Group 205 Digest Cases

CASE TITLE:
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
respondent.
TOPIC:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
FACTS:
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 1988 1 and
are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284.
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions
subject to limitations set therein.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution
which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment
in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
DEFENDANTS CONTENTION:
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice opinion on EO No. 248 is
"reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and construed the limitation imposed
by E.O. No. 284 as not applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which,
although not so designated as ex-officio are allowed by the primary functions of the
public official, but only to the holding of multiple positions which are not related to
or necessarily included in the position of the public official concerned (disparate
positions).
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
DECISION:
No, it is unconstitutional.It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants
from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government,
except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with
respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation
of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and
deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitutions
manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2),
Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting
the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
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CASE TITLE:
G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
TOPIC:
PROPER PARTY (LOCUS STANDI)
TAXPAYERS SUIT - REQUISITES
FACTS:
Oil Deregulation Law

PETITIONERSCONTENTION:
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the
government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The
government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One
such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law
allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil
and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and
operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or
use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims,
among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and
imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad
contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil
refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil
industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined
petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products
and 7% on refined crude products.
DEFENDANTSCONTENTION:
Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8180 and E.O. No. 392. In addition, respondents contend that the issues raised by
the petitions are not justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the law.
Respondents further aver that petitioners have no locus standi as they did not
sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A.
No. 8180. The Court then tries to resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions
raise procedural and substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8180 and E.O. No. 392. The procedural issues are: (1) whether or not the petitions
raise a justiciable controversy, and (2) whether or not the petitioners have the
standing to assail the validity of the subject law and executive order. The
substantive issuesconcerning its constitutionality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
DECISION:
The SC declared that the effort of respondents to question the locus standi of
petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too lucid to be
misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus
standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to
the people.In KapatiranngmgaNaglilingkodsaPamahalaanngPilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,the
Court stressed:
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or
interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the
importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of these petitions.
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CASE TITLE:
G.R. No. 88265 December 21, 1989
SANTIAGO A. DEL ROSARIO, GEORGE G. GACULA, EDGARDO G. SANTOS,
ALBANO S. SIBAL, ALBERTO C. REYES, NONITO P. ARROYO, EMMANUEL F.
TERENCIO, DOMINGO S. DE LEON, MODESTO O. LLAMAS, FARIDA U. ALONTO,
ZENAIDA A. FLOIRENDO, ISABEL A. MEJIA, LUZ P. MABANAG, RAMON H.
RABAGO, JR., SAMUEL D. TROCIO and OSCAR M. BRION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO R. BENGZON, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Health, respondent.
TOPIC:
TESTS OF VALID EXERCISE (LIMITATIONS)
LAWFUL SUBJECT: PUBLIC INTEREST
FACTS:
The Philippine Medical Association is the national organization of medical doctors
in the Philippines. They assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of
Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act 6675) and the implementation of Administrative
Order No. 62.
The law specifically provides that All government health agencies shall use generic
terminology or generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing,
dispensing, and administering of drugs and medicines. It also includes medical,
dental and veterinary, private practitioners shall write prescriptions using the
generic name.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
The petitioners main argument is the alleged unequal treatment of government
practitioners and those on the private practice. It is because the former are
required to use only generic terminology in the prescription while the latter may
write the brand name of the drug below the generic name. It is allegedly a specie of
invalid class legislation.
In addition, the petitioners gave a distorted interpretation on RA 6675 and Admin
Order No. 62 saying that the salesgirl and or druggist have the discretion to
substitute the doctors prescription. The court says that the salesgirl at the
drugstore counter merely informs the customer, but does not determine all the
other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their prices.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
Respondent points out that the institution of generics in the Philippines will compel
physicians to prescribe drugs based on their therapeutic or "active ingredient,"
instead of their well-known brand names. Multiple medications which may produce
potentially adverse, even lethal, chemical reactions in the patient will thereby be
avoided. Patients with limited means will be able to buy generic drugs that cost less
but possess the same active ingredients, dosage form, and strength as brand names,
many of which are priced beyond the reach of the common tao because the high
costs of advertising, packaging, royalties, and other inputs of production determine
their pricing for the market.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Generics Act is constitutional as to the exercise of police power
by the government.
DECISION:
Petition Dismissed.
The court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It
implements the constitutional mandate for the State to protect and promote the
right to health of the people and to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. The alleged unequal
treatment of government physicians, dentists and veterinarians on one hand and
those in the private practice in the other, is a misinterpretation of the law.
The salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer of all available
products, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have
the same generic name and their corresponding process.
The penal sanction in violation of the law is indispensable because they are the
teeth of the law. Without them, the law would be toothless.
The Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of theSecretary of

Health are constitutional.
The purpose of the Generics Act is to promote and require the use of generic
drugproducts that are therapeutically equivalent to their brand name
counterparts. The effect of the drug does not depend on its brand but on the active
ingredients which it contains.
TITLE OF THE CASE: Dumlao v. COMELEC
TOPIC:
Levels of Scrutiny; Bill of Rights; and Rights of the Accused
FACTS:
Petitioners
Contention:
Petitioner
Dumlao
assails
the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of
section
4 of
BatasangPambansaBlg. 52 as being contrary to the equal protection
clause guarantee by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent
COMELEC from implementing the said provision.
Respondents Contention: Respondent COMELEC claims that the
purpose of special disqualification of section 4 of Batas PambansaBlg.
52 is to infuse new blood in local governments which accepted by
majority. Said section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification- In addition to violation of Section
10 of Art. XII-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned I
existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification of any of
the elective enumerated in Section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial, city municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under law
and who shall been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term
of the office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to
run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao petitioner was a former governor of Nueva Viscaya. He
has retired from his office and he has receiving retirement benefits
therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local
elections. On the other hand BP 52 was passed providing
disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Petitioner assailed the said
provisions BP52 is unconstitutional as it is contrary to the equal

protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution.
The petitioner case is within the jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC
and as provided by Sec.2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent
portions which reads:
Section 2. The COMELEC shall have the following power and functions.
The sole judged of all contest relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all the members of the National Assembly and
elective provincial and city officials.
The aforequoted provision must also be related to Section 11 of Art.
XII-C, which provides:
Section 11. Any decision, order. Or rulling of the Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within 30 days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
ISSUE (S): Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 4 of Batas

