Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Mark A. Aronchick
Matthew A. Hamermesh
Hangley Aronchick Segal
Pudlin & Schiller, P.C
One Logan Square, 27th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103-6995
(215) 568-6200
Attorneys for Petitioners
Richard L. Bazelon
A. Richard Feldman
Lisa A. Barton
Bazelon, Less & Feldman, P.C.
One South Broad Street, Suite 1500
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 568-1155
Attorneys for Petitioners
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
I. THE OPINIONS BELOW....................................................................................i
II. THE ORDER IN QUESTION .............................................................................1
III. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .............................................1
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...........................................................................2
A. The Underlying Facts ......................................................................................2
B. The Proceedings Below ...................................................................................6
C. The Relevant Statutory Background ...............................................................6
V. THE REASONS FOR GRANTING ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL.................11
A. The Question of the SRCs Statutory Power to Cancel the PFTs Collective
Bargaining Agreement and to Impose New Economic Terms Is a Matter of
Substantial Public Importance that Presents Issues of First Impression and
Requires a Prompt and Definitive Resolution by this Court .........................11
1.
2.
Sections 693 and 696 of the Public School Code plainly and
unequivocally give the SRC the power to cancel any contract,
including collective bargaining agreements, and the Commonwealth
Court erred in holding to the contrary ......................................................16
a)
b)
a)
Sections 693(a)(1) and 696(k)(5) granted the SRC the power to impose
changed economic terms following a cancellation of the collective
bargaining contract ...............................................................................25
b)
3.
4.
The collective bargaining agreement between the School District and the
PFT is not a teachers contract within the meaning of section
693(a)(1) ...................................................................................................34
5.
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Appeal of Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist.,
483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946 (1978)..................................................... 27, 28, 30, 31
Appeal of Watson,
377 Pa. 495, 105 A.2d 576, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 879 (1954) ...........................35
Bd. of Pub. Educ. Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Intille,
401 Pa. 1, 163 A.2d 420, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 (1960) ...............................36
Burger v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of McGuffey Sch. Dist.,
576 Pa. 574, 839 A.2d 1055 (2003)............................................................... 26, 36
Burke ex rel. Burke v. Independence Blue Cross,
103 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2014).....................................................................................45
Cali v. City of Philadelphia,
406 Pa. 290, 177 A.2d 824 (1962)........................................................................17
Capecci v. Joseph Capecci, Inc.,
392 Pa. 32, 139 A.2d 563 (1958)..........................................................................16
Casino Free Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Bd.,
594 Pa. 202, 934 A.2d 1249 (2007)......................................................................42
Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist.,
450 Pa. 207, 299 A.2d 277 (1973)........................................................................36
City of Erie v. v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. (Annunziata),
575 Pa. 594, 838 A.2d 598 (2003)........................................................................16
Commonwealth v. 2101 Cooperative, Inc.,
408 Pa. 24, 183 A.2d 325 (1962)..........................................................................17
Commonwealth v. Bigelow,
484 Pa. 476, 399 A.2d 392 (1979)................................................................. 23, 24
Commonwealth v. Cherney,
454 Pa. 285, 312 A.2d 38 (1973)..........................................................................39
iii
Commonwealth v. Davidson,
595 Pa. 1, 938 A.2d 198 (2007)............................................................................17
Commonwealth v. Jones,
593 Pa. 295, 929 A.2d 205 (2007)........................................................................46
Commonwealth v. Kerstetter,
94 A.3d 991 (Pa. 2014).........................................................................................33
Commonwealth v. Mazzetti,
615 Pa. 555, 44 A.3d 58 (2012)..................................................................... 23, 24
Commonwealth v. McCoy,
599 Pa. 599, 962 A.2d 1160 (2009)......................................................................16
Community Coll. of Beaver Cty. v. Community Coll. of Beaver Cty., Soc'y of the
Faculty (PSEA/NEA),
473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977)......................................................................16
DePaul v. Commonwealth,
600 Pa. 573, 969 A.2d 536 (2009)........................................................................42
DePaul v. Kauffman,
441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971)................................................................. 38, 39
In re Employees of Student Servs., Inc.,
495 Pa. 42, 432 A.2d 189 (1981)..........................................................................48
Fonner v. Shandon, Inc.,
555 Pa. 370, 724 A.2d 903 (1999)........................................................................23
General Motors Corp. v. Romein,
503 U.S. 181 (1992) ....................................................................................... 37-38
Kirsch v. School Dist. of Philadelphia,
563 Pa. 513, 762 A.2d 1081 (2000)......................................................................43
Kirsch v. School Dist. of Philadelphia,
563 Pa. 345, 761 A.2d 540 (2000)........................................................................43
Klopp v. Keystone Ins. Co.,
528 Pa. 1, 595 A.2d 1 (1991)................................................................... 22, 30, 33
iv
vi
I.
(Pa. Cmwlth. Jan. 22, 2015). A copy of the slip opinion is attached hereto as
Appendix A. The opinion of the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County
is unreported; a copy may be found at Appendix B of this Petition.
II.
III.
Whether sections 693 and 696 of the Distressed School Law and Act
46 of 1998 authorized the School Reform Commission and the School
District of Philadelphia to cancel their collective bargaining
agreement with the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers and impose
new economic terms?
B.
IV.
By the Fall of 2014, four years of budget shortfalls had left the School
District a pale image of its former self. To make ends meet, the School District
had laid off thousands, losing one-third of its full-time staff, and closed 31 schools.
(R.383a (5).) The loss of so many guidance counselors, school nurses, teachers,
school police and assistant principals left schools severely understaffed. Deep
budget cuts decimated school cleaning and facilities maintenance and created
severe shortages in books, paper and school supplies, while programs in sports, art,
advanced placement, and career and technical education all suffered as well.
(R.383a (6); R.602a-603a.)
