People vs Aure (2008)

Facts: On 20 January 2000, 2 separate informations for rape were filed with
the RTC charging appellants (Arnulfo Aure and Marlon Ferol) of rape of AAA.
Both happened on November 7, 1999 when AAA was under investigation for
illegal recruitment. Subsequently, these cases were consolidated for joint trial.
The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges. On Nov 9, AAA went to a
hospital for a medical examination wherein she admitted to the doctor that she
was raped. Per advice of her lawyer, she reported the incident to the
NBI.Subsequently, preliminary investigations were made but appellants did not
appear during the hearings. The prosecution proffered documentary evidence
to bolster the testimonies of its witnesses: (1) sworn statement of AAA, (2)
medico-legal certificate of AAA, (3) referral-letter of the NBI to the Caloocan
City Prosecutors Office, (4) joint-affidavit of Agent Abulencia, Agent Erum and
other NBI agents,etc. The defense presented the testimonies of appellants,
SPO2 Jaime Acido, Virgilio Torres, Ronald Orcullo, Mary Ann Aglibar,etc to
refute the foregoing accusations. Appellants denied any liability and interposed
the defense of alibi. On 12 November 1999,NBI agents swooped down in the
CIDG office to conduct an inquest proceeding on appellants for the rape of
AAA. Colonel Danao refused to turn over appellants because the proceeding
was improper as appellants were not previously arrested. RTC rendered a
decision convicting Aure and Ferol but they were acquitted for the other charge
for failure to prove conspiracy. Appellants maintain that the foregoing findings
and rulings of the RTC are inconsistent with the allegations of conspiracy in the
two informations and that the RTC cannot individually and separately convict
appellants of rape because the informations in the two cases alleged
conspiracy between them in raping AAA. Also, appellant Ferol cannot be
convicted in Criminal Case II of rape committed on 8 November 1999 because
such fact was not alleged in the informations. Appellants argued that the said
finding and ruling of the RTC violated their constitutional rights to be informed
of the nature of the case against them, to be presumed innocent of the
charges, and to due process.
Issue: THE RTC ERRED IN DENYING THE REQUEST OF ACCUSED
APPPELLANTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE REQUISITE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION.
THE RTC IN RENDERING AND PROMULGATING THE SUBJECT
ASSAILED DECISION MANIFESTED CLEAR SIGNS OF BIAS, PARTIALITY
AND PREJUDICE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
Held: It appears from the records that upon filing of a complaint by AAA for
rape against appellants with the Caloocan City Prosecutors Office, a
preliminary investigation was scheduled on 3 and 17 December 1999 by
Prosecutor Yu. Thereafter, two subpoenas for the said investigation, dated 22
November 1999 (for the 3 December 1999 schedule) and 3 December 1999

(for the 17 December 1999 schedule), were sent by Prosecutor Yu to

appellants at the latters CIDG office. Despite receipt of these subpoenas,
appellants did not appear during the conduct of preliminary investigation.
Appellants claim that they did not receive said subpoenas in the CIDG office
does not inspire belief because they were active, on-duty police officers at the
CIDG during the period of November and December 1999. In fact, appellant
Ferol was the acting Chief of the Warrant Department of the CIDG office during
the period of November and December 1999. The said department was in
charge of receiving subpoenas and warrants from courts and other offices. It
was unbelievable that they did not receive, nor was informed, of the
subpoenas.
Mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is not enough since bias
and partiality can never be presumed. There was no plausible proof that Judge
Vidal was bias. On the contrary, the records show that Judge Vidal was fair
and considerate to both prosecution and defense. In the said 47-page
Decision, Judge Vidal has thoroughly and extensively discussed the facts and
the law on which appellants conviction for rape were based. Thus, the
appellants were afforded due process.
People vs Guevarra (2008)
Facts: On Aug 30, 2002, the accused were charged with murder wherein he
pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits followed and the prosecution presented
witnesses namely: Anacleto who is the cousin of the deceased saw appellant
shoot Inspector Barte several times with a short firearm. He also brought the
victim to the hospital, Antonette, 2 police officers who were in duty and the
surgeon.
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant and
Ferdinand Ravino. No documentary evidence was presented. Appellant
interposed the defense of alibi. He said that at the time of the incident, he was
at Brgy Malad, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro vacationing at the house of a
certain Hector Africa (Africa). He arrived therein on the afternoon of 23 August
2002 and left on the morning of 26 August 2002. He was not acquainted with
Inspector Barte and came to know that he was accused of killing Inspector
Barte when he arrived at Batangas City from Oriental Mindoro on the afternoon
of 26 August 2002. He was informed that he would be salvaged for killing
Inspector Barte. Hence, he became afraid and hid in his house for two weeks.
Thereafter, he surrendered to the mayor of Batangas City who turned him over
to the Batangas City police. He alleged that Anacleto and Antonette testified
against him because he did not support the candidacy of Antonette during the
previous election for barangay captain where Antonette lost. He supported
then the candidacy of the incumbent barangay captain. After trial, the RTC
rendered a Decision on 4 July 2006 convicting appellant of murder.

Issue: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT

trial.

Held: Denial is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving.

Corollarily, alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and
difficult to prove.Denial and alibi must be proved by the accused with clear and
convincing evidence otherwise they cannot prevail over the positive testimony
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. For alibi to prosper, it is
not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible
for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of
its commission.
After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the
foregoing guidelines to this case, the court found no cogent reason to overturn
the RTCs ruling finding the testimonies of Anacleto and Antonette credible. In
addition, the crime scene was well-lighted by a nearby lamp post and lights
coming from the videoke bar which enabled him to recognize appellant.
Further, he was familiar with the face of appellant because the latter was his
barriomate. Anacletos direct account of how appellant shot Inspector Barte is
candid and convincing. Aggravating circumstance were also proven but he is
entititled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. (mao ra gyud na
ang discussion sa fulltext, not sure kung related sa topic nato.)

