Ontological Innovation in Art

Author(s): AMIE L. THOMASSON

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 68, No. 2 (SPRING 2010), pp. 119130
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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AMIE L. THOMASSON

inArt
OntologicalInnovation

Whatsortofa thingis a workofart?Whendoes

whenis itdama workofartcomeintoexistence,
and whenis it deaged,whendoes it survive,
stroyed?Whichfeaturesare essentialto it and
Is itthesortofthingthatcan
whichexpendable?
Los Angeles,and
be seenbypeopleinCleveland,
Singaporeat thesame time,or do you have to
travelto a uniquelocationtosee it?
theontology
Theseareall questionsregarding
ithere,
oftheworkofart.As I shallunderstand
status"ofa workofartis fundathe"ontological
andpersisfixedbyitsexistence,
identity,
mentally
ofobject
thesefixwhatcategory
tenceconditions;
be
facts
other
it is. In fixing
these,
may fixedas
whenandwherea workis observwell,including
oftheworkareessentialor
able,whatproperties
withits
whatsortsofchangeinterfere
accidental,
so
on.
and
preservation,
havebeenproposedto
answers
Manydifferent
statusofthe
thequestion'Whatis theontological
workofart?'Theserangefromclaimsthata work
mustbe
ofartis a physical
perhaps,
object(which,
and
seen"inperson"at a particular
particplace
withitsvisibleproperties
ulartimeandpreserved
toclaimsthatitisnota physical
intacttosurvive),
anaction(ofan artist)ora
objectatall,butrather
to
generaltypeofaction, thosewho(withSartre)
thinkofworksofartas imaginary
objectsdistinct
fromanyrealobjectsoractivities.1
Othershave doubtedthata singleansweris
seemthattheanswermaydifItmight
available.2
which
ferfora workofvisualart(say,a painting,
we cannotall see "intheflesh"at thesametime,
if we are in different
cities,and whichmaybe
otherformsofphysiburntup in a fireor suffer
anda symphony
cal degeneration)
(whichwe can
citiesat thesame
in different
all hearperformed
time,whichcannotburnup,whichdoes notre-

stillseem
itmight
Nonetheless,
quirerestoration).
thattheanswersare fairlyeasy to comeby for
branchesof art-separating
thesedifferent
out,
from
say,paintings symphonies.
Buttheybecomemoredifficult
againwhenwe
lookat morerecentformsofart-for,evenifwe
to thevisualarts,it seemsthat
limitourinterest
thereis an evermorediverserangeofanswersto
questionslikethosewe beganwith.Someworks,
likeLiz Magor'sTimeand Mrs.Tiber,weredeprosignedto be leftto decay-itsdegenerative
is partofthework(ina wayitis notwith
gression
Simhowever
traditional
destructible).3
paintings,
in
Walead
that
cracks
and
the
appear
chips
ilarly,
Beshty'sFed Ex LargeBox duringshippingdo
toit.
notdamagetheworkbutinsteadareintegral
are
Witt
wall
Le
like
Sol
Others,
drawings, permitin differtedto be installed
painters
bydifferent
so that
visualformswithvarying
entmuseums,
surfacefeaturesis inessential.
again preserving
Forotherworksstill,likeFelixGonzalez-Torres's
thereis no continuous
Untitled,
physicalbasisat
thecandiesthat
allneededfortheworktosurvive:
makeup theworkaremeanttobe eatenbyviewers,andmaybe replacedwhiletheworkpersists.4
cases likethesecan shakeus out
Considering
that-at leastif
in thinking
of our complacency
branchesof art,
we limitourfocusto particular
ofart
abouttheontology
say,visualart-questions
instead
haveeasyorobviousanswers.
Theymight
pushus backtoaskthedeeperquestion:whatis it
whatdoes,anddoesnot,countas
thatdetermines
partofa workofart,whena workdoesanddoes
whatcountsas damage,destruction,
notsurvive,
restoration?
preservation,
ElsewhereI havearguedforthegeneralview
conand persistence
thattheexistence,
identity,
and
ditionsof paintings,
symphonies,
sculptures,

2010
68:2Spring
andArtCriticism
ofAesthetics
TheJournal
2010TheAmerican
SocietyforAesthetics

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120

The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism

otherfamiliarkindsof art are, at bottom,establishedstipulatively

by the beliefsand practicesof
those who groundand regroundthe referenceof
the relevantsortalterms.5I willbeginby givinga
briefoverviewof the generalkindof answerI've
argued for.But the purpose of this articleis to
discuss an interesting
consequence thatfalls out
of thatview,namely,thatthereis no set answer
to thequestionof theontologicalstatusof a work
of art; instead,it may varyover place and time,
and worksof art of ontologicallynew kindsmay
be introduced.Showinghow worksof art of ontologicallynew kinds can be introducedis itself
revealing,as it once again willgive supportto the
generalidea thatsuchfactsas thereare about the
ontologicalstatusof worksof art are, at bottom,
determinedby humanintentionsand practices.6
I. THE ONTOLOGY OF ART KINDS

Whatis itthatdetermineswhatdoes and does not

countas partof a workof art,whena workcomes
into existence,when it does and does not survive,whatcountsas damage,destruction,preservation,restoration?We can ask this question in
two ways: usinga familiarart-kindtermsuch as
'painting,''sculpture,''novel,' or 'symphony,'we
can ask what the ontologicalstatus of paintings
(say) is, what theiressential properties,identity,
and survivalconditions,and so on, are. Or we can
use a name or singulartermfor a work of art,
asking:whatis theontologicalstatusof Guernica,
of Haystacks,or of Timeand Mrs. Tiber,Fed Ex
Large Box, and so forth.
Most of thediscussionin the literaturethusfar
has concernedart kinds.Here I will begin with
thatquestion,and thenmove on to the more difficultsecond question. I have argued elsewhere
thattheontologicalstatusofpaintings,sculptures,
symphonies,and otherfamiliarkindsof art is, at
bottom,establishedstipulatively
bythebeliefsand
practicesof those who groundand regroundthe
referenceof the relevantsortalterms.7Establishingtheontologicalstatusof worksof a givenhind
is a matterof determiningthe most basic conditionsunderwhichworksofthatkindcome intoexistence,persist,or are destroyed.These,ofcourse,
are the sortsof featuresthatenterinto common
debates about, for example, whetherworks of
paintingare physicalobjects or abstractpattern
typesor actiontypesthatcan survivethe destruc-