At the time of cancellation, these abject conditions in the Philadelphia
schools remained. (R.604a-605a.) The PFT did not dispute these facts. Indeed,
PFTs President conceded that the School District was failing to provide very
basic things . . . paper, toilet paper, hand sanitizer, books. (R.574a.) 1
The School District also took steps to reduce the compensation it pays its
remaining staff, which accounts for approximately 50% of its budget. The School
District imposed benefit changes and medical plan contributions on its nonunionized employees, and sought economic concessions from its unionized labor
1
In September, 2014, the General Assembly passed and the Governor signed an act authorizing
the City to place a $2-per-pack tax on cigarette sales, the proceeds of which were to be paid to
the School District. Even with this new tax in place, the undisputed evidence in the record
indicated that the School Districts funding for this fiscal year would fall short of covering its
expenses, that a deficit for the 2015-2016 fiscal year in the amount of $71 million loomed ahead,
and that the School District could not count on receiving sufficient funds in either year to remedy
the unsatisfactory conditions prevailing in its schools. (R.384a.)
benefits solely for current employees and their families (i.e., not
retirees). 2
B.
The PFT responded on October 16, 2014 by filing a complaint in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, together with a request for a preliminary
injunction. (R.19a; R.49a.) An injunction hearing was held on October 20 at the
end of which the trial court issued a preliminary injunction. (R.689a.) The parties
stipulated to make the injunction permanent, while reserving their appellate rights,
and the trial court entered the Final Injunction Order on October 27, 2014.
(R.717a.) Petitioners immediately appealed, and the Commonwealth Court, at the
parties joint request, scheduled an expedited briefing and argument schedule
before an en banc panel of five judges. The Commonwealth Court issued its
Opinion and Order affirming the trial courts final order on January 22, 2015. This
petition is being timely filed.
C.
This case arises from a series of statutes and amendments imposing new
governance on school districts in financial distress, and granting the newly created
The changes described in text were estimated to save $39.5 million during the 2014-2015 fiscal
year. Further changes to compensation for substitute teachers, a legal services fund run by the
PFT, paid leave benefits, opt-out payments for those who declined health benefits, and benefits
received upon termination of employment would have saved another $4.3 million. An additional
$10 million in federal funds would have been realized had these changes gone into effect. The
changes included in the SRCs Resolution are described more fully at R.386a-388a.
governing boards special powers and authority to resolve the districts financial
difficulties.
The first of these statutes, passed in 1959, is known as the Distressed School
Law, Act of December 15, 1959, P.L. 1842, No. 675, codified in its current form at
24 P.S. 6-6916-697. It authorized the Secretary of Education to declare school
districts in distress and appoint special boards of control to supervise them.
Section 693 of the 1959 Law, which lies at the center of the present dispute,
gave the special board of control the power:
To cancel or to renegotiate any contract other than teachers contracts
to which the board or the school district is a party, if such cancellation
or renegotiation of contract will effect needed economies in the
operation of the districts schools. [24 P.S. 6-693(1).]3
In 1998, following a financial crisis in the School District in which it faced
the possibility of a systemwide shutdown, the General Assembly greatly expanded
the Distressed School Law by adding section 696, addressed exclusively to school
districts of the first class.4 This statute, the Act of April 27, 1998 (P.L. 270, No.
46), known as Act 46, gave the Secretary of Education the power to declare the
School District to be in distress, thereby suspending the existing school boards
In 2012, section 693(1) was recodified as section 693(a)(1). Act of July 12, 2012, P.L. 1142,
No. 141, Section 6. A copy of section 693 is appended hereto in Appendix C.
4
Section 696 of the School Code, 24 P.S. 6-696, is set forth in full in Appendix D.
powers and duties, and creating a new governing body the SRC in its stead. 24
P.S. 6-696(a) (SRC creation); 6-696(e)(1) (existing board suspension).
Act 46 granted the SRC sweeping powers to cope with the challenges
posed by financially distressed circumstances.
It
expressly relieves the School District from having to comply with certain
provisions of the Charter School Law. 5 24 P.S. 6-696(i)(2)(i). And, significantly,
section 696(i) gives the SRC all of the powers granted to a special board of control
under section 693. 24 P.S. 6-696(i) (incorporating 6-693 powers).
Section 696 also radically shifted the balance of power in the collective
bargaining process, SRC v. PFT, supra, curtailing union rights and expanding the
powers of the SRC and the School District. After a declaration of distress, the Act
authorizes the SRC to lay off professional employees without regard to seniority,
24 P.S. 6-696(i)(7); carves out a wide array of topics from the duty to bargain,
including subcontracting, decisions related to layoffs and recalls, and staffing
patterns and assignments, id., 6-696(k)(2)(i)(vi); requires certain provisions to
5
operation of the districts schools that section 693 conferred upon the SRC. It did
so using language lifted directly from section 693(a)(1). However, section 642A(a)(3) went on to say something that section 693(a)(1) did not [c]ollective
bargaining agreements are specifically exempt from this clause. 24 P.S. 6-642A(a)(3).
Significantly, Act 141 also amended sections 693 as well as 696. See Act
141, 6, 9. The General Assembly thus had the opportunity to add an exemption
to section 693 or 696 like the one inserted in section 642-A(a)(3), making clear that
the power to cancel any contract did not apply to collective bargaining
agreements. But it declined to insert such an exemption in either section, thereby
ensuring that no such exemption could be implied in section 693(a)(1)s power to
cancel.8
V.
Act 141 amended section 693 to clarify that it no longer applied to the other four classes of
school districts. 24 P.S. 6-693(b).
11
lives of those students, it is essential as well to the long-term vitality of the City of
Philadelphia and the Commonwealth.
In the last several years, the School District has faced drastic funding
shortfalls. In response, it has diligently acted to cut its costs to the bone, laying off
thousands of employees, closing schools, and cutting programs, the sad particulars
of which are described in part above.
After the School District was declared to be in distress in 2001, the SRC was
constituted to govern and oversee the School District. To assist the SRC in this
task, Act 46 gave the SRC powerful and unprecedented tools to use as needed to
address the School Districts financial woes. Those tools included the express
power to cancel . . . any contract other than teachers contracts to which . . . the
school district is a party, if such cancellation . . . will effect needed economies in
the operation of the districts schools. 24 P.S. 6-693(a)(1), incorporated in 6696(i).
For nearly two years, while the School District was making drastic cuts in all
other areas of its operations, it engaged in collective bargaining with the PFT in an
effort to reach a new contract that would contain needed economic concessions.
Those talks came to naught.
