STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 1 ROUND 1

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 2 People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romul
o Intia y Morada Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page
2, Footnote No.3 FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged
with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court
has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to
the refiling thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdicti
on over 16 yea rs olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by t
he issuance of PD 603 o r the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthf
ul offenders as those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commis
sion of the offense. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of t
he accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisd
iction over criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 year s of age at the
time of the filing of the case . The subsequent issuance of PD 603 know n as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as one who is over 9
years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense did not b
y such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accus ed w
ho are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Cour
t. LATIN MAXIM: 35 Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta Case No. 244 G.R. No. L
-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14 FACTS: Petitioner, w
hile driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged with violation
of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, particularly, for overtaking a truck . Peti
tioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for th

e issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing t

he said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipali
ty of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be pat
terned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has
been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By t
his express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlie
r law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it must not co
ntravene the statute for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances a
re inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the s tate. LATIN MAXIM: 4,
6c, 49

3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez Case No. 48 G.R. No.
L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31 FACTS: Petitioner
was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund o
f the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee La w) stating
that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 2 5% on f
oreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass i
n audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner s separate
importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of S
e c. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: The mar
gin established by the Monetary Board shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of the following: XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the
manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use o
f end-users. ISSUE: W/N urea and margin fee. HELD: The term urea formaldehyde us
ed in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product as expressed by the Natio
nal Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from urea
and formaldehyde which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthet
ic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a fi nished product, while the ones im
ported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of urea margi
n fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Astorga v. Villegas Case
No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37 FACT
S: and formaldehyde is not exempt from the imposition of the formaldehyde are ex
empt by law from the payment of the

House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate.
Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the
Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its appr
oval until all the presiding officers of d attested to the bill. The President a
lso signed it and thereupon Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled c
opy as a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the both houses cer
tified an became RA 4065. Senator of House Bill No. 9266 w amendments introduced
by
him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President with
drew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued th at
the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof
of a bill s due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted
and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdr
ew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enact
ed and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House
shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence
of attestation or evidence of the bil l s due enactment, the court may resort to
the journals of the Congress to verify such. Where the journal discloses that s
ubstantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in t
he printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that
the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law. LATIN MAXIM: b2

4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento Case No. 133 G.R. No. L
-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42 FACTS: Petitioner is a C
hinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 An Act to Regulat
e the Retail Business on the following grounds: a) It is a violation of the Equa
l Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their libert y, property and due
process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requi rement that a bi
ll s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because regulate doe s no
t really mean nationalize and prohibit 3) the Act violates International treatie
s and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180 is constitutional
. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the constitutional re
quirement that A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in its title.
This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation b ecause the title must be able to
apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope , and consequences of
that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of o ne department
to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily t
he judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the l
aw, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a,
d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Phi
lippines Case No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footn
ote No.42 FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Insta
nce of Manila dismissing the Plaintiff s complaint for the collection of sales t
axes from Defend ant on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of t
he same is unconstitutio

nal. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because acco
rding to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not th e s
aid Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means fo
r Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two su
bjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to th
e local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund. ISSUE: W/N RA 1
435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only
one subject reflected by its title Road and Bridge Fund. Statutory definition pr
evails over ordinary usage of t he term. The constitutional requirement as to th
e title of the bill must be liberal ly construed. It should not be technically o
r narrowly construed as to impede the p ower of legislation. When there is doubt
as to its validity, it must be resolved agai nst the doubt and in favor of its
validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional
requirement that A bill shall embrace only one subject, expres sed in its title
. This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to
apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of
that particular law. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d

5 People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje Case No. 203 G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3,
1925) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46 FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of
the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of illegal practice of med
icine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor. Defendant practices chiropr
actic although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine. She treat
ed and manipulated the head and body of Regino Noble. She also contends that pra
ctice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use
of title of doctor should be understood to refer to doctor of medicine and not t
o doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that A ct 3111 is unconstitutional as it
does not express its subject. ISSUE: W/N chiropractic is included in the term pr
actice of medicine Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code. HEL
D: Act 3111 is constitutional as the title An Act to Amend (enumeration of secti
ons to be amended) is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of e
ach section. Chiropractic is included in the practice of medicine. Statutory def
inition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirem en
t as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be tech
nical ly or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there
is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor
of its validity . A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title
, to prohibit duplicity in legisl ation by apprising legislators and the public
about the nature, scope, and consequences o f the law. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 7a, 25c,
37, d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alalayan v. National Power Corporation Case No. 8
G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968) under

Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46 FACTS: Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled An A
ct to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121 . In Section 3 of the same act, Res
pondent is empowered, in any franchise contract for the supply of electric power
constituting 50% of the elec tric power and energy of that franchisee, to reali
ze a net profit of not more than 12 % annually of its investments plus 2-month o
perating expenses; and NPC is allowed to renew all existing franchise contracts
so that the provisions of the act could b e given effect. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 i
s Commonwealth Act violative of the cted into law, cannot title. HELD: Section 3
is constitutional. Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is sufficient tha
t the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commo
nwealth Act 121). Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensiv
e enough to includ e the general object which the statute seeks to effect withou
t expressing each and eve ry ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Ti
tle doesn t need to be a complete index of the contents of the act. LATIN MAXIM:
24a, 37, d a subject which the bill title An Act to Further Amend No. 121 does
not embrace, thus making it a rider because it is constitutional provision requi
ring that a bill, which may be ena embrace more than one subject, which shall be
expressed in its

Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando Case No. 81 G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962) Chapt
er I, Page 12, Footnote No.47 FACTS: Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural T
enancy Act of the Philippines. Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent te
nants should be represented by Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress
then amended this in Republic Act No. 2263: An Act Amending Certain Sections of
Republic Act No. 1199. Section 19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of
tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also
provides that indigent tenant s shall be represented by trial attorney of the Te
nancy Mediation Commission. ISSUE: W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 i
s unconstitutional because of the constitutional provision that No bill which ma
y be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be express
ed in the title of the bill. HELD: Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. The co
nstitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general s
ubject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory provisions no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsiste nt with or fo
reign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutiona l provisi
ons relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so na rrowly
construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d S
TATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tobias v. Abalos Case No. 291 G.R. No. L-114783 (December
8, 1994) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47 FACTS: Petitioners assail the consti
tutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Mandaluyong because Article VIII, Section 49 of this act provided that the c
ongressional district of San Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate
districts. ISSUE:

W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675. H
ELD: RA 7675 is constitutional. Contrary to Petitioners' district for Mandaluyon
g of its conversion into a highly of its conversion into a highly assertion, the
creation of a separate congressional is not a subject separate and distinct fro
m the subject urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence urbanized
city
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been in
variably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The C
onstitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, la
nguage of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the conten t
s and the minute details therein. LATIN MAXIM: 20a, d

7 Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal Case No. 11 G.R. No. 14019 (Jul
y 26, 1919) FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance
No. 13, section 2 of which provided that all owners and proprietors of the indu
stry known as fish ing, with nets denominated cuakit and pantukos, before engagi
ng in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shor
e-line of this municipali ty, are obliged to provide themselves with a license i
ssued by this municipal government , after payment of a fee of P50 annually, pay
able every three months. The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was fr
om section 2270 of the Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Admin
istrative Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917, is
invalid. HELD: Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323
of the Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17,
section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provided that no private or local bill wh
ich may be ena cted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subje
ct shall be expresse d in the title of the bill because the Administrative Code
is neither a private nor a local bill. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for i
ts title, An Act amending the Administrative Code. It does not violate Paragraph
17, section 3 of the Jones Law , which provided that no bill which may be enact
ed into law shall embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be expres
sed in the title of the bill, be cause it was merely a revision of the provision
s of the Administrative Code enacted fo r the purpose of adapting it to the Jone
s Law and the Reorganization Act. LATIN MAXIM: 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lidasan
v. Commission on Elections

Case No. 148 G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No
.51 FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled An Act Cre
ating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur as unconstit
utional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, whic
h is Cotaba to, violating the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be e
nacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill. This question was initially presented to the Respondents,
which adopted a resolu tion in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elect
ions. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is
null and void. The title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the P
rovince of Lanao del Sur projects the impression that solely the province of Lan
ao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the sligh test intimatio
n is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporate
d in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase in the Province of Lanao del Sur ma
kes the title misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the members of
the Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in
the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law, and the province of Cotabat
o itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their town s and
provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the publi
c in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill
. Thes e are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of
Republic Act 4790. LATIN MAXIM: d

8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Reyes Case No. 169 G.R. No. 43263 (October 31,
1935) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No. 53 FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel m
ortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed to pay some of the installments. Petit
ioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mort gage. The mortgaged property was s
old at a public auction by the sheriff of the City o f Manila. After applying th
is sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated damages to Respondent s indebtednes
s, the latter owed the company a balance of P275.47 with interest. The company i
nstituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay th e deficiency of the de
bt. He pleaded as a defense that the company, having chosen to foreclose its cha
ttel mortgage, had no further action against him for the rec overy of the unpaid
balance owed by him, as provided by Act No. 4122. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 4122, enti
tled An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between Sections fourteen hundr
ed and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fiftyfive thereof a new section, to b
e known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A, is valid. HELD: Act No. 41
22 is valid and enforceable. The controlling purpose of Act No. 4122 is revealed
to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure
of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments. The general rule i
s adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title whic h declares a stat
ute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature
of the amendatory act need not be further stated. The proper approach in cases o
f this character should be to resolve all presumptions in fav or of the validity
of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the Constitution. L
ATIN MAXIM: 9a, 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Ferrer

Case No. 208 G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnot
e No.50 FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of
Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outl
aws the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other subversive associatio
ns and punishes any person who knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates
himself with, becomes or remains a member of the CPP or any other organization
subversive in nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statu
te due to its constitutional violations. The lower court declared the statute vo
id on the grou nds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and over
broad. The cases we re dismissed, to which the Government appealed. ISSUE: W/N t
he title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. HELD:
Yes. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents,
and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates
in clear terms the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its o
peration. A narrow and technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute
will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent
. The Anti-Subversio n act fully satisfies these requirements. LATIN MAXIM: 9a,
9d, 51d

9 Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al. Case No. 33 G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 197
0) FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The said Act pu
rportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly f
ails to in clude the phrase TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHI
LIPPINES. The statute plainly reads: An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Hous
es Numbered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Con
gress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for
Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election o
f Delegates t o and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for
the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other Purp
oses. ISSUE: W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject
. HELD: No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary
because the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on bot
h Houses Nos. 2 and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both Resolutions No. 2
and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Conve
ntion called fo r therein is to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Ph
ilippines, which phrase is reiterated in Sec. 1 of both Resolutions. The for on.
not power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call the
convention itself, whose raison d etre is to revise the present Constituti It is
required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be
comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the ge
neral subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to
mislead Congress or the people. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germ
ane to a nd are comprehended by its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d STATUTORY CO
NSTRUCTION

People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa Case No. 230 G.R. No. L-9
659 (May 29, 1957) Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55 FACTS: Defendant was char
ged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of Section 26 of Act
No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved to quash the information
on the ground that the title of the act, which was an Act t o regulate the impor
tation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms , and to prohibit
the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act, di
d not include weapons other than firearms, and that Section 26 violated the cons
titutional provision that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace mo
re than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. ISSUES: 1
. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2. W/N it was inconsi
stent with the Constitution. HELD: No. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1
780 on October 12, 1907, the one subject-one title rule referred to private and
local bills only, and to bill s to be enacted into a law and not to law that was
already in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. Th
e provision of Section 26 germane to the su bject expressed in the title of the
Act remained operative because it was not inconsis tent with the Constitution, p
ursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitu tion. LATIN MAXIM: 30a,
36a, 46a, 50

10 People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos Case No. 204 G.R. No. L-239 (Jun
e 30, 1947) Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63 FACTS: The People s Court found t
he Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the
People s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on mat
ters entirely foreign to the subject matter expresse d in its title, such as: (1
) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of F irst Instance; (2
) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Co u
rt and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3) a provision which change
d t he existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision which
suspen ds Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the People s Court
Act was unconstitutional. HELD: No. The People s Court was intended to be a full
and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgme
nt of treason cases. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the sub
ject matter and purposes of the People s Court Act. The Congress is not expected
to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. The constit
utional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed
in its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v
. Leoncio Lim Case No. 210 G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960) Chapter I, Page 19,
Footnote No.83 FACTS: In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Re
sources pursuant to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 400
3 (Fisheries Act) is sued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37. Section 2 of sa
id order prohibits trawl f ishing in certain areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subs
equently amended with FAO No. 37 1.

Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of said order, challenged its legality on
the ground that FAO No. 37 1 was contrary to Act No. 4003, the former having no
fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating t
hat pr ohibition was for any single period of time not exceeding five years dura
tion. ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 37 1 was invalid. HELD: Section 2 of FAO N
o. 37 1 was valid. Although FAO No. 37 1 was defective because it failed to spec
ify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between a bas
ic law and a rule issued to implement it, the basic law prevails because the rul
e cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. FAO No. 37 1 would be in
operative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years fo r any single peri
od of time, but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission. LATIN MAXI
M: 37, 38a

11 KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr. Case No. 68 G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994
) FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow pr
ovincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above an
d below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB issued Memoran d
um Circular No.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the pres
cri bed fares. PBOAP, without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB, availe
d of the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. Petit
ioner fil ed a petition opposing the increase in fares. SC issued a temporary re
straining order to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase. ISSUES: 1. W/N
authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15 % is
unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpos
e in the said increase. 2. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity f
or the increase thus viol ating the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court. H
ELD: 1. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP. 2. PBOAP w
as not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for t he fare i
ncrease. LATIN MAXIM: None STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Centr
al Bank Case No. 57 G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988) FACTS: Congress approved R
A No. 6125 entitled An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO
ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES Petiti
oners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate value from July 1, 1972-June 30, 1973,
as provided in the Act. The Central bank released Monetary Resolution No. 1995
which states that: For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January
1, 1972-June 30, 1972; the stabilization

tax shall be at the m July 1, 1972 to June exports of bananas shipped tion tax s
hall be at ISSUE:
rate of 6%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period fro 30, 1973; the s
tabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. For during the period from July 1,
1973-June 30, 1974; the stabiliza the rate of 2%.
W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of juris
diction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995. HELD: Central Bank ac
ted with grave abuse of discretion. In case of discrepancy between the basic law
and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said la w, the basic law pre
vails. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic law. LATIN
MAXIM: 9c

China Banking Corp. v. CA Case No. 59 G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996) Chapter
I, Page 19, Footnote No.84 FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp
. and its president, So Ching, in return for promissory notes to pay the loans.
Two extra mortgages were additiona lly executed by So Ching and his wife on July
and August 1989. The loans matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said
loans. This caused Petitioner to file fo r extra judicial foreclosures of the tw
o mortgaged properties. The properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3, 199
3. On April 28, 1989 the court ruled on the side o f So Ching. The issuance of t
he preliminary injunction was granted; therefore the sal e of the two mortgaged
properties was stopped. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and elevated the c
ase to the Court of Appeals. They were appealing that Act No. 3135 was the gover
ning rule in their case, instead of Administrative Order No. 3 as So Ching was c
ontending. ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the propertie
s. 2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosur
e. HELD: 1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties. 2. Act No. 3135 is the gove
rning law. Administrative Order No. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. It is an ele
mentary principle that a stature is superior to an adminis trative directive. Th
us, the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative directive. L
ATIN MAXIM: None STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. Honorable Estenzo Case No. 140
G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960) FACTS: The decedent is a driver for Peopl
e s Land Transportation Company, of which Petitioners are manager and proprietor
. The Workmen s Compensation Commission awarded the decedent s widow the amount
of P3,494.40, plus burial expenses not exceeding P200. After 5 years, Respondent
, in a civil case filed by the mother o f the

decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney s fees for
failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified ba
sed on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen s Compensation Commission and
prays further that the P500 in atty s fees exceeded the allowed fees according
to Sec.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules. ISSUE: 1. W/N the 772 and as 2. W/N the atto
rney s HELD: Rules of the Workmen s Compensation Commission amended R.A. No. a r
esult deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case. court committed a gr
ave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in fees.
Petition was dismissed. 1. The Commission, or any of its rules, cannot amend an
act of Congress. Furthermore, the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after t
he court had acquired jurisdiction over the main case. 2. The court did not comm
it grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the said rule only appli
es to the Commission and not the Court. LATIN MAXIM: 30, 35, 46a

13 Grego v. Commission on Elections Case No. 120 G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997)
Chapter I, Page 23, Footnote No.98 FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected fo
r his 3rd and final term as councilor of th e 2nd District of Manila. His qualif
ications are being questioned by herein Petiti oner, who is also asking for the
suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner brings into consi deration the fact t
hat Respondent was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon fi nding of
serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31, 1981. Petiti on
er argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Loca
l Government Code. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code shou
ld be applied retroactively. ISSUE: W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Gover
nment Code should be applied retroactively due to its wording. HELD: Section 40(
b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied retroactively. It is under
stood that statutes are not to be construed as intende d to have a retroactive e
ffect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly decla
red or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. The f
act that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a ca
ndidate s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the
court from applying the law prospectively. The term to be looked at in the issue
is REINSTATEMENT, which has a technical meaning, referring only to an appointiv
e position. Since Respondent was reelecte d, this does not fall under the scope
of the term. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 46c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. Municipal of
Caloocan Case No. 141

G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963) FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 char
ging slaughterhouses in the municipality certain fees including slaughterhouse f
ees, meat inspection fees, corral fees, and internal organ fees, pursuant to Com
monwealth Act No. 655. Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance. IS
SUE: W/N Respondent, in the issuance of Ordinance No. 24, exceeded the limits of
its jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth Act 655. HELD: Respondent exceeded it
s jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. The Commonwealth Act only
allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. When Respondent ordained the p
ayment of other said fees, it overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. The
only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or sanitary inspection
fees since it was mentioned in the statute. Incidentally, th e court ordered Re
spondent to refund the fees with the exception of slaughterhouse fees. One of th
e rules of statutory construction is that certain sections or parts of s ections
of an ordinance may be held invalid without affecting the validity of what rema
ins, if the parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one nec
essarily vit iates the others. LATIN MAXIM: 15a, 37

14 National Housing Authority v. Reyes Case No. 85 G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983
) FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of
an expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents clai
med they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petit
ione r opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 w
hich provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the o
wner in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.
00, but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the gove
rnme nt shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner
x x x o r the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, which
ever is low er. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation
on just compensation. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to execut
ive acts and legislative enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed t
o abide by the Constituti on x x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed ju
st compensation in expropriatio n cases, that the lower value made by the landow
ner should be the basis for fixing the price. The petition for Certiorari is gra
nted. LATIN MAXIM: 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito
Villavicencio Dy Case No. 73 G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990) FACTS: Private Re
spondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a period of 3 year
s. After it expired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the pr emises, and hen
ce, the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The case was termina
ted by a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from 1979 to 1982, then f
rom 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. The t

rial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract ha
s not expir ed; and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res ju
dicata. Petition er appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also
affirmed the decisio n of the trial court. ISSUE: 1. W/N the continuance of leas
e is made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. W/N the action for ejectment
is barred by compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable beca
use the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. On th
e compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpet ual renewals unless the lang
uage employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties. On the second
issue, the compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires
a different set of evidence. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any ca
use of action arising from a violation of the terms the reof, and hence, res jud
icata does not apply. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 11a, 26,

15 Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing; Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115044 (Janua
ry 27, 1995) FACTS: Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authorit
y to regulate JaiAlai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (
GAB). The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to a
llow the Associate d Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then P
resident Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local gover
nments to grant franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gam
bling. Then Pres ident Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No.
810 which revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai
and Amusement Corporati on. In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Ga
mes and Amusement Board intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked
all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by l
ocal governments. ISSUE: 1. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to A
DC is valid in view of E. 0. No. 392 which transferred from local governments to
the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai. 2. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing
that P.D. 771 is violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the
Constitution. HELD: R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the Cit
y of Manila the power to franchise the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 remov
es the power of local governments to issue license and permit. All laws are pres
umed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequ
ent law. It did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution beca
use the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by th e local governments
without exceptions. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 6c, 37, 44, 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Victo
riano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Case No. 169 G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974
) Union

FACTS: Petitioner, an Iglesia ni Cristo , was a member of the Respondent Union w

hich had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a close
d shop provision allowed under R.A. 875: Membership in the Union shall be requir
ed as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by t
his Agreement RA 3350 amended RA 875: but such agreement shall not cover members
of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such l
abor organization. Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union, which wrote a form
al let ter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service. ISSUE:
1. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2. W/N RA 3350 is co
nstitutional? 3. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ru
ling that the Union should pay 500 and attorney s fee. HELD: The right to join a
ssociations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organizatio
n. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution, as well a s Section 7 of A
rt IV of the 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form associations for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Article 2208 of the Civil Co
de provides that attorney s fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded when
the defendant s act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his
interest and in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered . LATIN MAXIM: 9
a, 40b

16 Taada v. Tuvera Case No. 287 G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) Chapter I, Pa
ge 37, Footnote No.159 FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in dema
nding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had
not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publicat
ion was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided as whe
n the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon their approval. ISSUE: W/N the clause otherwise provided in Article 2 of C
ivil Code pertains to the necessity of publication. HELD: No, the clause otherwi
se provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publ
ication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted. Publication in full should
be indispensable. Without such notice or publication, there would be no basis f
or the application of the maxim ignorantia Legis non excusat . The court, theref
ore, declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not
been published shall have no force and effect, and th e court ordered that the u
npublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately. LATIN MAXIM
: 6c, 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gutierrez v. Carpio Case No. 55 G.R. No. 31025 (
August 15, 1929) FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13,
1928, agreeing that if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs faile
d to repurchase a certa in land, the ownership would vest in the Defendants. But
when the Plaintiffs duly tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed that by t
hat time, August 13, 1928, the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipula
ted or fixed period had alr eady elapsed.

ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering. HELD: No. The
repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. The above issue d
epends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties, and on the day from wh
ich it should be counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified by Sec.
13 of the Administrative Code, according to which month now means the civil mont
h and not the regular-30-day month. In computing any fixed period of time, with
reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done wi
thin a certain limit of time, the day from which the time is reckoned is to be e
xcluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwis e provided. There
is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 39a

17 Guzman v. Lichauco Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-17986 (October 21, 1921) FACTS: Pla
intiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certai n
properties in Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. The uns
uccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to the Court
of First Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provisions of
Sec. 88 o f the CCP, as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desire to avoid t
he immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the Plaintiff,
or to deposit in court , on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month , th
e sums of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the
use and occupation of the property held by them. The Defendants made such dilat
ory payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth da
y of the month. As a resul t, the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgm
ents. The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. ISSUE: W/N the
payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month. HELD: The payment m
ade on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The term month must now be understood t
o refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the Administrative Code has mod
ified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latte r fixes the length of a mo
nth at thirty days. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 25c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U.S. v. Paniaga
Case No. 161 G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914) FACTS: This is an appeal by the gove
rnment from an order of the court, setting aside the forfeiture of a bail bond.
Judgment was rendered against the principal on February 7, and the sureties were
notified on the same day to produce the thereo f their principal. On Feb 28, th
e court ordered that the Defendant s bond be forfeit ed

and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount t
hereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. By
various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, and final
ly occurred on July 8, 1912, with government as the purchaser. On July 10, 1912
, th e principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the court, on application of th
e suret ies, set aside the order of forfeiting the bond, and ordered the sheriff
to annul the sal e. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed
by the court. HELD: Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: unless othe
rwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be
done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; if the
last be a Sun day or a legal holiday, it shall be excluded. This section is onl
y applicable if there i s a computation needed to be done. However, in this case
, there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fixed for when the
act be performed. It is also dire cted that the sale should take place on a name
d future date. The sale here of the property must stand. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

18 PNB v. CA Case No. 238 G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993) Chapter I, Page 47, Foot
note No.195 FACTS: To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages
two lots to Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank
extrajudicia lly foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder a
t the auction sale . Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Reg
istry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots t
o a third party. The notices of sale of Appellant s foreclosed properties were p
ublished on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily
Record . The d ate March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 an
d 12 fall on a Frid ay and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 req
uires that the notice of au ction sale shall be published once a week for at lea
st three consecutive weeks . ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the re
quirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortg
ages. HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to
the definition of what is week . In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term week was int
erpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. Th e
Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publicati
on. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 9b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hidalgo v. Hidalgo Case No. 1
24 G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29, 1970) Chapter I
I, Page 52, Footnote No.19 FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entit
led as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are working from the purchase
rs where no notice was previous

ly given to them by the vendor of the latter s intention to sell the property an
d whe re the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the Agr
icultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian
Court dismisse d petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec
. 12 of the same c ode is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants,
claiming that share tenanc y and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction o
f the code that the code expressl y grants said right to leaseholders only and n
obody else. Moreover, the court held that if the intention of Congress was to ex
tend the right of redemption to share tena nts through judicial legislation, the
section would have expressly said so. ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption gr
anted by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not
share tenants. HELD: Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and
premises, reducing agricultural lessee to only leasehold tenants . The purpose
of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tena
ncy. The policy of t he State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to
the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would de
feat the plain and vital pur pose of the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 12a,
36a, 37, 40a Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c, 30b, 43

19 U.S. v. Navarro Case No. 300 G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911) Chapter II, Page
52, Footnote No.20 FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the mu
nicipality of Piddig (in proceedings in connection with the general election hel
d on Nov. 2, 1909) that t hey owned real property with the value of P500. Eviden
ce showed that the Appellants, except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, di
d not own property of the asses sed value of P500. ISSUE: W/N the said statute s
true test of property qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the p
roperty owned or the assessed value thereof. HELD: It was the intention of the l
egislator as proved from an examination of the immediate context of provisions o
f the statute defining property qualifications of a voter, and of the statute as
a whole. In the statute, property qualification is an alternative to qualificat
ion based upon an annual payment. Both qualifications a re under a single head,
suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of the legislator. A
nother section of the statute disqualifies people who are delin quent in the pay
ment of public taxes assessed since Aug. 13, 1898, from voting. This prov ision
was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as
all other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to secu
re p urity of the ballot box. If the property qualification is actual/market val
ue, it would b e highly improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable ti
me because it will be di fficult to determine. LATIN MAXIM: 10, 11a, 12a, 28, 36
a, 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala Case No. 149

G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977) Chapter II, Page 53, Footnote No.22 FACTS:
Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required referendum
election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affi liation w
ith Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended that there was no statuto
ry authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that Resp
ondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N there is a statute au
thorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. HELD: Article 226 of the Lab
or Code addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction. Peti
tion denied. Article 226 of Labor Code is very cle ar concerning executive depar
tment s original and exclusive authority to act . LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 20a, 24a

20 Regalado v. Yulo Case No. 255 G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935) Chapter II
, Page 55, Footnote No.25 FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Alb
ay. On November 16, 1931, Act No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement amo
ng justices was approved. A few years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (
age retirement as provided b y Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code, amended furt
her by Act. No. 3899). Shortly thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Ju
stice of Peace to take the plac e of Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar as
sumed office. ISSUE: W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrati
ve Code, as further amended by Act No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary
justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office
upon reaching the ag e of 65. HELD: Justices appointed prior to the approval of
the Act will not be affected by said amendment (Act No. 3899). LATIN MAXIM: 1, 4
6a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA Case No. 26 G.R. No. 80223 (
February 5, 1993) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 27 FACTS: On March 3, 1986,
Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela against Private Respond
ent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of la nd in said area. In he
r defense, De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered by PD 2016 (a c
omplementary provision of PD 1517, which aims to protect tenants fro m unjust ev
iction.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in upholding her righ
ts as a lessee.

HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant.
While it may depart from its source, PD 1517, said provision still aims to prot
ect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for th
e land, as well as unjust eviction. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 25a

21 Araneta v. Dinglasan Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949) Chapter II
, Page 56, Footnote No. 29 FACTS: Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth
Act No. 671 (Emergency Powers Act), were questioned for its validity until the
National Assembly Conven tion of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. HE
LD: These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during the t
ime of the inability of the Congress to function. That when Congress conven ed a
gain on Jan. 1, 1942, said proclamations were also terminated. LATIN MAXIM: 2a,
9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Endencia and Jugo v. David Case No. 98 G.R. No. L-6355
-56 (August 31, 1953) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.33 FACTS: RA 590 declares
that no salary received by a public officer shall be considered exempt from inc
ome tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compe
nsation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Const itution states that judg
es shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall not b e diminished du
ring their continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590. I
SSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. HELD: No. Saying that the taxing of the salar
y of a judicial officer is not a decrease

in compensation is a clear interpretation of Which shall not be diminished durin

g th eir continuance in office , by the Legislature. Through the separation of p
owers, such a task must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt f
rom taxes on h is salary not for his own benefit but for the public, to secure a
nd preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c,
7a, 24a

22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte Case No. 84 G.R. No. L
-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50 FACTS: Prior to this
case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos b
y, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335 of the Civil Cod
e, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, o
r children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the Agonoys a
lready had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased mother of the
Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as grandchildren. Fu
rthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would introduce a foreign el
ement into the family unit, and would result in the reduct ion of their legitime
s in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for Agonoy. ISSUE
: W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. HELD: No, the court was corr
ect. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. 335, the children menti
oned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law a nd, do not include grandchi
ldren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included woul
d violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly inc luded would naturally excl
ude what is not included. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CIR v.
Limpan Investment Corporation Case No. 77 G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31
, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.55 FACTS: In 1959 and 1960, Respondent
Corporation filed income tax returns which later were bases for deficiency due t
o disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the C ourt of Tax Appeals, the deficiencie
s on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and P7,240.48, resolved at Septembe
r 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L-286 44)

respectively. ISSUE: W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the pay
ment of surcharges and interests. HELD: The CTA s decision on the date of paymen
t of surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the
following-On Tax shown on the return, in failure to pay the required amount on o
r before the date prescribed, interest up on such unpaid amount shall be collect
ed as part of the tax, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the date pres
cribed for the payment until paid, provided th at the maximum amount for the int
erest doesn t exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. The same g
oes with deficiencies, except that the additional tax must be paid within 30 day
s of the notice, else the same interests apply. With r egard to surcharge, if th
e amount in the notice isn t paid within 30 days, a surcharge o f 5 per centum o
f the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be comput ed from Sep
tember 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surchar ge of 5
% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April
3, 1966, the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26

23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu Case No. 53 G.R. Nos. 2411
6-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56 FACTS: Efforts of def
endant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax from 1960, 1961
, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, hav e all been met
with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally on June
26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as prov ided f
or under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a per
iod of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On
July 6 , 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff
that he was dist raining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff
s delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in
-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the c
ement bags) will be sold by publ ic auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 19
61, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account. Despite not
ice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962 ISSU
E: W/N the distraint and public auction were valid. HELD: Both actions are valid
. According to the Revised Administrative Code: The remedy by distraint shall pr
oceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing a ny municipal tax or revenue
to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and di
straint any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject t
o the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question,
together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the expenses of
the distraint. The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no r oom for d
oubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be d
eemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which uphel
d the validity of the auction. LATIN MAXIM:

6c, 7a, 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General Case No. 260 G
.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.57 FACTS: Pe
titioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was ex
empt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of UREA AND FORMALDEH
YDE , as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The specific
language of the Act speaks of UREA FORMALDEHYDE , a finished product which is di
stinct and different from UREA and FORMALDEHYDE . Petitioner argues his view, ci
ting the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consider ation of th
e bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Pe titi
oner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent
Audi tor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its p
revious resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that
the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within
the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption. ISSUE: W/N P
etitioner s allegations are valid. HELD: The Act clearly states UREA FORMALDEHYD
E as a finished product and not UREA and FORMALDEHYDE as separate units. Individ
ual statements made by Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senat
e. Much less do they in dicate the view of the House of Representatives. If ther
e was any mistake in the printi ng of the bill, it should be corrected by legisl
ation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor General was just doing his duty, f
ollowing what was written in the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines Case No. 248 G.R. No. L-26419
(October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.58 FACTS: Petitioners filed
an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitatio n Finance Corpora
tion (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged real estate prop
erties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Mortgage contrac
t was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. As of July 31,
1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13, 983.59. Petiti
oner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligat ion o
ut of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised Petitio
ners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not inc
urred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was approved. Responden
t filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real estate mo
rtgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the public auct
ion after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure file d by DBP.
ISSUE: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the a
pproval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original
Back Pay Law. W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petiti
oners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953. HELD: RA 897
has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for whic h back
pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA
897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner s loan was approved on April
30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 1954. The obligation t
herefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an ob
ligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a,
43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company

Case No. 66 G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979) FACTS: The Petitioner filed a c
ase for mandamus which the lower court has denied. Petitioner seeks to overturn
the ruling relying on a right that, according to th e Petitioner, RA 2023 grants
to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 co mpels employers to deduct
from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the debts of the employe
es and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has alre ady granted there i
s no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit uni ons in the pay
roll collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union s credit into a
first priority credit. HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall
be granted first pri ority in the salary collections. According to Justice Recto
in a subsequent opinion, it is wel l established that only specific legal right
s are enforceable by mandamus, that th e right sought to be enforced must be cer
tain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful . Ju
stice Barrera adds: the writ never issues in doubtf ul cases. It neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already p
ossessed and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

25 Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-287
39 (March 29, 1972) FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise
to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the
municipality of Davao. O n two different occasions it imported materials and equ
ipment for installation in its facilities. Petitioner is arguing that the taxes
levied against its imports should be waived by the collector of customs in Cebu
(the materials were delivered at the port of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pr
e-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric Power and Light Franchise Law) which
states that if any competing company should be granted franchise more favorable
than the one previously granted to another company, the latter shall enjoy the
same advantages given in the other franchise . ISSUE: W/N section 17 of act 3636
applies to the case of Petitioner. HELD: No. Firstly, the provision cited by Pe
titioner states that the franchise must be granted to a competing party . NPC, t
o which the contract with tax exemptions was given, is not a competing party to
Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely on RA 358 as amended by RA 987 to s
upport its tax exemption. Exemption from taxation i s never presumed, it is alwa
ys explicitly stated. LATIN MAXIM: 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alfredo Ramos v. Co
urt of Appeals Case No. 252 G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989) Chapter II, Page
62, Footnote No.60 FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al
for the recovery of its 74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer
and head of the Cruz, Du rian and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and hi
s firm to serve as counsel for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint
that the municipality is obliged to

pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to di
squa lify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for
the munici pality to hire a private counsel. ISSUE: W/N it is legal for the muni
cipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case. HELD: No. Under section 168
3 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal shall represent the
province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court. Furthermore, un
der section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney shall act as leg
al counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers
as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipality s interest would be
best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigatio n. These laws ar
e implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expen se of
hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

26 Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation Case No. 47 G.R. No. L-30642 (April 30,
1985) FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Resp
ondent Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in undergroun
d minin g operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca, recovered dam
ages under the Workmen s Compensation Act. However, a later report on the accide
nt showed there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter
, Petition ers filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation
s reckless and wanton negligence. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choos
e between availing of the worker s right under the Workmen s Compensation Act or
suing in the regular courts under th e Civil Code for higher damages. HELD: Pet
itioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages.
However, in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the
Workmen s Compensation Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular
courts, the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent t he inst
ance of double recovery. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of acti on
simultaneously. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court stat
ed that it did not legislate in this case but rather, applied and gave effect t
o the consti tutional guarantees of social justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 40a STAT
UTORY CONSTRUCTION Enrile v. Salazar Case No. 40 G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990) F
ACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murde
r and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attem
pt

from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Petitioners contend that they are being c
harged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books because t
echnically, the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses commi
tted on the occasion thereof. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Her
nandez doctrine. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains as t
he binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any o
ther offense committ ed on the occasion thereof. The charges of murder and multi
ple frustrated murders a re absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Therefore
, charges against Petitioner s in the information should be understood as that o
f simple rebellion under the RPC. Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice
Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be pro
secuted separately from rebellion, then t he principle of non-retroactivity woul
d be violated. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a, 48

Manikad v. Tanodbayan Case No. 162 G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984) Chapter II
, Page 63, Footnote No.65 FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processi
ng Zone Authority (EPZA) Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling,
theft and violations of AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Responden
t. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints of this nature are
lodged exclusively upon the E PZA and is not in the Respondent s jurisdiction.
Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states: The E PZA in the exercise of its sole police au
thority over the export processing zones shall have the power to receive and inv
estigate complaints relative to violation of penal l aws committed inside the zo
nes owned and administered by the Authority ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A
precludes the Respondent from investigating complaints within the Export Process
ing Zone. HELD: No, the use of sole in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. A
lthough the EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone, it i
s not the on ly authority that may investigate complaints, especially those whic
h fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 35 STAT
UTORY CONSTRUCTION Senarillos v. Hermosisimo Case No. 278 G.R. No. L-10662 (Dece
mber 14, 1956) Chapter II, Page 67, Footnote No.74 FACTS: Petitioner was appoint
ed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the charges filed by Petitioner, Se
narillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibo nga and investigated by a poli
ce committee composed of 3 councilors created by Resolution No.2 Series 1952 of
the municipal council. The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequent
ly signed by the members of the council. This was appealed to and affirmed by th
e Commissione

r of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga
had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. HELD: No. Under
RA No.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted by council its
elf and not by a mere committee thereof. Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction t
o investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. RA No.557 has elimin ated the prov
ision authorizing investigation by a committee council. Hence, the decision agai
nst him was invalid, even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors. The fac
t that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the decision of t
he Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee . The initia
l proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the decis
ion of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not val idat
e the proceeding. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 6b, 7a

28 People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang Case No. 211 G.R. No. L-12088 (
December 23, 1959) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.87 FACTS: Defendant was accu
sed and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Lanao. Defendant, admitti
ng the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions, invokes as his l
egal excuse the appointment issued to him by Govern or Dimakuta as secret agent
shown in the Governor s letter which he presented as and evidence. He was grante
d this appointment for having shown good faith by previously surrendering to the
office of the Governor a firearm. He has then bee n appointed as SECRET AGENT t
o assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authorized to ho
ld and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked
to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those authorized to
possess firearms. HELD: Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority t
o issue any firearm license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrat
ive Code provides th e peace officers are exempted from the requirements relatin
g to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently p
ut him in the categor y of peace officer equivalent even to a Municipal Police e
xpressly covered by section 879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reverse
d and the Defendant acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Peopl
e of the Philippines v. Mapa Case No. 213 G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967) Cha
pter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89 FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possess
ion of firearms. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent
of the provincial Governor of Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case o
f People v. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appoint
ment. ISSUE:

W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: No. T
he court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any e
xception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a
sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possessi on of firea
rm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The Cour
t s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 30a
, 35, 46c

29 Co v. CA Case No. 65 G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) Chapter II, Page 69,
Footnote No.91 FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1,
1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens Bank, postdated November 30,
1983. The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days la
ter, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: CLOSED ACCOUNT. A crimin
al complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delive
ry of a rubber or bouncing check as a guarantee for an obligation was not consi
dered a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the M
inistry of Justice. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. HELD: No. Accord
ing to them, Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance wit
h the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operativ e fact doctri
ne. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prej udice
of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary
o f Justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 46a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sy Kiong v. Sarmient
o Case No. 150 G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951) FACTS: Petitioner is the owne
r of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of Manila and an importer
of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealer s for purposes of ret
ail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of the City of Man ila assessed a
gainst him the sum of 566.50php which represents the alleged deficienc y municip
al license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries after

deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale. ISSUE: W/N th
e sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured into brea
d are retail or wholesale. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufacture
d into bread and to be resold to the public, in the absence of any express provi
sion of law on the matter, sho uld be treated as a sale at retail and should sub
ject the vendor to the retail tax law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 43

30 Sumulong v. Commission on Elections Case No. 149 G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1
941) FACTS: On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of
Abad Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in t
he fir st congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of
Petitioner , the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the
said province. El even days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded th
e minority inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. ISSUE: W/N Respo
ndent committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Where the minimum number of vot
es required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority partie
s, the right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to w
hich such coalition is entitled, cannot be clai med by any of the component part
ies which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the discretion to cho
ose the minority inspector. LATIN MAXIM: 36a, 37, d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Centr
al Capiz v. Ramirez Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920) Chapter III, P
age 79, Footnote No.8 FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corpo
ration for a term of 30 years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her planta
tion, which was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Re
gistry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future ow
ners of the same. The Respondent refuses to push through with the contract think
ing it might violate A ct No. 2874, An Act to amend and compile the laws relatin
g to lands of public domain, and for other purposes, since more than 61 percent
of the capital stock of the corporation is held and owned by persons who are not
citizens of the Philippine

Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural lan
d. ISSUE: W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Phi
lippine Islands which are privately owned. HELD: The limit and purpose of the Le
gislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands
of public domain and that lands held in private o wnership are not included ther
ein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Jones Law of 1916: Th
at no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. LATIN MAXIM: d

31 Eugenio v. Drilon Case No. 104 G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) Chapter III
, Page 81, Footnote No.20 FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment bas
is from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amorti
zations because of nondevelopm ent on the property. Petitioner then sold one of
the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Re
spondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applyi
ng P.D. 957 The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree , the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the developmen
t, reinstate Private Respondent s purchase contract over one lot and immediately
refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the
spouses. Petiti oner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 sayin
g it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does
not justify the non-payme nt of the amortizations. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Sec
retary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be giv
en retroactive effect. HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with
grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to
cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did
not expressly pr ovide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plain
ly inferred from the unm istakable intent of the law. The intent of the statute
is the law. LATIN MAXIM: 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v.
Purisima Case No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) Chapter III, Page
76, Footnote No.16 FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging t
he respective Defendant with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9

. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constit
ut e the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential eleme
nt of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused
of a blad ed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of,
connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or publ ic disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9
shows that the prohibi ted acts need not be related to subversive activities an
d that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public pol
icy. ISSUE: W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpret
ation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spi
rit of the law. Legislative int ent is the controlling factor. Because of the pr
oblem of determining what acts fall under P .D. 9, it becomes necessary to inqui
re into the intent and spirit of the decree and thi s can be found among others
in the preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events which jus
tify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanct ions stated therein. LAT
IN MAXIM: 9a, b2

32 People of the Philippines v. Echaves Case No. 207 G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (Janua
ry 28, 1980) Chapter III, Page 77, Footnote No.22 FACTS: The issue is whether or
not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts applies to agricultura
l lands. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is n
ot part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of th e same kind or specie
s) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agricultur e. The order
of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court, thus bring ing t
he case at hand. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to agricultural lands HE
LD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did, declaring t
hat P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it
was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. But the
Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis
because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It stated that the rule of Eju
s dem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to w
hen th e legislative is uncertain. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION A
boitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu Case No. 4 G.R. No. L-14526 (March 3
1, 1965) Chapter III, Page 82, Footnote No.23 FACTS: The Petitioner contends tha
t the ordinance implemented by Respondent should be declared null and void becau
se the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by collecting wharfage from vessels w
hich dock at the public wharves of piers located in the said City but owned by t
he National Government. According to Respondent, the legislature made no distinc
tion between those owned by the City

of Cebu and the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the
scope of the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in th
e light of the meaning of public wharf as it may have bearing on the right to c
harge wharfage. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the righ
t to charge wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government. HEL
D: The term public refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence, th
e power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. T h
e Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of th
e ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those dock
s that are owned by the City and those of the National Government. The Court sta
tes that on ly those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as it
s property. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 36b

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc. Case No. 80 G.R. No. 83736 (
January 15, 1992) Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.25 FACTS: Respondent Company
wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as provided in Sec. 292 of the N
ational Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a two-year prescription. The
Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provid ed in the law for refund
of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two years from the
date the quarterly income tax was paid. The Respondent contends, on the other ha
nd, that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustmen t Return) is t
he one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive pe riod and no
t the quarterly payment made. ISSUE: W/N the two-year prescriptive period provid
ed in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the da
te the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adj
ustment Return (final paymen t). HELD: The date of filing of the final payment s
hould be considered. The Supreme Court said that, Sec. 292 of the NIRC should be
interpreted in relation to the ot her provisions of the Tax Code in order to gi
ve effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which ma
y lead to inconvenience and absurdity. The intention of the legislator must be a
scertained from the whole text of the law a nd every part of the act is to be ta
ken into view. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 36b, 36d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Feliciano v. Aq
uino Case No. 105 G.R. No. 10201 (September 23, 1957) Chapter III, Page 83, Foot
note No.28 FACTS: Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion, Tarl
ac. Four days after the proclamation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted q
uo warran to proceedings, challenging Petitioner s eligibility on the ground tha
t Respondent wa

s not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Aquino claimed that age requ
ir ement refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the ex
istence o f a semi-colon, converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrat
ive Code, does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the ti
me of the elect ion but rather at the time of the assumption of office, provided
that he had fulfilled t he first two requirements. ISSUE: W/N the election of A
quino is unlawful and illegal. HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction
is that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to do con
trary. Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against th
e intelligible meaning of written words. No reason is shown why, after plainly a
nd unequivocally requiring that the candidat es of other elective offices should
possess the age qualification at the time of the election , the law should sudd
enly change the requirement for the case of municipa l officers. No argument is
needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible i
n the said section, taking part in the election is meant , not capacity to assum
e office. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the elect ion of Responden
t is declared unlawful and illegal. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9d, 11a, 11e, 36b

34 US. v. Hart Case No. 159 G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913) FACTS: Respondent w
as caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No. 519 which punishes
every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops o r gambling houses, o
r tramping or straying through the country without visible mea ns of support . T
he said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by t he comma, s
eparating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country
without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendan
ts had visible means of support , it was under the first part of the portio n of
law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase
without visible means of support was in connection to the second part of the sa
id portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense. ISSUE: How should
the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be bas
ed upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation giv
es it a meaning which i s reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative
will, it may be as an addi tional argument for adopting the literal meaning of t
he words in the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuations al
one is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation
when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature, disregard
ing superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others when necess
ary. Inasmuch as defendant had , visible means of support and that the absence o
f such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons an
d gambling houses, defendants are acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 11e, 33 STATUTORY CONS
TRUCTION In re: Estate of Johnson Case No. 131

G.R. No. 12767 (November 16, 1918) Chapter III, Page 86, Footnote No.38 FACTS: P
etitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States
but died and left a will in Manila. Sec. 636 of the Code of the Civil Pro cedure
states Will made here by an alien will made within the Philippine Islands by a
citi zen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance
with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and w
hich might be proved, allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be pro
ved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effe
ct as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. The will of Johnson wa
s probated and allowed in the lower court, but Petitioner contends that Sec. 636
is applicable only to wills of aliens; and in this connection, attention is dir
ected to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made
here by an alien and to fu rther fact that the word state in the body of the se
ction is not capitalized. ISSUE: W/N the will of Petitioner, a citizen of the U.
S and therefore an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. HELD: The fact that the words
state and country are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is ex
cluded from the phrase another state or country . It is a rule of hermeneutics t
hat punctuation and capitalization are aids of low de gree in interpreting the l
anguage of a statute and can never control against the inte lligible meaning of
the written words. The epigraph, or heading, of a section being nothi ng more th
an a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect o
f limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. Petiti oner, b
eing a US citizen, thus an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. The will duly probate
d. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 25a, 26, 37, 42a, 48

35 People of the Philippines v. Yabut Case No. 231 G.R. No. 85472 (September 27,
1993) Chapter III, Page 87, Footnote No.43 FACTS: Defendant was convicted for h
omicide. While serving sentence, he killed another prisoner. He was consequently
charged for murder. After conviction, he w as punished with the maximum period
for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N th
e lower court erred in applying Art. 160. HELD: No. Respondent relied on the wor
d another appearing in the English translation of the head note of Art. 160, and
suggests that the law is applicabl e only when the new crime committed by a per
son serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentenc
e. According to him, his conviction for mur der is not different because it invo
lved homicide. No such deduction is warranted from the text itself, or from the
Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no
need to resort to the preamble, heading, epigram or hea d note of a section for
interpretation of the text, which are mere catchwords or reference aids, consult
ed to remove, not create doubts. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Peop
le of the Philippines v. Mendoza Case No.112 G.R. No. L-38076 (November 4, 1933)
FACTS: Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administra
tive Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballot
s whi ch they prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. They wer
e tried and convicted. ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict. HELD:

No. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case whi
ch has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in th e crimi
nal case. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note cl earl
y shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit
s a ballot in the ballot box. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict
tha t defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. Judgment was r
eversed . LATIN MAXIM: 50, d

36 People of the Philippines v. Manaba Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-39037 (October 30
, 1933) FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the C
hief of Police. After trial, Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set as
ide and the case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over
his person or the subject matter, because the complaint was not signed by the o
ffended party. Subsequently, the offended party signed a complaint charging Defe
ndant of rape. Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy, b
ut it was denie d and he was convicted. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in d
ouble jeopardy. HELD: No. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy
depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case.
Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the compl
aint. As the fir st complaint was not signed by the offended party, it was not a
valid complaint in accordance with law, and the judgment of the court was void
for lack of jurisdic tion over subject matter, and defendant was never in jeopar
dy. The Spanish equivalent of the word filed is not bound in the Spanish text wh
ich is controlling, because it w as the Spanish text approved by the legislature
. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 36a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U.S. v. Quintanar Case No. 162 G.R
. No. 5654 (August 27, 1910) FACTS: Defendants, on the night of March 1, 1908 we
re caught in the act of smoking opium, in violation of Sec. 32 of Act No. 1761,
the Opium Law . On appeal, Defendants contend that they could not be legally con
victed for they rely on the Spanish translation of the Act which provides that i
t will take effect l primero de Marzo. (after the first of March) despues de

ISSUE: W/N the Defendant should be punished under Act No 1761 which takes effect
despues del primero de Marzo. HELD: The translation of the Defendant is not acc
urate. The English and original text says: on and after March 1, 1908 . Where th
e Act was originally promulgated in English, it shall prevail over its translati
on. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

Employees
Club, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation
Case No. 39 G.R. No. 40188 (July 27, 1934) FACTS: Respondent Corporation contend
s that the order requires it to surrender the register of deeds of the City of M
anila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 21192 so that the contract lease might b
e noted and entered in the corresponding records. They argue that the contract l
ease cannot be registered in the register of deeds beca use it is not a real rig
ht; and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law, only real rights can be regis
tered. The only exceptions, which it does not harbor, are a term exceeding three
years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an expres s covenant req
uiring the lease to be registered. ISSUE: W/N contract lease under the Mortgage
law is not a real right and not be registered. HELD: The property in question is
NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. 496, or the Torrens system, Sec. 5
1 and 52. This act expressly provides that all interests must be registered in o
rder to affect third persons, which includes the interest arising from the contr
act of lease in favor of the Respondent. The Spanish text of the l aw was relied
upon by the Petitioner the Mortgage Law. But the English enacted by the Legisla
ture, Act No. 496, should prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mc
Micking v. Lichauco Case No. 175 G.R. No. 7896 (March 30, 1914) Chapter III, Pag
e 88, Footnote No.49 FACTS: This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current
Respondent against Defendant Chu Chan Chac. However, there was another case pend
ing in its duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata whe
re judgment execution is. And likewise, in the duration of Mata s judgment, ther
e was yet anot her pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara L
ichauco

P17,666.60. ISSUE: With these two cases, who has preference over the funds owed
by Lichauco. HELD: Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appe
al. The preference on Mata was based on Art. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Proce
dure, which secures preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are fi
nal in the sense that no appeal lies therefrom). Mata must have immediate recour
se to the property of Lichauco based on the first judgment. However, until the a
llotment o f time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was no
t taken, the judgment, strictly, is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal
terminology where it would be explained that the right to share in the distribu
tion of the debtor (Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) unti
l he has the right to. One must take into account that classification and the in
cidents of judgments, o rders and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminolo
gy have been modified under the new Code of Civil Procedure, drawn in part from
American and English precedents. One should look rather to the spirit than the l
etter of the law. The lien of a judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the per
fecting of an appeal but simply suspended. Even if there was a new judgment, it
is simply reversed, not destroye d. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 49

Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 11 G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 198
7) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.54 FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal
pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased pa
rents. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. By virtue of such agree
ments, the Petitioners occupied after the said sa les, 2/5 of the lot, represent
ing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed the ir portion with a fence
and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking t
he right to redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed this complaint becau
se the time had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of
the sales. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was a valid notice. 2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil
Code was interpreted correctly. HELD: Although there was no written notice, the
re was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It i
s unbelievable that the co-heir s were unaware of the sale, with the erection of
a permanent semi-concrete structure. W hile Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresse
s the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners claimed that because th
ere was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledg e of it, the 30-day pe
riod for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure
that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the dat
e of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. The co
-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales alth ough no notice in
writing was given to them. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 8, 9a, 10, 11d, 11e, 12a, 17 STATUTO
RY CONSTRUCTION Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company Case No. 1
56 G.R. No. L-27489 (April 30, 1970) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.57 FACTS:

At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12, 1961, which
led to his death 16 days later, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the d
ecedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for t
he past 3 months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfull
y wedded. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962, to the posthumous daug
hter of the deceased, Racquel. ISSUE: W/N the widow and posthumous child are con
sidered dependents under the Workmen s Compensation Act. HELD: Yes. According to
the Workmen s Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually de
pendent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughte r, if under 18 years o
f age or incapable of supporting herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually
dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. Although not his wife at t
he time of the accident but at the time of his death, are still con sidered depe
ndents under the Act. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9c, 12a, 37

Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al. Case No. 290 G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955
) Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote No.61 FACTS: Sergio Nicolas applied for a parce
l of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was
approved by the Director of Lands who issu ed a patent in his favor, but because
Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his heirs, represented by his widow.
In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the hom estead to the Defendants
, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and secured the is
suance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs of the deceased Serg
io Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover the land, toge
ther with the fruits of the land as damages. ISSUE: W/N the sale or transfer of
right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land was valid. HELD: No
. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not comp
ly with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Direct
or of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could
not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the convey
ance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agricu
lture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was null an
d void. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 37, 38b, 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Home Insurance C
ompany v. Eastern Shipping Lines Case No. 125 G.R. No. 34382 (July 20, 1983) Cha
pter III, Page 91, Footnote No.64 FACTS: Plaintiff Company instituted two cases
of recovery of damages against Defendant Company. The Petitioner Company claimed
for reimbursement with regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignee
s due to losses suffered by the cargoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the l
ower court dismissed the two

cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to s
ue. ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks l
egal capacit y to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases. HELD: Ye
s. The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff Comp
any, must, in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction, pro
ve legal capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the com
pla int was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized
by law to transact in the Philippines. Otherwise, no cause of action accrues in
favor of t he Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court.
In the case at bar, the insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defen
dant were executed long before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact bus
iness in the Philippines . Therefore, said insurance contracts were void from th
e beginning as the purpose was contrar y to public policy. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 8, 9c
, 11a, 36a, 37