An accuseds right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial is guaranteed in

criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy
trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its
salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on
the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, justice
delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution
of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally
guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.

TAN vs. PP (2009)

Speedy Trial
FACTS: On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), on behalf of the People of the Philippines (People), filed three
Informations against Dante T. Tan the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
The cases pertained to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative
devises in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares and
the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW
shares. In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain
Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act
involving BW shares of stock. On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a Motion for Consolidation praying
that the cases be consolidated together which the trial court granted. Petitioner
was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges. On 6
February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among
other things, the first date of trial on 27 February 2001.
ISSUE: whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tans right to speedy

HELD: There is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of
violating petitioners right to speedy trial

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accuseds right to speedy trial

is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the
factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason
therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by
such delay
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed
its formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25
November 2003, both prosecution and defense admit that no evidence was
presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two
years and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for
Criminal Case No. 119830.
The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delay. To this, we apply the four-factor test
previously mentioned.
Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand that he gave an implied consent to the
separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case. No
objection was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed during
the initial hearing. Petitioners conformity thereto can be deduced from his nonobjection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested that the evidence
to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to
object to the prosecutions manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his
case
In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his
failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell
on his claim to the constitutional guarantee. More importantly, in failing to interpose a

timely objection to the prosecutions manifestation during the preliminary hearings that
the cases be tried separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to have
acquiesced and waived his objection thereto.
JACOB AND LEGARDA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (635 SCRA 94, 2010)
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated March 27, 2000
finding probable cause against several public officers and private individuals,
including petitioners Monico V. Jacob (Jacob), President, and Celso L. Legarda
(Legarda), Vice-President and General Manager for Marketing, both of Petron,
for perpetrating the so-called "tax credit scam."
Petitioners provided an undisputed account of the events that subsequently
took place before the Sandiganbayan:
On April 14, 2000, petitioners and the four other Petron officers who were
similarly charged filed a Motion for Reinvestigation [with the Office of the
Ombudsman].
On 17 April 2000, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] issued an Order giving
the prosecution a period of sixty (60) days within which
to re-assess its evidence in these cases and to take appropriate action on
the said motion for reconsideration of accused movants and to inform the Court
within the same period as to its findings and recommendations including the
action thereon of the Honorable Ombudsman.
Sixty (60) days passed but the Office of the Ombudsman did not even bother to
submit a report on the status of the motions for reconsideration. Months
passed, and then, AN ENTIRE YEAR PASSED. There was still nothing from
the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
In the meantime, petitioner Jacob was arraigned on 1 June 2000 while
petitioner Legarda was arraigned on 18 May 2001.
In all the hearings conducted in the cases the defense verbally and consistently invoked
their right to speedy trial and moved for the dismissal of the cases. In the course of
more than one year, however, the [Sandiganbayan 4th Division] kept affording the
prosecution one chance after another. The sixty days granted to the prosecution became
more than four hundred days still, there was no resolution in sight.
Justice Nario, as the Chairman of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, ordered the
dismissal of all criminal cases arising from the purported tax credit scam on the ground
that the accused, including petitioners, had already been deprived of their right to a
speedy trial and disposition of the cases against them. Petitioners assert that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in reversing Justice Narios order of
dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 because such reversal violated
petitioners constitutional right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.

HELD: NO. An accuseds right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is
guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution. This right
to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free
from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical
perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal
maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the
expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is
constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length
of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d)
prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of
the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent
oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to
trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most
serious is the last.
Irrefragably, there had been an undue and inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the
cases by the Office of the Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report
despite the lapse of the 60-day period set by the Sandiganbayan, and even more than a
year thereafter.
Nevertheless, while the re-investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman
delayed the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, the said process
could not have been dispensed with as it was undertaken for the protection of
the rights of petitioners themselves (and their co-accused) and their rights
should not be compromised at the expense of expediency.
In Corpuz, we warned against the overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a
case that may enable the defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without
having been tried, thereby infringing the societal interest in trying people
accused of crimes rather than granting them immunization because of legal
error.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that Justice Narios
dismissal of the criminal cases was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the
State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases
simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman.
There can be no denying the fact that the petitioners, as well as the other accused, was
prejudiced by the delay in the reinvestigation of the cases and the submission by the
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor of his report thereon. So was the State. We have

balanced the societal interest involved in the cases and the need to give substance to the
petitioners constitutional rights and their quest for justice, and we are convinced that
the dismissal of the cases is too drastic a remedy to be accorded to the petitioners. The
People has yet to prove the guilt of the petitioners of the crimes charged beyond
reasonable doubt. We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that before resorting
to the extreme sanction of depriving the petitioner a chance to prove its case by
dismissing the cases, the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor should be ordered by the
Sandiganbayan under pain of contempt, to explain the delay in the submission of his
report on his reinvestigation.

on such petition issued a restraining order thus causing the deferment of the
promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an order
from him "declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused'
had been violated, adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial'
[noting] 'that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in
chambers and not in the court room open the public';" and ordering the city
court Judge, now petitioner, "to desist from reading or causing to be read or
promulgated the decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases
(in question) ... pending in his Court, until further orders of this Court.'"

GARCIA vs. DOMINGO

A motion for reconsideration was denied, hence the petition for

certiorari and prohibition.

