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SouthWestAfrica(Liberiav.SouthAfrica)

ProceedingsjoinedwithSouthWestAfrica(Ethiopiav.SouthAfrica)on20May1961
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SummaryoftheSummaryoftheJudgmentof18July1966
SOUTHWESTAFRICACASES(SECONDPHASE)
Judgmentof18July1966
TheSouthWestAfricacases(Ethiopiav.SouthAfricaLiberiav.SouthAfrica),whichrelatetothecontinuedexistenceoftheMandateforSouth
WestAfricaandthedutiesandperformanceofSouthAfricaasMandatorythereunder,wereinstitutedbyApplicationsoftheGovernmentsofEthiopia
andLiberiafiledintheRegistryon4November1960.ByanOrderof20May1961theCourtjoinedtheproceedingsinthetwocases.The
GovernmentofSouthAfricaraisedpreliminaryobjectionstotheCourt'sproceedingtohearthemeritsofthecase,buttheseweredismissedbythe
Courton21December1962,theCourtfindingthatithadjurisdictiontoadjudicateuponthemeritsofthedispute.
InitsJudgmentonthesecondphaseofthecasestheCourt,bythePresident'scastingvote,thevotesbeingequallydivided(sevenseven),found
thattheApplicantStatescouldnotbeconsideredtohaveestablishedanylegalrightorinterestinthesubjectmatteroftheirclaimsandaccordingly
decidedtorejectthem.
ThePresident,SirPercySpender,hasappendedaDeclarationtotheJudgment.JudgeMorelliandJudgeadhocvanWykhaveappendedseparate
opinions.VicePresidentWellingtonKoo,JudgesKoretsky,Tanaka,Jessup,PadillaNervoandForsterandJudgeadhocSorLouisMbanefohave
appendeddissentingopinions.
*
**
TheApplicants,actinginthecapacityofStateswhichweremembersoftheformerLeagueofNations,putforwardvariousallegationsof
contraventionsoftheLeagueofNationsMandateforSouthWestAfricabytheRepublicofSouthAfrica.
ThecontentionsofthePartiescovered,interalia,thefollowingissues:whethertheMandateforSouthWestAfricawasstillinforceand,ifso,
whethertheMandatory'sobligationtofurnishannualreportsonitsadministrationtotheCounciloftheLeagueofNationshadbecometransformed
intoanobligationsotoreporttotheGeneralAssemblyoftheUnitedNationswhethertheRespondenthad,inaccordancewiththeMandate,
promotedtotheutmostthematerialandmoralwellbeingandthesocialprogressoftheinhabitantsoftheterritory,whethertheMandatoryhad
contravenedtheprohibitionintheMandateofthe"militarytrainingofthenatives"andtheestablishmentofmilitaryornavalbasesortheerectionof
fortificationsintheterritoryandwhetherSouthAfricahadcontravenedtheprovisionintheMandatethatit(theMandate)canonlybemodifiedwith
theconsentoftheCounciloftheLeagueofNations,byattemptingtomodifytheMandatewithouttheconsentoftheUnitedNationsGeneral
Assembly,which,itwascontendedbytheApplicants,hadreplacedtheCounciloftheLeagueforthisandotherpurposes.
Beforedealingwiththesequestions,however,theCourtconsideredthatthereweretwoquestionsofanantecedentcharacter,appertainingtothe
meritsofthecase,whichmightrenderanenquiryintootheraspectsofthecaseunnecessary.OnewaswhethertheMandateskillsubsistedatall
andtheotherwasthequestionoftheApplicants'standinginthisphaseoftheproceedingsi.e.theirlegalrightorinterestregardingthesubject
matteroftheirclaims.AstheCourtbaseditsJudgmentonafindingthattheApplicantsdidnotpossesssuchalegalrightorinterest,itdidnot
pronounceuponthequestionofwhethertheMandatewasstillinforce.Moreover,theCourtemphasizedthatits1962decisiononthequestionof
competencewasgivenwithoutprejudicetothequestionofthesurvivaloftheMandateaquestionappertainingtothemeritsofthecase,andnotin
issuein1962exceptinthesensethatsurvivalhadtobeassumedforthepurposeofdeterminingthepurelyjurisdictionalissuewhichwasallthat
wasthenbeforetheCourt.
