International Phenomenological Society

Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue

Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of
Knowledge by Linda Zagzebski
Review by: John Greco
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 179-184
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Vol. LX, No. 1, January2000

Two Kinds of IntellectualVirtue

JOHN GRECO

Fordham University

Linda Zagzebski argues that knowledge should be understood in terms of

intellectual virtue. The kind of virtue she has in mind is on the model of
Aristotle's account of moral virtue:"A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep
and enduringacquiredexcellence of a person, involving a characteristicmotivation to produce a certaindesired end and reliable success in bringing about
that end." (137) Examples of such virtues are open-mindedness,fair-mindedness, intellectual thoroughnessand intellectual courage. Zagzebski calls her
theory of knowledge a "true"virtue theory, distinguishing it from reliabilist
theories of Sosa and Goldman.' These latter authorsuse the terminology of
intellectual virtue and virtue epistemology, but in a way that, according to
Zagzebski, misuses the language of virtue.
In what follows below I will argue for two theses. First, there is an
importantway of dividing up the landscape so that the theories of Sosa and
Goldman are indeed virtue theories. On this understanding,all three of our
authorsare in the same broadcamp; one which can appropriatelybe labeled
"virtueepistemology,"and which can be distinguishedfrom otherbroadalternatives concerning the natureof knowledge. The real disagreementbetween
Zagzebski on the one hand, and Sosa and Goldman on the other, is over the
nature of intellectual virtue, or that kind of virtue which is required for
knowledge.
Once the question is put this way, it is possible to argue for my second
thesis. Namely, virtue reliabilists such as Sosa and Goldman are correct in
rejectingAristotle's accountof the moral virtues as the model for understanding intellectualvirtue.ContraZagzebski, the cognitive characterthat grounds
knowledge need not be acquired, need not include the strong motivational
component of an Aristotleanmoral virtue,and need not be an "excellence"in
Aristotle's sense. Rather, the essential aspect of an intellectual virtue is its
success component, or in Sosa's and Goldman's terms, its reliability.
For Sosa's and Goldman's positions, see Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Alvin Goldman, Liaisons:
Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT
Press, 1992).
BOOKSYMPOSIUM179

Finally, Zagzebski may be correctthat the way humanknowers are reliable is

through manifesting Zagzebski-type intellectual virtues. But even if this is
correct, that says something about the mechanics of human cognition rather
than the conditionsfor knowledge.
1. Can reliabilist theories be virtue theories?
One objection that Zagzebski raises against Sosa/Goldman-type virtue
theories is terminological. She claims that Sosa, and others following him,
have misused the language of virtue. It will be fruitful to discuss this terminological point, because it speaks to the more substantiveone that I eventually want to make. Namely, the general notion of a virtue is quite broad, and
the real disagreementbetween Zagzebski and othervirtuetheoristsis over the
natureof intellectualvirtues.
Zagzebski claims that Sosa (and I following him) have misunderstoodthe
Greeks' notion of a virtue.
Sosa's examples of intellectual virtues are faculties such as eyesight and memory, which are
not virtues at all in traditionalvirtue theory. It turns out, then, that his plea for a turn to the concept of intellectual virtue actually has little to do with the concept of intellectual virtue as a
virtue in the classical sense. (9)
It is quite obvious that sight, hearing, and memory are faculties, and (as mentioned in n.4), the
Greeks identified virtues, not with faculties themselves, but with the excellence of faculties.
The sense in which Greco's examples can be considered virtues, then, is misapplied if it is
intended to reflect the way the concept of virtue has been applied in ethics. (10)

It seems to me, however, that it is Zagzebski who has the terminology

wrong. Specifically, she has confused Aristotle's account of moral virtue
with the definition of virtue in general. As Sosa notes, Plato calls vision the
virtue of the eyes and hearing the virtue of the ears. (Republic, Book I, 342,
352) The following passage from Aquinasfollows Plato's usage.
Virtue designates a certain kind of perfection of a power.... Now some powers are of
themselves determined to their acts, for instance, active naturalpowers. Hence these natural
powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rationalpowers, which are properto man, are
not determined to some one thing, but are related indeterminately to many, and they are
determinedto their acts by habits, as we have said. (Summa Theologiae, I-II, question LV)2

Ironically, Aquinas' point in the passage is that some virtues are acquired
habits;the objection he is answeringis that virtues are commonly understood
as the powers themselves, and not habits that direct the powers. Aquinas'
response is to acknowledge that some powers are virtues, but he goes on to
insist that some habits are virtues too. Specifically, where the power is not
perfectedby nature,a good habit is needed to perfect the power, and so habits
2