40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Trinidad Case No. 154 G.R. No. 18316 (September
23, 1922) Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.71 FACTS: Plaintiff is a corporation
duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, doing business in the
City of Manila. Engaging in a stevedoring busines s, consisting of loading and u
nloading of cargo from vessels in ports, at certain r ates of charge per unit of
cargo, Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from Defendant, the Internal Revenue
Collector, the sum of P2,422.81, which had been paid under protest. Defendant al
leged that during the first quarter of 1921, the Plaintiff was engaged in busine
ss as a contractor, with its gross receipts from the said busin ess amounting to
P242, 281.33. Under the provisions of Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711, th e percentag
e tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business. ISSUE: W/N
the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. 1462 of Act No. 271
1. HELD: A contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an
independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the res
ult of his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. Plaintiff
is not a "contractor" based on Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711. Therefore, the tax pa
id by the Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid. LATIN MAXIM: 2
a, 4, 5b, 9c, 11a, 28 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Go Chioco v. Martinez Case No. 113
G.R. No. 19864 and 19685 (October 17, 1923) Chapter III, Page 93, Footnote No.93
FACTS: Petitioner made a loan of P40,000 to Respondent. They executed a promiss
ory note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within thre
e months. On the same day, Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note

and sent a check of P1,800 to Petitioner, which was cashed. After three months,
Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. He now executed a new promi
ssory note, again due within the next three months, and with this note, Responde
nt Hermanos sent a check for P1,800. Again, he could not pay so they executed an
other promissory note and sent another check worth P1,800. This cycle was repeat
ed a total of 7 times, with the third cycle's promissory note bring du e only a
month later and with a check for only P600. Then Respondent Hermanos paid P25,00
0 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15,000. Therefor e, Pe
titioner filed a complaint. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18 %
was in violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. 2992). Thus,
he must give back P11,850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15,000.
ISSUE: W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loa
ned together with the interest. HELD: No, since only the interest is forfeited.
Taking into consideration the history of the Usury Law, the intent of the framer
s is clear. In a previous law RA 2073, th e principal loan was forfeited togethe
r with the interest. However, unlike the pre vious law, the current law RA 2655
provides for stricter rules and alternative punishm ents for violations. The cur
rent law also does not expressly mention that the principal i s also forfeited.
As a rule of construction, when the intent of a law is ambiguous, one may consul
t the history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 36a, 37

41 US v. De Guzman Case No. 297 G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915) Chapter III, Pa
ge 94, Footnote No.95 FACTS: Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling,
was convicted of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendan
t was discharged before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear a
nd testify as a witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching
the witness stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever
saying anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made b
y him were made in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for t
he dis charge of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage o
f justice, nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a
future pro secution. ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. HELD: Sec. 19 a
nd 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant
fail to comply with the agreement with the State. However, looking at the legis
lative history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is ne
cessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in
the case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear
as wi tness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of
the right t o plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally,
discharge cannot be a n acquittal since it was made prior to his trial. LATIN MA
XIM: 9a, 22a, b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basiana v. Luna Case no. 31 G.R. Nos. L34135-36 (February 24, 1981) Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote No.102 FACTS: Petiti
oner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect

with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected 1
83 claims, 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna, a clear disreg
ard of their agreement. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declar
ation of location records, Luna amended the declarations with the intention of c
learing c laim names and tie points; Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent
. Consequently, Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of
claims overlappi ng Petitioner s claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were
valid, and were merel y abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees. ISSUE: W/
N Petitioner s mining claims are valid. HELD: Sec. 47 par. 2 of the Mining Law (
C.A. No. 137) provides: For the purpose of this section, a permanent and promine
nt object used as a tie point MAY be an intersection of known roads; a junction
of known rivers or creeks, a known publi c or private structure; a corner of app
roved public, private or mineral land survey; a kilometer post of public road; o
r location monument or triangulation station established by the Bureau of Lands,
Bureau of Mines, Army Corps of engineers, Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey, o
r other government agencies. An initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie po
int. Petitioner s contention that the word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is unten
able since it goes against the legislator s inten t to eliminate claim jumping a
nd overlapping claims. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 30a, 33, 36b

Baga v. PNB Case No. 27 G.R. No. L-9695 (September 10, 1956) Chapter III, Page 9
5, Footnote No.103 FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Responde
nt as the guardian under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which w
as passed with the intention of being modeled after the US version. RA 390 provi
des that a guardian ship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majorit
y. Petitioner alleges tha t she has married and has become emancipated under Art
. 399 of the New Civil Code thus terminating the guardianship. ISSUE: W/N Art. 3
99 of the Civil Code shall prevail over RA 390. HELD: No. The Civil Code does no
t prevail. It was the clear intent of the legislator t o create a uniform law fo
r material aid. Inserting provisions of the Civil Code wo uld result in discorda
nce with intent. RA 390 is a special law and thus must be take n to constitute a
n exception to the general law which is the Civil Code. RA 390 Sec. 23 applies n
otwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to judicial restora tion and
discharge of guardians. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 50, b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Villa
v. CA Case No. 88 G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote
No.110 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks
Law) for issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was dra
wn against a dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered b
y the said la w. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction ove
r the case in question.

HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor
(in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense w
as committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to
ves t jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisd
iction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a com
plaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to
Petitione r s allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be not
ed that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, th
e Court revealed that the records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that th
e intention of the lawmake rs is to apply the law to whatever currency may be th
e subject thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 17, 24b, 26, 43, b2

43 National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr. Case No. 185 G.R. No. 106724 (Fe
bruary 9, 1994) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110 FACTS: RA 6975, otherwise
known as An Act Establishing the PNP Under a Reorganized Dept. of the Interior a
nd Local Government, laid down the compulsory retirement age of PNP officers. Re
spondents argue that the age of retirement (56 ) of said law cannot be applied t
o them since they are covered by Sec. 89 of the same law (which temporarily exte
nded the age of retirement). In other words, Responde nts wanted to be extended
the same privileges as the local police. Hence, they contend that the term INP i
ncludes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the loca
l police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (I
NP). ISSUE: W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as applicable onl
y to the local police force. HELD: The intent was to classify the INP in such ma
nner that Sec. 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police force. The u
se of the term INP is not synony mous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the st
atute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole PNP f
or retirement purposes and not just t he INP. Indeed, the law distinguishes INP
from the PC and it cannot be construed th at INP as used in Sec. 89 includes the
members of the PC. The legislature did intend to exclude the members of the PC
from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned. LATIN M
AXIM: 9c, 11a, 12a, 27, b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION China Banking Corporation v. O
rtega Case No. 21 G.R. No. L-34964 (January 31, 1973) FACTS: A complaint was fil
ed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the

collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the said corporation in d
efault. The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest
with curr ent Petitioner Bank. Thus, a notice of garnishment was issued by the D
eputy Sheriff and served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong.
He refused to disc lose the sought information, citing the provisions of RA 1405
which prohibits the dis closure of any information relative to bank deposits to
any person except upon written permission of the depositor. Furthermore, RA 140
5 also imposes criminal liabilit y on any official or employee of a banking inst
itution who breaks the confidential nature of this law. ISSUE: W/N a banking ins
titution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank d
eposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking RA 1405. HELD: No. It was not the inten
tion of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to sa
tisfy a final judgment. The discussion of the confer ence committee report of th
e two houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition against examination of o
r inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnishe
d to insure satisfaction of a judgment. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11e, 12b, 30b, 35, 38b,
43, b2

44 Mayon Motors v. Acting CIR Case No. 173 G.R. No. 15000 (March 29, 1961) Chapt
er III, Page 96, Footnote No.111 FACTS: Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac a
utomobiles in three different shipments. Respondent assessed against Petitioner
deficiency advance sales tax o n the automobiles. Petitioner requested for recon
sideration and, this request havi ng been denied, it recurred to the Court of Ta
x Appeals. After the hearing, said co urt modified Respondent s decision by requ
iring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what the acting Commissioner on Internal
Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a refund. Hence this appeal. Petitio
ner assails the procedure adopted by the tax c ourt and insists the court s inte
rpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a statem ent made by then Congress
man Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the amendments for the Tax Code
. ISSUE: W/N the opinion of a legislator in the deliberations of a law, controll
ing in th e interpretation of the law. HELD: No. Courts are not bound by a legis
lator s opinion expressed in congressional debates regarding the interpretation
of a particular legislation. It is deemed t o be a mere personal opinion of the
legislator. LATIN MAXIM: b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato Ca
se No. 67 G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995) FACTS: Petitioners seek for recons
ideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona. The Court has determined that Petit
ioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the case. Petitioners insist th
at the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstak

es, lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture wit
h an y other party because of the clause except for the activities mentioned in
the preceding paragraph (A) in paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by
BP 42. ISSUE: W/N under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with a
n y party in operating an on-line lottery. HELD: No. Petitioner s interpretation
fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B)
, when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmakin
g authority, but also the phrase by itself. What the PCSO is prohibited from doi
ng is from investing in a business engaged in sweepst akes, races, lotteries and
other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so whe ther in collaborat
ion, association or joint venture with others or by itself. LATIN MAXIM: 34, 36b

Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union Case No. 77 G.R. No
. 9265 (April 29, 1957) FACTS: Petitioner files a case to review a resolution is
sued by the Court of Industrial Relations ruling that the 20 minutes rest given
to employees after mealtime shoul d not be deducted from the four hours of overt
ime work. Employees of the company are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am 6
:00 pm (12 hours of work, four hour s overtime), given three free meals a day an
d 20 minutes rest after mealtime. ISSUE: 1. W/N the definition for "hours of wor
k" as presently applied to dry land laborers equally applicable to seamen. 2. W/
N a different criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen'
s employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of work f
rom that of a dry land laborer. HELD: The definition of hours of work equally ap
plies to seamen and no need for a different criterion. Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 444, k
nown as the Eight-Hour Labor Law, provides that when the work is not continuous,
the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working plac
e and can reset completely, shall not be counted in the eight working hours. A l
aborer need not leave the premises of the factory, shop or boat in order that hi
s period of rest shall not be counted, it being enough that he cease to work, an
d may rest completely. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner o
f Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. 71 G.R. Nos. 48886-8 (July 21, 1993)
Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No.133 FACTS: Iligan Express Corporation maintai
ns a berthing facility at Kiwalan, Iligan City . Respondent Company availed of s
uch facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Custom whi
ch were paid by the said shipping company under protest. ISSUE:

W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged berthing fees

under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34. HELD: No.
Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. Sec. 2901 of the Tari
ff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34 speaks of the national ports only. Sec
. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was
amended by the presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a legislative
intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. Since the said
law limits the berthing taxes to national ports only, it is obvious that the pri
vate ports are not included. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memora
ndum circular 33-73 or E.O. 72. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25d, 30a

46 Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier Case No. 40 G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 199
3) Chapter III, Page 104, Footnote No.141 FACTS: The Private Respondents filed a
n administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the vio
lation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman f
iled an order directing the preventiv e suspension of the Petitioners, who were
employees of the national center for men tal health. The Respondent argue that t
he preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is conte
mplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987 Constitution, while the Petitione
r contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and
other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing admi
nistrative investigation conduc ted by his office. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has
the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices
other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative com
plaints. HELD: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the
said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of t
he Co nstitution refers to suspension in its punitive sense, as the same speaks
of penalties in administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombuds
man the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing admi
nistrative charge s. This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facili
tate a speedy and eff icient investigation on cases filed against the officers.
A preventive measure is not i n itself a punishment but a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. LATIN MAXIM: 27, 28 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Caroli
na Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc. Case No. 47

G.R. No. L-46908 (May 17, 1980) Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.146 FACTS: Pe
titioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing, carrying and se
lling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. Within three mo
nths, the Petitioner s amount deposited was completely wiped out without his per
mission. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffi ce to
prove such consent. Respondent now question the appellate court s ruling on the
ir violation of the SEC rules and securities Act, and how these statutes are int
erp reted, the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this
decision. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock
trading. HELD: If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting hims
elf, it is the duty of the broker to do so. The courts use of a ruling in foreig
n case is only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of th
e United States. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 9

47 Zamora v. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. 176 G. R. No L-15290 (May 31

, 1963) FACTS: Mariano Zamora, owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora M
anila, filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. The Collector o
f Inter nal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains
derived fro m the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which
were not allowable. Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora, bou
ght a piece of land located in Manila on May 16, 1944, for P132,000.00 and sold
it for P75,0 00.00 on March 5, 1951. They also purchased a lot located in Q.C. f
or P68,959.00 on January 19, 1944 which they sold for P94,000.00 on Feb. 9, 1951
. The CTA ordered the estate of the late Felicidad Zamora, to pay the sum of P23
5.00, representing all eged deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said es
tate. Esperanza Zamora appealed and alleged that the CTA erred. ISSUE: W/N the C
TA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora. HELD: No. The
appraisal is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb the sam
e. LATIN MAXIM: b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tamayo v. Gsell Case No. 282 G. R. No
10765 (December 22, 1916) Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.149 FACTS: This is
an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries suffered by Br
aulio Tamayo, 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. The injury was att ributed to th
e boy s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the first time a
nd without prior instruction.

ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the Employer s Lia
bility Act. HELD: Yes. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in p
ersonal injury cases brought under the Employer s Liability Act to be the same a
s that in the country from which the Act was taken, being of American origin. LA
TIN MAXIM: b2

48 Ossorio v. Posadas Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-31088 (December 3, 1929) FACTS: Pla
intiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector of Inte
rnal Revenue the sum of P56,246.72, which the Defendant, according to the compla
int, collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collect ed by
way of income tax. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintiff s wife
constitutes her separate estate within the scope and meaning of this phrase for
the purposes of the additional income tax. HELD: Yes. It is ordered that the Def
endant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax, one against t
he Plaintiff, and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property, return
ing the sum of P56,203.59 to said plaintiff, without prejudice to his levying ag
ainst and collecting from said Plaintiff s wife upon he r own separate individua
l declaration, in accordance with law, the additional income t ax for the income
from her paraphernal property. LATIN MAXIM: b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Campos Ru
eda Corp. v. Sta. Cruz Timber Co. and Felix Case No. 17 G.R. No. L-6884 (March 2
1, 1956) FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Peti
tioner against Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the a
mounts of P1,12 5 and P1,075, for lack of jurisdiction; holding that the two not
es constitute two separate causes of action involving less than P2,000. The Muni
cipal Court likewise dismis sed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respo
ndents for collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action,
on the ground that the amount of t wo notes, which Petitioner now consolidated u
nder a single cause of action, was in

excess of its jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the Municipal Court of Manila has jurisdi
ction over the subject matter of appellant s complaint. HELD: No. The jurisdicti
on of a court depends, not upon the value or demand in each single case of actio
n contained in the complaint, but upon the totality of the demand in all the cau
ses of action. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

49 Ang Giok Chio vs. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Case No. 8 G.R. No.
33637 (December 31, 1931) FACTS: Petitioner s warehouse was destroyed by fire w
hile the policy taken out with Respondent for the amount of P10,000 was in force
. The Respondent Company has appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider
on the insurance contract. ISSUE: W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of
insurance is null and void because it does not comply with the Philippine Insur
ance Act. HELD: Yes. A rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and re
ferred to in the contract of insurance, is valid and sufficient under Sec. 65 of
the Philippi ne Insurance Act as it was taken verbatim from Sec. 2605 of the Ci
vil Code of Calif ornia which states, The section as it now reads is in harmony
with the rule that a warr anty may be contained in another instrument than the p
olicy when expressly referred t o in the policy as forming a part thereof. LATIN
MAXIM: 6c, 7a, b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pando v. Kette and Sellner Case No. 99
G.R. No. 32124 (March 27, 1930) FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. In pu
rsuant thereof, the sheriff on January 3 0, 1929, posted notices of the sale of
the land in said writ in 3 public places, to wit, upon the land itself, at the m
arket, and on the municipal building of Pasay. Notice o f the sale was sent to t
he newspaper La Opinion for publication, and the editor certif ied that he publi
shed it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, more particularly on t he 2nd, 9th,
and 15th of February, 1929 and the sale took place on February 19, 192 9. ISSUE
:

W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public places and publication in La Opin
ion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied the requirements of the la w r
egarding the notice of the sale in question. HELD: Yes. The Provision of our Cod
e of Civil Procedure having been adopted from Sec. 692 of the California Code, t
he requirements of the law regarding the notic e of the sale in question have be
en substantially complied with. LATIN MAXIM: b2

Reyes v. Wells Case No. 135 G.R. No. 30587 (December 4, 1929) FACTS: Defendants
offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping machine and an Inter
national truck in a shed lot for P23,000. However, Plaintiff Guerrer o said that
he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machine. Respondent Rad
er promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need. Plaintif f
would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of the mortgage. Defe
ndant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. Northcott, and on June 29, 192 2,
the former endorsed the mortgage deed. However, neither the said amount nor any
part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero, or to any of his co-Plaintiffs
. Due to the failure of J. E. Rader and J. Northcott to pay said amount of P12,
000, the P laintiff sustained damages for default in the payment of the instalme
nts due. ISSUE: W/N the promissory notes in question which have not been paid, a
re not supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of the testimony
of Guerrero. HELD: There was evidence on the part of the promissory notes in que
stion. These are also in line with Sec. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. The prohibitio
n contained in sa id law against a witness testifying upon any transaction or co
mmunication between himsel f and a deceased person, is substantially the same as
that contained in Sec. 383(7 ) of our Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Ac
t No. 2252. Therefore, we believe that the construction placed upon it by the co
urt in the cases cited is applicab le to the case at bar. LATIN MAXIM: 1, b2 STA
TUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. Educ. Co. v. Soriano Case No. 235 G.R. No. L-22405 (Ju
ne 30, 1971) Chapter III, Page 107, Footnote No.156 FACTS: Montinola sought to p
urchase money orders from Manila Post Office. He

managed to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. Palomar received
one money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in
the Bank of America. Respondent, Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila
Pos t Office notified the Bank of irregularity, and deducted from the bank s cl
earing account the said amount, in the same way the bank of America debited Peti
tioner s account with the same amount. Petitioner requested to reconsider the ac
tion but was denied. ISSUE: W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiab
le instrument. HELD: Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforc
ed in the US. These are generally constructed and construed in accordance with c
onstruction of US s own postal statutes, in the absence of any special reason ju
stifying departure f rom the policy or practice. US held that postal money order
s are not negotiable instruments. LATIN MAXIM: 2b, 9a, b2

51 Cruz v. Pahati Case No. 28 G.R. No. L-8257 (April 13, 1956) FACTS: Defendant
bought an automobile from Bulahan, for P4,900 which he paid in check. He cancell
ed the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon impoundment and as a resul
t, he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in then surrendered the check for c
ancellation. He set up a counterclaim for attorney's fees. Bulahan claims that h
e bought the automobile from Belizo without having any knowledge of any defect i
n the title. It was found out that Belizo falsified a l etter that enabled him t
o sell the car of Bulahan for profit. The court rendered judgment declaring Defe
ndant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered t he Plaintiff
to return it to said Defendant and, upon his failure to do so, to pay him the su
m of P4,900, with legal interest from the date of the decision. The claim for da
mages and attorney's fees of Bulahan was denied. Defendant Belizo was however or
dered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4,900 and pay the sum of P5 ,
000 as moral damages. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for lack of evide
nce. ISSUE: Who has a better right of the two over the car. HELD: Plaintiff has
a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover the said car. I
t was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of the scheme of
Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v. Workmen s Compensation Commission Case
No. 132 G.R. No. L-29019 (May 18, 1972) FACTS: Petitioners seek full compensati
on of P6,000.00 plus attorney s fee of P600.00 under the WCC, without deducting
the P3,000.00 as death benefit which they had been previously paid by virtue of
the provisions of RA 610. ISSUE:

W/N the beneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death gratuity
under RA 610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC. HELD: T
he resolution of the WCC is modified; the P3,000.00 received under RA 610 should
be deducted from the full grant received under the WCC. It is difficult t o con
strue that the legislature intended to double the compensations received, consid
ering that at the times said laws were approved the finances of the government c
ould not have conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the purpose. Furtherm
ore, Sec. 9 of RA 610 and Sec. 5 of WCC bar payment under other laws. It was als
o contended that the phrase or any other law granting similar benefits to office
rs or employees, generally, of the national, provincial or mun icipal government
in Sec. 9 is highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent fu rther re
covery of compensation benefits under other laws. LATIN MAXIM: 17, 19b, 29, 38b,
39, 40b

Garcia et al. v. Hipolito et al. Case NO. 53 G.R. No. L-1449 (November 30, 1903)
FACTS: Judgment was rendered for the Defendants on May 1, 1903. The Plaintiffs
were notified thereof on May 21. Two days after, they excepted to the judgment a
nd presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on July 23. On July 28,
the Plaintiffs presented their proposed bill of exceptions, which on August 5 wa
s al lowed and signed by the court. The term of the court in which the case was
tried expir ed on May 30. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure all
ows the parties to consent to or for the judge to order an extension of the 10-d
ay period. HELD: The period of 10 days and the subsequent period of 5 days have
to do with the mechanical part of the appeal the preparation of the papers for t
ransmission t o the Supreme Court. The right of the parties to the appeal was al
ready fixed by t he notice of the intention to prepare a bill of exceptions ente
red of record in the clerk s office. If the period corresponds to the appeal or
for suing out a writ of error found in most other laws of American origin, it ca
nnot be extended. But that period is en tirely different from the 10 days for al
lowing the preparation of papers, after the rig ht to remove the case has been s
ecured. Therefore, it cannot be said that an extension of this time is an extens
ion of the time to appeal. Moreover, considering when the law was adopted, it se
ems impossible that the Commission intended to deprive the cou rt and the partie
s of the power to extend the term, given the physical impossibilit y to comply w
ith it in many cases. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 19b, 27, 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ESSO
Standard Eastern Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. 41 G.R. No. 7
0037 (July 7, 1989) FACTS:

The case is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the Pe
titioner s claims for refund of the margin fees P102,246.00 for 1959 and P434,23
4.92 for 1960. ISSUE: W/N RA 2609, entitled An Act to Authorize the Central Bank
of the Philippines to Establish a Margin over Banks Selling Rates of Foreign Ex
change , is a police measure or a revenue measure. HELD: RA 2609 is a police mea
sure as it is applied in order to strengthen our country s international reserve
. Petitioner contended that margin fees are taxes and cited the background and t
he legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that RA 260 9 was nothing l
ess than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange impose d by RA 601.
This was a revenue measure formally proposed by President Carlos P. Garcia to C
ongress as part of, and in order to balance, the budget for 1959-1960 . The CTA
stated that it is a well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely doubtful m
atters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Con gress bec
ome important. As a matter of fact, there may be no resort to the legislative hi
story of the enactment of a statute, the language of which is plain and unambigu
ous, since such legislative history may only be resorted to for the purp ose of
solving doubt, not for the purpose of creating it. Moreover, at least two cases
had been decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a tax. LATIN MAXIM:
1, 7a

53 Commissioner of Customs v. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. Case No. 26 G.R. No. L28329 (August 17, 1975) FACTS: Petitioner contends that the special import tax u
nder RA 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Ta
riff and Customs Code, and th at the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the pa
yment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exempti
on from the payment of the special import tax provided in RA 1394. ISSUE: W/N th
e exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by RA 387 should i
nclude the special import tax imposed by RA 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law.
HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of
RA 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase '
Spec ial Import Tax' is taken to include customs duties". In order to determine
the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the st
atute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole an
d every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its part
s. In fact every statute shou ld receive such construction as will make it harmo
nize with the pre-existing body o f laws. Antagonism between the Acts to be inte
rpreted and existing or previous laws is t o be avoided, unless it was clearly t
he intention of the legislature that such antago nism should arise and one amend
s or repeals the other, either expressly or by implica tion. Another rule applie
d by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice o f the origin and h
istory of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, an
d of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation. The Court exam
ined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b, 38a, b2 STATU
TORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. Director of Lands

Case No. 100 G.R. No. L-15816 (February 29, 1964) FACTS: Petitioner filed with R
espondents, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 102 C.A. No. 141, a petition for
the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the ground that Ramos had fa
iled to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the ta xes thereon sinc
e 1947, and on the further ground that he and his successors-in-inte rest had no
t cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon, in violatio n of
the terms and conditions of the lease. The policy in the disposition and concess
ion of public land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant. Th
us, in c ases of lease the law requires that no lease shall be permitted to inte
rfere with any pr ior claim by settlement or by occupation, until the consent of
the occupant or settl er is first had, or until such claim shall be legally ext
inguished (Sec. 33, C.A. No. 141). If anyone should be given prior right of entr
y at all, it should be the actual occu pants who have presented several petition
s for the subdivision or and sale of the land to them. ISSUE: W/N the ruling of
the trial court upholding Petitioner s claim to a right of entry was correct. HE
LD: No. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given by admi
nistrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or implement deserve s g
reat weight. In the present case, it appears that the trial court reversed not o
nly the decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural R
esources but that of the Office of inion, that the same are clearly to be in con
sonance with the ive priority or preference to not. LATIN MAXIM: 2a the Presiden
t, without the record disclosing in our op erroneous and unfounded. To the contr
ary, they appear purpose of the law invoked by Petitioner, namely, to g the actu
al occupant of public land which Petitioner is

54 Orencia v. Enrile Case No. 92 G.R. No. L-28997 (February 22, 1974) FACTS: Pet
itioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Cou rt
Division of the Land Registration Commission, and he has been performing functi
o ns of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and recognized
as su ch until RA 4040, increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Divisions
, among o thers, was implemented where he was left out while co-assistant chief
of the nine other div isions of the Land Registration Commission were so recogni
zed and extended increased compensation. Respondents filed their answer, and aft
er usual admissions and denials, interposed a defense that Petitioner is unquali
fied for the position of Assistant Chief, and being a new position created under
RA 4040, the same can only be file d by a qualified person; that Respondent, be
ing a lawyer, is more qualified than Petitioner, who is only a high school gradu
ate with second grade civil service eligibility, and praying that the petition b
e dismissed ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy clerk o
f court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. HEL
D: For Respondent officials, the answer was not in doubt. Since there was a new
legal provision to be construed, one which admittedly, to follow the approach of
counsel for Petitioner, has an ambiguous aspect, they chose to follow the princ
i ple that a public office is a public trust. Certainly, such a contemporaneous
constr uction, one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate, i
s entitled to t he highest respect from the judiciary. LATIN MAXIM: 2a STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION m i k iPeople of the Philippines v. Hernandez Case No. 107 G.R. No
s. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23, 1933)

FACTS: Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on Octo
ber 16, 1931. At this time, he was a delinquent in the payment of P2,000 for lan
d taxes to the government. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office, t
he municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. Th
e Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor, on the
condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. The Chief of E
xecutive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. By September,
1932, taxes had been paid for. However, in April 1932, he was charged for violat
ing Sec. 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived
the right to suffrage and public office. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 2659 can be applied to
refrain Respondent from taking office as Governor in Camarines Norte. HELD: No.
Sec. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been elected wit
hout possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as provided b
y law. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for assum
ing a public office. Hence, even though Respondent did not pay his land taxes, t
his does not incapacitate him from assuming office. Under these circumstances, w
e should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs . Rafferty: lon
g continued administrative interpretation of a tax law, while not conclusive, sh
ould be followed unless clearly erroneous. And in this case, it wa s not. LATIN
MAXIM: 2a, 32, 42b

55 Sagun v. People s Homesite and Housing Corporation Case No. 266 G.R. No. 7360
3 (June 22, 1988) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.180 FACTS: Respondent Corpo
ration was created to provide decent, low cost housing for those who are unable
to provide themselves with this. In accordance with RA 3208 , the lots located i
n Block 330, LCH Project 3, Quezon City were meant to be used for this purpose.
However, the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes, b efore convert
ing these store units into their dwelling homes. In 1971, Petitioners dec ided t
hat they wanted to buy these lots from Respondent Corporation but filed a petit
ion for mandamus alleging that Respondent Corporation was selling the lots at P5
0/sq m., which was in violation of RA 3802. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Corporation ca
n be compelled by mandamus to sell these lots for not more than P10/sq m. to its
registered tenants or their successors i n interest, in reference to Sec. 1 of
RA 3802. HELD: No. For mandamus to lie, Petitioner s rights should be well-defin
ed, clear and certain. In the case at bar, there is no showing of a clear and ce
rtain right to compel Respondent Corporation to sell them the units for a price
lower than what is bei ng offered. The Petitioners first leased these units for
business purposes. Thus, t he price of P50 is not excessive or unreasonable cons
idering that the market value for the l ots is at least P120. The action of Resp
ondent Corporation neither conflicts with the l aw nor does it demonstrate any a
buse of discretion to warrant its reversal. Moreover, t here is no obligation of
Respondent Corporation, under RA 3802, aside from the fact that the determinati
on of the selling price requires exercise of discretion on their part. LATIN MAX
IM: 2a, 9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova Case No. 236 G.R. No. L-60548 (
November 10, 1986) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.181 FACTS: In 1976, Petiti
oner filed with the Board of Communication, now NTC, an application for authorit
y to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose of rendering internation
al telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outsid e the Philippines wh
ere it is authorized to operate. In 1977, Manila was designate d as the sole gat
eway for communications in the Philippines. In January 1979, BOC gav e Petitione
rs authority to establish a station in Cebu, subject to that as soon as domestic
carriers have upgraded their facilities, applicant shall cease its operations.
Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said decision, which rul
ed in favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the autho
rity to establish other stations aside from the station in Makati. This is a pet
ition se eking to set aside the ruling rendered. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is author
ized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or points outside Metro Manil
a? HELD: Yes. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construct, maintain, and
operate, apart from its principal station in Makati, other stations or branches
within th e Philippines for purposes of its international communications operati
ons. This ca n be seen in Sec. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may be established
as long as it is approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
The opinion of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which affirmed the au
thorization of othe r stations is material and must be considered in favor of th
e Petitioners. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 36b