With the consensual processes of the past no longer working, the SRC
invoked for the first time section 693(a)(1) of the School Code, canceling the PFT
12
interpretation for which neither party nor any of the four amici curiae had
contended that the SRCs power to cancel any contract contained a second,
unspoken exception for collective bargaining agreements. (Cmwlth. Ct. Op. at 24.)
The case undeniably presents a number of critical issues of first impression
that require prompt and definitive resolution by [this] Court.
Pa.R.A.P.
1114(b)(4). Does the SRCs power to cancel any contract to effect needed
economies apply to collective bargaining agreements? If so, does the School
District have the power, express or implied, to impose new economic terms,
13
bargaining disputes arising under section 696 is a potent indication of the public
importance the General Assembly assigned to matters like this, and the need for
prompt and definitive rulings on such issues by this Court.
The interplay between the enhanced powers granted by statute to a
financially distressed school district and a school districts collective bargaining
duties under PERA and other applicable law is an issue that cries out for this
Courts guidance.
opinion.
The need for this Courts review in this case in particular could not be
clearer. The Opinion of the Commonwealth Court not only fails to provide a
definitive resolution 9 it is clearly and demonstrably wrong. The Courts core
holding that the power to cancel any contract must be construed to exempt
collective bargaining agreements (Op. at 24) is fundamentally flawed.
As
demonstrated below, this and other errors in the lower courts Opinion deprive the
SRC and the School District of the protections of Act 46 and call for a full airing
before this Court.
9
See Pa.R.A.P. 1114 (factors meriting allowance of appeal). A definitive resolution is one that
finally and completely ends and settles a controversy. Blacks Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)
(definition of definitive). See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801)
(Marshall, C.J.) (treaty calling for a definitive condemnation required a condemnation by the
court of last resort). See also Websters New Collegiate Dictionary (1979) (definitive means
authoritative and apparently exhaustive).
15
1.
Sections 693 and 696 of the Public School Code plainly and
unequivocally give the SRC the power to cancel any
contract, including collective bargaining agreements, and
the Commonwealth Court erred in holding to the contrary
Commonwealth v. Davidson, 595 Pa. 1, 35-36, 938 A.2d 198, 219 (2007) (the
term any . . . suggests a lack of restriction or limitation). And, of course, the
fact that section 693(a)(1) expressly lists a single exception for teachers
contracts means that no additional exceptions can be inferred, since
[e]xceptions expressed in a statute shall be construed to exclude all others. 1
Pa.C.S. 1924. Accord Cali v. City of Philadelphia, 406 Pa. 290, 305, 177 A.2d
824, 832 (1962) (exception in election code for certain offices prevented implying
additional exceptions); Commonwealth v. 2101 Cooperative, Inc., 408 Pa. 24, 24,
183 A.2d 325, 330 (1962) (where statute expressly exempted only nonprofit
agricultural cooperatives from tax, other types of nonprofit cooperatives were not
exempt).
In short, the plain language of section 693(a)(1) and settled principles of
statutory construction require a holding that the power to cancel applies to
collective bargaining agreements.
Given this natural and straightforward reading of section 693(a)(1), it is not
surprising that in both courts below, no party nor any of the four amici curiae
thought to argue that the term any contract in section 693(a)(1) somehow
exempted collective bargaining agreements. Indeed, the PFT agreed with the
School District defendants that the PFT collective bargaining agreement was a
contract within the meaning of that provision. PFT contended instead that its
17
collective bargaining agreement fell within the exception for teachers contracts
in section 693(a)(1), and therefore could not be canceled. 10
The Commonwealth Court, however, opted for a reading that no one had
advanced. In an effort to explain its ruling that the term any contract in section
693(a)(1) does not include collective bargaining agreements, the Court reasoned:
the School Code separately addresses contracts and CBAs throughout, and . . . if
it intended that a contract and a CBA were one and the same, it would not
reference them individually in the pertinent sections of the School Code, namely
sections 693 and 696. (Op. at 24.)
This puzzling explanation the fulcrum of the Courts Opinion erred in its
logic as well as its facts. The term any contract in section 693(a)(1) refers to all
contracts in general.
The proper construction of the exception for teachers contracts is discussed below at pp. 3437.
18
Moreover, the Court was wrong as a factual matter to say that section 696 in
particular and the School Code in general always use the term collective
bargaining agreement and not contract when referring to collective bargaining
agreements. Section 696(k)(1), prior to repeal, referred to a collective bargaining
agreement as both a collective bargaining agreement and a contract. (See Op.
at 18) (quoting 6-696(k)(1).)
bargaining agreements, section 696(k)(4) states that [a] provision in any contract
in effect on the date of the declaration of distress under this subsection that is in
conflict with this subsection 11 shall be discontinued in any new or renewed
contract. 24 P.S. 6-696(k)(4) (emphasis added).12 And subsections 696(k)(5)
and (k)(6) both use a synonym for contract, i.e., agreement, to refer to a
collective bargaining agreement. In short, the General Assembly used the terms
collective bargaining agreement, contract and agreement interchangeably
when referring to collective bargaining agreements in section 696. The same is
true elsewhere in the School Code.13 The core holding of the Commonwealth
Courts Opinion cannot stand.
11
The term subsection refers to subsection (k) of section 696, which states at the outset that
[c]ollective bargaining . . . shall be conducted in accordance with this subsection.
12
Section 696(k)(4) follows section 696(k)(3), which set forth certain provisions that it made
mandatory in any future collective bargaining agreement.
13
See, e.g., 24 P.S. 11-1111-A (written contract incorporating agreement reached through
collective bargaining); id. 11-1152-A (provisions of any collective bargaining
19
a)
The legislative
history of the debate on this amendment in the House supports this conclusion.
When a member of the minority party asked the House Majority Leader
whether the proposed exception of section 693 powers from section 696(k)(5)
would enable the abrogation of collective bargaining agreements, the latter
answered affirmatively by quoting the power-to-cancel language of section
693(a)(1), and noting that [w]e only took out what was inconsistent with the act of
1959. Legislative Journal House (October 23, 2001) at 1892. This exchange
made it abundantly clear that the General Assembly adopted the October 2001
agreementshall continue valid until the expiration of such contract) (emphasis added); id.,
20-2003-A(c) (Collective bargaining agreementsshall remain in force for the term of the
contract) (emphasis added).
