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Kojima
Jean-Louis Rallu
Abstract
Kojima (Hiroshi), Rallu (Jean-Louis). - Fertility in Japan and France Fertility in Japan and France was
very similar between 1975 and 1985, but the subsequent decline has been greater in Japan, where
levels have stood at below 1.5 births per woman since 1993. A study of fertility using civil registration
and survey data, and from indices based on the parity-specific birth probabilities, reveals that the
decline in fertility in Japan was due to the fall in nuptiality until the mid-1980s but that since then there
has also been a fall in fertility within marriage. Unlike in France, extra-marital fertility has not increased
in Japan, and the compensation due to postponed births remained at a low level until the start of the
1990s. There are various cultural and economic obstacles in Japan to an increase in fertility outside
marriage and among older women. It is through these new forms of fertility behaviour that France has
been able to maintain a relatively high fertility based on an overall rate of childlessness that is still quite
low.
Rsum
Kojima (Hiroshi), Rallu (Jean-Louis). - La fcondit au Japon et en France La fcondit tait peu
diffrente au Japon et en France entre 1975 et 1985, mais la baisse a t ensuite plus importante au
Japon avec des niveaux infrieurs 1,5 naissance par femme depuis 1993. L'tude de la fcondit
partir de donnes d'tat civil et d'enqutes, et d'indices bass sur les probabilits de naissance par
rang, montre que la baisse de la fcondit au Japon a rsult de la baisse de la nuptialit jusqu'au
milieu des annes 1980 mais consiste aussi depuis lors en une baisse de la fcondit dans le mariage.
la diffrence de la France, on n'observe pas au Japon d'augmentation de la fcondit hors mariage et
la rcupration des naissances retardes est reste peu importante jusqu'au dbut des annes 1990.
Le dveloppement de la fcondit hors mariage et des ges avancs se heurte diverses contraintes
culturelles et conomiques. C'est, au contraire, grce ces nouveaux comportements que la France
conserve une fcondit assez leve sur la base d'une infcondit des gnrations encore assez faible.
Resumen
Kojima (Hiroshi), Rallu (Jean-Louis). - La fecundidad en Japon y en Francia Entre 1975 y 1985, los
nivels de fecundidad de Francia y Japon eran similares, pero la disminucin posterior fue ms fuerte
en Japon, donde se alcanzan nivels inferiores a 1,5 nacimientos por mujer despus de 1993. El
estudio de la fecundidad a partir de datos del registro civil, encuestas e indices ba- sados en las
probabilidades de nacimiento por rango, muestra que la disminucin de la fecundidad observada en
Japon fue debida a la disminucin de la nupcialidad hasta la mitad de los aos ochenta, pero que, ms
recientemente, se explica tambin por la disminucin de la fecundidad dentro del matrimonio. A
diferencia de Francia, en Japon no se observa un aumento de la fecundidad fuera del matrimonio y la
fecundidad en edades avanzadas sigue siendo poco significativa hasta el incio de la dcada de los
noventa. Ambos fenmenos (fecundidad fuera del matrimonio y en edades avanzadas) se enfrentan a
multiples restricciones culturales y econmicas. En Francia, sin embargo, estos nuevos
comportamientos mantienen el nivel de fecundidad rela- tivamente elevado, teniendo en cuenta que
existe un nivel todavia reducido de infecundidad.
FERTILITY IN JAPAN
AND FRANCE
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320
., J.-L. RALLU
321
(1) In addition, a date of marriage preceding the date of first birth is automati
callyattributed to married mothers who did not state date of marriage.
322
and Toulemon, 1994). Civil registration and survey data can be combined
to calculate period fertility indices that are independent of these structures.
The period indices
323
TFR France
TFR Japan
1.2
i
i i
i
i
i i
i i
i
i
1.0
1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993
Year
Figure 1a. - Total fertility rates (TFR), Japan and France
baby boom', Figure la shows how relative this was. The two TFR trends
are remarkably similar during the mid-1970s low period which has often
been, perhaps precipitately, attributed to the oil shock; we shall come back
to this later. The subsequent recovery occurred later and was slighter and
briefer in Japan than in France, and it was followed by a more substantial
decline. Between 1975 and 1985, both countries were among those indus
trialized
countries that were closest to replacement level. Since then, the
two have diverged, and Japan is now heading towards a markedly low
fertility. In reality, the earlier resemblances conceal profound differences
that come to light when we examine the other indices - PATFR, PDTFR
and PADTFR - and in particular their birth-order components.
