the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then,
Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for
retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended
December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would
become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing
December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his
retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under
Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per
annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and
of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as
far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on
December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit
is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their
compensation and other emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant
retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they
were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the
Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioners colleague, exCongressman Singson, (S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would
lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what
cannot be done directly.
2. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES
a.

Privilege from arrests

MARTINEZ vs MORFE
Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegates of the
present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of
the above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the
Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions
of Congress, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
For under the Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary
immunities of a senator or a representative. Both petitioners are facing criminal
prosecutions, the information filed against petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for
falsification of a public document and two informations against petitioner Fernando Bautista,
Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the
respondent Judges in the above proceedings, would dispute such a contention on the
ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being
merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a
provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be
unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD: There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of
Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost
freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force
except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech
should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount
to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from
the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well,
without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event

come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong
public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be
expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators
belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown
around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would
constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is
that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence. Petitioners cannot claim
their claim to immunity.
***According to Art. VI, Sec. 15 of the Constitution: The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace,
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place.
EXEMPTION: They can be arrested in cases of Treason, Felony and Breach of Peace.
Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies
giving them aid and comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by law. Breach of the
peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special
statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained
and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Petitioners cannot claim
their claim to immunity.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of
a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents
to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as
member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The

confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more

than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or
more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
TRILLANES vs PIMENTEL
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al.
556 SCRA 471 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national
officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged with coup dtat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four
years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his
term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend
Senate Sessions and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as
senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to
work and serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of
detention prisoners who are held without bail
HELD: No distinction between Trillanes case and that of Jalosjos case
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules
also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is

strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally
to rape and coup dtat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil.
Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release
on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such
cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any
business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a
necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to
speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to
office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies
pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the
voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution
and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching
tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even
essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in
prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accusedappellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x
Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from
those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners,
at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely
abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to

register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast
his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on
June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be
accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to
him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
b.

Privilege of speech and debate

Jimenez vs Cabangbang
Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of
an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with
the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with
communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to
place him as the president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others,
under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used
as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of
general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of
damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of
the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication
rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace.
Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place. The publication of the said letter is not covered by said
expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the
same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members
of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as
such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session
when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of
the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez action for
damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons
unnamed therein alluded to as planners, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it
should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that it is of course possible that plaintiffs
are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. In other
words, the very document upon which plaintiffs action is based explicitly indicates that they
might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely
unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to

Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers
of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest
that the group therein described as planners include these two (2) high ranking officers.
Petition is dismissed.
Osmena vs Pendatun
Then Congressman Osmea Jr filed a verified petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and others in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution 59. He asked
for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement upon his parliamentary
immunity. He further asked that the respondents should not require him to substantiate his
charges against the president with the admonition that if he failed to do so he must show
cause why the House should not punish him. Said charges emanated from his one-hour
privileged speech entitled A Message to Garcia, which constituted a serious assault upon
the dignity of Garcia as the then President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon
member s of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament
in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or
unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.
Antero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009
In the recent administrative case of ANTERO J. POBRE vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSORSANTIAGO, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed the
letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, but castigated, so to speak, the feisty
and aggressive, if not foul-mouth, respondent lady senator for using what I would call
intemperate and hate-filled language in a privilege speech she had delivered before the
Philippine Senate which was directed against the Philippine Supreme Court Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
The JBC had previously rejected her nomination as Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme
Court.
I am truly glad the JBC had rejected her nomination to the highest tribunal of the land,
considering her notorious public image as a war-freak person.
In the aforecited case, although the Court held that the privilege speech of the combative
lady senator was not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court, it however expressed its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good

professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were

intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that
she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
The offensive and disrespectful words of the lady senator were as follows:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I
am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living
my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather
be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should
be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense, the Court said, citing previous decided cases.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite
and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good.
The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard
of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.

Let me digest the case for legal research purposes.

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre
invited the Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos
speech delivered on the Senate floor:
"x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I
am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living
my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather
be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x."
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker
towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and
constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asked that disbarment proceedings
or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel,
did not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those
statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being
part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open
controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She
averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar
Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be
vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent
justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should
have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor

The Court said that it does not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner
they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of
the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and
the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the
name of parliamentary immunity.
Although the Court held that the privilege speech of the combative lady senator was not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court, it felt,
however, expressed its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of
the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the
lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct.
It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper
in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the
Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. The Court stated that in this case, the
lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
"Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
"Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others."

It will be noted that Senator/Atty. Santiago was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law
professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of
numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator
Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, was duty-bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members.
Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher

degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.
Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her
statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.
The Court stressed that a careful re-reading of her foul and repulsive utterances would
readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not
being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were
outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must
not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the
Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are
agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual
members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for
the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
The Court stated that Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the
position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its
individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio
chairperson, have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of
Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and
indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and
defamatory words against all of them.
As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that it is the duty of a lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That
same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the
courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds
him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity to the courts.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the
courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous
to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus
has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.
The Court in a subtle way criticized the Senate itself for neglecting its duty to discipline the
respondent senator for her offensive language. The Rules of the Senate itself contains a
provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under
any circumstance, offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any
public institution. But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate
President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate
Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

3.

INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICE

Puyat vs De Guzman
On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe
Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that
the votes were not properly counted hence he filed a quo warranto proceeding before the
Securities and Exchange Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case,
Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group. And during a conference held by
SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 79) to have the parties confer with each
other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected
arguing that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone)
before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited
himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in this said SEC case for him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner
of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC
Commissioner granted the motion in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat
then moved to question the Commissioners action.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene
in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not
appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not
appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the
litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it
is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as
a party of interest which is clearly a work around and is clearly an act after the fact. A
mere work around to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly
could not likewise be done indirectly.
Liban vs. Gordon (2009)
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross Chapter while
Respondent is the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate - Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Consti: No
Senator or Member of the HoR may hold any other office/employment in the Govt, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including govt-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term w/o forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected).
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC which held that PNRC is a govt-owned or
controlled corporation. Flores v. Drilon held that incumbent national legislators lose their
elective posts upon their appointment to another government office.
Respondent:
Petitioners have no standing to file petition w/c appears to be an action for quo warranto
they do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent.

Sec. 11, Rule 66, Rules of Civil Procedure: action should be commenced w/in 1 year
after the cause of public officers forfeiture of office respondent has been working as a
Red Cross volunteer for 40 yrs
Petitioners cannot raise a constitutional question as taxpayers no claim that they
suffered some actual damage/threatened injury or illegal disbursement of public funds
If petition is for declaratory relief, SC has no jurisdiction original jurisdiction in RTC
PNRC is not a govt owned/controlled corporation
Sec. 13, Art. VI of Consti does not apply because volunteer service to PNRC is not an
office/employment

Petitioners: present petition is a taxpayers suit questioning unlawful disbursement of

funds considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries and other compensation
as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office. Court has jurisdiction because it
involves a legal/constitutional issue of transcendental importance.
Issues, Holding & Ratio:
WON petitioners have standing.
SC: NO. The petition is an action for quo warranto (Sec. 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court an
action for the usurpation of a public office against a public officer who does or suffers an act
which constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his office). See facts for petitioners allegations.
Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent.
WON PNRC is a Private or Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation.
SC: PNRC is a Private Corporation.
May 22, 1947 Pres. Manuel Roxas signed RA 95 (PNRC Charter) adhering to the
Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. PNRC is:
- A non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization whose mission is to
bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most
vulnerable w/o consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or
political affiliation.
- A member of National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement. 7 Fundamental Principles: Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality,
Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity, Universality.
- Must be autonomous, neutral and independent; not appear to be instrument/agency that
implements govt policy to merit the trust of all and effectively carry out its mission
therefore, it cannot be owned/controlled by the govt
The Philippine govt does not own the PNRC does not have govt assets and does not
receive any appropriation from the Congress. It is financed primarily by contributions from
private individuals/entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of
Governors (Sec. 11, PNRC Charter).
The govt does not control the PNRC. Only 6 of the 30 members of the PNRC Board of
Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines (Sec. 6, PNRC Charter). A
majority of 4/5 of the PNRC Board are elected/chosen by the private sector members of the
PNRC.
The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or any subordinate govt official,
therefore, he is not an official/employee of the Philippine Government. Sec. 16, Art. VII of
Consti President appoints all officials & employees in the Executive branch whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Consti or by law. President also appoints

those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. The law may also authorize
the heads of deparments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint officers lower in
rank.
The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including
students and foreigners; those contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC (Sec. 5,
PNRC Charter amended by PD 1264).
Sec. 2(13) of he Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987: A govtowned or controlled corporation must be owned by the govt, and in case of a stock
corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the govt. In case of a
non-stock corporation, at least a majority of the members must be govt officials holding
such membership by appointment/designation by the govt.
WON the office of the PNRC Chairman is a govt office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. VI of
Consti.
SC: The office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office. The President cannot review,
reverse or modify the decisions/actions of the PNRC Board and the PNRC Chairman. Only
the PNRC Board can review, reverse or modify the decisions/actions of the PNRC
Chairman.
*The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation
of Private Corporations by Special Law
1935 (Sec. 7 was in force when PNRC was created by special character on March 22,
1947), 1973 & 1987 (Sec. 16) Constitutions provide that: The Congress shall not, except by
general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations.
Govt-owned or controlled corporations may be created/established by special charters in
the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
Feliciano v. CoA Sec. 16 of 1987 Consti bans private corporations to be created by
special charters, which historically gave individuals, families or groups special privileges
denied to other citizens.
PNRC was created through a special charter, however, the elements of govt ownership
and control (e.g. capital assets and operating funds from govt) are clearly lacking in the
PNRC. It therefore cannot be considered a govt-owned or controlled corporation.
In creating PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private
corporation, which is not exempt from constitutional prohibition (Sec. 16 above) even as a
non-profit/charitable corporation.
PNRC Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it
corporate powers is void for being unconstitutional Sec. 1-13 are void. Other provisions
remain valid as they can be considered as a recognition by the State that PNRC is the local
National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and thus
entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter. They also
implement the Phil. Govts treaty obligations based on the Geneva Conventions.
Judgment: Office of the PNRC Chairman declared not a government office.
Dissent: Nachura, J.
The petition is one for prohibition and petitioners have legal standing as citizens
and taxpayers. The remedy sought is preventive and restrictive, an injunction against an
alleged continuing violation of the fundamental law. They raise a constitutional issue, w/o

claiming any entitlement to either the Senate seat or chairmanship of PNRC. The Court has
full authority and bounden duty to assume jurisdiction to determine WON other branches of
govt have kept themselves w/in the limits of the Consti & laws and have not abused
discretion given them.
PNRC is a govt-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC). Its charter does not
violate the constitutional proscription against creation of private corporations by
special law. PNRC was incorporated under RA 95, a special law. It cannot be anything but
a GOCC. PNRC was not impliedly converted into a private corporation simply because its
charter was amended to vest in it authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of
all duties, tax fees, etc.
The use of Sec. 2(13) of Introductory Provisions of Administrative Code of 1987 by the
ponencia to define a GOCC does not pronounce a definition of a GOCC that strays from
Sec. 16, Art. XII of Consti. It merely declares that a GOCC may either be a stock or nonstock corporation.
Sec. 1 of PNRC Charter PNRC is officially designated to assist the RP in discharging
the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions therefore, it is engaged in the
performance of the govts public functions.
PNRC is endowed w/ corporate powers. It administers special funds contributions of
members, aid given by govt, supported by PCSO and LGUs. It submits annual reports
receipts and disbursement to the President.
ANRC (precursor of PNRC) is considered a federal instrumentality immunity from state
taxation, subjected to governmental supervision & regular financial audit, principal officer
appointed by the President but remains an independent, volunteer-led org. No basis to
assume that it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out mission as a
National Red Cross Society. Separatists & insurgents do not consider them as the enemy
but as the entity to turn to in the event of injury.
Considering that PNRC is a GOCC, its charter does not violate the constitutional
provision (Sec. 16, Art. XII).
To declare Sec. 1 of PNRC Charter (creation and incorporation of the org) invalid and
the rest valid is to reach an absurd situation in w/c obligations are imposed on and a
framework for its operation is laid down for a legally non-existing entity. Sec. 2-17 of RA 95
are not separable from Sec. 1 cannot stand independently no separability clause.
Presumption of constitutionality of law is presumed. There is no clear showing that the
PNRC Charter runs counter to the consti. All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor
of the constitutionality of the statute.
Deleterious effects will result if PNRC is declared a private corporation employees will
no longer be covered by the GSIS; it can no longer be extended tax exemptions and official
immunity; and cannot anymore be given support, financial or otherwise, by the National
Govt, LGUs, and PCSO. The Court must not arbitrarily declare a law unconstitutional just to
save a single individual from unavoidable consequences of his transgression of the Consti
even if done in good faith.
Sen. Gordons continuous occupancy of 2 incompatible positions is a clear
violation of the Consti (Sec. 13, Art. VI). The language in the provision is unambiguous;
requires no in-depth construction. A position held in an ex officio capacity (a second post
held by virtue of the functions of the first office) does not violate such constitutional
proscription. The chairmanship of the PNRC Board is not held in an ex officio capacity by a
member of Congress.