20
amendment to section 696(k)(5) with the express intent to allow the SRC to cancel
collective bargaining agreements. The inconsisten[cy] referred to by the House
Majority Leader was the conflict between section 693s power to cancel any
contract, including collective bargaining contracts, and section 696(k)(5)s ban on
eliminating, superseding or preempting collective bargaining contract provisions.
In its discussion of the legislative history, the Commonwealth Court
overlooked this interchange, despite its having been discussed prominently in the
parties briefs. The Court stated flatly: it is clear from this legislative history that
there was no discussion of the right to cancel a CBA . . . . (Op. at 31.)
The Commonwealth Courts analysis of the meaning of the amendment to
section 696(k)(5) was similarly flawed. Despite the emphasis the Court put on the
supposed need for an express statutory indication that the power to cancel any
contract included collective bargaining agreements, the Court denied that the
amendment to section 696(k)(5) had any effect on the provisions ban on
eliminating,
superseding
or
preempting
collective
bargaining
agreement
provisions.
696(k)(5) renders the October 2001 amendment a nullity and violates the Statutory
Construction Act of 1972, which provides: Every statute shall be construed, if
possible, to give effect to all its provisions. 1 Pa. C.S. 1921(a).
Surprisingly, the Courts discussion of the 2001 Amendment to section
696(k)(5) does not even discuss section 693(a)(1), the cancellation provision.
Surely, canceling a contract eliminate[s] the contracts provisions. Klopp v.
Keystone Ins. Co., 528 Pa. 1, 7 n.6, 595 A.2d 1, 4 n.6 (1991) (cancellation destroys
the force and effectiveness of the contract).
The General Assembly confirmed its intent to authorize the SRC to cancel
collective bargaining agreements most recently in the 2012 School District
Financial Recovery Act. As noted above, this Act gave other classes of school
districts the power to cancel contracts, but expressly exempted collective
bargaining agreements.
22
would be no need for both. In Mazzetti, for example, one provision, dealing with
violations
of
county
or
state
intermediate
punishments,
allowed
the
24
2.
The power to cancel any contract in section 693(a)(1) authorizes the SRC
to impose unilateral terms following a cancellation. That provision authorizes
cancellation only if it will effect needed economies in the operation of the
districts schools.
24 P.S. 6-693(a)(1).
Section 693 is
expressly excepted from that rule. Hence, section 696(k)(5), as amended in 2001,
25
to effect needed economies, but lacks any authority after cancellation to change
economic terms, would produce an absurd result.
(presumption that legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of
execution or unreasonable).
The Commonwealth Court simply ignored this Courts precedent concerning
the broad express and implied powers of a school board. It ignored the express
statutory language requiring that a cancellation effect needed economies and
never addressed what significance that requirement had for the SRCs power to
impose. Instead, it merely stated repeatedly in conclusory fashion that no authority
to impose terms was granted. (Op. at 23, 24, 29, 38, 39.) This Court should grant
review to ensure that this case is decided in conformity with its precedents on the
express and implied authority of school districts.
b)
27
agreements economic terms after the agreement expires, so long as bona fide
bargaining continues over a new contract.14 That reliance was misplaced.
Section 28(a) of Act 46 repealed PERA insofar as it is inconsistent with the
provisions of this act, i.e., the School Code. 15 Here, section 693(a)(1) expressly
authorizes the SRC to cancel any contract . . . if such cancellation . . . of contract
will effect needed economies in the operation of the districts schools. 24 P.S. 6693(a)(1). As shown above, this power applies to collective bargaining contracts,
and requires that the cancellation achieve needed economies. The power to cancel
to achieve needed economies is thus plainly inconsistent with any requirement
under PERA that the economic terms of employment cannot be altered after a
cancellation.
14
As the court below noted, imposition of changed mandatory terms is permitted by Cumberland
Valley if bargaining reaches an impasse. (Op. at 19-22.)
15
References to this act in the Public School Code refer to the entire Code. 24 P.S. 1-101
(act means the School Code).
28
Blacks defines a
Cumberland Valley, 394 A.2d at 950-51, does not take into account the public
employers financial situation, and whether it can afford to keep maintaining the
economic status quo.
employer, including school districts, can raise taxes or tap other revenue sources.
A school district of the first class, however, does not have its own taxing power.
24 P.S. 5-507 (denying first class school districts the power to levy and collect
taxes). It can only beseech the City and the Commonwealth for more funds.
Where, as here, the School District is in financial distress and unable to obtain
30
necessary funding, it defies reason to suppose that the General Assembly intended
and expected that the School District should be required to bargain indefinitely or
to declare an impasse and then litigate the impasse question for years before it can
obtain the right to cut its costs. See, e.g., Morrisville Sch. Dist. v. PLRB, 687 A.2d
5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (over three years to complete PLRB proceedings and court
appeals of unfair labor practice charge after declaration of impasse).
The General Assembly had both the power and good reasons to enact a
statute providing different rules for collective bargaining in distressed school
districts of the first class, in contrast to other classes of school districts or public
employers generally. Collective bargaining is not a constitutional right, but rather
a statutory one.16 The court below ignored the critical distinctions the General
Assembly drew between bargaining under Act 46 and under PERA, and between
school districts of the first class, which can cancel collective bargaining
agreements, and all other classes of school districts, which cannot.
The
16
Section 696, which concerns only financially-distressed school districts of the first class, is
much more specific in its scope than PERA, which sets the collective bargaining rules for all
public employers in Pennsylvania with minor exceptions. Section 696 therefore controls under
well-established rules of statutory construction. 1 Pa.C.S. 1933 (specific statute controls
general); Olshansky v. Montgomery Cty. Election Bd., 488 Pa. 365, 370, 412 A.2d 552, 554
(1980) (same).
31
consistent with a distressed school districts use of the cancellation power to effect
sorely needed economies. 17
3.
17
In another section of its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court misconstrued section 696(k)(1)
and the significance of its repeal in 2001. As enacted in 1998, section 696(k)(1) provided that
any collective bargaining agreement in effect at that time would have no further effect after it
expired. 24 P.S. 6-696(k)(1), repealed, Act of June 22, 2001, P.L. 530, No. 35, 7. By the time
this section was repealed in 2001, all the agreements in effect in 1998 had expired and new
contracts had taken their place, rendering section 696(k)(1) of no further force or effect. The
court below thus erred in assuming that the provision would have had continuing effect had it not
been repealed, and in concluding, based upon that misguided assumption, that the repeal
signified a clear intent by the legislature not to alter the status quo requirement. (Op. at 18.)