The other indices
324
2.2
2.0
PADTFR
PDTFR
1.8 -
1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993
Year
Figure 1b. - Period fertility indices, Japan
in both countries (7% higher around 1990). The different positions and
time trends of PATFR, PDTFR and PADTFR in relation to TFR are ex
plained
by birth order factors.
In the case of first births, TFR exceeds PATFR when women's parity
structure is favourable, that is, when the proportion childless - at risk of
first birth - is higher, in a given year, in the actual population than in the
synthetic population (female population by age and parity constructed from
the fertility rates observed that year). This is the case when lower, or later,
fertility in preceding years has left more women still childless. For second
and higher order births (n = 2+), TFR is lower than PATFR when the pro
portion
of women of a given age having n-\ children is lower in the actual
population than in the stable population associated with the fertility of
that year. This was the case during the baby boom and up to the early
1970s, in a context of earlier childbearing owing to earlier marriage or
union formation and to shorter birth intervals. Japan, as well as France
and Western Europe, although to a lesser extent, experienced this situation
in the 1960s and early 1970s (see below).
After 1975 (1974 in Japan), the parity structure does not work in
favour of TFR. For first births:
Owing to the fertility decline among younger women, the proportion of
women who have already borne one child is higher, from 1976 on, than
that derived from the 'current conditions'. Young women have fewer first
325
PDiTFR
.^.~. PDTFR
i
i i i i
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993
Year
i
i
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981
1.4
1.6
326
PATFRl France
PATFR1 Japan
PADTFR2 France
TFR3 France
TFR2 France
PADTFR2 Japan
PADTFR3 France
TFR4 France
/
PADTFR4 France
/
TFR2 Japan
TFR3 Japan
PADTFR3 Japan
TFR4 Japan
/ PADTFR4 Japan
327
component reinforces this effect, especially for PADTFR. For all birth or
ders
combined, PATFR and PADTFR are higher than TFR since 1975. This
would suggest that the postponement of first births is the primary cause
of the low fertility currently observed in both Japan and France. The fact
that the position of the different indices is inversed at practically the same
moment in both countries shows the changes in fertility behaviour occurred
almost simultaneously and in the same direction.
In summary, the Japanese fertility level in 1994 amounts to 1.60 ac
cording
to PADTFR, 7% more than TFR but less than PDTFR (1.65), which
is often used to derive fertility values from the fertility and family planning
surveys in Japan. The French fertility level in 1989 was 1.94 according
to PADTFR (vs 1.68 in Japan that year), which was also 7% higher than
TFR and much lower than PDTFR, which is not used in France.
Period fertility levels
by birth order
328
different moments, and less significantly in Japan, where the level has since
dropped at the end of the 1980s before stabilizing at around 0.20 third
births per woman. As for births of fourth and higher orders, they are much
more rare in Japan than in France.
Period parity progression ratios
329
600
..--"*---.
a2Japan
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a2 France
y----
400
I
\"
300
fl3 France
\ a3 Japan
I
I
L
oooooooooonoon
On On On On On On On On
I
100
200
330
Japan 1975
Order 2
10
11
12
13
14
15
Duration (years)
160
140 Order 3
Japan 1989
120
100 -
France 1989
80
/
/ ///Japan 1975 \
/ .
/
/
40
1/
France 1975
60
'1
0
1
20
9
T^:
~ " - -|-
10
11
12
13
14
15
Duration (years)
Figure 4. - Birth probabilities of orders 2 and 3 by duration since
previous birth, Japan and France
331
in the mid-1970s then rose again, and remained just under the 0.9 level
between 1978 and 1984. A further decrease brought it down to 0.8 in 199294. This value is again lower than that calculated from first marriages in
the Fertility Survey.
PPPR a2 (the probability of having a third child when a second has
been borne) was around 0.4 before 1973 and fell to 0.3 in 1975. It then
rose, particularly in the early 1980s, and has stabilized at around 0.37 since
1984. Parity progression ratio a3 (the probability of having a fourth child
when a third has been borne) is very low and the time trend is more or
less parallel to a2.