56 Asturias Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs Case No. 24 No. L-19337 (Se
ptember 30 1969) Chapter III, Page 112, Footnote No.183 FACTS: Petitioner filed
a petition for review of the unfavorable decision of the CTA which denied the re
covery of the sum of P28,629.42 which the Petitioner paid und er protest in the
concept of customs duties and special import tax. Under the law in effect at tha
t time, the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of taxes and duties paid for impo
rtation of containers provided importer re-exports said containers within a 1yea
r period. Also Asturias contends that they are entitled to an alternative recove
ry of the said amount minus 1% under Sec. 106(b) of the Customs and Tariff Act.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import taxes and duties. HELD:
No. The 1-year period mentioned in the Philippine Tariff Act contains no express
mention of any extension or of any grounds for it to be extended. The provision
s invoked by the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund, offer two options t
o an importer. The first gives him the privilege of importing, free from import
duties, the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them withi n one
year from the date of acceptance of the import entry, it is non-extendible. The
second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid subject to refund
to the extent of 99% of the amount paid, provided the articles mentioned are exp
ort ed within three years from importation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4, 38b, 43 STATUTOR
Y CONSTRUCTION Phil. Sugar Central Agency v. Collector of Customs Case No. 241 N
o. 27761 (Dec. 6 1927) Chapter III, Page 113, Footnote No.186 FACTS:

Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Ma-ao
Sugar Central Co. shipped 5,124,416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to Un ited
States in a wharf on Pulapandan, Occidental Negros on steamship Hannover. Wharf
was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Defendant collect
ed wharfage dues on petitioner s wharf. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant can collect wha
rfage dues on wharves not owned by government. HELD: Yes. The Government can be
allowed to collect because not to do so would overthrow and destroy the whole sy
stem of the Government, in and by which millio ns of pesos have been levied and
collected and expended in the construction of Government wharves, and it would h
ave defeated the construction of the Government wharf at Pulapandan. Dissenting
Opinion: Historically, wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be ta
xed or levied upon. LATIN MAXIM: 3a, 4, 37, 5b, 11d

57 Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board Case No. 164 No. L-12727
(February 29, 1960) Chapter III, Page 114, Footnote No.190 FACTS: The Petitione
r states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for any event and
that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their right. Petitio
ner relies on the strength of Sec. 4 of RA 309, as amended by RA 983, tha t the
unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by
the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and
races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run, the GA
B reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities
b y six. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days. HELD: No
. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983, it is clear that the text is permis
sive and is not mandatory. The private individuals and entities are not en title
d to the use of such days. Petitioner s claim that the intent of the legislature
was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are untenable.
The words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of
Representatives or Senate. Also, Petitioner s claim that to allow the PCSO to us
e their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable beca
use they have a rental agreement with the PCSO. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6g, 37, 38b STA
TUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramos v. CA Case No. 253 G.R. No. L-22753 (December 18, 1967
) Chapter III, Page 115, Footnote No.193 FACTS: The present case had its incipie
ncy in a petition filed by the then National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) w
orkers for an obligation created by agreement

confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% for ad
ditional compensation for overtime work, night work and work rendered on Sundays
and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. Rice and Corn Administration
(RCA) claims that unlike NARIC, which was possessed with a distin ct and separat
e corporate existence, they are merely an office directly under the President, a
governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to stabilize t
he price of palay, rice, and corn, and not for profit. To carry out t his functi
on, by law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act, RCA depend
s for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside by the General
Appropriations Act. There has been consistent administrative interpretat ion by
the Office of the President as to what may, under law, be granted to RCA work er
s and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. Not a matter
of right, such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act. ISSU
E: W/N RCA should be held answerable when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA was crea
ted for the said obligation. HELD: While executive construction is not necessari
ly binding upon courts, it is entitled to great weight and consideration. The re
ason for this is that such construction comes from the particular branch of gove
rnment called upon to implement the particular law involved. Thus, unless the Pr
esident specifically appropriates the 25% compensation, RCA is not liable to the
abovementioned obligation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 11a, 38b

58 Salaria v. Buenviaje Case No. 267 G.R. No. L-45642 (February 28, 1978) Chapte
r III, Page 115, Footnote No.193 FACTS: Petitioner has been staying on the land
of Cailao when the latter sold the said land to Private Respondent Mendiola. A f
ormal letter of demand to vacate the premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to
Petitioner. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Mendiola against Pet
itioner Salaria. After the trial, the City Court ordered Petitioner to vacate th
e leased premises. On appeal, the CFI through Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirme
d the decision of the inferior court. Thus, a petition for review on Certiorari
was filed with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner fro
m the lot. HELD: No. Memorandum Circular No. 970 was issued by the President sta
ting that except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees bona fide tena
nts of dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, parti
cularly if the only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by t
he owners or th eir families. Construction by Executive Branch of Government of
a particular law although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the co
nstruction comes from that branch called upon to implement the law. The ground r
elied upon by the lessor in this case, namely, personal use of property by the o
wner or lessors or their families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectmen
t of lessees. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 30a, 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION University of the
Philippines v. CA Case No. 305 G.R. No. L-28153 (January 28, 1971) Chapter III,
Page 115, Footnote No.195 FACTS: With the filing of Petition for injunction in
the Court of First Instance of Man ila, Petitioners in the original case sought
to restrain herein Respondent from dismi ssing

them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed
from the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but by the Civil Serv
ice Commissioner. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case b
y the Board of Regents is final, or requires further action by the Civil Service
Commission. HELD: The management of Philippine General hospital was initially u
nder the Office of the President of the Philippines. Under RA 51 and E.O. 94, th
e President tran sferred them under herein Respondent. Thus, the Supreme Court r
uled that the President a nd Board of Regents of the U.P. possess full and final
authority in disciplining, s uspension, and removal of the civil service employ
ees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital, indep
endently of the Commissioner of the Civil Serv ice and the Civil Service Board o
f Appeals. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 9b, 20c, 38b

59 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Bureau of Labor Relati

ons Case No. 120 G.R. No. L-43760 (August 21, 1976) FACTS: Petitioner lost to Na
tional Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the certification elections fo
r the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in Philippine Blooming Mills,
Company, Inc. Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 429 PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots
17 (not counted) Abstained 4 Total Ballots 864 (Note: NAFLU didn t obtain the ma
jority vote, which is 432.) Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be consi
dered as in the ruling in a previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling i
n the previous case was base d on the Industrial Peace Act, which has been super
seded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to the case at bar. ISS
UE: W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the
spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers Assoc
iation of the Philippines vs. CIR. HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion
made by Respondent since the basis of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has
been superseded by the present Labo r Code. Also, the Rules and Regulations impl
ementing the present Labor Code has been already been made known to public and a
s such has the enforcing power in the case at bar. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 39a STATU
TORY CONSTRUCTION Everett v. Bautista

Case No. 43 G.R. No. 46505 (November 7, 1939) FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent w
ere partners who owned and managed Queen s Theater during the first Quarter of 1
937. The partnership charged admissio n fees of P0.40 per seat and at other time
s charged more than P0.40 but not more t han P0.70 per seat. During the first Qu
arter of 1937, their receipts were P15, 881.4 1. At that time, imposition tax is
at 5% of the gross receipts of theaters, cinematographs, etc. whose admission p
rice exceeds P0.40 (Sec. 1&3 of C.A. No. 128). The law does not say how tax shou
ld be imposed in cases where the daily receipts are not made at the same rate. A
s such, the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Regulations No. 94, which state
s that the daily receipts of prices charged differently will be joint ly taken i
nto account for computation purposes. Sec. 1458 of the Administrative Code stat
es that penalty for late payment will be at 25% of the tax imposed. The parties
fai led to pay the tax on time and therefore subject to Sec. 1458. They were ask
ed to pay P992.50, which they refused to pay. ISSUE: 1. W/N the collection to sa
id tax is in accordance with law. 2. W/N Regulations No. 94 is in accordance wit
h law. HELD: Yes to both. The interpretation given to a law by an officer charge
d by reason of his office to carry out its provisions should be respected. It ha
s also been held that where there is ambiguity in the language of the law, conte
mporaneous constructio n is given weight. LATIN MAXIM: 2a

60 Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong Case No.
62 G.R. No. L-52415 (October 23, 1984) FACTS: Petitioner first filed a complain
t to the lower Court against Insular Bank of As ia and America (IBAA) for not pa
ying the holiday pay. The Petition was granted and IBAA paid for the holiday wag
e. Later, IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in compliance to the issuance of
Sec. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing t he Labor Code and the Policy
Instruction No. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of DOLE). Petitioner file
d for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbi ter s decision of pay
ing the holiday wages and the motion was granted. IBAA then appealed to NLRC and
NLRC dismissed the appeal. At this point, IBAA filed a moti on for reconsiderat
ion to Respondent. Respondent granted IBAA s motion for reconsideration. Petitio
ner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respon dent of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: 1. W/N the decision of the
Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent considering that it has become fina
l and had been partially executed. 2. W/N Sec. 2 of Implementing Rules and Polic
y Instruction No. 9 are valid. HELD: A judgment in a labor case that has become
executory cannot be revoked after finality of judgment. In the case at bar, IBAA
waived its right to appeal by paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed t
o have accepted the judgment as correct. Sec. 2 and Policy Instruction No. 9 are
both null and void since the y amended the provisions of the Labor Code. It has
been held that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law m
ust be taken to mean exactly what it says. And also, if a contemporaneous constr
uction is so erroneou s, the same must be declared null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 6
c, 17, 37, 40c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC
Case No. 119 G.R. No. L-50320 (March 30, 1988) FACTS:

A collective bargaining agreement was made between Petitioners and Management of

Philippine Apparel Inc. (PAI) on April 2, 1977 and was signed on September 7, 1
977. CBA stipulated a P22.00 increase in monthly wage of workers t hat will retr
oact from April 1, 1977. However, on May of the same year, P.D. 1123 gr anted a
P60.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect from January 1, 197 7
, provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P60.00 will be g
iv en the difference. Management argues that since on April 2, there has been an
agreement to a P22.00 increase, PAI only had to pay the difference of P38.00. M
oreover, PAI was able to get the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor support
ing the PAI Management. Labor contends that increase does not fall within the ex
emption since the CBA was signed on September after P.D. 1123 has been passed. I
SSUE: W/N the case falls under the exception of P.D. 1123. HELD: No. There was n
o formal agreement on April 2, 1977 regarding the increase. Moreover, the opinio
n of the Undersecretary of Labor was based on a wrong premis e and misinterpreta
tion by PAI Management. It was unlawful and beyond the scope of law. LATIN MAXIM
: 2a

61 United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social Security Commission Case No. 2
93 G.R. No. L-26712-16 (December 27, 1969) Chapter III, Page 206, Footnote No.20
6 FACTS: Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay
tax for their operations. Nevertheless, upon knowledge thereof, they paid their
premium remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they di
d not kn ow that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances, claimin
g that the assessed penalties were inequitable. Respondent said that their organ
ization is embraced in the Social Security Act; therefore the assessed penalties
are impose d on them. ISSUE: W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no auth
ority under the Social Security Act to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty
prescribed by law for l ate payment of remittances. HELD: Respondent has no such
authority. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in the absence of an expres
s provision in the Social Security Act vesting Responden t the power to condone
penalties, it has no legal authority to condone, waive, or relinquish the penalt
y for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under th e SS Act. The reason
of the law is to develop, establish gradually and perfect a so cial security sy
stem which shall be suitable to the needs of the people to provide employees aga
inst the hazards of disability, sickness, old age, and death. Good faith and bad
faith are irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. Where the language of
the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no
room for interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6b, 7a, 9a, 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Yra v. Abao Case No. 316 G.R. No. 30187 (November 15, 1928) Chapter III, Page 118
, Footnote No.214 FACTS:

Respondent was running for office in Bulacan, his hometown. However, he is a reg
istered voter in Manila and to be a candidate, one of the qualifications is t ha
t he/she who is running should be a duly qualified elector therein . ISSUE: W/N
Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan. HELD: Yes. He i
s qualified to run for local office. In a previous case contested in th e Philip
pine Assembly, Fernando Ma. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the Phil.
Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the position on the ground that he w
as not registered in his electoral district. The conclusion to which was, qualif
ied elector meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be
a vote r and need not be register. The same was the case and decision of the Exe
cutive Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. Laurel. It is sufficient
that he possess the qualifications stated in Sec. 431 and none of the disqualifi
cations stated i n Sec. 432 of the Election Law. However, it is not least to dis
regard the forcible argu ment advanced that when the law make use of the phrases
, qualified electors and qualified voter the law means what it says. It would be
an absurdity to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in hi
s own municipality. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 3a, 6c, 11a

62 Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. v. CIR Case No. 134 G.R. No. L-6741 (Januar
y 31, 1956) Chapter III, Page 120-121, Footnote No.222 & 227 FACTS: Petitioner i
s engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of TPU buses in Misami
s Occidental and Northern Zamboanga. The provincial revenue agent for Misamis Oc
cidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had been issued by Peti
tioner. The stubs and the daily reports of the conductor did not state the value
of the goods transported. Pursuant to Sec. 121 and 127 of the Re vised Document
ary Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance, the agent assumed that t
he value of the goods was more than P5. Petitioner asked for a ref und and the C
ourt of First Instance of Misamis Occidental rendered a judgment in the ir favor
but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Court of Appe
als has jurisdiction over the case. 2. W/N the Court of Appeals decision is erro
neous. HELD: The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction because according to both
the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the Constitution the Supreme Court has the exclusi
ve appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any tax, impo
st, assessmen t or tolls, or any penalty in relation thereto. The decision of th
e Court of Appeals however was not erroneous: a. Sec. 121 falls within the scope
of administrative power of the Secretary of Finance as authorized in Sec. 79 of
the Revised Administrative Code. b. The regulation (Sec. 121) is valid also bec
ause of the principle of legislative approval be re-enactment. The regulations w
ere approved on September 16, 1924. When the National Internal Revenue Code was
approved on February 18, 1939, the same provisions of stamp tax, bills of landin
g and receipts were re-enacted. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re:
McCulloch Dick Case No. 129

G.R. No. L-13862 (April 15, 1918) Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote No.223 FACTS:
Petitioner, the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, filed for a
writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting
chief of police of the city of Manila. He is being detained because the Governo
r-Gener al of the Philippines ordered his deportation. Before the Governor-Gener
al gave his order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed
in Sec. 69 o f the Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N the Governor-General has the
power under Act No. 2113 and Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code to institute and
maintain deportation proceedings. HELD: Yes, the Governor-General has the power
to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. When the provisions of Act N
o. 2113 were enacted and continued in force by the enactment of the Administrati
ve Code and again continued in force by the enactment of the Jones Law the const
ruction theretofore placed upon it by this court became an integral part of thes
e statutes having th e force and the effect of a legislative command. In the int
erpretation of reenacted statutes, the court will follow the construction which
they received when previo usly in force. The legislature will be presumed to kno
w the effect which such statutes originally had, and by reenactment to intend th
at they should again have the sam e effect. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 4, 9a

63 Howden & Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. 9 G.R. No. L-193
92 (April 14, 1965) Chapter III, Page 120, Footnote No.222 and 224 FACTS: Common
wealth Insurance Co. (CIC), a domestic corporation, entered into reinsurance con
tracts with 32 British companies not engaged in business in the Philippines repr
esented by herein Plaintiff. CIC remitted to Plaintiff reinsuran ce premiums and
, on behalf of Plaintiff, paid income tax on the premiums. Plaintiff filed a cla
im for a refund of the paid tax, stating that it was exempted from withhold ing
tax reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies by foreign i
nsurance companies not authorized to do business in the Philippines. Plaintiffs
stated that since Sec. 53 and 54 were substantially re-enacted by RA 1065, 1291
and 2343, said rulings should be given the force of law under the principle of l
egislative approval by re-enactment. ISSUE: W/N the tax should be withheld. HELD
: No. The principle of legislative enactment states that where a statute is susc
eptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency charg
ed with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re-enacts the provis ions
without substantial changes, such action is confirmatory to an extent that the
r uling carries out the legislative purpose. This principle is not applicable fo
r the aforementioned sections were never re-enacted. Only the tax rate was amend
ed. The administrative rulings invoked by the CIR were only contained in unpubli
shed letters. It cannot be assumed that the legislature knew of these rulings. F
inall y, the premiums remitted were to indemnify CIC against liability. This too
k place withi n the Philippines, thus subject to income tax. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Laxamana v. Baltazar Case No. 144

G.R. No. L-5955 (September 19, 1952) Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote No.225 FACT
S: The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. By virtue of Sec. 2195 of the Revised Ad
ministrative Code, Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. However, the Provin
cial Governor, by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code, appo inted her
ein Petitioner as the mayor. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is the right person to assume
office. HELD: Yes, Respondent should assume the vacated position. Sec. 21 of th
e Revised Election Code, which was taken from Sec. 2180 of the Revised Admin Cod
e, applies to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2195 of the Revised Admin
istrative C ode applies to the office of mayor in particular. A special provisio
n overrides a ge neral one. Also, the incorporation of Sec. 2180 in Sec. 21 does
not enlarge its scope but merely supplements it. It has also been consistently
held in case of suspension of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume office; the
legislature is presumed to be acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretati
on. Hence, upon re-enacting Sec . 2180, the interpretation is deemed to have bee
n adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 4, 38b, 50

64 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice Case No. 32 G.R. No. L-42821 (January 18, 193
6) Chapter III, Page 121, Footnote No.226 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed justic
e of the peace for Lingayen, Pangasinan. He relinquished his office after he had
reached the age of 65 because of the provis ions of Act No. 3899. Petitioner cl
aimed that he was entitled to the benefits under t he vetoed Sec. 7 of the Retir
ement Gratuity Law which entitled justices of the peac e to gratuities. Petition
er was contesting the validity of the veto of the Governor-G eneral by claiming
that the Act was not an appropriation bill and hence, was not subjec t to item-v
eto. ISSUE: W/N the veto of the Governor-General of Sec. 7 was valid. HELD: Yes.
It is clear from reading Sec. 12 that the Legislature intended this Act to be a
n appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possibility of a future vet
o by the Chief Executive. Hence, the Governor can constitutionally veto certain
items on this bill. Furthermore, the legislature accepted the veto and made no a
ttempt to override it. The executive department sustained the validity of the ve
to as well . Contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, but wh
en two co-equ al branches of government have adopted and accepted the constructi
on of statutes, they must be given great respect. Also, this practice of vetoing
the separate it ems in a bill by the Chief Executive has long been allowed and
to rule against it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality. LATIN M
AXIM: 2a, 2b, 3a, 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION NPC v. Province of Lanao del Sur Cas
e No. 187

G.R. No. 96700 (November 19, 1996) Chapter III, Page 122, Footnote No.232 FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent since its
tax exempt status was revoked by P.D. 1931. Because of the Petitioner s failur
e to pay, the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole bidder.
Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely suspended. With
the Resolutions issued by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), the tax ex
empti on privileges of the Petitioners were restored. However, Respondent conten
ds that t he Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlier
case between the Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does no
t have power to re store tax exemptions and that the said Board can only recomme
nd to the President or th e Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Governme
nt can be given exemptions. Note however, that the Albay case was already superc
eded by the Maceda vs. Macaraig case stating that the FIRB Resolution is in acco
rdance with the requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minis
ter of Finance. In the present case, the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status
were properly approved by the Minister of Finance. ISSUE: 1. W/N Respondent Pro
vince and provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess RPT against, and
thereafter sell at public auction the subject properties of the Petitioner to ef
fect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such t axes. 2. W/N Pe
titioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges, including it
s exemption from payment of RPT. HELD: The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt
status, but its privileges were only suspended. Thus, the Respondent cannot asse
ss deficiency RPT against the Petitio ner. Furthermore, since the Petitioner was
never delinquent in paying RPT, the subseq uent auction and sale of the Petitio
ner s assets is also considered void. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 5b, 9a, 20a, 37, 38a,
49

65 J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Mariano & Aquial & Cordova Case No. 64 G.R. No. L-33140
(October 23, 1978) FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownersh
ip of a parcel of land located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. They allege
d that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Re
gistry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants T
uason (herein Petitioners ) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case
No. 7681 of the Court of Lan d Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT N
o. 735 and the titles derived t herefrom be declared void due to certain irregul
arities in the land registration proceedi ng. The Tuason s prayed that the petit
ion be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case,
improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgm ent. Respondents Cordova s
pouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were able to purchase 11
hectares from the Aquials. ISSUE: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid. HELD: OCT No. 735 i
s valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Cou
rt in the cases of Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason and Pili vs. Tuason. T
he ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity
of OCT No. 735. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 5b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION J.M. Tuason v. Land T
enure Administration Case No. 135 G.R. No. L-21064 (February 18, 1970) Chapter X
I, Page 434, Footnote No.7 FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatal
on Estate in Quezon City. They seek to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropr
iation of two lots inside the e state. Under Art. 8, Sec. 4 of the Constitution,
The Congress may authorize, upon paymen t

of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lot

s and conveyed at cost to individuals Petitioner contends that said law is unco
nstituti onal because the provision in the Constitution refers to lands not land
ed estates. ISSUE: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional. HELD: No. The question is on
e of constitutional construction. The Constitution clearly states that land not
landed estates can be expropriated. It has a broader scope, allowing the legisla
ture to expropriate more types of land. The law does not distinguish between dif
ferent types regardless of how big or small it may be, as long as there is a nee
d to address a growing social problem such as inequality. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 2
4a, 26, 37, 40c

66 Tolentino v. Commission on Elections Case No. 154 G.R. No. L-34150 (October 1
6, 1971) FACTS: The 1971 Constitutional Convention seeks to amend Sec. 1 of Art.
5 of the Constitution reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. This pro
posal was to be submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite coincid
ing with the Nov ember 1971 elections relying on Sec. 1, Art. 15 of the Constitu
tion: The Congress in a joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of a
ll the Members of the Senate a nd the House of Representatives voting separately
may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpos
e. Such amendments shall be vali d as part of this Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast at an el ection at which the amendments are submit
ted to the people for their ratification. ISSUE: W/N there is a limitation or co
ndition in Sec. 1 of Art. 15 of the Constitution calling for a plebiscite on the
sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution N o. 1. HELD: There was a violat
ion. Because such amendments regardless of how many are to be submitted to the p
eople for their ratification in an election, An elect ion only means one. Also,
no fixed frame of reference is given to the voter. No one knows what changes in
the fundamental principles of the constitution would be modified. The amendments
being proposed by the convention in must be seen in relation to the whole. LATI
N MAXIM: 6c, 7a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aglipay v. Ruiz Case No. 4 G.R. No. 45459
(March 13, 1937) FACTS: Respondent, who is the Director of Post, announced that
he would order the issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the celebration of
the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress in accordance with Act No. 4052. Pe
titioner,

who is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks prohibition
of such because it violates Sec. 13, Art. 6 of the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the
sale of such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of religious f
reedom. HELD: Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gi
ves the Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of
special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government. In this case, t
he issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. Act
. N o. 4052 grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new de
signs " as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. LATIN MAXIM: 9
a, 36a, 37

U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho Case No 295 G.R. No. 17122 (February 27, 1922) Chapter XI, P
age 435, Footnote No.12 FACTS: Respondent was charged for violating E.O. 53 (whi
ch fixes the ceiling price at which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a pri
ce greater than that fixed by law. E.O. 53 follows Act No. 2868 which penalizes
monopoly and hoarding of products under extraordinary circumstances. Respondent
contends that the Legislature has not defined any basis for the order but has le
ft it to the discretion of the Gov ernor General. Without leaving the discretion
to say which extraordinary circumstances to the Governor General are, Defendant
will not be charged. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue dele
gation of legislative power. HELD: The act is unconstitutional. The Constitution
is something solid, permanent and substantial. As known, no nation living under
republican form of government can enact a law delegating the power to fix the p
rice at which rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a rep
ublican form of government. This power is exclusive to the legislative. In fixin
g the price, the law is dealing with pr ivate property and private rights, which
are sacred under the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: None STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ord
illo v. COMELEC Case No. 192 G.R. No. 93054 (December 4, 1990) Chapter XI, Page
437, Footnote No.24 FACTS: A plebiscite was held pursuant to R.A. No. 6766 (Orga
nic Act creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people
in the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Abra and
the city of Baguio. Out of the provinces, only Ifugao managed to get a majority
vote. Resolutions an d memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice
states that only provinces voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute
the region. ISSUE:

W/N Ifugao being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can alone, leg
ally and validly constitute a region. HELD: Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitu
tion explicitly provides that there shall be created autonomous regions consisti
ng of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas From this, it can
be derived that the term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more pr
ovinces. The provisions of R.A. No. 6766 also show that the Congress never inten
ded that a single province may constitute the Autonomous Region. LATIN MAXIM: 6c
, 7a, 11g, 25a, 28

68 De los Santos vs. Mallare Case No. 89 G.R. Nos. L-3045-6 (August 31, 1950) Ch
apter XI, Page 440 and 450, Footnote No.33 and 54 FACTS: This case questions the
legality of the Petitioner s removal from the same office which would be the ef
fect of Respondent s appointment. Petitioner contends that under the Constitutio
n, he can not be removed against his will and without cause, citing Sec. 4, Art.
12 of the Constitution which reads: No officer or empl oyee of the Civil Servic
e shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided b y law. Respondent
admits that the position of City Engineer belongs to the unclassified service .
According to Lacson vs. Romero, all officers or employees i n the unclassified s
ervice are protected by the above provision; but notes that there is a differenc
e between this case and the Lacson case. Sec. 2545 of the Revised Administration
Code authorizes the President to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumera
ted therein, one of who is the city engineer. The two provisions are repugnant a
nd absolutely irreconcilable. ISSUE: W/N the position of City Engineer is an unc
lassified service. HELD: No. Reading Art. 12, Sec. 1 of the Constitution, it is
clear that Sec. 4 protect s those appointed into the service that do not fall as
any of the following: policy determining, primarily confidential or highly tech
nical in nature . The position of city engineer is neither of the above-stated.
This is confirmed by the enactment of C .A. No. 177. As a contemporaneous constr
uction, this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as conceived b
y the framers of the Constitution. Furthermore, the rules of construction inform
us that the words used in construc tion are to be given the sense they have in
common use. The Court therefore held that Petitioner De los Santos is entitled t
o remain in office as the City Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments, right
s and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he res igns or is removed for cause,
and that Respondent s appointment is ineffective in so far a s it may adversely
affect those emoluments, rights and privileges. LATIN MAXIM: 39