18
32
significant change as the right to cancel a CBA would presumably have been duly
noted by then-Chief Justice Castille in this detailed overview. (Op. at 37.)
The former Chiefs dissent provides no support for the Commonwealth
Courts refusal to recognize a power to cancel a collective bargaining contract.
That power was not relevant to the issues before this Court at the time, and neither
party had raised it. Moreover, placing reliance on what a dissent from a per
curiam order did not say about an issue that was not before the Court is a rather
perilous technique for interpreting a statute. The preferred method for ascertaining
the legislatures intent is to focus on the statutes plain language.
Commonwealth v. Kerstetter, 94 A.3d 991, 1001 (Pa. 2014) (The plain language
of a statute is, as a general rule, the best indicator of . . . legislative intent). This
the Court failed to do.
Elsewhere, the Commonwealth Court questioned whether the SRCs
action constituted a cancellation of the parties agreement, concluding that the SRC
had not canceled the entire contract but only a select number of provisions. (Op. at
32.)
In the courts below, a major focus of the PFTs argument was that its
collective bargaining agreement with the School District was exempt from
cancellation under the exception for teachers contracts in section 693(a)(1).
The Commonwealth Courts Opinion acknowledged both sides arguments on this
point, but declined to decide the issue. Because the trial court relied on this
ground, and the PFT will no doubt raise it in its response to this Petition, we are
obliged to address it.
The term teachers contracts has long had a specific and definite meaning
in Pennsylvania law. It refers to the individual employment contracts that each
school district has with its tenured teachers pursuant to 24 P.S. 11-1121. In
addition to protecting public school teachers from arbitrary dismissal, and
providing a discharged tenured teacher notice and a hearing, the School Code
provides that each tenured professional employe a term that includes teachers
must receive a written employment contract in the form set forth verbatim in
section 1121.
that are the sole object of the exception for teachers contracts in section
693(a)(1).
At the time that section 693 was enacted in 1959 as part of the Distressed
School Law, the Supreme Court had already referred in numerous cases to the
individual employment contracts set forth in section 1121 in the plural as
teachers contracts, or in the singular as a teachers contract.
See, e.g.,
Wilchenski v. Sch. Dist. of Bor. of Throop, 383 Pa. 394, 396, 119 A.2d 510, 512
(1956); Appeal of Watson, 377 Pa. 495, 500, 105 A.2d 576, 579, cert. denied, 348
U.S. 879 (1954); Spigelmire v. Sch. Dist. of Borough of N. Braddock, 352 Pa. 504,
507, 43 A.2d 229, 230 (1945); Walsh v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 343 Pa. 178, 22
A.2d 909, 912 (1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); Snyder v. Murphy, 333
Pa. 305, 306, 5 A.2d 226, 227 (1939); Malone v. Hayden, 329 Pa. 213, 225, 197 A.
344, 353 (1938).
Where, as here, a court of last resort has construed the language used in a
statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same subject matter
intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.
1 Pa.C.S.
1922(4); Patton v. Worthington Assocs., Inc., 89 A.3d 643, 649 n.6 (Pa. 2014).
Given this Courts repeated use of the term teachers contract to refer to the
individual employment contracts spelled out in section 1121 of the School Code,
when the General Assembly subsequently created an exception for teachers
35
Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. 1501, et seq., when words and phrases in
a statute have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning, they shall be
construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning. Id. at 1903(a).
This includes terms that have acquired a special meaning in the law. See Spahn v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 602 Pa. 83, 112-13, 977 A.2d 1132, 1149-50 (2009)
(peculiar and appropriate meaning includes words or terms that have acquired a
particular meaning in the law); Toy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 593 Pa. 20, 35,
928 A.2d 186, 195-96 (2007) (bad faith had acquired a peculiar and appropriate
meaning in the law at time insurance bad-faith statute was enacted).
The term teachers contracts in section 693(a)(1) thus must be construed
according to the peculiar and appropriate meaning that it had in Pennsylvania
19
Since the passage of the Distressed School Law in 1959, this Court has continued to use the
term teacher (or teachers) contract exclusively to refer to section 1121 teacher tenure
contracts. See, e.g., Burger, supra, 576 Pa. at 581, 839 A.2d at 1059; Reichley by Wall v. N.
Penn Sch. Dist., 533 Pa. 519, 525-26, 626 A.2d 123, 127 (1993); Rike v. Com., Secy of Educ.,
508 Pa. 190, 195, 494 A.2d 1388, 1390 (1985); Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist., 450
Pa. 207, 211, 299 A.2d 277, 278-79 (1973); Bd. of Pub. Educ. Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Intille, 401
Pa. 1, 4 n.3, 163 A.2d 420, 422 n.3, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910 (1960).
36
law at the time section 693 was enacted the individual teachers contracts spelled
out word for word in section 1121. Landay v. Rite Aid of Pa., Inc., 104 A.3d 1272,
1283 (Pa. 2014) (When construing a statute, we must ascertain the intent of our
legislature based on the law at the time the statute was enacted or amended).
5.
In the Commonwealth Court, the PFT also argued at length that section
696s authorization of a power to cancel contracts violates the Contracts Clause of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. I, 17, and also constitutes an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative powers. 20 Although the Commonwealth Court did not
reach these issues (Op. at 40-41, n.34), Petitioners are nonetheless obliged to
briefly address them. Neither constitutional challenge withstands analysis. 21
To sustain an impairment-of-contract challenge, PFT must demonstrate that
a change in state law has operated a substantial impairment of [its] contractual
relationship. South Union Tp. v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 1179, 1188 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2003) (en banc), affd, 578 Pa. 564, 854 A.2d 476 (2004), citing General
20
21
PFT did not raise these constitutional challenges until opening briefs were filed with the
Commonwealth Court simultaneously on November 24, 2014, after the parties had already
agreed to an expedited schedule for briefing and oral argument.
37
Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992). 22 However, black letter law
requires that the contract became effective before the statute did.
DePaul v.