180

"The translationis by John A. Oesterle, in St. Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on the Virtues
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).
JOHNGRECO

can be virtues. Of course Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that our higher
rational powers are cases in point; they are not perfected by nature, and so
their virtues are to be identifiedwith acquiredhabits. But that is a substantive
claim about the natureof those virtues. It is not true by definition of virtues
in general.
If we do not make Aristotle's account of moral virtue definitional of the
concept of virtue in general,then we can see that Sosa, Goldmanand Zagzebski are membersof an importantcamp; one appropriatelylabeled "virtueepistemology." The defining characteristicof virtue epistemology, in this sense,
is that it makes the normativepropertiesof persons conceptually priorto the
normative properties of beliefs. In "The Raft and the Pyramid," Sosa suggested that epistemology ought to borrow this strategy from virtue theories
in ethics.3In moral virtue theories, normativepropertiesattachingto character are basic. The normativepropertiesof actions are derivative,to be understood in terms of their relation to virtuous moral character.Sosa argued that
the same orderof analysis should be followed in epistemology. Here primary
epistemic evaluationwould attachto intellectual character.The evaluation of
beliefs, judgmentsand the like would be derivative,to be understoodin terms
of their relation to virtuous intellectual character.In Zagzebski's terminology, virtue theories in ethics are "virtue-based"ratherthan "act-based."That
is, such theories define the normative propertiesof acts in terms of the normative properties of persons, rather than the other way around. Virtue
theories in epistemology are "virtue-based"ratherthan "belief-based,"again
due to the orderof analysis that a virtuetheory follows. (15-16)
Accordingly, Zagzebski is incorrectwhen she claims that Sosa models his
epistemology on an act-based moral theory, and when she characterizes
reliabilism in general as belief-based (7-8). Versions of reliabilism can be
belief-based, insofar as it is open to reliabilismto define virtuouscharacterin
terms of justified belief or knowledge. But that is not what Sosa or the later
Goldman do. Rather, their virtue reliabilisms define justified belief and
knowledge in terms of virtuous character. Once this move to a virtue
approachhas been made, the central theoreticalquestion becomes the nature
of the intellectual virtues. In other words, what kind of characteris required
for knowing, justified believing, and the like. This is the real issue between
Zagzebski on the one hand,and Sosa and Goldmanon the other.4
2. What kind of intellectual virtue is relevant to knowledge?
Zagzebski defines knowledge as true belief arising out of acts of intellectual
virtue. (270-71) An act of intellectualvirtue A is "an act that arises from the
3
4

The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence vs Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,"
MidwestStudies in Philosophy 5 (1980): 3-25. Reprintedin Knowledge in Perspective.
Zagzebski is aware of Sosa's call for a virtue-based epistemology, but for some reason
does not recognize that Sosa's own theory is an instance of such. See pp. 8-10.

BOOK SYMPOSIUM 181

motivational component of A, is something a person with virtue A would

(probably) do in the circumstances,is successful in achieving the end of the
A motivation, and is such thatthe agent acquiresa true belief (cognitive contact with reality) through these features of the act." (270) Notice that on
Zagzebski's definition, an act of intellectual virtue does not require that the
agent actuallypossess the virtue in question.However, it does requirethat the
agent manifest the motivation that is characteristicof the virtue, and that the
agent achieve the particularend of the virtue. For example, an act of openmindedness involves a motivation to be receptive to new ideas and
arguments,achieves thatparticularend, and arrivesat true belief by means of
manifestingthe motivationand achieving the end. (269-70)
In this section I will argue that virtue reliabilists are correct in rejecting
Zagzebski's model of intellectual virtue. First, Zagzebski-type acts of virtue
are not necessary for knowledge, because a person with a reliable cognitive
charactercan have knowledge without them. Second, Zagzebski-typeacts of
virtue are not sufficient for knowledge, because a person without a reliable
cognitive charactercannothave knowledgewith them.5

a. Zagzebski-type acts of virtue are not necessary

for knowledge.
Considera cognitive agent who never engages in Zagzebski-typeacts of intellectual virtue. He never manifests the characteristic motivations of these
virtues, and is never successful at bringingabouttheircharacteristicends. For
example, he never engages in acts thatwould be consideredfair-minded,openminded, careful, or thorough.However, suppose that despite all this the person is highly reliable in making correct judgements in certain important
domains; he is almost never wrong in these areas of his expertise, and in fact
outperforms other, more open-minded, fair-minded, careful and thorough
persons. It seems to me that such a person does not lack knowledge for lack
of Zagzebski-typevirtuousacts. Rather,he acquiresknowledge in some other
way.
The above example seems not only possible but actual. For example,
some mathematicalgeniuses appearto be this way. But even if this is not the
case, suppose that we encountered non-human cognitive agents who were
infallible in the usual domains of human inquiry, but who never engaged in
Zagzebski-type virtuous acts. Clearly we would not say that these agents do
not have knowledge. Rather, we would say that they do not acquire knowledge like we do.

