Reigstration cases

Yra vs Abano
Maximo Abano is a native of Meycauayan Bulacan. He transfereed to manila to
complete his education and registered as a voter. Shorty after qualifying as a
member of the bar and the death of his father, he returned to bulacan. Abano
considered humself as a resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections were
approaching, he made an application for the cancellation of registration in manila.
The application was rejected by the city officials for the reason that it was not
deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless, Abano
presented himself as a candidate and was elected by popular vote.
Yra argues that Abano is ineligible to hold the position for the reason that he had
not been a resident for atleast one year before the election.
Issue: Is the non-eligibility of the respondent for the reason that he was not a
qualified voter in hi municipality sufficient to nullify his election?
Held:
One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy
is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the
term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person
must be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not need
to register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications
prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section
432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality
does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be voted for. ABANO
WON.

Akbayan Youth vs COMELEC

On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the
extension of the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has
already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be
allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the
petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for
denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were
not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act
8189 which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular election.
AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the
COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of preelection acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
extension of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of
Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120
days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures
like voters registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its
inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by
the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent
and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the
times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the
prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its
pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election
matters because the additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be
screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then
entered into the computerized voters list; and then they will have to reprint the voters
information sheet for the update and distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections
would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short,
it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are
disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths pleading was attached any
actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact
that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al
admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on
time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not
those who slumber on their rights.

CAMPAIGN:

CHAVEZ vs COMELEC:
FACTS:
Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain
establishments to endorse their products. According to him, the billboards adverted
to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for
premature campaigning under the rules.(nope, pasok to sa indirect solicitation)

He assails Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings
on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements
on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be
immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3
days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media
or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act. According to
him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda.
He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of
billboards as a form of election propaganda through the assailed provision, violated
the Fair Elections Act.
HELD:

Petitioners argument is not tenable. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed
provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use
to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all
candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure
and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use of
such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the law.
Under Sections 3 and 13 of the Fair Elections Act, all election propaganda are subject to the
supervision and regulation by the COMELEC:
NEITHER IS IT AN EX POST FACTO LAW, because the offense punished is not the posting of
the billboard(valid kasi nung nag post si Chavez e), but the failure to remove it.

Penera vs COMELEC
In Penera vs. COMELEC (G.R. 181613; 25 November 2009), the Supreme Court
reversed its earlier decision (dated 11 September 2009) to disqualify a candidate
(Penera) for premature campaigning.
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the
time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election
system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating
the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
According to the High Court, at the time the supposed premature campaigning took
place, Penera was not officially a candidate albeit she already filed her certificate

of candidacy. Under Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended by Republic Act

9369, a person who files his certificate of candidacy is considered a candidate only
at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts applicable to such candidate
take effect only at the start of such campaign period. Construing this law, the
Supreme Court concluded that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. Before the start of the campaign
period, such election offenses cannot be committed and any partisan political
activity is lawful.

SWS vs COMELEC
SWS(Social Weather Stations) is an institution conducting surveys in various fields.
Kamahalan Publishing Corp publishes a newspaper of general circulation and
features items including election surveys. Both are contesting the validity and
enforcement of RA 9006(Fair election act), especially section 5.4. which provides
that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published 15 days
before an election AND surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published 7 days before election.
Both want to release to the media the results of the survey and publish them
directly.
Issue:
WON the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint
on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify
such restraint.
Ruling:
Yes, it is an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the
press.
The power of the comelec over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal
opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of
charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among the
candidates.
The prohibition on speech here is direct, absolute and substantial. Neither does it
pass the Obrient test for content regulation.

It suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types of such as

editorials

The restriction is greater than what is needed to protect the government

interest.

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained
at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members
of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list
organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they
obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on
the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and
all the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House
of Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to
define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In
the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to
require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes
cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to
ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents deserving
of representation are actually represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR
-determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district
representatives/.80 x .20
-additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes
of party list system
-additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes
of first party x additional seats for concerned party
Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be
gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law,
but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative
state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation
of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts
are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all
the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is
computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes
are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes
shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the
other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.