In France, ax was 0.83 in 1965 and fell below 0.70 in the mid-1970s
- a level much lower than in Japan - before climbing back up to 0.8 during
the 1980s (Figure 3). The fluctuations in a, are much more marked in France
than in Japan. It is also noteworthy that until recently (owing to the decline
in Japan), \ was much lower in France than in Japan, while a2 and, even
more, a3- despite having experienced, like au substantial variations around
1980 - have been much higher in France. Leaving aside France's rapid
about-turn in a2, the two countries show some similarity in the pattern
observed from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s in a2 and a3, namely an
upward trend.
The birth probabilities by duration since previous birth, which ex
press
the probability that women at parity n-1 will have an nth birth, are
better than fertility rates by birth interval - particularly at long durations
- for showing the extent of the fertility variations in France between 1975
and the end of the 1980s. The second-birth probabilities were very low in
France in 1975, but they picked up rapidly thereafter (Figure 4a). In Japan,
the changes are barely discernible at durations below 4 years: the Japanese
family model - a second birth following close on the heels of the first was scarcely affected by the fertility decline in the mid-1970s. At durations
4 years and more, however, the second-birth probabilities are observed to
have fallen somewhat between 1975 and 1989, showing that a change in
family formation has, in fact, occurred. The annual PADTFR values (Ap
pendix
Table 2) confirm that the birth of a second child has become less
frequent since the mid-1980s, and only just about stabilized in the early
1990s. Thus, at a time when French women responded to the context by
spacing their births and increased fertility at long durations, the behaviour
of Japanese women was relatively unyielding. Similar patterns of change
are observed in the third-birth probabilities in the two countries, with an
increase this time also in Japan (Figure 4b); nonetheless, they remain much
higher in France in 1989 at durations of 4 years and more since the second birth.
Mean age of mothers
332
Years of age
34
Japan order 3
32
30
_ . Japan order 2
France order 2
France order 1
1967
1971
1973
1975
1977
1985
1987
1989
1991
l
1983
I l
1979 1981
l
i
1969
20
1965
22
1993
Year
France (Figure 5). Age at first birth then grew more rapidly in France than
in Japan, because of the greater recovery of delayed first births at late
childbearing ages (see above). Mean age at second birth runs parallel with
mean age at first birth in Japan, where most first births are followed by
a second birth with stable interval patterns; mean age at third birth follows
a similar trend. In France, while a slight dip is observed in age at first
birth during the early 1970s, the mean ages at second and third births rise,
mostly owing to a lengthening of birth intervals. Thereafter, the three time
trends move in the same direction, but they are less parallel than in Japan
and the ages increase more rapidly. Thus, fertility has remained younger
overall in France, but the gap with Japan has shrunk from 1 year in 1965
to less than 0.5 year in 1989.
II. - Nuptiality and fertility
Given that extra-marital fertility is very low in Japan, the level of
nuptiality has a strong influence on childlessness, and the recent develop
mentsin first-birth fertility must be considered from this perspective.
333
First marriages
0.8
TFMR, France
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.3 l
0.4
i
u-i On
On
NOvO4OvONOt^t^I^t~-t^r^r^r^t^(^00000000000000000000ONONONONON
On
t^ On
oo On
o\ On
o On
'oin^ifihooaO"
On On On On On On On On On On cNo^vivor-ooavO
On On On On On On On On On On
NOn On
m TfOn
Year
Figure 6. - First marriage indicators for women, Japan and France
(4) By calendar-year table, we refer to the period index obtained by combining the
age-specific probabilities of first marriage in a given year, that is, taking into account the
fact that only never-married persons can marry for the first time. The total first marriage
rate (TFMR) is a period sum of incidence rates, that is, relating first marriages at a given
age to the total population of that age, whether at risk or not. Cf. Rallu and Toulemon loc.
cit., p. 85 and Table 4 in the Demographic Situation annual report in Population: An English
Selection.
334
200 -
\
\
i i i
i i
//First births
\
1994
^isa&f"\
If
//
il
// //
100 -
50 --
150 -
1 1
1 ""i^-t-i^-_4-J--.t-i,.J.-Age
335
Japan 1980
160
140
120
100
80 -
\ France 1989
France 1980/
V /
\/
-' Japan
Japan1994
1990
60
40
/y
1
20
Age
' * The same author reports that when women who are cohabiting or are not in a stable
union become pregnant, they generally either marry or abort.