182

Zagzebski's acts of virtue might be less than sufficient for knowledge because of Gettiertype reasons as well. I am not here concerned with that kind of problem.
JOHNGRECO

b. Zagzebski-type

acts of virtue are not sufficient

for knowledge.

It will be rememberedthat Zagzebski-type acts of virtue do not require that

the agent possess the virtue in question. Rather,the act must be "something
a person with virtueA would (probably)do in the circumstances."This opens
the account to an objection that is similar to one raised against process
reliabilism. Early versions of reliabilism defined knowledge in terms of
reliable processes, with no restriction on which reliable processes were the
relevant ones. This led to the problemof fleeting processes. Specifically, it is
possible for an agent to adopt a highly reliable process in a fleeting, even
accidental manner, but it seems wrong that the person thereby acquires
knowledge.
For example, suppose that a poor math studentadopts a correct algorithm
for solving an equationhe is working on. By hypothesis, using the algorithm
is a highly reliable process for solving the equation. But suppose the student
almost never uses a correct algorithm;usually he adopts an incorrectone, or
merely hazardsa wild guess. Then it seems wrong to say that he has knowledge in the case where he happens to use a reliable process. The principle
behind the example is this: knowledge requiresmore than that some process
the agent adopts, however fleetingly, be reliable. What is requiredis that the
agent be reliable. This might be cashed out in terms of a reliable disposition
to adopt reliable processes, but it is the agent-reliability that is doing the
work, not the process-reliabilityas such.
Zagzebski's definition of knowledge is open to a similar objection. Since
she does not requirethat the knower actually possess any intellectual virtue,
it is possible to think of Zagzebski-type acts as fleeting processes. On a
particularoccasion one might do "something a person with virtue A would
(probably)do in the circumstances,"and yet possess no disposition to act this
way in general. Even if we grant that acting in the specified way is highly
reliable, the agent herself would not be reliable. She would possess no
dispositionto act in the reliableway, and thereforewould not have knowledge
on the rareoccasion that she does act that way. Zagzebski does requirethat a
person have a "motive disposition." The way she understands the
motivational component of an act of virtue is that the person have a
disposition to have the characteristicmotivation of the virtue in question. But
she does not requirea disposition for success in achieving the characteristic
end of the virtue, or in achieving the ultimate end of arriving at true belief.
(276, 279)
Zagzebski's account can be modified to addressthis concern. Specifically,
we can simply add to her definition of an act of virtue that the agent
possesses the virtue in question. Because such virtues are understoodto have
a reliability component,this assures that agents who act virtuouslyare agentreliable. This gives rise to a different question, however. Namely, what role
BOOK SYMPOSIUM

183

do Zagzebski-type virtues as such play in the revised conditions for knowledge? It seems that they do not play any importantrole at all.
We can see the point clearly if we distinguish two aspects of the success
componentof Zagzebski-typevirtues.First, the success componentis defined
in terms of the characteristic end of the virtue in question. For example, the
virtue of open-mindedness involves reliable success at being open-minded.
Second, Zagzebski-type virtues involve success at achieving the more
ultimateend of truth."Theintellectualvirtues are a subset of truth-conducive
traits that are entrenchedand whose entrenchmentaids their truthconduciveness." (178-79) Clearly the first aspect of the success component does not
entail the second, for traitslike open-mindedness,courageousnessand the like
are not necessarily truth-conducive.Perhaps Zagzebski means to stipulate
here: in orderfor a charactertraitto count as an intellectual virtue, it must in
fact be truth-conducive.
The point is now this. If we understandthe success componentof intellectual virtues only in the first way, it will still be possible to act virtuously
and be unreliable.The problem of agent-reliability,or lack thereof, persists.
Suppose we understandthe success componentto include the second way. It
will now be impossible to engage in acts of virtue and not be reliable, and so
the problemraised above is avoided. But once again it is the agent-reliability
that is doing the work, and nothing about Zagzebski-typevirtues as such. In
other words, the person who acts virtuously has knowledge because she is
reliable, not because she manifests any of the other components of Zagzebski-type virtues.
The above considerations show that Zagzebski-type virtues are not
relevant to the definition of knowledge. At best, Zagzebski has given us a
correct account of some special features of human cognition. The way that
humansare agent-reliable,and thereforesatisfy the conditions for knowledge,
is by having and manifesting Zagzebski-typevirtues. But even if this is correct, that says something aboutthe mechanics of humancognition ratherthan
the conditions for knowledge. Is Zagzebski correcteven about the mechanics
of human cognition? This is an interesting question, but almost wholly an
empirical one.

184

JOHN GRECO