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary Case No. 64
G.R. No. 83896 (February 22, 1991) Chapter XI, Pages 443, 450 and 454, Footnote
s No. 41, 51 and 71 FACTS: Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which,
in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant s
ecretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their pr
imary positions. This run s counter to Art. 7, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which
provides that the President, Vice-P resident, the Members of the Cabinet, and t
heir deputies and assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constit
ution, hold any other office or employment duri ng their tenure. ISSUE: W/N the
prohibition in Art. 7, Sec. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for appointiv
e officials in general under Art. 9-B, Sec. 7, par. 2. HELD: No. A foolproof yar
dstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision.
The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government would l
ead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes
of self-enrichment, particularly during the Marcos era. The qualifying phrase un
less otherwise provided in this Constitution of Sec. 13, Art. 7 cannot possibly
refer to the broad exceptions of Sec. 7, Art. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution. The
former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multip le offices applic
able to all elective public officials and employees while the latt er is meant f
or the exception of the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet , thei
r deputies and assistants. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution.
E.O. 284 is therefore declared null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, b2

69 People of the Philippines vs. Muoz Case No. 217 G.R. No. L-38969 (February 9, 1
989) Chapter XI, Page 446, Footnote No.42 FACTS: The Defendant was convicted of
three counts of murder. The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Pen
al Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death but this was modif
ied by Art. 3, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution providing that any death pena
lty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion temporal. ISSUE: W/N this Cour
t would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that the abolition of the death penalty l
imited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, t he minimum and
the medium. HELD: No. In the case at bar, the Court found that the applicable s
entence would be the medium period of penalty prescribed in Art. 248 of the Revi
sed Penal Code , which does not follow the Masangkay ruling, and that would be r
eclusion perpetua . LATIN MAXIMS: 1, 6c, 20a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Nitafan v. C
ommissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. 190 G.R. No. 78780 (July 23, 1987) Chap
ter XI, Page 447, Footnote No.46 FACTS: Petitioners submit that any tax withheld
from their emoluments and compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decr
ease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10, Art.
8 of the Constitution manda ting that during their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased , even as i t is anathema to the ideal of an inde
pendent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution . ISSUE: W/N the salary of the
members of the judiciary is subject to the general

income tax applied to all taxpayers. HELD: Yes. The salary of the members of the
judiciary is subject to the general income tax. According to Perfecto vs. Meer,
income taxes are part of the diminut ion of judges salaries because the indepen
dence of judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come fr
om taxing their salaries . Endencia vs. David confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer. Howev
er both decisions must be discarded because the framers of the fundamental law (
i.e. Fox, Concepcion, and Bernas), a s the alter ego of the people, have express
ed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec. 10 Art. 8 of the 1987 Con
stitution; that is, to make the salarie s of the members of the judiciary taxabl
e. LATIN MAXIM: 3, b1

70 Taada v. Cuenco, et al Case No. 286 G.R. No. L-10016 (February 28, 1957) Chapte
r XI, Page No. 451, Footnote No.55 FACTS: The Senate upon nomination of the Naci
onalista Party chose Senator Laurel, Lopez, and Primicias, as members of the Sen
ate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Upon nomination of the Citizens Party, Petitioner
was next chosen by the Senate as member of SET. Then, the Senate chose Responden
ts as members of the same SET. Petitioners maintain that after the nomination an
d election of Senator Laurel, L opez, and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as
members of the SET, the other Senator s must be nominated by the Citizens Party
. Respondents alleged, however, that six members of the Electoral Tribunal shall
be members of the Senate or the House of Representatives , is mandatory. The wo
rd shall is imperative in nature relative to t he number of members of the Elect
oral Tribunal and this is borne in the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. ISSU
E: W/N the election of Respondents as members of the Electoral Tribunal was vali
d or lawful. HELD: No. The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous constr
uction is more restricted except as to matters committed by the Constitution its
elf to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical constr
uction is n ot necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case. Hen
ce, if the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further
applicatio n is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public p
olicy, it may be rejected. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6b, 9b, 11a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION A
ratuc v. COMELEC Case No. 19 G.R. No. L-49705-09 (February 8, 1979) Chapter XI,
Page 452, Footnote No.62 FACTS:

Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to addre
ss irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batasan g Pa
mbansa. ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions made by t
he Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the Petiti
one rs. HELD: No. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out with gra
ve abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court cit ed differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to the S
upreme Court s power over COMELEC decisions in 1935, the Supreme Court may revie
w Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari; 1973, Respondent s decis
ions may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. This highlights the 1
973 Constitution s intent to strengthen Respondent s independence. Consequently,
errors of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable i
n certiorari. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9a, 25a

In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta Case No. 59 A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC (N
ovember 9, 1998) FACTS: Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May
12 1998, within 2 months before the election. There are two conflicting provisi
ons in the 1987 Constitution, the former validating this action and the latter p
roscribing it. O n the one hand, Art. 8, Sec. 4 requires that all vacancies in t
he judiciary be filled with in 90 days of such vacancy. On the other hand, Art.
7, Sec. 15 prohibits the President from making any appointments two months befor
e Presidential elections, except for temporary appointments to executive positio
ns when public interest is at stake. ISSUE: W/N the appointments were valid. HEL
D: No, the appointments were void. The general rule is that the President must f
ill in vacancies in the Judiciary within 90 days, but this does not apply in the
spe cial circumstance of Presidential elections, which occurs only once every s
ix years. Temporary appointments to executive positions are the only exception.
The prohibition is for public policy purposes, to prevent midnight appointments
which is more compelling than temporary vacancies in the judiciary. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9a, 35, 36b, 38a, 50, b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtoto v. Manguera Case No.
159 G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 (March 3, 1975) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.79 F
ACTS: The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. 20 Art. 4 of the New
Constitution which took effect on Jan. 17, 1973. The provision reads: Any person
under investigation shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and t
o b e informed of such right . Any confession obtained in violation of this sect
ion shal l be inadmissible. Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murd
er in two informations both dated Feb. 23, 1973. During the trial, his extrajudi
cial confe ssion dated Nov. 15, 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection
that it was take n while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC wi
thout his having bee

n informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Petit
ioner s extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. 15, 1972 is admissible as eviden
ce. 2. W/N Sec. 20, Art. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retroactively.
HELD: 1. Yes. Petitioner s confession is admissible. The court ruled that a con
fession obtained from a person under investigation, who has not been informed of
his rig ht to counsel, is admissible in evidence if the same had been obtained
before the effectivity of the New Constitution, since no law gave the accused th
e right to be so informed before that date. Conversely, such confession is inadm
issible if the sa me had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitu
tion. 2. No. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospecti
ve effect. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted h
ard ship on the part of the prosecutor. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 46a

72 Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan Case No. 106 G.R. No. 79543 (October 16, 1996) Chapt
er XI, Page 457, Footnote No.80 FACTS: Petitioners were held guilty by Responden
t Court for the crime of robbery of a postal delivery van. Upon the capture of h
is co-accused, he was pointed out as t he mastermind. When Petitioner was captur
ed, he admitted involvement in the crime and pointed his other confederates. On
May 30, 1982, Petitioner executed sworn statements (confessing what had happened
), without the presence of a counsel. Th e 1987 Constitution provides that the r
ight to counsel of the accused cannot be waived except in writing and in the pre
sence of a counsel. Petitioner claims tha t such proscription against an uncouns
elled waiver is applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial inves
tigation took place in 1983. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Petitioner s extra-judicial confe
ssion is admissible even without the presence of a counsel. 2. W/N the said prov
isions of 1987 Constitution can be applied retroactively. HELD: 1. Yes, it is ad
missible under the 1973 Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of th e right to coun
sel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel d uring the ef
fectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admis sible
. 2. No. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver
b y an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be m
ade w ith the assistance of a counsel may not be applied to him retroactively or
in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity o
f the said const itution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 46a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Co v. E
lectoral Tribunal, House of Representatives Case No. 66 G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 9
2202-03 (July 30, 1991) Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.82 FACTS:

Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of Northern Samar, as

a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987 Cons
titution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on June 19, 1948 (during which the 1935 Con
stitution was operative), is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been bor
n to a Chinese father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao. ISSUE:
1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constituti
on are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens. 2. W/N this provision sh
ould be applied retroactively. HELD: Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 of the C
onstitution, children born of Filipin o mothers before January 17, 1973 shall be
accorded natural born status if they el ect Philippine citizenship upon reachin
g the age of majority. They need not perform any act of election granted that hi
s father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957, when he was on
ly 9 years old. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since it
seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under t he 1935 Constitution wherein
people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born w
hile children born of Filipino mothers and alien father s were not. LATIN MAXIM:
8a, 9a, 42a

73 Sarmiento v. Mison Case No. 277 G.R. Nos. 80519-21 (December 17, 1987) Chapte
r XI, Page 458, Footnote No.84 FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of appoi
ntment of Respondent as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that
it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The Court favored the R
espondent based on express provisions of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: W/N Sec.
16, Art. 7 provides for officers other than the first group to be appointed with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. HELD: No. Sec. 16 Art. 7 only pr
ovides for the appointment, by the President of heads of executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces fr
om the rank of colonel or naval captain, and othe r officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution with the requirement of CA approval. Deli
berations of the Constitutional Commission revea l that the framers of the 1987
Constitution deliberately excluded the position head s of bureaus from CA confir
mation with the intent of reconciling the 1935 Constitution which turned the Com
mission into a venue for horse-trading , and that of the 1973 Constitution which
placed absolute power of appointment in the President. The wo rd also in the se
cond sentence of Sec. 16 Art. 7 must not be construed as to suppose that officer
s in the second sentence shall be appointed in a like manner as that o f the fir
st group. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24b, 32, 39a, b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Domingo v. Com
mission on Audit Case No. 37 G.R. No. 112371 (October 7, 1998) FACTS: Petitioner
was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the personnel of t
he entire Region V of DSWD. Respondent sent a communication to the

Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement accoun
ts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collectin
g transportation allowances when they should not be. Petitioner asserted that ev
en if she was assigned a government vehicle, she was entitled to transportation
allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle. ISSUE: W/N a commuta
ble transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provi
ded with a government vehicle, for the days the officia l did not actually use t
he vehicle. HELD: The General Appropriations Act of 1988, 1990 and 1991 clearly
provides that transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who are
assigned a government vehicles except as approved by the President. LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 24a

Globe-Mackay v. NLRC and Salazar Case No. 112 G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992) Cha
pter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.3 FACTS: Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar und
er preventive suspension because it appeared that she had full knowledge of the
loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from
the company but failed to infor m her employer. Respondent Salazar filed a compl
aint for illegal suspension and for ot her damages. On appeal, the Respondent Co
urt affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement
of Private Respondent but limited back wages to 2 years and deleted award for m
oral damages. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discreti
on in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar. 2. W/N there existed ind
ependent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and, thereb
y, justify her dismissal. HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to h
is full back wages. An exce ption to this is when the reinstatement may be inadm
issible due to strained relations between the employer and the employee. The pos
ition of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may be characteri
zed as such. Moreover, Petition er merely insinuated that since Respondent Salaz
ar had a special relationship with Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge
of Saldivar s questionable activitie s. LATIN MAXIM: 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Luzon Brokerage Co v. Public Service Commission Case No. 76 G.R. No. L-37661 (No
vember 16, 1932) FACTS: Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized
exclusively for the carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. On
May 9, 1932, Responde nt required the Petitioner to file with the commission wit
hin a period of thirty da ys an application for a certificate of public convenie
nce for the operation of his tru cks since they were said to be devoted to the t
ransportation of cargo with

compensation as provided in Sec. 13 of the Public Service Law. ISSUE: W/N the am
endments introduced into Sec. 13 of Act No. 3108 by Act No. 3316 conferred juris
diction on the Respondents over the Petitioner s business, although it is not a
common carrier. HELD: The omission from Sec. 13 of the phrase for public use in
the definition of a public service does not mean that the Legislature meant to e
xtend the jurisdicti on of the PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public
use. Public service is a se rvice for public use. The insertion of the phrase fo
r hire or compensation does not show the intent either. This is a stock phrase f
ound in most definitions of a common carr ier and a public utility. Also, notwit
hstanding the changes in the wording of the defini tion of the term public servi
ce introduced by Act No. 3316, there were no alterations made in the basic provi
sions of the other sections. Respondent has no jurisdicti on over Petitioner. LA
TIN MAXIM: 6c, 36b

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 75 ROUND 2

76 Aparri v. Court of Appeals Case No. 15 G.R. No. L-30057 (January 31, 1984) Ch
apter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.4 FACTS: R.A. 1160 created the National Resettle
ment and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). Said law also empowered its Boar
d of Directors to appoin t and fix the term of office of the General Manager sub
ject to approval of the President. On January 15, 1960, the Board approved Resol
ution No. 13 appointing Petitioner as General Manager of NARRA. On March 15, 196
2, the Board approved Resolution No. 24 wherein the President expressed his desi
re to fix the term of office of the incumbent Genera l Manager up to March 31, 1
962. ISSUE: W/N Resolution No. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without caus
e. HELD: No, Petitioner s term of office is deemed expired. R.A. 1160 expressly
gives the Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General M
anager. Th e word term describes the period that an office may hold office and u
pon expiration of such term, his rights, duties, and authority must cease. In th
is case, the te rm of office is not fixed by law, but by the Board. LATIN MAXIM:
6a, 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Quijada Case No. G.R. Nos. 115008 (July
24, 1996) FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. H
e was convicted of 2 offenses, which were separately filed: 1) Murder under Art.
248 of the RPC 2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under P
D 1866 Par 2 of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 states that, the If homicide or murder is com
mitted with

use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. ISSUE: 1) W

/N the trial court s judgment should be sustained in conformity with the doctrin
e laid down in People v. Tac-an, People v. Tiozon, People v. Caling, etc. OR to
modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of fire
arm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. Barros. 2) W/N the 2nd par of S
ec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm a nd the resultant killi
ng into a single integrated offense. HELD: 1) The trial court s judgment is affi
rmed. 2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P.D. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intend
ed to treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of illegal poss
ession with homicide or murder . It does not use the clause as a result on the o
ccasion of to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime, but rathe
r it uses the clause with the use of . LATIN MAXIM: 6c
or

77 Baranda v. Gustillo Case No. 30 G.R. No. L-81163 (September 26, 1988) Chapter
IV, Page 125, Footnote No.5 FACTS: Both parties claim that they own a parcel of
land, Lot No. 4517. The Court, after discovering that private respondent s TCT
was fraudulently acquired, ordered a writ of possession against them and issued
a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed by Private
Respondents. Another group filed a separate civil case against Petitioners and
applied for lis pendens on the TCT of said lot, whi ch the court found out to be
privies of the Private Respondents tasked to delay the implementation of the fi
nal decisions of the Court. ISSUE: 1. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subseque
nt civil case with the Court Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notic
e of lis pendens in certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier decl
ared valid subsisting by this Court. 2. What is the nature of the duty of the Re
gister of Deeds to annotate or the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificat
e of Title? HELD: of the and annul
1. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of D
eed s stand. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. 77 of P.D. 1529 which provides: Cance
llation of lis pendens Before the final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that it is necessary to
protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered. 2. Sec 10 of PD 1529
states that, It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately regis
ter an instrument presented for registration . If the instrument cannot be regis
tered, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of
such denial in writing, stating the ground therefore, and advising him of his ri
ghts to appeal by consulta. LATIN MAXIM: 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basbacio v. O
ffice of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice Case No. G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1
994)

FACTS: RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustl
y accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama w
er e charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding hi
s wif e and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal t
o the CA , Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him an
d his son-i nlaw was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of
the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with hi
s son-in-la w. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to comp
ensation. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309.
HELD: No, he is not. For one to be unjustly accused one must be wrongly accused
from the very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliber
ately rendered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis
for judgment) and imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted becau
se the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner w
as guilty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11a, 25a

78 Segovia v. Sandiganbayan Case No. G.R. No. 124067 (March 27, 1998) FACTS: Pet
itioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee for NPC s Mindana
o project. The lowest bidder, Joint Venture was disqualified after th e PCAB ver
ified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder, Urban Consoli dated C
onstructors, were downgraded thereby ineligible as bidders. Since all other bids
exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project, the committee declar
ed a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. NPC Board approved, but for r
easons not on record. The project was eventually cancelled. Petitioners wer e ch
arged under RA 3019 for in one way or the other, extending undue advantage to Jo
int Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusab l
e negligence. For this, petitioners were suspended from office. ISSUE: W/N it is
mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspensi
on public officers who stand accused before it. HELD: Yes, it is mandatory. Unde
r the act, one accused of any offense involving fraud upon government public fun
ds or property whether the crime is simple or complex, regardless of stage of ex
ecution and mode of participation, shall be suspended from office. Jurisprudence
is clear that upon determination of the val idity of the information, a court m
ust issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, Luciano, et al
. v. Mariano, Socrates v. Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 7a STATUTORY CONSTR
UCTION Tanada v. Yulo Case No. 288 No. 43575 (May 31, 1935) Chapter IV, Page 127
, Footnote No.11 FACTS: Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. G
en. with the consent by the Philippine Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas.
Later in his service, he was transferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65th
birthday on October 35, 1

934, subsequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory the retire
ment of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes
effe ct on January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon the direct
ive of the S ecretary of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holdin
g office pursuant to A ct No. 3899. ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hol
d office. 2. W/N his transfer is considered a new transfer and requires confirma
tion by the Philippine Commission. HELD: No, Petitioner should not cease to hold
office as Act No. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office
are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect, not thereafter. Theref
ore, Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good
behavior or does not become incapacitated. No, his transfer is not a new appoin
tment. Hence, no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the ju
risdiction grounded on original appointmen t. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

79 Eliseo Silva v. Belen Cabrera Case No. 146 G.R. No. L-3629 (March 19, 1951) F
ACTS: Respondent filed an application with the Public Service Commission for a c
ertificate of public convenience, to be able to operate an ice plant in the Cit
y of Lipa. Petitioner, owner of another ice plant already in the same area, oppo
sed Respondent s application, claiming that public convenience did not need anot
her ice plant. Atty. Aspillera was delegated by the Commissioner to receive test
imon y and conduct hearing of the contest; thereafter the Commission en banc ren
dered a decision that Respondent was allowed to operate the ice plant. After whi
ch, Petitioner claimed that under the law, no one except the Commissioner may he
ar contested cases. ISSUE: W/N delegation to Atty. Aspillera to hear the case is
lawful. HELD: No, the delegation is unlawful. Although Sec. 32 of Public Servic
e Act allows the Commission to delegate to any of their attorneys the right to r
eceive eviden ce or take testimony, Sec. 3 of the same act provides that in (1)
all contested cases and (2) cases involving fixing of rates, the reception of ev
idence may only be delegated to one of the Commissioners. Thus, though the law m
akes it inconvenient or cumbersome for the Commission to handle contested cases,
where the law is clear, the Commission nor the Court may not disregard, circumv
ent, or interpret the law any other way. Plu s, you have to look at the entire A
ct, and not just specific provisions, in applyin g the law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a,
8a, 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Radio Communications of the Philippines v. Natio
nal Telecom. Com. Case No. 129 G.R. No. L-68729 (May 29, 1987) FACTS:

Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operate a rad

io communications system, recognized by the Public Service Commission (PSC). Pet
itioner then established services in Sorsogon, Mindoro, and Samar. In 1980, t he
Respondent, which replaced the PSC, authorized Kayumanggi to set up radio syste
ms in Mindoro and Samar too. Respondent, after conducting a hearing upon a compl
aint by Kayumanggi, ordered Petitioner to stop operating, because it didn t have
a certificate of public convenience, which is necessary under EO 546 for an y p
ublic service to operate. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of can
didacy before it can validly operate. HELD: Yes, they need such certificates to
validly operate. Petitioner was created under RA 2036, governed by the Public Se
rvice Commission. Under it, radio companies did not need a certificate of public
convenience to operate. However, P.D. 1 abolished the Public Service Commission
and EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. Under EO 546, Respondent must iss
ue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communicati on
s systems. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have. LATIN MAXIM: 2a
, 6c, 30, 46a, 49

80 National Federation of Labor v. Hon. Eisma Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-61236 (Janu
ary 31, 1984) FACTS: Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termi
nation of their union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. In the
process, they blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from ente
ring the premises. Thereafter, Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruc
tion of p rivate property. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this cas
e belongs to Labo r Arbiter and not for courts to decide. ISSUE: W/N courts may
be labor arbiters that can pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is
it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC? HELD: Yes, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction
. In the Labor Code, Sec. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction.
However, P.D. 1367 amended Sec. 217, vesting courts of first instance with origi
nal jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. But again P.D. 1691 am
ended Sec. 217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. Additionally, BP 13
0 amended t he same section, but without changing original jurisdiction of LA ov
er money claims aris ing from employer-employee relations. Thus the law is clear
, respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to act on the case. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7
a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista Case No. 198 G.R. No. 84240
(March 25, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16 FACTS: Petitioners are th
e acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the
full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate witho
ut any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurio

us children. ISSUE: W/N Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which sta
tes that An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the leg
itimate chil dren and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children
or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child , can be in
terpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the dec
eased. HELD: In Diaz v. IAC, this Court ruled that Art. 992 of the Civil Code pr
ovides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestat e between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relat
ives of the father o r mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural
tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992. El
igio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate childr e
n. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the lat
ter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother o
f their fat her. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 7b, 36b

People v. Amigo Case No. 201 G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996) Chapter IV, Page
127, Footnote No.16 FACTS: The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding
the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentence
d to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-Appellant argues that error was
committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion
perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Const
itution was already in effect whe n the offense was committed. Accused-Appellant
contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7
659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should hav
e been imposed for the crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. ISSUE
: W/N Sec. 19 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresp
onding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition a gainst
the death penalty. HELD: In People vs. Muoz, the Court held that A reading of Sec
tion 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therei
n which expressly decla res the abolition of the death penalty. LATIN MAXIM: 5a,
7b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Santayana Case No. 115 No. L-22291 (Novembe
r 15, 1976) FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession o
f firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day t
o two years, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS, which
apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms, exempts him from secur
i ng a license or permit corresponding thereto. HELD: Yes. At the time of appell
ant s apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing was enunciated in the case of P
eople vs. Macarandang wherein it was held that the appointment of a civilian as
secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace a nd order campaigns and dete
ction of crimes sufficiently puts him within the categor y of a peace officer eq
uivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 8
79 . LATIN MAXIM: 46a

82 National Marketing Corp. (NAMARCO) v. Miguel D. Tecson Case No. 184 G.R. No.
L-29131 (August 27, 1969) Chapter 4, Page 127, Footnote No.18 FACTS: On 14 Novem
ber 1955, defendants were ordered by the Court of First Instance of Manila to pa
y PRATRA, the sum of P7,200 plus 7% interest until the a mount was fully paid un
til May 25, 1960. On 21 December 1965, Plaintiff filed a compla int against the
same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the init ial case. D
efendants moved to dismiss the said complaint, on the ground of lack of jurisdic
tion over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. The com plaint
was dismissed as having prescribed. ISSUE: W/N the date on which ten years from
December 21, 1955 expired was considered to be December 21, 1965. HELD: NO. "Whe
n the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hun
dred sixty-five days each" according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code. 1960 and 1964
being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (1 0)
years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955, e
xpired on December 19, 1965. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santiago
v. Commission on Elections, et al. Case No. 90 G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997)
Chapter IV, Page 129, Footnote No.26 FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Private Respon
dents filed with Respondent Commission a petition to amend the Constitution thro
ugh a system of initiative S ec. 2, Art. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
s filed a special civil action for p rohibition based on the argument that the c
onstitutional provision on people s initiative can

only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been pas
sed. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Cons ti
tution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitl e on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initi
ative, which a re specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. Thi
s deliberate omiss ion indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend
the Constitution was left to som e future law. ISSUE: W/N RA 6735 is an adequat
e statute to implement Section 2, Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: NO.
While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtit
le II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitl e is p
rovided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the l
atter si mply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
on national and loc al laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provid
e for the implementation of th e initiative on amendments to the Constitution, i
t could have provided for a subti tle therefore, considering that in the order o
f things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the peop
le to directly propose amendments to the Constit ution is far more important tha
n the initiative on national and local laws. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 43

83 Villanueva v. COMELEC Case No. 170 No. L 54718 (December 4, 1986) FACTS: On J
anuary 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of D
olores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoz a w
ho withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in t
he election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respon
den t Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner s candidacy was
not duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment
of th e proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds t
hat Mendoza s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was e
ffective, Petitioner s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw af
t er January 4. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of fo
rmal or technical defects. HELD: No. The fact that Mendoza s withdrawal was not
sworn is a technicality, which should not be used to frustrate the people s will
in favor of Petitioner as the su bstitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right
on the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having
been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the lite
ral reading of the provision by Respon dent Commission. The spirit of the law ra
ther than its literal reading should have gu ided Respondent Commission in resol
ving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as ca
ndidates. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 39c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mario R. Melchor v. Com
mission on Audit Case No. 177 G.R. No. 95398 (August 16, 1991) Chapter IV. Page
133, Footnote No.35 FACTS:

On July 15, 1983, Petitioner, as school administrator of Alangalang Agro-Industr

ial School of Leyte, entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for
the construction of one of the school buildings. The school accountant issued a
certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but failed
t o sign as a witness to the contract, which was approved by the Minister of Edu
cation. During construction, the contractor sought additional charges due to lab
or cost increas e, but eventually gave up the project to save itself from losses
. Consequently, the matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallowed
the payment in postaudit on the ground that the contract was null and void for l
ack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. For thi
s reason the petitioner was made personally liable for the amount paid to the co
ntractor. ISSUE: 1. W/N the contract was null and void. 2. W/N the petitioner sh
ould be held personally liable for the amount paid to th e contractor. HELD: No.
The chief accountant s issuance of a certificate of fund availability served as
substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of t h
e contract. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore
th e approval of the Minister of Education. Also, it was highly inequitable for
the C ourt to compel the Petitioner, who had substantially complied with the man
date of LOI 96 8, to shoulder the construction cost of the building, which was b
eing utilized by t he school when he was not reaping benefits from it. LATIN MAX
IM: 8a, 9a, 12a

Mateo Casela v. Court of Appeals, and Exequiel Magsaysay Case No. 50 G.R. No. L
26754 (October 16, 1970) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No.38 FACTS: Petitioner
was ordered, on Oct. 26, 1956, to vacate the premises and remove his house. Peti
tioner refused to comply. Thus, the Court issued two more writs on Ma y 6, 1958
and April 14, 1959. Instead of obeying the writs, the Petitioner filed a ca se b
efore the Court of First Instance of Zambales, asking Private Respondent to pay
him th e value of his house in addition to damages. He also filed a motion for s
uspension of the implementation of the writ of execution. The Court granted the
motion for suspension but the civil case was dismissed when it reached Responden
t Court. Fo r this reason, Magsaysay filed a motion for execution of the writ da
ted Dec. 6, 19 63 and another on Feb. 11, 1964. CAR denied the motion holding th
at its decision da ted Oct. 26, 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion
for the reason that a period of five years has already elapsed from the said dat
e. ISSUE: W/N the motion for execution which was filed beyond the reglementary p
eriod was time-barred. HELD: No. From Dec. 17, 1956 when the decision in questio
n became final and executory, to Dec. 11, 1963, the date when Private Respondent
s motion for execution was filed, a period of 6 years, 11 months and 24 days el
apsed. From th is period, the time during which the writs of execution could not
be served, or a p eriod of 3 years, 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. Co
nsequently, only 3 years, 1 month and 29 days can be charged against the regleme
ntary period. Hence Private Respondent s motion for execution was not time-barre
d. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9c, 11a, 11d, 11e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Jesus v. City of
Manila Case No. 86 G.R. No. L-9337 (December 24, 1914) Chapter IV, Page 134, Fo
otnote No.41 FACTS:

In 1907, Petitioner bought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila whic
h was under the Torrens system. Apparently, the original owner incorrectly decla
red the size of the land. So, from 1901 1907, the original owner was paying less
er taxes than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1907 1910. Upon findin
g out that he was not paying the correct amount of taxes, Petitioner paid the ta
xes, fees, and interest of P2, 096.49 for the unpaid balance of the years 1901 1910. Soon after, he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount. P
etitioner was awarded P1, 649.82. Petitioner contends that the supposed taxes fr
om before 1910 were not actually taxes because they had not yet been assessed. T
axes may not be due and payable until they are assessed. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner s
hould still pay the taxes which were not assessed before. HELD: Petitioner shoul
d only pay the taxes when he was the owner of the property. LATIN MAXIM: 6, 9a,
38b, 43, 50