FACTS:
In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner
Judge, eight informations were filed on January 16, 1968. The criminal actions
against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner
Francisco Lorenzana, were as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint
of Francisco Lorenzana), there were 2 cases for slight physical injuries and 1
case for maltreatment; b. Against Simeon Carbonnel, the cases were for
maltreatment, slight physical injuries, and light threats; c. Against Francisco
Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) the cases were for violation
of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer), and
slander."
The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held from March to
August 10, 1968. The trial of the cases in question was held, with the
conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia.
During all the fourteen days of trial it was only on April 20, 1968 that
Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. At
the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, on the said date and and
respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse
party. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for
and were granted time to submit memoranda. Up to this date, respondents
Calo and Carbonnel had not pointed out any supposed irregularity in the
proceedings.
The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23,
1968. This was postponed to September 28, 1968, and again to October 1,
1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning. The applications for postponement were not
grounded upon any supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings.
In the morning of October 1, 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru their
counsel, Atty. Consengco, filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction alleging jurisdictional defects. Respondent Judge acting

Issue: WON there was a violation of the constitutional guarantee of a

public trial
Ruling:
The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the
antecedents of this petition, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to
which an accused was entitled. Justice Jose P. Laurel stressed: "Trial should
also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and
unjust manner. He concluded his historical review that "Today almost without
exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that
all criminal trials be open to the public."
The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. It
does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be
given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The
trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in
observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may
do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the
litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The
thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is
afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity
and not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate
Laurel in his terse summation the importance of this right singled out its being a
deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is
deemed embraced in procedural due process.
In the instant case, there is no showing that the public was thereby
excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would
reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice
Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of
a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel
present, no matter with what offense he may be charged."

Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least
fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without
objection on the part of respondent policemen. Chief Justice Moran said thus:
"In one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused,
invoking his right to a public trial, assigned the procedure thus taken as error.
The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the
accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was
held, his right is deemed waived" (United States v. Mercado).
There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by
respondent Judge to assure the reality as against the mere possibility of a trial
being truly public. An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city
courts would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily
calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed
attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less
tense atmosphere. As a result, the attendance of the general public is much
more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is remembered
further that the occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal
acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to
the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would
be denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a
judge, with the eyes of the alert court alert to his demeanor and his rulings,
would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change
matters, just because, as did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned
chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took
place.
The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting aside, and
declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix
Domingo November 29, 1968 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
Facts:
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Broad Kaster ng Pilipinas(KBP), an
association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio
networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live
media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in
order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history."2 The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar
N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by
Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.

ISSUE: What is the extent of the right to information of the press on covering
judicial proceedings?
RULING:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more
than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A
public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies
that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities
for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too
small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the
trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to
report what they have observed during the proceedings.16
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and
the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to
provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the
proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process
in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is
still the paramount right of the accused to due process17 which must never be
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. Justice Clark thusly
pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying
out the important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its
exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in
the judicial process."
ANIMAS VS MINSTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
FACTS: Diosdado Yanson was a political leader of Ernesto Montilla, candidate
for Mayor of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental in the November 11, 1971 local
elections. The petitioners were charged with murder in connection with the
alleged killing of Yanson on the of the November 11 elections.
The accused were arrested almost a year later, on September 21, 1972 after
martial law was proclaimed. It was only in 1974 that a summary preliminary
investigation was conducted by a PC captain belonging to the Judge Advocate
General Service. The report of the Negros Occidental PC Command states that
Zacarias Seminio Jr., a candidate for Vice-Mayor, gave fist blows and kicked

Yanson then ordered Carlos Javier to get a piece of water pipe to beat up the

Before trial could proceed, the respondent Minister of National Defense

victim, while pointing his pistol and watching the latter being mauled. Yanson

ordered on June 30, 1979, the transfer of the case to the civil courts. Before

was allegedly brought in a car to Malicon Beach, shot, tied with rope attached

the order could be implemented, it was superseded by the respondent

to an engine block and dumped at sea. Originally, 18 men were to be charged

Ministers 1st Indorsement dated August 22, 1979, directing immediate

with murder, qualified by superior strength, night time, use of motor vehicle,

implementation of the hand-written marginal instructions dated August 14, 1979

and treachery. The list of 18 accused was later trimmed to 14.

of the President enfaced on the letter of Nelly Yanson, the wife of the

The petitioners were recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal,

deceased-victim.

considering that one of them, petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military

ISSUE: WON the Military Commission has jurisdiction wherein the formers

personnel. Thereafter, the Judge Advocate General filed the corresponding

jurisdiction only refers to illegal possession of firearms and explosive and not in

charge sheet, but he modified the crime charged from Murder to Violation of

relation to crimes committed with a political complexion.

Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code in Relation to Section 2692 of

the same Code and Presidential Decree No. 9, Illegal Possession of Firearms
with Murder.

RULING: The petitioners allege that respondent Military Commission No. 27

has no jurisdiction over the instant case. They ask that it be declare as null and
void the lst Indorsement of respondent Minister of National Defense and the

On February 16, 1978, the Minister of National Defense referred the case to

corresponding order of arrest dated June 8, 1978 of respondent military

the Military Tribunals Branch of the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO)

commission for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.

which in turn assigned the same to respondent Military Commission No. 27.
Sometime in 1977, the petitioners were released even as the Provincial Fiscal
commenced to investigate the murder charge. However, a warrant of arrest
was issued on June 8, 1978, resulting in the re-arrest of 14 accused including
the petitioners.

According to the petitioners, Military Commission No. 27 is without jurisdiction

over the criminal case filed against them because General Order No. 59 upon
which the Commissions jurisdiction is anchored refers only to illegal
possession of firearms and explosives in relation to crimes committed with a
political complexion. They point out that, from the charge sheet, the only crime

On November 25, 1978, with two of the accused agreeing to become

imputed against them is murder and that the essential elements of the crime of

witnesses for the State. However, when the case was called for trial on June

illegal possession of firearms were not alleged. They also stress that the

25, 1979, the title of the charge sheet was amended on motion of the

alleged killing of the deceased Yanson was devoid of any political complexion.

prosecution by the addition of the phrase Violation of Article 248 of the

Revised Penal Code. There was, however, no amendment of the body of the
charge sheet.

