Is Something Better Than Nothing?

Dec 17th, 2009

Vision of 2010
Kanbawza Win

We’re just days away from 2010 – a defining year for Burma, as we witness the
opposition composed of ethnics and pro democracy movement. have to admit that they
have been soundly beaten. First, they lost is in the battle fields and very lately in the
diplomatic arena, where the Junta scored a major victory of recognition without yielding
an inch from the Western countries who claims to be the defender of Democracy and
Human Rights. Now, the Junta is going to be legitimized by its phony elections.

The Burmese regime has claimed to hold a new election in 2010 to facilitate a formation
of a civil-military government in accordance with the military-orchestrated constitution
with a rigged referendum. The prospect of the new election is a moral and strategic
dilemma to the democratic movement, especially the NLD and its supporters who are
entrenched in upholding their eighteen-year-old election. Will the moderates group
participate or not seems to be the key factor in deciding the authenticity of the elections.
That is why the Euro Burma Office, Director said, “For the people inside, they cannot
avoid casting votes and if they don’t have their own candidates, then they will have to
choose the Junta’s candidates. Or better if they could set up their own parties, hoping
some of their candidates will win some seats. It’s up to each locality to decide for itself,
and is not a question of opportunity or survival but depends on planning. It’s not the
resistance armies that will suffer if fighting resumes, but it is the people who suffer,
because when there is war, the Burma Army always pick on the people, not the
resistance.”

This is but one way of encouraging the moderates. View internationally, the Burmese
pro-democracy movement was merely a moral case and moral concern which is usually
inferior to strategic needs in international relations and one could be compared to the
Free Tibet Campaign that seems to share the same fate. Both movements have been
remarkably successful in awareness campaigns and then come to a full stop. They
managed to mobilize international support in transnational causes but failed to realise
that it has to be followed up by pursuing the international authorities. The actual policy
making depends on the willingness and capability of the international powers and the
international system. Sadly, both the Diaspora democracy movement and the ethnics
leaders could not comprehend the situation and have little or no knowledge about
economic incentives and the country`s resources to play with, that are so crucial in the
international scene. Lamentably the opposition groups are unable to learn the lessons
from Iraq where US allotted $100 if compared to Burma not even $10 including the care
of refugees and IDPs.

