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Dadalo v.

Petitioner Rosario Dadulo, Brgy. Chairman of Payatas QC and Barangay Security Dev Officers Edgar Saraga,
Rogelio Dumadigo and Efren Pagabao were administratively charged by private respondent Gloria Patangui
before the Ombudsman.
According to PR, she saw the accused stealing galvanized iron sheets, lumber, and rolled plain iron sheets from
her backyard. The incident was purportedly witnessed by Patanguis two daughters who saw two men cart away
the items upon the orders of a woman who was standing nearby. A BSDO on duty told Patangui that it was
Dadalo who ordered the seizure of the subject construction materials. The same information was relayed to her
by a certain Elsie Castillejos. The following day, Patangui found out that some of the galvanized iron sheets
taken from her backyard were utilized in building the new barangay outpost. She recognized said items because
she is familiar with the campaign stickers still posted on the galvanized iron sheets.
Jessica, 9 year old daughter of Patangui, stated that while she was playing in their yard, two men seized their
construction materials upon the orders of a woman. The following day, she pointed to a BSDO wearing a black
jacket as one of those who took the construction materials. Upon inquiry, said man was identified as Edgar
Saraga. Jessica later learned from their neighbors and from her mother that the woman who was standing near
their house and giving orders to the BSDOs, was petitioner Rosario Dadulo.
Petitioner denied the charge against her and declared that on day of incident, a certain Elsie Castillejos applied
for a permit to construct a house extension but was denied because the structure was intended to be built on the
land owned by the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA). Nevertheless, the construction
proceeded. Petitioner inspected the site and found out that the structure is owned by Patangui and not by Elsie
OMBUDSMAN: Guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, for which the penalty of
Suspension for Six (6) Months Without Pay. CA affirmed. HtP.
W/N there is substantial evidence to show that petitioner ordered the seizure of Patanguis construction
Yes. Petition denied. CA affirmed.
Substantial evidence rule
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." Otherwise stated, a finding of guilt in
an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the
respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
As applied
A review of the records of the case shows that the factual findings of the Ombudsman upon which its decision on
petitioners administrative liability was based are supported by the evidence on record. Petitioner and BSDO
Edgar Saraga were identified as the persons who took the construction materials. Respondents claim was
corroborated by the testimony of her daughter who saw the actual taking of the construction materials. Moreover,
respondent testified that the materials taken from her premises were used in the construction of the new
barangay outpost.
On the other hand, the defense proffered by petitioner failed to rebut the charges against her. She cannot rely on
the sweeping general denial of the charges in the face of a positive and categorical assertion made by
respondent and her witness. Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to disprove the charges against her but still
failed to offer any plausible explanation as to why the construction materials were in their possession, some of
which were even used in the barangay outpost. Instead, she accused private respondent of illegally constructing
a structure. However, even if the construction materials were to be used in constructing an illegal structure, their
summary seizure would still make the public officers ordering or affecting the seizure administratively liable.

W/N there was a premature application of her suspension order (when her Court pets. were still pending)
No. Petition denied with finality
Petitioner argues that her appeal has the effect of staying the execution of the decision of the Ombudsman
hence, the immediate implementation of the suspension order before it has become final and executory, was
premature. She cited the cases of Lapid v. Court of Appeals and Laxina v. Court of Appeals where this Court
ruled against the immediate implementation of the Ombudsmans dismissal orders in view of Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, at the time the Lapid and Laxina cases were decided, Section 7,
Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was silent as to the execution of its decisions
pending appeal. This was later amended by Administrative Order No. 17 and Administrative Order No. 14-A as
implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 1 s. 2006. Hence, as amended, Section 7 of Rule III now reads:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall
be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for
review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written
Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.1wphi1

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be
paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The
Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The
refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the
petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the
event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by
reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any
personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
Finally, the appeal of the decision of the Ombudsman to the Court of Appeals is through a Petition for Review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, Section 12 of which categorically provides that the appeal shall not stay the
award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct
otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.