The President issued Proclamation No. 2045 which ostensibly lifted martial law
in the Philippines. Unfortunately, the more important and necessary step of
dismantling the apparatus and structures of martial rule was not taken.

Proclamation No. 2045 while revoking General Order No. 8 and dissolving the

The petitioners were investigated for Murder. The crime was committed on

military tribunals earlier established under the Order, created a lacunae or

November 10, 1971 long before there was any intimation that cases with

penumbral areainsofar as pending military tribunal cases were concerned. The

absolutely no national security implications nor political complexion and,

policy announced in the Proclamation was to transfer cases pending with the

whoever the accused may be, would be taken away from the civil courts where

military tribunals to civilian courts except those which may not be transferred

they properly belong. The Summary Pre-evaluation Report prepared by

because of irreparable prejudice to the state in view of the rules on double

Captain Federico G. Real, Inquest Officer, and approved by Lt. Col. Meliton D.

jeopardy or other circumstances which would render further prosecution of

Goyena, Provincial Commander of the Negros Occidental Constabulary

cases difficult if not impossible. While dissolving military tribunals, the

Command refers to the crime of murder committed by the petitioners. The

Proclamation also mandated that their dissolution would be effective only when

resolution of Captain Cesar T. Demetria of the Judge Advocate General Service

they finally decide pending cases which should not be transferred to civil

on the preliminary investigation he conducted covers an investigation for

courts.

murder, and nothing else.

When civilian and military accused are segregated and tried for the same

When the charge sheet was prepared, the offense charged was no longer

offense in two separate tribunals, the witnesses would be presented twice and

murder but Violation of Sec. 878 of the Revised Administrative Code in

would testify two times on exactly the same incident, with all the concomitant

Relation to Sec. 2692 of the same Code and P.D. No. 9 (Illegal Possession of

mischief such a procedure entails. This is not to mention the ever present

Firearm With Murder). The change in the offense charged was obviously to

possibility of the military tribunal and the civil court coming up with diametrically

bring it within the jurisdiction of a military court.

opposing decisions on the same facts and issues. The P. D. also mandates that
any waiver is for the civilian to submit himself to the military tribunal and not for
the armed forces member to opt for a civilian trial.

The crime for which the petitioners were charged was committed on November
10, 1971 long before the proclamation of martial law. There was no question
about the case being prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil courts at

Inspite or because of the ambiguous nature of the decrees insofar as civilian

the time. Now that it is already late 1986, and martial law is a thing of the past,

takeover of jurisdiction was concerned and notwithstanding the shilly-shallying

hopefully never more to return, there is no more reason why a murder

and vacillation characteristic of its implementation, this Court relied on the

committed in 1971 should still be retained, at this time, by a military tribunal.

enunciated policy ofnormalizationin upholding the primacy of civil courts. This

The reason given by the August 14, 1979 marginal notation on the letter of Mrs.

policy meant that as many cases as possible involving civilians being tried by

Nelly M. Yanson for retention of jurisdiction by military courts, In order to calm

military tribunals as could be transferred to civil courts should be turned over

the fears of injustice by the aggrieved party, even assuming it to be true, can

immediately. In case of doubt, the presumption was in favor of civil courts

be overcome through a careful monitoring by an interested parties to insure

always trying civilian accused.

that the trial court is indeed responsive to the demands of justice.

The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes and civilian

persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is

accused at a time when all civil courts were fully operational and freely

effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic.

functioning.

18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their

WHEREFORE, the PETITION is hereby GRANTED. Criminal Case No. MC27-68 is ordered transferred to the appropriate Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental with the prosecution to be handled by the Provincial Fiscal. The
temporary restraining order dated October 23, 1979 is made permanent.

confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and
academic. But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the
decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.
ISSUE2:The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the
jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD:The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the

OLAGUER VS MILITARY COMMISSION

military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving
civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise

In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and
they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all
civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and
incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos;
(3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco
Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo
Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6)
attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals
Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to
the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE:Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD:The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic
because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions
were already released from military confinement. When the release of the

jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses
allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and
functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian
is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal
concerned.
HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE
FATCS: 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area,
the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to
Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express
Lane. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From
the first traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and
chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate
boxes which were almost of the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she
took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she
saw inside was white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus
immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs
Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the
police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing
with her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.

At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest and further
examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three chocolate
boxes. Next was petitioners bag which contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco,
however, recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to
him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages
of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate
boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six accused.
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged,[17] all the accused testified almost identically,
invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about the
transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which were provided
by the travel agency.
petitioners claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to confront the
witnesses against him.
ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST
HIM.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
petitioners conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been
caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any
confession or admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and
credible by the trial court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident
thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime.
Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a
single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found positive and
credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a
conviction.

absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure
to appear is unjustifiable.
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses
testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to
would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it
by cross-examination or by his own countervailing evidence.
petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the
prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to
understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should have manifested it
before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless able to crossexamine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices as compliance with
petitioners right to confront the witnesses against him.
The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know,
in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to crossexamine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of
confrontation is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the
opportunity for cross-examination has been secured, the function and test of
confrontation has also been accomplished, the confrontation being merely
the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against him was not impaired.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
Bernardo v. People of the Philippines

Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation. Turning now to the second assigned error,
petitioner invokes the pertinent provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution providing for the right to confrontation, viz:
Section 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the