PambansaBlg. 52 is valid.
COURT DECISIONS:
Yes the Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.52 is valid. In the case of a
65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for
the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The
tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already
declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work,
but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume
again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from
the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does
not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification.
What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a
reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where
the classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies to
all those belonging to the same class.
DISSENTING OPINION:
Teehankee, J., Sec.4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 Special Disqualification
is void. The claim of the respondent COMELEC as accepted by majority,
is that the purpose of the special disqualification is to infuse new blood
in local governments but classification is not rational. It is not germane
or relevant to the alleged purpose of infusing new blood because such
old blood retirees may continue in local governments since they are
not disqualified at all to run at any other local elective office, other
than the local elective office from which they retired.
Furthermore, in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are
disqualified only when they have received payment of the retirement
benefits to which they are entitled under the law. If they are not
received such retirement benefit they are not disqualified.
In addition, the mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has young
or new blood does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective
and competent than a mature 65-year old like the petitioner who has
experience on the job and who was observed in the hearing to appear
to be most physically fit.
CONCURRING OPINION:
Barredo, J., I concur. But as regards the matter of equal protection, I
reiterate my view of Peralta that Sec. 9 (1) Article XII is more expensive
than the equal protection clause.
Aquino, J., I concur in the result as to paragraph 1 of the dispositive part of the
decision.Idissentastoparagraph2.Inmyopinion,paragraph2,section4ofBatas
PambansaBilang52isvalid,beingsimilartocertainpresumptionsinArticles217and
315ofthePenalCode,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.4885.SeeU.S.v.Luling,34
Phil.725andPeoplev.Mingoa,92Phil.856.
Abad Santos, J., I concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction
as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 should be one
which is final and unappealable.
CASE TITLE:
In re Cunanan
PETITIONER: Albino Cunanan
RESPONDENT: Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag

TOPIC:
Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful
Candidates
FACTS:
The Congress passed Republic Act 972, also known to be the
controversial Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which has the title An Act To
Fix The Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and
Including1955.
Section 1. Republic Act 972 provides that any bar candidate who
obtained the following general average in their corresponding bar
examination year, without obtaining a grade below 50% in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the oath of office as member of
the Philippine Bar: from 1946 to 1951-70%; 1952- 71%; 1953- 72%;
1954- 73%; and 1955- 74%.
Section 2. Republic Act 972 provides that any bar candidate who
obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain
in any subsequent examinations that he may take. The Republic Act
will benefit 1,094 examinees. Petitions were filed, however,
questioning the validity of Republic Act 972.
PETITIONER CONTENTIONS:
Petitioner together with other bar flunker believes himself or herself
that they are fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and
pass by the SC and feeling that they have discriminated against,
unsuccessful candidates who obtained a few percentage lower than
those admitted to the bar, went to the congress for, and secured in
1951 Senate no. 12 for a consideration.
RESPONDENT CONTENTIONS:
The President vetoed the said Bill after he was given advice adverse to
it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved Senate Bill no.
372 embodying substantially the provisions of the veto bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 972 is constitutional.
HELD:
The Court held Republic Act 972 to be partly constitutional, declaring

the portion in Section1referring to the 1946 to 1952 examinations and
all of Section 2 as unconstitutional, and declaring the remaining
portions of the law as valid and shall continue in force. First of all,
Republic Act 972 was passed to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation because of the aftermath of the Japanese occupation. The
Court declared some parts unconstitutional because:
1. Its declared purpose is to admit candidates who failed in the bar
examinations of 1946-1952, and who are certainly inadequately
prepared to practice law. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something
contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner, and this is a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.
2. It is a judgment revoking the resolution of the Court on the petitions
of the 810 candidates without having examined their respective
examination papers. In attempting to do it directly, Republic Act No.
972 violated the Constitution.
3. Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
amendatory rules are intended to regulate acts subsequent to its
promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of
law, and these are just considered minimum norms. It is therefore the
primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the
practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates,
which the law makes, is contrary to facts, which are of general
knowledge, and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is
arbitrary. It is undoubtedly class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the
law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable
from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void. Because of lack
of votes, the portion pertaining to the 1953-1955 is declared valid and
shall continue in force.
CONCURING AND DISSENTING OPINION:
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the
exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the
Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission
thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The
power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is
exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to
promulgate rules, which regulate admission. It is only this power (to
promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution
to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to
admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications
of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the
legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has
made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies
completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial
function, and lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of
amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general
average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in
1955 should be considered as having passed the examination is to
mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is
a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with
grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to
show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and
discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why
should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be
allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those
taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is
not embraced within the rule-making power of Congress, because it is
an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members
thereof, and because it is discriminatory.
CASE TITLE: PLDT v. NTC
TOPIC: Business Organization; Corporate Fiction; Franchise; Right of
Succession
FACTS:
In 1958, Congress a franchise to build radio stations (later construed as
to include telephony) granted Felix Alberto & Co., Inc (FACI). FACI later
changed its name to Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI). In
1987, ETCI was granted by the National Telecommunications
Commission a provisional authority to build a telephone system in
some parts of Manila. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT)
opposed the said grant as it avers, among others, that ETCI is not
qualified because its franchise has already been invalidated when it
failed to exercise it within 10 years from 1958; that in 1987, the
Albertos, owners of more than 40% of ETCIs shares of stocks,
transferred said stocks to the new stockholders (Cellcom, Inc.? not
specified in the case); that such transfer involving more than 40%
shares of stocks amounted to a transfer of franchise which is void
because the authorization of Congress was not obtained. The NTC
denied PLDT. PLDT then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the NTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PLDTs petition should prosper.
COURT DECISION:
No. PLDT cannot attack ETCIs franchise in a petition for certiorari. It
cannot be collaterally attacked. It should be directly attacked through a
petition for quo warranto which is the correct procedure. A franchise is
a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due
process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a
franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been
forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative
writ of quo warranto. Further, for any violation of the franchise, it
should be the government who should be filing a quo warranto
proceeding because it was the government who granted it in the first
place.
The transfer of more than 40% of the shares of stocks is not
tantamount to a transfer of franchise. There is a distinction here.
There is no need to obtain authorization of Congress for the mere
transfer of shares of stocks. Shareholders can transfer their
shares to anyone. The only limitation is that if the transfer
involves more than 40% of the corporations stocks, it should be
approved by the NTC. The transfer in this case was shown to
have been approved by the NTC. What requires authorization
from Congress is the transfer of franchise; and the person who
shall obtain the authorization is the grantee (ETCI). A distinction
should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by
stockholders, the sale of which requires only NTC approval, and
the franchise itself which is owned by the corporation as the
grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which requires
Congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the shares of
stock, they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may
not, however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation,
like its franchise. In other words, even if the original stockholders