85 Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong Case No. 45 G.R. No. L-48848 (May 11, 1
988) FACTS: In April 1977, PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in th
e private sector to pay their employees an extra P60/month as emergency allowanc
e. The increase was set at May 1, 1977, as well as the rules issued on the same
day. Se c. 6 stated that Employers may apply for exemption with the Secretary of
Labor within 30 days from the effectivity of these rules. On September 27, 1977
, the company fil ed with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from
paying the increase. Respondent approved both applications granting exemptions
for the company. Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave abuse of disc
retion, amounting to loss of jurisdiction by approving both applications. ISSUE:
1. W/N the first application was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period. 2
. W/N the petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emerge
ncy allowance. HELD: No, the application was not a strict rule. The purpose of t
he PD is to protect wages and income. The law takes into consideration that ther
e is a possibility t hat some employers are not financially capable to pay such
wages and such incapability may happen anytime within the year. No, only the Dep
artment of Labor and Wage Commission can decide if the petitioner was in a finan
cial position to pay. The Department is in a better pos ition to assess the matt
er. In absence of any grave abuse of discretion, their recommendations will be r
espected by the courts. Moreover, the company was able prove their financial sit
uation by giving financial statements. LATIN MAXIM: 8, 9a, 42 STATUTORY CONSTRUC
TION Morales v. Paredes Case No. 83 G.R. No. L-34428 (December 29, 1930) FACTS:

Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other peopl
e have already registered such land as their own. Respondent Judge granted the r
egistration of the land to the two claimants. Petitioner filed a motion for reco
nsideration in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. While the Motion was s
till pending, Petitioner brought the present a ction to the Supreme Court prayin
g that the decision of Respondent Judge be set aside and a new trial should be g
ranted in accordance with Sec. 513 if the Code of Civ il Procedure. ISSUE: W/N a
new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 513 of the Code of Civil Pr
ocedure. HELD: Supreme Court cannot open a new trial. The Supreme Court does not
have jurisdiction to reopen judgments under Sec. 513 if there are other adequat
e reme dies available. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration
case with t he Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, therefore, that action sh
ould be finished first. LATIN MAXIM: 9c

86 Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines Case No. 125 G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23
, 1956) FACTS: Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his
and Paz Vasquez children without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General
opposed t his stating that Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to
be adopted by his father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged a
s natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted
by his natural fathe r or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the st
atus of the natural child for it will go against Art. 335. ISSUE: W/N the Civil
Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or m
other. HELD: The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized o
r not. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, Ar
ticle 338 would be of no useful purpose. The rights of an acknowledged natural c
hild are much le ss than those of a legitimated child. Contending that this is u
nnecessary would den y the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rig
hts. The trend when it come s to adoption of children tends to go toward the lib
eral. The law does not prohibit t he adoption of an acknowledged natural child w
hich when compared to a natural child is equitable. An acknowledged natural chil
d is a natural child also and fo llowing the words of the law, they should be al
lowed adoption. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 8a, 9, 12, 26, 36a, 37, 39b STATUTORY CONSTRUCT
ION De Guia v. COMELEC Case No. 30 G.R. No. 104712 (May 6, 1992) FACTS:

Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 3 of RA 7166, members of the Sang
guniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. ISSUE: W/N
par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials
of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large
. HELD: No. Par (d) Sec.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the San
gguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sa
ngguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically st
ated that provin ces with only one legislative district should be divided into t
wo and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be i
nterpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation
of the petitioner there would have been no reason for the RA to single out the
single district provinces. The court real ized that the language of the law in t
his case seems abstruse and the key to determine wha t legislature intended is t
he purpose or reason which induced it to enact the stat ute. The explanatory not
e in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the divis ion into two legis
lative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the 19
92 elections. LATIN MAXIM: 2, 9c, 11a, 36b, 37, b2

Salenillas v. Court of Appeals Case No. 68 G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989) Cha
pter IV, Page 135, Footnote No.47 FACTS: On December 4, 1973, the property of Pe
titioners was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2
,500. For failure to pay th eir loan, the property was foreclosed by PNB and was
bought at a public auction by Private Respondent. Petitioner maintains that the
y have a right to repurchase the proper ty under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act.
Respondent states that the sale of the pro perty disqualified Petitioners from
being legal heirs vis--vis the said property. Respo ndent also maintains that the
period for repurchase has already prescribed based on Monge et al. vs. Angeles.
ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the sa
id Act. 2. W/N the prescription period had already prescribed. Held: The provisi
on makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by Respond
ent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. Petitioners contention would be mor
e in keeping with the spirit of the law. With regard to prescription, the Monge
case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules
under the transaction would be diffe rent. For foreclosure sales, the prescripti
on period starts on the day after the expir ation of the period of redemption wh
en the deed of absolute sale was executed. LATIN MAXIM: 9b, 26, 27, 9b, 42a STAT
UTORY CONSTRUCTION Sarcos v. Castillo Case No. 276 G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31,
l969) Chapter IV, Page 136, Footnote No. 48 FACTS: Petitioner, the elected Mayo
r of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in offi
ce by Respondent, the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. The act, constitut
ing the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged con
nivance of Petitioner with certain private individua

ls in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit, t
o the damage and prejudice of the public and of the government. And on the basis
of such administrative complaint, Petitioner was placed under preventive suspen
sion by Respondent pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as the De
centralization Act of l967 . ISSUE: W/N Respondent is vested with power to order
such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967. HELD: The ne
w law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provincia
l Board. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations by vesting t
he power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the power of susp
ension. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of preventive suspe
nsion over a Municipal Mayor. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 6d, 7a, 9a, 36b, 49

88 Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC Case No. 7 G. R. No. 122165 (February 17, l99
7) Chapter IV, Page 138, Footnote No. 53 FACTS: Respondents were both employees
of Petitioner and holding position as line leaders, tasked to supervise 36 sewer
s each. On May 5 and 6, l993, all the line leaders did not report for work. On M
ay 6, l993, Private Respondents were not allowed to enter the premises of the Pe
titioner, and then required to submit written explan ations as to their absence.
On May 10, l993, Private Respondents tendered their explanation letters. Despit
e their explanation, they were not allowed to resume their work and were advised
to await the decision of the management whether or not the real reason for thei
r absence was intended to sabotage the operations of Petitioner. But other line
leaders were allowed to resume their work despite their absence on Ma y 5 and 6,
l993. ISSUE: 1. W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from
resuming their work constitutes dismissal from the service? 2. W/N the Labor Ar
biter erred in limiting the award of backwages for only a period not exceeding t
hree 3 years? HELD: Under the old doctrine, the backwages that can be awarded to
illegally dismissed employees was not to exceed a period of three years. Howeve
r, a new doctrine allowed the awarding of full backwages and also prevented the
company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees elsewhe
re during the pendency of their case. The Labor Arbiter was wrong in awarding ba
ckwages for a period of not exceeding three years. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 6a, 6c, 7
a, 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Comendador v. Renato S. De Villa Case No. 69 G
.R. No. 93177 (August 2, 1991) Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote No. 61 FACTS:

The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prose
cution for their participation in the failed coup d etat on December l to 9, l98
9. In connection with their prosecution, a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court M
artial was formed. During their trial, petitioners invoked their right to perem
ptory challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the
right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decre
e. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial in
vestigation. 2. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. 14 to deny the right
of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. 3. W/N there was a legal basis
for the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the release of petiti
oners. HELD: The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law wa
s declared. But when the same was lifted, the right to peremptory challenge was
effectively revived. The reason being, the right was suspended due to the creati
on of military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases tha
t may b e referred to them, so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals wer
e abolishe d, the right to peremptory challenge was revived. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a
, 10

Matabuena v. Cervantes Case No. 172 G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971) Chapter IV
, Page 143, Footnote No.69 FACTS: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. D
uring this period, Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later
the two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitione
r, sought the nullifica tion of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code Ev
ery donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. The trial co
urt ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation
was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were
simply cohabitating. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition applies to donations between liv
e-in partners. HELD: Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory constructio
n that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what
is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during th
e marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressur
e being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibit
ion shall not apply also to commo n-law relationships. The court, however, said
that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necess
arily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed proper
ty because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by mar
riage. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 9c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Cour
t of Tax Appeals Case No. 151 G.R. No. L-9274 (February 1, 1957) Chapter IV, Pag
e 144, Footnote No.76 FACTS: Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. The
Manila Customs Collector assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppli
ers invoice. The duties

were paid and the shipment released. Thereafter, the Manila Customs Collector re
assessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation an d
imposed additional duties. Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but
they dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec. 7 of RA 1125 creating sa
id Tax Court. Provision says that the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions
of Commissioner of Customs. However, under Sec. 11 of same Act, the Court has j
urisdiction to review rulings of the C ollector of Customs when brought by perso
ns affected thereby. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the
decisions of the Collector of Customs. HELD: Yes, there is indeed a disparity be
tween Sec. 7 and 11 of same RA. The Supreme Court concurred with the positions o
f the Solicitor General that a cleri cal error was committed in Sec. 11 and the
word Collector should read Commissioner. To support this, the Supreme Court cite
d that under the Customs Law as found under Sec. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Adm
inistrative Code, the Collectors of Customs a re mere Subordinates of the Commis
sioner of Customs over whom he has supervision and control. In this ruling, the
court did ified an apparent clerical error in icuous intention of the Legislatur
e. t the letter, but the spirit of the law and LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 16a, 16c, 36a no
t engage in judicial legislation. It merely rect the wordings of the statute to
carry out the consp Under the rule of statutory construction, it is no the inten
t of the legislature that is important.

90 Lamb v. Phipps Case No. 143 G.R. No. L-7806 (July 12, 1912) Chapter 4, Page 1
44, Footnote No.78 FACTS: Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper acco
unt of all the funds of the government which came to his possession as a superin
tendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. Pe
titioner thus filed an action for mandamus clearance. However, prosper since the
re eedy and adequate remedy ISSUE: W/N the legislature intended to limit the jur
isdiction to cases where there is n o other adequate and speedy remedy in the or
dinary courts of law. HELD: There appears to be a typographical error in the wor
ding of Sec. 222 of Act No. 190 which reads in part: When the complaint in an ac
tion in a court of First Instance alleges that any inferior tribunal, it may if
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of la
w. The phrase courts of law should read as course of law . Copied verbatim from
the Code of Civil Procedure of California, the said section in the Californ ia C
ode reads course of law instead of courts of law . Spanish translation of said S
ec. 222 more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. In Spanish, the ot
her reme dy is not limited to the ordinary courts of law . On its face, this evi
dent typographical error, which, if uncorrected, would render the law nonsensica
l. It is therefore the duty of the court to give the statute a sensible construc
tion, such as will effectuat e the legislative intent and to avoid injustice or
an absurd conclusion. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9d, 11a, 11d, 12a, 36a, 36b, 36d, 36f, 37
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Com. of Internal Revenue v. ESSO Case No. 27 to compel t
he acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a it was contended that the action
for mandamus cannot is no showing that, as provided by law, there is no plain,
sp in the ordinary courts of law.

G.R. No. L-28502-03 (April 18, 1989) FACTS: Respondent overpaid its 1959 income
tax. It was accordingly granted a tax credit by Petitioner on August 5, 1964. Ho
wever, Respondent s payment for 1960 was found to be short. Thus, Petitioner dem
anded payment of the deficiency tax toget her with interest for the period of Ap
ril 18, 1961 to April 18, 1964. On August 10, 1964, Respondent paid under protes
t the amount alleged to be due. It protested the computation of interest, arguin
g that it was more than what was properly due, claiming that it should only be r
equired to pay interest for the amount of the difference between the deficiency
tax and Respondent s overpayment. ISSUE: 1. W/N Respondent shall pay the deficie
ncy tax of P367, 994 with interest. 2. W/N Respondent is entitled to a refund. H
ELD: The government already had in its hands the sum of P221, 033 representing t
he excess payment of Respondent. Having been paid and received by mistake, the s
um belonged to Respondent and the government had the obligation to return such a
mount, which arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time
that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. Since the amount of P221, 033
was already in the hands of the government as of July, 1960, whatever obligatio
n Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to b
e reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be charged. It is w
ell established that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner a s to s
ubvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced. Nothing i s b
etter settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which w
ould lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. Moreover, a literal interpret
ation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Statute
s should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legisl
ative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion. LATIN MAXIM:
8a, 8b, 11a, 11d, 11e, 12a, 12b

People v. Villanueva Case No. 116 G. R. L-15014 (April 29, 1961) FACTS: Defendan
t was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injuries with damage
to property in amount of P2,362 through reckless imprudence in the Justice of t
he Peace Court of Batangas. The case was considered beyond the court s jurisdict
ion because of the fine imposable upon the accused. The case was forwarded to th
e Court of First Instance, which also declared itself without jur isdiction beca
use the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries through re ckl
ess imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, and even
applied to its maximum degree. It should remain within the jurisdiction of the
J ustice of Peace. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdi
ction. HELD: Yes. Angeles et al vs. Jose, a similar case, held that jurisdiction
was with the Court of First Instance and not the municipal court. Also, since t
he Court of Fi rst Instance would have jurisdiction if the only offense were the
damage of property , it would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serio
us and less serious physi cal injuries combined with damage to property through
reckless imprudence is in jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. Moreover, there
is the possibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the physical injuries
aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property. The Justice of Pe
ace, if given jurisdiction, would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the
P2,636 fine for the damage to property committed, since such fine cannot be les
s than the amount of the damage. LATIN MAXIM: 5, 11 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Peopl
e v. Duque Case No. 106 G. R. 100285 (August 13, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 149, Foo
tnote No.97 FACTS:

Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed nor aut
horized by the proper government agency, POEA. The Labor Code provides that the
offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision o f how to
compute it. Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that prescription shall begin to r
un from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same b
e n ot known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial
procee dings for its investigation and punishment . According to Accused, a lit
eral reading suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run. ISS
UE: What is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused? HELD: Presc
ription began from the time the activities of the Accused were ascertained by th
e complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or a
uthority from the government. There is absurdity in Sec. 2 but Accused does not
benefit from a literal reading. It must be construed in such a way as to give ef
fect to the intention and avoid absurd results. Institution of judic ial proceed
ings for its investigation and punishment may be either disregarded as surplusag
e or should be deemed preceded by the word until . LATIN MAXIM: 9, 11a, 11d, 12,
15, 38

92 Bello v. Court of Appeals Case No. 15 G. R. L-38161 (March 29, 1974) FACTS: P
etitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which should
have been taken directly to Respondent Court. The Prosecutor filed a petition to
dismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50, Sec. 3) di
r ecting the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the
case to t he proper court. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismiss
al of the app eal. Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and man
damus to prohibit t he execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Responden
t Court. They dismissed the petition. Although Respondent Court recognized that
the Court of First Insta nce may have exercised its inherent powers to direct ap
peal to Respondent Court, it held that Petitioners did not implead the Court of
First Instance as principal party respondent and thus it could not grant any rel
ief at all even on the assumption th at Petitioners can be said to deserve some
equities . ISSUE: W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite fi
nality of judicial decision. HELD: Yes. The Court of First Instance acted with g
rave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreti
ng a statute, defeating its pu rpose and stressed that it is the essence of judi
cial duty to construe statutes as to a void such a deplorable result of injustic
e or absurdity . The provision should also be taken within the context and spiri
t of Rule 50, Sec. 3 as an analogous provision. The Supreme Court finds no reaso
n as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and justice to be bound by the
same rule. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 9e, 11a, 11g, 11h, 12, 36, 8b STATUTORY CONS
TRUCTION Cesario Ursua v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 306 G.R. No. 112170 (April 10, 1996) Chapter 4, Page 152, Footnote No.1
12 FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. He was requ
ested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman becau
se the law firm s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend some personal matters. A
t the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote his name at the logbook as Oscar Perez.
Petitioner s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the Omb
udsman. He was charged and convicted for violation of C.A. No. 142. ISSUE: W/N t
he acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be remedied b
y C.A. No. 142 HELD: Petitioner was acquitted. Statutes are to be construed in t
he light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. The
court may consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would le
ad to injus tice and absurdity. Likewise, C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute that s
hould be construed st rictly against the state, and in favor of the accused. LAT
IN MAXIM: 9a, 11a, 12a, 41a

93 Paat v. Court of Appeals Case No. 95 G.R. No. 111107 (January 10, 1997) FACTS
: Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in ille
ga l logging operations. He insists that only the Court can do so, citing Sectio
n 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 which reads The court shall further the orde
r of confiscation in favor of the Government as well as the machinery, equipment
which are illegally used ISSUE: W/N the petition should be granted in light of
Sec. 68 of P.D. 705. HELD: No. The above-quoted provision should be read togethe
r with Sec. 68a. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be a
chieved and the e vil to be suppressed, and they should be given such constructi
on as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits in
tended. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pritchard v. Republic Case N
o. 245 G.R. No. L-1715 (July 17, 1948) Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page 156 F
ACTS: The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption fr
om filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement fo
r exemption, it is imperative that Petitioner s children should be enrolled duri
ng t he entire period of residence, and that the Petitioner having failed to enr
oll all of his children in school, he failed to comply with one of the condition
s required to e ntitle him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention.
Issue: W/N the Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invokin
g the aforementioned provision.

HELD: The
that the
period of
intended

provision of law invoked by appellant must be interpreted in the sense

enrollment required by law must be made at any time during the entire
the residence of the applicant. The drafters of the law could not have
to create an absurd or impossible situation. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 19a

Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines Case No. 245 G.R. No. 94723 (August
, 21, 1997) Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page 156 FACTS: An American tourist r
aped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral damages, the Deputy Sheriff of
Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to draw from the Amer
ican s bank account to pay the fees. China Bank responded by invoking Sec. 113 o
f Circular 960 of Central Bank, which states that foreign curr ency deposits sha
ll be exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other process of an y court. Re
spondent Bank states that though the law is harsh, such is the law and stood fir
m on the policy. ISSUES: W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section
8 of RA 6427, as amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner. H
ELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the
deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic cr
i sis, where foreign investments were minimal. As, some time has already passed
since t he crisis that enacted RA 6424, the economy has now somewhat recovered f
rom the financial drought. Hence, the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that th
e guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent, stating that if Circ
ular 960 is to be followed, justice would be undermined, stating Art. 10 of the
Civil Code, in case of doubt as to the interp retation or application of laws, i
t is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right an d justice to prevail. LA
TIN MAXIM: 2, 14, 39 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Demafiles v. Comelec Case No. 91 G.R
. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967) Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159 FACTS: Re
spondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to

reject returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, consi
dering that they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of P
etitione r. Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board memb
ers in quest ion were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincia
l but not as municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its pre
vious decisio n. ISSUES: 1. W/N this case is moot and rom Precinct 7. 2. W/N the
board members who from sitting in the board in 3. W/N Respondent Commission . H
ELD: the board had the authority to reject the returns f were candidates for ree
lection were disqualified its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers. can o
rder the board of canvassers to count a return
RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of
Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials an d
shall have qualified. The Supreme Court ruled that and shall have qualified is d
evoid of meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of
January following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly cre
ated municipality. No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to what
ever cause. However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass made and
proclamatio n should be annulled. The law states any member of a provincial boa
rd or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall
be incomp etent to act on the said body. Since Respondent Commission has the pow
er to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why i
t cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regula
r. LATIN MAXIM: 15, 35, 43, 26

95 National Housing Corporation v. Juco Case No. 86 G.R. No. L-64313 (January 17
, 1985) FACTS: For being declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned by Petitio
ner, Private Respondent was terminated. He filed a complaint with Respondent Cou
rt and Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent Court is without jurisdict
ion as Petitioner Corporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds
for dismissal were for valid reasons. Respondent Court however, despite past dec
isio ns, decided in favor of the Private Respondent. ISSUE: W/N employees of Pet
itioner are covered by the Labor Code or by the laws and regulations governing t
he civil service. HELD: Petitioner is government owned as it never had any priva
te stockholders. The 1935 constitution s section 1 article 12 states that A civi
l service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the government shall be pro
vided by law. While the amendments in section 1 article 12b of the 1973 constitu
tion states that The civi l service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision a
nd instrumentality of the government, including every government owned or contro
lled corporation. Clearly, the inclusion of government owned or controlled corpo
ration carries out a message that the coverage is broad and all-embracing. Furth
ermore, P.D. 80 7 Sec. 56 implements the said provision. In addition to this, th
e Labor Code state s that the mentioned corporations shall be governed by the Ci
vil Service Law. LATIN MAXIM: 6, 7, 24, 26, 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v.
Mejia Case No. 111 G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407 (July 7, 1997) FACTS
: Sec. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads: Sec. 14. Any person who is found gui
lty of carnapping shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, b
e punished by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and
not more than thirty years,

when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or in intimidation of pers

ons or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when t
he owner, driver, or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. ISSUE: 1. W/N the phrase is kille
d covers both homicide and murder. 2. If the crime was frustrated murder, would
the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death? 3. W/N frustrat
ed homicide would be treated as a separate offense. HELD: The words is killed ma
ke no distinction between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other wh
ich is committed in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof makes no
difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. T he killing, whether it is h
omicide or murder, cannot be treated as a separate offen se and only serves to q
ualify the carnapping. The phrase is killed murder. refers only to consummated m
urder, and not frustrated
Frustrated homicide (or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is de
emed to fall under the clause of Sec. 14 by means of violence or in intimidatio
n of persons . LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 26, 38a, 43, 48

96 City of Manila v. Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines Case No. 23 G. R. No. L-37
251 (August 31, 1981) FACTS: The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 1
8, 1949. It fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special
Education Fund Law (RA 5447) , which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969, imposed an an
nual additional one percent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent.
With the three percent maximum limit set by RA 5447, the municipal board of Man
ila enacted Ordinance No. 7125, effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, i
mposing an additional one-half percent realty tax. Respondent Corporation paid t
he tax, but protested the Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled
that the tax ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or b
y any law, and that the city of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation s
aid tax. ISSUE: W/N the tax ordinance is valid. HELD: The Court holds that the d
octrine of implications in Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manila s
contention that the additional one-half percent real ty tax is sanctioned by the
provision of the Special Education Fund Law that the total r eal property tax s
hall not exceed a maximum of three per centum . While the 1949 Revised Charter o
f Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent, the 1969 Special Educ
ation Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax. The obvious
implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be impo sed by mun
icipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the real ty ta
x that would accrue to the city or municipality. The fact that the 1974 Real Pro
pe rty Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms th
e prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper
. That w as also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance. LATIN MAXIM: 2a,
20a, 38b, 43, 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Chua v. Civil Service Commission Case No. 60 G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992) C
hapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146 FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early
retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: Sec. 2. Coverage. Thi
s Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Governm
ent. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporar
y, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least
a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of se
paration Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the
benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Responden
t Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to
Respondent Commission yielded the same result. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner s status a
s a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirem
ent Law). HELD: The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate
the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sus
tain Respondent s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a cl
ass of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the s
aid law . The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding th
is case. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 11e, 12a, 20a, 20b, 37

97 Solid Homes Inc. v. Teresita Payawal Case No. 280 G.R. No. 84811 (Aug. 29, 19
89) Chapter IV, Page 169, Footnote No.164 FACTS: The Court of Appeals sustained
that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the case file
d by the Respondent against Petitioner for fa ilure to deliver a land title afte
r payment of the agreed amount. Petitioner contends tha t the case should have b
een heard by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and not the RTC. ISSUE: 1
. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. 2. W/N the applicable law is the g
eneral law (BP 129) or the special law (PD 134 4) HELD: The RTC has no jurisdict
ion over the case since the respondent s argument relies on the general statute
where in fact it is the special statute that shoul d prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 20
c, 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Richard Gordon v. Regino Veridiano II Case No. 116
G.R. No. L-55230 (Nov. 8, 1988) Chapter IV, Page 170, Footnote No.171 FACTS: Res
pondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City Drugstore. A
test buy operation at San Sebastian Drugstore, wherein agents were sold 200 tabl
ets of Valium without a doctor s prescription, gave rise to the closu re ordered
by the FDA. Before such order was promulgated, the Mayor revoked the Mayor s Pe
rmits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently, a signboard was posted
by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure. On May 7,
1980, FDA approved Respondent s request to exchange the locations of the two dru
gstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building). Upon knowledge of this,
Petitioner then revoked the Mayor s Permit issued to Olongapo City Drugstore. IS
SUE: The conflict between the FDA s and the mayor s power to grant and revoke

licenses for the operation of drugstores. RULING: The FDA had the authority to o
rder the closure of San Sebastian Drugstore, the Mayor however did not. In the c
ase of Olongapo City Drugstore however, the authority rested on the Mayor (local
jurisdiction). LATIN MAXIM: 20c, 38b

98 Eufronio Llanto v. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo Case No. 155 G.R. No. L-21905 (Mar, 3
1, 1966) Chapter IV, Page 171, Footnote No.178 FACTS: The Provincial Board of La
nao del Norte reverted the 60- 61 salary appropriation for the position of Assis
tant Provincial Assessor to the general f und. The position, then held by the Pe
titioner, was abolished. Petitioner came to the cou rt on mandamus, wherein the
Respondent s motion to dismiss was granted hence the current action. ISSUE: 1. W
as the dismissal order issued without hearing on the motion to dismiss? 2. Is it
void? RULING: There is no need for a hearing and no, it is not void. The motion
to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action, which can be determined by r
eference to the facts in the averred pleading. The question raised is purely one
of law. The leg al issue was fully discussed in the motion and opposition there
to. Oral arguments are the n reduced to unnecessary ceremonies. Further, petitio
ner contends that the stamp o f approval of the Secretary of Finance is needed i
n abolishing his position. Such action was, however, done away with by the Local
Autonomy Act (Sec. 3a of RA2264). LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 20a, 32, 37, 49 STATUTORY CO
NSTRUCTION People v. Concepcion Case No. 205 G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922)
Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.202 FACTS: Defendant authorized an extension o
f credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion, S. en C, a co-partnership. Defendant s w
ife was a director of this co-partnership. Defendant was found guilty of violati
ng Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that T he National Bank shall not, directl
y or indirectly, grant loans to any of the membe rs of the

Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks. This Section w
a s in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1
921. ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747
, which were repealed by Act No. 2938. HELD: In the interpretation and construct
ion, the primary rule is to ascertain and giv e effect to the intention of the L
egislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provides a punishm
ent for any person who shall violate any provisions of th e Act. Defendant conte
nds that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served to take away ba
sis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of t he Legislat
ure which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same off
ense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of
jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with viola tions of
the old law. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6b, 9a, 37, 38b

99 Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo Case No. 285 G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994) Cha
pter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.205 FACTS: The petition questions the withholding
of one-half of Petitioner s retirement benefits. Petitioner was Chairman of the
COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1985 , he applied for and obtained clearance
, which covered the period from 1976 to 1985, from all money, property, and othe
r accountabilities in preparation for hi s retirement. After the EDSA Revolution
, he submitted his resignation and sought a second clearance for the period from
January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. Responden t, who took over as Chairman, creat
ed an inventory/audit of all equipment acquired during the tenure of his 2 prede
cessors. After the committee recommended Petitioner s clearance from accountabil
ity and after another special audit, Respondent approved Petitioner s applicatio
n for retirement but added that of the money value of benefits due would be withh
eld subject to the findings of the aud it. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can authorize t
hat half of Petitioner s retirement benefits may be withheld. HELD: No. Under Se
ction 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to the Auditor General and members
of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or e
xecution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146 (Revised Government Service In
surance Act), the benefits granted shall not among others, to attachment, garnis
hment, levy or other processes. Petitioner s benefits is not allowed in this cas
e. Well-settled is etirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the reti
ree because the to provide for the retiree s well-being. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 9d
, 11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, 38b, 42a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alpha Investigation and Se
curity Agency, Inc. v. NLRC Case No. 12 G.R. No. 111722 (May 27, 1997) Chapter V
, Page 177, Footnote No.2 be subject, Withholding the rule that r intention is