tionof thecanvas,whetherworksofmusicshould
be understoodas being created and so as coming into existenceat a certaintime,or ratheras
Platonisticabstracta,and so on.
ThoughI do not have the space to argue again
forthatview here,the basic idea is thatwhenwe
ask questionsabout theontologyofartlike 'when
does a paintingsurvive?' and 'must a novel be
created?' we are using termslike 'painting'and
'novel.' So we can rephrasethequestionas asking
what (ontological) sortof thingthe terms'painting' and 'novel' pick out. But giventhe qua problem,we could at least attemptto referto a great
manydifferent
(ontological) sortsof thingswith
any termwe introduce;we could intendour term
to referto the physicalmarkson the surfaceof
the canvas, to the three-dimensional
object with
a certainweight,to the (replicable) visualpattern
on its surface,to the kind of techniqueor action
used to produce it,to the space on the wall, and
so on.8The question'whatsortof thingis a painting?' forexample,is onlyanswerableto theextent
thatthewaythereferenceofthetermis grounded
(and regrounded)disambiguatesthe ontologyby
thegeneralkindor categoryofentity
determining
thatthe termis to referto ifit refersat all.
The needed disambiguation,I have argued,is
providedas long as the termsin question('painting,''novel,'and thelike) are genuinesortalterms.
A sortaltermis a termthatcomes withsome basic rulesofuse oftwokinds:first,
basic application
conditions,layingout conceptuallyrelevantconditionsin which'painting'maybe successfully
applied (thusyieldingexistenceconditionsforpaintings),and second,basic co-applicationconditions
thatgiverulesfordetermining
whenthetermmay
be reapplied to one and the same thing(yielding
identityconditionsfor paintings).9The application conditionsand co-applicationconditionstogetheryieldpersistenceconditionsforpaintings.10
So, in short,on thisviewthemostbasic factsabout
theontologyofpaintings(theirexistence,identity,
and persistenceconditions)are determinedbythe
applicationand co-applicationconditionsassociated withthesortalterm'painting.'11
One consequence of this view is that debates
about the ontological status of even traditional
sortsof art-worksof music,painting,literature,
and so on- mustin some sense be resolvedby analyzingthe conceptsof thosewho groundand regroundthe referenceof the term.But the sense
of "conceptual analysis" at issue here has to be

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ThomassonOntological
Innovation
inArt

121

orthelike.Theuseof
of
orabstract
For the determination
understood
structures,
types,
carefully.
thecommonterm'art'shouldnotlead us to supreference
of ourcommontermsseemsto be eskind
or phrases pose thattheremustbe a singleontological
notbylittlepictures
tablished
mostly
works
of
art.14
to
all
in
the
heads
of
common
entertained
competent
explicitly
concluThatleads,in turn,to theinteresting
ofthosewho
butrather
bythepractices
speakers,
usethetermsanddealwiththeobjects,including sion thattheremayin principlebe moreontoa workto
underwhichweconsider
theconditions
byus as
logicalkindsof artthanare recognized
artkindsandnamedbyourfamiliar
ourfamiliar
a painting
be observable
maybe
(as,forexample,
cultureshave differterms.If different
of
art-kind
a performance
seenthismonthat themuseum,
art-kind
ent
while
a musicalworkmaybe heardtonight
category-specifying termsanddifferonly,
thatgo
andevaluativepractices
theworkitself
maybe heardinanyofthreemajor entindividuative
whenwe considerit
citiesanynightthismonth),
alongwiththese,theremaybe correspondingly
kindsof worksof art.15It also leaves
different
to be destroyed
(as, forexample,a firemaydekinds
the
idea
thatworksofnewontological
what
we
not
a
but
a
open
symphony),
stroy painting
withinan artistictradition.
considerto be saleableand moveable(thework maybe introduced
works
toitorcopiesofit),andso on.These But whatmakesit possibleto introduce
versusrights
newkinds,andwhatdeterofartofontologically
co-evolvewiththeuse
whichnaturally
practices,
statusof theseinnovative
minestheontological
and
like'painting'
artterms
ofcategory-specifying
works?
in
core
role
the
disambiguating
play
'symphony,'
statusofthekindsofworksofart
theontological
referto (bothin languageand in
we commonly
ourotherdealingswiththem),andso (I havear- II. THE ONTOLOGY OF THE INDIVIDUAL WORK
statusofworks
outtheontological
gued),figuring
ofartofthesekindsmustgo bywayofanalyzing To answerthisquestion,we firstneedto answer
theontological
involvedin talkingaboutand deal- thequestionof whatdetermines
thepractices
workof artbelongsto,since
So we havehere kindan individual
ingwithworksofthesekinds.12
we couldthenhopeto showhowtherecouldbe
of
statusofthings
a viewonwhichtheontological
a firstworkof a new ontologicalkind.I think
intenhuman
kindis determined
therelevant
by
ofa certainkind(understand- someprogress
tionsandpractices
maybe madeifwestartagainfrom
casesandsee whatlighttheycanshedon
notas privatementalstates familiar
ingthoseintentions
cases.
our normative theunfamiliar
butas publiclyavailablethrough
about
theontologicalstatusof an
To
in
terms
and
in
and
inquire
practices applying refusing
of
art
we musthavesomewayof
work
individual
or
the
same
works
as
different,
buyable,
treating
toit,orelsewecannotposethequestion
andso on).
sellable,moveable,
referring
ofgeneralterms
at all. Butjustas thereference
and
Butnotall generalnounsaresortalterms,
mustbe disstatus suchas 'painting'and 'symphony'
so notall questionsabouttheontological
to engagein
so similarly
of Gs (whereG is a generalnoun)are answer- ambiguated
byspeakers,
toa work(andinquireaboutits
reference
able.A nounsuchas 'gift,'forexample,mayfail singular
as mygiftto youmight ontological
to be category
status),whoeveritis whois referring
specifying,
sortofthing
whatontological
to itmustestablish
or
a tripto thebeach,a newhaircut,
be a T-shirt,
to bythename(or othersinguforyou.It seemsthatthe is to be referred
a poemI havewritten
status
larterm).Questionsabouttheontological
genericterm'art'or 'workof art'is like'gift'in
work(likethoseaboutartkinds)
thisregard:'workof art'appearsnotto be cat- ofan individual
answersto theextentthat
sinceit is appliedindifferentlyonlyhavedeterminate
egoryspecifying,
of
thereference
and
who
those
to physicalindividuals,
reground
ground
performances,
processes,
theanswersin determining
worksofmusic,and so on. It is perhaps thetermdetermine
abstract
istobe namedifthetermrefers
whatsortofthing
thathasledtowhatDavidDavieshas
thisfeature
at
all.
ofontological
calledthe"orthodoxy
pluralism."13
term(a namelike'GuerSo ifweusea singular
thenit
If 'art'is indeednotcategory
specifying,
nica' or 'David,' or an indexicallike'thatwork
toassumethattheremustbe
wouldbe misguided
sortof
whatontological
kindforall worksofart-that ofart'),whatestablishes
a singleontological
thread
In
least
one
central
to?
at
it
refers
or
actionbe
must
all,say,
thing
objects,
really physical

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The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism

122
actual
of usage, we use 'art' as an essentiallyartif
actual termis one
term,wherean essentiallyartif
for whichany memberof the kind must be the
productof an intentionto create thatverysortof
to referto thatworkof
object.16So in attempting
art, or to Guernica,we generallymean to refer
to the entitythe artistintentionally
created,17to
referto whateverthe artistreferredto. In short,
the public use of names for works of art (such
as 'Guernica' or 'David') generallydefersto the
artist'soriginalwayofpickingoutthework,and so
the artistis aptlyconsideredthe grounderof the
name's reference.18
(Even if the artistdoes not
her
work
a
give
proper name, she fairlyclearly
refersto her workin consideringit,reworkingit,
presentingit, and so on. Issues of referencein
thoughtparallelthoseforlanguage.)19
But how does the artistestablishwhat sort of
thingshe refersto, in attemptingto (singularly)
referto her workof art? Normally,the reference
of names is ontologicallydisambiguatedby treatingthename as a name fora certainsort(or more
broadly,category)ofthing(forexample,fora perand so on). As I have
son,place,holiday,highway,
suggestedabove, however,'art' and 'artwork'are
not category-specifying
terms,so treatinga name
as a name fortheworkof artherewillnot disambiguatetheontologicalcategoryofentityto which
the name refers.
Instead,artistsnormallydisambiguatethe reference of our names forworksof art by treating
these as names forcertainsortsof works-forexample,intending'Guernica' to be a paintingname,
'David' to be a sculpturename,and so on. In that
case theartistmayrelyon thegeneralpracticesof
the communitythatestablishwhat (ontologically
speaking) a painting,dance, or symphonyis and
and perthusset up the broad existence,identity,
sistenceconditionsforthe work she creates and
establishessingularreferenceto.
III. UNFAMILIAR KINDS OF ART

But what about cases in which the name is not

used to referto a workof a familiarartkind,with
establishedindividuativepracticesin thecommunitythatcan be appealed to disambiguatethe ontologicalstatusof the work referredto? A wonderfulrange of examples arises in the area of
Internetart,since here the practicesare just in
the process of emerging,and the very ontolog-

ical formof the Internet(as itselfnot spatially

located,but created,changeable,and multiplyaccessible) makestheemergenceofnew ontological
categoriesofartlikelyina waythatotheradvances
in technology(forexample,the adventof acrylic
paints) did not. Given the newnessof the material,perhapsitis bestto beginwithsome examples,
thoughthecases surelywillnotprovidean exhaustive list of kinds (or potentialkinds) of Internet
art.
Thomsonand Craighead's(1998) Triggerhappy
sets up a traditionalgame of Space Invaders,
where the invadingforce,however,is not aliens
but ratherthewordsof Foucault'sessay "What Is
an Author?"-wordswhichmay be shot to oblivion one by one, ifyou can get thembeforetheir
squiggly"bombs" get you.20Anotherwork,Jane
Prophet,Gordon Selley,and Mark Hurry'sTechnosphere,allowed users to design virtualcreatures,which inhabit a virtualenvironmentand
compete for survivaland reproductionover the
While therewas consistencyin terms
long term.21
ofthevisualstyle,rules,and goals ofthegame,the
actual contentof whatappeared on users'screens
was vastlyvariable based on the strategiesand
skillsof the participants.
Other works of Internetart seem to have no
consistentcontentwhatsoever,but ratherare applied to do thingsto other Websites (chosen by
the vieweror arbitrarily
selected). Mark Napier's
Shredder,forexample,takesanyextantWeb page
and virtually"shreds"it,yieldinga shreddedversion of thepage.22A workbyMark Daggett,CarnivoreIs Sorry(2001), tracksa user's visitswhile
thenemails himor her a "postcard"
Web surfing,
withan imagecomposedbycompressingand blurringintoverticallinesversionsof all theWebsites
he or she has visited.23
In cases like these,thereseems to be no great
how worksof thesenew typesmaycome
mystery
intoexistence.In traditionalcases,thegrounderof
a name's referencemaytreatthe name as a name
fora memberofa recognizedkindo art(painting,
sculpture,dance) and relyon thepracticesforthat
artkindto providetheontologicaldisambiguation
of thekindof thingto be referredto. Whatseems
to be happeningin thesortofcases justoutlinedis
thatthename used to referto theindividualwork
is associated with a differentontologicalkindfamiliar,thoughnot fromthe artworld.Thus,for
example,the names 'Triggerhappy'and 'Technosphere'seem to be names forvideogames (which

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Thomasson O ntologicalInnovationin Art

are art),so thattheindividuative
practicessuitable
forcomputergamesare tacitlybroughtintoplayto
help disambiguatethe reference(just as thosefor
paintingsare invokedforthe name 'Guernica').
'CarnivoreIs Sorry'and 'Shredder'seem to be
namesfora certainkindofprogram-presumably,
like othercomputerprogramssuch as Microsoft
Word and Adobe Photoshop,at least in part individuated in terms of their functionalcapacities and origin.By usingthese as names forprograms(whichare art), thereis implicitappeal to
theindividuative
conditionssuitableforcomputer
programs,and these conditionscan tacitlysupply identityand persistenceconditionssuitable
forthese worksof art. In cases like these,then,
whatwe have is new ontologicalkindsof art beingcreated,butnotnewontologicalkindsofthing
simpliciter
beingcreated.Instead,a familiarkind
of entity(a computergame or program)is introduced as art.

123

the Internetsurfer'sexperienceof time

highlights
in a workthatscrollsphrasesacrossthescreenexslowly,withcommentslike 'You, you
cruciatingly
must be bored?' or only visuals, as in the case
of a work by Jodi (Joan Heemskerk and Dirk
Paesmans) entitled "Index.html" (1996), which
providesscreensof unstableimages of code and
color, seeminglyturningthe Web "inside out"
to bringthe base-structuralcode to the surface
and suppress any user-friendly
recognizableimages or signpostedlinks(linksmaystillbe found,
but clickingon themjust reveals more pages of
odd visual displays).25
Drawingon the traditionof readymades,using
found objects as art, other Internetartistshave
made works based on linking,framing,or otherwise highlighting
extantmaterialon the Web.
Alexei Shulgin'sArtMedal (1995-1997) selectsa
rangeof externalWebsites,presentsthese virtual
"prizes"as foundart,framingthemin gold,listing
"grounds"forthe award (for example,"For correctuse ofpinkcolors,""For sincerity")and someIV. NEW KINDS OF ART
timesappendingpieces of "foundcriticism"from
other sites.26By now,most of the links are broBut thereare othercases where such easy soluken,so thatclickingon themyieldsonlya framed
version of the "This page cannot be displayed"
tions are not available- where it does not seem
that the name is a name for somethingof any
message.
What determinesthe existence,identity,and
familiarontologicalkind. Below are some other
persistenceconditionsfor works such as these?
examples of Internetart where the termsdo not
If we employ a name such as 'Index.html'and
to worksofeitherfamiliarart
seem to be referring
ask what the ontological status of this work is,
kindsor familiarkindssuchas computergamesor
in treatingthat as a name for a work of art,we
programs.
Some worksof Internetartclearlydrawon exnormallywould mean to referto the work the
artistreferredto with the name. But the artist
istingtraditionsof visual art and narrative,but
(or whoever groundsthe use of the name) canexploit the nonlinearlinks and interactiveposnot disambiguatereferenceby treatingthe name
sibilitiesof the Internetto create works with a
as a name for a work of a familiarart kind,or
distinctstructure.Olia Lialina's (1996) work My
of another extant kind such as games or proBoyfriendCame Back fromtheWar,forexample,
consistsof a mixtureof textand images,the first grams,to provide tacit frame-levelcriteriafor
set of whichappears as a black page witha single
existence,identity,and persistencefor the work
created.
link line saying,"My boyfriendcame back from
We could say that withoutsuch background
theWar.Afterdinnertheyleftus alone."24Clickingthelinkbringsone to a page oftwoimagelinks, practicesforan extantkindto relyon, the names
are just ontologicallyambiguous,and there are
and clickingon one of thoserevealsfurther
links,
of
some
no
facts of the matter,for example, about the
inincreasingly
frames,
arrays
fine-grained
of whichreveal images and some text,makinga
identityand persistenceconditionsof the works
disorientingassemblageof snatchesof conversatheyreferto. But theredoes not seem to be any
tion and views untilat last all are exhausted in
way of treatingit as a genuine name fora work
whileconsideringtheontologicalstatusoftherefdarkness.
erentto be completelyindeterminate.Even simSimilar works use only text, as in Now
Here/Nowhere,
by Brighid Lowe (http://www.e- ple discussionof and criticaldiscourseabout the
which
work relies on some tacitviews about when two
2.org/c-ship/projects/nowhere/apbl.html),