Kauffman, 441 Pa. 386, 398, 272 A.2d 500, 506 (1971) (leases formed after date of
statute cannot be impaired by its passage); Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch,
666 F.3d 862, 874 (3d Cir. 2012) (under the Contract Clause, the contract in
question must preexist the passage of the state law), citing General Motors, 503
U.S. at 186.
Here, sections 693(a)(1) and 696(i) were enacted, respectively, in 1959 and
1998 long before 2010, when the parties entered into the expired collective
bargaining agreement that governed the parties relations in whole or in part until
its cancellation. Further, the declaration of distress was issued in 2001 and the
SRC, equipped with its cancellation power, was empaneled in 2002.
These
The test for unconstitutional impairment of contract is the same under the Pennsylvania and
United States Constitutions. South Union Tp., supra, 839 A.2d at 1189.
38
argument on its assertion that the Legislature has not provided any standards that
would permit the SRC to cancel the [collective bargaining agreement] and
impose new economic terms and conditions of employment. (PFT Br. to Cmwlth.
Ct. at 68.)
The stated purpose of the Distressed School Law is to improve the
financial condition of a financially distressed school district.
School Sec.
Services, Inc. v. Duquesne City Sch. Dist., 851 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2004), app. denied, 582 Pa. 690, 870 A.2d 325 (2005). Consistent with that policy
goal, the statutes endowed the SRC with the cancellation power and enabled it to
cancel contracts that it can no longer afford in order to achieve needed economies
in the operation of the districts schools. 24 P.S. 6-693(a)(1), as incorporated in
6-696(i). This needed economies standard is more than sufficient to guide the
SRC in employing the cancellation power.
This Court has upheld delegations of authority guided by standards much
less precise than section 693(a)(1). See, e.g., William Penn, supra (authority to
invalidate tax if excessive and unreasonable); Commonwealth v. Cherney, 454
Pa. 285, 290-91, 312 A.2d 38, 41 (1973) (authority to set speed limits where
highway conditions make it safe); DePaul v. Kauffman, 441 Pa. at 393, 272 A.2d
at 504 (authority to withhold rent when dwelling unfit for human habitation).
39
In short, the General Assembly made the basic policy choices and the statute
contains an adequate standard to guide the SRCs conduct achieving necessary
economies through contract cancellation. A constitutional attack on delegation
grounds will not lie.
VI.
When the General Assembly enacted Act 46, it structured the Acts
provisions so that a declaration of financial distress would trigger a fundamental
redrawing of the collective bargaining map for the School District and its labor
unions. The legislators foresaw that statutory challenges would likely be brought
concerning those fundamental collective bargaining changes, as well as
constitutional challenges to the SRCs section 696 powers. When that happened,
the General Assembly recognized it would be of critical importance to the parties
and the affected students to have those challenges resolved in a prompt and
definitive manner.
To ensure a prompt and definitive adjudication of those disputes, the
General Assembly included section 27 in Act 46. That provision creates exclusive
jurisdiction in this Court, inter alia, over constitutional challenges concerning
sections 691(c) and 696, as well as statutory issues related to collective bargaining
that arise under either of those provisions. It reads in full as follows:
40
41
Section 27 jurisdiction exists over these PFT challenges to the SRCs section
696 powers. Those challenge[s] . . . concern[] . . . issues related to collective
bargaining arising under section 696.
In addition to these statutory challenges, the PFT also challenged
Petitioners section 696 authority on the constitutional grounds described above.
(Op. at 40 n.34.)
These constitutional challenges based on impairment of contract and
unlawful delegation of legislative power trigger section 27 jurisdiction. They are
challenge[s] to or . . . concerning the constitutionality of sections 691(c) and 696
of the act . . . . 27 of Act 46 of 1998.
This Court has repeatedly upheld and exercised legislative grants of
exclusive jurisdiction in the rare circumstances in which they occur. The Gaming
Acts grant of exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional attacks on its provisions
has been exercised by the Court on several occasions; see, e.g., DePaul v.
Commonwealth, 600 Pa. 573, 576 n.1, 969 A.2d 536, 538 n.1 (2009); Casino Free
Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Bd., 594 Pa. 202, 204, 934 A.2d
1249, 1250 (2007); Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth, 585 Pa.
196, 202, 888 A.2d 655, 658-59 (2005). See also Local 22, Philadelphia Fire
Fighters Union, IAFF, AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 531 Pa. 334, 336 n.1, 613
A.2d 522, 523 n.1 (1992) (exercising exclusive jurisdiction over both constitutional
42
23
In Pennsylvania State Troopers Assn v. Commonwealth, Gaming Control Bd., 591 Pa. 561,
920 A.2d 173 (2007), an attempt to invoke exclusive jurisdiction was unsuccessful, for reasons
not applicable here. In that case, the plaintiff sought exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 4 Pa.C.S.
1904, which limited exclusive jurisdiction to constitutional challenges to the Pennsylvania Race
Horse Development and Gaming Act (Gaming Act). This Court held that the petitioners
complaint did not represent a constitutional challenge, since, despite complaining about a lack of
separation of powers, the Complaint did not specifically aver that the Gaming Act is
unconstitutional. 591 Pa. at 570, 920 A.2d at 179. Here, PFT has gone on record to assert that
the power to cancel collective bargaining agreements in section 693(a)(1), which is incorporated
in section 696, is unconstitutional.
43
The PFT likely will object to the exercise of section 27 jurisdiction in this
case. It may contend that it is too late for this Court to become involved; that
section 27 does not include appellate jurisdiction; that it did not bring any
constitutional challenges; and that section 27 does not apply to statutory collective
bargaining issues. None of these contentions has merit.
Regarding waiver, whether a court has exclusive jurisdiction over a case
poses a question of subject matter jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived. Burke ex rel. Burke v. Independence Blue Cross,
103 A.3d 1267, 1276 (Pa. 2014) (subject matter jurisdiction not subject to waiver);
45
Commonwealth v. Jones, 593 Pa. 295, 304, 929 A.2d 205, 210 (2007) (same).
Hence, this assertion of exclusive jurisdiction is timely and has not been waived.
