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TABLE OF CONTENTS

2010 CASES
LIGERALDE V. PATALINGHUG and REPUBLIC .................................................................................... 1
FUENTES V. ROCA ........................................................................................................................ 2
JARILLIO V. PEOPLE ...................................................................................................................... 5
RAMOS V. PANGILINAN et. Al ........................................................................................................ 6
RICARDO P. TORING V. TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC ............................................................. 7
ISIDRO ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC ....................................................................................................... 11
CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL ........................................................ 12
CAMACHO- REYES V. REYES ......................................................................................................... 13
MUNOZ V. RAMIREZ .................................................................................................................... 20
SPOUSES AGGABAO V. PARULAN, JR. AND PARULAN ....................................................................... 22
PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL ............................................................................................................... 25
BOLOS V. BOLOS ........................................................................................................................ 27
BACCAY V. BACCAY ..................................................................................................................... 28
AGRAVIADOR V. AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR ....................................................................................... 31
ANTONE V. BERONILLA................................................................................................................ 33
DOLINA V. VALLECERA ................................................................................................................ 34
2011 CASES
MARABLE V. MARABLE ................................................................................................................. 35
DIO V. DIO ............................................................................................................................ 37
YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO .............................................................................................. 39
OCHOSA V. ALANO ..................................................................................................................... 42
LLAVE V. REPUBLIC ..................................................................................................................... 44
AGUETE V. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK ........................................................................................ 45
FLORES V. LINDO ....................................................................................................................... 46
SULTAN PANDAGARANAO A. ILUPA V. MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH ...................................................... 48
AURELIO V. AURELIO .................................................................................................................. 49
REPUBLIC V. GALANG .................................................................................................................. 51
JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS.............................................................................................. 53
YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU ............................................................................................ 55
TEVES V. PEOPLE........................................................................................................................ 57
HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO ............................................................... 59
2012 CASES
CABREZA, JR V. ROBLES CABREZA ................................................................................................ 61
DE MESA V. ACERO ..................................................................................................................... 63
DELA PENA V. AVILA ................................................................................................................... 64
VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE .............................................................................................. 66
PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) V. EIJI* YANAGISAWA .............................................................. 68
REPUBLIC V. GRANADA ............................................................................................................... 70
QUIAO V. QUIAO ........................................................................................................................ 73

2010

her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored.

1. SILVINO A. LIGERALDE V. MAY ASCENSION A.


PATALINGHUG
and
the
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES (Rigets)
G.R. NO. 168796, April 15, 2010

In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the


thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their
children, and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded
him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile
with her.

DOCTRINE: The root cause of the psychological incapacity


must be identified as a psychological illness, its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the
totality of the evidence presented during trial.

Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life


cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown
that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception
of marriage.
FACTS: Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984.
Silvino claimed that, during their marriage, he observed
that May had several manifestations of a negative marital
behavior. He described her as immature, irresponsible and
carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities,
he claimed, characterized their marital relations.
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at
4:00 oclock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had
watched a video program in a neighboring town, but
admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in
a hotel. Silvino tried to persuade her to be conscientious of

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May was back again to her old ways. This was


demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and
learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched for
her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with
a male lover. Later, May confessed that she had no more
love for him. They then lived separately.
Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred
the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological
evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she
was still young and became manifest after marriage; and
that the same was serious and incurable.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage
of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on
the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina NicdaoBasilio.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It
ruled that private respondents alleged sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute

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psychological incapacity within the contemplation of


Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify
prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Hence,
petition.

the
and
was
this

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave


abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court declaring the marriage null and void due to
psychological incapacity
HELD: Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.
RATIO: In this case at bench, the Court finds no
commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of
the assailed CA decision dismissing petitioners complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and
(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It is the Courts considered view that petitioners
evidence failed to establish respondent Mays psychological
incapacity.

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Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause,


gravity and incurability of private respondents condition.
Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her
psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the
totality of the evidence presented during trial.
More importantly, the acts of private respondent do
not even rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity"
that the law requires. Private respondent's act of living an
adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence
was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at
the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to
establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation
of a disordered personality, which makes her completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state.

2. Fuentes vs. Roca (Pelayo)


G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
FACTS: Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar,
Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca
(Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in
1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They met in the
office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to
prepare the documents of sale and signed an agreement to
sell that Atty. Plagata prepared. It expressly stated that the

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sale was to take effect in six months. Within six months,


Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants
and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario
Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale.
Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the
Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay
him an additional pay besides the downpayment, depending
on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house
standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of
the lot without any further formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata
who then worked on the other requirements of the sale.
According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of
his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent.
After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the
spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot.
Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and
Rosario, namely, respondents(collectively, the Rocas), filed
an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the
land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC.
The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void
since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it.
Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged.
They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them
upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses
paid Tarciano.
The spouses denied the Rocas allegations. They presented
Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario
sign the affidavit at her residence. He admitted, however,

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that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four


months later. All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out
that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she
alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive
period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already
lapsed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Rosarios signature on the document of consent
to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the
Fuentes spouses was forged?
2. Whether the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of
that sale to the spouses already prescribed?
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was
not had, could bring the action to annul that sale?
HELD:
1. It was forged.
2. It did not prescribe.
3. The heirs of Rosario may bring an action to annul the
sale.
RATIO:
1. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosarios
signature on the document of consent had been forged. For,
if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her
consent to her husbands sale of the conjugal land would
render the other issues merely academic. The SC agreed
with the CA that the signature was forged.

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While a defective notarization will merely strip the


document of its public character and reduce it to a private
instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the
marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as
proof of Rosarios consent to the sale of the land. That the
Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as
proof of Rosarios consent does not matter. The sale is still
void without an authentic consent.
2. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law
that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil
Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses
on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place
the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their
property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the
sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166
prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property
without his wifes consent. Still, if he sold the same without
his wifes consent, the sale is merely voidable. Article 173
gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the
marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing
in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of
the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano
fraudulently sold.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code
on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further,
the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to
already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to
vested rights.

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Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also


apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
(n)
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of
the Family Code does not provide a period within which the
wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of
the real property. It simply provides that without the other
spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale,
the same would be void.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts,
a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from
the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that
are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case
of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouses
written consent. But, although a void contract has no legal
effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of
its terms have been performed, an action to declare its
inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has
been given under it. This action, according to Article 1410 of
the Civil Code does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses
in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real
property that Tarciano sold without their mothers (his
wifes) written consent. The passage of time did not erode
the right to bring such an action.
3. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning.
Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano
and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they
passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs,

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namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the


right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any
person from its enjoyment and disposal.

3. JARILLIO V. PEOPLE (Antonio)


G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010
DOCTRINE: He who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

FACTS: On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo,


being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M.
Alocillo in 1974, and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only
discovered in 1999.
On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed
against the appellant a civil case for annulment of marriage
before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration
of nullity of their marriage against Alocillo in 2000.
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her
marriage to Alocillo was null and void because Alocillo was
allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the
time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages
to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid
marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since
Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.

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Notwithstanding her defenses, the RTC found Jarillo


guilty for the crime of bigamy in 2001 and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of six years to ten years of prision
mayor.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was
affirmed. It held that petitioner committed bigamy when
she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy
because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had
not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being
so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo
was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA
also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous
marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in
2003, declaring petitioners 1974 marriage to Alocillo null
and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological
incapacity. Said decision became final and executory. In her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction.
ISSUE: W/N CA committed a reversible error in affirming
the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of bigamy despite the
supervening proof that her marriage to Alocillo had been
declared void.
HELD: No.
Jarillos conviction of the crime of bigamy must be
affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of

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her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid


defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner
contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of
bigamy was already consummated. Under the law, a
marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or
guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage,
it is presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty
party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence
of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question.

4. RAMOS V. PANGILINAN et. Al (Tenorio)


G.R. No. 185920, July 20, 2010
DOCTRINE: For the family home to be exempt from
execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies

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based on when it was constituted and what requirements


must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege and on both instances,
the exemption must be proved.

FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal


against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by
Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein
petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the respondents backwages, separation
pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The
decision became final and executory so a writ of execution
was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a
property in Ramos name situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family
home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the
judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash
the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the
family home there being another one in Antipolo and that
the Pandacan address is actually the business address. The
motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by
the NLRC. Ramos and the company appealed to the Court of
Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and was
substituted by herein petitioners.
The appellate court, in denying petitioners appeal,
held that the Pandacan property was not exempted from
execution, for while "Article 153 of the Family Code provides

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that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and


lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it did
not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such that
all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code."
ISSUE: Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan
property was valid
HELD: YES.
RATIO: The general rule is that the family home is a real
right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the
land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular
family the right to enjoy such properties, which must
remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It
cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special
cases.
For the family home to be exempt from execution,
distinction must be made as to what law applies based on
when it was constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors
claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are
applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the
effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988,
then it must have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233

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of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is


governed by Articles 240 to 242..
On the other hand, for family homes constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially,
and the exemption is effective from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the
family home should belong to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its
constitution must have been with consent of the other, and
its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon
the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for
which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art.
155 for which the family home is made answerable must
have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances,
the claim for exemption must be proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the
family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as
early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure
mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no
proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos family home, the
law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby
making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.

5. RICARDO P. TORING V. TERESITA M. TORING and


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

(Que)

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA6

G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010


DOCTRINE: A marriage will be annulled on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
if it is characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Furthermore, the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the
complaint and duly proven. The complete facts should
allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative
of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of
the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo and Respondent Teresita are
husband and wife with three children. After 20 years of
marriage, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the
RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the
celebration of their marriage. Therefore, he asked the court
to declare his marriage to Teresita null and void. He alleges
that Teresita is a squanderer because she did not know how
to manage the funds of the family and is always incurring
debts. Aside from this, Teresita likewise failed to remit
amounts she collected as sales agent of a plasticware and
cosmetics company. She left the familys utility bills and
their childrens tuition fees unpaid. She also missed paying
the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo
acquired for the family. He also alleges that Teresita is an
adultress because she presents herself as a single woman
and sees other men while Ricardo is away for work as an
overseas contract worker. He also suspected that she was
pregnant with another mans child and proved himself
correct when Teresita incurred a miscarriage. He claims that
he could not have fathered the child because his three

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instances of sexual contact with Teresita were characterized


by "withdrawals.
To bolster his position, Ricardo introduced the
testimony and evidence prepared by Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran.
The doctor stated that the demise of the marriage of the
spouses was due to the Narcissistic Personality Disorder of
Teresita. Her behavioral patterns indicate this kind of
disorder which is considered to be grave and incurable
based on the fact that individuals do not recognize the
symptoms as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is
nothing wrong in them. Interestingly, the doctor based her
diagnosis from the testimony given by Ricardo and
Richardson, the eldest child of the couple. This is because
Dr. Albaran was not able to conduct a personal psychiatric
evaluation over Teresita.
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was no
basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It
asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on
Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague and
general conclusion on these parties personality traits but
not on Teresitas psychological makeup. The OSG also
argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify
and sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate
that the alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or
at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave
and incurable.
The RTC ruled to annul the marriage on the basis of
the evidence and testimony presented in court. However,

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the Solicitor General appealed the case and the Court of


Appeals reversed the ruling on the ground that the RTC did
not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. The RTC failed to
specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused
Teresitas psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to
show that the incapacity already existed at the time of
celebration of marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albarans
psychological evaluation do not appear to have been drawn
from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on
hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found
that Ricardos allegations on Teresitas overspending and
infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring
the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. These allegations, even if true, could only effectively
serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge
for adultery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the
decision of the trial court
HELD: No, the CA is correct in reversing the decision made
by the trial court because the decision of the latter failed to
comply with the standards and guidelines provided for by
jurisprudence.
RATIO: In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,
et al.,11 we held that psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity,

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(b) juridical antecedence, and (c)


sufficient basis to annul a marriage.

incurability,

to

be

We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in


Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of this article. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability established in the
Santos case, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. The root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

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(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at


"the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision.