Vote to grant Petition.

D. SESSIONS, OFFICERS, QUORUM, INTERNAL RULES, JOURNALS (Sec. 15-16)
1. Officers, Quorum
AVELINO V. CUENCO 1949
On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate
charges against the then Senate President Avelino. He request to do so on the next session
(21 Feb 1949). On the next session however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for
about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Cuenco and Sanidad and others,
Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory
and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by
Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and
Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the
session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said
adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his
chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then stood up, and
asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the
Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the
remaining

members

of

the

Senate

to

continue

the

session

in

D. SESSIONS, OFFICERS, QUORUM, INTERNAL RULES, JOURNALS (Sec. 15-16)

order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to
deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be

1. Officers, Quorum

elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized
by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office

AVELINO V. CUENCO 1949

thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the
rightful Senate President.

On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Avelino.
He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the next session however,
opening
of the session
for about two
ISSUE:Avelino
Whether delayed
or not thethe
SC can
take cognizance
of the case.
hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his
allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering
hisBypiece.
Motions
being
raised
by Taada
etcognizance
al were being
HELD:
a vote of
6 to 4, the
SC held
that they
cannot take
of the case. This is
blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among
as being
out of
Avelinos
moved
to
in others,
view of the
separation
of order.
powers, the
political camp
naturethen
of the
controversy
and the
adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested
said
to power
be placed
Avelinowhich power
constitutionalthe
grant
to adjournment
the Senate of the
to electinitsvoting.
own president,
just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed
by be
hisinterfered
followers.
stood up,
andshould
askedabstain in this
should not
with, Senator
nor taken Cabili
over, bythen
the judiciary.
The SC
that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonmentcase
of because
the Chair
by
the
Avelino,
made
it
incumbent
upon
Senate
the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves
President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue
session
in time
order
not totheir
paralyze
functions
of them.
the Anyway, if,
who arethe
at liberty
at any
to choose
officers, the
change
or reinstate
Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz
to Sanidads
Resolutionthe(No.
68)ofthat
Cuencowant
be petitioner to
as theyielded
petition must
imply to be acceptable,
majority
the Senators
elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was evenpreside,
recognized
by lies
thein President
of theHall
Philippines
following
his remedy
the Senate Session
not in thethe
Supreme
Court.
day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate
President.
ISSUE: Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the
resolution?

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of
the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving

HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the the
case.
is the
in view
of the et
separation
of powers,
the political
Hall,This
prevent
other (Cuenco
al) twelve senators
from passing
a resolution that met
nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power
elect itsendorsement.
own president,
which
power
should
with theirtounanimous
The answer
might
be different
hadnot
the be
resolution been
interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case
because
selection
of the presiding officer affects only
approved
only by the
ten or
less.
the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change
or reinstate
asSoto
thewas
petition
mustwhile
imply
**Two senators
were notthem.
presentAnyway,
that time. if,
Sen.
in a hospital
Sen. Confesor
to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy
lies
in
the
Senate
Session
Hall

not
in
the
Supreme
Court.
was in the USA.
ISSUE: Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
ISSUE: Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation
of the
and
a minority
tenWas there a
session (presided
by morning
Avelino)? session
Are there
twothat
sessions
in one of
day?
senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuencoquorum
et al) twelve
senators
from
passing
a
resolution
that
met
with
constituting such session?
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved
only
ten or less.
The second
session
is aby
continuation
of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen.entered
Confesor
in the There
USA. were 23 senators considered to be in session that time
into was
the journal.
(including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the

Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the members of

House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a

the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said provision

majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority

was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall

of all the members of the House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less

constitute a quorum to do business, shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution

number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate

to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but

less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who

Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the

are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or

arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be

absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make

no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same

attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process

inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)

session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and

for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words of all

that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or

the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original

wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected

Constitution which required concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National

president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and

Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present

the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the

Constitution, so as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each

majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13

House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the

NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was

jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21,

no quorum.

1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the
light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the
result of the majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has
become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a
quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group,
taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing
compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the
Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason,
the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with
the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate
President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)

SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA 1998

During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was
declared the duly elected President of the Senateby a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad
manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member
of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted
for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also
a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the
majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 LakasNUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition
for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUE:
1. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
2. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader?

4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
HELD: WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.
In view of constitutional violation
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not
provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority",
who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
Definition of minority and majority
Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,"
not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast,
minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater
number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority.
In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by
petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be
identified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general
elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to
different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision
prescribes which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof
has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in
both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "each House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary." In this regard, the Constitution vests in each
house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings."
Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal
affairs. However, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.
In view of usurpation
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power
by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding
is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a
public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show
that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of
the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners
present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate
minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize
any of his specific acts as minority leader.
In view of Fernans recognition of Guingona
"By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty

enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."
By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he
was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent
Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the
rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done
within their competence and authority.
2. Internal Rules of Proceedings
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA G.R. NO. 127255, AUGUST 14, 1997
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted
its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of
a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair
was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep.
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to
the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then
already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House
HELD:Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body,

the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll
call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.

and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated
in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon

SANTIAGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN 2001

determination by the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This

On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of

is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a

Immigration and Deportation (CID) approved the application for legalization of the stay of

penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not

about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran

being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.

counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is

But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still

also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens

be suspended as a senator?

legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the

cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Garchitorena, presiding

clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the SC has,

Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of Santiago. Santiago petitioned for a

more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public

provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved.

officials and employees indicted before it.

After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must

1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then,

be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which

from office. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago

he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate

from office for 90 days.

that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate

Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?

without violating the Constitution.

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a

HELD: The Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its

proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the

proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-

gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence

thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when

the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence

imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. On the other hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019 provides :

before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the

SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom

trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the

any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of

validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded

the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds

the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a

or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution

specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of

Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds

that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in

set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

two newspapers of general circulation.

DELA PAZ V. SENATE COMMITTEE 2009

In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to
attend an Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled
GA, de la Paz is also scheduled to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the
departure area for he was carrying with him 105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also
carrying with him 45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in writing that he is
carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. De
La Paz and his group was later released but the s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon
arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations for the investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident. De
La Paz averred that the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz
argued that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident
as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section
13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that
respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest
without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee.
They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as
required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation
involving them relative to the Moscow incident.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD: The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution states:Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings. This provision
has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. The challenge to
the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case
at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of
the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question. Also, the signatures
were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the Senate president and it is
shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules. It is also shown

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. V. JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS TO CANVASS

THE VOTES FOR PRESIDENT & VICE PRESIDENT IN THE MAY 10 2004 ELECTIONS
By a petition for prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring
null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the
votes cast for Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in the May 10 2004 elections
following the adjournment of Congress on June 11 2004.
The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint
Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the
Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
ISSUE: Whether or not legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the
rules of both Houses of Congress supports Pimentels arguments against the existence and
proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress after the adjournment of Congress.
HELD: NO. Pimentels claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure,
precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly
contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is
an incumbent member.
Moreover, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support
the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee. Thus, during the 1992
Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned on 25 May 1992. Thereafter, on
22 June 1992, the Eight Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of
Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as
President and Vice President, respectively.
Senate Ethics Committee; Due Process. This case refers to the ethics complaint filed
against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200 million for the C-5
Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Petitioners allege that the
adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is
violative of Senator Villars right to due process. The SC did not agree. The Constitutional
right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and
affirmed by this Court. The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own
rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these
requirements are complied with, according to the SC, the Court will not interfere with the
right of Congress to amend its own rules. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate
Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No.
187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate Ethics Committee; Equal Protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of
the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint
against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed
Senator Villars recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate
as a body. The SC did not agree with this. The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that
all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation
of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate
Committee on Ethics and Privileges. However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to
name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while
ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical conduct is

within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from
pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics
Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared
that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics
Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of
the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved
by a majority of the members of the Senate. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate
Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No.
187714, March 8, 2011.
-----------------------------Senate; Publication of Rules. Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary
because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics
Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent
alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the
Senate Committee of the Whole. The SC held that the Constitution does not require
publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the
Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need
not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules
can take effect. In this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even
if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication.
To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if
the rights of its own members are affected. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate
Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No.
187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate; Quorum and Voting. If the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a
majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section
16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express
provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and
voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict
between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will
of course prevail. . Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole
represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.

3. Journals and Enrolled Bills

US V. PONS 1916
Conclusiveness of the Journals
Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez
arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine
were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the
other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record

were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs
officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually
contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons
and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such
contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381
was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said
that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the
special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is
the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if
Act 2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are
conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought
into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and
to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses
cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of
the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February
28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these
journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
CASCO V. GIMENEZ 1963
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in
bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange
for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the
production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and
P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second
sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November
3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from
said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the
said refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the
provision of section 2 of RA 2609.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the
margin fee.

HELD: No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly
a finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners contends
that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction and between the terms urea
and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of urea
formaldehyde and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the
intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in
the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.
ARROYO V. DE VENECIA 1997
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the
House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made
an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair
declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker?
The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries
of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House
HELD:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body,
the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll
call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.
ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS 1974
Journal When to be Consulted
In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs
of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise
issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had
been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga
reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on
September 7, 1964 for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory
and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board
to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An
Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further
Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four
Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila)
because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said law
rd

passed the 3 reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which
referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by
Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to
the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant
amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back
to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for
approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the
Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the President for signing was
the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the
version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact,

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their

signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and

readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the

binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute.

1 reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate

Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is

passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate

conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.

could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of

st

SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was

text (only the text) of the HB.

validly enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioners are correct in saying that since Republic Act No.
HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record.

7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI,

The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is

Section 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two

subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this

distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630, it is unconstitutional

case. This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by
the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific

HELD: This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue

facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for

bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of

the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were

Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House

introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed

may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the

text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to

whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later.

incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not

At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill

duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the

may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the

Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also

legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same

declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To

as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with

perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill

amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of

has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous

legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the

consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Senate.

TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY 1994

Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as
the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6
of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3

What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills,
bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must
come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to

approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to

That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on

bear on the enactment of such laws.

separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld

Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill

pending receipt of the House bill.

which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
It is claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either

We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three

the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by

readings on separate days as required by the Constitution[8] because the second and third

the Conference Committee.

readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February
24, 1994[9] and again on March 22, 1994,[10] the President had certified S. No. 1630 as

this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its

urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but

report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate

also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President

bill.[17] If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions,

certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies

there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an

the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three

"amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the

readings on separate days and [ii] t has been printed in its final form and distributed three

subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the

days before it is finally approved.

approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative

department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third

In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because

legislative chamber is thus without any basis.

the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause
as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause [i.e., printing and

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716

distribution three days before final approval] would not only violate the rules of grammar. It

must be resolved in its favor. Our cases[20] manifest firm adherence to the rule that an

would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the

enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.

immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or

emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not

time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It

been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee

may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing

"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the

copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law

invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in

in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-

such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our

President. Under the Constitution, such a law is required to be made within seven days of

government.

the convening of Congress in emergency session.

The question is whether this amendment of Section 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in

is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be

considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of
Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being
in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have
only one subject which should be in expressed in its title.
The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the
ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election
practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office other than
the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto
resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the
OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.

the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P. D. No. 1590 as

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

among those which the statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose

HELD: No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be
expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The
purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does
not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the
notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed
that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same
was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the
petitioners as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations
regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of
the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G. R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, Section
26[1] which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof." It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor
S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the
VAT and that this was made only in the Conference Committee bill which became Republic
Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title.

of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by
withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To insist that P. D. No. 1590 be
mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to Section 103 of the NIRC, in which it is
specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of
its content.

The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the
members of Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to,
they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its
exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for
the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event
somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not
any more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P. D. No. 1590, and yet no
mention is made of its tax exemption.