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The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism

124

may not) be essential to a work of Internetart,

includingvisual (or auditory)appearance,timing,
interactivand motion(as inNow Here/Nowhere),
in
and
methods
(as Index.html),
itypotentialities
links to other sites (context) (as in ArtAwards),
use of hardware or software basis (some
works exploit bugs of familiarprograms),and
so on.
I thinkit is clear that at least many of these
works are thingsof differentontological kinds
fromthose of traditionalworks-differingfrom
(for example) paintingsin lacking an essential
connection to a single physical basis, differing
fromnarrativesand video in havinga linear order inessential(thoughlinkingstructuresmay be
essential)whilefeatureslike means of interactivityand context(as partof a fullylinked-upWeb)
may be essential,and so on. It is also interestingjust how variedthepotentialontologicalkinds
are which may be developed under the general
rubricof Internetart- 'Internetart,'like 'art' itterm,
self,seems not to be a category-specifying
as workswithmanyincompatiblesets of identity
and persistenceconditionscould fall under this
heading.29
But whatI thinkis particularly
here
interesting
is thatwherewe cannot(tacitly)participatein and
appeal to extantpractices(forfamiliarkinds) to
we
ontologicallydisambiguatea name'sreference,
have to findotherways to specifywhichfeatures
are to be consideredessentialto the workof art.
1. documentation
(e.g.,screenshots)
In this respect,these cases are in clear contrast
2. migration
code)
(e.g.,updating
withcases oftraditionalartformssuchas painting,
3. emulation
on newplat- where
(a wayto runold software
practicesmaybe reliedon to make it clear
forms)
for
that,
example,surfacepigmentsare relevant
4. reinterpretation
(re-creating
yourworkordocumen- to thework'spreservationand stretcher
stripsare
tationina newtechnological
environment)27
not (at least unlessexplicitlyspecifiedotherwise).
They are,however,quite similarto cases of other
ontologicallyinnovativeworksof art,suchas TorThey thenlay out a series of features,askingthe
res's Untitled,whichcomes withexplicitinstrucartisthowimportantitis thateach be preservedin
tionsallowingthe consumptionand replacement
thework:
migrating,
emulating,or reinterpreting
of theconstitutive
candies.
So farI have dealt withthe extremecases on
1. How important
is itthatyourprojectlooksthesame
contrast, each end: in cases of traditionalpainting,itseems,
(displaysize,colordepth,hues,saturation,
nothingneeds to be said; our backgroundpraccomposition,
etc.)?
tices do all the work in fixingwhich features
2. Howimportant
isitthatyourprojectmovesthesame
are and are not part of the work (the frontbut
frames
(framerate,
persecond,etc.)?
3. How important
is it thatyourproject'sinteractivity not the back is to be viewed, the paintingdethesame(rollovers,
userinput,
remains
links,
etc.)?28
grades to the extent that the visible markings
on its frontsurface do, and so forth).In cases
Thisbeginsto givesome idea oftheapparently of ontologicallynovel formsof art,it seems that
the essentialand inessentialfeaturesand survival
open parametersforwhatsortsoffeaturemay(or
individualsare talkingabout (and perhaps disof) the
agreeingabout themeritsor interpretation
same work.Moreover,artists,
museums,and Internetartsitesmustmake decisionsabout theconditionsunderwhichtheycan claimto exhibitor preservethework,whichrequiressome assumptions
about conditionsunderwhichtheworkwould and
would not be observableand would or would not
persist.In short,if the ontological status of the
referentwere reallyleftcompletelyontologically
the termcould not functionas a
indeterminate,
standardworkname at all.
As a result,thereis a need forontologicaldisambiguation,and insofaras the referenceof the
name cannot be disambiguatedby associatingit
witha familiarkind,boundariesand survivalconditionsfortheworkmustbe establishedby other
means. This may be done more or less explicitly;forexample,the artistmayexplicitlystipulate
the relevantconditionsforpreservingher work.
Thus,forexample,one of the mostimportantcuratedWebsitesof Internetart,Rhizome,includes
a lengthy"Artist'sIntent"questionnaireforartists
theirwork-askingartistsabout what
submitting
theysee as the essential featuresof theirwork
and how it is to be preserved.In it, theyoutline
diversestrategiesforpreservingworksofInternet
artinspiteofanticipatedchangesin hardwareand
software:

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125

Thomasson OntologicalInnovationin Art

conditionsfortheworkoftenhave to be explicitly
stipulated.
SherriIrvin'sveryusefulnotionof the "artist's
sanction"may,however,enable us to see a unity
across these varied cases. The artist'ssanction,
on Irvin'sview,involvesthe artist's"publiclyaccessible actions and communications,"as deliveredincertaincontextswithcertainconventions.30
These mayinvolvesomethingas mundaneas presentinga paintingto a gallery or as novel as
givinginstructionsfor installingand preserving
a work. The sanctions,however delivered,"fix
the boundaries of [the artist's]work, . . . determine whethera particularfeatureis relevantto
. . . establish in what
the work's interpretation,
genre the work belongs,and, in some cases, . . .
determinewhetherit,qua artwork,has a particular featureor not."31This suggestsa global approach that can cover both the traditionaland
innovativecases: thatwhat establishesthe ontological statusof an individualworkis the artist's
sanction.
In cases of traditionalworksof art,the artist
may not need to say anythingexplicit:"by presentinga painted canvas witha particularset of
visible features,for instance,the artisttypically
sanctionsa correspondingset of visible features
forthe artwork."32
So, forexample,ifan artistin
a contextof traditionalWesternpaintingpresents
a canvas, framed,withpaint on the frontto an
art galleryforexhibition,we can (in the absence
fromthe artist)take
of any counter-indications
the artistto have sanctioned treatingthis as a
traditionalpainting,whose relevantfeatures(qua
work of art) are on the frontsurface,whichare
to be preserved(as far as possible) in the state
in whichtheyarrive.Put in myterms,she establishesthathername forthework,say 'JonesNo. 5'
(along withothersingulartermsintendedto refer
to thatverywork of art), is to referto a painting,where the ontologicalstatus of paintingsis
determinedby the backgroundpracticesof those
competentin usingthe termand dealingwiththe
objects.
In more innovativecases, where thereare not
suchbackgroundconventionsto relyon (or where
these are being violated), the artistmay need to
do somethingmoreto make itclearwhatdoes and
does notcountas an exhibitionofherwork,under
what conditionsit survives,and so on. This may
forexample,by filling
be done ratherexplicitly,
in an artist'sintentformlike that on Rhizome

statementto the work (for

or adding a clarifying
example, Sol Le Witt insiststhat instructionsbe
exhibitedalongsidehismurals).Or itmaybe done
throughactions ratherthan words,as the artist
correctorreject
maysetup thefirstdisplayherself,
various
galleries,make it
attempteddisplaysby
clear how manyinstitutions
maydisplaythework
at one time,and so on.
In any case, whetherverballyor nonverbally,
the artistmay make it clear under what conditions she will accept that her work is (properly)
curatorsabout how herwork
displayedor instruct
is to be displayed(and under what conditionsa
displaywould count as the workat all), whether,
and ifso,in whatways,herworkis to be preserved
(whichfeaturesmustbe preservedand whichneed
notor even mustnotbe preserved),and so on. All
of thisamountsto a specificationof the ontological statusoftheworkcreated-whatdoes and does
notcountas a partor featureofit,qua workofart;
underwhatconditionsit is damaged; underwhat
conditionsitsurvives;whatcountsas an exhibition
of thisverywork;and so on- is all, on thisview,
determinedby the artist'ssanction.33Of course,
some questionsmay remainunansweredand, as
a result,the ontologicalstatus of the work may
remainin certainregardsindeterminate-but that
fromwhat happens in otherareas
is no different
of ontology.34
One aspect of Irvin's understandingof the
artist'ssanctionmay raise worries,however:her
requirementthat the artist'sintentionsbe made
publiclyaccessible.For suppose (to develop a line
of objectionaptlyraised by LindseyFiorelli) that
an innovativeartistlike Liz Magor suddenlydies
in her studio. Is it not conceivable that she had
just completed a work of art,but she had done
so withoutleaving a sanctionthat makes public
what was and was not supposed to count as the
work,whenitwould and would notsurvive?(Perhaps she writesin herjournal: "I've just finished
Static,mymostimportantworkto date," and then
passes away.) On Irvin's view, withouta public
in certain
communication(eitherby participating
establishedconventionsor bymakingexplicitstipulations),no sanctionhas been established.For,
to estabIrvininsists,"intentionis not sufficient
lish a sanction"; endowing a work with certain
featuresvia a sanctionis like makinga contract:it
thatmatis public actions,not privateintentions,
ter.35Yet it does seem naturalto say that there
is such work as Static,whichhas certain(even if

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The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism

126
and persistenceconditions,though
vague) identity
we maybe unable to tell(fromthemessleftin the
studio) what does and does not count as part of
the work,whatitsidentityand persistenceconditions were supposed to be, and so on. Irvincan,
of course, allow thatsome works of art may be
privatelycompleted:an artistmay leave behind
traditionalpaintingsthat(by her participationin
the conventionsof canvas wall paintings)clearly
have a sanctionedontologicalstatus,even ifthey
neverleave thestudio.But on Irvin'sview,itseems
thatmore ontologicallyinnovativeworkscannot
existwithouthavinga public sanction.
One naturaloption is to allow that an actual
sanctionis not necessary-that instead it is what
the artistsanctionedor (given minimalopportunities,like survivinganotherweek) would have
sanctionedthatdeterminesthe ontologicalstatus
withhow
of her work.This,at least,seems fitting
we would behave in the hypotheticalcase: one
to figureout whatis and is not
can imaginetrying
supposed to be part of the work Staticand what
its survivalconditionsare by tryingto figureout
(based on what is in the studio along with the
knownhistory,
and conartist'scommunications,
text) what Magor herselfwould have sanctioned
regardingit. What the artistwould have sanctionedas countingas partof the work,preserving
the work,and so on, is presumablywhat she intendedtobe partofthework,a continuationofthe
work.
As a result,thisproposal does allow thatnonto fixthe
actualized intentionsmay be sufficient
ontologicalstatusof a work created,contraryto
Irvin'sinsistencethat"intentionsthathave never
been acted on have no effecton the work's features,"so it is worthexaminingwhyIrvininsists
that the relevantintentionsbe part of a public
sanction.36One importantreason is that she is
clearlytryingto distanceherselffromthe problematic formsof intentionalismin aestheticsparticularlythose thatwould treatan artist'sintentionsas fixingthemeaningor value of a work.
She does thisintwoways:first,
byrequiringtheintentionsto be public,second,byinsisting(rightly)
that her view only entails that the artist'sintentions make a differenceto whatfeaturesa work
has or does nothave and whenitdoes or does not
survive-m short,to whatis the object to be interor value.
preted,not to its correctinterpretation
But thelatterobservationseems sufficient
to save
her view fromaccusationsof fallinginto unten-

so whyadd the
intentionalismable interpretive
insistenceon publicity?
One motivationmaybe thatwe do notwantto
have to allow thatan artist'smereintentionis relevant to the work'sontologicalstatusifit is kept
entirelyprivateand conflictswithpublicpractices.
Thus,we mightimaginethat,unbeknownstto us,
Mary Cassatt submittedThe Boating Partyto a
galleryin theusual way,in thenineteenth-century
no
artisticcontext,with no special instructions,
complaintsabout its manner of exhibition,and
so forth,but secretlyintendingthe back of the
canvas to count as partof the workand relevant
to its appraisal. In this case it does seem that
(despite the supposed intention)the name 'The
Boating Party'refersto a traditional(one-sided)
painting.
But the above proposal- that what the artist
sanctioned or (given minimal opportunities)
would have sanctioned determinesthe ontological status of the work-does not tell us otherwise. Cassatt,by her actions,sanctionedtreating
The Boating Partyas a traditionalpainting.Nor
she
mustwe saythat,givenminimalopportunities,
for
would have sanctionedtreatingit differently,
she had them and did not. In fact,givenher actions in the relevantcontext,we may even deny
that she really intendedto sanctiontreatingthe
back as part of the work (just as- regardlessof
his avowal- we would denythatJonesdid not intend to insultSmithwhen he called hima sniveling maggot). An idle thoughtor wish does not
an intentionmake,nor are our intentionsalways
or to othsecurelyrevealedto us byintrospection
ers by avowal. Instead,as in legal contexts,a person's intentionsmust be interpretedagainst the
backgroundof her behavior (and dispositionsto
behave) withina culturaland conventionalcontext. In short,provided we employ a plausible
of intentions,
we
and sophisticatedunderstanding
need notworryabout allowingthatwhatan artist
intended to sanction or would have sanctioned
may play a role in fixingthe ontologicalstatusof
certainworks,where a publicizedsanctionis not
available.
In any case, regardlessof whetherwe say it is
onlythe artist'sactual sanctionor allow thatit is
whattheartistsanctionedor (givenherintentions,
properlyunderstood)would have sanctionedthat
is relevantto determining
theontologicalstatusof
herwork,thekeypointforpresentpurposesis that
it is the artistwho determineswhat (ontological)