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(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate


Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
In so far as the present factual situation is
concerned, what should not be lost in reading and applying
our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the
application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most
serious cases of personality disorders; these are the
disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of
the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the
marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the
psychological illness and its root cause must have been
there from the inception of the marriage. From these
requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family
Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply
recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first
place because the affliction already then existing was so
grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.
In the present case and guided by these standards,
we find the totality of the petitioners evidence to be
insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. First of all,
the testimony given by Dr. Albaran was based solely on the
testimony of Ricardo, the petitioner and their son,
Richardson. No personal evaluation was made as to the
condition of Teresita to properly conclude that she is indeed
inflicted with the Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Conclusions and generalizations about Teresitas
psychological condition, based solely on information fed by
Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA9

hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content


of such evidence.

DOCTRINE: The plaintiff must be the party who stands to


be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Every action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the
party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the
action.

Second, it was not proven that the condition of


Teresita was present from the moment the marriage was
celebrated. The only other party outside of the spouses who
gave statements for purposes of Teresitas psychological
evaluation was Richardson, the spouses eldest son who
would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article
36 case because he could not have been there when the
spouses were married and could not have been expected to
know what was happening between his parents until long
after his birth.

FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC


in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26,
1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and
Leonila Honato.

Finally, the contention of Ricardo that the root cause


of the psychological incapacity need not be alleged in the
petition is without merit. While in other cases, the court has
allowed the petition to do away with the root cause, it is
because the root cause has been described based on the
physical manifestations which are indicative of the
psychological incapacity. The statement of the root cause
does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in
nature, as the root causes of many psychological disorders
are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege
the physical manifestations constituting the root cause of
the psychological incapacity. Hence, the statement of the
root cause is a requirement that cannot be dicpensed with
but it may be proven either by an express statement or
through the description of its physical manifestations.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between


Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on
January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab
initio for having been solemnized without a marriage
license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to
one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano
before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could
impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition
on the ground that petition is filed out of time and that
petitioner is not a party to marriage. Motion for

6. ISIDRO ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC (Abdulwahid)


G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010

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10

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of


Appeals affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC on the
ground that the action must be filed by the proper party,
which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to
the marriage. Hence, this appeal.

Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed


himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate
of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner,
albeit not a compulsory heir, has the right to succeed to the
estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in
Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff
must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is
basic in procedural law that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a
"proper interest" can file the action. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court
as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real
party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of
lack of cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in


the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage
of his deceased brother?
HELD: Yes. The applicable law when marriage was
contracted between Cresenciano and Leonila on December
26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the
exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right
to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no
application to the petitioner. The case was reinstated and its
records returned to RTC for further proceedings.
Ratio: Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a
line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil
Code. This specifically extends only to marriages covered
by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988,
but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced
after March 15, 2003.

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7. CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR


GENERAL (Mangahas)
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
FACTS: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized
Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto.
Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and
other professional commitments. When he returned to the
Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already
romantically involved with another man. This brought about
the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which
was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor,
Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took

11

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with


another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil
Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce
decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas.
However, despite the registration, an official of National
Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage
still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a
judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a
competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC
denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.
It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper
party who can institute an action under the principle of
Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino
citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign
divorce decree. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a
petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its


authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence,
serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner's presumptive evidence of aright by proving want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment,
once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata
between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court.
8. CAMACHO- REYES V. REYES (Inoturan)
G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met
respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines
(UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19)
years old. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed
into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.

HELD: Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.


The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC.
In other words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign

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At that time, respondent held a job in the family


business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good
impression of the respondent was not diminished by the
latters habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery
that respondent was taking marijuana.

12

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university


studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By
1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third
year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat
Restaurant.

without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the


set up, hoping that the situation will change.
To
prod
respondent
into
assuming
more
responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately
from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement
engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner
struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of
the
household,
respondents
business
floundered.
Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in
Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave
money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the familys
financial woes and further straining the parties relationship
was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his
family. That his business took him away from his family did
not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort
to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.

In 1976, the year following petitioners graduation


and her fathers death, petitioner and respondent got
married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5)
months pregnant and employed at the Population Center
Foundation.
Thereafter,
the
newlyweds
lived
with
the
respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses
were shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples
respective salaries were spent solely for their personal
needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly
allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.

After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses


transferred residence and, this time, moved in with
petitioners mother. But the new set up did not end their
marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more
estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of
supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects
as well.

When their first child was born on March 22, 1977,


financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed
expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance
of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent
no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner
mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this,
the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow
advancement within the family business. Respondents
game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the
province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the
Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took
respondent away from his young family for days on end

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In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a


miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time,
respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on
the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week
later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly

13

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find


out how the hospital bills were settled.

and respondent, but these did not improve the parties


relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.

In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents


fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any
means to support his family, respondent refused to go back
to work for the family business. Not surprisingly, the
relationship of the parties deteriorated.

In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad


A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine
benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with
all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did
not continue with the clinical psychologists recommendation
to undergo psychotherapy.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that


respondent was having an extra-marital affair. Petitioner
soon realized that respondent was not only unable to
provide financially for their family, but he was, more
importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her
and their family.

At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of


respondents siblings, told respondent to move out of their
house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did
not improve. Neither did respondents relationship with his
children.

One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the


parties marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for
the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be
operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played
dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as
she was wheeled into the operating room. After the
operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of
respondents lack of concern, and asked her mother to
order respondent to leave the recovery room.

Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a


petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
the respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity
to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Traversing
the
petitioners allegations
incapacitated.

Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his


spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group,
invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The
elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner

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petition,
that he

respondent
denied
was psychologically

After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical


psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a
psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in
evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the

14

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of


their psychological incapacity.

The three expert witnesses


unanimous in their findings that
from
personality
disorder
incapacitated him to fulfill his basic

The CA reversed. Hence, this appeal.


ISSUES/HELD:

This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in


the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is
serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and
renders him a helpless victim of his structural constellation.
It is beyond the respondents impulse control. In short, he
is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his
consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider the
same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his
assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the
petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one.
In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and
efforts extended to them by his original family members to
save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive
to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally
disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have
been saturated already that she finally revealed her
misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to
counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard
position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask
respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings
of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the
remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties.
Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings.

Whether the respondent was suffering from psychological


incapacity. YES.
Whether the marriage should be declared null and void
under Art. 36. YES.
RATIO: Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in
the determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction
to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on
the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and
outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses,
Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the
psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds
that the marriage between the parties from its inception has
a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity"
which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively
function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each
other in relation to their essential duties to mutually
observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually
render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short,
there was already a fixed niche in the psychological
constellation of respondent which created the death of his
marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest
doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the
respondent.

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have spoken. They were


respondent is suffering
which
psychologically
duties to the marriage.

15

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

As previously adverted to, the three experts were


one in diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to
wit:

sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings.


He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of
authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision
making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to
antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his
mother was not resolved (sic).

1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas


Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the
examiner, that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies along
her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the
emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great
amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested
strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a
Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with
strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings and
narcissistic features that renders him psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to
the social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of
adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit"
associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no
anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged
drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately,
are external factors to boost his ego.

It existed before marriage, but became manifest only


after the celebration, due to marital demands and stresses.
It is considered as permanent in nature because it started
early in his psychological development, and therefore
became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It
is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered,
interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning
related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt
to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude.
[Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep
feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends
to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with
others. He feels that he is "different" and as a result is
prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort
produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and
social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with
himself and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from
interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the
less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow
than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained

The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due


to his underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious
mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His
prolonged and closed attachments to his mother
encouraged cross identification and developed a severe

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16

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

Diagnostic Impression

person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in


order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a
small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone.
He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender
feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very
angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling.
[Respondents] strong need for social approval, which could
have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes
him submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make
extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he]
already feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still
tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts.
Despite his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize
dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others.
Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger
and frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed.

Axis I : Drug Dependence


Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things
but is unable to accomplish anything; unable to give priority
to the needs of his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis
supplied)

There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the


moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and anxiety.
He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness.
Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness
and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he
is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is striving
[for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain.
Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty
concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to
prioritize. He has many plans but he cant accomplish
anything because he is unable to see which path to take.
This feeling of hopelessness is further aggravated by the
lack of support from significant others.

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3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno


Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with SelfDefeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord
(spouses immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)

17

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

Severity: 4-severe

A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior


that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or
more of the following areas:

Diagnosis for [respondent]


Axis I Partner Relational Problem

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving


interpreting self, other people, and events)

Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked


narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent features

and

Axis III No diagnosis

(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and


appropriateness of emotional response)

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord


(successful wife)

(3) interpersonal functioning


(4) impulse control

Severity: 4 (severe)

B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a


broad range of personal and social situations.

[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality


disorder with marked narcissistic features and aggressive
sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage:
to love, respect and render support for his spouse and
children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is
permanent and stable over time.

C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant


distress or impairment in social, occupational or other
important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset
can be traced back at least to adolescence or early
adulthood.

From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence


that the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null
and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)

E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a


manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder.

The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, citing The


Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (DSM IV), instructs us on the general
diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:

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F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological


effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication)
or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

18

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors


can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based
on a number of factors culled from various sources. A
person afflicted with a personality disorder will not
necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a
pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent
consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot
trump the clinical findings of experts.

incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at


the time of his marriage to the petitioner.

9. Munoz vs. Ramirez (Lavadia)


G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010
DOCTRINE: Property acquired during marriage by
gratuitous title by either spouse is excluded from the
community property; When the value of the paraphernal
property is considerably more than the conjugal
improvement, said paraphernal property does not become
conjugal property.

In the case at bar, however, even without the


experts conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial,
all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.