had transferred their shares to another group of shareholders,
the franchise granted to the corporation subsists as long as the
corporation, as an entity, continues to exist. The transfer of the
shares does not thereby invalidate the franchise. A corporation
has a personality separate and distinct from that of each
stockholder. It has the right of continuity or perpetual succession.
DISSENTING OPINION:
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.,
I share with the rest of the Court the desire to have a "modern,
efficient, satisfactory, and continuous telecommunications service" in
the Philippines. I register this dissent, however, because I believe that
any frustrations over the present state of telephone services do not
justify our affirming an illegal and inequitable order of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). More so when it appears that
the questioned order is not really a solution to the problems bugging
our telephone industry.
A. CASE TITLE : City of Quezon v. Ericta

B. TOPIC
power
C. FACTS
: Eminent domain: Invalid taking under the police
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE

REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL
GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law
basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial
of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents
of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law
by invoking police power.
Petitioners Contention: Petitioners argue that the taking of the
respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police
power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended
for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the
exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances
and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience
of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein."
Respondents Contention: Respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious
because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use
of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is
not available as a source of power for the taking of the property
in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived
of his property outright under the State's police power, the
property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and
summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare.
The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the
destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.
ISSUE
: WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid
exercise of the police power. No.
A. COURT DECISIONS
Court of First Instance: declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64,

of the Quezon City Council null and void.
Supreme Court: The petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The
decision of the respondent court is affirmed.
The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal

corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit and
confiscate.
1.
Case Title: Gonzales v. COMELEC 21SCRA774

Topic: Amendment and Revision of the Constitution; Stages; Ratification
of
Facts: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed
Resolutions (a) to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from
maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180 to
be apportioned among the several provinces; (b) to call a convention to propose
amendments to the present Constitution; and (c) to amend Section 16, Article VI
the said Constitution so they can become delegates themselves to the Convention.
on
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill which became RA 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held
November 14, 1967.
Joint
a
(1) Petitioner's Contention:

Ramon A. Gonzales for G.R No. L-28196
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) for G.R. No. L-28224
In this consolidated petition, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and
PHILCONSA seek to (a) declare RA 4913 unconstitutional and (b) to restrain
COMELEC from holding the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional
amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3.
It is further contested that said resolutions are null and void because: (1)
The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments and the
resolutions are, at best, de facto Congressmen; (2) Congress may adopt either one of two
alternatives-- propose amendments or call a convention-- but may not avail of both at
the same time; (3) The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution
shall be submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election.
(2) Respondents Contention:
COMELEC; Director of Printing and Audito General
That they have done it in accordance with the provision of the Constitution
which does not specifically provides through a special election but only "election".
Issue: Whether or not Constitutional Amendments be submitted for ratification in a

General Election?
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court: COMELEC
Dismiss the petition of non-iplementing of R.A. 4913 an act providing that
the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the House Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted for approval by the people.
(2) Appeallate Court: N. A
(3)
Supreme Court:
(a) Chief Justice Concepcion;
There is nothing in Section 1 Article XV of the 1935 Constitution that
indicates "election" therein referred to is a "special election" not general election. The
circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to
the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best
to do so under the circumstance then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
(b) Concurring Opinion of Justice Makalintal;
The ratification of the amendments to the Constitution need not
necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called for that purpose alone. While such
procedure is highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of "an election" at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
(c) Concurring Opinion of Justice Bengzon
Had the framers of the Constitution thought of requiring a special election
for the purpose only to proposed amendments, they could have said so, by qualifying the
phrase with some word such as "special" or "solely" or "exclusively". They did not.
Dissenting Opinion:
(a) Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sanchez;
That the proper submission of amendments to the people to enable them to
equally ratify them properly is the meat of the constitutional requirement is reflected in
the sequence of uniform practices. The Constitution has been amended thrice in 1939,
1940 and 1947 of which through a special election.
(b) Concurring the opinion of Justice Sanchez, Justice JBL Reyes;
The framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character
thereof and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have only
meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted at an
election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the subject, which means
through a special election.
Definition of Terms:
2.
Case Title: Tarrosa v. Singson 232 SCRA 553
Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review; Necessity of Deciding the Constitutional

