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No solvency: Even Fergusson concedes that China is too strong, both politically and
economically, to lose the Taiwan recognition battle.
Fergusson 12 Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at International Business Times,
Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher at University College London,
Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University of Glasgow (Robbie, The Chinese Challenge to
the Monroe Doctrine, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-inlatin-america-threaten-american-interests/)
Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on
infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007. However, even Taiwans
economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only
debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining
supporters of the ROC take for example, the Dominican case. In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked
Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to
develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned
down the request. [54] This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for
Latin America. Political strategies of the PRC In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position,
thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China provides incentives but does
not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan, [55] the reality is that the use of force and
direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain
official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country
being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domngu ez suggests that the PRC has not
been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan), [56] the legitimacy of this
claim has to be brought into question for example in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in
Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan. [57] This incident showed that
China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position.
Similarly, Chinas experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition
to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common
understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties
in the countries that were Taiwans diplomatic allies in Latin America, [58] further isolating the ROC.
China Fills In (thru FDI) premise of China advantage takes out the impact to Economy adv
An end-of-the-year assessment of U.S. policy towards Latin America could possibly qualify for the world's shortest
blog. For a President who has clearly established that foreign policy is not something that gets him up in the
morning (or appears to keep him awake at night), Latin America must rank just above Antarctica in descending areas
of interest. This uneven, sporadic focus on the region has led to only adverse consequences for U.S. interests. What effort the administration does expend
seems only directed toward placating a smattering of hostile populist regimes, while ignoring the interests of our
friends. Indeed, the predictable response is that we have only emboldened our enemies and despaired those in the
hemisphere who share the U.S. vision of open political systems, free markets, and robust trade. Radical populists in
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have run roughshod over democratic institutions and the best Washington can come
up with is asking for the terms under which a U.S. ambassador would be allowed to return to their capitals. In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega
is likely chuckling at the feeble U.S. response to his recently rigged re-election. It also appears that the administration has lulled itself into complacency
over a cancer-stricken Hugo Chvez in Venezuela, ground zero for regional instability, seemingly content to wait
and see what happens after Chvez passes from the scene. But even as his circus antics continue, he is leaving
behind what my colleague Roger Noriega calls a mountain of toxic waste that will take years to clean up. Chvez's days
may indeed be numbered, but his friends in Iran, Russia, China, and Cuba are certainly taking the long-term view of things. All four have been great
beneficiaries of Chvez's political solidarity and oil-fueled largesse and can be counted on to want to maintain that
access with or without him in power. In other words, don't count on them to support a democratic transition away
from Chavismo, only a succession.
2.Any negative impacts are wholly empirically denied by 50 years of embargo. They can
only possibly win positive benefits to reversing the embargo.
3.Conservative House means future policies wont allow US to truly improve relations with
Latin America [& structural issues prevent strategic coop.]
Weisbrot 11, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research
Latin
America is now more independent of the United States than Europe is, and its independence is growing. There are
structural reasons for these changes, among them the failure of neoliberalism, the collapse of the International
Monetary Funds creditors cartel in the region (which was the major avenue of U.S. influence), the rising relative
importance of Asia as a source of markets and investment funds, and the increasing multipolarity of world politics.
Perhaps most important, the people of the region have voted for left governments because they can: in the past, as is
sadly still the case in Honduras and Haiti today, the United States did not allow such choices to be made peacefully.
Yet the foreign policy establishment here sees Latin Americas leftward shift as primarily just a swing of the
pendulum, something that will eventually swing back and allow the United States to regain its lost influence without
changing its policies. Needless to say, this is unlikely. The capture of the House of Representatives by the
Republicans will simply provide more pressure for the continuation of the administrations conservative
policies toward Latin America.
In the articles in Foreign Affairs and other publications of the establishment there is little to indicate that these analysts have grasped the historic significance of the transformation that has taken place over the past decade.
the US is no closer
to Latin America than its been since 9/11, when attention shifted to terrorism and away from the issues most Latin
Americans care about, especially immigration. The regions favorable view of the US has grown, from 58 percent in
2008 to 72 percent in 2011 (down slightly from a high of 74 percent in 2009), according to the 2011
Latinobarometro poll. The slight dip can be explained by a boost in expectations for Obama after former US
President George W. Bush left office he was widely reviled in Latin America. But even under Obama issues like
immigration and drugs have been stuck. There is little hope of them getting unstuck in the upcoming US election
year. More than anything, however, is the simple fact that the US is no longer the sole player for Latin America.
Obama's March trip was billed by the media as an effort to recapture US influence in Latin America. But Latin
America has moved on. Countries are looking amongst themselves and much farther, particularly to China, to
bolster their economies. They are forming their own relationships with countries, whether the US likes it or not. Of
course US foreign policy matters here, but it matters so much less than it used to. There is just a sense that Latin
America is pursuing its own agenda, says Mr. Shifter.
Plan necessary but insufficient improving relations is impossible without reforming the
entire foreign policy apparatus
Gvosdev, 12 - former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and
broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College (Nikolas, To Reset Latin America
Policy, U.S. Must Think Big, 4/20, World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11867/therealist-prism-to-reset-latin-america-policy-u-s-must-think-big)
More generally, Obamas Latin America policy is suffering from a lack of what George H.W. Bush famously called
the vision thing, compounded by how the administration organizes the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. The
president had an initial opening at his first Summit of the Americas in Trinidad, in 2009, to reset what had become a
very problematic relationship between the United States and most of the rest of the hemisphere during the George
W. Bush administration. Most regional leaders also made it clear they understood that, given the global financial
crisis and the challenges of winding down Americas involvement in two Middle Eastern wars, Obama could not
immediately pivot U.S. foreign policy to the region. But as I noted two years ago, There was insufficient follow-up
to take advantage of the momentum generated by the Trinidad meeting. Just as candidate George W. Bushs
rhetoric about the importance of Latin America understandably evaporated after Sept. 11, the Obama administration,
in continuing to react to a series of crises elsewhere in the world, has also put the Western Hemisphere on the back
burner.As a result, according to Sean Goforth, Americas relations with the region appear to be adrift. Many
countries want and deserve a serious partnership with Washington. But President Obama is an unconvincing
partner. . . . He has stalled on trade treaties with Latin American countries that still want preferred access to the U.S.
market, and hes made it clear that his strategic priority is a pivot toward Asia.Worse still, no senior official within
the administration, starting with the president himself, has articulated a clear, compelling and convincing vision for
what a Western Hemispheric partnership would look like, beyond the expected bromides about peace, democracy
and prosperity. What is the desired end state? There is no lack of compelling possibilities to choose from: free
circulation for people, goods and capital from the Yukon to Tierra del Fuego; a greater push for regional
independence, in terms of manufactured goods, services and energy; an arrangement that mimics the pre-Maastricht
European Community.
Snowden
No policy coordinator / method to improve relations
AT OAS Credibility
CFR's Shannon K. O'Neil says the OAS's role as a forum for regular, high-level discussions on issues facing the
hemisphere is one of its major strengths. Several other analysts have praised the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission as a crucial, objective platform for human rights litigation. However, many state leaders and
policymakers have also heavily criticized the OAS for its institutional weakness. Christopher Sabatini, senior policy
director for the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, says the OAS as a political entity "has declined
precipitously in recent years."
However, analysts say, since the Democratic Charter was signed, the organization's consensus around democracy
promotion has atrophied.
One of the OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to make
many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified within the region, this has made it difficult for the
OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action. The polarization between American states has also led to one of the
OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to the core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes (VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of
mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of funding made for an
"unsustainable" fiscal future.
Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions in light of its commitment to democracy, is also restricted by
its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country
unless that country wants to be condemned," CFR's O'Neil says. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in
many member countries to accept OAS monitors, which she says has been helpful.
Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties abound. In the summer 2011 issue of Americas
Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust: "Insulza and the OAS itself are widely seen as being
bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to [Venezuelan President] Hugo Chavez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador
and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely, still beholden to the U.S., even though Washington
seems to have lost interest."
Chavez has called the OAS a puppet of the United States; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House Committee
on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to defund the OAS (ForeignPolicy), on the charge that the
organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America.
Various efforts have been made to create organizations to act as alternatives to the OAS. In 2010, Latin American
leaders formed the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), an organization that excludes the
United States. Chavez and Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa have expressed the desire for CELAC to eventually
supplant the OAS, although Sabatini argues that CELAC is "nothing more than a piece of paper and a dream."
Many consider another regional organization, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), to be a useful
counterweight to the OAS. UNASUR is regarded by many observers as a means for Brazil to assert its power in the
region. O'Neil argues the organization has been able to fulfill some duties that the OAS has been less effective in
doing, such as successfully mediating between Ecuador and Colombia during their diplomatic crisis in 2008.
Despite the OAS's shortcomings and questions over its continued relevance in the region, there is a strong call to
reform the organization rather than eliminate it altogether.