<7) Between 1980 and 1990, the growth of first-birth fertility after age 28 represents
only 40% of the decline before this age in Japan. In France between 1980 and 1989, the
growth begins after age 25 and it represents 80% of the decline at younger ages. Over a
longer period, 1973-89, the increases at older ages represent only 23% of the decline at younger
ages in Japan, as against 47% in France.
336
modest between 1990 and 1994. In contrast, the first birth probabilities
have grown much more substantially in France between 1980 and 1989,
and as from age 28. We shall come back later to this relatively slight upturn
in Japan.
Thus, the Japanese fertility decline in the mid-1970s appears to have
been solely caused by the nuptiality decline which emerged around 1970,
according to the first marriage tables. This is not the case in 1980, when
marital fertility shows distinct signs of a real decrease: the Japanese model
of virtually universal marriage and of family formation implying a first
birth very early in marriage followed closely by a second, is thus chal
lenged.
The compensation mechanism whereby the first births that do not
occur at young ages are 'recovered' at later childbearing ages is not really
observed yet in Japan, and this explains much of the fertility decline, given
that there is no increase in extra-marital births to slow it down.
III. - Cohort replacement
Let us first take a look at the components of Japanese and French
fertility in recent years. The levels of first marriage and of fertility of
each birth order are very different (Table 1), and the TFR value in 1989
is 1.81 in France vs 1.57 in Japan, and 1.65 vs 1.50 in 1994 (for reasons
of data availability, we compare the situations in 1989). TFMR is 22 per
centage
points lower in France than in Japan, but this goes together with
a far higher proportion of extra-marital births. Although the parity pro
gression
ratio fl0 (from marriage to first birth) remains high in Japan, the
first-birth component of TFR is lower than in France. Because of higher
a, ratios and higher first-birth fertility during the mid-1980s, Japan maint
ains a second-birth TFR close to that of France, but its lower fertility at
higher birth orders brings the total TFR gap to a level of 0.24 in 1989.
Table 1 . - Nuptiality and fertility in Japan and France, 1989
Total fertility rate
Total first marriage rate
Extra-marital births (%)
TFR1*
PATFR1
TFR2
PADTFR2
TFR3
PADTFR3
TFR4
TFR5+
* TFR1...5+: Birth order components of TFR.
PATFR and PADTFR: indices explained in section I.
Japan
1.57
0.77
1 %
0.67
0.79
0.61
0.65
0.25
0.22
0.04
0.01
France
1.81
0.55
28%
0.72
0.86
0.62
0.68
0.33
0.28
0.08
0.06
337
Cohort analysis confirms the in-depth transformation of Japan's nuptiality and fertility models since the early 1970s. Before 1970, women's
first marriage rates were at their maximum, and marriage was soon fo
llowed
by a birth; in 1951, the combined probabilities of marriage and of
a first birth for married women gave 93.5% of women in this situation
(Feeney and Saito, 1986; Ogawa and Retherford, 1993). The cohorts born
after the Second World War, however, gradually move away from this model.
In cohort (denoted c.) 1950, already affected by the fertility decline, we
find only 0.90 first births per woman, and this reduction then becomes
more marked: 0.88 in 1955 and 0.85 in 1959. The first-birth fertility
value was slightly lower in France than in Japan in 1950 - 0.88 - and
then the two countries meet in 1954, with 12% of women remaining
childless. The downward trend thereafter accelerates in Japan, and in
1959 the proportions childless are 15% and 14% in Japan and France re
spectively.
The gap will widen rapidly unless more Japanese women catch
up on first births at the later childbearing ages.
Second births remain more frequent in Japan than in France in
1960 (0.69 vs 0.65), although the difference is less marked than in 1950
(0.78 vs 0.68), but third and higher order births are more widespread in
France. As a result, French women born before 1960 practically reach r
eplacement
level, while in Japan those born in 1955 fall below 2 children
per woman and 1959 is down to 1.9. Given the limited compensation
through later childbearing (although it has increased since 1990), completed
fertility in cohorts born in the mid-1960s will likely be no more than 1.65
(estimated by projecting the age-specific fertility trends; when the rates
are held constant from 1994, the estimate is 1.6). This is much lower than
France's 1.97 (or 1.91 when the rates are frozen from 1995) (Prioux, 1997).