Question
Facts: This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a "taxpayer,"
questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the
BangkoSentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the
performance of his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez,
Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in payment
of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson.
JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA
Petitioner argues that respondent Singson's appointment is null and void since
it was not submitted for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments.
The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653,
which established the BangkoSentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the
Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides that the Governor
of the BangkoSentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall
be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON. SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ III
(a) Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in
requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointment of the Governor of the BangkoSentral. They contend that an
appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which
have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, as provided in
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
(b) Respondents also aver that the BangkoSentral has its own budget and
accordingly, its budgetary requirements are not subject to the provisions of
the General Appropriations Act.
Issue: Whether or not the question of constitutionality of Section 6, Article II of R.A. No.
7653isindispensable for the determination of the case filed by the petitioner

Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court: N.A
(2) Appeallate Court: N.A
(3) Supreme Court:
No, the court ruled that likewise, it is refrained from passing upon the
constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle that
bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof
is indispensable for the determination of the case (Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA
489 [1992]).
Dissenting Opinion:
3.
Case Title: Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas 1 SCRA 646

Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Necessity of the Exercise
Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government
drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola street, up to the
Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of
approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden de PP.
Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda
College, a private educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having been
able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted the
present expropriation proceedings.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
It is to be observed that paragraph IV of the complaint expressly alleges that
appellant needs, among other properties, the portion of appellee's property in
question for the purpose of constructing the Azcarraga street extension, and
that paragraph VII of the same complaint expressly alleges that, in accordance
with Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the
Philippines had authorized the acquisition, thru condemnation proceedings, of
the aforesaid parcel of land belonging to appellee, as evidenced by the third
indorsement dated May 15, 1957 of the Executive Secretary.
LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS
I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public
use and therefore is not subject to expropriation.
II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation.

III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site
which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not
necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to education.
IV. That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant is
discriminatory.
V. That the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push
through its project of constructing the proposed Azcarraga Extension and to
allow the plaintiff to expropriate defendant's property at this time would be
only to needlessly deprive the latter of the use of its property
Issue: Whether or not the need to open the extension of Azcarraga Street to ease and
solve the traffic congestion on Legarda Street is a valid necessity for the exercise of
expropriation by the government.
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court:
Dismiss the case in favor of the respondents
(2) Appeallate Court: N.A
(2) Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court did not rule on the subject matter but decided that the case
to be set aside and a present case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings in order for the parties to be given an opportunity to present their
respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or
indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved.
It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for
public use and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of
private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a
genuine necessity therefore of a public character. Consequently, the courts
have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity
therefore (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349; Manila
Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 O.G. 1957)
Dissenting Opinion:
4. Case Title: EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) (Reversing NHA v. Reyes)
Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Determination of Just Compensation: Judicial
Function
Facts: The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees
Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule
67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of
property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as declared by
the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY
HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Issue:
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court:
(2) Appeallate Court:
(3) Supreme Court:
Dissenting Opinion:
1.
Case Title: Gonzales v. COMELEC 21SCRA774

Topic: Amendment and Revision of the Constitution; Stages; Ratification
of
Facts: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed
Resolutions (a) to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from
maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180 to
be apportioned among the several provinces; (b) to call a convention to propose
amendments to the present Constitution; and (c) to amend Section 16, Article VI
the said Constitution so they can become delegates themselves to the Convention.
on
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill which became RA 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held
November 14, 1967.
Joint
a

Ramon A. Gonzales for G.R No. L-28196
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) for G.R. No. L-28224
In this consolidated petition, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and

PHILCONSA
seek to (a) declare RA 4913 unconstitutional and (b) to
restrain COMELEC from
holding the plebiscite for the ratification of
the constitutional amendments
proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1
and 3.
It is further contested that said resolutions are null and void because: (1)
The
Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments
and the
resolutions are, at best, de facto Congressmen; (2) Congress
may adopt either
one of two alternatives-- propose amendments or
call a convention-- but may
not avail of both at the same time; (3) The
election, in which proposals for
amendment to the Constitution shall
be submitted for ratification, must be a
special election, not a general
election.
only

COMELEC; Director of Printing and Audito General
That they have done it in accordance with the provision of the Constitution
which does not specifically provides through a special election but
"election".
Issue: Whether or not Constitutional Amendments be submitted for ratification in a

General Election?
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court: COMELEC
Dismiss the petition of non-iplementing of R.A. 4913 an act providing that
the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the House Resolutions
No. 1 and
3 be submitted for approval by the people.
(2) Appellate Court: N. A
(3)
Supreme Court:
(a) Chief Justice Concepcion;
There is nothing in Section 1 Article XV of the 1935 Constitution that
indicates
"election" therein referred to is a "special election" not
general election. The
circumstance that three previous amendments to the
Constitution had been
submitted to the people for ratification in
special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so
under the circumstance then obtaining. It
does not negate its authority
to submit proposed amendments for ratification in
general elections.
(b) Concurring Opinion of Justice Makalintal;

The ratification of the amendments to the Constitution need not
necessarily be
in a special election or plebiscite called for that purpose
alone. While such
procedure is highly to be preferred, the
Constitution speaks simply of "an
election" at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
for
by
"solely" or
(c) Concurring Opinion of Justice Bengzon

Had the framers of the Constitution thought of requiring a special election
the purpose only to proposed amendments, they could have said so,
qualifying the phrase with some word such as "special" or
"exclusively". They did not.
Dissenting Opinion:
(a) Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sanchez;
That the proper subm,ission of amendments to the people to enable them
to
equally ratify them properly is the meat of the constitutional
requirement, is
reflected in the sequence of uniform practices. The
Constitution has been
amended thrice in 1939, 1940 and 1947 of
which through a special election.
(b) Concurring the opinion of Justice Sanchez, Justice JBL Reyes;
The framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental character
thereof and
of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable,
could have only
meant that any amendments thereto should be
debated, considered and voted
at an election wherein the people
could devote undivided attention to the
subject, which means
through a special election.
2.
Case Title: Tarrosa v. Singson 232 SCRA 553
Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review; Necessity of Deciding the Constitutional

Question
Facts: This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a "taxpayer,"
questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the
BangkoSentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the
performance of his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez,
Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in payment
of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson.

JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA
Petitioner argues that respondent Singson's appointment is null and void since
it was not submitted for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments.
The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653,
which established the BangkoSentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the
Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides that the Governor
of the BangkoSentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall
be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON. SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ III
(c) Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in
requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointment of the Governor of the BangkoSentral. They contend that an
appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which
have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, as provided in
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
(d) Respondents also aver that the BangkoSentral has its own budget and
accordingly, its budgetary requirements are not subject to the provisions of
the General Appropriations Act.
Issue: Whether or not the question of constitutionality of Section 6, Article II of R.A. No.
7653isindispensable for the determination of the case filed by the petitioner
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court: N.A
(2) Appellate Court: N.A
(3) Supreme Court:
No, the court ruled that likewise, it is refrained from passing upon the
constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle that
bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof
is indispensable for the determination of the case (Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA
489 [1992]).
Dissenting Opinion:
3.
Case Title: Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas 1 SCRA 646

Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Necessity of the Exercise
Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government
drew plans to extend Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola street, up to the
Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of
approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden de PP.
Benedictinos de Filipinas, a domestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda
College, a private educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having been
able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted the
present expropriation proceedings.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
It is to be observed that paragraph IV of the complaint expressly alleges that
appellant needs, among other properties, the portion of appellee's property in
question for the purpose of constructing the Azcarraga street extension, and
that paragraph VII of the same complaint expressly alleges that, in accordance
with Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the
Philippines had authorized the acquisition, thru condemnation proceedings, of
the aforesaid parcel of land belonging to appellee, as evidenced by the third
indorsement dated May 15, 1957 of the Executive Secretary.
LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS
I. That the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public
use and therefore is not subject to expropriation.
II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation.
III. That the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site
which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not
necessitate the expropriation of a property dedicated to education.
IV. That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant is
discriminatory.
V. That the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push
through its project of constructing the proposed Azcarraga Extension and to
allow the plaintiff to expropriate defendant's property at this time would be
only to needlessly deprive the latter of the use of its property
Issue: Whether or not the need to open the extension of Azcarraga Street to ease and
solve the traffic congestion on Legarda Street is a valid necessity for the exercise of
expropriation by the government.
Court Decisions:
(3) Lower Court:
Dismiss the case in favor of the respondents

(4) Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court did not rule on the subject matter but decided that the case
to be set aside and a present case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings in order for the parties to be given an opportunity to present their
respective evidence upon these factors and others that might be of direct or
indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved.
It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for
public use and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of
private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a
genuine necessity therefore of a public character. Consequently, the courts
have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity
therefore (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349; Manila
Railroad Company vs. Hacienda Benito, Inc., 37 O.G. 1957)
Dissenting Opinion:
4. Case Title: EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) (Reversing NHA v. Reyes)
Topic: Eminent Domain; Elements; Determination of Just Compensation: Judicial
Function
Facts: The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees
Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule
67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of
property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as declared by
the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY
The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and in setting the commissioner's report for
hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which is the applicable law herein, the
basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared
by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value
as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more
need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules
of Court and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable factors
in order to determine just compensation. The petitioner further maintains that
P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the assessors and the property owners themselves
the power or duty to fix the market value of the properties and that said
property owners are given the full opportunity to be heard before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the property owner of the right to
determine the just compensation in expropriation proceedings, with
appropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative boards, is valid and
constitutional
HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The judiciary who has interpreted the eminent domain provisions of the
Constitution and established the meaning, under the fundamental law, of just
compensation and who has the power to determine it.
Issue: Whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the same provision on just
compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine
just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to
appoint commissioners for such purpose.
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court:
The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the
factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such
amount.
(3) Supreme Court:

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
Dissenting Opinion:
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a
fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the
property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
A. Case Title: Cruz v. DENR [G.R. No. 135385]
B. Topic:
Requisites of Judicial Review > actual case or controversy
C. Facts of the case

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).
C.1 Petitioners contention
a) Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57 and 58 of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.
b)Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.
C.2 Defendants Contention
a)Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) ----- IPRA is constitutional and the petition be dismissed for lack of
merit.
b)Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through
the Solicitor General ----- IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants
ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be
granted in part.
D. Issue: Whether or not the petition raised has an actual case or controversy. (Issue
is based on the topic and concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza)
E. Court Decisions
E.3 Supreme Court: ( no explanation why the justices decided to dismiss or
sustain the validity of IPRA, just this.)
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition and to sustain the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to
grant the petition.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was re-deliberated upon. However, after re-deliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
F. Concurring Opinion (Justice Mendoza)

The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, 1 extends only to
cases and controversies for the determination of such proceedings as are
established by law for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the
prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs. In this case, the purpose of the
suit is not to enforce a property right of petitioners against the government and
other respondents or to demand compensation for injuries suffered by them as
a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle what they believe to
be the doubtful character of the law in question. Such judgment cannot be
executed as it amounts to no more than an expression of opinion upon the
validity of the provisions of the law in question.
Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not
involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting the balance of power
among the three branches of the government and erecting, as it were, the
judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with
power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is
exactly what we would be permitting in this case were we to assume
jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA
contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a
statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is
sought to be declared void on its face.
Guanzon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623

Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
The Constitution and the Courts>Requisites of Judicial Review>No Locus Standi
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the

military and police officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal
Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila. The forty one (41) petitioners
state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and
leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that they have a common or
general interest in the preservation of the rule of law, protection of their human rights and
the reign of peace and order in their communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of
Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all before this Court.
Petitioners Contention:
The "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in critical areas
pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding.
The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the July 20 saturation
drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended
on November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City.
The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern
of human rights abuses.
Defendants Contention:
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives.
And second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate
disregard for human rights are total lies.
Issue:
WON the respective Petitioners have Legal Standing in filing the case.
Ruling:
Not one of the several thousand persons treated in the illegal and inhuman manner
described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial court to
present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have
been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the
several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently been charged
and none of those affected has apparently complained
Where not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged, the
problem is not initially for the Supreme Court.
Dissenting Opinions:
CRUZ, J.,
While acknowledging that the military is conducting the saturation drives, the
majority practically blinks them away on mere technicalities. First, there are no proper
parties. Second, there is no proof. Therefore, the petition is dismissed.
The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for
inaction. We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there are
constitutional questions that must be met. There are many decisions applying this
doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603; Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41
SCRA 702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481; Gonzales
v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals; 154 SCRA
199; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.
I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he
may not be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes
him a proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning house who has the right to call
the firemen. Everyone has the right and responsibility to prevent the fire from spreading
even if he lives in the other block.
SARMIENTO, J.,
The petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to raise, arising from abuses they
pinpoint to the lower offices of the Executive (which presumably has its imprimatur). To
make it an executive problem, so I hold, is to make the Executive judge and jury of its
own acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter.First, the facts are not "second-hand", they are
undisputed:There had been saturation drives. Second, the petitioners have trooped to the
highest court with a legitimate grievance against the Executive (and military).
Occena v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1

Ponente: Fernando, C.J.
Amendments and Revision>Stages>Proposal Stage
Facts:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of
threeBatasangPambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further
than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity.The rather unorthodox aspect
of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law.
The following are the three resolutions: Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment
allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own
a limited area of land for residential purposes; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the
Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections.The
three resolutions were approved by the InterimBatasangPambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the BatasangPambansaBlg. 22, the date of the
plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.
Petitioners Contention:
Petitioners argue the proposition that the amendments proposed are so
extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the
Interim BatasangPambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly.
Issue:
WON the Interim BatasangPambansa can validly propose amendments.
Ruling:
The Interim BatasangPambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body
applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments
could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is

concerned.
Thus any argument to the contrary is unavailing. As for the people being
adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time, as in the cited 1980 Occena
opinion of Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the retirement age
of members of the judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and
extensively discussed at the Interim BatasangPambansa, as well as through the mass
media, [ so that ] it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment [ s ]."
Dissenting Opinion:
TEEHANKEE, J.,
The proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional agency
vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. inthe Interim National Assembly provided
in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be convened and not from the
executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent
power has been withheld.The proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the
Interim BatasangPambansa as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976 amendments must
necessarily suffer from the same Congenital infirmity.
The three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical amendments of
our very structure of government were considered and approved by the Interim
BatasangPambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date
of the plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and
far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to
"sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously
deliberate thereon and to express their will in a genuine manner."
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

Ponente: Cruz, J.
Police Power>Test of Valid Exercise>Lawful Means
Facts:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A. Which prohibited the
interprovincial movement of carabaos.
Petitioners contention:
That the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the

owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process.
Defendants contention:
They are just following the law.
Issue:
WON there was a lawful means in the exercise of police power pursuant to
Executive Order No. 626-A.
Court Decision:
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Citysustained the confiscation of the carabaos.
Intermediate Appellate Court upheld the Trial Court decision.
Supreme Court:
Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed,
and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.The executive order
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.To sum up then,
we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process
is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
A. Case Title: Eslaban v. De Onorio [G.R. No. 146062 June 28, 2001]
B. Topic: Eminent Domain > Just Compensation > Definition
Respondent Clarita Vda. deEnorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas,
Sto. Nio, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters. The lot, known as
Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586, is covered by TCT No. T-22121 of the Registry of
Deeds, South Cotabato. On October 6, 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager
of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the
said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. Respondents husband
agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the
government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the Commission
on Audit. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which
respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way damages.
Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which
waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way.
After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay P111, 299.55 for taking her
property but the petitioner refused.
At the pre-trial conference, the following facts were stipulated upon: (1) that the
area taken was 24,660 square meters; (2) that it was a portion of the land covered by
TCT No. T-22121 in the name of respondent and her late husband (Exh. A); and (3)
that this area had been taken by the NIA for the construction of an irrigation canal.
D. Issue: Whether or not the value of just compensation shall be determined
from the time of the taking or from the time of the finality of the decision.
E. Courts Decisions
Regional Trial Court held that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of
P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have been
used for the construction of the canal.
Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Supreme Court:
With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned
property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value
which should be paid or that sum of money which a person, desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would
agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. Further, just
compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of
the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just
for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the
date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever
came first. Even before the new rule, however, it was already held in
Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgosthat the price of the land at the
time of taking, not its value after the passage of time, represents the true
value to be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court of
Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should be
determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its
taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in its
obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court

of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the extent that the
just compensation for the contested property be paid to respondent in the amount
of P16,047.61 per hectare, with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the time of taking until full payment is made. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Case Title:Oposa vs. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083 | 1993-07-30)
Topic: Proper Party (locus standi) [under Topic C: The Constitution and
the Courts; subtopic 2: requisites of judicial review]
Ponente: Justice Hilario G. Davide
Facts of the Case:

Petitioners: minors and their respective parents and the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc.
Respondents: Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., in his capacity as the Sec.
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (substituted
by Hon. Angel C. Alcala)
The petition stems from a civil case instituted by minors duly

represented and joined by their respective parents against Fulgencio S.
Factoran, the then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The complaint was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical rainforests."
The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource. The petitioners also
aver that they represent their generation and generations yet born (by
virtue of inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational
justice.)
In the said civil case, the petitioners prayed to have all existing
timber license agreements (TLAs) cancelled and for the DENR
Secretary to cease and desist from approving new TLAs. They sought
to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital
life-support systems and continue rape of Mother Earth.
The case was dismissed by the lower court on the ground

inter alia that the plaintiffs were not proper parties, hencethe
filing of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 asking the
Court to set aside the judgment.
Petitioner's Contention:
1. The complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action

as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a
sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
192 creating the DENR,Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable
right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in
natural law.
2. The respondent has a correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O.
No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
3. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their

generation as well as generations yet unborn, hence they
are proper parties.
Defendants Contention:
On the matter of proper party, the challenged RTC order stated
that the complaint fell short in alleging with sufficient definiteness, a
specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1,
Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
D. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
E. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts decision to
dismiss the case on the ground that the plaintiffs were not proper
parties. Petitioners have the legal standing. In fact, they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation, and for succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue on behalf of
succeeding generation can only be based on the personality
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
The complaint focuses on a fundamental natural and legal right
enshrined in the Constitution. The same right and source of obligation
can justify the claimed inter-generational responsibility. Hence, they
may bring the matter at hand to court and be granted the proper
recognition.
Section 16, Article II which recognizes above all: THE STATE
SHALL PROTECT AND ADVANCE THE RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND
HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY IN ACCORD WITH THE RHYTHM AND HARMONY
OF NATURE. Said provision is recognized as self executory and hence
may be a source of obligation upon the state without need of further
positive act from Congress.
A. Case Title:Tio v. VRB, 151 SCRA 208

B. Topic: The Fundamental Power of the State > Police Power >Tests of Valid
Exercise
C. Facts of the Case
Parties: VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI
ENTERPRISES (petitioner) vs.VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF
FINANCE, METRO MANILA COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF
MANILA (respondents.)
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own
behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely
affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled
"An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate
and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the
BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on
April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the
abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National
Internal Revenue Code providing SEC. 134.
Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be
subject to sales tax.
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect
a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case
may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%)
of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other
fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the
City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
xxx xxxxxx
C.1 Respondent's Contention
The rationale behind the decree is set out in its preambular clauses:
1. The proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among
others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation
thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and
have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%)
and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement
and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million
annually in government revenues;
2. Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum
from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been
subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in

taxes each year;
3. The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected
the viability of the movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie houses
and theaters throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide displacement and
unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous moviehouses and theaters;
4. In order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the
Government to create an environment conducive to growth and development of all
business industries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated
investment of about P3 Billion;
5. Proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only
alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which more than
75,000 families and 500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an
additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize
the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;
6. The rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features
constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the
youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
7. Civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures to curb
these blatant malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright laws;
8. In the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the
people and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency
measures must be adopted with dispatch;
C.2. Petitioner's Contention
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts
payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the
subject matter thereof;
2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful
restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the
vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
it
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which

is
not.
D. Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed by the Decree is a valid exercise of police
power.
E. Supreme Court Decision:
On the matter of whether or not the decree is a valid exercise of police power,
the court held that the levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed
primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of
the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the
proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the
DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. The public
purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to
impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. It is inherent in the power to
tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly
held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". Taxation has been made
the implement of the state's police power
A. Case Title: US v. Causby [ 328 US 256]

B. Topic: Eminent Domain > Elements > Taking
Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina.
It has
on it a dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which were mainly used for
raising chickens. The noise is startling. And at night the glare from the planes brightly
lights up the place. As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken
business.
C.1 Petitioners Contention. Under those statutes the United States has
'complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space' over this country. It is,
therefore, argued that since these flights were within the minimum safe altitudes of
flight which had been prescribed, they were an exercise of the declared right of travel
through the airspace. The United States concludes that when flights are made within
the navigable airspace without any physical invasion of the property of the
landowners, there has been no taking of property.
C.2 Defendants Contention. Defendant argues that he owned the airspace above
his farm. By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated
his property without compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
D. Issue.Whether respondents' property was taken within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft over
respondents' land at low altitudes.
E. Courts Decisions
The ancient doctrine of common law ownership of the landdoes not
control the present case. For the United States conceded on oral argument that if
the flights over respondents' property rendered it uninhabitable, there would be a
taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. Though it would be only an
easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely
temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be a
definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land.
The reason is that there would be an intrusion so immediate and direct as
to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his
exploitation of it. While the owner does not in any physical manner occupy that
stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in
somewhat the same sense that space left between buildings for the purpose of
light and air is used. The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to
the land that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land
itself. We think that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to
it and that invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of the surface.
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of
the public domain. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so
low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the
enjoyment and use of the land. For the findings of the Court of Claims plainly
establish that there was a diminution in value of the property and that the
frequent, low-level flights were the direct and immediate cause.
Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting.
It is inconceivable to me that the Constitution guarantees that the airspace
of this Nation needed for air navigation, is owned by the particular persons who
happen to own the land beneath to the same degree as they own the surface
below.It has by statute, 44 Stat. 568, 52 Stat. 973, provided that 'the United States
of America is to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty
in the air space (over) the United States.' This was done under the assumption that
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution gave Congress the same plenary power
to control navigable airspace as its plenary power over navigable waters.
To make sure that the airspace used for air navigation would remain free,
Congress further declared that 'navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right
of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation,' and finally stated
emphatically that there exists 'a public right of freedom of transit through the
navigable airspace of the United States.' Congress thus declared that the air is
free, not subject to private ownership, and not subject to delimitation by the
courts. Congress and those acting under its authority were the only ones who had
power to control and regulate the flight of planes. 'Navigable air-space' was
defined as 'airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the
Civil Aeronautics Authority.'
Old concepts of private ownership of land should not be introduced into
the field of air regulation.In my opinion this case should be reversed on the
ground that there has been no 'taking' in the Constitutional sense.
D. CASE TITLE : Salonga vs Hermoso