Appellate jurisdiction is not at issue here. Section 27 confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon this Court.
preliminary injunction hearing and created a record. The parties briefed the issues
before the Commonwealth Court and that Court has issued an opinion. Although
Petitioners respectfully submit that the Commonwealth Courts opinion is mistaken
46
on certain key points, even a wrong opinion below can lighten a reviewing courts
burden by winnowing and sharpening the issues for its focus.
The PFT attempts to cast its constitutional challenges to the statute in the
guise of a statutory construction argument designed to avoid constitutional
questions. However, this effort does not take it outside section 27s ambit. The
PFT did not merely raise a constitutional question that would ensue from one
interpretation; it flatly contended that the power to cancel a collective bargaining
agreement a power that the PFT conceded the statute granted was
unconstitutional. See Appendix F. The substance of the PFTs briefing on this
point was to raise constitutional challenges in the alternative.
Had the
Commonwealth Court agreed with the parties that the power to cancel applies to
collective bargaining agreements, it would have had to decide the constitutional
questions. Indeed, the Commonwealth Court noted that it did not need to reach the
constitutional issues because of its interpretation of the statute. (Op. at 40 n.34.)
Finally, section 27 is not limited to constitutional challenges. It plainly
grants jurisdiction over any challenge or declaratory judgment concerning the
constitutionality of sections 691(c) and 696 of the act and issues related to
collective bargaining arising under those sections.
Act 46 of 1998, 27
(emphasis added). To hold that only constitutional questions are authorized would
read the italicized language out of the statute, in violation of 1 Pa.C.S. 1921(a)
47
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), when the special board of
control assumes control of a distressed school district, it shall have power and is
hereby authorized to exercise all the rights, powers, privileges, prerogatives and
duties imposed or conferred by law on the board of school directors of the
distressed district, and the board of school directors shall have no power to act
without the approval of the special board of control. In addition thereto, the special
board of control shall have power to require the board of directors within sixty (60)
days to revise the districts budget for the purpose of effecting such economies as it
deems necessary to improve the districts financial condition. To this end the
special board of control may require the board:
(1) To cancel or to renegotiate any contract other than teachers contracts to which
the board or the school district is a party, if such cancellation or renegotiation of
contract will effect needed economies in the operation of the districts schools.
(2) To increase tax levies in such amounts and at such times as is permitted by the
act to which this is an amendment.
(3) To appoint a special collector of delinquent taxes for the district who need not
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be a resident of the school district. Such special tax collector shall exercise all the
rights and perform all the duties imposed by law on tax collectors for school
districts. The superseded tax collector shall not be entitled to any commissions on
the taxes collected by the special collector of delinquent taxes.
(4) To direct the special school auditors of the department or to appoint a
competent independent public accountant to audit the accounts of the distressed
school districts.
(5) To dispense with the services of such nonprofessional employes as in his
judgment are not actually needed for the economical operation of the school
system.
(6) To suspend, in accordance with the provisions of section 1124 of the act1 to
which this is an amendment, such number of professional and temporary
professional employes as may be necessary to maintain a pupil-teacher ratio of not
less than twenty-six pupils per teacher for the combined elementary and secondary
school enrollments.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to a school district of the first
class A, second class, third class or fourth class.
Credits
1949, March 10, P.L. 30, art. VI, 693, added 1959, Dec. 15, P.L. 1842, 2.
Amended 2012, July 12, P.L. 1142, No. 141, 6, effective in 180 days [Jan. 8,
2013].
24 P.S. 11-1124.
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APPENDIX D
(a) Within thirty (30) days of a declaration by the Secretary of Education that a
school district of the first class is distressed under section 691(c),1 a School Reform
Commission shall be established consisting of four members initially appointed by
the Governor and one member initially appointed by the mayor of the city
coterminous with the school district. The School Reform Commission shall be an
instrumentality of a school district of the first class, exercising the powers of the
board of school directors. The Governor shall appoint a chairman of the School
Reform Commission. At least three of the commission members, including the
member appointed by the mayor, must be residents of the school district.
(b) Membership of the School Reform Commission shall be as follows:
(1) Members appointed pursuant to this section shall serve terms as follows:
(i) Two of the members appointed by the Governor shall serve initial terms of
seven (7) years.
(ii) One of the members appointed by the Governor shall serve an initial term of
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(4) A commission member shall hold office until a successor has been appointed
and qualified.
(5) A commission member may serve successive terms.
(6) No commission member may, while in the service of the School Reform
Commission, seek or hold a position as any other public official within this
Commonwealth or as an officer of a political party.
(7) Commission members shall be reimbursed for reasonable and necessary
expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties from funds of the
school district.
(b.1) Actions of the School Reform Commission shall be by a majority vote. A
majority of the commission members appointed shall constitute a quorum.
(b.2) Upon the issuance of a declaration by the Secretary of Education that a school
district of the first class is distressed under section 691(c), the Governor shall
appoint an interim chairman of the School Reform Commission, who shall have
the full power and authority of the School Reform Commission. The interim
chairman shall serve for a term not to exceed thirty (30) days. The interim
chairman may be appointed to the School Reform Commission pursuant to this
section.
(c) The School Reform Commission may suspend or dismiss the superintendent or
any person acting in an equivalent capacity.
(d) Deleted. 2001, Oct. 30, P.L. 828, No. 83, 1.
(e) The following shall apply:
(1) The School Reform Commission shall be responsible for the operation,
management and educational program of the school district of the first class. The
powers and duties of the board of school directors of a school district of the first
class shall be suspended. All powers and duties granted heretofore to the board of
school directors of a school district of the first class under this act or any other law,
including its authority to levy taxes and incur debt, shall be vested in the School
Reform Commission until the Secretary of Education issues a declaration under
subsection (n).
(2) The School Reform Commission may enter into agreements necessary to
provide for the operation, management and educational programs of the school
district of the first class. The agreements shall include appropriate fiscal and
academic accountability measures. Academic accountability measures shall
include:
(i) Strategic goals and objectives for improving academic performance.
(ii) Methods setting forth how the strategic goals and objectives are to be achieved
and the specific methodology for evaluating results.
(f), (g) Deleted. 2001, Oct. 30, P.L. 828, No. 83, 1.
