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Philosophy 172: The History of Modern Moral Philosophy

Chris Korsgaard
Handout 7: Hobbes on the Motive of Obligation; Enduring Influence of Natural Law Theory and
Rationalism
I. Hobbess Story, a Reconstruction:
1. We have a restless desire of power after power that puts us at war.
2. We have a natural right to everything.
2a. A natural right is a liberty to do what in our own judgment will preserve ourselves.
2b. A liberty is the absence of an impediment.
3. We are under LN.1 which tells us to seek peace, but if we cant get it to use the arts of war, in
order to preserve ourselves.
How do we know that? God made us self-preserving machines, so he made us to preserve
ourselves. But he also made us rational and capable of decision. So God has entrusted us
with our own preservation: this is the source of both our natural right of self-government,
and of LN.1.
4. LN.1 implies LN.2, that we should be willing to transfer our natural right of self-government
to a sovereign and so join the commonwealth, so long as others agree do so as well.
5. Since a natural right is a liberty, and a liberty is the absence of an impediment, we transfer our
right to the sovereign by setting up an impediment: we give him our power.
How can we make the social contract if contracts are not binding in the state of nature? Since we
make the social contract by transferring a natural right and so by setting up an impediment that is,
by giving all our power to the sovereign, and contracts are binding once the sovereign has power,
the social contract makes itself binding.
II. Moral Motivation, Motives of Obligation, and the Free Rider Problem
The Free Rider problem is the flip side of collective rationality: it is not rational to obey the laws of
nature until everyone else does; but it may be rational to break the laws of nature once everyone else
does, when you can get away with it: it may be rational to cheat.
Complication:
If rationality = maximizing the satisfaction of your interests, cheating when you can get away with it
may not only be rationally allowable but rationally required.
If rationality = doing what is necessary to preserve yourself, we might think cheating when you can
get away with it (when you wont be expelled from the community, say) is rationally
allowable but not rationally required.

Phil. 172, Handout 7, p. 2

Three reasons to obey the law


1. It is rational.
2. We are afraid of sanctions, of being punished.
3. It is obligatory; we are motivated by obligation itself.
Hobbes on Command vs. Counsel:
1. When you are commanded you are motivated by the fact that it is the commanders will; when
you are counselled you act for your own good. So reasons 1 and 2 reduce the law to a
counsel.
NB. the commander wills for his own good; that is, for the good of the commonwealth.
2. Command obligates; counsel only recommends.
Note: 2 accounts of how obligation arises:
Obligation arises when we are commanded by an authority.
Obligation arises when we transfer a right.
Why these come together: transferring a right always = transferring part of your right to
self-government, hence giving someone else the right to govern you in some respect.
How is the motive of obligation possible?
Logically:
As in Pufendorf, something must be required before we can do it because it is required;
and in order to require things, the commander needs sanctions.
Psychologically:
When we join the commonwealth we become part of a larger and more powerful person.
We regard the acts of this person as our own (we have authorized them).
The conception of ourselves as citizens as part of this larger person is an empowering
conception of the self, and so we are motivated by the thought of its acts (the acts
of the sovereign) as our own.
So, to be motivated by obligation is conceive of yourself as part of the commonwealth:

Phil. 172, Handout 7, p. 3

III. Enduring influence of some views we are studying:


Contemporary natural law theory in general religious and especially Catholic thinkers
Either you believe that nature is a rational order rather than merely a causal and material one.
Or you accept voluntarism, and its problematic concept of authority
Pufendorfs problem: the account of authority is circular
Hobbess problem: authority is ultimately traced to Gods power alone
Neo-Hobbesianism David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (1986)
Focuses on the insight that morality is collective rationality, and attempts to address free
rider problem
Ignores Hobbess specific view of obligation, assumes the motive for obedience is rationality
Two ways for morality to be rational:
Neo-Hobbesianism: it is rational to do what is in your interest and morality is in our interest
Rationalism (and Kantianism): moral principles are themselves principles of reason
(Dogmatic) Rationalism Past and Present
17th-18th century Germany: Leibniz, Wolff
17th- 18th century Britain: Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, Balguy, Price, Reid
19th century Britain: Stewart, Whewell
20th century Britain: Prichard, Ross, Moore, Sidgwick (in foundations)
20th- 21st century Anglo-American: Wolf, Parfit, Scanlon

Phil. 172, Handout 7, p. 4

Classification Problems:
Kant is usually also called a rationalist, since he believes moral principles are principles of reason,
but unlike these others he does not believe principles of reason are part of the framework of the
universe, nor that they are self-evident they are the laws of our own minds, and they need to be
deduced or established.
Intuitionism
1. A view about how we know moral truths they are self-evident to direct rational apprehension
2. A view according to which there are a plurality of moral principles and no method for
adjudicating conflicts between them
Tenets of Dogmatic Rationalism
1. Moral Principles are Rational Principles
2. Right actions are not just instrumentally but intrinsically rational or right to do:
Clarke: Fit in themselves, in virtue of the relations between people or people and things
Wollaston: True rather than False
Wolff: Tending to the perfecting of our nature (where that is not exactly an instrumental
property)
Clarke (and Butler): moral actions are also useful
3. Moral Principles are apprehended through reason, perhaps by intuition
Support of this thesis through the Mathematics Comparison
(e.g. Clarke, Ross, Scanlon, Parfit)
4. Reason obligates and motivates us to moral action

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