FACTS: Petitioner provides security services. One of its clients is Don Mariano
Marcos State University (DMMSU). Security guards working in DMMSU filed before t
he Regi onal Office of the DOLE a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance
with the cur rent minimum wage order. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision hol
ding Petitioner and DMMSU solidarily liable for the salary differential owed to
the security guards. Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should
be borne by DMMSU. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may be held jointly and severally liab
le with DMMSU for nonpaymen t of minimum wage. HELD: Yes, Petitioner is jointly
and severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of wage increases. Section 6 of
RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) provides that in case of wage increases resul
ting in a salary differential, the liability of the principal and contractor sha
ll be joint and several. The same liability attaches under Art icles 106, 107 an
d 109 of the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in the cas
e at bar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescribed i n Sect
ion 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code. Th is
interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory constructio
n that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review o
f the whole law, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and n
ot of an isolate d part or a particular provision alone. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 3
6a, 36c, 38b

100 Alfon v. Republic Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-51201 (May 29, 1980) FACTS: Petition
er files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primi
tiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon. The reasons she gave on why she was petitioning
to have her name changed are the following: 1. She has been using the name Estre
lla Alfon from infancy. 2. She has been enrolled from Grade school to College in
the same name. 3. All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon. 4. She exercise
d her right to suffrage under the same name. ISSUE: W/N legitimate and legitimat
ed children are required to use the surname of their father. HELD: No. The word
"principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that
there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to
use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally ent itled. Petition
er is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiv
a Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 42a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Espino v. Cleofe Case No. 102 G.R. No. L-33410 (July 13, 1973) Chapter V, Page
182, Footnote No.25 FACTS: Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition fo
r declaratory relief filed by 18 Respondents for a judicial declaration of their
rights under RA 1862 as amend ed by RA 4902 in the matter of conversion lump su
m gratuity to annual retirement

pension. ISSUE: W/N the provision applies to military personnel who retire even
after its June 17, 1967. HELD: No. Looking at the legislative intent through the
explanatory note the persons referred to are those who had retired and received
the gratuity in lump sum afte r June 22, 1957 but prior to the approval of the
act on June 17, 1967. A contrary interpretation which would allow or authorize r
etired military personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annu
al pension would virtually abolish the essential distinction between the two typ
es of retirement benefits and render the option under the law meaningless and nu
gatory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9a, 25a

Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of Customs Case No: 258 G. R. No. L-28
463 (May 31, 1971) Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39 FACTS: This is a petition
for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in whi ch they found in
Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues
for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) under Sec. 2802 of the Tar
iff and Customs Code which states: There shall be levied collected and paid on p
roducts of the Philippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of 2 pesos pe
r gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage ISSUE: W/N the words products of the Ph
ilippines excludes bran and pollard on the ground that they are from wheat grain
, which is imported into the Philippines. HELD: No. Even without undue scrutiny
it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the count
ry, they fall within the terms of the above section. The law is clear; it must b
e obeyed. The Term product of the Philippines should be taken in its usual signi
fication to mean any product produced in the country; hence, bran(ipa) and polla
rd(darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are products of the Phil
ippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Asiatic Petrol
eum Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. 10 G.R. No. 12687 (August 27,
1918) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.47 FACTS: The Defendant, under threat of
penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the Internal Revenue Tax provided for un
der Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432 upon all such oi ls which the plaintiff had on hand
on the 1st day of January, 1915. The tax was pai d under protest. The Plaintiff
contends that the tax collected was illegal. Sec. 1 7 Par 72a of Act No. 2432 pr
ovides that no tax (imposed by this law) shall be collected on such articles whi
ch, before the taking effect of this Act, shall have been disposed o f to consum
ers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers. Said Act took

effect upon the 1st day of January, 1915. ISSUE: W/N a dealer is required to pay
the Internal Revenue Tax, provided for under Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432, u
pon mineral oils, composed of kerosene and gasoline which had been sold, but not
delivered, prior to the 1st day of January 1915. HELD: No. The Legislature evid
ently intended, by said phrase, to mean that merchandise dispose of had been sol
d. The Legislature, by Act No. 2445, fully recognized that the phrase disposed o
f meant nothing more or less than a contract whereby the vendor was bound to fur
nish an article, because in said Act it provided that the purchaser, and not the
vendor, was subject to pay such tax in the absence of stipulations to the contr
ary. The phrase disposed of as used in Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432, should be given
its commercial sense and not a technical interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 3, 6c, 25a
, 43

102 Wil Wilhemsen, Inc v. Baluyut Case No. 173 G.R. Nos. L-27350-51 (May 11, 197
8) FACTS: Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage an
d sale storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign
ports o f Manila among others. After the merchandise had arrived at the port and
the cargo vans had been emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle
de San Francisco Stalag. The Defendant applied to the Surveyor of Port for the t
ransfer of these empty sea vans. The request was based on the Memorandum Order N
o. 19 and the Memorandum Order dated April 20, 1964. The trial court held that t
he transfer of Appellants empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Appellee was done
by authority of Customs Memorandum of April 20, 1964 and Customs Administrative
Order No. 22-64, and that the said objects were lawfully detained by Appellee i
n his warehouse pending the payment of storage charges. ISSUE: W/N the decision
of the trial court is legally valid. HELD: Yes. As plainly worded in the adminis
trative order, it becomes necessary for all empty sea vans to be removed from th
e pier premises by their owners or shipping agents within ten days after the van
s have been completely emptied of all their contents. This is in order to make a
vailable at all times adequate space in all ports for the loading and unloading
of cargoes. In addition, the administrative order has no requirement similar to
that found in Memorandum Order No. 130-63 whereby the owners of the impounded va
ns should be notified in writing. The two customs regulations under consideratio
n are in pari materia so far as both operate under the flexible cargo system. LA
TIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 32, 35, 38a, 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Calder & Co v. The Un
ited States Case No. 44 G.R. No. 2839 (August 15, 1907) Chapter V, Page 187, Foo
tnote No.46 FACTS:

The following were imported into the Philippines "One steam turbine, condensing
machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessories" the steam tu
rbine was classified under Par 257b as other machinery and detached parts not ot
herwise provided for". The trial court reversed the classification m ade by cust
oms authorities and classified it under Par 250 as "Dynamos, generators, exc ite
rs, and all other machinery for the generation of power." ISSUE: W/N the machine
ry in question should be classified under Par 257b or Par 250. HELD: A turbine e
ngine and generator, although intended for use as a powergenerating device, does
not constitute a complete power generation machine. Component parts must still
be added for that purpose to be achieved it should be classified as "other machi
nery" under Par 257b. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c, 25a, 43

103 Manila Herald Publishing Co v. Ramos Case No. 163 G. R. No. L-4268 (January
18, 1951) Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.51 FACTS: Respondent filed a libel su
it, docketed as Civil Case No. 11531, against Aproniano G. Borres, Pedro Padilla
and Loreto Pastor, editor, managing editor an d reporter, respectively, of the
Daily Record, a daily newspaper, asking damages aggregating P90,000. With the fi
ling of this suit, the Plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon p
utting up a P50,000 bond. The Sheriff of the City o f Manila levied an attachmen
t upon certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily
Record. Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printer s, Inc. commenced a joint
suit against the sheriff, Respondent Quirino and Respondent Corporation, in whi
ch the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attac
hment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P45,000 damages. This suit was d
ocketed as Civil Case No. 12263. Respondent Judge declared that the suit, in cas
e No. 12263, was "unnecessary, superfluous and ill egal" and so dismissed the sa
me. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Inc., sh
ould do was intervene in Case No. 11531. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge has authori
ty to dismiss Case No. 12263 at the stage when it was thrown out of court. HELD:
Yes, the right to intervene, unlike the right to bring a new action, is not abs
olute but left to the sound discretion of the court to allow. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 2
5a, 30, 36a, 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Malanyaon v. Lising et. al Case No. 160
GR No. L-56028 (July 30,1981) Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.52 FACTS: A Munic
ipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practic
es Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his

incumbency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his de
ath. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension pur
suant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides, Should he be convicted by final judgm
ent he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he i
s acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benef
it s w/c he failed to receive during suspension . ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of th
e case due to death of the accused constitutes acquittal. HELD: No. It is obviou
s that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted" it mea
ns that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the cour
t found that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of
the case is not equal to acquittal of the accused. In People vs. Salico (84 Phi
l. 722), " Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal d oes not decid
e the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7
a, 25a

104 Rura v. Lopena Case No. 139 G. R. No. L-69810-14 (June 19, 1985) Chapter 5,
Page 189, Footnote No.53 FACTS: Petitioner was accused, tried and convicted of f
ive (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates. The counts were consolida
ted and tried jointly. On ly a single decision was rendered. The Petitioner then
applied for probation but was denied by the fiscal on the ground that he had be
en previously convicted by fina l judgment of an offense. The fiscal invoked Sec
. 9 of the Probation Law, which disqualifies persons who have previously been co
nvicted by final judgment from applying for probation. The trial court denied hi
s application on the belief tha t since the crimes were committed on different d
ates, he was guilty on each of those dat es. Petitioner however contends that si
nce there is only one decision, he has not ye t been previously convicted. ISSUE
: How should the word HELD: The word previously refers to the date of the convic
tion and not to the dates of the crimes involved. Although he was guilty of five
counts of estafa, t hey were tried jointly and only one decision was handed dow
n. Hence, when Petitioner applied for Probation he had not yet had a final judgm
ent of conviction on his record. He is eligible for probation under such circums
tances. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Krivenko v. Register of D
eeds Case No. 139 G.R. No. L-360 (November 15, 1947) Chapter 5, Page 190, Footno
te No.60 FACTS: Petitioner, an alien, bought a residential lot but its registrat
ion was interrup ted by the war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registrati
on but was denied by the previously be construed?

register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire land in this ju
risdiction. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Mani l
a which ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. ISSUE
: W/N residential land falls under the phrase agricultural lands XIII of the 193
5 Constitution. HELD: Under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or
public agricultural lands, which includes residential lands. It may safely be pr
esumed that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when t
hey drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technica
l meaning then prevailing. Soon after, the National Assembly revised the Public
Land Law and pa ssed C.A. No. 141 which permits the sale of residential lots to
Filipino citizens or to corporations controlled by such citizens. Such revision
is equivalent to a decla ration that residential lots are considered as agricult
ural lands, for under the Consti tution, only agricultural lands may be alienate
d. In addition, the interpretation given by the Secretary of Justice (1939) also
supports the claim that residential land is part of public agricultural lands .
It is clear that the three branches of the Government have always maintained th
a t residential lots are included in agricultural lands . If the term "private a
gricultur al lands" is to be construed as not including lands not strictly agric
ultural, the result would not be in line with the conservative spirit of the Con
stitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 5a, 9a, 25a, 30a, b as stated in Article

105 Chang Yung Fa, et al. v. Gianzon, etc. and De la Cruz, etc. Case No. 19 G.R.
No. L-7785 (November 25, 1955) FACTS: Petitioners were admitted to the Philippi
nes on pre-arranged employment as immigrants under C.A. No. 613 with the express
condition that their stay shall b e limited to two years. An amendatory law was
then passed which changes the classification of pre-arranged employees from imm
igrants to non-immigrants. Petitioners contend that having been classified as no
n-quota immigrants , they should have been admitted for permanent residence in t
his country because the word immigrant is defined to be a person who comes into
a country for a permanent residence. ISSUE: W/N the word immigrant only refers t
o a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. HELD: The only de
finition given by our law to the term "immigrant" is: "any alien departing from
any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines, o ther than a no
nimmigrant." The law gives no definition to the term "nonimmigrant" fro m which
we may imply that the term "immigrant" is merely intended to include any a lien
coming to this country for permanent residence as now contended by appellants. A
review of the whole law would disclose no such intention which denotes that the
purpose of the law is to give broad power to the Commissioner of Immigration on
matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants into the Philippines. LATIN M
AXIM: 6b, 9a, 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Garcia v. COMELEC Case No. 109 G.R. No.
111511 (October 5, 1993) Chapter V, Footnote No.67, Page No. 192 FACTS: In its
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataa
n agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Spe
cial Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227. Respondent Commission i
ssued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and refere

ndum on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
It contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the Local Go
vernment Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiativ e
. The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. ISSU
E: W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an initia
tive and referendum. HELD: The petition to review and set aside the issued COMEL
EC resolutions is granted because resolutions are appropriate subjects for initi
ative and referend um (Sec. 32 of Art. VI of the Constitution). Also, RA 6735, t
he law providing for a system on initiative and referendum, includes resolutions
as among the subjects of initiat ive. Although the Local Government Code does n
ot include the word resolution in its definition, the court holds that the defin
ition does not limit the coverage of l ocal initiatives to ordinances alone. Res
olutions are still proper subjects of an ini tiative according to the Constituti
on and RA 6735. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9c, 11a, 50

106 Motoomull v. dela Paz Case No. 180 G.R. No. L-45302 (July 24, 1990) Chapter
V, Footnote No.73, Page No. 195 FACTS: The Petitioners and the Respondents were
the initial directors of the Sarkara Trading Corporation. The Corporation issued
a resolution authorizing the issuanc e of unissued stocks on a one is to one ba
sis to its stockholders. The resolution was then amended authorizing the issuanc
e of unissued shares of stock on a two is to one basis to its stockholders payab
le on Aug. 31, 1974. Petitioner sought issuance of a preliminary injunction by t
he Court of Appeals to stop the enforcement of the SE C decision pending resolut
ion of the appeal. The Court however held that it had no jurisdiction according
to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision
or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or th e court, on mot
ion, after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem just, should provide otherw
ise. The propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body render ing the award
, order, ruling, decision or judgment may be raised only by motion in t he main
case. ISSUE: 1. W/N the word court refers to a trial court and not the Court of
Appeals 2. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the dec
ision. HELD: Yes, the word court refers to the trial court. The law unequivocall
y stated its declared objection that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision
, award, orde r. The exception is given where the officer or body rendering the
same, or the cour t on motion, after hearing should provide otherwise. The law p
rovides further that th e propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body ren
dering the award, order, decision or ruling may be raised only by motion in the
main case. More important ly where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in i
tself or is equally susceptib le of various meanings, its obscurity or doubt may
be reviewed by reference to associa te words. Accordingly, an interpretation wh
ich leads to patent inconsistency must b e rejected as not in accordance with th
e legislative intent. LATIN MAXIM:

9a, 12a, 36a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Nazario Case No. 218 G.R. No. L-44
143 (August 31, 1988) Chapter V, Footnote No.81, Page No. 197 FACTS: Accused was
charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to pay municipal tax
es worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated demands. Sec. 1 Ord
inance No. 4 Series of 1995 provides: Any owner or manager of fishponds in place
s within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax i
n the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. He admi
ts to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the ordinance is unconstitu
tional, or assuming its constitutionality that it does no t apply to him as he i
s a lessee not an owner or manager. ISSUE: 1. W/N the ordinance is null and void
because it is ambiguous and uncertain. 2. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused.
HELD: No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ordinance at bar b
e said to be tainted with vagueness. It is unmistakable from the above provision
that t he Accused falls within the coverage. As the actual operator of the fish
ponds, he c omes within the term manager . While it appears that the National Go
vernment is the owner of the fishpond, the Government never shared in the profit
s they generated . It is therefore, logical that Accused alone shoulders the bur
den of the taxes under the ordinance. And obviously, the word owner cannot be co
nstrued to include the Government because of the ancient principle that the gove
rnment is immune from taxes. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 37

107 People v. Evangelista Case No. 106 G.R. No. 84332-33 (May 8, 1996) FACTS: Pr
ivate Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. Private Respo
ndent filed a petition for probation. However, Chief Probation and Parole Office
r recommended denial of Private respondent s application for probation on the gr
ound that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had alre ady waived his rig
ht to make his application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Office
r s recommendation and granted Private Respondent s application on April 23, 199
3. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by gran
ting private respondent s application for probation. HELD: Yes. Private Responde
nt filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after PD 1990 had t
aken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that no application for proba
tion shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal f
rom the judgment of conviction and that the filing of the application shall be d
eemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Having appealed from the judgment of the
trial court and applied for probation only after the Court o f Appeals had affir
med his conviction, Private Respondent was clearly precluded fr om the benefits
of probation. LATIN MAXIM: 6, 26, 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Banco de Oro Savings
and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corporation Case No. 12 G.R. No. 74917 (
January 20, 1988) FACTS: Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank fo
r reimbursement of P45,982.23 as a consequence of six crossed Manager s checks w
hich turned out to have forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the
back of each check. Philippine Clearing House Corp. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner B
ank to pay the said amount. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jur
isdiction because the checks involved were non-negotiable checks.

ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks which are non-negotiable. HELD: Yes
. As provided in the articles of incorporation of PCHC, its operation extends to
clearing checks and other clearing items. Clearly, the term checks refer to che
cks in general use in commercial and business activities, including nonnegoti ab
le checks. No doubt non-negotiable checks are within the ambit of PCHC s jurisdi
ction. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none
is indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes n
o distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought
t o be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. LATIN MAXIM: 24a
, 24b, 25a, 25b, 26

108 Robles v. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., et. al. Case No. 261 G.R. No. L-1256
0 (September 30, 1958) Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.90 FACTS: Petitioner and
Respondent Company entered into a contract by virtue of which the latter delive
red the possession of certain mining properties over whic h it had control to Pe
titioner who was to extract, mine and sell ores from said prope rties upon payme
nt of certain royalties. Upon violation of the terms of agreement, the company f
iled a complaint for unlawful detainer. Petitioner filed a motion to di smiss th
e complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without jurisdiction i n
taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land. ISS
UE: W/N Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court includes any kind of land, includi
ng mineral lands. HELD: Yes. Any land spoken of in this provision obviously incl
udes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential or mineral. It is a we
ll known maxim in statut ory construction that where the law does not distinguis
h, we should not distinguish. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Velasc
o v. Lopez Case No. 308 G.R. No. 905 (February 12, 1903) FACTS: Santiago Velasco
died in Namacpacan, La Union on December 4, 1895, leaving a last will and testa
ment. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on several grounds, most imp
ortantly that the hour is not stated. ISSUE: W/N the will of Santiago Velasco is
void because the hour of its execution is not stated.

HELD: Yes. Book III, Title II, Chapter I, Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code
explic itly states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void: T
he testator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. Afte
r the testament has been drafted in accordance with the same, stating the place
, year, month, day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud, (art 695)
Any will, in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in
this chapter have not been observed, shall be void. (art 687) The law explicitly
defines what shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what t he sanctions shal
l be if such formalities aren t met. (art 687) It was stated that if the decisio
n would be in favor of the Defendant (overlooking the absence of the hour) the C
ourt may disregard one formality afte r another until eventually they had to rep
eal the entire system established by the code. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7a

109 Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez Case No. 67 G.R. No. L-14787 (January
28, 1961) Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.95 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation eng
ages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. Importation of
materials including stabilizers and flavors is among those Petitioner imports.
For every importation, Petitioner pays the Centr al Bank of the Philippines 17%
special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, tra
nsportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. Under su
ch law, it was also provided that: Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cos
t, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Phil
ippines of stabilizer and flavo rs shall be refunded to any importer making appl
ication therefore. The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special ex
cise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of dental cream stabilizers and flavors are subj
ect to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law. HELD: No.
The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the items en
umerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, na mely: food prod
ucts, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The stabilizers an d flavo
rs the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of fo od
products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is not a food produ
ct and therefore not subject to exemption Petitioner s arguments effected the g
rant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. T
hough stabilizers and flavors are preceded by items that might fall under food p
roducts, the following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry
feed, vitamin concentra te, cattle, and industrial starch. Therefore, the law mu
st be seen in its entire context, not the parts and categorizations posited by t
he respondent. LATIN MAXIM: 26, 29, 36 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Oliva v. Lamadrid

Case No. 191 G.R. No. L-23196 (October 31, 1969) Chapter V, Page 200, Footnote N
o.96 FACTS: Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as se
curity for the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan, t
he property was foreclosed and sold to Respondent. However, under RA 720, the la
nd could be redeemed two (2) years after the sale, Feb. 4 1963. No redemption wa
s made withi n that time. On May 31 1963, Plaintiff offered to repurchase, claim
ing that under C.A. No. 141, he was entitled to repurchase the land, not two (2)
, but five (5) years after the title was sold because he was a holder of a free
patent and torrens title. ISSUE: W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec
. 119 of C.A. No. 141 of Sec. 5 of RA 720. HELD: No. Petitioner, as a former own
er of land with a homestead patent and a torrens title, is not included in those
enumerated in RA 601 and therefore not s ubject to the two (2) year allotment f
or redemption. In July 30, 1951, the Court had already decided that Sec. 119 of
C.A. No. 141 is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead
or a free pat ent; therefore, the plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) ye
ars. Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the R
epublic Act, they should be unified, and should abide by the conditions of the t
imes. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 30a, 38a, 39a, 50, b, b2

110 Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc. Case No. 100 G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702
(January 31, 1962) Chapter V, Page 200, Footnote No.97 FACTS: Petitioners are e
mployees of San Respondent Corporation who at various times during employment, f
ell ill. They were given sick leave pay pursuant to it s Health, Welfare and Ret
irement Plan. Despite receipt of the sick leave pay from Respondent Corporation,
the employees claimed for sickness benefit allowances under the Social Security
Act contending that their receipt of sick leave pay of less than the full wage
does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances provided in the law. Res
pondent Corporation countered that having already received sick leave pay, they
cannot claim benefits under the Social Security Ac t as these are exclusive to t
hose not receiving any leave privileges at all from the employer. ISSUE: W/N Pet
itioners were entitled to additional sickness benefit allowance under the Social
Security Act. HELD: To uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives
any amount as sick leave pay by a private benefit plan, the employee cannot avai
l of the privi leges under the Social Security Act, would be to enable the emplo
yer to defeat the purpose of the law. The Social Security Act, having been enact
ed for the welfare of the employees, cannot be given an interpretation that woul
d defeat such purpose. LATIN MAXIM: 26, 2b, 3a, 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phili
ppine British Assurance v. Intermediate Appelate Court Case No. 234 G.R. No. L-7
2005 (May 29, 1987) Chapter 5, Page 200, Footnote No.99 FACTS: Sycwin Coating& W
ires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial
Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent attached some of the properties of
Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersede s

bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attache
d properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appea
l against the properties of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ of exec
ut ion was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attac
hed per sonal properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation
be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. ISSUE: W/N the counte
r bond issued was valid. HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Se
c. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the cou
nter bond limited its appli cation to a final and executory judgment. It appllie
s to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. The only lo
gical conclusion is that an execution of a ny judgment including one pending app
eal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. The rule t
herefore, is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the
payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final
and executory judgment but also the exec ution of a judgment of pending appeal.
LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 26, 36a

111 Ramirez v. Court of Appeals Case No. 251 G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January
31, 1962) Chapter 5, Page 201 , Footnote No.100 FACTS: A civil case was filed b
y Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent, in a confrontation in the latter
s office allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated him. Petitioner produced a ver
batim transcript of the event to support her claim. The act of secretly taping t
he confrontation was illegal. Thus, respondent and filed a c riminal case. ISSUE
: W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense. HELD: The law makes
it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties in an y private com
munication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. Th
e law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all pers ons unauthorize
d to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier " any". Wher
e the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 7a,
9a, 11a, 24a, B2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilar v. Commission on Elections Case No
. 242 G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995) Chapter 5, Page 201, Footnote No.100 FACT
S: On March 22, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the posi
tio n of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Thre
e days later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, Respondent
Commiss ion imposed a fine of P10,000 pesos for failure to file his statement of
contributio ns and

expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candida
te must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of con
tributio ns and expenditures since he was a non-candidate , having withdrawn his
certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. HELD: Yes. Sec. 14 of RA
7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file his statement of con
tributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as
to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term e
very candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his c
ampaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 2
348 categorically refers to icate of candidacy . LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 26, 37, b2
all candidates who filed their certif

112 Sanciangco v. Roo Case No. 273 G. R. No. 68709 (July 19, 1985) Chapter 5, Page
203 , Footnote No.106 FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. Later,
he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozami
z City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. Petitioner then Petiti
oner then filed his Cer tificate of Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 elections for
Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao alliance. He was not succes
sful in the said elections. ISSUE: W/N an appointive member of the Sangguniang P
anglungsod, who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of
May 14, 1984, should be considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upo
n filing of his certific ate of candidacy. HELD: The legislative intent of Sec.
13(2) of BP 697 is clear that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also
covered by the said provision. Since he is unquestionably an appointive member,
he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his cert
ificate of candidacy for the May 1984 Batas an elections. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9
c, 28, 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appea
ls Case No. 38 G. R. No. 116356 (June 29, 1998) FACTS: Davao Pilots Association
elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum of money and attorney s fees a
lleging that DPA had rendered the pilotage services to Petitioner between Januar
y 14, 1987 to July 22, 1989 with total unpaid fees of P703,290.18. Despite repea
ted demands, Petitioner failed to pay and prays that t he latter be directed to
pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint; att
orney s fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation. ISSUE:

W/N EO 1088 is unconstitutional. HELD: No. In Philippine Interisland Shipping As

sociation of the Philippines v. Court o f Appeals, the court upheld the validity
of EO 1088 and it shall not depart from t his ruling. The Court s holding clear
ly debunks Petitioner s insistence on paying the pilotage fees based on the memo
randum circulars issued by the PPA. Administrativ e or Executive Acts, Orders an
d Regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 9a, 37 49

113 Castillo-Co v. Barbers Case No. G.R. No. 129952 (June 16, 1998) FACTS: Congr
essman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Go
vernor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor alleging irregulariti
es in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and Provincial Engineer. T
he items purchased were reconditioned instead of brand new and included other ir
regularities. Emilio A. Gonzales III, Director, and Jesus G uerrero, Deputy Ombu
dsman for Luzon, placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension for 6 months
. Petitioners contest that the Deputy Ombudsman has no power to sign the order o
f preventive suspension. ISSUE: W/N the deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority
to sign the order for preventive suspension. HELD: Yes. The deputy Ombudsman po
ssessed the authority to preventively suspend the Petitioners. There is nothing
in RA 7975 which may suggest that the Ombudsma n and only the Ombudsman may sign
an order preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as gr
ade 27 or above. The word or is clearly disjunctive in this case signifying diss
ociation from one thing from the other. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTI
ON People v. Martin Case No. 214 G.R. No. L-33487 (May 31, 1971) Chapter 5, Page
204, Footnote No.110 FACTS: Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of
C.A. No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of
La Union, specifica lly in the act of bringing in and landing. The Court dismis
sed the charges on the ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Cas
e 6258-M filed in Bulacan against ot her Respondents who were concealing and har
boring the same Chinese Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jur
isdiction.