FACTS:
Petitioner Carmelo C. Bernardo was charged with six counts of violation of BP
22 for issuing six postdated checks in equal amounts of Php 22,500. Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. Petitioner
failed to appear at the pre-trial conference held on August 25, 1999, thereby
prompting the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and set the cases for
trial in absentia. After the prosecution presented its first witness, petitioner filed
a Waiver of Appearance, a Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest, and a Motion to
Quash two Informations charged against him. In an Order dated April 5, 2000,
the trial court lifted the warrant of arrest in view of his appearance, but denied
the Motion to Quash. However, petitioner failed to appear on the next trial date,
drawing the trial court to proceed with the trial in absentia and issue another

warrant of arrest against him. The trial court, in a decision promulgated in

absentia, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the cases.
Ten months following the decision, petitioner posted a bond in another branch
of court, which was cancelled due to petitioner having been convicted and no
motion having been filed for his temporary liberty pending appeal. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial which was denied due to his and his
counsels failure to appear at the motions hearing. Petitioner, upon the denial
of his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, appealed to the RTC. The RTC in
turn affirmed the lower courts judgment with modification.
Petitioner appealed the said decision to the CA. He filed a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Petition for Review within 30 days from June 1, 2004, which was
granted by the CA but only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42. Because
of his failure to file his petition during the 15-day extension, his petition was
denied by the CA. One of the errors he pointed out is the CAs denial of his
petition for review.

US v. Tan Teng
FACTS:
The defendant was charged with rape after forcefully having carnal knowledge
with a 7 year-old girl. Upon gaining information regarding the said crime, the
police arrested the defendant and taken to the police station to be examined.
The police took a sample substance from the defendants body and had it
examined in the Bureau of Science. It was later found out that the defendant
was suffering from gonorrhea, the same venereal disease the victim suffered
after having been raped (the results of the analysis was later on used as
evidence during trial). The defendant was later on found guilty for the offense of
abusos deshonestos (rape?). Upon appeal, defendant pointed out that the
analysis of the substance taken from his body is an incriminating piece of
evidence, and thus should be inadmissible.
ISSUE:
W/N the report of the Bureau of Science is an incriminating piece of evidence,
and thus inadmissible.
HELD:
NO. As the Court ruled in the present case, the prohibition against selfincrimination provided in Section 5 of the Philippine Bill only covers oral
examination of defendants before or during trial. This prohibition, as
established in People v. Gardner, is for the prevention of extortion of unwilling
confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. It
does not cover situations such as the one contemplated in the present case. To

ISSUE:
W/N he was denied due process of law upon the CAs denial of his petition for
review.
HELD:
NO. The CA correctly dismissed petitioners appeal for failure to comply with
Sections 1 and 2(d) of Rule 42. Since these provisions are clear and
mandatory in character, there is no reason for the courts to bend them.
Furthermore, he was not denied due process, as his failure to appear during
his trials at the MeTC level constituted a trial in absentia, which is allowed by
the Constitution.
The holding of a trial in absentia is allowed provided that the following
requisites are present, viz, (1) the accused has already been arraigned, (2) he
has been duly notified of the trial, and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
These three requisites are established in the facts of the present case. This
being said, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law since he
was given the opportunity to defend himself.
do so would limit the actions the courts (and even the sanitary department of
the Government) can take. In the case at bar, since the defendant was not
compelled to admit or answer any question pertaining or related to the crime, it
has been held that his right against self-incrimination was not violated.
VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920]
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge
ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to test
whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of adultery
being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination
interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her
constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the
petitioners constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the
constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
PEOPLE VS. YATAR (2004)
FACTS:
On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmothers (Isabel
Dawangs) house, despite her intention to go forth Tuguegarao City, as her
other formers housemate-relatives left in the morning. At 10:00 am, accusedappellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where Kathylyn
stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyns first cousin saw Yatar,
who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, descended
from the second floor and was pacing back and forth at the back of Isabel

Dawangs house, Judilyn didnt find this unusual since Yatar and his wife used
to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn, telling the latter that he
would not be getting the lumber he had been gathering. This time, Judilyn
noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black shirt (without collar) and blue pants;
and noticed that the latters eyes were reddish and sharp. Accused-appellant
asked about the whereabouts of Judilyns husband, as the former purports to
talk with the latter. Then, Yatar immediately left when Judilyns husband arrived.
In the evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her
house turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers,
which she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the
second floor to check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the
door therein was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded opening the tied door
with a knife, and as she groped in the darkness of the second level of her
house, she felt Kathylyns lifeless and naked body, with some intestines
protruding out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to
provide assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyns clothes and undergarments
beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with blood
was also found 50-meters away from Isabels house. Meanwhile, semen has
also been found upon examination of Kathylyns cadaver. When subjected
under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the sperm
specimen is identical to Yatars genotype. Yatar was accused of the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the same by the
Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an appeal to the
Honorable Supreme Court in order to assail the court a quos decision. On
appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving much weight to the
evidence DNA testing oranalysis done on him, in lieu of the seminal fluid found
inside the victims (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample taken from is
violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the conduct of
DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws.
MAIN ISSUE
Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may
be used as evidence for Yatars conviction?
HELD
Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004, which was three (3)
years before the Rules on DNA evidence took effect. The Supreme Court in
this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert vs. Merrell Dow as a
precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that pertinent evidence
based on scientifically valid principles could be used, so long as the same is
RELEVANT and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then as the DAUBERT TEST.
RULE: At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as
the legal basis. Sec. 7 of the Rules on DNA evidence, which took effect on
2007, provides for the factors to be considered in assessing the probative
weight or value to be given on evidence derived or generated from DNA
testing. Such factors, are, to wit:
(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected,
how they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;

(b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in

analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure,
and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;
(c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable
standards-setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the
laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be properly established;
and
(d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided
PPLICATION DAUBERT TEST:
The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the probative value of the
DNA test result yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood sample from that of
the semen specimen obtained from the cadavers vaginal canal. Accordingly, it
held that the DNA evidence is both reliable and relevant. In ascertaining the
relevance of the evidence in a case, it must be determined whether or not the
same directly relates to a fact in issue, as to induce belief in its existence or
nonexistence. In this case, the evidence is relevant in determining the
perpetrator of the crime; In giving probative value on the DNA testing result,
yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood sample from that of the biological
sample (semen) obtained from the victims vaginal canal, the trial court
considered the qualification of the DNA analyst, the facility or laboratory in
which the DNA testing had been performed, and the methodology used in
performing the DNA test. In the said case, the DNA test was done at the UP
National Science Research Institute (NSRI). The method used was Polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR)
analysis, which enables a tiny amount of DNA sequence to be replicated
exponentially in a span of few hours. Hence, sufficient DNA analysis may be
made easier even with small DNA samples at hand. The analyst who
performed the procedure was Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria, who is a
duly qualified expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.
CONCLUSION:
Hence, apart from the other sets of circumstantial evidence correctly
appreciated by the trial court, the said DNA evidence is sufficient to be admitted
as evidence to warrant the accused-appellants conviction of the crime of Rape
with Homicide.
Rosario V. Astudillo vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 159734, November 29, 2006
Facts:
Petitoners were hired by Western Marketing, a chain of appliance
stores, as sales persons. Benitez and Robel were hired as floor
manager and service-in-charge/cashier-reliever, respectively.
An incident ensued later wherein the petitioners and the other accused
were involved wherein the daily cash collection report of the company
did not reflect any remittance of payments from the transactions
covered by the alleged missing invoices.

It was later found out that the goods covered thereby in the invoices
were missing. Concluding that the transactions under the said invoices
were made but no payment was remitted to Western, branch
accountant Camilo reported the matter to Aurora Borja, the branch
assistant manager.
Benitez soon approached Camilo and requested him not to report the
matter to the management, he cautioning that many would be involved.
Later, in a subsequent meeting with the branch manager Lily Ong,
accused-petitioner Orellana admitted having brought home some
appliances while Benitez gave a handwritten statement.
The other accused as well executed statements relating themselves to
the incidents.
On complaint of Western Marketing Corporation, petitioners Astudillo
and Orellana were collectively charged with Qualified Theft, along with
a certain Robel and Benitez, under an information dated September 9,
1996.
Additionally, petitioners, Benitez and a certain Javier were individually
charged also with Qualified Theft in four separate informations all
dated September 9, 1996.
During arraignment, petitioners, with assistance of counsel pleaded not
guilty.
Thereafter, the RTC found the accused-herein petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs judgment with modification as to
the penalties imposed.

Issue: W/N the employees extra-judicial admissions taken before an

employer in the course of an administrative inquiry are admissible in a
criminal case filed against them.
Held:
The petitioners argue that their extra-judicial statements were taken without the
assistance of counsel, they are inadmissible as evidence, following Sec. 12,
Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
It bears noting, however, that when the prosecution formally offered its
evidence, petitioners failed to file any objection thereto including their
extra-judicial admissions. At any rate, this Court answers the issue in the
affirmative.
The rights above specified (Miranda rights), to repeat, exist only in "custodial
interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this
Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."

The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the

investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense
to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements,
whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action
brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making
and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be
informed thereof, etc) which, to repeat, are relevant in custodial investigations.
People v. Tin Lan Uy, Jr. is similarly instructive:
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked
by accused-appellant are not available before government investigators enter
the picture. Thus we held in one case (People v. Ayson, [supra]) that
admissions made during the course of an administrative investigation by
Philippine Airlines do not come within the purview of Section 12. The protective
mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or
confessions made to a private individual, or to a verbal admission made to a
radio announcer who was not part of the investigation, or even to a mayor
approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity.
The Court of Appeals did not thus err in pronouncing that petitioners were not
under custodial investigation to call for the presence of counsel of their own
choice, hence, their written incriminatory statements are admissible in
evidence.

Alejandro B. De La Torre vs CA and People

G.R. No. 102786, August 14, 1998
Facts:

In various incidents, electrical engineers of MERALCO who were

assigned to inspect six electric meters installed in Cathay Pacific Steel
and Smelting Corporation (CAPASSCO) discovered that these electric
meters were missing. These engineers suspected that employees of
CAPASSCO must have damaged the electric meters while tampering
with them and that to conceal the attempt, the employees must have
removed the electric meters.
Later it was discovered that several crewmembers of MERALCO were
removing the electric meters. Patrolman Edgar Enopia ascertained the
identities of the men, one of whom turned out to be petitioner de la
Torre.
These men were later brought to a police lineup.

Petitioner de la Torre was pointed to be the leader of the group which

took down the electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises.
As such, de la Torre was charged with Qualified Theft. The RTC found
de la Torre guilty of Qualified Theft.
De la Torre appealed to the CA, contending first that his constitutional
rights were violated during the custodial investigation of the case.
CA however denied reconsideration.

Issue: W/N de la Torres rights under custodial interrogation or

investigation were violated.
Dela Torres contention: he was not informed of his right to remain silent and
to have the assistance of counsel during the investigation conducted on July 4,
1989 at the NPD headquarters, where the crewmembers of MERALCO service
truck number 522 were presented in a police line-up. He further invokes the
exclusionary rule in par. 3 of the same sec. 12 that "any confession or
admission obtained in violation of [this rule] shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him."
Held:
In Gamboa v. Cruz, this Court ruled that "no custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person
arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the
right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in
the presence of counsel." However, this applies only from the moment the
investigating officer begins to ask questions for the purpose of eliciting
admissions, confessions, or any information from the accused. A police line-up
is not considered part of any custodial inquest because it is conducted before
that stage is reached.
In the instant case, petitioner de la Torre, together with the other crewmembers
of MERALCO truck number 522, was merely included in a line-up of eight (8)
persons from which he was picked out by Garcia as the leader of the group
which had removed the electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises. Until
then, the police investigation did not focus on petitioner. Indeed, no questions
were put to him. Rather, the questions were directed to witnesses of the
complainant. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner's allegations that his
rights as a suspect in a custodial interrogation were violated.

People of the Philippines vs Eduardo Pavillare

G.R. No. 129970, April 5, 2000
Facts:
On March 10, 1996 the accused appellant Pavillare was apprehended in
connection with the kidnapping of an Indian national Accused-appellants were
thereafter charged and convicted of kidnapping for ransom for abducting the
Indian national. Pavillare contends that the identification made by the private
complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because the appellant stood at
the line-up without the assistance of counsel, and that the money given to them
was not ransom money but was given in exchange for their dropping of the
charges of rape against private complainant.
Issue: W/N Pavillares rights under custodial interrogation or
investigation were violated.
Held:
Sec. 12 (1) Art III of the Constitution states that "Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel." Thus the prohibition for custodial investigation conducted without the
assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
mandate is inadmissible in evidence. The prohibition however, does not extend
to a person in a police line-up because that stage of an investigation is not yet
a part of custodial investigation.
It has been repeatedly held that custodial investigation commences when a
person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission
of the crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions
on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.

The stage of an investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a police

line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to
counsel because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is
purely investigatory in nature. It has also been held that an uncounseled
identification at the police line-up does not preclude the admissibility of an incourt identification. The identification made by the private complainant in the
police line-up pointing to Pavillare as one of his abductors is admissible in
evidence although the accused-appellant was not assisted by counsel.
We find that the trial court did not err in giving due weight and credence to the
identification in open court of the accused-appellant by the private complainant
and his cousin as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses had ample opportunity
to observe the kidnappers and to remember their faces.
PEOPLE VS. CASIMIRO
FACTS: In a buy bust operation, after arresting accused-appellant, the
policemen took him to the Narcom Office, where the policemen wrote their
initials on the brick of marijuana before giving it to the evidence custodian. The
policemen prepared a booking sheet and arrest report, affidavits, and a request
for the laboratory examination of the confiscated marijuana. They also
prepared a "receipt of property seized," Accused-appellant signed the receipt
without the assistance of counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant was properly informed of the charges
against him. (No)
RULING: The receipt could not be considered evidence against accusedappellant because it was signed by him without the assistance of counsel.
The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the
suspect to a poseur buyer and signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as
"suspect/ owner." In effect, accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a
prohibited drug to another, which is an offense under the law. Having been
made without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that
marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in evidence.
In People v. Obrero, this Court held that an uncounseled statement is
presumed by the Constitution to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an
unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of a police interrogation, the suspect needs the guiding hand of
counsel.
PO2 Supa testified that he informed accused-appellant of his Miranda rights
while he was being arrested outside the grocery:
Also, the recitation of the Miranda rights to the accused was incomplete and
was made without any effort to find out if he understood it. It did not include a
statement that, if accused-appellant could not afford counsel, one would be

assigned to him.. It was merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting

meaningful information to the suspect. SC ruled that signing of the receipt
without a lawyer, the accused-appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely.
The police investigators did not pause long enough and wait for accusedappellant to say whether he was willing to answer their questions even without
the assistance of counsel or whether he was waiving his right to remain silent
at all.
The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if accusedappellant could not afford counsel, one would be assigned to him. The warning
was perfunctory, made without any effort to find out if he understood it. It was
merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the
suspect. We cannot say that, in signing the receipt without a lawyer, accusedappellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely. What is more, the police
investigators did not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say
whether he was willing to answer their questions even without the assistance of
counsel or whether he was waiving his right to remain silent at all.
PEOPLE VS. SAYABOC
FACTS: Witnesses of the shooting of the deceased Galam identified Benjamin
Sayaboc at the PNP Provincial Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman
who shot Joseph Galam to death. SPO4 Cagungao was called on the very
same day to the Provincial Command Headquarters in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, to take the statement of Sayaboc Before taking the statement of
Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Sayaboc told him
that he wanted to have a counsel of his own choice however sSayaboc could
not name one. The police officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO
who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc
say, "okay," he continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo
remained silent the entire time. Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc
whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort room. Sayaboc
executed an extrajudicial confessionin Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to
killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of
P100,000. Accused argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not
be admitted in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer
who was his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent,
independent, vigilant, and effective counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc is inadmissible.
RULING:
Sayabocs extrajudicial confession cannot be used in evidence in this case.
The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right
(waiver of rights) is missing. The right to be informed requires "the transmission

of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory

recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow the suspect to
consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these
rights especially in this case where the suspect only has an educational
attainment of Grade IV.
Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel. While
we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was
partial to the police, still, the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc
and prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent
throughout the duration of the custodial investigation.
PEOPLE VS BAGNATE
Facts: Appellant was turned over to SPO2 Junwel Ambion for custodial
investigation and was informed by the latter in the Bicol dialect of his right to
remain silent, to be assisted by counsel, that whatever he says may be used
against or in his favor, and that he cannot be tortured or molested. His rights
were reiterated by Atty. Brotamonte in the absence of the policemen. Appellant
told Atty. Brotamonte that he is willing to give a statement. Appellant signed his
typed confession. The next day, appellant was brought before Judge Arsenio
Base, Jr. of the MTC of Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base requested the presence of
Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently examined the voluntariness and veracity of
the confession as well as the authenticity of the signatures of appellant and
Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to appellant the consequences of his
confession to the crimes charged and asked him if he was coerced into
admitting them. Judge Base then asked appellant if he was still willing to sign it
again and appellant answered in the affirmative saying that his conscience
bothered him. Judge Base asked him to sign the confession again in the
presence of Atty. Brotamonte after which appellant affixed his signature. There
were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the extra-judicial confession of
appellant showed how the crimes were committed by him.
Issue: Whether or not appellants confession was executed in violation of his
constitutional rights thus inadmissible.
Held: The taking of appellants confession has conformed to the safeguards of
the Constitution. An extra-judicial confession must be express and voluntarily
executed in writing with the assistance of an independent and competent
counsel, and a person under custodial investigation must be continuously
assisted by counsel from the very start to be admissible evidence. The
presence of counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confession, and the assistance given must be independent and
competent, that is, providing full protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused. The assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than
perfunctory. His testimony during cross-examination leaves no room for doubt

that he adequately assisted appellant during the investigation. Appellant signed

the confession with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel,
Atty. Brotamonte, and it was also sworn to by him before Judge Arsenio Base,
Jr. of the MTC of Tabaco, Albay, who, before administering the oath to
appellant, conferred with him and informed him of his rights and the
consequences of his confession.
What the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is confession given
by an accused without having been informed of his right to remain silent, or,
without having been given competent and independent counsel, preferably his
own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not provided
with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in writing and not in the presence
of counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by violence
or any other means that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the
Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the possible
penalty for the crime he committed.

PEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985

FACTS:
The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He
had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no
avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link
him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession
was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and
to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will
had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to
maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face
into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more.
His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he
had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating
officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared.
Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators,
purporting it to be a reenactment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him.
RULING:
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the
requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the
Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear

questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language

known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is
no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest,
accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a
friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he
had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His
statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during
the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment,
again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute
gross violations of his rights.
SANTOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 7152368
Facts: All the accused appropriated among themselves the proceeds of
amounted to 9,000,000,000 to their own personal use and benefit which was
illegally taken from Central Bank of the Philippines or Bank of the Philippine
Islands. In 1985, accused are found guilty as co- principals in the three
separate complex crimes of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents.
Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and
Valentino are inadmissible in evidence as their right to counsel was violated
when said confessions were executed.
Held: Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution providing for the rights of
an accused during custodial investigation. It reads: No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
First paragraph of Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution states: (1)
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The 1973 Constitution does not specify the right against uncounselled waiver
of the right to counsel, which is found in paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring
that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial
investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied
retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to
the effectivity of said Constitution. Waivers of the right to counsel during
custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. The

prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be
voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is
involuntary and untrue. Valentino and petitioner Estacio failed to present any
convincing evidence to prove the use of force or intimidation on their persons
to obtain he confession.
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the
Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he
would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel,
made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from
being awitness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take
the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse
of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call
petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination
being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of
a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be
availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled
to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an
administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.

Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants
violates the Self-Incrimination Clause. YES.

Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical
practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to
take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in
accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may
refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."
If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the
forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a
perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his
guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he

chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free
genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused,
stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More
and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even
those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
Galman vs Pamaran
Facts: On 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned
down to death inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in
Pasay City.
To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a
free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, PD
1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later
became more popularly known as the Agrava Board.
Pursuant to PD 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various
witnesses appeared and testified by obedience to a subpoena or in response
to an invitation issued by the Board.
Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another
one, jointly authored by the other members of the Board namely: Hon.
Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto
Herrera.
The reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the Tanodbayan for
appropriate action.
After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan filed
with the Sandiganbayan 2 Informations for murder one for the killing of Sen.
Benigno S. Aquino (Criminal Case 10010) and another for the killing of
Rolando Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who was found dead on the airport
tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day.
In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were charged as accessories, along with
several principals, and one accomplice.

Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.

In the course of the joint trial, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the
Agrava Board were marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence,
Ver, et. al., through their respective counsel objected to the admission of said
exhibits.
Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver
before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the above-cases"
contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right
against self incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by PD 1886,
and thus prayed that his testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution.
Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed separate
motions to exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking the same
ground.
The Tanodbayan opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied
upon by Ver, et. al. in support of their motions to exclude their respective
testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their
right against self incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board.
On 13 June 1985, The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting all the
evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other
evidence produced by Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886.
The Tanodbayan, along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved for the
reconsideration of the said
Resolution, but were denied. They filed two separate petitions for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against
oneself applies also in the proceeding before the Agrava Board. YES.
Held: Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the
Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity
charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or
persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the
bar of justice.
The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of
its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their
consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction.

And as safeguard, the Presidential Decree guarantees "any person called to

testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the proceedings."
Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in
the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not
merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants
in the tragic killing.
And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce
evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing
evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not
merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the
assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of
his participation therein.
Among this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the said
assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained
(under technical arrest) at the time they were summoned and gave their
testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886 denied
them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses
against themselves.
Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness
stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or
refused to do so, the jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars
even before conviction dangled before their very eyes.
Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves,
both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law.
Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a

witness against himself were right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886. When
they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune
from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.
It must be noted that initially the provision in our organic laws were similar to
the Constitution of the United States and was as follows: "That no person shall
be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself."
As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself." The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case"
connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to
cases other than criminal.
Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies
to Ver, et. al. notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is
not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not merely
denied the said sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to "due process"
which is fundamental fairness.
The review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral
arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal
adherence to and compliance with due process.
The manner in which the testimonies were taken from Ver, et. al. fall short of
the constitutional standards both under the "due process clause" and under the
"exclusionary rule" in Section 20, Article IV.
In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of
Ver, et. al.cannot be admitted against them in any criminal proceeding. This is
true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the
presence of a grant of immunity by law.