The fertility levels at each birth order determine women's distribution
by completed family size. In 1950, this distribution shows considerable
divergences between the two countries (Table 2). There are fewer childless
women and mothers-of-one in Japan, and also fewer mothers with three
children or more. The result is a greater concentration on the two-child
family: more than half of women in Japan compared to 40% in France.
In 1960, although the Japanese distribution continues to focus on the
Table 2. - Percentage distribution of women by completed family size
Birth cohort 1950
France*
Japan
0 children
10
12
1 child
12
20
2 children
52
39
3 children or more
26
29
Total
100
100
* Leridon, Toulemon, 1996.
** Based on PATFR and PADTFR.
Year 1989**
Japan
21
14
43
22
100
France
14
18
40
28
100
338
two-child family, the latter's relative weight has fallen rapidly. We note
that though one-child families remain less frequent in Japan than in France,
childlessness has become more widespread.
IV. - Contraceptive use
Contraceptive use differs considerably in Japan and France. According
to the IPP National Fertility Survey of 1987, 63.3% of married women
aged under 49 were contraceptive users(8), but this figure is thought to be
underestimated and unmarried women were not asked whether they used
a method of contraception. In France, 65% of women aged 20-49, all marit
al
statuses combined, were contraceptive users in 1994 (Leridon and Toulemon, 1995), and a further 4% were sterilized; only 3% of women at risk
of pregnancy and not wanting a child were unprotected.
The two countries differ most in the methods employed. The 1996
Mainichi Shimbun survey (Hayashi, 1996) found that, among users, 77%
were protected by the condom, 3.8% by the IUD, 5.3% by sterilization
through tubal ligation, 1.2% by male sterilization (vasectomy) and only
1.3% by the pill, the remainder using periodic abstinence (Ogino and tem
perature
methods) or coitus interruptus. The government has taken a stand
against the pill - it is authorized only on medical (not contraceptive) grounds,
and at high doses; as a result, there are important side-effects and many
women are wary of taking chemical contraceptives. A low-dose oral con
traceptive
was to have been authorized in 1997, but the decision was post
poned.
According to the Mainichi Shimbun survey, however, only 16% of
unmarried and 13% of married women would be willing to adopt a lowdose pill (Wagatsuma, 1996; Hayashi, 1996). In France, the pill is far ahead
of any other method, with 57% of users aged 20-49, followed by the IUD
(25%). The condom concerns only 7% of contracepting women, but 45%
of first sexual relations.
The current abortion rate in Japan was derived from survey data for
the first time in 1996 (responses to the question "Did you undergo an
abortion during the last twelve months?"): it amounted to 14.8 per 1,000
women aged 15-49, that is, 25% higher than the official abortion statistics.
Almost 70% of married women stated they had never had an abortion,
compared to 50% in the surveys conducted in the early 1970s to mid-1980s
and 60% thereafter (Hayashi, 1996); although the figures are somewhat
shaky, it is likely that induced abortion has in fact declined. In France,
the abortion rate in 1994 was 15.1 per 1,000 women aged 15-49, or 0.52
abortions per woman.
339
340
only 16% of married under-30s and 19% at ages 30-34 used this right
between 1992 and 1996. This was principally either because women
preferred to give up their job completely to look after their children (46%)
or because the "atmosphere in their work place made it difficult to take
the leave" (15%). The child care leave is mainly aimed at full-time workers
who can fulfil the 12 months worked in the last two years condition, and
it can only have a positive impact on fertility if it stops women from leav
ing their job; otherwise the loss of income related to having a child
becomes prohibitive. This prospect could explain why marriages tend to
be deferred, since they are still expected to be followed post-haste by start
ing a family.
In the context of an imminent decline of the working-age population,
the solution of increasing women's participation in the labour force is often
proposed. Indeed, the female activity ratio is still M-shaped in Japan and
women's work is largely part-time. This solution contains, however, two
risks: a reduction of fertility and a reduction of the amount of care provided
by women for elderly family members (Ogawa and Matsukura, 1995).