(h) The School Reform Commission shall be responsible for financial matters
related to the distressed school district of the first class and:
(1) All taxes authorized to be levied by a school district of the first class or for a
school district of the first class by a city or county of the first class on the date of
the declaration of distress shall continue to be authorized and levied in accordance
with this act and shall be transmitted to the school district. For the first fiscal year
or part thereof and every fiscal year thereafter in which the school district is
declared to be distressed, the amount appropriated or paid by the city or county to
the school district and the tax authorized by the city or county to be levied for the
school district or dedicated to the school district shall be an amount or tax not less
than the highest amount paid by the city or county to the school district or
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authorized by the city or county to be levied for the school district or dedicated to
the school district during any of the three full preceding fiscal years. In addition,
the city of the first class shall provide to the school district of the first class all
other available local non-tax revenue, including grants, subsidies or payments
made during the prior year.
(2) In addition to the moneys collected under paragraph (1), the city of the first
class shall remit to the school district of the first class for each year that the school
district is declared distressed that portion of all other local tax revenue levied for a
full fiscal year by a city or county of the first class coterminous with a school
district of the first class that was allocated to the school district prior to the school
district being declared distressed in accordance with section 691(c).
(3) All taxes collected on behalf of a school district of the first class by any person
or entity, including a city or county of the first class, shall be promptly paid
following collection to the School Reform Commission for the benefit of the
school district.
(4) In the event the city or county of the first class does not meet the financial
obligations prescribed in this subsection, the Commonwealth may apply to that
obligation any amounts otherwise due from the Commonwealth to the city or
county of the first class, including, but not limited to, grants, awards and moneys
collected by the Commonwealth on behalf of the city or county of the first class.
Funds withheld shall be maintained in a separate account by the State Treasurer to
be disbursed as determined by the Secretary of Education in consultation with the
State Treasurer.
(5) The School Reform Commission shall adopt a budget.
(i) In addition to all powers granted to the superintendent by law and a special
board of control under section 6933 and notwithstanding any other law to the
contrary, the School Reform Commission shall have the following powers:
(1) To appoint such persons and other entities as needed to conduct fiscal and
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interfere with the regular selection of school directors for the school district of the
first class.
(k) Collective bargaining between employes and the school district of the first class
shall be conducted in accordance with this subsection. For purposes of collective
bargaining, as used in section 693 and this section: professional employe shall
have the meaning given in section 1101(1), and teacher shall have the meaning
given in section 1202-A.9
(1) Repealed. 2001, June 22, P.L. 530, No. 35, 7, imd. effective.
(2) No distressed school district of the first class shall be required to engage in
collective bargaining negotiations or enter into memoranda of understanding or
other agreements regarding any of the following issues:
(i) Contracts with third parties for the provision of goods or services, including
educational services or the potential impact of such contracts on employes.
(ii) Decisions related to reductions in force.
(iii) Staffing patterns and assignments, class schedules, academic calendar, places
of instruction, pupil assessment and teacher preparation time.
(iv) The use, continuation or expansion of programs designated by the School
Reform Commission as pilot or experimental programs.
(v) The approval or designation of a school as a charter or magnet school.
(vi) The use of technology to provide instructional or other services.
(3) A collective bargaining agreement for professional employes entered into after
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the expiration of the agreement in effect on the date of the declaration of distress
shall provide for the following:
(i) A school day for professional employes that is equal to or exceeds the State
average as determined by the department. An extension of the school day resulting
from this requirement shall be used exclusively for instructional time for students.
(ii) The number of instructional days shall be equal to or exceed the State average
number of instructional days.
(iii) The School Reform Commission shall not increase compensation for
employes solely to fulfill the requirements under subparagraphs (i) and (ii).
(4) A provision in any contract in effect on the date of the declaration of distress
under this subsection that is in conflict with this subsection shall be discontinued in
any new or renewed contract.
(5) Except as specifically provided in section 693, nothing in this subsection shall
eliminate, supersede or preempt any provision of an existing collective bargaining
agreement until the expiration of the agreement unless otherwise authorized by
law.
(6) If upon the termination of a collective bargaining agreement in effect on the
date of the declaration of distress under this section a new collective bargaining
agreement has not been ratified, the School Reform Commission shall establish a
personnel salary schedule to be used until a new agreement is ratified.
(l) During the time the school district of the first class is under the direction of the
School Reform Commission, all school employes shall be prohibited from
engaging in any strike as defined in Article XI-A10 and section 301 of the act of
July 23, 1970 (P.L. 563, No. 195),11 known as the Public Employe Relations Act.
The Secretary of Education may suspend the certificate of an employe who
violates this subsection.
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10
24 P.S. 6-691.
24 P.S. 6-693.
24 P.S. 17-1729-A.
24 P.S. 11-1125.1.
24 P.S. 3-318.
10
11
43 P.S. 1101.301.
12
24 P.S. 17-1705-B.
11
APPENDIX E
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23,2001
SESSION OF 2001
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The House convened at 11 a.m., e.d.t.
No. 58
PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
(The Pledge of Allegiance was recited by members and
visitors.)
HOUSE BILLS
INTRODUCED AND REFERRED
L. I. COHEN,
No. 2006 By
Representatives
BEBKO-JONES, CASORIO, CIVERA, CREIGHTON,
DiGIROLAMO, GEIST, GEORGE, HARHAI, HORSEY,
McGILL, MELIO, R. MILLER, WATSON, YOUNGBLOOD,
CRUZ and CORNELL
An Act amending Title 75 (Vehicles) of the Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes, further providing for driving under the influence
of alcohol or controlled substance and for surcharges.
1890
LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL--HOUSE
LEAVE OF ABSENCE
LEAVE OF ABSENCE CANCELED
The SPEAKER. The Chair returns to leaves of absence and
recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Veon, who asks that the
gentleman, Mr. LaGROTTA, be placed on leave for the balance
of the day, and the gentleman, Mr. Kirkland, who is present on
the floor of the House, be taken from the leave list. Without
objection, leave will be granted and Mr. Kirkland will be placed
back on the active roll call.
OCTOBER 23
1892
LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL--HOUSE
OCTOBER 23
APPENDIX F
CERTIFICATION
This 23rd day of February, 2014, I certify that I am this day serving a true
and correct copy of this Petition via hand delivery upon the following persons,
which service satisfies the requirements of Pa. R.A.P. 121: