Sunteți pe pagina 1din 15

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

ANGEROUS DRUG ACT


42. FRANCISCO IMSON y ADRIANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 193003
13 July 2011CARPIO,
J
.:
Facts:
PO1 Gerry Pajares, PO1 Noli Pineda, the confidential informant, and other policemen arrived
at around 10:30 p.m. to theplace where a buy bust operation was about to be conducted by
reason of a report that accused Francisco Imson was sellingshabu. Said buy bust operation
was not undertaken because they saw Imson talking with Dayao. Thereafter, they sawImson
giving Rolando S. Dayao a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
Pajares approached thetwo men and introduced himself. He immediately apprehended Imson
while Pineda ran after Dayao who tried to escape.The policemen confiscated two plastic
sachets containing the suspected shabu.Imson and Dayao were brought to the Police Station
where they executed their joint sworn statements and where the twoplastic sachets were
marked with RDS and FIA ,the initials of the two. The two plastic sachets were examined
and bothtested positive for shabu.Two informations for illegal possession of dangerous drugs
against Imson and Dayao were filed.In its Decision, the RTC found Imson and Dayao guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.When appealed, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC.Imson and Dayao filed a
motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied said motion. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the two plastic sachets containing shabu were inadmissible in evidence
because the integrity of the chain of custody was impaired.
Resolution:
The failure of the policemen to make a physical inventory and to photograph the two plastic
sachets containing shabu donot render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence.
Likewise, the failure of the policemen to mark the two plasticsachets containing shabu at the
place of arrest does not render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People
v. Resurreccion, the Court held that the failure of the policemen to immediately mark the
confiscated items does notautomatically impair the integrity of chain of custody. The Court
held:
Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not automatically
impair the integrity of chain of custody.The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of
RA 9165 does not necessarily render an accuseds arrest illegal or theitems seized or
confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and theevidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.To be able to create a first link in the
chain of custody, then, what is required is that the marking be made in the presence of the
accused and upon immediate confiscation. Immediate Confiscation has no exact
definition. Thus, in People v. Gum-Oyen,testimony that included the marking of the seized
items at the police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient inshowing

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana


Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation
contemplates even marking atthe nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.
The presumption is that the policemen performed their official duties regularly. In order to
overcome this presumption,Imson must show that there was bad faith or improper motive on
the part of the policemen, or that the confiscated itemswere tampered. Imson failed to do so.
50. People vs Narvasa
GR. No. 128618 November 16, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
FELICISIMO NARVASA, JIMMY ORANIA and MATEO NARVASA, accused, FELICISIMO
NARVASA and JIMMY ORANIA, appellants.
FACTS: Three informations were filed against accused-appellants, two for aggravated illegal
possession of firearm and one for homicide.
The trial court in convicting the accused guilty of aggravated illegal possession of firearm
accorded credibility to the prosecution witnesses and held that mere denial could not
overcome the prosecution evidence showing that appellants used high-powered firearms to
shoot at the prosecution witnesses, thereby resulting in the death of SPO3 Primo Camba.
Further supporting said testimonies were the results of the paraffin test conducted on
appellants and the recovery of various cartridges and shells matching the firearms
purportedly used in the crime. Though these unlicensed firearms were not presented as
evidence, the trial court, citing People v. Ferrera, ruled that appellants may still be convicted
of illegal possession of firearms.
Appellants question the credibility of Witnesses Laderas and Nagal because of an alleged
inconsistency in their testimonies. Laderas testified that there was an exchange of fire
between appellants and PO2 Simeon Navora, while Nagal declared that only the appellants
fired. Appellants point out that conflicting testimonies on a material and relevant point casts
doubt [on] the truthfulness or veracity 17 of such testimonies.
ISSUE1: W/N the inconsistencies in the witnesses testimonies affected their credibility
HELD1: Appellants contention is untenable. The circumstances of the instant case explain
the seeming inconsistency in the testimonies of the two witnesses. At the time, they were
under fire and in fear of losing their lives. Moreover, they did not take cover in the same place
that Navora did.
Nonetheless, their uncertainty on whether Navora had fired back is immaterial to the crime
charged and too insignificant to impair their credibility. In any event, the Court has ruled that a
Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana
Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of minute


details.
ISSUE2: W/N the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the appellants conviction
HELD2: Appellants cite People v. Lualhati, wherein this Court ruled that in crimes involving
illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof,
viz: the existence of the subject firearm and the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the
same. Appellants contend that the existence of the firearms was not sufficiently proven
because the prosecution had not presented the firearms as evidence. It is necessary, they
argue, that said firearms allegedly possessed by the accused-appellants and allegedly used
in the killing of Policeman Primo Camba be presented in evidence as those firearms
constitute the corpus delicti of the crime with which they are sentenced. 20
Appellants argument is not persuasive. In People v. Lualhati, this Court merely stated that
the existence of the firearm must be established; it did not rule that the firearm itself had to be
presented as evidence. Thus, in People v. Orehuela, the Court held that the existence of
the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said
firearm. In the said case, Appellant Orehuela was convicted of qualified illegal possession of
a firearm despite the fact that the firearm used was not presented as evidence. The existence
of the weapon was deemed amply established by the testimony of an eyewitness that
Orehuela was in possession of it and had used it to kill the victim.
98. ARTURO MEJORADA VS.SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Mejorada was a right of way agent employed in the Office of the Highway District
Engineer in Pasig, Metro Manila. His work was to negotiate with property owners affected by
highway constructions/improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the damages
that they may incur. Mejorada required the claimants de Leon et.al to sign blank copies of
Sworn Statement on the Correct Assessment and Fair Market Value of Real Properties as
well as an Agreement to demolish, remove and reconstruct improvements. Claimants did sign
without bothering what those documents were about as they were more concerned with just
compensation supposedly due them. In the signed documents, Mejorada made it appear that
the value of the properties of the claimants were much higher than actual value claimed by
the de leon et. Al. What was reflected in the Agreement was the value of improvements that
was P2,000 lower than the value declared by the owner/claimants. Also, declarations of
property were attached to the documents, which declarations were actually falsified as they
were registered under different names other than the claimants. Claimants were later
accompanied by Mejorada to receive the proceeds of their checks. But Mejorada took part of
the proceeds. Claimants could not complain as they were afraid of Mejoradas armed
companions. Claimants de leon et.al later filed complaints against Mejorada (assisted by their

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana


Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

counsel) with the Provincial Fiscal Office in Pasig. Consequently, 8 informations were filed
against Mejorada.
Mejoradas contentions 1. He cannot be guilty of violating S3 of RA 3019 as he is not charged
with the duty of granting licenses, permits as mentioned in the provision. 2. His act was not
done while in the performance of his official functions 3. Claimants were not injured party 4.
The most that can be charged against him is Robbery not liable under RA 3019
ISSUES: WON Mejoradas act constitute the offense in S3 of RA 3019 (i.e. causing undue
injury to any partygiving party unwarranted benefits... thru manifest partiality, evident bad
faith / gross inexcusable negligence.) and have been clearly and convincingly proven by
the prosecution?
Other Issues (Crimpro related):
WON offense proved during trial should prevail over offense charged in the info
WON Sandiganbayan is the competent court with jurisdiction over the case
RULING: YES. Mejorada is guilty under RA3019 for violating S3 of the law. He is a public
officer who took advantage of his position by making claimants sign agreements which
contained falsified declarations of the value of improvements and lots. There was manifest
evident bad faith on his part when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he
divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them. The claimants are not the
only injured party but also the State because the latter was disadvantaged with Mejoradas
act of inflating said values of property. The law is not limited to those public officials who
committed the prohibited act while discharging their duty of granting licenses, permits but
also those who committed prohibited acts while being public officers. Offense charged in the
info should prevail over offense proved during trial. Since this is the case, the appropriate
penalty that should be imposed upon Mejorada is 56 years and 8 days and this did not violate
the 3 Fold rule of the RPC. Art. 70 speaks of service of sentence, duration of penalty and
penalty to be inflicted and not on the imposition of penalty. It merely provides that the prisoner
cannot serve more than 3x the most severe of the penalties of 40 years. The Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over Mejoradas case as he is deemed to have committed the prohibited act
while being a public officer.
90. Merencillo v People (521 scra 31)
Facts: Juanito Merencillo was charged of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct
bribery. Petitioner demanded from private complainant Ma. Angeles Ramasola Cesar
P20,000.00 in exchange for the approval of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR).
Due to the repeated demand of the petitioner and delaying the release of CAR, private
complainant seek the help of the authorities. As a result, petitioner was caught in the
entrapment instituted by the police. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged.
Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana
Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Sandiganbayan which was denied affirming the RTC
decision. Hence, this petition for review of certiorari, contending that he was twice in jeopardy
when he was prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.
Issue: WON the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.
Holding: No. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 begins with the following statement: Sec.3 In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following acts
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful: XXX
XXX
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the
RPC for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged
with a felony under the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged
simultaneously of successively for violation of the Sec.3 of RA 3019 and the RPC. The rule
against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to
commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or os
necessarily included in the other, as provided in Sec.7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An
offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint, constitute the latter; and an
offense charged is necessarily included in an offense proved when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under
RPC and those violation of Sec.3 (b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor
necessary inclusion between the two offenses although the two charges against the petitioner
stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct
offense.

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana


Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

JUDICIAL PROCEEDING THAT INTERRUPTS THE PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME


82. PEOPLE V. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012
Perez, J:
FACTS:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for
estafaand violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan(respond
ent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaintalleges that
respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of
NineMillion Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two P
esos(P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored uponpresentmen
t for payment.Consequently the case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two
countsfor violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan inthe
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On 17 June 2000, respondent filed anOmnibus
Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before
MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liabilityhas been extinguished
by reason of prescription.In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law that
governs theprescription of special penal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326
(An Act ToEstablish Periods Of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts)
where theright to file an action to a proper court and not to merely to prosecution office
forB.P. 22, prescribes four (4) years from the commission of the crime. The imputedviolation
occurred sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a case
wasformally filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the action alreadyprescribes.
RTC granted the motion.On the other hand, the complainant argued that the filing with the
office of cityprosecutor constitutes an interruption to the prescription.
ISSUE:
Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered a judicial proceeding thatcan interrupt
prescription of crime under B.P. 22?
HELD:
YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that, there is no more distinctionbetween
cases under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by
speciallaws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription; that theinstitution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation in the office of prosecutoragainst accused interrupts
the period of prescription.Following the factual finding the crime was committed sometime in
1995, the filingof complaint on September 1997, two (2) years from the commission of the
crime
validly interrupts the running of prescription. Therefore the action against therespondent
Pangilinan did not prescribe.

People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, March 10, 2000


Crim Pro - Rule 110

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana


Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Facts:
Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this instant case allegedly issued 9 checks
with the aggregate amount of P9,658,692 in favor of Virginia Malolos. But, upon Malolos'
presentment of the said checks, they were dishonored. So, on Sept. 16, 1997, Malolos filed
an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan.
On December 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of
commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance
against Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Later, Pangilinan also filed on December
10, 1997, a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question".
On March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended
Pangilinan's petition which was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Malolos,
then, raised the matter before the DOJ.
On January 5, 1999, Sec. of Justice Serafin Cuevas reversed the resolution of the
City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of the informations for violation of BP 22 in connection
with Pangilinan's issuance of two checks, the charges involving the other checks were
dismissed. So, two counts of violation for BP 22, both dated Nov. 18, 1999, were filed against
Pangilinan on Feb. 3, 2000 before the MeTC of Quezon City.
On June 17, 2000, Pangilinan filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and
to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City, alleging
that the criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. The motion was
granted. Malolos filed a notice of appeal and the RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC.
According to the RTC, the offense has not yet prescribed "considering the appropriate
complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on
16 September 1997". Dissatisfied, Pangilinan raised the matter to the Supreme Court for
review but it was referred to the CA "for appropriate action".
On October 26, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and recognized Feb.
3, 2000 as the date of the filing of the informations.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September
1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
Held. Yes. Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22 cases,
[v]iolations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: after four years for those punished by imprisonment
for more than one month, but less than two years. Under Section 2 of the same Act, [t]he
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana


Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes
in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period,
however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16
September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000
because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition
before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial
question. The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor
approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of
Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the
filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
122. DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government(PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec.
3(h), inconnection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the
DoromalInternational Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million
worth ofelectronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the
Department ofEducation, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and
Youth Council (orNMYC).
An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said violation and
a
preliminary investigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file the information without the
approval of the Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor
under the 1987Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to
the Ombudsman) isclearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct
the filing of criminalcases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman.
Subsequently annulling the information filed by the Tanodbayan.
A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully,
participate in a business through the DoromalInternational Trading Corporation, a family
corporation of which he is the President, and which company participatedin the biddings
Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana
Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower
&Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution. The
petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since
therehad been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against
him. The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigatio
n isunnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.(2)
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve the
samesubject matter.(3) Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the
absence of preliminaryinvestigation.
HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the
SupremeCourt.RATIO:(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of
Doromal as part of the applicationto bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having
participated in a business which act isabsolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the
Constitution" because "the DITC remaineda family corporation in which Doromal has at least
an indirect interest."Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the
President, Vice-President, themembers of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall
not... during (their) tenure, ...directly orindirectly ... participate in any business.(2) The right of
the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over hisopposition
is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.Since the first information
was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shallalso be considered as
void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.(3) The absence of
preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case.Nor do they
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there wereno
preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention
ofthe court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct
such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so
that thepreliminary investigation may be conducted. WHEREFORE, the petition for
certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shallimmediately remand Criminal
Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminaryinvestigation and shall hold in
abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation.
130. G.R. Nos. 147706-07 | February 16, 2005 | PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and
EFREN L. ALAS, respondents | J. Corona
FACTS: Two separate informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were filed with the Sandiganbayan on November
17, 1999 against Efren L. Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous
advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating
Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing
Company which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government.

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana


Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of jurisdiction,
which motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After considering the arguments
of both parties, the respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private corporation and that its
officers, particularly herein respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
-

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officers unless private persons are
charged with them in the commission of the offenses.
The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings Bank is a subsidiary of the
Philippine Postal Corporation which is a government owned corporation, the same is
not created by a special law.
said entity is formed was primarily for business

The People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this petition arguing, in
essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned or controlled corporation as the term was
defined under Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code of 1987.
RA 8249 (act defining jurisdiction of sandiganbayan) did not make a distinction as to the
manner of creation of the government-owned or controlled corporations for their officers to fall
under its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under
the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
HELD: Petition granted. More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to
the government while the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were themselves
officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA
7354, otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of, among others, to
encourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the general public,
especially the youth and the marginalized sector in the countryside xxx and to facilitate
postal service by receiving collections and making payments, including postal money orders.
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish
Constitution: The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corrupt practices and such other offense committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to
their office as may be determined by law.
58. People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 138470)
Facts:
Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan, wasapproached by Garcia and
Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brandnew Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip
Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana
Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

to the Bicol region. Cortez refused, sayingthat the van was unavailable. Instead, he got in
touch with Ferdinand Ignacio,who had just purchased a brand new Toyota Tamaraw
FX. Ignacio agreed tolease his vehicle to Cortez for two days at the daily rate of P2,000.00.
Bernabeand Garcia, on the other hand, rented the vehicle from Cortez for P4,000.00 aday
inclusive of the P500.00 drivers fee. They agreed to pay the rental fee upontheir return from
Bicol. Cortez and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up IgnaciosTamaraw FX at his residence in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same backto Marilao, Bulacan and, at 8:00 a.m., he
and the two accused left for Bicol.However, four days passed without a word from Garcia and
Bernabe.Cortez began to worry about the vehicle he had borrowed from FerdinandIgnacio so
he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. It waslater found out that
the two accused attempted to sell the vehicle. They stabbedand dumped Elis him along the
highway near the sabana in San Rafael, Bulacanwhen Elis refused to join their plan to sell
the Tamaraw FX. The RTC found Artemio Garcia and Regalado Bernabe guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of specialcomplex crime of carnapping with homicide. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the two accused are guilty of the crime charged?
Decision:
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing andPenalizing Carnapping",
defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain,of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latters consent, or by meansof violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things."More specifically, the elements of the crime are as follows: 1. That
there is anactual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking
of the vehicle; 3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; 4. That
the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that thetaking was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things. A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all theelements of
carnapping were proved in this case. In the case at bar, it cannot bedenied that the nature of
the appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX wasinitially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful
killing of the deceased for the purposeof taking the vehicle radically transformed the
character of said possession intoan unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his
first visit to theMoncada Police Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained,
thetwo separately admitted to him that they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join
their plan to sell the
vehicle.Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellantconstituted the
crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of thevehicle and not the owner. The
settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence, it
is not necessary that the personunlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner
thereof. What is simply
required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actualpossession of the
property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as
thereis apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter's willthrough viole
nce or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of aproperty belonging to another is
imputable to the offender.
BASA, Michelle Yvonne L. Case Digests
Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana
Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

and entered another judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of carnapping
underRepublic Act No. 6539.
(2) PEOPLE vs. GARCIAFacts:
On December 17, 1996, Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan,
wasapproached by Artemio Garcia and Regalado Bernabe because they wanted to borrow
his brandnew Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip to the Bicol region. Cortez refused, saying that
the vanwas unavailable. Instead, Cortez got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who had just
purchased abrand new Toyota Tamaraw FX. Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for
two days. Fourdays passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortez began to worry
about the vehiclehe had borrowed from Ferdinand Ignacio so he informed the Barangay
Captain of Saog, Marilao,Bulacan. Meanwhile, Elis wife, Nancy, approached Cortez and
asked where her husband was.The Tamaraw FX, as well as Garcia and Bernabe were seen
in Nueva Ecija. When they failed toproduce documents of ownership over the Tamaraw FX,
they were brought to the MoncadaPolice Station for investigation.
Issue:
Whether the elements of the crime of Carnapping as defined in R.A. 6539 are present to
warrantthe conviction of the accused.
Held:
The Court held that all the elements of the crime of carnapping are present in this case.
Itexpounded that Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and
PenalizingCarnapping", defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor ve
hiclebelonging to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidationof persons, or by using force upon things." More specifically, the elements of the
crime are asfollows: 1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the offender
intends to gainfrom the taking of the vehicle; 3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other
than the offenderhimself; and 4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof;
or that the takingwas committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force uponthings. In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature of the
appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX was initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful
killing of the deceased for thepurpose of taking the vehicle radically transformed the
character of said possession into anunlawful one. The Court was convinced that while there
may be no direct evidence of thecommission of the crime, the foregoing constitute
circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrantGarcias and Bernabes conviction. The following
requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustaina conviction were met, to wit: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from whichthe inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
suchas to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances indeed form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that Bernabe and Garcia
werethe perpetrators of the crime. It has been held that facts and circumstances consistent
with guiltand inconsistent with innocence constitute evidence which, in weight and probative
force, maysurpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court. The Court affirmed the
decision of thetrial court and modified the award for damages.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)
178. People v. Arturo F. Pacificador (G.R. No. 139405)
Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana
Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Facts:
Respondent herein, Arturo F. Pacificador was then the Chairman of theBoard of the National
Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NSSC) , a GOCC andtherefore making respondent a public
officer.On Oct. 27, 1988 Pacificador and a certain Jose Marcelo were chargedbefore the
Sandiganbayan for violation of R.A. NO. 3019 otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information alleges that on or aboutDec. 6, 1975 to Jan.
6, 1976 Pacificador together with Mr. Marcelo who was thenchairman of a private corporation
Philippine Smelters Corporation , conspired tocause the transfer and conveyance of parcels
of land owned by the
NSSClocated in Camarines Norte to the private corporation Philippine SmeltersCorporation
by virtue of a contract of sale. That in relation to that sale theGovernment was in a serious
disadvantage for the contract price of such landwas only P 85, 144.50 compared to the
fairmarket value of P862,150.The Deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of
said provinceon May Dec. 29,
1975Pacificador main defense was that the crime charged had beenextinguished by
prescription.Petitioner argument on the other hand was that the crime was notextinguished
first on the ground that R.A. 3019 provides for its own prescriptionof 15 years. 2nd
on the ground that the case should have been deemeddiscovered only on May 13, 1987,
when a complaint was filed with the PCGG,hence the filing to the Sandiganbayan on Oct. 27,
1988 was well within
theprescriptive period.Lastly, it is the petitioners contention that respondenteffectively
prevented the discovery of the offense in such way the ordinaryprinciples of prescription do
not apply in this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime has been extinguished by prescription?
Decision:
Yes. The SC answered herein petitioners argument in the negative. Firstthe Sc held that Sec.
2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescriptionof offenses defined and penalized
by special laws. Wherein it provides thatPrescription should begin from the day of the
commission of the violation of thelaw, and if the same be not known at the time from the
discovery thereof andinstitution of judicial proceedings. In other words if the commission of
the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was
discovered, and the running of the prescriptive period is tolled by the institution of judicial
proceeding.In the case at bar Pacificador allegedly committed the acts from Dec. of 1975 to
Jan. of 1976. The Highcourt stated that the provision on R.A. 3019
inwhich crimes prescribed in 15 years could not be appreciated in this casebecause it seems
to show that prior to the amendment of Sec. 11 of 3019 by B.P.195 which was approved on
March, 1982, the prescriptive period then was only10 years, wherefore it could not be applied
on the ground that such amendmentis not favourable to the accused. The SC also held that
while petitioners herein
allegation of having no knowledge of the crime, well entrenched is the jurisprudential rule that
the registration of deeds in the public real registry is anotice thereof to the whole world. All
persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. Hence, even If the period

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana


Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

of prescription is reckoned from Feb.18, 1977, the crime had already prescribed when the
Information in this case wasfiled with the Sandiganbayan on Oct. 27, 1988.
138. AONUEVO, JR.V. COURT OF APPEALS411 SCRA 621
FACTS:
Pending the resolution of the administrative disciplinary case against Anonuevo, Jr., et. al.,the
Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for Indirect Bribery against them before
theMTC based on the same set of charges. The Office of the City Prosecutor conducted
areinvestigation of the case and recommended the withdrawal of the Information for insufficie
ncy of evidence to support a finding of probable cause.
ISSUE:
Does the dismissal of the criminal case for warrants the dismissal of the
administrativedisciplinary case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence?
HELD:
NO. The quantum of evidence required in the latter is only substantial evidence, and not
proof beyond reasonable doubt that is required in criminal cases. Thus,
considering thedifference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure
followed and
thesanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings andcon
clusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.
146.PNB v. Gancayco, 15 SCRA 91 (1965); FACTS:
-Ernesto Jimenez was the former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Administration (ACCA).-He was investigated for unexplained wealth.-The special prosecutors
of DOJ Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor required Philippine National Bank to produceat a
hearing the records of the bank deposits of Jimenez.-PNB declined to reveal its records
invoking RA 1405.-On the other hand, the special prosecutors demanded anew that Eduardo
Romualdez, as bank president, producethe records or he would be prosecuted for contempt
citing the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (3019).- Because of the threat of prosecution,
plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment-. After trial, during which Senator Arturo M.
Tolentino, author of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act testified,the court rendered
judgment, sustaining the power of the defendants to compel the disclosure of bank accounts
of ACCFA Administrator Jimenez. The court said that, by enacting section 8 of, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Congress clearly intended to provide an additional ground for
the examination of bank deposits. Without suchprovision, the court added prosecutors would
be hampered if not altogether frustrated in the prosecution of thosecharged with having
acquired unexplained wealth while in public office.
-PNB appealed the decision.
ISSUE:
-Whether or not a bank can be compelled to disclosed the records of accounts of a depositor
who is under investigation for unexplained wealth.
HELD:
- While Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are "absolutely confidential ... and
[therefore] may not beexamined, inquired or looked into," except in those cases enumerated
Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana
Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C

LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

therein, the Anti-Graft Law directs inmandatory terms that bank deposits "shall be taken into
consideration in the enforcement of this section,notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary." The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-GraftLaw is intended
to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule
againstthe disclosure of bank deposits.- With regard to the claim that disclosure would be
contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential, it isenough to point out that while
section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential,"it
nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of
the depositor; (2) Incases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of publicofficials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the
subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealthare similar to cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot beexcepted
from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from
the policyas to the other. This policy express the motion that a public office is a public trust
and any person who enters uponits discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so
far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana


Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C