FACTS: The residential lot in the subject property was


registered in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo
Carlos (respondents). On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of
Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged said lot, with
Erlindas consent, to the GSIS to secure a P136,500.00
housing loan, payable within twenty (20) years, through
monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66. The respondents
then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story
residential house on the lot. On July 14, 1993, the title to
the subject property was transferred to the petitioner by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992,
executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of
Eliseo, for a stated consideration of P602,000.00.

In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior


manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3)
substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not
connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal
charges of estafa.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case
and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample
basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically

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On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a


complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of

19

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a


mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the
title to the petitioners name were falsified. The respondents
presented
the
results
of
the
scientific
examination conducted
by
the
National
Bureau
of
Investigation of Eliseos purported signatures in the Special
Power of Attorney dated April 29, 1992 and the Affidavit of
waiver of rights dated April 29, 1992, showing that they
were forgeries. The petitioner, on the other hand,
introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of the
subject property since it was registered in Erlindas name.

spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is


proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda
inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently
rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership pursuant
to Articles 92and 109 of the Family Code. The residential
lot, therefore, is Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property.
Moreover, we cannot subscribe to the CAs misplaced
reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and CalimlimCanullas. As the respondents were married during the
effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on conjugal
partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have
governed their property relations. However, with the
enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil
Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including
Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the
Family Code (Articles 105 to 133).

The RTC ruled for petitioner finding that the property


is paraphernal and consequently, the NBI finding that
Eliseos signatures in the special power of attorney and in
the affidavit were forgeries was immaterial because Eliseos
consent to the sale was not necessary. The CA reversed and
held that pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 158 of
the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, the
subject property, originally Erlindas exclusive paraphernal
property, became conjugal property when it was used as
collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal
funds Eliseos monthly salary deductions.

Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes


Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements that are
made on the separate property of the spouses, at the
expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of
either or both spouses. Applying the said provision to the
present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the
GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. From April 6,
1989 to April 30, 1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, not
the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest,
since the petitioner advanced the P176,445.27 paid by
Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering
the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is

ISSUE: Whether the subject property is paraphernal or


conjugal
HELD: The property is paraphernal property of Erlinda.
RATIO: As a general rule, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential


lot is considerably more than theP60,755.76 amount paid
by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions. Thus, the
subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal
property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the
petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction
was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseos signatures
in the special power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries
was immaterial.

the petitioners argument that the Family Code did


not apply because the acquisition of the contested
property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively
if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the
Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did
not show any vested right in the property acquired
prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation
from the retroactive application of the Family Code.

Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA apparently failed to


consider the real nature of the contract between the parties
(where the SC found that the contract is an equitable
mortgage and not one of sale).
10. SPOUSES AGGABAO V. PARULAN,
PARULAN (Gruba)
G.R. No. 165803, September 1, 2010

JR.

FACTS: In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K.


Atanacio offered 2 lots located in Paraaque to the
petitioners. On February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up
with Elena Parulan at the site of the property and showed
them the following documents: (a.) Owners original copy of
the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.) tax declarations; (c.) a copy of
the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991
executed by Dionisio authorizing Elena to sell the property.
The petitioners paid P200,000.00 as earnest money for
which Elena executed a handwritten Receipt of Earnest
Money which stipulated that the peitioners would pay an
additional payment of P130, 000.00 on February 4, 1991;
P650,000.00 on or before February 15, 1991 and P700,
000.00 on March 31, 1991 once Elena turned over the
property.

AND

DOCTRINE(S):

1. The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The
proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the
Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property made during the
effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article
124 of the Family Code.

On February 4, 1991, the petitioners, accompanied


by the broker, went to the Office of the Register of Deeds to
verify the TCTs shown by Elena. There they discovered that
one of the lots had been encumbered to Banco Filipino, but
that the encumbrance had been cancelled due to the full
payment of the obligation. They noticed that the loan was

2. According to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively
provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v.
Fernandez, 330 SCRA 718 (2000), the Court rejected

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

effected through and SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of


Elena. The other lot on the other hand had an annotation of
an existing mortgage in favor of Los Baos Rural Bank, with
the same SPA with a court order authorizing Elena to
mortgage the lot to secure the loan.

At Atanacios instance, the petitioners met on March


25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan at the Manila Peninsula. They
were accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca. They recalled
that Atty. Parulan smugly demanded P800,000.00 in
exchange for the duplicate owners copy of TCT, because
Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the property
to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they
tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined, giving
them only until April 5, 1991 to decide.

The petitioners and the broker next inquired about


the mortgage and the court order at the Los Baos Rural
Bank. There, they met with Atty. Zarate, related that the
bank had asked for the court order because the lot involved
was conjugal property.

Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty.


Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they
informed him that they had already fully paid to Elena.

Following their verification, the petitioners delivered


P130,000.00 as additional down payment on February 4,
1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baos Rural Bank on
February 12, 1991, which then released the owners
duplicate copy of TCT to them.

Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty.


Parulan, commenced an action (Civil Case No. 91-1005
entitled Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr., represented by Jeremy Z.
Parulan, as attorney in fact, v. Ma. Elena Parulan, Sps. Rex
and Coney Aggabao), praying for the declaration of the
nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena,
and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by
virtue thereof.

On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the


final amount of P700,000.00 to Elena, who executed a deed
of absolute sale in their favor. However, Elena did not turn
over the owners duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that
said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then
in Hongkong. She assured them that the owners duplicate
copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.

In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their


own action for specific performance with damages against
the respondents.

On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new


one was issued in the name of the petitioners.

Both cases were consolidated for trial and judgment


in the RTC.

Elena did not turn over the duplicate owners copy of


TCT as promised. In due time, the petitioners learned that
the duplicate owners copy of TCT had been all along in the
custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold
an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to
sell both lots.

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On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),


Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute
sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two
parcels of registered land the respondents owned for want
of the written consent of respondent husband Dionisio
Parulan, Jr. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

ISSUE: Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and


Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of
the conjugal property executed without the consent of
Dionisio?
HELD: Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal
properties made after the effectivityof the Family Code

Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of


the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.

RATIO: The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the Civil


Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code, governed the
property relations of the respondents because they had
been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; and
that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code
should not apply because the other spouse held the
administration over the conjugal property. They argue that
notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still
held the administration of the conjugal property by virtue of
his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother; and that
even assuming that Article 124 of the Family Code properly
applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulans
counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or


otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed
as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.

To start with, Article 25427 the Family Code has


expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code,
among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on
the property relations between husband and wife, Article
173 included, are found.

Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code,


the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively
provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v.
Fernandez, the Court rejected the petitioners argument
that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition
of the contested property had occurred prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that Article
256 provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively
if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired
rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested
right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that

Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or


after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The
proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family
Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family
Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

exempted their situation from the retroactive application of


the Family Code.

this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouses


consent, the transaction should be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.

Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their


contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration
over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty.
Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that
they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty.
Parulan the authority for the administration.

11. PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL (Roman)


G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010

Nonetheless, we stress that the power of


administration does not include acts of disposition or
encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such,
an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to
administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be
exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency
of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878).
Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a
special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in
question, and did not include or extend to the power to
administer the property.

DOCTRINE: Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the


Family Code is not a prejudicial question in a criminal case
for parricide.
FACTS: On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap
(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.

Lastly, the petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans


making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991
meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under
Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed
sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court
order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void
contract could not be ratified.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to


appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for
the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v.
Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the


void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and
Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or
rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both
Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the
second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes

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On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent


motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon
City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the

24

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the


outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was


filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111
of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since
the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action.

The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the


case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.

The relationship between the offender and the victim


is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes
any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants
or descendants, or his spouse. However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with


application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals.
However, The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent would be
declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already
been committed.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage


under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect
on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage

ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment


of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner


could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.

2003, extends only to those marriages entered into during


the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3
August 1988

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v.


Court of Appeals that the judicial declaration of the nullity
of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x
x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial
declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability
for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in
that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here
is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that
a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.

FACTS: Petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia)filed a petition for


the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Respondent
Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition
for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by
respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice
of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos
failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new
trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.
Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its
decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment
filed by Cynthia.

12. BOLOS V. BOLOS (Pasquil)


634 SCRA 429, October 20, 2010

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition


forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of
the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to

DOCTRINE Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on


Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated on 15 March

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him,


the family home and their children.

RATIO: The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void


Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

The CA granted the petition and reversed and set


aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring the nullity of
marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated
that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not
apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and
Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the
Family Code took effect.

Section 1. Scope.This Rule shall govern petitions


for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also


applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of
the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase under
the Family Code in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
word petitions rather than to the word marriages. Such
that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code
are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was
solemnized before the same.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves


no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners
interpretation that the phrase under the Family Code in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word petitions rather
than to the word marriages.

Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 0211-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with
Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before
its effectivity.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting


aside the RTC decision which denied due course to
respondents appeal and denying petitioners motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled Rule


on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, is applicable to the case
at bench.
HELD: No, it does not.

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13. BACCAY V. BACCAY (Barrientos)

27

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

G.R. No. 173138, December 1, 2010

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The


RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential
marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to
a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality
Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist.

DOCTRINE: The phrase psychological incapacity is not


meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.
FACTS: Noel and Maribel were schoolmates turned
sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and
hard-to-get type. Maribel was also snobbish around his
family. Noel tried to break up with Maribel. However,
Maribel refused. Noel and Maribel still continued to see each
other only on a friendly basis. They failed to keep their
meetings friendly as they had several romantic moments
together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact
casually since Maribel never demanded anything from him.
After a while, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant.
Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel
agreed to live with Noels family. Maribel remained aloof and
did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. Maribel
refused to contribute to the household expenses. She also
refused to have any sexual contact with Noel. Despite
Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any
symptoms of pregnancy in her and this was confirmed by
Maribels officemates. One day, Maribel told Noel and his
family that she had a miscarriage. Noel confronted her
about her alleged miscarriage, which escalated into an
intense quarrel. Maribel left Noels house and did not come
back. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but he failed.
After less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Despite summons,
Maribel did not participate in the proceedings.

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On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision


of the RTC. The CA ruled that Maribels Narcissistic
Personality Disorder is not the psychological incapacity
contemplated by law. Her refusal to perform the essential
marital obligations may be attributed merely to her
stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the manifestations of the
Narcissistic Personality Disorder had no connection with
Maribels failure to perform her marital obligations. Noel
having failed to prove Maribels alleged psychological
incapacity. Finally, Maribels misrepresentation that she was
pregnant to induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud
contemplated under Art. 45(3) as it was not among the
instances enumerated under Art. 46.
Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribels
refusal to procreate as psychological incapacity. He argues
that making love for procreation and consummation of the
marriage for the start of family life is different from plain,
simple and casual sex. He points out that Maribels
psychological incapacity was proven to be permanent and
incurable with the root cause existing before the marriage.
The psychologist testified that persons suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder were unmotivated to
participate in therapy session and would reject any form of

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

psychological help rendering their condition long lasting if


not incurable.

favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and


against its dissolution and nullity.

The OSG maintains that Maribels refusal to have


sexual intercourse with Noel did not constitute psychological
incapacity under Art. 36 as her traits were merely mild
peculiarities in her character or signs of ill-will and refusal or
neglect to perform her marital obligations.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be


(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Art. 36 requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage is null and void under Art.


36.

(3) The incapacity must be existing at the time of the


celebration of the marriage.

HELD: No. The marriage is valid.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or


clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations.

RATIO: The phrase psychological incapacity is not meant


to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to
no less than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be
truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Art. 68,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most
serious
of
cases
of
personality
disorders
clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the


disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.

The following are guidelines in resolving petitions for


declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Art. 36:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate


Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.

The burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove


that private respondent suffers from a psychological
disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders
her truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in
the performance of some marital obligations.
An
unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or


fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition.

Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused


with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.

In this case, the totality of evidence presented by


Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was
psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely
established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse
with him after their marriage, and that she left him after
their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged
miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The report of
the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her
experiences during childhood, did not establish how the
personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly
assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed,
the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was
capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be
difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty is not the
incapacity contemplated by law.

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14. AGRAVIADOR V. AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR (Bacani)


G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010
DOCTRINE/RULING: The court held that both Enrique's
court testimony, as well as Dr. Patacs Psychiatric
Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital duties.
FACTS: Petitioner Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (Enrique)
challenges the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed the resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

MuntinlupaCity, declaring the marriage of the petitioner and


respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (Erlinda) null and
void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity.

Personality Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She was


said to been having this disorder since her adolescence,
with no definite treatment for her disorder.

In 1971, Enrique, then a security guard, first met


Erlinda at a beerhouse where the latter worked, and later on
became sweethearts after courtship. They soon entered into
a common-law relationship, but later contracted marriage in
1973, whereby they begot four children. Enrique's family,
however, expressed their apprehensions because Erlinda
came from a broken family and because of the nature of her
work.

ISSUE: Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners


marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
HELD: No, the totality of evidence presented failed to
establish the respondents psychological incapacity.
RATIO: The court held that both Enrique's court testimony,
as well as Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short
in proving that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. First,
petitioner's claims should be distinguished from the
difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in the
performance of some marital obligations that characterize
some marriages to the level of psychological incapacity that
the law requires. He merely showed that Erlinda had some
personality defects that showed their manifestation during
the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary
to establish that the respondents defects existed at the
inception of the marriage. His claims that Erlinda does not
accept her fault, does not want to change, and refused
to reform are insufficient to establish a psychological or
mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as
contemplated by Article 36of the Family Code.

In 2001, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration


of nullity of marriage on the basis of respondent's
psychological incapacity, alleging that she was carefree and
irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like
cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for
long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not
take care of their sick child to the point of his death;
consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and
refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities.
He also claimed that she refused to have sex with him
because she became very close to a male border of their
house, and even caught their love notes and trysts.
However, because the root cause of her psychological
incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the
petition, motion was denied. The petitioner, thus, presented
testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his
claims through the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan
Cirilo L. Patac, who claimed that Erlinda is suffering from a

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Second, Dr. Patac failed to clarify the circumstances


that led the respondent to act the way she did in her
attempt to establish the juridical antecedence of the

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

respondents condition. The report that he submit likewise


failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the
respondents condition, as his enumeration of the
respondents purported behavioural defects (as related to
him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the
respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder
deemed insufficient. There was no other statement
regarding the degree of severity of the respondents
condition, why and to what extent the disorder is grave, and
how it incapacitated her to comply with the duties required
in marriage. The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise
failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the
conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had
no definite treatment. It did not discuss the concept
of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause,
symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what
extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to
create a necessary inference that the respondents condition
had no definite treatment or is incurable.

FACTS: Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-Complaint,


filed in March 2007, that she and Leo were married in 1978.
However, Leo contracted a second marriage with Cecile
Maguillo in 1991. The prosecution filed the Information in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo
moved to quash the Information on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense because his
marriage with Myrna was declared null and void as of April
2007 and became final and executory on May 2007. Leo
argues that since the marriage had been declared null and
void from the beginning, there was actually no first
marriage to speak of. Thus, absent the first marriage, the
facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime
of bigamy. The prosecution argued that the marriage of
Myrna and Leo on 1978 was not severed prior to his second
marriage on1991, for which bigamy has already been
committed before the court declared the first marriage null
and void on 2007.

15. ANTONE V. BERONILLA (Comafay)


G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 615.

The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying on


Morigo v. People. Similarly, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for certiorari.

DOCTRINE: As reiterated in a long line of cases, Article 40


of the Family Code has been established as a new provision
expressly requiring judicial declaration of nullity of a prior
marriage for purposes of remarriage. Therefore, a person
who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial
declaration of nullity is guilty of bigamy.

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ISSUE: Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of the


first marriage only after contracting the subsequent
marriage is immaterial in the crime of bigamy.
HELD: Yes.

32

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

GR No. 182367- December 15, 2010

RULING: Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the


previous ruling of People v. Mendoza (under the Civil Code)
declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab
initio marriage will not prosper because there is no need for
a judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is
invalid; and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has
retroactive legal effect such that there would be no first
valid marriage to speak of after all, which renders the
elements of bigamy complete.

DOCTRINE: To be entitled to legal support, petitioner


must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. If
filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of
obligation.
FACTS: In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order
against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and
child abuse under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint
cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed child.
She based such prayer on the latters certificate of live birth
which listed Vallecera s employer, to withhold from his pay
such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.

In fact, this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado


v. Tan. It stated that, under the Family Code a subsequent
judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is
immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then the crime had
already been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person
who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is guilty of
bigamy.

Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolinas


petition was essentially one for financial support rather than
for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was
not the childs father and that the signature in the birth
certificate was not here. He also added that the petition is a
harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the
child as his and therefore give financial support.

While, Morigo v. People was promulgated after


Mercado, the facts are different. In Mercado, the first
marriage was actually solemnized, although later declared
void ab initio. While in Mendoza, no marriage ceremony
was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer,
because what occurred was a mere signing of a marriage
contract through a private act. Thus, there is no need to
secure a judicial declaration of nullity before Morigo can
contract a subsequent marriage.
The ruling of Morigo is
not applicable to this case.

RTC dismissed petition.


ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas
action for temporary protection and denied her application
for temporary support for her child?

16. DOLINA V. VALLECERA (Delos Reyes)

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HELD: Yes.

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

RATIO: Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain


support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which
she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and
children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the
issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the
case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and
the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection
order and to legal support. In this case neither her or her
child lived with Vallecera.

2011
17. MARABLE V. MARABLE (Fuster)
G.R. No. 178741, January 17, 2011
FACTS: On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent
eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before
Mayor Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December
30, 1970 and their marriage was blessed with 5 children.
Their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical
quarrels became common occurrences. Petitioner developed
a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned
about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But
despite the end of the affair, their quarrels aggravated.
Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted and
unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards
respondent. Petitioner left the family home and stayed with
his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties
which he and respondent had accumulated during their
marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later,
he converted to Islam after dating several women.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in


proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the
same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas
demand for support for her son is based on her claim that
he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled
to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until
Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The childs
remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is
beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In
short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and
successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.

On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his


marital bonds and filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage to respondent on the ground of his
psychological
incapacity
to
perform
the
essential
responsibilities of marital life.

Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child


an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in
order to establish filiation and then demand support.
Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support,
where the issue of compulsory recognition may be
integrated and resolved.

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Petitioner averred that he came from a poor family


and was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at an
early age. His father left their family to live with another
woman with whom he had seven other children.
This
caused petitioner's mother and siblings to suffer immensely.
He further alleged that he supported himself through college

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

and worked hard for the company he joined. But despite


his success at work, he alleged that his misery and
loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his
relationship with his own family.

likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest


only after its solemnization.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground
for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. These
are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or
inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and
significance to the marriage he or she has contracted.
Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive
of
the
basic
marital
covenants
that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.

Petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr.


Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National
Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayag's report stated that
petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder,"
characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy,
rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness
and lack of remorse.
The report also revealed that
petitioner's personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of
rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his
experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed
attention. It was Dr. Tayag's conclusion that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations.

In Republic v. CA, the Court laid down the guidelines


in the interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court
held, (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The
essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7)

The RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner's


marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioner's
psychological incapacity. Upon appeal by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision.
CA denied MR.
ISSUE: Whether
incapacitated.

or

not

petitioner

is

psychologically

HELD: NO! CAs decision was upheld.


Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial


Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.

personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter


insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
18. DIO V. DIO (Salazar)
G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011

In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article


36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological
illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the
inception of the marriage.
The evaluation of Dr. Tayag
merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is
suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder. As held in
the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert proof
in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an indepth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity. The
evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof
which the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void
petitioner's marriage to respondent. It is indispensable that
the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

DOCTRINE: Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to


marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36
of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. In
this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared
void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under
Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS: Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio
(respondent) got married on 14 January 1998 before Mayor
Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family


history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the
reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his
marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became
unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his
marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his
personal history. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the
intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of

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Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a


psychological report establishing that respondent was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
incurable and deeply ingrained in her system since her early
formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

with the essential marital obligations at the time of the


celebration of the marriage and declared their marriage void
ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code.

1.
The man and the woman must be capacitated to
marry each other;
2.
They live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and
3.
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void.

Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of


petitioner, modified its decision holding that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.

All these elements are present in this case and there


is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling
has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a


decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD: Yes. The trial court's decision is affirmed with
modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall
be issued upon finality of the trial court's decision without
waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a


decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that
the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

RATIO: The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void


marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that


Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which
are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting
for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the


following elements must be present:

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37

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the


marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties
agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the
property relations of the parties is governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains,
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.
That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by
the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

marriage with respondent Patricio Yambao (hereinafter


respondent husband) after 35 years of marriage. She
invoked the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner wife alleged that since the beginning, her
marriage with the respondent husband had been marred by
bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latter's
inability to comply with the essential obligations to married
life. She elaborated by saying that through all the years of
their married life, she was the only one who earned a living
and took care of the children and that respondent husband
just ate and slept all day and would spend time with friends.
In addition, she claimed that respondent husband would
venture into several businesses but all of these failed.
Respondent husband was also a gambler. Petitioner wife
also claimed that, when their children were babies,
respondent did not even help to change their diapers or
feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her
caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew
nothing about children. Later, respondent husband became
insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he
would see petitioner talking to other people, even to her
relatives. When respondent husband started threatening to
kill petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode and
live separately from him. She then consulted a psychiatrist
who concluded that respondent was indeed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was


declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled
that the property relations of parties in a void marriage
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on
co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil
Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary
to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
19. YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO (Tanhueco)
GR. No. 184063 January 24, 2011

Respondent husband denied that he has refused to


work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent
job, but was always unable to because of his old age and
lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay
long in the jobs he had because the same could not support

FACTS: Petitioner Cynthia Yambao (hereinafter petitioner


wife) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not
commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured
into small businesses but they failed due to various
economic crises. Respondent further claimed that he was
not, in fact, contented with living with petitioners relatives
since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes.
He also denied that he gambled. He alleged that even
without a steady source of income, he still shared in the
payment of the amortization of their house in BF Homes,
Paraaque City. He also denied that he threatened to kill
petitioner, considering that there was never any evidence
that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on
petitioner to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown.
He further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist,
and denied that he was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

The court recognized that respondent did indeed


have many faults, such as his indolence and utter
irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondents failure
to find decent work was due to his not having obtained a
college degree and his lack of other qualifications. Likewise,
respondents failure in business could not be entirely
attributed to him, since petitioner was a business partner in
some of these ventures.

RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit holding


that petitioner wife's evidence failed to support her
argument
that
respondent
husband
was
indeed
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
Thus:

The RTC concluded that while respondent might have


been deficient in providing financial support, his presence,
companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish
many things. Thus, respondent could be relied on for love,
fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations expected
of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code.

RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of


respondents Dependent Personality Disorder. The RTC said
that, although the evidence tended to show that respondent
would unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a living for the
family, there was no evidence to show that the latter
resented such imposition or suffered with the additional
financial burdens passed to her by her husband.

The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be


unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the
union lasted for over thirty years and the parties were able
to raise three children into adulthood without suffering any
major parenting problems.

Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioners claim that she


suffered through respondents overbearing jealousy. It
found that respondent only became jealous when he
thought that petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC
determined that jealousy was not a character trait that
contributed to respondents psychological dysfunction; much
less did it amount to psychological or mental torture on
petitioner.

The court also noted that respondent was faithful to


petitioner and never physically abused her.

Likewise, when the parties lived with petitioners


parents, respondent got along well enough with her family.

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On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held


that:

39

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA


Petitioner failed to show that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage

neither the report nor petitioners testimony established


that respondents psychological condition was grave enough
to bring about the inability of the latter to assume the
essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was
medically permanent or incurable.

Petitioner exerted efforts to find a source of income


to support his family. However, his failure to find a suitable
job and the failure of his business ventures were not mental
but physical defects and, hence, could not be considered
psychological incapacity as contemplated under the law.

ISSUE: WON the totality of petitioner wifes evidence


establish respondents psychological incapacity to perform
the essential obligations of marriage?

The fact that the parties lived together for 35 years


and raised three children well, and the fact that respondent
never physically abused petitioner belied the formers
psychological incapacity.

HELD: No.
RATIONALE: In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be medically or clinically identified.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition.

The respondents refusal to care for the children was


not psychological incapacity but merely constituted refusal
to perform the task, which is not equivalent to an
incapacity or inability.

It rejected petitioners allegation of respondents


unbearable jealousy. It said that the same must be shown
as a manifestation of a disordered personality which would
make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state. The CA averred
that a jealous attitude simply evinced respondents love for
his wife, whom he could not bear to lose to another man.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the


application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under
Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically
incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

The the purported threats to kill petitioner is an


emotional immaturity and not psychological incapacity.

Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr.


Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be unsupported
by sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not
corroborated by any other witness. Moreover, the CA said,

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40

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

In this case, there is no showing that respondent


was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that
he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On
the contrary, respondents efforts, though few and far
between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty
to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much
success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own
indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external
factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in
showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with
his many failings, does not suffer from psychological
incapacity.

abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondents


faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not been
established that the same existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
Furthermore, as found by both RTC and CA,
respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused
petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the
children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that
both made an impact in the childrens upbringing. Still, the
parties were able to raise three children into adulthood
without any major parenting problems," and such fact
could hardly support a proposition that the parties marriage
is a nullity.

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take


cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and
not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of
the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself
must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering
of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring;
and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed
to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological illness.

20. OCHOSA V. ALANO (Francisco)


G.R. No. 181881, January 26, 2011
DOCTRINE: Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

That respondent, according to petitioner, lack[ed]


effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility" does
not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His
refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for his
business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may
indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but
none have been shown to amount to a psychological

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FACTS: Jose, a young lieutenant in the AFP, married Bona


in Basilan in 1973. In 1976, they adopted as their daughter
Ramona. During the marriage, Jose was often assigned to
various parts of the Philippines as a member of the AFP.
Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

stay in Basilan. Bona had illicit relations with other men


whenever Jose was assigned in various parts of the country.
She was even caught by a security aide having sex with
Joses driver. Word circulated of such infidelity and when
Jose confronted Bona about it, the latter admitted her
relationship with said driver. Jose filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Bonas
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage. Jose and his two military aides testified on Bonas
infidelity. A psychiatrist testified that after conducting
several tests, she reached the conclusion that Bona was
suffering from histrionic personality disorder and that her
personality was that she had an excessive emotion and
attention seeking behavior and therefore could not develop
sympathy in feelings and had difficulty in maintaining
emotional intimacy. She further testified that whenever Jose
was gone, her extramarital affairs was her way of seeking
attention and emotions from other persons and that said
disorder was traceable to her family history, having for a
father a gambler and womanizer and a mother who was a
battered wife. Finally, the psychiatrist said that there was
no possibility of a cure since Bona did not have an insight of
what was happening to her and refused to acknowledge the
reality. The Solicitor-General opposed the petition.

psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)


gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved. In
Republic v. CA and Molina, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code were laid down: (1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; (4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable, whether absolute or
relative only in regard to the other spouse; (5) Such illness
must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6)
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Article 68 up to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code; (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts; and (8) The trial court
must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. In
Marcos v. Marcos, it was held that the foregoing guidelines
do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated and that what is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately

ISSUE: Whether Bona should be deemed psychologically


incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. NO
RATIO: Article 36 of the Family Code provides: a marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. In Santos v. CA, it was held that

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

establish the partys psychological condition. In the case at


bar, the evidence presented were the testimonies of Jose,
his military aides and the psychiatrist. But this is inadequate
in proving that her defects were already present at the
inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Only the
uncorroborated testimony of Jose supported the allegation
that Bonas sexual promiscuity already existed prior to the
marriage. The psychiatrists testimony on Bonas histrionic
personality disorder did not meet the standard of evidence
required in determining psychological incapacity as her
findings did not emanate from a personal interview with
Bona herself and merely relied on her interview with Jose
and his other witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes
the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is
tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of
sufficient corroboration. In view of the foregoing, the
badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her
sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly
traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and
not to the inception of the said marriage. Article 36 of the
Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision


dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89
declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as
void ab initio.
FACTS: Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano
married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws and
tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC
Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
indicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s
wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja
Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib
Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf
of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with
Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for
the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and
Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged
that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under
civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when
he married Estrellita in 1993.

21. LLAVE V. REPUBLIC (Liquigan)


G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the


late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
HELD: Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda
and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano


Estrellita is void ab initio.

s subsequent marriage to
FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a
complaint for annulment against PNB before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal.

RATIO: The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and


Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and
Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslimsa nd non-Muslims alike was
the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the
marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No.
394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of


P115,000.00 from PNB and as security, a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land with TCT. No. T-9646 was
executed. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged
property was instituted by PNB. After the lapse of a year,
the property was consolidated and registered in the name of
PNB.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s


prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of
divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim
personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita.
Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to
marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
any part of the Philippines. But Article 13 of PD 1083 does
not provide for a situation where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites.

Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of


the said loan nor the mortgage constituted on the land
which is part of their conjugal property, contested the
transactions and filed for an annulment of the proceedings.
She interposed in her defense that the signatures affixed on
the documents were forged and that the proceeds of the
loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may
during their marriage and within ten years from the
transaction mentioned, may ask the court for an annulment
of the case.
On notice of appeal by PNB, Court of Appeals reversed this
ruling and found for PNB, stating that forgery was concluded
without adequate proof. It also found that the loan was
used in the expansion of the family business.

HELD: The petition is DENIED


22. AGUETE V. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (Dela
Cruz)
G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011
DOCTRINE: Where the husband contracts obligations on
behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly
so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.

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Hence, this petition.

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

ISSUE: How is the benefit to the family proven so as to


render the loan contracted by the husband binding upon the
conjugal property?

contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed


to be his exclusive and private debts. It is immaterial, if in
the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed, such may still be charged against the conjugal
property of the spouses.

HELD: If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the


contract, that contract falls within the term "x x x x
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the
benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the
contract. Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf
of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so,
that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.

23. FLORES V. LINDO (Mendez)


G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011
FACTS: Respondent Edna Lindo obtained a loan from
Petitioner Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000 and secured
it with a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgage
covered property in the name of Edna and her husband, corespondent Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna likewise signed a
Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as
his attorney-in-fact.

Court denies the petition.


RATIO: Annulment of the contract will only be granted
upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent to the
transaction.
Even as Aguete disavows the documents
supposedly acknowledged before the notary public, the
document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
with respect to its due exececution. It has in its favor the
presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by
evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.

She issued three checks as partial loan payments, all


of which were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Flores
therefore filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage
with damages. The RTC ruled that petitioner was not
entitled to judicial foreclosure as the Deed was without
consent and authority of Ednas husband. The Deed was
executed on October 31, 1995, while the Special Power of
Attorney was executed by Enrico only on November 4,
1995. Accordingly, the mortgage is void pursuant to Article
96 of the Family Code. The RTC, however, ruled that
petitioner may still recover the loan through a personal
action against Edna, but that it had no jurisdiction over the
said personal action which should be filed where plaintiff or
defendant resides.

Petitioners did not present any corroborating


witness, such as a handwriting expert, who could
authoritatively declare that Aguetes signatures were really
forged.
In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros
engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware
whether it prospered. Debts contracted by the husband for
and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he

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Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and


damages. The respondents alleged that Enrico was not a

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna without


Enricos signature. They also prayed for the dismissal of the
case on grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forumshopping. The RTC ruled that res judicata will not apply to
rights, claims or demands which, though growing out of the
same subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes
of action.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated


or
otherwise
unable
to
participate
in
the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals set aside the RTC ruling. It


noted that petitioner allowed the earlier decision of the RTC
to become final and executory without asking the courts for
an alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that
petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts
that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed
to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on
multiplicity of suits, closing petitioners avenue for recovery
of the loan.

Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to


conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of Article
96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the promissory note and deed of mortgage are
void
(2) Whether there remains an available remedy for
petitioner

Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code


provide that the powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent of the other
spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the written
consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state
that the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

HELD:
(1) NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of
contract implementing such decision.

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In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of


Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995.
The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by


the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer
as a binding contract between the parties, making the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.

The main objective of the principle against unjust


enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the
expense of another without just cause or consideration. The
principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna
admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same
has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was
declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first
when she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33
and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief
before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected
to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy, as
what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done,
because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no
jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might
have against Edna.

(2) YES. In Chieng v. Santos, this Court ruled that a


mortgage-creditor may institute against the mortgagedebtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies
are alternative and not cumulative and held that the filing of
a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
was in effect a collection suit or a suit for the recovery of
the mortgage-debt. In that case, however, this Court pro
hac vice, ruled that respondents could still be held liable for
the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no
person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another.
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under
Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:

Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself


because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts
when she questioned the validity of the Deed.

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of


performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.

24. SULTAN PANDAGARANAO A. ILUPA V. MACALINOG


S. ABDULLAH
A.M. No. SCC-11-16-P (formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I No. 10-33SCC [P]), June 01, 2011

There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly


retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid
basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at
the expense of another.

FACTS: The complainant alleges in support of the charge


that the respondent exhibited ignorance of his duties as
clerk of court when he issued a certificate of divorce, (OCRG
Form No. 102) relying mainly on an illegal Kapasadan or
Agreement. He claims that the agreement was executed
under duress and intimidation; the certificate of divorce
itself is defective and unreliable as there were erroneous
entries in the document and unfilled blanks. He claims that

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

the respondent took away his beautiful wife by force or had


a personal interest in her.

Court merely performed his ministerial duty in accordance


with the foregoing provisions. The alleged erroneous
entries on the Certificate of Divorce cannot be attributed to
respondent Clerk of Court considering that it is only his duty
to receive, file and register the certificate of divorce
presented to him for registration. Further, even if there
were indeed erroneous entries on the certificate of divorce,
such errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled through [his]
administrative complaint.

The respondent argues that contrary to the


complainants claim, there was a divorce agreement, in the
Maranao dialect, attached to the divorce certificate. The
complainant even signed both pages of the agreement.
Although the agreement was not labeled as such, its
essence indicates that the couple agreed to have a divorce
and it was so understood also by their children and the
witnesses who signed the agreement. He also denies that
he took the complainants wife by force or that he was
interested in her; he claims that no evidence was ever
adduced to prove these allegations. With the divorce
agreement, Mrs. Ilupa applied for a certificate of divorce
which he issued under Divorce Registry No. 2009-027 on
November 5, 2009. He points out that in issuing the
certificate of divorce, he observed the same procedure
applied to all applicants or registrants.

The allegation that the respondent Clerk of Court


manipulated the dismissal of his petition for restitution of
marital rights, we find the same unsubstantiated. Aside
from complainants bare allegation, there was no substantial
evidence presented to prove the charge. It is a settled rule
in administrative proceedings that the complainant has the
burden of proving the allegations in his or her complaint
with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly
performed
his
duties
will
prevail.

On the complainants claim that there is no divorce


in the Philippines, the respondent points out that this is true
only as far as the civil law is concerned, but not under the
Muslim Law which recognizes divorce. The civil marriage
they subsequently entered into was just an affirmation of
their marriage vows under the Muslim Law. Also, the courts
dismissal of the complainants petition for restitution of
marital rights affirmed the divorce between the Ilupa
couple.

25. AURELIO V. AURELIO (Delos Reyes)


G.R. No. 175367, June 06, 2011
DOCTRINE: The following are the guidelines to aid the
courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological
incapacity: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) The root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

ISSUE: W/N The issuance of a certificate of divorce is


within the Clerk of Courts duties, as defined by law.
HELD: Yes. The issuance of a certificate of divorce is within
the respondents duties, as defined by law. The Clerk of

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must be


grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The
essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision; (7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition.

psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial


support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity
to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband
exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife.
His moods alternated between hostile defiance and
contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the
family.
On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive
and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings
change very quickly - from joy to fury to misery to despair,
depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance
for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature;
she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot
delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot
get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits
immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted
their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the
essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of
their marriage.

FACTS: Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida


Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They
have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to


Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the
petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to
meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation
and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional


Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition,
respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying
with their respective essential marital obligations.
In
addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological
incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the
marriage ceremony.
Hence, respondent prays that her
marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. It alleged among others that said

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RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.


ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null
and void?
HELD: Petition denied. Marriage is null and void.
RATIO: First, contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court
finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the


manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of
both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the
complaint as the root causes of their psychological
incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist
clinically identified the same as the root causes.

concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the


parties to the marriage.
FACTS: In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted
marriage in Pampanga and thereafter they resided in the
house of the Nestors father. Nestor worked as an artistillustrator while Juvy stayed at home. They had one child,
Christopher.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness


of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about
a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers
from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers
from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.
The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital
obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and
incurable.

In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article
36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy
was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a
swindler; that Juvy suffers from mental deficiency, innate
immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care,
love and affection [towards him and their] child. He posited
that Juvys incapacity was extremely serious and appears
to be incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital


obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the
petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the
petition, respondent's allegations fall under Article 68 of the
Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife
are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

Having found no collusion between the parties, the


case was set for trial. In his testimony, Nestor alleged that
he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy
did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to
their neighbors care; and Christopher almost got lost in the
market when Juvy brought him there. He added that Juvy
stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the
check representing Nestors fathers pension. He, likewise,
stated that he caught Juvy playing mahjong and kuwaho
three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed
money from their relatives on the pretense that their son
was confined in a hospital.

26. REPUBLIC V. GALANG (Calderon)


G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011
DOCTRINE: Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. The defect should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that

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Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist,


who testified that she conducted a psychological test on

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

Nestor. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made


the following findings:

and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the


trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before
marriage although its overt manifestations appear over
after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments
required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve
time and expense beyond the reach of the subject are all
obtaining in this case.

Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang


resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is welladjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off
major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration
tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure
anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and
emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain,
depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional
tensions caused by his wifes behavior.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC


decision in toto.
ISSUE: Whether there is basis to nullify the respondents
marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the
celebration
of
the
marriage,
Juvy
suffered
from
psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying
with her essential marital obligations.

The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in]


such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very
irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense
of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling activities
such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which
exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her
neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and
child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of
initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable
to perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible
and caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons to
believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated
mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.

HELD: None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of


Nestors evidence his testimonies and the psychologist,
and the psychological report and evaluation insufficient to
prove Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.
RATIO: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
The defect should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive
of
the
basic
marital
covenants
that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. [Louel Santos vs. CA]

The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision


of January 22, 2001. The RTC Judge, relying on the Santos
Case, stated in the decision that the psychological
incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage can be characterized by (a)
gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any
average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life

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It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert


opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if
the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability
can be duly established. [Brenda Marcos vs. Marcos]

Petition was granted. Galangs petition for the declaration


of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of
the Family Code was dismissed.
27. JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS (Castaneda)
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina Doctrine


unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound
by it. [Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te] In Ting vs. Velez-Ting, far from
abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply suggested the
relaxation of its stringent requirements; the Ngo Te case
merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity.

FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish


Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged
that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted
with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also
submitted documents which include
(a) petitioners
certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate;
(c) petitioners college diploma, showing that he graduated
from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in
Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same
school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of
the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several
articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.

In the present case, the psychologist did not even


identify the types of psychological tests
which
she
administered on
Nestor and the root cause of Juvys
psychological condition. There was no showing that any
mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage.
The report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys
alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the
disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply
with her marital duties; the report did not even categorically
state the particular type of personality disorder found. The
report failed to establish the incurability of Juvys condition.
The reports pronouncements that Juvy lacks the initiative
to change and that her mental incapacity appears
incorrigible are insufficient to prove that her mental
condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond her means to undertake.

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Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special


Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be
served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion
to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be
sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that
DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation
pointing to him as Jesses father.

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Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC


dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity
action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely,
a prima facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.

have presented their respective evidence. They are matters


of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of
the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation
has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima
facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for


Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was
scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds
relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is
premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet
taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of
Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four
significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been
met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when
the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely


provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall
issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a
showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that
is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not
previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing,
but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d)
The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the
case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which
the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy
or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude
a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not
mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are
established.

ISSUE: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before


a court can issue a DNA testing order
HELD: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of
a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since
no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
RATIO: Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four
significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case
which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood
and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these
so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties

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In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA


testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein

53

ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to


establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or good cause for the holding of the test.

DOCTRINE: It is more proper to rule first on the


declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each
partys psychological incapacity to perform their respective
marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the
parties' respective petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both
of the parties' psychological incapacity, then the parties
shall proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code before a final decree of absolute nullity of
marriage can be issued.
Pending such ruling on the
declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage, the Court
finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with the
reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and
property relations, since these are mere incidents of the
nullity of the parties' marriage.

In these states, a court order for blood testing is


considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as
in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie
case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions
as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in
various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have
almost universally found that a preliminary showing must
be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and
find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may
issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving
party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must
be held in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing

FACTS: Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of


marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig.
Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that
Erics partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be
submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been
remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of
the nullity of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On
September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for
resolution, considering that the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations (incidental issues) were
mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the
parties marriage.

The same condition precedent should be applied in


our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion
for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on


declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations. Eric added that the
incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can

28. YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU (Dela Torre)


G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011

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both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in


favour of Erics opposition.

Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders were issued


with grave abuse of discretion and that those were patently
erroneous.
Considering that the requisites that would
justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper
recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due
course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits,
incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
orders.

Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so


that the case was re-raffled to another branch presided by
Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by
Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion
seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as
codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the
declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution
ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric
opposed this motion.

It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not


disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the
assailed orders that the trial court judge merely deferred
the reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and
property relations. And the trial judge's decision was not
without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the
Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19
and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations after the trial court
renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of
judgment granting the petition:

Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion,


saying that the main cause of action is the declaration of
nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely
ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration,
which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for
certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
ISSUES/HELD: Whether the main issue of nullity of
marriage must be submitted for resolution first before the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations (incidental issues) NO.

Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a


decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that
the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

RATIO: It appears in the records that the Orders in


question, or what are alleged to have been exercised with
grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An
interlocutory order is one which "does not finally dispose of
the case, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating
the parties' contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that
other things remain to be done by the Court."

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Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution,


custody, support of common children and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes. - Upon entry of the judgment
granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the


petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, including custody, support of
common children and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.

parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had


already provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the
deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may
receive evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment
granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or
annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge
Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed
orders.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu's
assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving
evidence on the subject incidents would result in an
ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly
speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption
that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence
submitted by the parties.

Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the


reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules
issued by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the
petition is already at hand and before a final decree is
issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the
family court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution, custody, support of common children, and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of
judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent
provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 0211-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner
asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code
state:

Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge ReyesCarpio acted in a capricious and whimsical manner, much
less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when
she issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To
reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court's wisdom and
legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot
likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio
and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse of
discretion on her part.

Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall


provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the
previous judicial proceedings.

29. TEVES V. PEOPLE (Regis)


G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the


presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as
of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the

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DOCTRINE: Where the absolute nullity of a previous


marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage


was declared null and void, "there is in effect no marriage at
all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of."
Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the
Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his case because
in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was
initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was
filed. Petitioner says that in his case, the first marriage had
already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case
was filed in court.

A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a


valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
FACTS: On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized
between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves
(Thelma). After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad
and would only come home to the Philippines for vacations.
In 2002, Thelma was informed that her husband had
contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon. Thelma
then went to the National Statistics Office and secured a
copy of the Certificate of Marriage indicating that her
husband (Cenon) and Edita contracted marriage on 10
December 2001 in Bulacan. In 2006, the uncle of Thelma,
filed a complaint accusing petitioner Cenon of bigamy.
Petitioner was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the
RPC on June 2006. However, during the pendency of the
criminal case for bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan City,
rendered a decision dated May 2006 (one month before the
case for bigamy was decided) declaring the marriage of
petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that
Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36, Family
Code. Said decision became final by a Certification of
Finality issued on 27 June 2006. Petitioner Cenon appealed
before the CA contending that the court a quo erred in not
ruling that his criminal liability had already been
extinguished.

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ISSUE: Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime


of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC) despite the judicial declaration
that his previous marriage with Thema is null and void.
HELD: YES. The court held that it does not matter whether
the case for declaration of nullity was filed before the case
for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender
contracted a subsequent marriage while his previous
marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a
Declaration of Nullity of the First marriage AT THE TIME HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
RATIO: The instant case has all the elements of the crime
of bigamy under Art. 346 of the RPC. Thus, the CA was
correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26
November 1992. He contracted a second or subsequent
marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001. At the time of
his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma
was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the
decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with
Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or


subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the
essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not
disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.

been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still


escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier
marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court.
Such cannot be allowed.

His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in


view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is
bereft of merit. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must
first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. With
the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage,
the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.

30. HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO


and GO (Briones)
G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011
FACTS: Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract of
sale of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under
oath that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta
Go) who purchased the said property. Subsequently,
Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of
the property to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March
2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the
property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand; hence
this case for the annulment of sale of the property. The
contention of the petitioner was that following Protacio, Jr.s
renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and
that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior
liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr.
and Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the
Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of
the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the
liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid,
because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that
was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the
sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as
heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within
the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were
entitled to as heirs.

If petitioner's contention would be allowed, a person


who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is
rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him. We note that in petitioner's case the complaint
was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It
was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by
the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following
petitioner's argument, even assuming that a complaint has

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The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal


property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive
property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the
validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved, the
petitioners went all the way up to the Supreme Court.

expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on


dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
The proper action in cases like this is not for the
nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of
the thing owned in common from the third person who
substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it
continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In
the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit
of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that
might not be validly sold to her.

ISSUE: Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was


applicable
HELD: The appeal lacks merit.
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the
Family Code,any disposition of the conjugal property after
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made
only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was
dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and
an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio,
Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in
the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation
following its liquidation.

31. KALAW VS. HERNANDEZ (Manliclic)


G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his


children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any
specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition
of the property being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or
abstract quota in Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-owner
could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the
right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but
not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by
Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of
the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights
of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of
Martas share.
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra,

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FACTS: Tyrone Kalaw and respondent Malyn Fernandez met


in 1973 and eventually married in Hong Kong in 1976. They
have 4 children. Tyron had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano,
who gave birth to a son in 1983. In 1985, Malyn left the
conjugal home and her 4 children with Tyrone. Then Tyrone
started living with Jocelyn, who bore him 4more children. Nine
years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based
on Article 36. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Gates, and a
Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Healy, to testify on Malyns
psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained on the stand that
the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual
infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out
with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD). Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

as a mother. Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed


by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-inlaw), and their son. Fr. Healy characterized Malyns
psychological incapacity as grave and incurable. He based
his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial
transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Dayan, Malyns
expert witness. He clarified that he did not verify the
truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyns
habits because he believed it is the courts duty to do so.

alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of


quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not
actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence
refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony
and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to
their children. There may be grounds for legal separation,
but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.

ISSUE: Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malyn


suffers from psychological incapacity
HELD: NO
RATIO: The burden of proving psychological incapacity is
on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the
incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior,
suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely
disables him or her from understanding and discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of
marriage, and must be incurable.

2012
32. CABREZA, JR., BJD HOLDINGS CORP., represented
by ATTY. MANUEL DULAYV.ROBLES CABREZA (King)
G.R. No. 181962, January 16, 2012
DOCTRINE: The Ruling of the RTC regarding the sale of the
conjugal dwelling (family home) is final and cannot be
impugned.

Petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent)


suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the
testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts
or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners
allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of
their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents

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FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Pasig Branch 70 (RTC


Br. 70) in JDRC Case No. 3705 declared void ab initio the
marriage between Ceferino Cabreza, Jr. (Ceferino) and
Amparo Cabreza (Amparo) and ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership in accordance with
Article 129 of the Family Code. Ceferino moved that their
only conjugal property, the conjugal home, be sold and the

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

proceeds distributed as mandated by law. RTC Br. 70


granted his Motion in a 26 May 2003 Order which became
final. Ceferino, for himself and on behalf of Amparo, he
executed the Deed of Sale in favor of BJD Holdings
Corporation. He then filed a Motion for Writ of Possession
and to Divide the Purchase Price, which RTC Pasig Branch
70 granted in its 12 May 2004 Order. In response to RTC
Br. 70s issuance of a Writ of Possession, followed by a 30
June 2004 Notice to Vacate, Amparo filed a Motion to Hold
in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate,
arguing that (1) the parties had another conjugal lot apart
from the conjugal dwelling; and (2) under Article 129 of the
Family Code, the conjugal dwelling should be adjudicated to
her as the spouse, with whom four of the five Cabreza
children were staying. Amparo filed with the Pasig RTC,
Branch 67 (RTC Br. 67) a Complaint (docketed as Civil Case
No. 70269) to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale for being
void due to lack of her consent thereto. RTC Br. 67
dismissed the Complaint with prejudice, on the basis of litis
pendentia and forum shopping.

C. Identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any


judgment that may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
Regarding the first requisite, there is no dispute that
the two cases have substantially the same parties.
Anent the second requisite, the CA correctly noted
that to determine whether there is identity of the rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for grounded on the same facts
and bases, the following tests may be utilized: (1) whether
the same evidence would support and sustain both the first
and the second causes of action; or (2) whether the
defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the
complaint in the other.
There is substantial identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for between the two cases. RTC Br. 70 issued
an Order dated 2 October 2003, which granted authority to
Ceferino to sign the Deed of Sale on Amparos behalf. This
same Order also contained, in its dispositive portion, a
directive that "(a)fter the sale of the subject property shall
have been consummated, all the occupants thereof shall
vacate and clear the same to enable the buyer to take
complete possession and control of the property." Thus,
using the first test, the same evidence the 2 October 2003
Order of RTC Br. 70 would defeat both Amparos
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale and
her Petition impugning the Writ of Possession.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether the complaint should be dismissed on the basis
of litis pendentia? YES.
2. Whether the decision of the RTC with regard to the sale
of the conjugal dwelling is final and cannot be impugned in
another case? YES.
RATIO:
1. The following requisites must be present for the proper
invocation of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissing an
action:
A. Identity of parties or representation in both cases;
B. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts and the same basis; and

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Accordingly, using the second test, the same defense


(i.e., the 2 October 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70) will defeat
both the Complaint to nullify the Deed of Sale and the
Petition to impugn the Writ of Possession. In fact, the

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subsequent Writ of Possession issued by RTC Br. 70 was the


logical consequence of, and merely gave effect to, the Deed
of Sale which it had previously approved.

exempt from execution from the time it was


constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein;

As to the last requisite, a final judgment on the


merits by a court that has jurisdiction over the parties and
over the subject matter in the Petition to nullify the Writ of
Possession would have barred subsequent judgment on the
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale
based on the principle of res judicata

Third, family residences which were not judicially or


extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing
thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as
such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the
debtor himself before the sale of the property at public
auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved
to the Sheriff.

2. The Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of


Sale cannot prosper, because, like the Petition to nullify the
Writ of Possession, it effectively seeks the modification of an
already final Order of RTC Br. 70. In view of this Courts
consistent ruling that Amparo cannot be allowed to impugn
the already final Order of RTC Br. 70 directing the sale of
the conjugal dwelling.
33. DE MESA V. ACERO (Ibaraa)
G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012

FACTS: Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.


They purcahsed a parcel of land located in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which
became their family home. A year after, Arceli contracted a
loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which
was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and
house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan.
When Acero presented the check to the bank it was
dishonored because the checking account was already
closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De
Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation
of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but
ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A
writ of execution was issued to levy on the said property.

DOCTRINE: Rules on constitution of family homes, for


purposes of exemption from execution:
First, family residences constructed before the
effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3,
1988 must be constituted as a family home either
judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt
from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus

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The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero
was the highest bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito
Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva
contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the
property.

RATIO: For the family home to be exempt from execution,


distinction must be made as to what law applies based
on when it was constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors
claiming such privilege.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes,
for purposes of exemption from execution, could be
summarized as follows:

The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to


Spouses Aceros complaint and ordering the Spouses De
Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De
Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the
property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens
title over the subject property was issued in Claudios name
up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the
petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by
the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale that was
conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Aceros Torrens
title that was resultantly issued.

First, family residences constructed before the


effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3,
1988 must be constituted as a family home either
judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt
from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus
exempt from execution from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT


issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject
property is a family home, which is exempt from execution
under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been
validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of
execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTCs
decision.

Third, family residences which were not judicially or


extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing
thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property, as a family


home, may be subject to execution in this case.
HELD: YES, the subject property is family home but is
subject to execution.In general, the family home is exempt
from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege
must assert it at the time it was levied or within a
reasonable time thereafter.

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Here, the subject property became a family


residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De
Mesa got married. There was no showing, however, that the
same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988,

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

the subject property became a family home by operation of


law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The
petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject
property was a family home.

mortgage over same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI, to


secure a loan facility with a credit limit of P1,200,000.00.
Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina
an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, that she was the true and
lawful owner of the property and, that the Deed of Absolute
Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated.
The Register of Deeds inscribed the adverse claim.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family


home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution,
Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property
being a family home and its being exempted from execution
at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the exemption
of the property from execution.

FEBTC-BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real


estate mortgage constituted over the property due to
Gemmas failure to pay the loan. As the highest bidder at
the public auction conducted in the premises, FEBTC-BPI
later consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused
the same to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392 of
the Marikina registry.

34. DELA PENA V. AVILA (Chan)


G.R. No. 187490, February 08, 2012

Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin Dela Pea


(Alvin), filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of
deed of sale as the subject realty was conjugal property,
and that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed
in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who
was already dead by that time. Gemma specifically denied
the material allegations, maintaining that the realty was the
exclusive property of Antonia who misrepresented that her
husband was still alive.