E. TOPIC
: Actual case or controversy: Exception to the
exception question is capable of repetition yet evading review
F. FACTS
During the time of Martial Law, JovitoSalonga filed a

mandamus proceeding to compel Rolando Hermoso of the Travel
Processing Center to issue a certificate of eligibility to travel to
Salonga.
G. ISSUE
: WON the case has been moot or academic. YES
H. COURT DECISIONS
Supreme Court: The petition is dismissed for being moot and

academic.
In the motion to dismiss of the Solicitor General dated April 21,
1980, it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had
been granted to the petitioner. A xerox copy was enclosed. A
resolution for dismissal is, therefore, in order.
The necessity for any ruling was thus obviated (avoided/prevented).
Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that in the future this Court
may be faced again with a situation like the present which takes up
its time and energy needlessly, it is desirable that respondent Travel
Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the
impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their
constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or
annoyance.
I. Separate Opinion:
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petitioner is the holder of a Philippine passport issued on March 3,
1980 and valid up to March 1982 and has urgent medical
appointments and official engagements as the only Filipino member of
the Board of Trustees of the United Board for Higher Christian
Education in Asia based in New York. His last trip abroad was from
February 21, 1980 March 15, 1980 without any complaint from any
government agency. There seems no valid basis for the delay in the
issuance of petitioner's travel permit (which he had long applied for on

April 1, 1980) and for his representative to have had to follow up in
vain daily from the scheduled release date of April 11, 1980 until he
was constrained to file the present petition on April 18th as his
scheduled trip on April 23rd was in jeopardy (while all other
applications had already been long acted upon favorably).
As the Chief Justice stresses in the Court's resolution "it is desirable
that respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost
care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising
their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience
or annoyance." Under the antecedents, with petitioner having
previously established his right to travel as sanctioned by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs which duly issued him his passport, petitioner has
cause to complain that he should not be placed by respondents on
their "watch list without benefit of previous notice and hearing so as to
be afforded the opportunity to rebut whatever adverse information
might have been compiled or given in secret against him.
Finally, it is not amiss to call the attention of the public officials
concerned to the provisions of Article 27 of the Civil Code that "Any
person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official
duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter,
without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be
taken."

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CASE TITLE:

G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

Oil Deregulation Law

The Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of theSecretary of

Levels of Scrutiny; Bill of Rights; and Rights of the Accused

provisions BP52 is unconstitutional as it is contrary to the equal

ISSUE (S): Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 4 of Batas

PETITIONER: Albino Cunanan

RESPONDENT: Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag

The Court held Republic Act 972 to be partly constitutional, declaring

like its franchise. In other words, even if the original stockholders

A. CASE TITLE : City of Quezon v. Ericta

: Eminent domain: Invalid taking under the police

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE

Court of First Instance: declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64,

private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal

Case Title: Gonzales v. COMELEC 21SCRA774

(1) Petitioner's Contention:

Issue: Whether or not Constitutional Amendments be submitted for ratification in a

Case Title: Tarrosa v. Singson 232 SCRA 553

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review; Necessity of Deciding the Constitutional

7653isindispensable for the determination of the case filed by the petitioner

Case Title: Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas 1 SCRA 646

II. That there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation.

Case Title: Gonzales v. COMELEC 21SCRA774

(1) Petitioner's Contention:

In this consolidated petition, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and

(2) Respondents Contention:

Issue: Whether or not Constitutional Amendments be submitted for ratification in a

(b) Concurring Opinion of Justice Makalintal;

(c) Concurring Opinion of Justice Bengzon

Case Title: Tarrosa v. Singson 232 SCRA 553

Topic: Requisites of Judicial Review; Necessity of Deciding the Constitutional

(3) Petitioner's Contention:

Case Title: Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas 1 SCRA 646

(2) Appellate Court: N.A

(3) Supreme Court:

Requisites of Judicial Review > actual case or controversy

C. Facts of the case

F. Concurring Opinion (Justice Mendoza)

Guanzon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the

Occena v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1

could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is

Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

That the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court

Case Title:Oposa vs. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083 | 1993-07-30)

Ponente: Justice Hilario G. Davide

Facts of the Case:

The petition stems from a civil case instituted by minors duly

The case was dismissed by the lower court on the ground

1. The complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action

3. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their

A. Case Title:Tio v. VRB, 151 SCRA 208

subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in

6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which

A. Case Title: US v. Causby [ 328 US 256]

D. CASE TITLE : Salonga vs Hermoso

During the time of Martial Law, JovitoSalonga filed a

: WON the case has been moot or academic. YES

Supreme Court: The petition is dismissed for being moot and

issuance of petitioner's travel permit (which he had long applied for on

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