Relief and Blowdown Systems

Are you sure you can rely on them?

Colin Deddis, June 2013

This document is created for general illustration only and is not intended as a substitute for specialist advice in relation to
any particular situation. All liability is expressly disclaimed.

© Genesis Oil & Gas Consultants Ltd

 Relief and Blowdown Systems

• Relief and blowdown systems as layers of

protection.

• Relief and blowdown systems’ functionality.

• What can go wrong?

– Overview
– Relief valve provision and set pressure
– Inadequate design capacity
– Liquid accumulation
– Vibration

• Design verification.

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 Relief and Blowdown Systems

Basic
Process Emergency
H Control Shutdown &
A Safety
Z Instrumented
Functions
A
R TOP EVENT
D Post Release
Physical C
Protection
O
Process e.g. Blowdown
Design N
S
Critical E
Alarms & Q
Human U
Intervention E
Physical
Protection N
e.g. Pressure C
Relief E
Emergency
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 Relief and Blowdown Systems- Functionality
High pressure “cold” flare system

High pressure “wet” flare system

Relief Blowdown Manual Rupture Control

valves valves valves disks valves HP Flare Drum

Liquids to process system

or LP Flare Drum

Process systems

Low pressure flare system

LP Flare Drum
Liquids to process system

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 Relief and Blowdown Systems - Functionality

Operational Sources
Start-up/shutdown
Process upsets
Emergency Sources Maintenance vents
Relief devices
Depressurisation

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 Relief System Incidents (70 examples)
The Institute of Petroleum Guidelines for the Safe and Optimum Design of Hydrocarbon Pressure Relief and Blowdown Systems. 1999

Pressure build-up/
Management of change
Relief valve provision, chokes
sizing and set pressure
Vibration

Layout and drainage

Slugging/hydraulic
hammer
Control and
instrumentation
Reverse flow

Operation Incompatible fluids

HP/LP interfaces
Installation/
maintenance

Design specification Materials of

construction
Liquid hold-up/
flare drum sizing Capacity of flare
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Jet reaction forces Purge rates Vent ignition
 Pressure Relief Devices Performance
Inspecting the inspection data, TCE , December 2011/January 2012, Flower & Jones

% Set Pressure Number of Valves % Valves

<95% 2044 29.3

95% to 110% 4273 61.1

110% to 130% 416 6.0

>130% 253 3.6

Test data for ~7,000 operational relief valves period 2000 - 2008

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 Relief System Sizing Basis

Full flow relief

To flare
Blocked outlet
To export
SDV-001

Train 1
FC

Full flow relief

To flare
Blocked outlet

SDV-002

Train 2
FC
To export
• Flare sized for full flow relief from single train
• Export route can be common for both trains
• Simultaneous blocked outlet of both trains discounted on basis of:
• segregated air supplies to SDV-001 and SDV-002 &
• air accumulators on each valve with single check valves in the supply line
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 Actual air supply to SDVs

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 Liquid Accumulation/Slugging

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 Vibration

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 Complex Failures

What happened? press =

4 barg
liquid @+40m
(no alarm)
disc failure does not
water
tell-tail blocked? enters trip
SWR no level seawater
PAH no alarm drum >LAH pumps
overfills LAH ESD
Heat Exch. HP Flare
Drum
LP flare
gas ESDV drum
not tight fills fills
Closed
shut-off
SWS drain ESDV

Over-
board
closed
Source: HSE Safety Alert 01/2008
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 STHE Overpressure Protection – the “problem”

Two major hazards associated with bursting disk failures:

• Impairment of relief system – liquid inflow & overfill.

• Incident escalation - reverse rupture leads to uncontrolled

hydrocarbon release from systems connected to the relief system.

© Genesis Oil & Gas Consultants Ltd

 STHE Overpressure Protection – the “problem”

• Increased use of bursting disks to protect STHEs over past 10 to 15

years
• Estimated frequency of guillotine tube rupture
– 0.0009 per unit per year (~1 per 1,100 years)[1]
• Frequency of bursting disk failures protecting STHEs
– 7 incidents in 13 years (~50 exchangers)
– 0.011 per unit per year (~1 per 90 years)[2]
• Future growth in numbers of high pressure STHEs requiring
overpressure protection
• Has the balance of risk shifted?

1. IP Guidelines for the Design and Safe Operation of Shell & Tube Heat Exchangers to Withstand the Impact of Tube Failure, Aug 2000
2. Estimate based on incident details collated by Energy Institute JIP

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 Relief Systems Design Verification Process

Agree Scope of Work

Data Gathering

Design Verification
Overpressure Design Design & Control &
Protection Specification Construction Instrumentation
Disposal System
Relief Load Liquids Handling Emergency Shutdown
Design

Emergency
HP/LP Interfaces Purge Rates Materials Selection
depressurisation

Relief Device Flare Stack / Vents /

Flare Capacity SIL & LOPA Analysis
Selection Headers & Tail Pipes

Relief Device Inlet Management of

Flare Radiation Operation
Piping Change

Competency Assessment

Presentation of Findings and Recommendations

Agreement of Actions and Closeout Priorities

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 Relief System Design Verification
Categorisation of Findings
Management of Vibration Slugging/hydraulic
changes, modifications 3% hammer
and upgrades Pressure build-
up/ chokes 2%
10%
8% Reverse flow
3%
Incompatible fluids
4%
HP/LP interfaces
Relief valve provision,
2%
sizing and set pressure
22% Materials of
construction
6%

Capacity of flare
3%

Vent ignition
1%
Layout and drainage
Purge rates
1%
3%
Jet reaction forces
Control and
0%
instrumentation Design specification
6% 19% Liquid hold-up/flare drum
Operation
1% sizing 5%
Installation/maintenance
2%

© Genesis Oil & Gas Consultants Ltd 15 Reviews, 551 Findings

 Relief Device – Design Verification

313 Relief Devices - Findings

Relief Valves Adequately Sized
0.3%
Governing Relief Case Incorrect

No Relief Provision

29.4%

70.3%

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 Relief Device – Design Verification

Inlet Line Loss Checks

36%

64%

Inlet line Losses Acceptable

Inlet losses unacceptable

(>3% of set pressure)

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 Summary

• Relief and blowdown systems are complex pressure systems

• Design constraints can be violated; impairing the relief and blowdown

systems.

• Design verification can be successfully deployed to determine

system robustness prior to operation.

• Design verification findings indicate some systemic design flaws.

© Genesis Oil & Gas Consultants Ltd

 Thank-you

Any questions?

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 References

1. The Institute of Petroleum Guidelines for the Safe and Optimum Design of
Hydrocarbon Pressure Relief and Blowdown Systems, 1999

2. IP Guidelines for the Design and Safe Operation of Shell & Tube Heat
Exchangers to Withstand the Impact of Tube Failure, Aug 2000

3. Inspecting the inspection data, TCE , December 2011/January 2012, Flower

& Jones

4. HSE Safety Alert 01/2008 Flare system impaired by cooling water loss
through bursting disc failure on an intercooler heat exchanger.

© Genesis Oil & Gas Consultants Ltd