FARINAS V. EXECUTIVE 2003

SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. Any
elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he

ISSUE: Whether or not the effectivity clause which states This Act shall take effectupon its
approval(Sec.16) is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution
HELD:
An effectivity clause which provides that the law shall take immediately upon its approval
is defective, but it does not render the entire law invalid, the law shall take effect fifteen days
after its publication in the OG or newspaper of general circulation. In Tanada vs Tuvera, the
court laid down the rule: The clause, unless otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself. Publication is indispensable in
every case

E. ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS AND COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS (Sec. 17-19)

1. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
a. Jurisdiction
ROBERT Z. BARBERS, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Robert Z. Barbers (Barbers) and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the
Senate of the Philippines in the 10 May 2004 Elections. On 24 May 2004, the COMELEC
proclaimed the first 11 duly elected Senators in the elections. The COMELEC declared that
it would proclaim the remaining 12th winning candidate for Senator after canvassing the
remaining unsubmitted COCs. On 2 June 2004, the COMELEC proclaimed Biazon as the
12th ranking duly elected 12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The COMELEC
stated that after the canvass of the supplemental Provincial COCs from Maguindanao
(Cotabato City), Lanao del Sur and one barangay in Nueva Vizcaya, Biazon obtained
10,635,270 votes nationwide. On the other hand, Barbers obtained 10,624,585 votes.
Thus, Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. The COMELEC stated that this
difference will not materially be affected by the votes in certain precincts where there was
failure of elections.
Claiming that Biazons proclamation was void, Barbers filed a petition to annul the
proclamation of Biazon as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. Barbers asserted that
the proclamation of Biazon was illegal and premature being based on an incomplete
canvass. Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the
results of the special elections, which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly affect
the results of the elections.
On 9 June 2004, Barbers filed an Omnibus Motion for Immediate Service of
Summons, for Suspension of the Effects of Proclamation, and to Set Case for Hearing.
Barbers asserted that an immediate resolution of the present case was necessary because
the term of office of Senators would commence on 30 June 2004. Barbers further claimed
that there were Municipal COCs still to be included in the senatorial canvass and special
elections still to be held in certain municipalities involving a total of 29,219 votes. Thus,
Barbers insisted that suspension of the effects of the proclamation of Biazon was
necessary. Barbers stressed that there could be no valid proclamation based on an
incomplete canvass. Comelec denied the petition. In its contention, assuming that the
remaining uncanvassed votes of two thousand nine hundred thirty-one (2,931) in places
where special elections are yet to be held were all votes in favor of petitioner Barbers,
nevertheless, this will not materially affect the results of the election.
ISSUE: Whether this Court can take cognizance of this petition
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organization
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal provides:

RULE 12. Jurisdiction. The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The alleged invalidity of Biazons proclamation involves a dispute or contest
relating to the election returns of members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of
such dispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET. For this Court to take cognizance
of the electoral protest against Biazon would usurp the constitutional functions of the SET.
In addition, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Resolutions affirming Biazons proclamation since the uncanvassed returns and the
results of the special elections to be held would not materially affect the results of the
elections.
VINZONS-CHATO V. COMELEC 2007
Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the HOR,
hence, Comelec ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chatos election
protest against Unico regarding canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of Unicos
proclamation. He then filed a special civil action for certiorari in the SC.
ISSUE: WON the court should take cognizance of Chatos election protest. If not, to who is
this issue best addressed to? WON his civil action for certiorari will prosper.
HELD: The court should not take cognizance of Chatos election protest for it would amount
to usurpation of the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET. Civil action for
certiorari will not prosper.
Ratio: - In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate
who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue
is best addressed to the HRET.
Reason: it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional
bodies with due regard to the peoples mandate.
-Special civil action for certiorari shall prosper if the following requisites concur:

Tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted

without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to
lack of jurisdiction

There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to annul or modify the proceeding.
-In this case, COMELEC did not commit rave abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution
holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon Unicos proclamation. It demonstrated fealty to the
constitutional fiat regarding HRET
ARNOLD V. GUERRERO V. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR. 2000
On May 8, 1998, Farias filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC,
substituting candidate Chevylle V. Farias who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 9, 1998,

Ruiz filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion To Resolve Petition" with the COMELEC, attaching
thereto a copy of the Certificate of Candidacy of Farias. The Second Division of the
COMELEC dismissed Ruizs petition, and stated, "[T]here is none (sic) inthe records to
consider respondent an official candidate to speak of without the filing of said certificate.
Hence, there is no certificate of candidacy to be cancelled, consequently, no candidate to be
disqualified. On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled. The postelection tally of votes in Ilocos Norte showed that Farias got a total of 56,369 votes
representing the highest number of votes received in the first district. Farias was duly
proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farias could not
validly substitute for Chevylle V. Farias, since the latter was not the official candidate of the
Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was an independent candidate.
Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate.6.On June 3, 1998, Farias
took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives.
Then petitioner herein filed his "Petition-In-Intervention" in COMELEC Case No.
SPA 98-227. Petitioner averred that he was the official candidate of the Liberal Party (LP) in
said elections for Congressman, and stood to be adversely affected by Case No. SPA 98227. Guerrero contended that Farias, having failed to file his Certificate of Candidacy on or
before the last day there for, being midnight of March 27, 1998, Farias illegally resorted to
the remedy of substitution provided for under Section 77of the Omnibus Election Code and
thus, Farias disqualification was in order. Guerrero then asked that the position of
Representative of the first district of Ilocos Norte be declared vacant and special elections
called for, but disallowing the candidacy of Farias.8.Petitioner Guerrero argues that the
refusal of the COMELEC to rule on the validity or invalidity of the certificate of candidacy of
Farias amounted to grave abuse of discretion on its part. He claims that COMELEC failed in
its Constitutional duty to uphold and enforce all laws relative to elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
the determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farias is
already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, and whether or not the COMELEC failed in its Constitutional duty to
uphold and enforce all laws relative to elections.
HELD: NO. SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it
held that its jurisdiction over Case No.SPA 98-277 had ceased with the assumption of office
of respondent Farias as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While the
COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its
refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by
Farias is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET).Under Article VI, Section 17 of
the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus,
once a winning candidate ha sbeen proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins.
Thus, the COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is
justifiable, in deference tothe HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.

AQUILINO PIMENTEL III VS COMELEC & ZUBIRI

2 months after the May 14, 2007 national elections, 11 candidates for senatorial posts were
proclaimed and had taken their oaths except to the 12' and last post where Pimentel and
Zubiri were the contenders. A new board of canvassers (Special Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Maguindanao) was created because Pimentel thru his counsel questioned
some irregularities as to the authenticity and due execution of Cert. of Canvass. During the
proceedings, they were not allowed to ask questions and present evidence to prove their
claim. Instead, their questions were noted in the minutes. Hence, Pimentel a petition for
certiorari and mandamus seeking the court to issue tro as to enjoin comelec from
canvassing; to annul such proceedings because it is unconstitutional and illegal proceedings
and; to allow them to raise their objections and present evidence to prove their claims. All
petitions were denied. Eventually, Zubiri were proclaimed, had taken oath and assumed
office. Pimentel protested. Zubiri filed a motion to dismiss contending that Pimentel should
have filed with Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) for the annulment of his proclamation.
ISSUES:
1. WON the case of Pimentel is an exception to the prohibition on pre-proclamation in cases
of Senators
2. WON the comelec has the jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
1. No. The SC did not recognize the pre-proclamation case of Pimentel, which could have
prospered if he met the requirement of law, because SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress
nor COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, specifically charged by Section 30 of Republic
Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, with the duty to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it.
In elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or
certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized
exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions
affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination
of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of
Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. And, in this case, the
exception applies only to Congress or the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not to
local boards of canvassers who must still be deemed covered by the prohibition on preproclamation controversies.
2. No. As provided in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution SET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a senator, COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the SET's own jurisdiction begins. The word
"sole" in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution underscores the exclusivity of the
electoral tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective members. It
is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari
and mandamus on matters which may be threshed out in an election contest. It is the SET
which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does, a
contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.
DISMISSED

FERNANDEZ vs HRET, Supra.

ABAYON, PALPARAN VS THE HRET

FACTS: Plaintiffs Abayon and Palparan are first nominees of the the party-list groups
Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, both of which won a seat in the House of
Representatives in the 2 007 elections. The defendant questioned the eligibility and
qualification of the plaintiffs to sit as representatives since both did not belong to the sectors
in which the respective party-list groups represent. The House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo and
Bantay but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitionersYES
(2) W/N it is the party-list nominee and not the group who stands as elected member- YES
HELD: Affirmative.
The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the
disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were
not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as
nominees.
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the "members" of that House are
representatives of districts and party list
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated
in like manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as "members
of the House of Representatives," a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected
member of the House of Representatives."
Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,
would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the
House of Representatives.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for
disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe
need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list
organizationin the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan's
relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and
underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed
office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list
but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan.

LOKIN JR. VS COMELEC

COMELEC issued resolution giving due course to CIBAC's Manifestation of Intent to
participate in the party-list election. Respondents, President and chairman Villanueva
submitted the certified Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law
Department. Pia Derla submitted a 2nd Certificate of Nominees including Lokin, Jr
(petitioner) as party-list nominees as she affixed her signature as "acting secretary-general"
of CIBAC. The nomination of petitioners was unauthorized Respondents filed with the
COMELEC a "Petition to expunge from the records and/or for disqualification," seeking to
nullify the certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contented that Derla had misrepresented
herself as "acting secretary-general", and not even a member of CIBAC. Resolution filed
by the COMELEC First division granted the petition and ordered the Certificate filed by
Derla to be expunge from the records, and declared respondents' group as the true
nominees of CIBAC. COMELEC en banc affirmed the Division's findings as the
commission reiterated that Derla was unable to prove her authority to file a certificate,
whereas respondents presented evidence that Villanueva deputized CIBAC secretary to
submit the Certificate of Nomination pursuant to CIBAC's Constitution and bylaws. The
COMELEC en banc affirmed the said Resolution, prompting Lokin Jr. (petitioner) to file
Petition for Certiorari for grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing
the said Resolution. The petitioner wants to be recognized as the legitimate nominees and
representative of CIBAC party-list. ISSUES: (1) WON the authority of Secretary of CIBAC to
file the part's Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable
by special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction; (2) WON
the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing
respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list. HELD: (1) The
COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party leadership and the nomination of
party-list representatives. The present dispute stemmed from an intra-corporate matter, their
submissions even recognize the COMELEC's constitutional power to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall. More specifically, as one of its constitutional functions, the COMELEC is also
tasked to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of
government." Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the
identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court
also declared that the COMELEC's power to register political parties necessarily involved
the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident
of its power to register political parties. (2) No error because it is indicated clearly in the law
that Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as partylist representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding
the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. Pia

Derla, who is not even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the party-list, and
clearly not qualified to attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to
the COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use their registration with the SEC as a substitute for the
evidentiary requirement to show that the nominees, including Derla, are bona fide members
of the party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even presented evidence proving the
affiliation of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is registered
with COMELEC.

election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
election. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and
COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special
election, much less invalidate it. Further, there was No Proof that COMELECs Failure to
Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the
Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not informed since
there had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless
there had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere
with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec.

TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of
2001 were conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a
special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the said election with
the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in
the senate.
Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the
declaration of the 13th elected senator.
Issue:
1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the petition was moot.
3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were
questioning was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was
elected and not to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper
under a quo warranto.
On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it
is capable of repetition yet evading review.
On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and
exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage,
considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again
On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.
The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election
as required under RA 6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special

ARROYO VS HRET
Arroyo was proclaimed over Syjuco as Congressman of the lone district of Makati after the
May 11, 1992 elections. A protest was filed praying for revision and recounting. After some
paper battles between the Arroyo and Syjuco, the latter filed a memorandum amending his
protest and prayed for a non-traditional examination of precinct level documents. The House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) set aside Arroyo's proclamation and declared
Syjuco winner. The 3 justices' members of the HRET ruled that such amendment is already
beyond the tribunal's jurisdiction and the 6 representative members ruled otherwise.
Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by Syjuco and the
HRET later declared Syjuco as the winner.
ISSUE: WON HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction (GADALEJ).
HELD: Yes. With GADALEJ, Syjuco should not have been allowed to amend his protest at
the memorandum stage. The evidence relied on by the HRET was unreliable (precinct level
documents that are mere photocopies and not certified or authenticated). HRET nullified the
election results in violation of its 50% rule (requisites to annul election results based on
fraud, irregularities, or terrorism: (1) more than 50% of the total number of votes were
affected (2) by the fraud, terrorism, or irregularities.)
The SC has the power to determine whether the ETs have acted with GADALEJ. The High
Tribunal ruled in favor of Arroyo saying it has violated the rules of evidence by giving
probative value to unauthenticated documents and for disregarding election results on
several precincts on the basis of omissions committed either through mere oversight or plain
negligence on the part of election officials or employees which is not part of the grounds to
nullify the votes casts by the people in their exercise of suffrage in these precincts. "The
persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's own governing rules and of even the
most basic rules of evidence cannot be justified...the Court, therefore, cannot stamp with
approval the conduct exhibited by public respondent HRET as it was attended by
arbitrariness," Justice Francisco said.

B.) RULES OF PROCEDURES

LAZATIN VS HRET
Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his
proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the

duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the HRET and
not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatin's
opposition), alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the
assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC
issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the
instant petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid. The Telex
Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if
warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code," was in effect a grant of
authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate
Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal
and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without
waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin
himself, against certain election returns.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of
the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET's jurisdiction.

C.) COMPOSITION

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be
totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in
saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot
legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment
of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication
of a senatorial election contest.

ABBAS VS SET
Political Law Inhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal

BONDOC VS PINEDA

HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the
petition. The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner
of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office
as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the
electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral
Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by
the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the
pendency of the
protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises,
to the sound judgement of the Electoral Tribunal .

On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the
disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations
of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested
the following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five
(5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where
more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a
quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by
majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the
petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of
the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.