FACTS: Antonia Dela Pena (Antonia) obtained from A.C.


Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of
P250,000.00 with interest pegged at 5% per month.
Antonia executed a promissory note and a notarized Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage over a 277 square meter parcel of
residential land, together with the improvements thereon,
situated in Marikina City and previously registered in the
name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Pea (Antonia), "married
to Antegono A. Dela Pea" (Antegono) under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-32315 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal.[to secure the payment of the loan
obligation.

RTC held that the subject property was conjugal in


nature and that the Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed
in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the
liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code.
CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the property was
paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peas to prove
that the same was acquired during Antonia's marriage to
Antegono. Furthermore, that the Deed of Absolute Sale in

Antonia executed another notarized Deed of Absolute


Sale over the property in favor of Gemma Remilyn C. Avila
(Gemma), for the stated consideration of P600,000.00. As
such Gemma caused the transfer of the aforesaid property
to her name. Gemma also constituted a real estate

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

favor of Avila and the subsequent sale on auction of the


subject property to FEBTC-BPI are upheld as valid and
binding. Hence this petition.

As the parties invoking the presumption of


conjugality, the Dela Peas did not even come close to
proving that the subject property was acquired during the
marriage between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonia's
bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
purchased when she was already married, the record is
bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of
acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC


holding the house and lot covered by TCT No. N-32315
conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia
Dela Pea
HELD: No, petition is denied. CA decision affirmed in toto.

In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase


"married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the
wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is
also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible that
the property was acquired by the wife while she was still
single and registered only after her marriage, neither would
registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the
same was acquired during the marriage and, for said
reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. "Since there is
no showing as to when the property in question was
acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife
alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e.,
belonging exclusively to said spouse."

RATIO: Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all property of


the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary
to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case of Francisco
vs. Court of Appeals, the Court said that the party who
invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the NCC, must
first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The
party who asserts this presumption must first prove said
time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only
to the property acquired during the marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only
with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a
strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.

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As such, the nature of the property is paraphernal


and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in
nullifying Antonia's sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack
of the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family
Code. Furthermore, Antonia treated the realty as her own
exclusive property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from her
utilization thereof as security for the payment of the
P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.
35. VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE (Advincula)
G. R. No. 183622, February 08, 2012

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

DOCTRINE: Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may


be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to
be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.

FACTS: Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,


allegedly obtained a divorce in the United States from his
first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with petitioner.

The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the


issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and
granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings
in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage
between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters
of administration for her appointment as administratrix of
the intestate estate. While the case was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando
from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC.
The two cases were consolidated.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for
bigamy meant that the marriage with Bristol was still
valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be
recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition


filed by the respondent on the ground of litis pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file the petition. Respondent
further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed
against petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.

HELD: It is imperative for the trial court to first determine


the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to
be issued the letters of administration over the estate of
Orlando. Petition is partially granted. Case is remanded to
RTC.

However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and


ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was
not valid. The RTC took note of the action for declaration of

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1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case that petitioner
was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that,

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows


that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was
valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven by the
divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando's divorce under the
laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand
the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of
evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

36. PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) V. EIJI*


YANAGISAWA (Loveria)
G.R. No. 175303, April 11, 2012
DOCTRINE: An undertaking not to dispose of a property
pending litigation, made in open court and embodied in a
court order, and duly annotated on the title of the said
property, creates a right in favor of the person relying
thereon. The latter may seek the annulment of actions that
are done in violation of such undertaking.
FACTS: Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanese
national, and Evelyn F. Castaeda (Evelyn), a Filipina,
contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall of
Manila.

Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the "party


who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. It is
well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved.

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On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152


square-meter townhouse unit located at Bo. Sto. Nio,
Paraaque, Metro Manila (Paraaque townhouse unit). The
Registry of Deeds for Paraaque issued Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 99791 to "Evelyn P. Castaeda, Filipino,

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

married to Ejie Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen[,] both of legal


age."

Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its Order on Evelyns


commitment not to dispose of or encumber the properties
registered in her name.

In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of


nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy
(nullity of marriage case). During the pendency of the case,
Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order
against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary
Injunction. He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing
or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name.
At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer
voluntarily undertook not to dispose of the properties
registered in her name during the pendency of the case,
thus rendering Eijis application and motion moot. Said
undertaking was annotated on the title of the Paraaque
townhouse unit or TCT No. 99791.

Eiji learned of the REM upon its annotation on TCT


No. 99791. Deeming the mortgage as a violation of the
Makati RTCs Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the annulment
of REM (annulment of mortgage case) against Evelyn and
PAFIN.
For its defense, PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the
October 2, 1996 Order against Evelyn. It admitted,
however, that it did not conduct any verification of the title
with the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City "because x x x
Evelyn was a good, friendly and trusted neighbor." PAFIN
maintained that Eiji has no personality to seek the
annulment of the REM because a foreign national cannot
own real properties located within the Philippines.

Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan


of P500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific Ace Finance Ltd.
(PAFIN). To secure the loan, Evelyn executed a real estate
mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the Paraaque
townhouse unit covered by TCT No. 99791. The instrument
was submitted to the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City
for annotation on the same date.

Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the October


2, 1996 Order. Evelyn asserted that she paid for the
property with her own funds and that she has exclusive
ownership thereof.
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the CA Decision, which
allegedly affirmed the Makati RTC ruling that Eiji is a coowner of the mortgaged property. PAFIN insists that the CA
sustained a violation of the constitution with its declaration
that an alien can have an interest in real property located in
the Philippines.

At the time of the mortgage, Eijis appeal in the


nullity of marriage case was pending before the CA. The
Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyns marriage, and
had ordered the liquidation of their registered properties,
including the Paraaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds
to be divided between the parties. The Decision of the

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ISSUE/S:
1. Whether a real property in the Philippines can be part of
the community property of a Filipina and her foreigner
spouse;
2. Whether a real property registered solely in the name of
the Filipina wife is paraphernal or conjugal;
3. Who is entitled to the real property mentioned above
when the marriage is declared void?
4. Whether the Paraaque RTC can rule on the issue of
ownership, even as the same issue was already ruled upon
by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA.

bases for seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his


right to rely on Evelyns commitment not to dispose of or
encumber the property (as confirmed in the October 2,
1996 Order of the Makati RTC), and the annotation of the
said commitment on TCT No. 99791.
It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Eijis incapacity
to own real property as their defense to the suit. They
maintained that Eiji, as an alien incapacitated to own real
estate in the Philippines, need not consent to the REM
contract for its validity. But this argument is beside the
point and is not a proper defense to the right asserted by
Eiji. This defense does not negate Eijis right to rely on the
October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and to hold third
persons, who deal with the registered property, to the
annotations entered on the title. Thus, the RTC erred in
dismissing the complaint based on this defense.

HELD: The petition has no merit.


RATIO: Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA did not
make any disposition as to who between Eiji and Evelyn
owns the Paraaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that
the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said
question and should not have been interfered with by the
Paraaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it was improper
for the Paraaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a coequal court.

Petitioner did not question the rest of the appellate


courts ruling, which held that Evelyn and PAFIN executed
the REM in complete disregard and violation of the October
2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and the annotation on TCT
No. 99791. It did not dispute the legal effect of the October
2, 1996 Order on Evelyns capacity to encumber the
Paraaque townhouse unit nor the CAs finding that
petitioner is a mortgagee in bad faith.

Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the


Paraaque RTC to rule on the ownership issue because it
was essential for the determination of the validity of the
REM.

The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyns


commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property, is
akin to an injunction order against the disposition or
encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all

The Court disagrees. A review of the complaint


shows that Eiji did not claim ownership of the Paraaque
townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his

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ATTY.MELSTA.MARIA

acts done in violation of a standing injunction order are


voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who are
not in good faith. The party, in whose favor the injunction is
issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of the
offending actions.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no need to
discuss the other issues raised by the petitioner.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a


Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the
RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a
Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that
Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus
and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was
already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then
elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA
had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on
Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial
proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and
executory and, thus, not appealable.

37. REPUBLIC V. GRANADA (BALANI)


G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012
DOCTRINE: Even if the RTC erred in ruling that the
respondent was able to prove her well-founded belief that
her absent spouse was already dead, such order already
final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed,
[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment
becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.

The appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to


Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic
v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the
Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment
thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to
the parties.

FACTS: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of


Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric
Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek
employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did
not receive any communication from her husband,
notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified
that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the
latters whereabouts, to no avail.

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Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied.


Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final

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and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not


subject to ordinary appeal

unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the


decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the
errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.

2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the


petition for declaration of presumptive death based on
evidence that respondent had presented
HELD: Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final
and immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred in
granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the


losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the
CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

RATIO:
1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding as provided for under the Family Code. Taken
together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code
provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive
death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court
therein shall be immediately final and executory.

2. Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for


Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of
respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the
evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by
Article 41 of the Family Code.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the


court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final
and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with
the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in
certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an

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For the purpose of contracting the subsequent


marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that
his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the

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present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The


law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded
belief.

that if she were, she would have sought information from


the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other
government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She
could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did
not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

is a state of the mind or condition prompting the


doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence
or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating
to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity
and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men,
and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends
to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light
on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate
question of his death.

The
Republics
arguments
are
well-taken.
Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent
was able to prove her well-founded belief that her absent
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to
declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no
longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, [n]othing is more
settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The
same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result


of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded
belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)

38. QUIAO V. QUIAO (Aldana)


G.R. No 176556, July 04, 2012
FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal
separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC
rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby
awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of
Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of
the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal
liabilities.

Applying the foregoing standards to the present


case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not
initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having
inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters
relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate
Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly
not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues

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Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by


the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common

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children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and


appeal within the period
270 days later or after more than nine months from
the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before
the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define
the term Net Profits Earned.

RATIO:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the
promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is
that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.

RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED


denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse
and the debts. It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the offending spouse does
not have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the
Family Code.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the


spouses marriage the operative law is already the Family
Code, the same applies in the instant case and the
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129
of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong


when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of
Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies
because there is no other provision under the Family Code
which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a
result of legal separation.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations


between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the
Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal
partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband
and wife.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership
of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights
over of the properties in the conjugal partnership
NO.

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While one may not be deprived of his vested right,


he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

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In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his


right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the
respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the
petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community
assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting
and inventory of all the community properties of the parties.
Second, when the decision for legal separation was
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial
court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net
profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.
Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right
to due process.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a


regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article
142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in
common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either
spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision,
each of the couple has his and her own property and debts.
The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of
those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it
establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established
by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The
listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the abovelisted properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the
trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share
from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited
in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2)
of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the
absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because
there is no separate property which may be accounted for in
the guilty party's favor.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute


community, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever
property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those
acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under
Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of
the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in
the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of
the value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is
applicable, since it has been established that the spouses
have no separate properties, what will be divided equally
between them is simply the net profits. And since the
legal separation decision states that the share of Brigido
in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido
will still be left with nothing.

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