Turningtothebasisofitsdecisioninthepresentproceedings,theCourtrecalledthatthemandatessystemwasinstitutedbyArticle22ofthe
CovenantoftheLeagueofNations.Therewerethreecategoriesofmandates,'A','B'and'C'mandates,whichhad,however,variousfeaturesin
commonasregardstheirstructure.Theprincipalelementofeachinstrumentofmandateconsistedofthearticlesdefiningthemandatory'spowers
anditsobligationsinrespectoftheinhabitantsoftheterritoryandtowardstheLeagueanditsorgans.TheCourtreferredtotheseasthe"conduct"
provisions.Inaddition,eachinstrumentofmandatecontainedarticlesconferringcertainrightsrelativetothemandatedterritorydirectlyuponthe
membersoftheLeagueasindividualStates,orinfavouroftheirnationals.TheCourtreferredtorightsofthiskindas"specialinterests",embodiedin
the"specialinterests"provisionsofthemandates.
Inaddition,everymandatecontainedajurisdictionalclause,which,withasingleexception,wasinidenticalterms,providingforareferenceof
disputestothePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice,which,theCourthadfoundinthefirstphaseoftheproceedings,wasnow,byvirtueof
Article37oftheCourt'sStatute,tobeconstruedasareferencetothepresentCourt.
TheCourtdrewadistinctionbetweenthe"conduct"andthe"specialinterests"provisionsofthemandates,thepresentdisputerelatingexclusivelyto
theformer.ThequestiontobedecidedwaswhetheranylegalrightorinterestwasvestedinmembersoftheLeagueofNationsindividuallyas
regardsthe"conduct"clausesofthemandatesi.e.,whetherthevariousmandatorieshadanydirectobligationtowardstheothermembersofthe
Leagueindividually,asregardsthecarryingoutofthe"conduct"provisionsofthemandates.IftheanswerwerethattheApplicantscouldnotbe
regardedaspossessingthelegalrightorinterestclaimed,thenevenifthevariousallegationsofcontraventionsoftheMandateforSouthWestAfrica
wereestablished,theApplicantswouldstillnotbeentitledtothepronouncementsanddeclarationswhich,intheirfinalsubmissions,theyaskedthe
Courttomake.
ItwasintheircapacityasformermembersoftheLeagueofNationsthattheApplicantsappearedbeforetheCourt,andtherightstheyclaimedwere
thosethatthemembersoftheLeagueweresaidtohavebeeninvestedwithinthetimeoftheLeague.Accordingly,inordertodeterminetherights
andobligationsofthePartiesrelativetotheMandate,theCourthadtoplaceitselfatthepointintimewhenthemandatessystemwasinstituted.Any
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enquiryintotherightsandobligationsofthePartiesmustproceedprincipallyonthebasisofconsideringthetextsoftheinstrumentsandprovisions
inthesettingoftheirperiod.
Similarly,attentionmustbepaidtothejuridicalcharacterandstructureoftheinstitution,theLeagueofNations,withintheframeworkofwhichthe
mandatessystemwasorganized.AfundamentalelementwasthatArticle2oftheCovenantprovidedthatthe"actionoftheLeagueunderthis
CovenantshallbeeffectedthroughtheinstrumentalityofanAssemblyandofaCouncil,withapermanentSecretariat".IndividualmemberStates
couldnotthemselvesactdifferentlyrelativetoLeaguemattersunlessitwasotherwisespeciallysoprovidedbysomearticleoftheCovenant.
ItwasspecifiedinArticle22oftheCovenantthatthe"bestmethodofgivingpracticaleffectto[the]principle"thatthe"wellbeinganddevelopment"of
thosepeoplesinformerenemycolonies"notyetabletostandbythemselves"formed"asacredtrustofcivilization"wasthat"thetutelageofsuch
peoplesshouldbeentrustedtoadvancednations...whoarewillingtoacceptit"anditspecificallyaddedthatitwas"onbehalfoftheLeague"that
"thistutelageshouldbeexercisedbythosenationsasMandatories".ThemandatoriesweretobetheagentsoftheLeagueandnotofeachand
everymemberofitindividually.
Article22oftheCovenantprovidedthat"securitiesfortheperformance"ofthesacredtrustweretobe"embodiedinthisCovenant".Byparagraphs
7and9ofArticle22,everymandatorywasto"rendertotheCouncilanannualreportinreferencetotheterritory"andaPermanentMandates
Commissionwastobeconstituted"toreceiveandexamine"theseannualreportsand"toadvisetheCouncilonallmattersrelatingtothe
observanceofthemandates".Inaddition,itwasprovided,intheinstrumentsofmandatethemselves,thattheannualreportsweretoberendered"to
thesatisfactionoftheCouncil".
IndividualmemberStatesoftheLeaguecouldtakepartintheadministrativeprocessonlythroughtheirparticipationintheactivitiesoftheorgansby
meansofwhichtheLeaguewasentitledtofunction.Theyhadnorightofdirectinterventionrelativetothemandatories:thiswastheprerogativeof
theLeagueorgans.
ThemannerinwhichthemandateinstrumentsweredraftedonlylendsemphasistotheviewthatthemembersoftheLeaguegenerallywerenot
consideredashavinganydirectconcernwiththesettingupofthevariousmandates.Furthermore,whiletheconsentoftheCounciloftheLeague
wasrequiredforanymodificationofthetermsofthemandate,itwasnotstatedthattheconsentofindividualmembersoftheLeaguewasadditionally
required.IndividualmembersoftheLeaguewerenotpartiestothevariousinstrumentsofmandate,thoughtheydid,toalimitedextent,andincertain
respectsonly,deriverightsfromthem.Theycoulddrawfromtheinstrumentsonlysuchrightsastheseunequivocallyconferred.
HadindividualmembersoftheLeaguepossessedtherightswhichtheApplicantsclaimedthemtohavehad,thepositionofamandatorycaught
betweenthedifferentexpressionsofviewofsome40or50Stateswouldhavebeenuntenable.Furthermore,thenormalLeaguevotingrulewas
unanimity,andasthemandatorywasamemberoftheCouncilonquestionsaffectingitsmandate,suchquestionscouldnotbedecidedagainstthe
mandatory'scontraryvote.ThissystemwasinconsistentwiththepositionclaimedforindividualLeaguemembersbytheApplicants,andif,as
membersoftheLeague,theydidnotpossesstherightscontendedfor,theydidnotpossessthemnow.
*
**
IthadbeenattemptedtoderivealegalrightorinterestintheconductoftheMandatefromthesimpleexistence,orprinciple,ofthe"sacredtrust".
Thesacredtrust,itwassaidwasa"sacredtrustofcivilization"andhenceallcivilizednationshadaninterestinseeingthatitwascarriedout.Butin
orderthatthisinterestmighttakeonaspecificallylegalcharacterthesacredtrustitselfmustbeorbecomesomethingmorethanamoralor
humanitarianideal.Inordertogeneratelegalrightsandobligations,itmustbegivenjuridicalexpressionandbeclothedinlegalform.Themoralideal
mustnotbeconfusedwiththelegalrulesintendedtogiveiteffect.Theprincipleofthe"sacredtrust"hadnoresidualjuridicalcontentwhichcould,so
farasanyparticularmandateisconcerned,operatepersetogiverisetolegalrightsandobligationsoutsidethesystemasawhole.
NorcouldtheCourtacceptthesuggestionthatevenifthelegalpositionoftheApplicantsandofotherindividualmembersoftheLeaguewereasthe
Courtheldittobe,thiswassoonlyduringthelifetimeoftheLeague,andthatonthelatter'sdissolutiontherightspreviouslyresidentintheLeague
itself,orinitscompetentorgans,devolvedupontheindividualStateswhichweremembersofitatthedateofitsdissolution.AlthoughtheCourtheld
in1962thatthemembersofadissolvedinternationalorganizationcanbedeemed,thoughnolongermembersofit,toretainrightswhich,as
members,theyindividuallypossessedwhentheorganizationwasinbeing,thiscouldnotextendtoascribingtothem,uponandbyreasonofthe
dissolution,rightswhich,evenpreviouslyasmembers,theyneverdidindividuallypossess.Norcouldanythingthatoccurredsubsequenttothe
dissolutionoftheLeagueoperatetoinvestitsmemberswithrightstheydidnotpreviouslyhaveasmembersoftheLeague.TheCourtcouldnotread
theunilateraldeclarations,orstatementsofintention,madebythevariousmandatoriesontheoccasionofthedissolutionoftheLeague,expressing
theirwillingnesstocontinuetobeguidedbythemandatesintheiradministrationoftheterritoriesconcerned,asconferringonthemembersofthe
Leagueindividuallyanynewlegalrightsorinterestsofakindtheydidnotpreviouslypossess.
ItmightbesaidthatinsofarastheCourt'sviewledtotheconclusionthattherewasnownoentityentitledtoclaimthedueperformanceofthe
Mandate,itmustbeunacceptable,butifacorrectlegalreadingofagivensituationshowedcertainallegedrightstobenonexistent,the
consequencesofthismustbeaccepted.Topostulatetheexistenceofsuchrightsinordertoavertthoseconsequenceswouldbetoengageinan
essentiallylegislativetask,intheserviceofpoliticalends.
TurningtothecontentionthattheApplicants'legalrightorinteresthadbeensettledbythe1962Judgmentandcouldnotnowbereopened,theCourt
pointedoutthatadecisiononapreliminaryobjectioncouldneverbepreclusiveofamatterappertainingtothemerits,whetherornotithadinfact
beendealtwithinconnectionwiththepreliminaryobjection.Whenpreliminaryobjectionswereenteredbythedefendantpartyinacase,the
proceedingsonthemeritsweresuspended,byvirtueofArticle62,paragraph3,oftheCourt'sRules.Thereafter,anduntiltheproceedingsonthe
meritswereresumed,therecouldbenodecisionfinallydeterminingorprejudginganyissueofmerits.Ajudgmentonapreliminaryobjectionmight
touchonapointofmerits,butthisitcoulddoonlyinaprovisionalway,totheextentnecessaryfordecidingthequestionraisedbythepreliminary
objection.Itcouldnotrankasafinaldecisiononthepointofmeritsinvolved.
Whilethe1962JudgmentdecidedthattheApplicantswereentitledtoinvokethejurisdictionalclauseoftheMandate,itremainedforthem,onthe
merits,toestablishthattheyhadsucharightorinterestinthecarryingoutoftheprovisionswhichtheyinvokedastoentitlethemtothe
pronouncementsanddeclarationstheywereseekingfromtheCourt.TherewasnocontradictionbetweenadecisionthattheApplicantshadthe
capacitytoinvokethejurisdictionalclauseandadecisionthattheApplicantshadnotestablishedthelegalbasisoftheirclaimonthemerits.
InrespectofthecontentionthatthejurisdictionalclauseoftheMandateconferredasubstantiverighttoclaimfromtheMandatorythecarryingoutof
the"conductoftheMandate"provisions,itwastobeobservedthatitwouldberemarkableifsoimportantarighthadbeencreatedinsocasualand
almostincidentalafashion.Therewasnothingaboutthisparticularjurisdictionalclause,infact,todifferentiateitfrommanyothers,anditwasan
almostelementaryprincipleofprocedurallawthatadistinctionhadtobemadebetween,ontheonehand,therighttoactivateacourtandtherightof
acourttoexaminethemeritsofaclaimand,ontheother,theplaintiff'slegalrightinrespectofthesubjectmatterofitsclaim,whichitwouldhaveto
establishtothesatisfactionoftheCourt.Jurisdictionalclauseswereadjectivalnotsubstantiveintheirnatureandeffect:theydidnotdetermine
whetherpartieshadsubstantiverights,butonlywhether,iftheyhadthem,theycouldvindicatethembyrecoursetoatribunal.
TheCourtthenconsideredtherightsofmembersoftheLeagueCouncilunderthejurisdictionalclausesoftheminoritiestreatiessignedafterthe
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FirstWorldWar,anddistinguishedtheseclausesfromthejurisdictionalclausesoftheinstrumentsofmandate.Inthecaseofthemandatesthe
jurisdictionalclausewasintendedtogivetheindividualmembersoftheLeaguethemeansofprotectingtheir"specialinterests"relativetothe
mandatedterritoriesinthecaseoftheminoritiestreaties,therightofactionoftheMembersoftheCouncilunderthejurisdictionalclausewasonly
intendedfortheprotectionofminoritypopulations.Furthermore,any"differenceofopinion"wascharacterizedinadvanceintheminoritiestreatiesas
beingjusticiable,becauseitwastobe"heldtobeadisputeofaninternationalcharacter".Hencenoquestionofanylackoflegalrightorinterest
couldarise.Thejurisdictionalclauseofthemandatesontheotherhandhadnoneofthespecialcharacteristicsoreffectsofthoseoftheminorities
treaties.
TheCourtnextdealtwithwhathadbeencalledthebroadandunambiguouslanguageofthejurisdictionalclausetheliteralmeaningofitsreference
to"anydisputewhatever"coupledwiththewords"betweentheMandatoryandanotherMemberoftheLeagueofNations"andthephrase
"relating...totheprovisionsoftheMandate",which,itwassaid,permittedareferencetotheCourtofadisputeaboutanyprovisionoftheMandate.
TheCourtwasnotoftheopinionthattheword"whatever"inArticle7,paragraph2,oftheMandatedidanythingmorethanlendemphasistoa
phrasethatwouldhavemeantexactlythesamewithoutit.Thephrase"anydispute"(whatever)didnotmeananythingintrinsicallydifferentfrom"a
dispute"nordidthereferencetothe"provisions"oftheMandate,intheplural,haveanydifferenteffectfromwhatwouldhaveresultedfromsaying
"aprovision".AconsiderableproportionoftheacceptancesoftheCourt'scompulsoryjurisdictionunderparagraph2ofArticle36ofitsStatutewere
couchedinlanguagesimilarlybroadandunambiguousandevenwider.Itcouldneverbesupposedthatonthebasisofthiswidelanguagethe
acceptingStatewasabsolvedfromestablishingalegalrightorinterestinthesubjectmatterofitsclaim.TheCourtcouldnotentertaintheproposition
thatajurisdictionalclausebyconferringcompetenceontheCourttherebyandofitselfconferredasubstantiveright.
TheCourtnextadvertedtothequestionofadmissibility.Itobservedthatthe1962Judgmenthadsimplyfoundthatithad"jurisdictiontoadjudicate
uponthemerits"andthatifanyquestionofadmissibilitywereinvolveditwouldfalltobedecidednow,asoccurredinthemeritsphaseofthe
NottebohmcaseifthisweresotheCourtwoulddeterminethequestioninexactlythesameway,i.e.,lookingatthematterfromthepointofviewof
thecapacityoftheApplicantstoadvancetheirpresentclaim,theCourtwouldholdthattheyhadnotgotsuchcapacity,andhencethattheclaimwas
inadmissible.
Finally,theCourtdealtwithwhathadbeencalledtheargumentof"necessity".ThegistofthiswasthatsincetheCounciloftheLeaguehadno
meansofimposingitsviewsontheMandatory,andsincenoadvisoryopinionitmightobtainfromtheCourtwouldbebindingonthelatter,the
Mandatecouldhavebeenfloutedatwill.Hence,itwascontended,itwasessential,asanultimatesafeguardorsecurityforthesacredtrust,that
eachMemberoftheLeagueshouldbedeemedtohavealegalrightorinterestinthatmatterandbeabletotakedirectactionrelativetoit.Butinthe
functioningofthemandatessysteminpractice,muchtroublewastakentoarrive,byargument,discussion,negotiationandcooperativeeffort,at
generallyacceptableconclusionsandtoavoidsituationsinwhichtheMandatorywouldbeforcedtoacquiesceintheviewsoftherestoftheCouncil
shortofcastinganadversevote.Inthiscontext,theexistenceofsubstantiverightsforindividualmembersoftheLeagueintheconductofthe
mandatesexercisableindependentlyoftheCouncilwouldhavebeenoutofplace.Furthermore,leavingasidetheimprobabilitythat,hadtheframers
ofthemandatessystemintendedthatitshouldbepossibletoimposeagivenpolicyonamandatory,theywouldhaveleftthistobehaphazardand
uncertainactionofindividualmembersoftheLeague,itwasscarcelylikelythatasystemwhichdeliberatelymadeitpossibleformandatoriesto
blockCouncildecisionsbyusingtheirveto(though,sofarastheCourtwasaware,thishadneverbeendone)shouldsimultaneouslyinvest
individualmembersoftheLeaguewithalegalrightofcomplaintifthemandatorymadeuseofthisveto.Intheinternationalfield,theexistenceof
obligationsthatcouldnotbeenforcedbyanylegalprocesshadalwaysbeentheruleratherthantheexceptionandthiswasevenmorethecasein
1920thantoday.
Moreover,theargumentof"necessity"amountedtoapleathattheCourtshouldallowtheequivalentofanactiopopularis,orrightresidentinany
memberofacommunitytotakelegalactioninvindicationofapublicinterest.Butsucharightwasnotknowntointernationallawasitstoodat
present:andtheCourtwasunabletoregarditasimportedby"thegeneralprinciplesoflaw"referredtoinArticle38,paragraph1(c),ofitsStatute.
Inthefinalanalysis,thewhole"necessity"argumentappearedtobebasedonconsiderationsofanextralegalcharacter,theproductofaprocessof
afterknowledge.ItwaseventssubsequenttotheperiodoftheLeague,notanythinginherentinthemandatessystemasitwasoriginallyconceived,
thatgaverisetothealleged"necessity",which,ifitexisted,layinthepoliticalfieldanddidnotconstitutenecessityintheeyesofthelaw.TheCourt
wasnotalegislativebody.PartiestoadisputecouldalwaysasktheCourttogiveadecisionexaequoetbono,intermsofparagraph2ofArticle38.
Failingthat,thedutyoftheCourtwasplain:itsdutywastoapplythelawasitfoundit,nottomakeit.
ItmightbeurgedthattheCourtwasentitledto"fillinthegaps",intheapplicationofateleologicalprincipleofinterpretation,accordingtowhich
instrumentsmustbegiventheirmaximumeffectinordertoensuretheachievementoftheirunderlyingpurposes.Thisprinciplewasahighly
controversialoneanditcould,inanyevent,havenoapplicationtocircumstancesinwhichtheCourtwouldhavetogobeyondwhatcould
reasonablyberegardedasbeingaprocessofinterpretationandwouldhavetoengageinaprocessofrectificationorrevision.Rightscouldnotbe
presumedtoexistmerelybecauseitmightseemdesirablethattheyshould.TheCourtcouldnotremedyadeficiencyif,inordertodoso,ithadto
exceedtheboundsofnormaljudicialaction.
ItmightalsobeurgedthattheCourtwouldbeentitledtomakegoodanomissionresultingfromthefailureofthoseconcernedtoforeseewhatmight
happenandtohaveregardtowhatitmightbepresumedtheframersofthemandatewouldhavewished,orwouldevenhavemadeexpress
provisionfor,hadtheyhadadvanceknowledgeofwhatwastooccur.TheCourtcouldnot,however,presumewhatthewishesandintentionsof
thoseconcernedwouldhavebeeninanticipationofeventsthatwereneitherforeseennorforeseeableandevenifitcould,itwouldcertainlynotbe
possibletomaketheassumptionscontendedforbytheApplicantsastowhatthoseintentionswere.
Fortheforegoingreasons,theCourtdecidedtorejecttheclaimsoftheEmpireofEthiopiaandtheRepublicofLiberia.
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