Pineda from the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc of the Nacionalista
Party (NP) were rival candidates for Rep of the 4th district of Pampanga. Pineda was
proclaimed winner of the election. Bondoc filed protest to house of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The decision held that Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of
23 votes. The LDP insisted a recount and the recount has increased Bondocs win by 107
votes. So congressman Camasura voted with the SC justices and Congressman Cerilles
proclaimed Bondoc the winner of the election.so Camasura being a member of the LDP
revealed to the chief congressman Conjuanco that he voted for Bondoc and he did so in
view of what was in line with truth justice and self respect. The revelation prompted efforts
by the LDP to neutralize pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. So on the eve of promulgation
of Bondocs win, Congress man Jose Conjuangco thru a letter stated that Camasura and
Bautista were being expelled for the LDP for allegedly helping in the organization of Partido
Pilipino of Danding cojuanco and for having members of LDP join said pol party. The LDP
informed Herrera that they were no longer part of LDP hence; his (Camasuras) vote in favor
of Bondoc should be withdrawn. The judges in HRET all wanted out cause of this
distressing development. They were saying that unseating should be prevented in all cost.
They also said that the tribunal should not be hampered in doing its constitutional function

by factors, which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it. The Bondoc
promulgation was cancelled because the decision lack the concurrence of 5 members as
required by Section 24 of the rules of the tribunal. Bondoc asked the court to annul the
decision of the House in rescinding Camasuras nomination and restrain the replacement of
Camasura through a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of the
petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn over the office in contention.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with the
disposition of an election contest in the HReT by reorganizing the representation of the
majority party in the tribunal?

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was
among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.

Held: No. Section 17 Articles VI supplies the answer to this question.. So the HRET is the
sole judge of all contests relation to the election, returns and qualification of their respective
members. The operative term found in the section was sole Judge. It (HRET) was made to
function as a non-partisan court although 2/3 of its members are politicians. Its suppose to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative
office devoid of partisan consideration.
So they cant just shuffle and manipulate the political component for the electoral tribunal to
serve the interests of party in power.
Its independence would be undermined if the removal of Camasura for as a punishment for
party disloyalty for voting for Bondoc would allow them to change the judgment of the
HRET in the Bondoc case.If allowed so, then the HRET isnt really a sole judge of senatorial
elections. The members of the HRET are entitled to security of tenure just as the members
of the judiciary are. They can only be replaced in cases such as expiration, death,
permanent disability, resignation forms the political party, and formal affiliation with another
party of any valid cause hence mere disloyalty is not a valid cause for termination.

2.) COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

A.) COMPOSITION
CARLOS CUNANAN vs. JORGE TAN, JR.
Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting Deputy
Administrator of the Reforestation Administration. Cunanan was formerly appointed in the
same position but was later on rejected by the Commision of Appointment prompting the
President to replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent.
Filing the quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of
the convened Commission of Appointments citing irregularities as to the numbers of
members comprising the same.
Issue: WON the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid.
Ruling:
With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled that such is a power
vested in the Congress as they deem it proper taking into consideration the proportionate
numbers of the members of the Commission of Appointment members as to their political
affiliations. However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right which they

DAZA V. SINGSON

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in
a political realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this development,
the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the
newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the
original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as
the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the
Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the
Commission on Appointments
HELD: At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing
as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of
the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the
political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from
one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to
Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.

GUINGONA, JR. v GONZALES 1992

On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. in his behalf and in behalf of
LAKAS-NUCD filed a petition to prohibit Senator Neptali Gonzales, ex-officio Chairman of
Commission on Appointments from recognizing the membership of Senators Alberto
Romulo and Wigberto Tanada. The resulting composition of proportional representatives is
as follows:
POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP PROP.
REPRESENTATIVES
LDP
NPC
15 7.5 members
5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD
3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members
To resolve the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the effect that
the Senate elect 12 members to the Commission on Appointments, 8 from LDP, 2 from
NPC, 9 from liberal party. This proposal was approved despite the objections of Senators
Guingona and Osmena. Senator Romulo occupied the 8th membership of the LDP while
Senator Tanada for LD-PDP-LABAN.
ISSUE: WON the election of Senators Romulo and Tanada as members of Commission
on Appointments is in accordance with Art. 6, Section 18 of the Constitution.
HELD: No, Art.6 Sec. 18 assures representation in the COA of any political party who
succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of Senators so
elected enables it to put a representative in the COA. Drawing from the ruling in the case of
Coseteng v Mitra, Jr. a political party must have at least 2 senators in the senate to be able
to have a representative in the COA, so that any member less than 2 will not entitle such a
party a membership in the COA.
In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules and jurisprudence on the
matter before this court, we declare the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator
Wigberto Tanada as members of the COA as null and void for being in violation of the rule
on proportional representation under Art VI, Sec 18 of the Philippine Constitution.
Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents Senator
Romulo and Senator Tanada to desist from assuming, occupying and discharging the
functions of members of the COA; and ordering the respondent Senate President Neptali
Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio chairman of the COA, to desist from recognizing the
membership of the respondent Senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting
and participating as members of said commission.

GUINGONA VS GONZALES
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators,
5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the
requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to
use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of
Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5

members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN.
Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party
to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who
proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDPLABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed
the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional
representation.
Issue: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the
Commission on Appointments
Held: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other
manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each
of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be
able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political
parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced
the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where
there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each
other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may
have affiliations with the other party.

PIMENTEL VS HRET
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance
with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time,
the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees
would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list
representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q.
Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from
party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang
Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse!
Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to
the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected
were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House
constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two
constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political
parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available

records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the
House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing
of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district
representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople,
as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo
(now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and
Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include
party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of
the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel's letter to the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an
Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary
General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their
Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its
Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List
System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and
2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8
February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR
141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their
petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his
capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted
both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present
petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his
capacity as taxpayer 'and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list
representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as copetitioners.

Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated
duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, 'the doctrine of separation of powers calls for
each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither
can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are
duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any
allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in
the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11
May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the
party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election
process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time
they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any partylist representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the partylist representatives lies with the House of Representatives, 'the Court cannot resolve the
issues presented by petitioners at this time.

Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list
representatives in the HRET.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include partylist representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held: [1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and partylist representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and
the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the
House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to
choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 seats of each chamber's respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional
provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to
the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on
proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the

ARNAULT VS NAZARENO

[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the
1987
Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves

POWER OF THE CONGRESS

A.) LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES AND QUESTION HOUR (SEC. 21 -22)
1.) LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
a.) LIMITATIONS

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation

This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine
Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the
witnesses called to be examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution
was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a
representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the
identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to
the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer
other pertinent questions in connection therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas
Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in
a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.

HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who
refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the
members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness right to due process of law.

BENGZON VS SENATE BRC 203 SCRA 767

Legislative Department Inquiry in Aid of Legislation When not Allowed
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they
obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law,
among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country
including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining
Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa
took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The
motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue
Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee
for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused
invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying
his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to
have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require
their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional
rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no
appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no
suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa,
had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended
legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of
legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since
the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case.

FACTS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

LIMITATIONS
1. ARNAULT V. NAZARENO
2. BENGZON V. SENATE
3. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE V. MAJADUCON (407 SCRA 356)
On August 28, 1998, Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No.157 directing the Committee on National
Defense and Security to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense Secretary Orlando
Mercado that a group of active and retired military officers were organizing a coup d 'etat to prevent the administration
of then President Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
On the same date, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III also filed Resolution No.160, "directing the appropriate senate
committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment
portfolio of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS
purchased a lot in General SantosCity, designated as Lot X, MR-1160, for P10,500.00 per square meter from private
respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the
purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00 per square meter.
The Committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to respondent Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and
testify before it. Respondent refused to appear at the hearing. Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and
preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
Branch 23, which was docketed as SP Civil Case No. 496.On October 21, 1998, the trial court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order directing the Committee "to CEASE and DESIST from proceeding with the inquiry in P.S.
160 particularly in General Santos City and/or anywhere in Region XI or Manila on matters affecting the
patenting/titling and sale of Lot X,MR-1160-D to AFP-RSBS," and "from issuing subpoenas to witnesses from
Region XI, particularly from General Santos City, pending the hearing of the petition for prohibition and
injunction.

4. STANDARD VS SENATE COMMITTEE (541 SCRA 456)

FULLTEXT:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/december2007/167173.htm
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech entitled Arrogance of
Wealth before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the
future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege
speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166, DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON
BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES,TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION,
INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED
BANK, WHICH RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC.
Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial hearing on
February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and resolution filed by Senator
Enrile.
Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper.

JURISPRUDENCE

Issue: Whether the trial court (Judge Jose Majaducon) can issue a
Temporary Restraining Order directing the Committee "to CEASE
and DESIST from proceeding with the inquiry. NO.
SC: Courts have no jurisdiction to restrain Congress from performing its
constitutionally vested function to conduct investigations in aid of
legislation, following the principle of separation of powers.
The senate conducts legislative inquiries in aid of legislation, and
persons were subpoenaed and invited thereto, the latter cannot go to
the court of justice because it has no authority to prohibit (issue a writ
of injunction) the committee from requiring that person from
appearing and testifying before it; otherwise it will be inconsistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers as the same is an encroachment
to ones prerogatives.

Issue: Whether the pendency of the cases would bar the congress or
senate from continuing with the investigation. NO.
SC:
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a
court or a quasi- judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct
of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
subvert the intended inquiry.

Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position,
particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the
legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry.
On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile inquired who among those invited as
resource persons were present and who were absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved that subpoena be issued to
those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the Bureaus Watch List.
Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion was approved.
Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners, through
counsel, made an Opening Statement that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from
affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents
mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding the
alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.
In re: Sabio 504 SCRA 77
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_174340_2006.html

Issue: Whether Chairman Sabio and Board of Directors can invoke right
to privacy and right against self-incrimination for refusing to appear
before the Senate. No.

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate
Res. No. 455),"directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations
by their respective Board of Directors."
On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was submitted to the Senate and referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Public Services. However, on
March 28, 2006, upon motion of Senator Francis N. Pangilinan, it was transferred to the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman
Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he
invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
8

On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, approved by Senate President Manuel
Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and
Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006.
Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006, he reiterated his
earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1.

10

Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator Gordon, sent another notice to
Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter set on September 6, 2006. The notice
was issued "under the same authority of the Subpoena Ad Testificandum previously served upon (him) last 16 August

SC: The alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC,

ranging in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the
PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact
vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to
aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and
formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding
PCGG's efficacy.
There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those
directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. No. 455,
it follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by respondent
Senate Committees.
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that this
right maybe invoked by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation only when the incriminating question is being
asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or
effect of the questions to be asked of them." That this right may
possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent
Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when
this power is abused, such issue may be presented before the courts. At
this juncture, what is important is that respondent Senate Committees
have sufficient Rules to guide them when the right against selfincrimination is invoked.
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of
witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will be
respected by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate
with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent
legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to
respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its

2006."

Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm
of proper investigation.

Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the notice. He sent a letter dated September 4, 2006 to Senator
Gordon reiterating his reason for declining to appear in the public hearing.
This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring Chairman Sabio and
Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show the caause why they should not be cited in contempt of the
Senate. On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation.
ROMERO V. SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA (2009)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/174105.htm
FACTS
Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc., were invited on an
investigation with regards to the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the
Smokey Mountain project. The said investigation will aid the Senate in determining possible amendments of Republic
Act 8042 other known as the Migrant Workers Act.
SUBJUDISM- is an ethical rule or professional rule that when use, party litigants and the lawyer in particular
should not talk about it in public.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of the sub judice rule may render
one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE
Whether the Senate Committees inquiry is sub judice owing to the
pendency of the Chavez petition.
SC:
It will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect of Chavez
and resist, on that ground, the assailed congressional invitations and
subpoenas. The sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic
by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in
G.R. No. 164527.
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has
different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like
adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving
demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are,
inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather
information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively;1[17] and to
determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new
or remedial legislation,2[18] albeit the inquiry need not result in any
potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude
congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

NERI V. SENATE (2008)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/sep2008/gr_180643_2008.html
Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of NEDA, was invited by the respondent Senate Committees to attend
their joint investigation on the alleged anomalies in the NBN Project. This project was contracted by the Philippine
Government with the Chinese firm ZTE, which involved the amount of US$ 329,481,290. When he testified before the
Senate Committees, he disclosed that then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE,
offered him P200 million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether or not the President followed up
the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she directed him to

ISSUE:
Whether the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were
covered by executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the
respondent Senate Committees void.
SC: The court was convinced that the three questions are covered by
presidential communications privilege, and that this privilege has been
validly claimed by the executive department, enough to shield petitioner
Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him for not
answering such questions.

approve it.
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and
testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter dated 15 November to the
Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri's testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked
the privilege on the ground that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China, and given the confidential nature in which these information
were conveyed to the President, Neri cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations,
without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear
before the respondent Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause why he should not
be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29 November, Neri replied
to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not intend to snub the Senate hearing, and requested that if there
be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first appearance, he be informed in advance so he can prepare
himself. He added that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President, and that his conversation with her
dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal
involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines. Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri in contempt
and consequently ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears and
gives his testimony.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neri_vs._Senate

GARCILLANO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE (2008)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_170338_2008.html

Issue:

Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the
"Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of
heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
th
1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14 Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free,
and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.

Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing

Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the Senates website, satisfies the
due process requirement of law. NO.
SC:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate,
or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the
Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of
Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding
any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is
mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the
Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person who violates
the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to
support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document
only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes
the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the
internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore,

could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the
legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until
it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do
so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
SENATE V. ERMITA (2006)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169777_2006.html
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the
Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3
which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress.

NERI V. SENATE (2008)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/sep2008/gr_180643_2008.html
Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of NEDA, was invited by the respondent Senate
Committees to attend their joint investigation on the alleged anomalies in the NBN Project. This
project was contracted by the Philippine Government with the Chinese firm ZTE, which involved
the amount of US$ 329,481,290. When he testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed
that then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him
P200 million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he
informed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused
to answer the questions on 1.) whether or not the President followed up the NBN Project, 2.)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve
it.
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring
him to appear and testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
sent a letter dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri's
testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
SC:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is
covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation
in
a
particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive
branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch
withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch
to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the
mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

ISSUE:
Whether the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by
executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate Committees
void.
SC: The court was convinced that the three questions are covered by presidential
communications privilege, and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive
department, enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue
against him for not answering such questions.
executive privilege may be validly claimed by the executive department only in cases where
the power subject of the legislative inquiry is expressly granted by the Constitution to the
President. Such powers include the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. In light of the doctrine of separation of powers, the said powers of the
President enjoy a greater degree of confidentiality than other presidential powers. In the
present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that
the communications elicited by the three questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and
policy decision-making process, and that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. It is

with the Peoples Republic of China, and given the confidential nature in which these information
were conveyed to the President, Neri cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. Thus, on 20
November, Neri did not appear before the respondent Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause
why he should not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20
November. On 29 November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not
intend to snub the Senate hearing, and requested that if there be new matters that were not yet
taken up during his first appearance, he be informed in advance so he can prepare himself. He
added that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President, and that his conversation
with her dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the
impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. Respondents found the explanation
unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and consequently ordering his
arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears and gives his
testimony.

clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the quintessential and nondelegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of the President's Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptively
privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need
by the branch seeking access to such conversations. In the present case, respondent
Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three
questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer
more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As
ruled in Senate vs. Ermita, the the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

GUDANI V. SENGA (2006)

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/G.R.%20No.%20170165.htm

ISSUE: Whether the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative
inquiry.

The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of massive
cheating in the 2004 elections and the surfacing of the Hello Garci controversy.
President Arroyo issued E.O 164 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without
her approval. However, the two concluded their testimonies before the Senate in spite
the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, both of them were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time
honored principle of the Chain of Command.

SC: Yes. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey the President they may dislike or distrust. The
ability of the President to prevent military officials from testifying before Congress DOES NOT TURN ON
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE BUT ON THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES POWER AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF to
control the actions and speech of the armed forces. Under the Commander in Chief Clause (Art. XVl,
section 5), the President has absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the
armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict travel, movement and
speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
The rule is not absolute. In as much as it is ill advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents
power as Commander-in-Chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congress right to conduct legislative inquiries. xxx Courts are empowered, under the principle of
JUDICIAL REVIEW, to arbitrate disputes between the executive and legislative branches of the
government on the proper parameters of power. By this, if the court so rule, the duty falls on the
shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers
before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disregarded with notion of officers appearing before
the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the
court.

QUESTION HOUR
SENATE V. ERMITA (2006)
ISSUE: Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464
SC:
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department
heads
in
the
question
hour
contemplated
in
the
provision
of
said
Sec.
22,
Art.
VI
xxx
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance of
department
heads
in
the
question
hour
is
discretionary
on
their
part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department

head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the
Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22
refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
ENACTMENT OF A LAW

ORIGIN OF BILLS
GUINGONA V. CARAGUE (1991)
ISSUE:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/apr1991/gr_94571_1991.html
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion the
budget
for
education.
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the
General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the HELD:
DECS
amount
to
P27,017,813,000.00.
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the interest
and
for
the
attainment
of
other
state
policies
or
objectives.
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at
stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
debt service, it being higher than the budget for education; therefore it is against Section assailed as unconstitutional.
5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary
priority to education.
TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY (1994)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/aug1994/gr_115455_1994.html
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks
to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it
did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI,
Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is
sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo
extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not
only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
ABAKADA v. Exec. Secretary (2005)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_168056_2005.html
Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform
Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining
government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari
and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:

Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate,
especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power? NO
Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or
inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the
authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it
shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power
and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its
delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and one-half percent (1%)

(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution

(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the
VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a
tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within
the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties,
tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions
precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how
the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.

(e) delegation to administrative bodies

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006,
contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the
12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be
exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is
used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a
statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law.

Alvarez v. Guingona (1996)

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/jan1996/118303.htm
Facts:
HB 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of
Representatives, subsequently passed by the House of Representatives, and transmitted
to the Senate. A counterpart of HB 8817, SB 1243 was filed in the Senate, and was
passed as well. The enrolled bill was submitted to and signed by the Chief Executive as

Issue:
whether or not considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA 7720
can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives
Held:
Yes. Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import was passed in the Senate, it

RA 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the
registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.

cannot be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.

Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed first (18 Apr 1993). The SB was
filed 19 May. The HB was approved on third reading 17 Dec, and was transmitted to the Senate 28
Jan 1994.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does
not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House of
Representatives, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application
should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon
until it receives the House bill.

ONE SUBJECT ONE TITLE RULE

Guzman v. COMELEC (2000)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html
The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the
Voters Registration Act. The Act prohibits election officers from holding office in a
particular city or municipality for more than four years. Petitioners claim that the act
violated the equal protection clause because not all election officials were covered by the
prohibition.
Farinas v. Executive (2003)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/dec2003/gr_147387_2003.html
Facts:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office.
Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of
Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for
being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law
to have only one subject which should be in expressed in its title.
The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of
the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67
of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA
9006.

HELD: The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality
of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the
complicity of election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or
municipality.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section
14 of the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having
a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent
the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the
legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of
the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon
by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of Representatives,
expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the

legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
PJA v. Prado (1993)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/nov1993/gr_105371_1993.html
Facts:
Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the constitutionality of Sec 35 of
RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its being discriminatory because of withdrawing the franking
privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the President, the VP,
members of Congress, the Comelec, former Presidents, and the National Census and
Statistics Office. Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as the franking
privilege has also been withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of
National Language, the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the National Historical Commission, the AFP, the AFP Ladies Steering
Committee, the City and Provincial Prosecutors, the Tanodbayan (Office of the Special
Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay, the Commission on the Filipino Language, the
Provincial and City Assessors, and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons.

Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354

Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional.
The EPC (equal protection clause) is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of decisions,
equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other
words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application
of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices
from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a
category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and
the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may
appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies
Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that
Committee.
In the SCs view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived
need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by
the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the
government and the people. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the
franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some
and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those
favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem
is not solved by violating the Constitution.

Garcia v. Mata (1975)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1975/jul1975/gr_l_33713_1975.html
Facts :
Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed
an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service
and readjust his rank and pay emoluments.

Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the
relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government
while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the
reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits
the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in

violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was
indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.

On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no
relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein.
(RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in
the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of
the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.
SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

A. ENACTMENT OF
A LAW
(Sec 24, 26, 27),
(Sec 30-31)
2.) ONE SUBJECT
ONE TITLE RULE

Lidasanvs COMELEC (October 25, 1967)

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1967/oct1967/gr_l28089_1967.html
FACTS:Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic
Act No. 4790, entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in
the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan however discovered
that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao
Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of
Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC
proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said
territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be
nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly
indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in
its territory several barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790,
which
created

HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title
here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform

Dianaton but which

includes
barrios

the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and

located in another
province

in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being

taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent

Cotabato to be
spared from attack

Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a

planted upon the

constitutional

Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that
it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures

mandate that No
bill which may be

which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

enacted into law

shall embrace more
than one subject
which shall be
expressed in the
title of the bill?

BANAT vs COMELEC (August 7, 2009)

Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/177508.htm

Issue: Whether RA

FACTS:Barangay Association for National Development and Transparency

VI
of
Constitution

(BANAT) party list petitioned in Court for the constitutionality of RA9369,

enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
implementing the statute. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No.
2231 and House Bill No. 5352
Petitioner also assailed the constitutionality of Sec 34, 37, 38 and 43 of
the said Republic Act and alleged that they were of questionable
application and their validity was doubtful.
Petitioner raised the issue whether RA9369, RA7166 as amended, being a
consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352, violated Sec
26 (1) of Artcile VI of the Constitution which states that Every bill passed

9369
violates
Section 26 (1), Art
the

Relevant Portion from the Full Text:

RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it
speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing
with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleges
that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor
germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is
broad enough to encompass topics which deal not only with the
automation process but with everything related to its purpose
encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof has always been given a practical rather than a
technical construction. The requirement is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The title of a law does not
have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters
embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred
from the title.Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an act to

amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the

amendatory act need not be further stated.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act Amending
Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on
Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998
National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local
Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness
and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas
PambansaBlg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other
Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes. Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the
amendments to RA 8436, Batas PambansaBlg. 881 (BP 881), Republic
Act No. 7166 (RA 7166), and other related election laws to achieve its
purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy
in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal
with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881,
specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of
RA 7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section
265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the
subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881,
among others.

by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in

the title thereof.
Petitioner alleged that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks
of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with
manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleged that Sec 34,
37, 38 and 43 are neither embraced in the title not pertaining to the
subject matter of RA9369.

3.) THREE
REASINGS

PJA vs Prado (November 11, 1993)

Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/nov1993/gr_105371_1993.html
FACTS:
Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the
Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the
Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices
were withdrawn from them.
In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the
methods adopted prior it becoming a law.

ISSUE: Whether or
not RA 7354 is
unconstitutional
(1) Violative of Art
VI Sec 26(1) which
says '"Every bill
passed by the
Congress shall
embrace only one
subject which shall
be expressed in
the title thereof."
- Violative of Art VI
Sec 26(2) which
says 'No bill
passed by either
House shall
become a law
unless it has
passed three
readings on
separate days, and
printed copies
thereof in its final
form have been
distributed to its

RULING:
The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec
26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms
prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to
be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as
to cover every single detail of the measure.
However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal
protection clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial.
It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege.
Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
.

Members three
days before its
passage, except
when the President
certifies to the
necessity of its
immediate
enactment to meet
a public calamity or
emergency. Upon
the last reading of
a bill, no
amendment
thereto shall be
allowed, and the
vote thereon
shall be taken
immediately
thereafter, and the
yeas and nays
entered in the
Journal.
- Violative of the
Equal protection
clause

Tolentinovs Secretary of Finance (1994)

Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/aug1994/gr_115455_1994.html

ISSUE: Whether or

HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge,

not the EVAT law is

procedurally infirm.

holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the
Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version
originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according
to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note

FACTS: Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA

7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law.
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from

also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its
own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and

the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the

Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it

other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by

substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino

passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
st
readings in Senate for after the 1 reading it was referred to the Senate

concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would

make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has

Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have

been done.

done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with
the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the
Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even
signed the said Senate Bill.)
Abakadavs Executive Secretary (September 1, 2005)

ISSUES:

HELD: :

Fulll text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_168056_2005.html
FACTS:Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party
List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending
Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformpro v is o
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after
specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is
unconstitutional.

1. Whether or not
there is a
violation of
Article VI, Section
24 of the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not
there is undue
delegation of
legislative power
in violation of
Article VI Sec
28(2) of the
Constitution.
3. Whether or not
there is a
violation of the
due process and
equal protection
under Article III
Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.

1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively

originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting
within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House
bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending
corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy
that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward.
3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural
classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established.
Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the
rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of
assessment, valuation and collection, the States power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with
such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.

4.) HOW A BILL

BECOMES A LAW

Miller vsMardo (July 31, 1961)

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/jul1961/gr_l15138_1961.html
FACTS: These appeals present one identical question of law, namely, the
validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the authority
of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as
it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor
created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and
separation pay, etc.
In G.R. No. L-15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of
the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint against Bill Miller (owner
and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver
of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957, on which latter
date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being paid separation
pay. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him as separation pay
plus damages. Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief Hearing Officer
AtanacioMardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor
required Miller to file an answer.
In G.R. No. L-16781, CresencioEstano filed with Regional Office No. 3 of
the Department of Labor, a complaint (RO 3 Ls. Case No. 874) against Chin
Hua Trading Co. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong, as Manager and
Assistant Manager thereof, respectively, claiming to have been their
driver from June 17, 1947 to June 4, 1955, for which service he was not
paid overtime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours and for Sundays and legal
holidays) and vacation leave pay. He prayed for judgment for the amount
due him, plus attorney's fees.
In G.R. No. L-15377, appellant NumerianaRaganas filed with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu a complaint (Civil Case No. R-5535) against
appellees Sen Bee Trading Company, Macario Tan and Sergio Tan,
claiming that she was employed by appellees as a seamstress from June 5,
1952 to January 11, 1958, for which service she was underpaid and was
not given overtime, as well as vacation and sick leave pay. She prayed for
judgment on the amount due her for the same plus damages.
In G.R. No. L-16660, Vicente B. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. 2 of
the Department of Labor a complaint (Wage Case No. 196-W) against
SiaSeng, for recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime
and separation pay. SiaSeng, filed an answer.
In G.R. No. L-17056, Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 3
of the Department of Labor a complaint (IS-2168) against petitioner Fred
Wilson & Co., Inc., alleging that petitioner engaged his services as Chief

ISSUE:
Whether or not,
independent of the
matter of
delegation of
legislative
authority, said plan,
nevertheless
became a law by
non-action on the
part of Congress.

Relevant portion from full text:

Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not
countenanced in this jurisdiction. By specific provision of the
Constitution
No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have
been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished
the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its
passage by the National Assembly (Congress), except when
the President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no
amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon
its final passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. (Sec. 21-[a], Art.
VI).
Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same,
he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all
the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members voting for and
against shall be entered on its journal. If any bill shall not be
returned by the President as herein provided within twenty
days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented
to him, the same shall become a law in like manner as if he
has signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevent
its return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed
by the President within thirty days after adjournment. (Sec.
20[1]. Art. VI of the Constitution).
A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in
section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act and that prescribed by the
Constitution will show that the former is in distinct contrast to the
latter. Under the first, consent or approval is to be manifested by
silence or adjournment or by "concurrent resolution." In either case,
the contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions
requiring positive and separate action by each House of Congress. It is
contrary to the "settled and well-understood parliamentary law (which
requires that the) two houses are to hold separate sessions for their
deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law

Mechanic, Air conditioning Department, from October 1947 to February

19, 1959, when he was summarily dismissed without cause and without
sufficient notice and separation pay.
The petitioners questioned the authority of the regional offices to take
cognizance of the subject matter involved in their cases as provided for by
paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which provided
that: 25. Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law, and cases
affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor
standards on working conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid
wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of
employees and laborers; and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay,
vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help.
It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A to the President who, in turn, transmitted
the same to Congress on February 14, 1956. Congress adjourned its
sessions without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting the said
reorganization plan.

is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other,"

(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187).
Furthermore, Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the
"passage" of any measure, as that word is commonly used and
understood, and with the requirement presentation to the President.
In a sense, the section, if given the effect suggested in counsel's
argument, would be a reversal of the democratic processes required
by the Constitution, for under it, the President would propose the
legislative action by action taken by Congress. Such a procedure would
constitute a very dangerous precedent opening the way, if Congress is
so disposed, because of weakness or indifference, to eventual
abdication of its legislative prerogatives to the Executive who, under
our Constitution, is already one of the strongest among constitutional
heads of state. To sanction such a procedure will be to strike at the
very root of the tri-departmental scheme four democracy.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we hold ad declare that
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as confers judicial power to the
Regional Offices over cases other than these falling under the
Workmen's Compensation on Law, is invalid and of no effect.

TanadavsTuvera (April 24, 1985)

Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1985/apr1985/gr_l63915_1985.html
FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent
public officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.

ISSUE: Whether
publication in the
Official Gazette is
still required
considering the
clause in Article 2
unless otherwise
provided.

The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted

to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large,"
and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when
public rights are to be subserved.

HELD:
Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and
not with the publication requirement which cannot be omitted as
public needs to be notified for the law to become effective. The
necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed
by the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actions and
conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of
the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the
said petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by
petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land.
5.) VETO
A.) Item vs
Provision
B.) Doctrine on
Inappropriate
Provisions
C.) Legislative Veto
A. Item vs
Provision

BengzonvsDrilon
Full text:
FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic
Act No. 1797) that were repealed during the time of former President
Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to
retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions.
Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize
retirement benefits among government officials. However, President
Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that
the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select
government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the
Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed
out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said
PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case
of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non

ISSUE: Whether or
not the veto of the
President on that
portion of the
General
Appropriations bill
is constitutional

HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued
pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which
was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and
override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president
have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional
since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in
the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an
item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that
in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and
retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive
must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an
entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president
did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She
merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the
justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the
other departments of the government.

publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court
then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General
Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for
pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the
following manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund
Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations
in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the
allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for
the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She
explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when
she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and
justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the
President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary
Franklin Drilon.
BOLINAO VS VALENCIA (1964)
Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1964/jun1964/gr_l20740_1964.html

ISSUE: Whether or
not Valencia is
entitled to claim for
damages

HELD:The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any

right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation.
Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to
operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress
and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the
Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in
Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there
can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencias
department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot
claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then
president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal
because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executives veto power does not carry with
it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been
adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it
follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the
restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

ISSUE: Whether or
not the Presidents
veto is valid

HELD:In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted

within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In the Taada
petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the
ruling in Gonzales vsMacaraig. The president particularly vetoed the
debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the
scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more

FACTS: Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a copetitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat
Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and
radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido
Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after
their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBNs
continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had
caused damages to his department.

B.) Doctrine of
Inappropriate
Provisions

PCA vs Enriquez (August 19, 1994)

Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/aug1994/gr_113105_1994.html
FACTS: This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto
authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Bill of
1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide

development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds
but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be
applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions
of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the
veto. Instead, Senators WigbertoTaada and Alberto Romulo sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive
Secretary TeofistoGuingona et al. Taada et al contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items
in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations
for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not
delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al
averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o
vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein
is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in
fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect
repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling
legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the
President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income
and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was
likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already
funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program.
Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the
veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided
double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for
road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a
breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to
abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be
the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item
shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The
1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special
provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be
vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they
are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not
valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of
military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and
prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of
contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the
original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military
equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed
the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts
must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore,
being inappropriate provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation
benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically
approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is

lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the

Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the
president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the
payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto
Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item
on the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant
to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per
reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed
the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the
Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore,
confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to
the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on
compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that the conditions
imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the
CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions
questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself,
not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the
Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can
only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements
are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be
made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be
treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being
representatives of their local districts know more about the problems
in their constituents areas than the national government or the
president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the
Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to where funds
should be allocated.
C.) Legislative Veto

AbakadavsPurisima
Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/gr_166715_2008.html
FACTS: Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC

ISSUE:
Main Issue:
Whether or Not
there is a violation
of equal protection
clause

RULING:
(1) Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of
treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial
differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things
or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in
law differently.

Issue related under

this topic: Whether

The Constitution does not require that things which are different in
fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal

officials and employees if they exceed their revenue targets. It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend
that the limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.
Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system will
breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate
the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the
law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they
perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities.

or not the
bicameral
conference
committee is
clothed with an ex
post veto power

protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are

different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed.
(2) There is absolutely no legal warrant for the bold submission that a
Bicameral Conference Committee possesses the power to add/delete
provisions in bills already approved on third reading by both Houses or
an ex post veto power.
Taken from the full text:
In fine, there is neither a sound nor a syllable in the Rules of the
Senate and the House of Representatives to support the thesis of the
respondents that a bicameral conference committee is clothed with
an ex post veto power.
But the thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can wield ex
post veto power does not only contravene the rules of both the Senate
and the House. It wages war against our settled ideals of
representative democracy. For the inevitable, catastrophic effect of
the thesis is to install a Bicameral Conference Committee as the Third
Chamber of our Congress, similarly vested with the power to make
laws but with the dissimilarity that its laws are not the subject of a free
and full discussion of both Houses of Congress. With such a vagrant
power, a Bicameral Conference Committee acting as a Third Chamber
will be a constitutional monstrosity.
The thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can exercise law
making power with ex post veto power is freighted with mischief. Law
making is a power that can be used for good or for ill, hence, our
Constitution carefully laid out a plan and a procedure for its exercise.
Firstly, it vouchsafed that the power to make laws should be exercised
by no other body except the Senate and the House. It ought to be
indubitable that what is contemplated is the Senate acting as a full
Senate and the House acting as a full House. It is only when the Senate
and the House act as whole bodies that they truly represent the
people. And it is only when they represent the people that they can
legitimately pass laws. Laws that are not enacted by the peoples
rightful representatives subvert the peoples sovereignty. Bicameral
Conference Committees, with their ad hoc character and limited
membership, cannot pass laws for they do not represent the people.
The Constitution does not allow the tyranny of the majority. Yet, the
respondents will impose the worst kind of tyranny the tyranny of the
minority over the majority. Secondly, the Constitution delineated in
deft strokes the steps to be followed in making laws. The overriding
purpose of these procedural rules is to assure that only bills that
successfully survive the searching scrutiny of the proper committees of
Congress and the full and unfettered deliberations of both Houses can

become laws. For this reason, a bill has to undergo three (3)
mandatory separate readings in each House.
PROHIBITED
MEASURES (Sec
30, 31)

First Lepanto vs CA
Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/mar1994/gr_110571_1994.html
FACTS: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that
appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments(BOI) shall be the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a few months after the
1987 Constitution took
effect
(July
17,
1987),
the
OmnibusInvestments Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which
provided in Art 82 thereof that such appeals be directly filed with the SC.
The SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, CircularNo. 1-91
which confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over appeals from
the decisions of the BOI. SCs Second Division, relying on saidCircular,
accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present
case. Petitioner now move to reconsider and question the Second
Divisions ruling which provided:

Issue: Whether the

Court was correct
in sustaining the
appellate
jurisdiction of the
CA
in decisions from
the
Board
of Investments?

Held: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitutiontook

effect February 2, 1987. Thus, Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is invalid and therefore
never became effective for the concurrence of the Court was no
sought in its enactment. Thus, the OmnibusInvestments Code of 1981
as amended still stands. The exclusive jurisdiction on appeals
from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or
not Section 27 of
the
Ombudsman
Act is valid

HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction

of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize
an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing
argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended
to give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the
appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised
over final judgments and orders of lower courts, that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the
quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are

.although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO 226 is a

substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of procedure,
nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal
can be brought are only matters of procedure which this Court hast he
power to regulate.
They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot be
deemed to have superseded Art 82 of EO 226 (a legislation).
Fabian vsDisierto
Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/sep1998/129742.htm
FACTS:Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of
PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was
engaged in the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila
Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian
and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts
of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to
the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, AnianoDesierto, inhibited himself.
But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus
Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and
executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred

that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)

pertinently provides that:
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within 10 days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
LIBAN VS GORDON
Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/175352.htm
FACTS: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of
Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme
Court what they styled as Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having
Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against respondent Gordon, who was
elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the
PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of
the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that [n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners cited
the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6,
1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument
that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate
when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board
of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 75,[1] held thatthe office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office
or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC
Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any
subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC
because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run
charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of
Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore,
respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected
as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95,
as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as
a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution

now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on averified

petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
of the Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies.

ISSUE:
Was
it
correct for the
Court
to
have
passed upon and
decided on the
issue
of
the
constitutionality of
the PNRC charter?
Corollarily: What is
the nature of the
PNRC

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the

dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence
thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the
constitutional issue because it was not the very lismota of the case.
The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a
private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by
the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the
Decision; thus, it was not the very lismota of the case. We have
reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of
constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality
unless it is the very lismota. It is a well-established rule that a court
should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections
of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised
judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other
ground upon which the Court could have based its
judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected
by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even
originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence
of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the
Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this
country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several
times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15,
1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373,
P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several

states that [t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed the PNRC
to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also
declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene
and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of
some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding the

effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the
nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid
constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that
there is none like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms
of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State
and the international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention
that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui
generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and
effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the
1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws
have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not
even in this case before the Court now.
*T+his Court *must+ recognize the countrys adherence to the
Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in
consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has
the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled
and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead
of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to
organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private
corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs
special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary
of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under
the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither be classified as an
instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of
neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and
is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary
thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was
correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion
does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation
within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that
must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui

generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies

involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally
and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in
accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court
cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially
since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never
raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has
responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely
known to provide a substantial portion of the countrys blood
requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court
should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic
manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who
depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have
adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international
community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void
must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its
entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by
deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows: WHEREFORE, we
declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
C. POWERS OF
APPROPRIATION

Garcia vs Mata
Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1975/jul1975/gr_l_33713_1975.html
FACTS:Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as
amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano
Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by selling
illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority from the
Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned. Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case,
he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be
found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding
Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is with the court. The Judge
then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records.
This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and
for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others,
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was
denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a

ISSUE: Whether or
not the judge must
before issuing the
warrant personally
examine on oath or
affirmation
the
complainant
and
any witnesses he
may produce and
take
their
depositions
in
writing, and attach
them to the record,
in addition to any
affidavits presented
to him?