Young Japanese women have studied for years, and they have other
horizons than the traditional family lifestyle (marriage and looking after
their children, with a sometimes painfully close link to the husband's family
when there is cohabitation). Low starting salaries and the high cost of urban
housing are further reasons why a young couple may postpone a formal,
and very expensive, wedding. The cost of education is another reason for
limiting family size, particularly when a first or second child has already
been born.
What is the family policy position in Japan? Those implemented by
a number of Western countries in the 1970s and 1980s have not succeeded
in raising fertility to replacement level. Japan has not launched any policies
of the kind, that would have recalled pre-war nationalism and would have
been perceived as an intrusion into private life. Although 18% of married
women reported in the 1996 Mainichi Shimbun that they were "very anxious"
about the low fertility level (and 63% "a little anxious") - because of their
fears concerning the future of pension systems, care of the elderly and the
nation's loss of economic and social vitality - a majority continue to think
that fertility is a private matter (65% in 1994 and 1996 vs 79% in 1990).
But 32% (as against 17% in 1990) think the government should do some
thing to boost fertility to replacement level (Okazaki, 1996); this opinion
is less frequent among the younger women, however. A family policy could
help compensate the low wages at the beginning of working life, and more
generally help conciliate pursuing a career with having a family; however,
crches and kindergarten are presently much less available in Japan than
in France.
As well as marriage postponement, the decline of first birth proba
bilities
is noteworthy. It is true that divorce - which is not a new phe
nomenon
in Japan and has never been seen as threatening the family model
34 1
- has increased since the 1970s and often occurs in the first years of marr
iage, but the fact that the shortfall of first births at younger ages is not
made up at later ages is also a problem. In the IPP surveys, the women
who say they expect to have fewer than their ideal number of children are
asked why. In 1992, 22% in age group 30-34 and 36% in 35-39 stated
they wanted no more children because of their age, and 30% said they
could no longer stand the physical and mental strain of childrearing. But
the costs entailed by children - education, keep - were the most common
reasons, with 38% and 46% respectively in age group 30-34 and 30% in
age group 35-39; compared to 1982, that was an 8 to 10 percentage point
increase (Kojima, 1993). We note here that, though the present economic
situation does not favour an upturn in fertility, the rates began to fall in
1983, long before the financial 'bubble' burst and the recession of the early
1990s. Among the other reasons stated in the survey, we find lack of space
for (more) children (30% at ages 25-29 and 20% at ages 30-34) and the
necessity that all children be independent when the husband retires (6%).
Incompatibility with work is mentioned only by 11-12% of women aged
25-39 (and more frequently by working women).
It therefore seems unlikely that fertility will increase in the near fu
ture
in Japan. The trend towards later marriage will continue, since for
women it is a means to ensure their place in the workforce, and it is not
sure that the babies not borne now by younger women will be borne when
they are older. Moreover, the reduction of the working-age population which
is expected at the turn of the century will encourage women's labour force
participation (Ogawa, 1996).
Conclusion
Registration data give a quite different picture of fertility in Japan
to the one provided by fertility surveys. Childlessness appears to be higher,
in connection with the marriage decline and that of first marital births.
From 1965 to the latter 1980s, nuptiality trends dictated fertility trends
and the parity progression ratio a0 and birth intervals were very stable.
Since then, however, a decrease in marital fertility has emerged. The Japanese
model of virtually universal marriage followed by the birth of one or two
children - unchanged until the 1970s for marriage and until the mid-1980s
for marital fertility - is thus challenged. The reasons are not a devaluation
of the family image - family formation still begins with marriage and di
vorce
is not perceived negatively as in France - but a mechanical conse
quence of delayed marriage, linked to economic conditions (housing costs,
salaries increasing with seniority) and women's desire to work. There is
also a loosening of the tie between marriage and childbearing, the impact
of which is all the more marked as Japanese society refuses births outside
marriage and does not favour having children later in life. Were the re-
342
luctance to have children after age 30 to diminish, fertility might rise once
marriage postponement has settled down. But fertility might just as well
fall if childlessness, linked to celibacy or not, were to continue to spread
and if the family model were to deviate further from the traditional twochild family. The fertility decline should consequently be read in the frame
workof a double set of constraints: those related to the traditional family
model and those concerning the modern way of life, both of which impose
restrictions on women and men. The outlook does not, therefore, seem promi
singand points to low fertility being here to stay. Unless... the possibility
of a collective realization of the demographic implications is not to be
ruled out. The implementation of a global family policy, encompassing child
education benefits, inter-generational solidarity, gender equity and the con
tinuance
of Japanese society, could have a positive effect on fertility.
In France, the growth of unmarried cohabitation and divorce has chal
lenged
the traditional family model more seriously. But this has resulted
in a rise in extra-marital fertility which, together with a shift towards later
childbearing, has kept childlessness at a rather low level. Family formation
patterns have also proved very sensitive to contextual factors, with large
variations in birth intervals, so that the rapid fertility decline in the mid1970s was in part made up around 1980. France is characterized also by
a relative stability of the two-child family model, while the proportion of
families with three children or more remains substantial. It is this combi
nation that has kept fertility close to replacement level.
Hiroshi Kojima, Jean-Louis R.ALLU
343
PATFR
2.845
2.756
2.609
2.529
2.482
2.435
2.453
2.374
2.267
2.085
1.937
1.858
1.880
1.848
1.872
1.951
1.953
1.926
1.817
1.837
1.852
1.874
1.855
1.870
1.865
France
PDiTFR
2.723
2.672
2.512
2.444
2.419
2.372
2.422
2.304
2.180
1.977
1.841
1.811
1.915
1.928
2.038
2.209
2.255
2.196
1.993
2.033
2.097
2.155
2.128
2.133
2.100
PDTFR PADTFR
1.969
1.904
1.948
1.952
2.021
2.138
2.192
2.166
2.026
2.049
2.096
2.141
2.132
2.144
2.131
1.922
1.834
1.858
1.841
1.887
1.987
2.013
1.991
1.876
1.889
1.916
1.945
1.932
1.946
1.937
344
Appendix Table 2. - Birth order components of fertility indices for Japan and
France, 1976-94
Japan
TFR1 TFR2 TFR3 PATFR1 FATFR2 PATFR3 PADTFR2 PADTFR3 PDTFR2 PDTFR3
1976
821
747
227
889
753
216
778
214
763
219
1977
786
732
225
879
732
204
737
200
738
209
1978
776
728
229
873
723
204
729
203
741
219
1979
773
707
231
868
712
202
206
741
225
726
778
228
207
1980
685
865
704
199
722
736
225
1981
785
673
228
864
702
200
725
209
734
227
1982
792
684
237
863
703
211
723
221
734
238
1983
805
692
247
863
709
224
731
239
742
254
1984
795
700
258
857
705
232
734
251
745
266
1985
759
691
260
842
688
227
723
248
736
266
742
672
259
832
674
220
242
260
1986
708
720
722
261
821
1987
661
660
218
696
240
714
261
1988
701
647
263
807
645
214
678
236
697
259
1989 673
606
251
788
617
197
647
217
663
242
1990
664
587
246
111
601
191
628
209
646
236
1991
681
572
237
775
600
191
624
208
641
233
1992
677
557
225
768
587
182
612
201
226
630
669
211
1993
538
758
569
170
593
190
611
215
1994
695
551
211
224
766
580
179
603
199
621
1995
662
522
197
743
546
160
568
180
586
205
France
TFR1 TFR2 TFR3 PATFR1 PATFR2 FATFR3 PADTFR2 PADTFR3 PDTFR2 PDTFR3
815
614
229
899
228
642
220
1976
657
662
243
1977
822
647
238
897
665
238
651
230
681
261
644
1978
808
632
238
895
653
226
224
680
263
1979
795
654
268
892
651
245
656
248
695
297
1980
816
679
311
897
667
280
682
289
720
344
1981
797
668
329
893
656
284
300
722
360
683
1982
792
666
305
891
653
269
685
286
727
342
1983
758
634
259
880
227
664
242
707
290
628
1984
746
641
278
875
627
235
666
249
711
302
1985 744
638
295
870
629
244
671
261
716
320
1986
741
645
311
869
633
254
680
273
725
338
1987
733
631
315
865
626
253
676
274
721
342
1988
728
630
323
863
632
256
681
278
721
345
1989
720
623
327
861
630
255
677
276
716
341
The indices are explained in section I.
345
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346
347
Hiroshi Kojima, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Ministry
of Health and Welfare, Kasumigaseki 1-2-3, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100, Japon