Bagong Bayani v. Comelec

Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
issued by theCOMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list
elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the none-marginalized or
over represented.(bakit daw mga mainstream na lng lge)
Issues:
a. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections
b. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
COMELEC which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the
154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this
Court directed the COMELEC to refrain proclaiming any winner during the last
party-list election, shall remain in force until after the COMELEC have compiled and
reported its compliance.
a.Yes
b.No.
Rationale:
a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House
of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. "Furthermore, under
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be
registered under the party-list system. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also
provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that
a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
b. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution
and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The provision on the party-list
system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in

accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to
sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was
enacted.

ATONG PAGLAUM vs COMELEC

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and
BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for
not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back
to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new
guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor,

peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,

veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political
constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that
represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their
bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list
elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies
to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined
political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all
parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is
pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will
of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the
people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be
reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED
for the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they
do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor

candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a
national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the
system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in
the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be
understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors
that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted
that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for
sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not
have well-defined political constituencies as they are ideologically
marginalized.

Palparan vs HRET
FACTS: In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list group received the sufficient voting
percentage entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives in which Petitioner
Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the said party-list group. Respondents
Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr. , Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes. Jr. ,Erlinda Cadapan,
Antonia Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of the other party-list groups filed
with the HRET a petition for quo warran to against Bantay and its nominee,
Palaparan.
They alleged that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the House of Representative
because he did not belong to a marginalized and under reprsented sectors which
then are the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels. Palaparan claimed that he was just
Bantays nominee and that HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was
actually the party-list that was elected to assume membership in the House of
Representatives. Furthermore, he said that such question should be raised before
the party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 HRET issued an order upholding its jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner Palparans qualifications. Palparan filed a motio for reconsideration but
the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009.
ISSUE: Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the
nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.

Held: YES. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the members of the House
of Representatives are of two kinds: members who shall be elected from
legislative districts and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Thus, it is the part-list representatives who are elected into office, not their parties
or organizations. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the
elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes member of the House
of Representatives.
As contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , the HRET shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the House of Representatives. Since the party-list representatives
and districts representatives are treated in like manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hear and pass upon their qualifications. Once the party or organization of the partylist nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed
office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. Since party-list nominees are elected
members of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives
are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy
with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins.

CAPALLA VS COMELEC
On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued a Resolution resolving to accept
Smartmatic-TIMs offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31,
2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on behalf of the Comelec
the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract (Extension
Agreement). Comelec again issued a Resolution resolving to approve the Deed of
Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latters PCOS
machines to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize
Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the Comelec. The
Deed of Sale was forthwith executed.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Comelec Resolutions on the grounds
that the option period provided for in the AES contract had already lapsed; that the

extension of the option period and the exercise of the option without competitive
public bidding contravene the provisions of RA 9184; and that the Comelec
purchased the machines in contravention of the standards laid down in RA 9369. On
the other hand, respondents argue on the validity of the subject transaction based
on the grounds that there is no prohibition either in the contract or provision of law
for it to extend the option period; that the OTP is not an independent contract in
itself, but is a provision contained in the valid and existing AES contract that had
already satisfied the public bidding requirements of RA 9184; and that exercising
the option was the most advantageous option of the Comelec.
Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Comelec in issuing the assailed Resolutions
and in executing the assailed Extension Agreement and Deed.
Held: No. A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the
parties are given the right to amend the contract which may include the period
within which to exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the
extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective. The Comelec still
retains P50M of the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance security, which
indicates that the AES contract is still effective and not yet terminated.
Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the provisions thereof may still
be amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided said amendment is in
writing and signed by the parties. Considering, however, that the AES contract is not
an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a government agency, the rights
and obligations of the parties are governed not only by the Civil Code but also by RA
9184. A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain
provisions of the contract bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitute
substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the
contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid
on the same terms.