Analysing Contemporary History

Gen. Ne Win’s military coup in 1962 has the ability to consolidate its power by
institutionalizing a one-party state, a decade after the military takeover. The current
Junta unlike Ne Win is not capable of institutionalizing its rule into a formal political
system. Hence the transition plan is based on the regime’s orchestrated constitution
which the Junta forced through a forced rigged referendum and the coming unfair
elections.
But the interpretation of the constitution in practice will depend on the degree of
participation by civilian politicians in the election and the authority of the elected
representatives in the government. The constitution itself does allow elected members to
hold substantial power in the new government. Hence the legitimacy of the 2010 election
depends on the participation of pro-democracy civilians and their roles in the new
government.
The regime’s strategy appears to minimize the influence of hard liners, including the
NLD. The major arrests and severe jail-terms imposed on the activists are a part of the
plan to steer clear hard-line elements before the election comes. On the other hand, an
alternative third-force in the opposition movement is not in an organized form. Because
of the nature of polarization in Burma’s conflict, many moderate individuals are reluctant
to engineer a third-force platform which is a politically derogative term for the Burmese
oppositions.
Regarding the participation of the civilians it depends on their roles and stance towards
the coming election, there seems to be four categories of civilian politicians, in addition
to the pro-military elements to contest the election. The first type is the majority of the
oppositions strongly condemned the regime’s road map. They will continue to reject the
2010 election and refuse to participate. These hardliners among the opposition
movement are mostly in exile. Most hardcore activists inside the country are under lock
and key. These hardliners voice will make little or no impact on the holding of the
election.
The second type of oppositions sees the election as a step towards a confrontation with
the military. Despite its call to recognize the result of the 1990 general election, the
splinter group of the NLD and the likes e.g. veteran politician U Shwe Ohn of Shan
State, the daughters of U Nu and U Kyaw Nyein, choose to participate in the 2010
election because it is the only option to reclaim its legitimacy and remobilize its
supporters after 2010. For many hardliners, including some of the ethnic nationalities
and the defunct Burmese Communist Party, the coming election is a tactical
battleground for further escalation of the conflict.
The third type is political groups who view the coming election as an enticing
opportunity to pursue their self interests. Many smaller ceasefire groups like the DKBA,
KNPLF, KDA and the likes fall into this account. They will seek to strengthen their
legitimacy through the existing electoral process regardless of the degree of fairness and
freedom of the election. Some ceasefire groups may also incline to transform into the
third force.
The fourth type is the individuals regard themselves moderates and share a view that
the current NLD-led opposition movement is a failure. Many individuals include former
political prisoners, elected representatives from the NLD, current leaders in NGOs, and
environmental activists and some exiles even though may have not emerged as an
institutionalized political force, are likely to establish their political platform to contest the
2010 election.
The Junta’s Perspective
It seems that the regime is also facing a dilemma based on three major
concerns. First, the military is reluctant to open up political space for the civilian
politicians to mobilize to contest in the election because the regime learned a hard
lesson after it had released former student leaders and allowed them to organize their
supporters. Their mobilization paved a way to the monk-led protest in 2007. The regime
is very careful this time not to repeat the previous mistake.
Second, the regime is concerned with the repetition of the NLD’s another victory in the
2010 election. The dominance of anti-military oppositions in the civilian portion of elected
representatives will encourage the oppositions to challenge the military after the election.
In other words, the military wants more ‘moderate’ opposition to contest in the election
than the hard-liners. The release of student leaders in 2004 partially aimed at creating a
so-called ‘third force’ between the NLD and the regime. However, the student leaders
chose to take hard-line stance.
Third, the regime is worried that the emerging civilian-led government would undermine
the military’s institutional interests. The military wants to avoid creating itself a
“Frankenstein or Dracula” image by its own Road Map. The military therefore
embedded protective clauses in the constitution to guarantee its own interests because
of its distrust on civilian politicians. Overall, the Junta does not have viable civilian
partnership in the new government after 2010. Lack of confidence on civilian politicians
and amicable partnership has fostered siege mentality among the military leaders who
will desperately cling on to the constitution and use suppression to safeguard their
interests.
Hence there is a faint possibility that Burma may become a liberal democracy and the
most potent ingredient for instability, when poor economic performance and factional
mobilization characterize a new transition. Any new government, regardless of the forms
of transition, will not be able to revive the country from current economic pauperization in
a short term. Poverty will continue and quality of life remains poor after 2010. Economic
destitutions are usually channel towards political discontent. Under poverty, Burmese
people will remain dissatisfied with the government as long as the military is a part of the
ruling institution.
It will eventually expand political space for formerly suppressed oppositions who were
deprived of political mobilization under the previous system. Economically dissatisfied
public is vulnerable to political instigation stirring up unrests. The hard line oppositions
will utilize newly emerging political space to mobilize poverty-stricken angry publics to
pressure the new government. Their objective will aim to scrap the existing constitution
and boot the military out of politics.
On the other hand, the military is likely to be politically defensive after the 2010 election
while taking shelter under its brainchild constitution. The military’s 25 percent of
representatives in the parliament and its supporters will continue to preserve the
military’s institutional interests threatened by the oppositions’ mobilization. Alternatively,
the military may disenfranchise potential hardliners in the 2010 election and continue to
deny their political freedom even after 2010. In both scenarios, the confrontation
between the military and hardcore oppositions is likely to escalate after the election. But
it will be the first time in more than two decades that the civilian politicians and the
military representatives will be sitting under the same roof in the Parliament. It will also
be the venue for both the military and civilians to interact in policy making and mutually
envisioning the future. Against all odds, the transition in 2010 offers an opportunity to
jumpstart confidence building to seek much need reconciliation for the country.
O! Burma betrayed by Obama

President Obama and his strategic advisors acknowledge that the extension of US
power has reached a critical threshold. The US has become a declining power in the
face of a rising China, Russia and India. The US economy is largely interdependent with
the Asian economy. The combination of Japanese and Chinese ownership of US debt
has reached 45%t of US Treasury securities. In addition, the military gap is narrowing. A
study conducted by the RAND Corporation, an influential think-tank, concludes the
Chinese military could defeat US forces in the Taiwan Strait, if the US attempted to deter
a Chinese offensive to reclaim Taiwan. Russia has fielded its latest S-400 air-defence
system far superior than the US’s second-generation Patriot missile system. Hence
Obama realizes that the most effective approach to totalitarian countries is the utilization
of ‘soft power,’ which calls for friendliness rather than coercion and the end result was
that the Junta’s representative Thein Sein sat smiling besides Obama in S`pore. The
other Western countries like the EU are bound to follow the American lead.

For one thing, Obama clearly wants to distinguish himself from George W. Bush, who
badly tainted the human rights agenda by linking it to the war in Iraq and by adopting an
overly moralistic, evangelical tone about democracy. Will P resident Obama be forcefully
advocating democracy abroad if he believes that negotiating about human rights behind
the scenes works better than bullying in public, since it permits nasty regimes to save
face while, at least theoretically, allowing them to quietly make concessions? It seems
that the president seems to believe that, no matter how brutal a government he is
dealing with, he can find common cause.

Though the Bush administration established a deputy national security adviser for global
democracy strategy, Obama’s National Security Council structure has explicitly
downgraded the role of democracy specialists. And some parts of the government seem
to be backing away from even the word “Democracy.” What more proof is wanted when
Obama’s administration became the first since 1991 not to meet with the Dalai Lama,
even privately, when the Tibetan leader was in Washington last October?

On matters of democracy and human rights, past presidents have wielded the bully
pulpit to impressive effect, sometimes winning the release of high-profile dissidents e.g.
after Bush highlighted the case of Ayman Nour, the most prominent Egyptian dissident,
in early 2005, Hosni Mubarak’s government released him from jail even though he is
locked up again. After much rhetoric of Obama and Clinton about the new Burma policy,
the American delegate lead by Assistant Secretary of East Asia and Pacific Kurt
Campbell who went to Burma never uttered a word for the release of Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi. Sadly the American Nobel Laureate has failed his duty to the Burmese Nobel
Laureate.

The Chinese Card

The Burma-China relationship will enter a new chapter after China completes an oil
pipeline connecting the Andaman Sea with China’s Yunnan province. The move is
alarmingly strategic. Past Chinese interest in Burma was less critical than many
observers have speculated, with trade accounting for a fraction of one percent of overall
Chinese exports, while China has failed to transfer any strategic weaponry to
Naypyidaw. But the 2.9-billion dollar Chinese oil pipeline will drastically transform the
role of Burma in China’s strategic calculus. China has been geographically vulnerable to
a naval blockade, being confined by Japan to the east, Taiwan to the south and South
Korea to the north of China – all US allies. In addition, China lacks a naval force capable
of protecting its sea lines. The projected oil pipeline from Burma will reinforce China’s
long-term strategic energy initiative. The pipeline will be much more significant than any
existing China-Burma engagements. China may even consider protecting its interest in
Burma under a nuclear umbrella. One of the main reasons for China to send its
advanced submarines to the Andaman Sea is to protect its strategic interest,
simultaneously restricting the regional power projection of the US Navy’s 7th fleet. As I
had said earlier if Burma used to be a moral issue for the United States now it is for the
current leaders of how to play it into the hands of US security and its national interests.
Perhaps one should recollect that Obama in the Nobel Academy said that “evil does
exist in the world and that there will be times when nations…will find the use of force not
only necessary but morally justified,” if this is a clear statement of American foreign
policy principles in international realm we would like to see how it applies to Burma or
rather a hypocritical aspect of quid pro quo engagement, ranging from counter-narcotics
to political prisoners. But I am afraid that among all initiatives, however, the focus of US
policy will be on the 2010 elections.
Likely Scenario
Obviously the military will not drop its Road Map and seek an alternative political
settlement with the opposition. Any political outcomes have to go through the military-led
transitional process. In the past, the military is asked to sit down at a table set up by the
opposition, now it will be vice versa. The process will be likely initiated in phases,
starting with the military and moderate political forces in the parliament and the
government. If we look at the world we see that democratic transition history we see
that in 108 democratic transitions, only 12 countries have consolidated democracy since
1955. In many cases, instability follows transitions and often than not fell back to
autocracy.
Burma conflict is vastly factionalized, and the polarity between the military and the
oppositions is deeply entrenched. The traditional opposition forces will likely take the
path of confrontation with the military after 2010. Confidence building won’t be
materialized as long as both the civilian politicians and the military fail to cooperate in
shared common interests, such as economic development, health care, security and
public welfare.
As long as the junta sees no viable civilian partnership after 2010, the military will restrict
the participation of civilian politicians in the coming election and their capacity to
mobilize. The only civilian force willing to categorically cooperate with the military is
moderate non-NLD pro-democracy activists who feel discontented with the status quo in
the opposition movement. Although the military may not trust this so-called third force, it
is the only viable civilian partnership the military needs to implement its Road Map.
The moderate force has not been able to organize its political platform and leadership
structure to function as a feasible political institution. The election in 2010 will likely be a
breeding ground to shape the structure of moderate force in Burmese politics.
Regardless of whether the NLD fields’ candidates through proxy parties or contests the
elections, the generals will make sure her party is in no position to field any sizable
number of candidates, much less win a landslide again. What other benchmarks, then,
could be treated as signals that the regime is serious about democratic transition? It
could, relax media and Internet censorship; show increased tolerance towards valid
public criticism of its policy and leadership failures; enable existing parties to reorganize
themselves with full organizational rights and responsibilities; adopt conciliatory gestures
towards multi-ethnic dissidents and armed resistance organizations; allocate public
resources fairly and equitably among the parties for election purposes; and grant them
equal access to the State-owned media outlets; and last but not least, encourage and
educate the Burmese electorate in general about their voting rights, as well as
fundamental rights as citizens of a soon-to-be democracy. But without institutionalizing
legal regimes of human rights to protect citizens’ and communities’ socio-cultural rights,
as well as economic and political freedoms, no polity can be label democratic.

We don’t expect culturally conservative and semi-feudal society such as Burma be

expected to evolve into something that can sustain a formal democracy and its further
advancement because those who are at the helm of wearing uniform have grown
accustomed to power, privileges, wealth and State protection, as well as adept at
control, manipulation and domination over the public, economy and the State. As such,
these men in uniforms are not going to be agents of change, rather it is the people
themselves—multi-ethnic communities, religious leaders and associations, individual
professionals, educators, entrepreneurs, artists and intellectuals, and pockets of
enlightened military officers, as well as the webs of informal networks—that need to be
viewed as potential change agents. If ever change come to Burma, for sure it will not be
achieved through the generals’ elections.
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