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Thomasson OntologicalInnovationin Art

127

mine the ontologicalstatusof the work without

having to investigatewhat the artistsanctioned
(or would have sanctioned).
But first,what we are doing when we engage
in judging that,for example, timingis essential
to Now Here/Nowhereseems to be making a
judgmentabout whatthe artistwould have sanctioned,given a certainprincipleof charity:that
the artistwould have wanted to create the best
workpossible,and thata workwheretimingwas
essentialto it (ratherthan an accidentbased on
the speed of my computer) would have greater
aesthetic value. So this does not show that an
artist's(actual or intended)sanctionis irrelevant
to what countsas part of a work,but onlythata
thatmay be by way of
good routeto determining
whatwould make the best
charitablyinterpreting
work.
These considerationsalso seem to showthatalcrithoughtheremay not be category-specifying
teriaofidentityor preservationforworksofartas
such,theremay be a cross-categorialframe-level
criterioninvokedwhenwe referto somethingas a
workof art,namely,thatat least a necessaryconditionforthe persistenceof the same workof art
is preservingall or mostof the featureson which
its artisticand aestheticpropertiessupervene.40
practices.37
(Since thesepropertiesmaybe variousin ontological kind,thisis nota category-specific
persistence
V. ONTOLOGY, INTERPRETATION, AND EVALUATION
condition.)
But thisapproach does not provide a general
solution to the problem of what determinesthe
The above view,however,is likelyto facea central
ontologicalstatusofa workofart.For to interpret
objection:thatwe need notconsultthe artist'sinof
a work,we mustbeginwithsome understanding
tentions(whetherin theformof a publicsanction
whatis,and is not,partof thework-or we maygo
or not) to determinethe ontologicalstatusof the
workofart;we canjusttellor at leastfigureoutthe
badlyastray.For example,itdoes notseem thatwe
a worklikeArtMedal independently
can interpret
modal and kindpropertiesof worksof art-even
the work,figuring of knowingwhetherthe externallylinked pages
in novel cases- by interpreting
imare partofthework;iftheyare,theworkmightbe
out what its aestheticallyand interpretively
on theshallow,tacky
as a commentary
thatthose are
interpreted
portantfeaturesare, and inferring
material
of
the
For example,whatwe are
itsessentialfeatures.38
presented,and
particular
triviality
the
work
not
that
if
are
the
essential
for
mightsurvive
in,
(so
they
example,judging timing
doing
seems to be determining even when all the originallyselected pages come
to Now Here/Nowhere,
the
what propertiesare essentialby interpreting
up as "This page cannot be displayed"),it might
and unstable
ratherbe emphasizingthetransitory
essential
those
and
work,
considering
properties
nature of the Web itself,in whichcase the brothe work's
thatare mostcentralto underpinning
ken linksreemphasizethis.41(Stallabrass reports
artisticor aestheticvalues- or perhaps to realizthat the creator of Art Medal, Alexei Shulgin,
ingwhatDavies calls "the artisticstatementartic"claims not to mind [about the broken links],
ulated" in the work.39This mightbe thoughtto
underminethe idea thatthe artist's(actual or insaying that it reflectswider dysfunctionin the
Net.")42As Irvinputsit,"The artist'ssanction. . .
tended)sanctiondeterminestheontologicalstatus
of her work-for(it mightbe said) we can deterplays an ontologicalrole in fixingfeaturesof the

sortof thingshe has created.Accordingthe artist

thisrole does not,however,mean neglectingthe
theonkeyrole ofpublicpracticesin determining
tologicalstatusofworksofart:intraditionalcases,
as discussedabove, the artist'smereparticipation
in the relevantpracticesof,say,canvas painting
to markher workas havingthe idenis sufficient
tityand persistenceconditionsof paintings.Even
in innovativecases, if the artist'sintroductionis
successfuland the work influential,others may
latch onto the new rules (for example,fortreatrepeatableand
ingthingsas perishablesculptures,
variable wall paintings,and the like), and a new
public practicemay emerge that enables future
artiststo simplyparticipatein it and deferto the
relevantrules of that practice,much as one can
traditional
deferto the practicesof individuating
paintingson canvas.
In any case, the veryidea that an artistmay
(throughher sanction) determinethe ontological statusof her work and introducean ontologicallynew kind of work of art reemphasizesthe
general point I have made elsewhere:that such
factsas thereare about the ontologyof worksof
art (whetherof familiaror unfamiliarkinds) are,
at bottom,determinedby human intentionsand

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The Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism

128
mustbe reartwork.. . . Insofaras interpretation
the
artist's
sanction
to
the
work's
nature,
sponsive
willplace some indirectconstraintson interpretation."43As a result,we cannotrelyon interpretationto determineontology,forproperinterpretation (and evaluation) of a workof art relies on a
ofwhatis and is notpartof
properunderstanding
thework.44
Thisleads to a finalinteresting
observation:The
artist's(actual or intended)sanction,in fixingthe
boundariesof a workof art(and thusitsontological status),does not merelyfixdescriptivefacts
about whatis and is not part of the work:it also
has modal and normativeimport.Fixingtheontological statusof a workof art goes hand in hand
withfixingits modal features(what featuresare
essentialand inessential,what sorts of change it
could and could not survive).Perhaps more instill,fixingwhat is and is not part of
terestingly
the workalso determinesnormativefeatures:establishinghow the workis to be displayed,to be
conserved,and what is and is not to be considand evaluation,
,45
ered relevantfor interpretation
this
is
of
course
not
to
that
the
say
(Although
artistin any way determineswhat the properinor evaluationofherworkis,onlythat
terpretation
she determineswhat counts as the object to-beinterpreted.)46
In sum, then,I have argued thatthe ontological statusof worksof art is, at bottom,fixedby
human intentionsand practices.The ontological
statusof suchgeneral,familiarartkindsas paintingsand symphoniesis establishedby the beliefs
and practicesof those who groundand reground
the referenceof these general terms.The ontological statusof an individualwork of art is determined,at bottom,by the artist's(actual or intended) sanction,thoughthere may be quite a
wide rangeof cases,fromthosein whichthe artist
simplyparticipatesin a rangeofbackgroundpracticesforworksof a familiarkind(as someonejust
makesa paintingand presentsit) throughto novel
cases whereat least some of the identityand persistenceconditionsmustbe more explicitlysancBut thesevariationsshould
tionedby the artist.47
not obscure the general point that the ontological statusof a work of art is, at bottom,determinedby humanintentionsand practices;where
backgroundpracticesleave off,explicitstipulationmusttake over,ifthereare to be ontological
factsofthematterat all. And wherenovel criteria
forpreservationand identification
are sanctioned,

worksof art of ontologicallynovel kindsmay be

introduced.48
AMIE L. THOMASSON
Departmentof Philosophy
Universityof Miami
Coral Gables, Florida 33124-4670
internet:thomasson@miami.edu
1. David Davies defendstheactionviewinhisArtas Performance(Maiden,MA: Blackwell,2004). For the actionsee GregoryCurrie,An Ontologyof Art
typehypothesis,
(New York: St. Martin'sPress,1989); for the view that
worksof art are imaginary
objects,see Jean-PaulSartre,
The Psychologyof Imagination,
trans.BernardFechtman
(New York:Washington
SquarePress,1966).
2. Those othersincludeRichardWollheim,
Artand Its
Press,1980);NelsonGoodObjects(CambridgeUniversity
man,LanguagesofArt(Indianapolis:Hackett,1976);Sherri
in
Irvin,"The OntologicalDiversityof Visual Artworks,"
New WavesinAesthetics,
ed. KathleenStockand Katherine
Thomson-Jones
(Basingstoke,Hampshire,UK: PalgraveMacmillan,2008), pp. 1-19; and myselfin "The Ontology
ed. PeterKivy
ofArt,"in TheBlackwellGuidetoAesthetics,
(Maiden,MA: Blackwell,2004),pp.78-92.
3. See SherriIrvin,"The Artist'sSanctionin Contemand ArtCriticism
63
poraryArt,"TheJournalofAesthetics
(2005):315-326.
4. See also Irvin's"The Artist'sSanctionin ContemporaryArt."
5. See my"TheOntologyofArt,"and"TheOntologyof
ArtandKnowledgeinAesthetics,"
TheJournal
ofAesthetics
and ArtCriticism
63 (2005):221-229.
6. Forfurther
defenseofthisidea,see my"TheOntology
ofArtand Knowledgein Aesthetics."
7. "TheOntologyofArt"and "TheOntologyofArtand
Knowledgein Aesthetics."
8. Fordiscussionofthequa problem,
see MichaelDevitt
andKimSterelny,
2nded. (MIT Press,
LanguageandReality,
1999), pp. 79-81, 90-93; and my OrdinaryObjects(New
York:OxfordUniversity
Press,2007),pp.38^4.
9. See Ordinary
Objects,pp.39-42.
10. Forfurther
discussionoftherelationbetweenapplifortermsandexistence,
cationandco-application
conditions
andpersistence
conditions
forobjects,see Ordinary
identity,
Objects,pp.55-59.
11. Sortaltermsmay(as I havearguedelsewhere[OrdinaryObjects,pp.41-42]) be arrangedin hierarchies,
grouping themintodifferent
categoriesthatall sharethe same
for
conditions
conditions
(andwheretheapplication
identity
thecategoryare guaranteedto be fulfilled
providedthose
of any of the sortaisof thatcategoryare)- so, forexample,termssuchas 'rat,''kangaroo,'and 'fish'mayall be of
and
thecategory'animal,'and termslike'cup,''typewriter,'
'concreteartifact.'
Sortais
'house'mayall be ofthecategory
conditions
thatcome withmutuallyincompatible
identity
(as, forexample,'place,''person,'and 'explosion'do) cannotreferto thingsofthesamecategory.
12. Anotherinteresting
consequenceofthiskindofview
is thatontologicalquestionsabout the existence,identity,

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inArt
Innovation
ThomassonOntological

129

work is Len Baldwin's

mu23. A similarprogram-based
and persistenceconditionsof a painting,symphony,
abstractsfroma convenhave determinate GoodWorld,whichprogressively
or workof literature
sical performance,
tionalsiteso that [w]hatyou see is a real-timephantom
answersonlyto the extentthatthoseanswersare tacitly
oftheoriginalsketchedin magentasquares.
determined
representation
practicesof
bycompetent
speakers'normative
Whereno
themin varioussituations.
and refusing
Most,if not all, of the remaining
imageson the page are
applying
answersarebuiltintoour(oftenvague)practices, turnedintoyellow'wrappers'and the textand linksare
definitive
a complacenthappy
into '*_*' symbolizing
transformed
be no answertoquestionsabout,forexamtheremaysimply
face"(http://rhizome.org/object.rhiz75635).
ple,exactlyhowmanywordsmaybe changedwhilea novel
24. http://www.teleportacia.org/war/
while
orhowmuchthepaintcolormaydeteriorate
survives
25. Stallabrass,InternetArt, pp. 36-41. The link is
the same paintingremains.We shouldneitherbe embaranswersto thesequestions
rassedby thelack of definitive
http://wwwwwwwww.jodi.org/100cc/hqx/i900.html
26. Stallabrass,InternetArt, pp. 27-29. The link is
norbulliedintoproviding
answers;whereourpracarbitrary
we shouldnotexpectdeterminate http://www.easylife.org/award/
ticesarenotdeterminate
27. http://www.rhizome.org/artbase/policy.htm
answers(comparemy"The Ontologyof Art and Knowl28. http://www.rhizome.org/artbase/policy.htm
pp. 227-228,and my"Answerableand
edge in Aesthetics,"
29. This,of course,is notto denythattheremaybe an
ed. David
UnanswerableQuestions,"in Metametaphysics,
artformsuch as "computerart" (as Dominic
identifiable
and David Manley[Oxford
J.Chalmers,
RyanWasserman,
Art[NewYork:
ofComputer
Press,2009],pp.448^52).
Lopes arguesinA Philosophy
University
13. Davies,Artas Performance,
Routledge,2009]) thatmayincludesomeor mostworksof
p. 76. AmongontologInternetart.If we unifyartformsin termsof sharedapare RichardWollheim{Artand Its Objects),
ical pluralists
Nelson Goodman{Languagesof Art),SherriIrvin("The
preciativefeatures(forexample,Lopes arguesthathaving
as relevantto its appreciationis whatunifies
andmyself
ofArtworks"),
interactivity
("The OnOntologicalDiversity
worksof computerart),thentheremaybe ontologicalditologyofArt").
and persistence
individuation,
14. Thisdoes not,however,ruleout theidea thatthere
(in termsof identity,
versity
and persistenceconon identity
conditions)evenwithina singleartform.
maybe some constraints
30. Irvin,"The Artist'sSanctionin Contemporary
Art,"
ditionscommonto all worksof art,even if theseare not
sufficient
to specifya categoryand,withit,a singleset of
p. 315.
31. Irvin,"The Artist'sSanctionin Contemporary
conditionssharedby all worksof
Art,"
and persistence
identity
of
art.I discussone suchpossibleconstraintpp.315-316.
preservation
32. Irvin,"The Artist'sSanctionin Contemporary
Art,"
below.
aestheticpropertieswhatontologicalkindsof
15. And thewayto determine
p. 319.
33. CompareIrvin,"The Artist'sSanctionin Contemworksofartthereare in a givensocietymustgo at leastin
embodtheconceptualsystem
poraryArt,"p. 319. As Irvinnicelypointsout in another
partbywayofunderstanding
Artofthelocalpeopleinnaming,
iedinthepractices
preserving, article("Museumsand theShapingof Contemporary
21 [2006]:
and Curatorship
andotherwise
works,"MuseumManagement
dealingwiththeirart.(Ifa tribetreatscertain
a "chiap"onlyin a cereas constituting
(presumably
143-156),museumsand otherartinstitutions
bodilymovements
like Rhizome,thoughshe does notuse thisexample)may
monialcontext,thentheycannotturnout to be mistaken
theontological
roleinestablishing
thusalso playan indirect
fora chiap,and showingthem
aboutthesurvivalconditions
statusof certainworks,by askingartistsforvarioussorts
thatthesame motionscan be made anywhereat anytime
rubrics(like theartist'sintent
ofclarification,
willnotbe counter-evidence.)
byproviding
dif16. See my"Realismand Human Kinds,"Philosophy
form)thatgivethema rangeofoptionsforsanctioning
theirwork,and so on,all ofwhich
ferent
Research67 (2003): 580-609,at pp.
and Phenomenological
waysofpreserving
592-593.Issuesaboutreadymades
mayprovokean artistto producea sanction-or a kindof
maybe addressedbyconbe absent.
sanction-thatwouldotherwise
selectiona kindofdegeneratecreation.I willleave
sidering
andUnanswerableQuestions."
34. See my"Answerable
discussionofthesecases to one sidehere.
further
conThere may also be limits,forexample,consistency
17. Notingthatthismaynotbe thesame as theobject
on whatsortsof conditionsan artistmayimpose.
tocreate.
theartistintended
straints,
Fordiscussionofrelatedproblemsofinconsistent
Levinsonhas madethesimilarpointthatan
18. Jerrold
ontologisee my"The Easy Approachto Ontology,"
cal conceptions,
herwork
whatcategory
at leastdetermine
intentions
artist's
19 (2009): 1-15.
A Last
Axiomathes
belongsto. See his "Intentionand Interpretation:
35. Irvin,"The Artist'sSanctionin Contemporary
Art,"
ed. GaryIseminger
and Interpretation,
Look," in Intention
Press,1992),pp.232-233.
p. 321.
(TempleUniversity
36. Irvin,"The Artist'sSanctionin Contemporary
Art,"
19. Of coursethisdoes not precludethe idea thatwe
p. 321.
may"exapt"naturalobjectsor objectsintendedas things
37. See my"The Ontologyof Art"and "The Ontology
worksof art,and
ofotherkinds,treatthemas constituting
ofArtand Knowledgein Aesthetics."
name theseworks.In thiscase, the exaptergroundsthe
38. Thanksto David Davies forraisingthistypeofissue
ofthetermforthework.I willmostlyignorethis
reference
on an earlierversionofthisarticle.
in hiscomments
inwhatfollows.
complication
20. http^/www.thomson-craighead.net/docs/thap.htm39. Davies,Artas Performance,
pp. 108-112.
while 'gift'is not a category-specifying
40. Similarly,
21. See JulianStallabrass,InternetArt: The Online
conditionsmaybe common
Clash of Cultureand Commerce(London: Tate, 2003),
term,some necessaryidentity
to all tokengifts-forexample,thatitbe givenbythesame
p. 147.
22. http://www.potatoland.org/shredder/
personor personson thesameoccasion.

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andArtCriticism
ofAesthetics
TheJournal

130
41. Theseseemto presentcases in whichtheroleof an
thecategoryand boundariesof
artist'sintentin specifying
relevantto thework's
a workmayalso makeit indirectly
interpretation
(compareLevinson's"Intentionand InterA Last Look").
pretation:
Internet
42. Stallabrass,
Art,p. 42.
43. Irvin,"TheArtist'sSanctionin Contemporary
Art,"
p. 320.
44. CompareIrvin's"The Artist'sSanctionin ContemporaryArt,"p. 320.
ofwhatde45. Thismaybringtheabove understanding
statusoftheworkofartintocloser
termines
theontological
contactwithDavid Davies's viewthat"whatmatters. . . for
of ... artworksin general,is the set of
the individuation
normative
fortheirproperappreciation"("The
properties
ofPracticeintheOntologyofArt,"TheJournalof
Primacy
67 [2009]:159-172,at p. 170).
Aesthetics
and ArtCriticism
thatwe mustrecognize
Yet I wouldadd twocaveats:first,
fixwhatproperat bottom,
thathumanbeliefsandpractices,
forthework'sappreciation
tiesare normative
and,second,
forappreciationare onlyone
thatthe featuresnormative
factor(althougha particularly
one) in determinimportant
ing the ontologicalstatusof a work;otherpracticesalso
thoseinvolvedin exhibition,
comeintoplay,including
buy-

and so on. The idea thatsuch

ingand selling,restoration,
of whatit is to
normativefeaturesare partlyconstitutive
be a workof artof a givenkindis in linewithHeidegger's
observationsthatpartof whatit is, forexample,to be a
object(such as an artifact)is forit to have
ready-to-hand
forexample,thatitis tobe used
certainnormative
features,
incertainways.Thefactthatontological,
modal,andnormain thiswayis,I think,one that
tivefeaturescome together
the ontolmaybe made especiallyevidentin considering
ramifications
ogyofart,butwhichmayalso haveinteresting
ButI willhaveto leave
otherareasofmetaphysics.
through
discussionofthatforelsewhere.
46. CompareIrvin,"TheArtist'sSanctioninContemporaryArt,"p. 320.
47. Althoughbackground
practicesforentitiesofother
kinds(like computergames or programs)may also conso thatpurestiptributeto theontologicaldisambiguation,
ulationof the identityand persistenceconditionsforthe
workto be referred
to is seldomrequired.
refereeforthisjour48. Manythanksto an anonymous
Jones,
nal,David Davies,SherriIrvin,KatherineThomsonMartinThomson-Jones,
and to LindseyFiorelliand therest
oftheaudienceatOberlinCollege(wherethiswaspresented
in February
or discussion.
2009) forhelpfulcomments

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