HELD:YES. Under the Constitution no search warrant shall issue but

upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule
of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must
before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to
any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that
his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant
is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching
them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles

and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC
Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that
effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant
were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no
moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these
documents are to be attached to the records. Matas motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to
the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others,
that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged
failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as
inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
PCA vs Enriquez
Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/aug1994/gr_113105_1994.html
FACTS: This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto
authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Bill of
1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide
development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds
but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be
applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions
of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the
veto. Instead, Senators WigbertoTaada and Alberto Romulo sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive
Secretary TeofistoGuingona et al. Taada et al contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items
in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations
for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

ISSUE: Whether or
not the Presidents
veto is valid

HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted

within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In the Taada
petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the
ruling in Gonzales vsMacaraig. The president particularly vetoed the
debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the
scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more
properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not
delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al
averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o
vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein
is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in
fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect
repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling
legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the
President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income
and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was
likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already
funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program.
Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the
veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided
double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for
road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a
breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to
abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be
the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item
shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The

1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special

provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be
vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they
are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not
valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of
military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and
prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of
contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the
original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military
equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed
the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts
must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore,
being inappropriate provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation
benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically
approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is
lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the
Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the
president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the
payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto
Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item
on the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant
to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per
reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed
the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the
Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore,
confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to
the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on
compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that the conditions
imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the
CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions
questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself,
not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the
Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can

only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements

are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be
made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be
treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being
representatives of their local districts know more about the problems
in their constituents areas than the national government or the
president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the
Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to where funds
should be allocated.

Atitiw vs Zamora
Full text:
FACTS: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of
autonomous regions in MuslimMindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating
the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article X of
the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President
Cory Aquino shepromulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress
enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organicact for the cordillera
autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the
people. Thecourt declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until
properly repealed or amended. Later onFebruary 15, 2000, President
Estrada signed the General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000)
whichincludes the assailed special provisions, then issued an E.O 270 to
extend the implementation of thewinding up of operations of the CAR and
extended it by virtue of E.O 328.The petitioners seek the declaration of
nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA 870 (GAA2000)
directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its
activities and pay theseparation and retirement benefits of all the
affected members and employees.

Power of

Demetria V Alba

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the
assailed special
provisions in RA
8760 is a rider and
as such is
unconstitutional.2.
(2) Whether the
Philippine
Government,
through Congress,
can unilaterally
amend/repeal EO
220.3.
(3) Whether the
Republic should be
ordered to honor
its commitments as
spelled out in
EO.220

HELD: In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court

said that xxx an appropriations bill covers abroader range of subject
matter and therefore includes more details compared to an ordinary
bill. Thetitle of an appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is
since it is not feasible to come out with a titlethat embraces all the
details included in an appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1
of theRA8760 does not constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a
provision in an appropriations bill mustrelate specifically to some
particular appropriations.On the other hand, the contention that
Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O 220 is rejected, there is nosuch
thing as an irrepealablelaw. And nothing could prevent the Congress
from amending or repealingthe E.O. 220 because it is no different from
any other law.The last issue, the court ruled that, the concept of
separations of powers presupposes mutual respect.Therefore, the
implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while the
sourcing of funds iswithin the powers of the legislature. In the absence
of any grave abuse of discretion, the court cannotcorrect the acts of
either the Executive or the Legislative in respect to policies concerning
CAR.

HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any

Appropriation
(Sec. 25, 29)

transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker,
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan

the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions

Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget,

may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law

from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the

for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective

Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality

appropriations.

of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:

However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege

The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,

granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately

appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and

transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive

agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the

Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office

General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any

included

department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations

enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are

Act or approved after its enactment.

actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not

Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973

Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is
constitutional.

in

the

General

Appropriations

Act

or

approved

after

its

the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be
made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise
goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to
another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and
efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

Aglipay V Ruiz
The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman
Catholic Church took place sometime in 1936. In commemoration
thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the production of
certain stamps the design of which would have in their center a
chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually,
the stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No.
4052, which provides for appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church,
assailed the production and sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that
the funding of said stamps commemorative to a particular religious

HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was
emphasized on the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of
Manila as being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not
appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act No. 4052 appropriated the
sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new
designs and other expenses incident thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may
be deemed advantageous to the Government. The fact that the fund is being
used for such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his
discretion.

event is in violation of Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution

which prohibits the appropriation or usage of public money for the use
or benefit of any church or denomination.

On religious freedom
The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating influence of religion is

recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we

ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the

implored the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal government. If should

Constitution.

also be further noted that religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an

inhibition of profound reverence to religion.

Garces V Estenzo

HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, "reviving the

FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia,
Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by
the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and
cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving
the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint.
As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish
church during the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano
mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however,
petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused to return
custody of the image to the council on the pretext that it was the
property of the church because church funds were used for its
acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case
against the priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish
priest and his co-petitioners filed an action for annulment of the
council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that
when they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly
constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was
not

allowed

to

participate;

and

that

they

contravened

the

constitutional provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of

religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church.
ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of
saint's image with private funds in connection with barangay fiesta,

traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of
Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia", and providing for: (I) the
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting
shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through the
"selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any
religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any
sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax
money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The
wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio
fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of
the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron
saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is
nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for
the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint
(such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As
noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an
ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and
drudgery of the lives of the masses.

constitutional.
Brillantes V Comelec
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436
authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES)
for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections.
It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting
machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and
adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation
during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections, particularly in counting
the votes collected from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). However, the failure of the machines to correctly read a
number of automated ballots discontinued its implementation.
Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172 on
January 24, 2003, allocating the sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively
fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004 elections. On February 10,
2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing the release of a
further supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the
COMELEC.
The petitioners-in-intervention point to several constitutional infractions
occasioned by the assailed resolution. They advance the view that the
assailed resolution effectively preempts the sole and exclusive authority
of Congress under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution to canvass
the votes for President and Vice-President. Further, as there has been
no appropriation by Congress for the respondent COMELEC to conduct
an unofficial electronic transmission of results of the May 10, 2004
elections, any expenditure for the said purpose contravenes Article VI,
Section 29 (par. 1) of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the appropriations made by the president
constitutional.
b)
for violating Art. VI, Sec. 29 (par. 1) of the 1987 Constitution that
no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law;

Held. NO
The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the constitutional provision that
no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.[37]
By its very terms, the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election
results projected under Resolution No. 6712 is unofficial in character, meaning
not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged by the government or
government body.[38] Any disbursement of public funds to implement this project is
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the
2003 General Appropriations Act. The use of the COMELEC of its funds appropriated
for the AES for the unofficial quick count project may even be considered as a
felony under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. [39]
Irrefragably, the implementation of the assailed resolution would entail, in due
course, the hiring of additional manpower, technical services and acquisition of
equipment, including computers and software, among others. According to the
COMELEC, it needed P55,000,000 to operationalize the project, including the
encoding process.[40] Hence, it would necessarily involve the disbursement of public
funds for which there must be the corresponding appropriation.
We have reviewed Rep. Act No. 9206, the General Appropriations Act, which took
effect on April 23, 2003 and find no appropriation for the project of the COMELEC
for electronic transmission of unofficial election results. What is appropriated
therein is the amount of P225,000,000 of the capital outlay for the modernization of
the electoral system.
Under paragraph 3 of the special provisions of Rep. Act No. 9206, the amount
of P225,000,000 shall be used primarily for the establishment of the AES prescribed
under Rep. Act No. 8436, viz:
3. Modernization of Electoral System. The appropriations herein authorized for the
Modernization of the Electoral System in the amount of Two Hundred Twenty-Five
Million Pesos (P225,000,000.00) shall be used primarily for the establishment of the
automated election system, prescribed under Republic Act No. 8436, particularly for
the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of
the national and local elections.
Section 52 of Rep. Act No. 9206 proscribes any change or modification in the
expenditure items authorized thereunder. Thus:
Sec. 52. Modification of Expenditure Components. Unless specifically authorized in

this Act, no change or modification shall be made in the expenditure items in this
Act and other appropriations laws unless in cases of augmentation from savings in
appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
Neither can the money needed for the project be taken from the COMELECs
savings, if any, because it would be violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the 1987
Constitution.
The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. In this
case, no law has, thus, far been enacted authorizing the respondent COMELEC to
transfer savings from another item in its appropriation, if there are any, to fund the
assailed resolution. No less than the Secretary of the Senate certified that there is no
law appropriating any amount for an unofficial count and tabulation of the votes
cast during the May 10, 2004 elections.
What is worrisome is that despite the concerns of the Commissioners during
its En Banc meeting on April 27, 2004, the COMELEC nevertheless approved the
assailed resolution the very next day. The COMELEC had not executed any
supplemental contract for the implementation of the project with PMSI. Worse, even
in the absence of a certification of availability of funds for the project, it approved
the assailed resolution.
Constitutionality of
PDAF

Belgica V Exec. Sec. Ochoa

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since
about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary
funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal
designations

from Congressional

Pork

Barrel

to

the

latest

Priority

Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40
million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical
assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative
power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that
which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve
purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify

projects, P100 million for soft projects.

the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on
non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby

lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not

certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their

lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it

department provided that the request for realignment is approved or

state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of

concurred by the legislator concerned.

Congress.

Presidential Pork Barrel

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the

GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)

president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate.

the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been

But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once

around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from

the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he

the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.

will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of

budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the

corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed

President useless.

that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been
facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in

d. Local Autonomy

funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local

organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being

affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can

used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An

develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with

audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results

the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of

thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass

or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various

instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national

petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the

officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary

pork barrel system.

to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good
if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF

ISSUES:

becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is

HELD:
I. No,

that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the

the

congressional

pork

barrel

system is

unconstitutional. It is

unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

Constitution which provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of

anappropriation made by law.

a. Separation of Powers

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of

of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a

funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the

particular legislation.

laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive
may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the

was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves

Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which

dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear

amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:

act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of

separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected

was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide

from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the

Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only

Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource

recommend where their pork barrel funds go).

development and for other purposes which the President may direct;

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive
will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of

PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of
the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to
be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the
case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

War Powers

David V Macapagal
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The
said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists
to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the
same

time

revoked

all

permits issued

for

rallies

and

other

public

organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,

Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led
to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was
raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The
SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for
the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence
of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary,
the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless

write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was

violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.

raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested.
His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall

because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.

ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017.
David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national

Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is

emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen

vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the

averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot

laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me

be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress.

personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to

Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho

the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as

also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those

provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional

of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that

insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative

PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and

power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6

unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and

categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the

academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP

Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of

1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out

Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a

power, take care power and take over power.

state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing

decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

cannot create or enact laws.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

unconstitutional.

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or

The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the

institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On

lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties

the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not

still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can

limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made

take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in

a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but

part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The

her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for

SC ruled in the following way;

such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress
must be based on the following:

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may

Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events

prescribe.

leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy

records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious

declared by Congress.

threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders.
There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of
the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military.

Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president
by the president.

any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms
and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
Power of Taxation
(sec. 28)
Public Purpose

must not stifle liberty.

Planters V Fertiphil
FACTS:
Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations
incorporated under Philippine laws, both engaged in the importation
and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital
recovery component of Php10.00 per bag of fertilizer. The levy was to
continue until adequate capital was raised to make PPI financially
viable. Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA),
which was then remitted the depository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid
P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986. After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA
voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphil demanded
from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted, however PPI refused.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages, questioning the
constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a
denial of due process.PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have
a "personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury
as a result of its enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any
damage from the imposition because "incidence of the levy fell on the
ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer
company.

RULING:
Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a
mere procedural technicality which may be waived. The imposition of the levy was
an exercise of the taxation power of the state. While it is true that the power to tax
can be used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy was
revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least,
one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.
Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These
powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the power of
the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to
levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the
regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The
"lawful subjects" and "lawful means" tests are used to determine the validity of a law
enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is
circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality
of LOI No. 1465.

Delegation to the
President

What is the power of taxation?

Southern Cross V Cement
Facts:

It is also clear from Section 5 of the SMA that the positive final determination to be
undertaken by the Tariff Commission does not entail a mere gathering of statistical

The case centers on the interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act

No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA), which was one of the
laws enacted by Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. The SMA provides for the structure and
mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs,
to protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports
which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.
Philcemcor filed with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) a
petition seeking for the imposition of safeguard measures on Gray
Portland cement, in accordance with the SMA. After the DTI issued a
provisional safeguard measure, the application was referred to the
Tariff Commission for a formal investigation pursuant to Section 9 of the
SMA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, in order to determine
whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of
gray Portland cement. After public hearings and conducting its own
investigation, the Tariff Commission came out with a negative finding.
Notwithstanding such finding, the DTI sought the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard
measure. The Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do so
under the SMA, and so the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision
wherein he expressed the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of
the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying
Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on the ground that
the he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commissions negative
findings.
Philcemcor filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well
as the Tariff Commissions Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI
Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the power of review, is not
bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and,
that the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework,
inconsistent inferences and erroneous methodology. The CA held that
the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff
Commission since such findings are merely recommendatory and they
fall within the ambit of the Secretarys discretionary review. It
determined that the legislative intent is to grant the DTI Secretary the
power to make a final decision on the Tariff Commissions
recommendation.
Issue:
Whether or not the factual determination of the Tariff commission
binding on the DTI secretary. YES

data. In order to arrive at such determination, it has to establish causal linkages from
the statistics that it compiles and evaluates: after finding there is an importation in
increased quantities of the product in question, that such importation is a substantial
cause of serious threat or injury to the domestic industry.
The Court of Appeals relies heavily on the legislative record of a congressional
debate during deliberations on the SMA to assert a purported legislative intent that
the findings of the Tariff Commission do not bind the DTI Secretary. Yet as explained
earlier, the plain meaning of Section 5 emphasizes that only if the Tariff Commission
renders a positive determination could the DTI Secretary impose a safeguard
measure. Resort to the congressional records to ascertain legislative intent is not
warranted if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.

Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution confirms the delegation of

legislative power, yet ensures that the prerogative of Congress to impose limitations
and restrictions on the executive exercise of this power:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
The safeguard measures which the DTI Secretary may impose under the SMA
may take the following variations, to wit: (a) an increase in, or imposition of any duty
on the imported product; (b) a decrease in or the imposition of a tariff-rate quota
on the product; (c) a modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on
the importation of the product into the Philippines; (d) one or more appropriate
adjustment measures, including the provision of trade adjustment assistance; and
(e) any combination of the above-described actions. Except for the provision of
trade adjustment assistance, the measures enumerated by the SMA are essentially
imposts, which precisely are the subject of delegation under Section 28(2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.
This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is
authorized by the Constitution itself. At the same time, the Constitution also grants
the delegating authority (Congress) the right to impose restrictions and limitations on
the taxation power delegated to the President. The restrictions and limitations
imposed by Congress take on the mantle of a constitutional command, which the
executive branch is obliged to observe.
The SMA empowered the DTI Secretary, as alter ego of the President to impose
definitive general safeguard measures, which basically are tariff imposts of the type
spoken of in the Constitution. However, the law did not grant him full, uninhibited
discretion to impose such measures. The DTI Secretary authority is derived from the

Ruling:
The SMA establishes a distinct allocation of functions between the Tariff
Commission and the DTI Secretary. The plain meaning of Section 5
shows that it is the Tariff Commission that has the power to make a
positive final determination. This power, which belongs to the Tariff
Commission, must be distinguished from the power to impose general
safeguard measure properly vested on the DTI Secretary. The distinction
is vital, as a positive final determination clearly antecedes, as a
condition precedent, the imposition of a general safeguard
measure. At the same time, a positive final determination does not
necessarily result in the imposition of a general safeguard
measure. Under Section 5, notwithstanding the positive final
determination of the Tariff Commission, the DTI Secretary is tasked to
decide whether or not that the application of the safeguard measures
is in the public interest.

SMA; it does not flow from any inherent executive power. Thus, the limitations
imposed by Section 5 are absolute, warranted as they are by a constitutional fiat.

SC RULING
Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is
lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well
as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such
delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be
defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative
body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law
and implement legislative policy provided that it must comply with the following
requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
The first requisite was actually satisfied since EO 156 has both constitutional and
statutory bases. Anent the second requisite, that the order must be issued
or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, the presumption is
that the said executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations
imposed by law since the respondents never questioned the procedure that paved
way for the issuance of EO 156 but instead, what they challenged was the absence
of substantive due process in the issuance of the EO.
In the third requisite, the Court held that the importation ban runs afoul with the third
requisite as administrative issuances must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of
the authority conferred. In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws
authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is

the domestic industry. EO 156,however, exceeded the scope of its application by

extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA
7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory.
The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually the "customs
territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227
which states: "the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport where
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other national tariff and customs
laws are in force and effect."
Regarding the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the issuance of EO is
unreasonable. Since the nature of EO 156 is to protect the domestic industry from
the deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms, the Court however, finds
no logic in all the encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport
Zone which is outside the customs territory of the Philippines. As long as the used
motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be
prevented or remedied will not arise.
The Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is VOID insofar as it is made
applicable within the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area but is
declared VALID insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory
outside
the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section
1.1 of EO 97-A (an EO executed by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos in 1993 providing the Tax
and Duty Free Privilege within the Subic Freeport Zone).
Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine territory via the secured
fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used or traded therein, or
exported out of the Philippine territory, but they cannot be imported into the
Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.
Petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED provided that said provision is declared VALID
insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former
Subic Naval Base area and VOID with respect to its application to the secured
fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.
Tax Exemption

Lung Center V Quezon City

Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity
established by virtue of PD No. 1823. It is the registered ownerof the
land on which the Lung Center of the Philippines Hospital is erected. A
big space in the ground floor of the hospital is being leased to private
parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or
professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics. Also,

Held: The Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution. To determine

whether an enterprise is a charitable institution or not, the elements which should be
considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its
constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual
work performed, that character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the
beneficiaries and the use and occupation of the properties.
However, under the Constitution, in order to be entitled to exemption from real

a big portion on the right side of the hospital is being leased for

property tax, there must be clear and unequivocal proof that (1) it is a charitable

commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical

institution and (2)its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used

Orchids and Garden Center.

for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for treatment of
patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-

When the City Assessor of Quezon City assessed both its land and

paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals and

hospital building for real property taxes, the Lung Center of the

enterprises.

Philippines filed a claim for exemption on its averment that it is a

charitable

institution

with

minimum

of

60%

of

its hospital

Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others, debarred

bedsexclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of

from participation or enjoyment. If real property is used for one or more commercial

itshospital operation is to serve charity patients. The claim for exemption

purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to

was denied, prompting a petition for the reversal of the resolution of the

taxation.

City Assessor with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon

City, which denied the same. On appeal, the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals of Quezon City affirmed the local boards decision,
finding that Lung Center of the Philippines is not a charitable institution
and that its properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used
for charitable purposes. Hence, the present petition for review with
averments that the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable
institution

under

Section

28(3),

Article

VI

of

the

Constitution,

notwithstanding that it accepts paying patients and rents out portions

of the hospital building to private individuals and enterprises.
Issue: Is the Lung Center of the Philippines a charitable institution within
the context of the Constitution, and therefore, exempt from real
property tax?
Chavez V PCGG
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, in his capacity as taxpayer,
citizen and a former government official asked the court to prohibit
and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately
entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the
heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and
concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in
the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos
gold hoard.

HELD:
The petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution.
Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all
forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear
violation of the Construction. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is
vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies.

Chavez assailed the validity of the General and Supplemental

Agreement executed by the government (through PCGG) and the
Marcos heirs on December 28,1993.
Item No. 2 of the General Agreement states that the assets of the
PRIVATE PARTY (Marcos heirs) shall be net of and exempt from, any
form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement entered into by the PCGG and
the Marcos heirs which committing to exempt from all forms of taxes
the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs is valid.

Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: "No law granting
any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Member of the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax
exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth
cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses form paying
taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal
protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor
only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the
constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform and equitable."
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner
of internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only
when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the
taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's financial position demonstrates a clear inability to
pay. Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the Marcoses, because
under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims
against their properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the
PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or
cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to
be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs
involved do not justify the collection of the tax due. In this instance, the cancellation
of tax liability is done even before the determination of the amount due. In any
event, criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which legal actions have been filed in
court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be compromised.

Initiative and
Referendum (sec.
32)

Garcia V Comelec
FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic
Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days
after its submission; so, they resorted to their power of initiative under
the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the required
number of signatures to repeal the said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding
Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June

HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled
and set aside.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation
because of the event in February 1986. The new Constitution became less trusting
of public officials.
Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution
under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12%
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voter therein.

11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum.

The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum.

On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative
because its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for
a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.

ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper

YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative

subject of an initiative?

and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly

Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set

propose

aside?

and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution petition to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is the power
of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.

SBMA V COMELEC

Whether the exercise of polls is an exercise of initiative or referendum?

Fatcs:

SC:
Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments not only to the
constitution but also to propose and enact legislation through an election called for
that purpose. It is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, to enact or
reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. There is also what
we called as indirect initiative, wherein this is an exercise of the initiative by the
people through a proposition set Congress or local legislative body for action. Tayo
ang nag propose kelangan lang ng isang Congressman to support us to present
before the Congress.

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases

Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic
Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the
declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation
into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic
military reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,
petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the
preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed

Referendum on the other hand, is the power of the electorate to approve or reject
a legislation through an election called for that purpose. So, it may be a referendum
statute, wherein it is to approve or reject an act or law passed by Congress. Or
referendum of local law, which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law
enacted by the local legislative body.

Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its

absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join
the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of
the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.
10, Serye 1993.
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang
Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,
b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by
promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting
Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the
LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the
ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.

Initiative is resorted by the people directly, either because the law making body fails
or refuses to enact the law, ordinance or resolution that they desire or because they
want to amend or modify what is already existing. Initiative is the act of the people,
it comes from the people. Referendum on the other hand, the law making body
submits to the people for approval or rejection any ordinance or resolution which is
due to enact thereto. Or approve by such law making authority. It is commenced
by the legislative bodythe referendum. Initiative is entirely the work of the
electorate. Whereas, referendum is began and consented to by the law-making
body. Initiative is the process of law-making by the people themselves without the
participation and even against the wishes of their elected representatives.
Referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been
brought up or enacted by the legislative body.
In other words, the process and voting in initiative is understandably more complex
than in referendum. Because in initiative, it is us the people proposing and there are
several provisions for approval or non-approval. Whereas, in referendum what is only
submitted to the people is only the question of a yes or a no. It follows, that there is
a need for the COMELEC to supervise the initiative more closely. Its authority is not
only on the counting and canvassing of the votes but also to see to it that the
manner as submitted by the people is in the proper form and language. So it is
easily understood and voted by the electorate. This is especially true when the
propose legislation is lengthy and complicated, it should be broken down into
several autonomous parts.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532

defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the
portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845
and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and
providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting
the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is
intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an
amendment of a national law
ART. XVII
Amendments and
Revisions

Santiago V COMELEC

HELD:
RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the

Facts:

constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to

of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be

Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by

directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve

Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the

per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative

time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused

district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters

the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general

therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this

circulation, and c.)instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners

right This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be

and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD

passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated

Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the

without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although

Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on

this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses

peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented

Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action.

by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the

by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative

Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold

namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local

niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people

legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided

cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for

for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made

whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.

for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter
of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices

law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.

of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative.

HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on

Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various

amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded,

opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic

adequately covers such initiative.

Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples
initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.

Lambino V Comelec

Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a
mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed

Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for

amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by

an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number

petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be

of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with

parliament to enact more rules.

each legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of

its registered voters. This has been verified by local COMELEC registrars

There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be

as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify

decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality

Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled

so long as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.

Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the president

bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of

***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by the

government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the

Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act 6735

Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative

is adequate.

petitions to amend the Constitution this is in pursuant to the ruling in

HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:

Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that the decision in

Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various

the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within that case.

opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of
Sec 2 ArtXVII of the 1987 Constitution.

initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis

HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the
people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity

The Santiago vs. COMELEC doctrine. The ruling in Santiago vs. COMELEC may be

and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties

summarized in this manner: RA 6735, also known as the Peoples Initiative and

who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the

Referendum Ac, is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and

proposed amendments to the people.

The proponents present

favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the

arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters,

conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

Santiago was decided by the Supreme Court en banc, which means that it may be

often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no

overturned only in another en banc decision and only when necessary.

presumption

The Lambino vs. COMELEC ruling. The Supreme Courts ruling in Lambino vs.

that

the

proponents

observed

requirements in gathering the signatures.

the

constitutional

The proponents bear the

burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional

COMELEC, in contrast to the Santiago ruling, states that there is no need to revisit
the sufficiency of R.A. 6735. In the words of the Supreme Court:

requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained,

or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to
the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what
the petition contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where
people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full text of the
proposed amendments.

There is no need to revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735

incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the
system of initiative to amend the Constitution.
In other words, any discussion on the sufficiency of RA 6735 is an obiter, and the
subsequent reiteration of the separate opinions of the 10 members of the
Supreme Court does not change that fact.
Still, the Supreme Court left the door wide open for future proponents of peoples
initiative. It can be argued that the reiteration of the 10 votes in favor of the
sufficiency of RA 6735 has the effect of overturning the Santiago ruling. In any case,
with or without such reiteration, the Supreme Court is not precluded from revisiting
the Santiago ruling in future controversies.
One of the effects of the reiteration is this: When a petition for peoples initiative is
filed in the future, the COMELEC can grant the petition on the basis of the
reiteration of the sufficiency of RA 6735. In other words, proponents of future

moves for a Charter Change have a better fighting chance.

Province of North Cotabato V GRP

Article VII (Executive Department)

FACTS:

Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)

concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines

(GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of

Article X. (Local Government)

Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala

Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement
mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to which it grants the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral
Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural
resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two
local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they
negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD
brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional

Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are
the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.

Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions
to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting

HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public

favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and

initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this

to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.

Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide

for legislative powers over:

REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public

1. Administrative organization;

consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for

2. Creation of sources of revenues;

peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of

3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;

peoples participation in the peace process.

4. Personal, family, and property relations;

Article III (Bill of Rights)

5. Regional urban and rural planning development;

6. Economic, social, and tourism development;

Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be

7. Educational policies;

recognized, access to official records and to documents and papers

8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to

9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general

government research data used as basis for policy development shall

welfare of the people of the region.

be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided

by law.

The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.

Article II

ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state

adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

transactions involving public interest.

1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

2. A constitutional convention.

LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct

periodic consultations. No project or program be implemented unless

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof

such consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.

shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of
such amendment or revision.

MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the
present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a
comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional
amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required

amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite.

MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.