ISSUE: W/N the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense wi
th concealing and harboring. HELD: No. They are two separate offenses. C.A. No.
613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts. Each act
possesses its own distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. The wo rd OR i
n C.A. No. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separat
ion of one act from the other. The words in the information suggesting conspirac
y ar e considered a mere surplusage. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 37, 15b

114 GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications Inc. Case No. 49 G.R. No. 126496 (April 30,
1997) FACTS: NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of Bell Telecommunicat
ions for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation
of telecommunications equipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to opera
te. The denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its feasibili
ty a nd the endorsement of Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Pe
rez. ISSUE: Whether the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole con
trol of Commissioner Kintanar. HELD: The NTC is a collegial body and its decisio
ns should be reached by a majority vote. Executive Order 146 creating the NTC cl
early shows that the NTC shall be composed of a head commissioner and 2 deputy c
ommissioners suggesting its collegial nature. Therefore the acts of Chairman Kin
tanar are void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
7a, 15a, 24a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc. Ca
se No. 158 G.R. No. 111097 (July 20, 1994) Chapter V, Page 208, Footnote No. 130
FACTS: PAGCOR, created by P.D. 1896, leased a building belonging to Pryce in or
der to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Various civic organizati
ons, religious elements, women s and youth groups, and even the local officials
angrily denounced the project. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two or
dinances disallowing the building of the planned casino. Petitioners argue tha t
by virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC), the Sangguniang Panlungsod may pr
ohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general wel
fare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling. ISSUE:

W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Or

o are valid. HELD: The two local ordinances are not valid. In Basco v. Phil. Amu
sements and Gaming Corp., this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decr
ee. Under th e LGC, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress
gambling and other prohibited games of chance. Since the world gambling should
be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited g
ames of cha nce, must be prevented or suppressed. On the assumption of a conflic
t between P.D. 18 69 and the LGC, the proper action is not to uphold one and ann
ul the other but to g ive effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. Casino
gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute th
at cannot be amended or nullifie d by a mere ordinance. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9c, 11e
, 28, 37, 38, 50

Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine Acetylene Company Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-2
2443 (May 29, 1971) Chapter V, Page 210, Footnote No. 135 FACTS: Charles Butler,
manager of Respondent Company, imported a custom-built LPG tank which is used t
o contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to trans port it to the company
s plant in Manila. RA 1394 provides a tax exemption for the importation of machi
nery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary industries as determin
ed in accordance with RA 901. The Tax Court held that the term industry should b
e understood in its ordinary and general definition, which is a ny enterprise em
ploying relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor. ISSUE: W/N the Philipp
ine Acetylene Co., Inc. may be considered engaged in an industry as contemplated
in Sec. 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the payment of the special impor
t tax with respect to the gas tank in question. HELD: Philippine Acetylene is no
t exempt from the special import tax. Tax exemptions are held strictly against t
he taxpayer. The obvious legislative inten t is to confine the meaning of the te
rm industries to activities that tend to produce or create or manufacture, and n
ot to all ventures and trades falling under the ordi nary and general definition
. In granting the exemption, it would have been illogical for Congress to specif
y importations needed by new and necessary industries as the term is defined by
law and in the same breath allowed a similar exemption to all other industries i
n general. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 11d, 28, 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v
. Santiago Case No. 224 G.R. No. L-17663 (May 30, 1962) Chapter V, Page 136, Foo
tnote No. 211 FACTS: The information alleges that Santiago has committed the cri
me of "libel." The accused delivered false, malicious, and highly defamatory sta
tements against May or Lacson through an amplifier system before a crowd of arou
nd a hundred persons. Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground
that the crime charged

therein is not libel but oral defamation. ISSUE: Whether the crime charged in th
e information is oral defamation, under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or l
ibel, under Art. 355, in relation to Art. 353 , of the same Code. HELD: The fact
s alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation. The word "
radio" should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated
, all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a
means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that
prescribed for oral defamation. Radio as a means of publication is the transmiss
ion and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening
between transmitter and receiver, while transmission of words by mea ns of an am
plifier system is not thru "electromagnetic waves" but thru the use of "conducti
ng wires" intervening between the transmitter and the receiver. It has also been
held in the United States that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscri
pt read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel. LATIN MAXIM: 11h, 25a, 28,
b2

116 Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Palomar Case No. 45 G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 19
66) Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211 FACTS: Petitioner conceived the Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest where participants have to estimate the actual number of li
ters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a specific period of time. There was
no fee or consideration required to be paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex prod
ucts to be made in order to join the contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of ma
il for advertising and communications , Caltex requested clearance for Responden
t Postmaster General but was denied citing said contest is a gift enterprise dee
med as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law
. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition fo r declaratory relief. ISSUE: W/N the Cal
tex Hooded Pump Contest falls under the term gift enterprise which is banned by
the Postal Law. HELD: No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word lotter
y is defined as a game of chance where the elements of which are (1) considerati
on, (2) chance, and (3) prize. The term gift enterprise and scheme in the provis
ion of the Postal Law making unmailable any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme
for the distributi on of money or any real or personal property by lot, chance,
or drawing of any kind means such enterprise as will require consideration as a
n element. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame
the gambling spirit and to co rrupt public morals. There being no element of con
sideration in said contest, the spir it of the law is preserved. LATIN MAXIM: 9a
, 28 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC Case No. 272 G.R. No. 80774
(May 31, 1988) Chapter V, Page 211, Footnote No. 138 FACTS:

Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded cash to SM

C employees who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the corporation.
Rustico Vega submitted his proposal entitled Modified Grande Pasteurization Pro
cess and claimed entitlement to the cash award. SMC denied utilizing such propos
al but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with th e NLRC which arbitra
ted against the Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the money claim of Vega falls within the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. HELD: No, said money claim falls
outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. The jurisdiction of the NLRC is outl
ined in Art. 217 of the Labor Code which include s in par. 3 all money claims of
workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate
agreement While par. 3 refers to all money claims of workers, it is not necessar
y to suppose that the entire universe of mon ey claims has been absorbed into th
e jurisdiction of the NLRC. Par. 3 should not be read in isolation with the cont
ext formed by par. 1 (unfair labor practices), par. 2 (terms and conditions of e
mployment), par. 4 (household services), par. 5 (prohibited activities). The uni
fying element of pars. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or di sputes arising out
of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. The scop e of par. 3
is clarified by its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling wi thin
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some re
ason able causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. LATIN MAXIM
: 28, 36b, 36e

117 Gotiaco v. Union Ins. Soc. Of Camilon Case No. 114 G.R. No. 13983 (September
1, 1919) Chapter V, Page 213, Footnote No. 141 FACTS: The Gotiaco Brothers tran
sported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. The rice was damaged due to the inf
low of seawater into the ship during the voyage because of a defect in one of it
s drain pipes. Plaintiffs sought recovery from Defendant under maritime insuranc
e that purports to insure the cargo from: Perils of the seas, men of war, fire,
enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, barr atry of the master and marine
rs, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes The tria l court ruled that
the ship was unseaworthy and Defendant is not liable. Plaintiff s appealed henc
e this action. ISSUE: W/N the insurer is liable for the loss. HELD: No, the owne
rs of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner for redress and not to the ins
urer. The words all other perils, losses, and misfortunes are to be interpreted
as covering risks which are of like kind with the particular risks w hich are en
umerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract. A loss which, in t
he ordinary course of events, results from the natural and inevitable action of
the sea, from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship, or from the negligent fail
ure of th e ship s owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment to convey t
he cargo under the ordinary condition is not a peril of the sea. The insurer und
ertakes to insure aga inst perils of the sea and similar perils, not against per
ils of the ship. It was fou nd that the cargo was improperly stowed and that the
owners of the ship were chargeable with negligence for failure to protect the p
ipe by putting a case over it. It was appropriately held that the ship was not s
eaworthy. LATIN MAXIM: 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corpo
ration v. Oil Industry Commission Case No. 122

G.R. No. L-41315 (November 13, 1986) FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was contendin
g that Respondent Commission had no jurisdiction over the contractual disputes b
etween them and a gasoline dealer in the name of Manuel Yap. ISSUE: W/N Responde
nt Commission had jurisdiction over the contractual disputes. HELD: The contenti
on of the Petitioner is well founded. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act w
ill say that there has not been an express provision providing f or disputes inv
olving the gasoline dealer and the oil company. Sec 6 of R.A. 6173 restricts the
extent and scope the OIC prerogative of jurisdiction in sub paragraph a to f. W
hat the law intend here is to be all embracing to the jurisdictional power of Re
spondent Commission so anything not mentioned are not or cannot be presumed or i
ndicated. Thus, the jurisdictional power should be restricted to mere regula tor
y and supervisory power and not judicial. The phrase, to set the conditions mean
s th e right to prescribe rules and conduct. It only pertains to rule making pow
er and not adjudication. Such limitation is included in the provision in Sec. 7(
4d) LATIN MAXIM: 25, 30, 31, 36

118 Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals Case No. 43 G.R. No. 1
23248 (October 16, 1997) Chapter V, Page 217, Footnote No.158 FACTS: La Tondea reg
istered with the Philippine Patent Office, pursuant to RA 6231, the 350 c.c. whi
te flint bottles it has been using for its gin popularly known a s Ginebra San M
iguel . Thereafter, a case was initiated against Petitioner for using the 350 c.
c., white flint bottles with the mark La Tondea, Inc. and Ginebra San Miguel stamp
ed or blown-in therein by filling the same with Petitioner s liquor product bear
ing the label Sonny Boy for commercial sale and distribution, without La Tondea s
written consent, and in violation of Sec. 2 of RA 623 as amended by RA 5700. ISS
UE: W/N La Tondea was part of the protected beverages of RA 623 amended by RA 5700
. HELD: The words other lawful beverages is used in its general sense, referring
to all beverages not prohibited by law. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liqu
id for d rinking. Hard liquor, although regulated, is not prohibited by law; hen
ce, it is within t he purview and coverage of RA 623, as amended. To limit the c
overage of the law onl y to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as tho
se specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose of the law. LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 26, 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Rep. of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and
Tecson Case No. 257 FACTS: Acting on information received, which indicated the a
cquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board r
equired Private Respondent to submit his explanation or comment, together with h
is supporting evidence. Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was unable to
produce his supporting evidence, despite several postponements, because they we
re allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The anti-graf
t Board was created by the PCGG to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrup
t practices

of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service. ISSUE: W/N Private Respond
ent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for
violation of RA 3019 and 1379. HELD: No. Applying the rule in statutory construc
tion, the term subordinate as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a
close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, sim
ilar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO 1 and t
he close relative, business associate , dummy, agent, or nominee in EO 2. LATIN
MAXIM: 28, 30, 36b, 38

Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. 71 G.R. Nos. 48886-88
(July 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No.133 FACTS: Petitioner contend
s that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohib ited and the arti
cles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec. 2530 (f) and 102 (k)
of the Tariff and Customs Code. The foodstuffs in question being articles of pro
hibited importation cannot be released under bond. ISSUE: W/N the imported food
stuffs in question are not contraband, and are not as stated by Respondent Court
, among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. 102 of the Tariff and Cus
toms Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released under bond as provided in S
ec. 2301 of the same code. HELD: Yes. The imported foodstuffs are considered pro
hibited importation under Sec. 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. LATIN MAX
IM: 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION United States vs. Sto. Nino Case No. 302 Chapter V
, Page 220, Footnote No.172 FACTS: Respondent was caught possessing a deadly wea
pon. He was prosecuted under Act No. 1780, which stated that it shall be unlawfu
l for any person to carr y concealed upon his person any bowie knife, dirk dagge
r, kris or other deadly weapons, provide that this prohibition shall not apply t
o firearms in the posses sion of persons who have secured a license therefore or
who are entitled to carry the sa me under the provision of this Act. The trial
court ruled that, using the principle of ejusdem generis, the law will only appl
y to bladed weapons ISSUE: W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem g
eneris.

HELD: No. The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter i
s only resorted to in determining the legislative intent, such that if the inten
t is cl ear, the rule must give way. In this case, the proviso provides that unl
icensed revolvers were covered by the law and as such the law is not limited to
bladed weapons. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 29

120 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission Case No.
263 G.R. No. L-15045 (January 20, 1961) Chapter V, Page 221, Footnote No.175 FAC
TS: Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that Catholic Charitie
s, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are
di rectly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Archbishop
of Manila be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, otherwise known as th
e Social Security Law of 1954. Petitioner contends that the term employer as def
ined in the law should following the principle of ejusdem generis---be limited t
o those who carry on undertakings or activities which have the element of profit
or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain, because the phrase activity o
f any kind in the definiti on is preceded by the words any trade, business, indu
stry, undertaking. ISSUE: W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this
case. HELD: No. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncerta
inty. It is n ot controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislatu
re would thereby be hindered and defeated. The definition of the term employer i
s sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions
or entities no t organized for profit. This is made more evident by the fact th
at it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not inclu
ded. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Rep. v. Estenzo Case No. G.R. No
. L FACTS: 35376 (September 11, 1980)
Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastral Court
to declare Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land. Petitioners filed
an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdictio
n

over the petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings. ISSUE: W/N RA 6236 ap
plies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were decl
ared public lands. HELD: No. RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastra
l proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. The Respondent
judge was wrong i n interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable; the job of the judi
ciary is to apply la ws, not interpret it. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7a, 30, 32

121 In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes Case No. 130 G.R. No. 9351 (January 6, 19
15) Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 180 FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate
and was survived by his 2 legitimate daughters, Petra and Pascuala. Petra had 2
legitimate children, Rafael and Josef a. Pascuala had 1 legitimate child, Aurea,
and had begotten a natural child by a pr iest, Vicente. Petra, Pascuala, and Au
rea have since died. The lower court held that Vicente was the owner of all the
separate property of Aurea and half of the esta te of Francisca. ISSUE: W/N Vice
nte was an acknowledged natural child. HELD: Yes. G. E. 68, which was promulgate
d on December. 18, 1899, repealed the law that priesthood was a ground for decla
ring a marriage void. Since Vicente wa s born in 1905 after the said law was ena
cted, he is considered an acknowledged natural child. LATIN MAXIM: 30a, 35, 49 S
TATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Empire Insurance Co. v. Rufino Case No. 97 G.R. No. L 3826
8 (May 31, 1979) Chapter V, Page 223, Footnote No. 181 FACTS: Vicente A. Rufino
died intestate and was survived by his widow and 7 children. They then executed
a Partition Agreement agreeing to pay for all liabi lities or obligations of the
decedent. Almost 1 year later, Petitioner filed a Civil Case claiming liabiliti
es and obli gations from the Rufino estate. The trial court dismissed this claim
stating the Petitioner d id not file within the time limited in the notice to c
reditors in the intestate proceedings. A Petition for Review on Certiorari was f
iled by the Petitioner on the decision of the trial

court claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the
estate of the decedent, but a claim on the estates of the Respondents. ISSUE: W/
N the petition has merit. HELD: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The
liabilities claimed by Petition er were not listed in the obligations acknowled
ged by the Partition Agreement. LATIN MAXIM: 29, 30a, 45a

Ching Leng v. Galang Case No. G. R. No. L-11931 (October 27, 1958) FACTS: Petiti
oner obtained judgment granting his petition for naturalization. He and his wife
later petitioned to the Court of First Instance in Rizal for the adopti on of h
is five children who were all minors and Chinese nationals. The petition was lat
er granted. Petitioner then requested the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel
the alien certificate of registration of their children based on the following g
roun ds: (1) by virtue of their naturalization, the children are now considered
as Filipino citi zens, (2) adoption gave the adopted children the same rights an
d duties as if they were th e legitimate children of the adopter, (3) since a le
gitimate child follows the nat ionality of the adopter, the children are conside
red Filipino Citizens. ISSUE: W/N citizenship can be acquired by a child through
adoption. HELD: Citizenship is not a right but a mere privilege. Art. 254 of th
e Civil Code enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and acquisition is no
t a part of t he said enumeration. Furthermore, Art. 341 of the Civil Code does
not include acquisitio n of citizenship. Also, Art. 49 of a special law that pro
vides the character of natur alization enumerates the means of acquiring citizen
ship and adoption is not part of it. LATIN MAXIM: 30a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aco
sta v. Flor Case No. 5 G. R. No. 2122 (September 13, 1905) Chapter V, Page 224,
Footnote No. 187 FACTS: The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the
Office of the Municipal President of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Plaintiff alleged that
he was duly e lected to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unla
wfully held the same. However, not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confi
rmed the latter s allega tions that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at t
he said election. Nor can it be

inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he, as a result of s
aid election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of Municipal
Presi dent of Laoag, now held by Defendant. ISSUE: Can the Plaintiff maintain an
action for the purpose of excluding the Defendant from the exercise of said off
ice? HELD: No. Art. 199, 200, and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reserve
d to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals, as the case may be, the
right to bring such action. If the legislative had intended to give all citizen
s alike the righ t to maintain an action for usurpation of public office, it wou
ld have plainly said s o in the law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such
far-reaching importance. LATIN MAXIM: 30a

123 Lerum v. Cruz Case No. 146 G. R. No. L-2783 (November 29, 1950) Chapter V, P
age 225, Footnote No. 192 FACTS: This is an appeal for a petition for declarator
y relief. Attys. Lerum and Fernando filed for this petition in order to test the
sufficiency and probative value of a testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Jud
ge Cruz regarding the issuance of a divorce decree. ISSUE: Can the attorneys fil
e a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufficien cy and probative val
ue of (former) Judge Cruz s testimony? HELD: No, the petition for declaratory re
lief cannot be granted. Under Sec 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, declaratory
relief may only be granted to a person whose rights are affected by a statute or
ordinance, or who is interested under a deed, will, contract or other written i
nstrument. The sufficiency and probative value of a testimony, which is the subj
ect matter for declaratory relief in the instant cas e, is not included in the e
numeration. Thus, the assailed order is affirmed. LATIN MAXIM: 30a STATUTORY CON
STRUCTION Central Barrio v. City Treasurer of Davao Case No. 55 G.R. No. L-25811
(April 3, 1968) Chapter V, Page 225, Footnote No. 193 FACTS: On August 29, 1962
, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732, pursuant to RA 2370, declaring as
officially and legally existing several barrios of the cit y. Among these were
barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion. Subsequently, barrio Poblacion, also called
barrio Central, asked for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected o n real pro
perty located within the barrio, as provided in Sec. 3 of RA 3590. Respondent re
fused to release the share on the ground that the amount pertaining to the sai d
barrio, in relation to barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be determined because t
h

e respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law. T
he Petitioner thus filed a case against Davao City s Treasurer, Council, Auditor
and Mayor with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao, which dismissed the
case on the ground that the issue had been rendered academic by the passage of R
A 4354, amending the charter of Davao City. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal order was c
orrect. HELD: The dismissal was affirmed. Sec. 2 of RA 4354 enumerated the barri
os comprising the City of Davao, which did not include the Petitioner. Thus, the
re prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished Barrio Central as p
art of Da vao City. A non-existent barrio or a barrio not situated in Davao City
cannot presen t a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under
RA 3590. LATIN MAXIM: 30

124 Vera v. Fernandez Case No. 55 G.R. No.L-31364 (March 30, 1979) Chapter V, Pa
ge 225, Footnote No. 193 FACTS: This case is an appeal with regard to two orders
promulgated by the CFI of Negros Occidental, Branch V in relation to the intest
ate estate of Luis D. Tongo y. The cases were for the claim and payment of defic
iency income taxes in the total sum of P3,254.80 with 5% surcharge and 1% monthl
y interest, as provided in the Tax Code . The Petitioners were denied the said c
laim and payment as they were barred under Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
. ISSUE: W/N the statute of non-claims under Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the New Rules of
Court bars claim of the government for unpaid taxes. HELD: The order appealed f
rom is reversed. A perusal of the aforequoted provision shows that it makes no m
ention of claims for monetary obligations of the deceden t created by law, such
as taxes which is entirely different from the claims enumer ated therein. Par. 3
15 of the Tax Code states that payment of income tax shall be a l ien in favor o
f the government from the time the assessment was made by the Commissioner of In
ternal Revenue until paid with interests, penalties, etc. Thus , before the inhe
ritance has been passed to the heirs, the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be c
ollected, even without its having been presented under Sec. 2 of Rule 36 of the
Rules of Court. LATIN MAXIM: 27, 30, 44 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villanueva v. Cit
y of Iloilo Case No. 312 G.R. No. L-26521 (December 28, 1968) Chapter V, Page 22
6, Footnote No. 197 FACTS: The case is an appeal questioning the lower court s j
udgment declaring

Ordinance No. 11 as illegal. The Petitioners, Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva, a

re owners of 5 tenement houses containing 43 apartments. By virtue of the ordin
ance , the city was able to collect P5,824 from the spouses for the years 1960-1
964. ISSUE: 1. Is Ordinace 11 illegal because it imposes double taxation? 2. Is
the City of Iloilo empowered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement taxes?
3. Is it oppressive and unreasonable because it carries a penal clause? 4. Does
it violate the uniformity of taxation? HELD: The judgment is reversed; the ordi
nance is valid. 1. No. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as
well as by the local government. 2. Yes. RA 2264 confers on local governments b
road taxing authority. It is clear tha t the intention of the ordinance is to im
pose a tenement or apartment tax, which i s not among the exceptions listed in S
ec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. 3. No. The lower court had in mind the constitu
tional provision that no person shall be imprisoned for a debt or non-payment of
a poll tax , which should not apply; the tax in question is neither a debt nor
a poll tax. 4. No. Taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of
the same class or character within the taxing authority. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 20c,
30, 35, 42

Santo To v. Cruz-Pao Case No. 275 G.R. No. L-55130 (January 17, 1983) Chapter V, P
age 226, Footnote No. 199 FACTS: Petitioner Santo To was convicted of estafa for
a bouncing check and was sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. He appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision c
orrectional. He then filed a petition for probation but was denied by the Respon
dent judge, Hon. Cruz-Pao, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation O
ffice, on the ground that granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the of
fense, and that Santo To w as not a penitent offender. In a motion for reconside
ration, the Solicitor General recommended the grant because the Petitioner was n
ot among the offenders disqualified to avail probation, as enumerated in the pro
bation law (P.D. 968) S ec. 9. ISSUE: Can Petitioner To avail himself of probati
on? HELD: Yes. The law gives more importance to the offender than the crime. He
is a first-time offender and his offense has relative lightness. In addition, th
e Res pondent judge cannot assume that To had not shown repentance. Besides, whe
re the Probation Law expressly enumerates the persons disqualified to avail of i
ts bene fits, the clear intent is to allow the benefits of probation to those no
t included in the enumeration. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Samso
n v. Court of Appeals Case No. 270 G.R. No. L-43182 (November 25, 1986) Chapter
V, Page 226, Footnote No. 200 FACTS: Petitioner Samson, the mayor of Caloocan, t
erminated the services of Respondent, Mr. Talens, as Assistant Secretary, throug
h Administrative Order No. 3, because of lack and loss of confidence, and appoin
ted Mr. Liwag, co-Petitioner, to said position. RA 2260 (Civil Service Act of 19
59) Sec 5(f) declares that the po sition of

secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive. Talens asserts his position was n

ot covered by the said act and, being permanently appointed, he can only be rem
oved for a cause and after due process. The Court of First Instance ruled in fav
or of Talens, declaring the order null and void. The Court of Appeals also affir
med said decision. ISSUE: Was the termination of Talens illegal? HELD: Yes, Tale
ns termination was illegal; his position is not among those expressly declared b
y law as highly confidential. The nature of functions attached to a po sition de
termines whether such position is highly confidential. Where the law provides th
at positions in the government belong to the competitive service, except those d
eclared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are policydet
ermining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, the legislatu re
is presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated, for otherwise, it
wou ld have included them in the enumeration. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30

126 Finman General Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals Case No. 107 G.R. No 100
970 (September 2, 1992) Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No. 202 FACTS: Carlie Surp
osa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his beneficiari
es. On October 18, 1988, Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound. After a written no
tice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company, the latte r denied
the claim, saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the covera
ge of the insurance policy. The insurance company was found liable by the Insura
nce Commission to pay P15,000, and this decision was affirmed by the appellate c
ourt. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using expressio uni us exclus
io alterius in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting f rom
murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom. ISSUE: Did the CA make a
mistake in using the said principle? HELD: No. The fact remains that the death
of Surposa was pure accident on the part of the victim. Furthermore, the persona
l accident insurance policy specific ally enumerated only 10 circumstances where
no liability attaches to the insurance company. Failure to include death throug
h murder or assault meant it had not bee n intended to be exempt from liabilitie
s resulting from such. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Centano v. Vil
lalon-Pornillos Case No. 54 G.R. No. 113092 (September 1, 1994) Chapter V, Page
228, Footnote No. 203 FACTS: In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayo
n ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Bar
rio Tikay in Bulacan. Martin Centeno, chairman of the group, approached Judge An
geles, President of Tikay, and the latter solicited P 1,500. However, this solic
itation was made without a

permit from the DSWD and as a result, it was contended that Centeno violated P.D
. 1564, which states Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitab
le or pub lic welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office of
the Departmen t of Social services and Development. ISSUE: W/N the phrase chari
table purposes religious purposes. HELD: No. Where a statute is expressly limite
d to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended
to others. The 1987 Constitution tre ats the words charitable and religious sep
arately and independently from each other. Since P.D. 1564 merely states that ch
aritable or public welfare purposes need a permit from DSWD, this means that the
framers of the law never intended to inclu de solicitations for religious purpo
ses within its coverage. The term charitable shou ld be strictly construed to ex
clude solicitations for religious purposes. Moreover, sinc e this is a criminal
case, penal law must be construed strictly against the State and l iberally in f
avor of the accused. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11g, 11i, 25, 27, 30, 48 in P.D. 1564 is m
eant to include

Escribano v. Avila Case No. 101 G.R. No. L-30375 (September 12, 1978) Chapter V,
Page 229, Footnote No. 205 FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato, fi
led a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Co
urt of First Instance (now the RTC) to Judge David Avila. Escribano questioned J
udge Avila s authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense.
He contended that the city fiscal of Cotobato is the only one empowered to condu
ct the preliminary investigation, pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 360 of the RPC wh
ich does not empower the Court of First Issuance to conduct preliminary investig
ations of written defamations due to an amendment made for Art 360. ISSUE: Wheth
er the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct the pre
liminary investigation of the crime of libel or whether that power is lod ged ex
clusively in the city attorney of that city. HELD: Yes. The Court of First Issua
nce may conduct preliminary investigations because this power is not lodged excl
usively in the city attorney. The enumerati on in the law of the public officers
and the courts that may conduct preliminary investigations was designed to dive
st the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the Court of Fi
rst Instance of that same power. The power of the CFT to conduct a preliminary i
nvestigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power for a judge to ho
ld a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest an d search warrant
s. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigation s by the CFT
is the exception to the rule and not the general rule. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 11e, 12,
37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manabat v. De Aquino Case No. 161 G.R. No. L-5558 (Ap
ril 29, 1953) Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No. 208 FACTS:

Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1,261.74 plus interest for usury, wherein the
couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. Notified o
f the decision on September 7, 1951, they filed for an appeal by registered mai
l on September 22 of that same year. However, the papers were actually received
by th e court on September 24. Thus, the Judge of First Instance declared that t
he appea l was late and dismissed it. ISSUE: 1. Whether the appeal was deemed fi
led on September 22, when they were deposited by registered mail, or Sept 24, wh
en they were actually received by the court. 2. W/N the appeal has been perfecte
d within 15 days. HELD: Yes. The appeal was perfected within 15 days. Rule 27 Se
c. 1 of the Rules of Court must be applied which will result to the date of depo
sit in the post offic e by registered mail of court papers as the date of filing
. Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify procedure. Thus, Petitioners
filed their appeal just in time. LATIN MAXIM: 3a, 9c, 11d, 12a

Gomez v. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners Case No. 115 No. 32441. March 29
, 1930 Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No.209 FACTS: Plaintiff had his license rev
oked on unprofessional conduct due to the administration of opium. Petitioner cl
aims that his administration of opium to p atients was not a grounds for unprofe
ssional conduct because it has been repealed by subsequent Opium Laws. ISSUE: W/
N Plaintiff should have his license restored. HELD: No, Plaintiff should not hav
e his license restored. The subsequent Opium Laws cannot be held to have implied
ly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict o r remove said prior laws. The
Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined term of unprofessional cond
uct can include improper administration of opium to patients. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 3
8b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Primero v. CA Case No. 126 G.R. Nos. 48468-69. Novembe
r 22, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner carried a bladed weapon outside of his residence wh
ile PD 9, the prohibition against fan knives, balisong or clubs was in effect wh
ich thereafter resulted in his arrest. Petitioner answers in his defense that a
bayonet, the bladed weapon he was carrying, was neither a blunt nor bladed weapo
n enumerated in PD 9 and therefore he was not guilty of violating the law agains
t bladed or blunt weapons. ISSUE: W/N a bayonet is not a bladed or blunt weapon
that falls under the purview of PD 9. HELD: No, the bayonet is a bladed weapon t
hat falls under PD 9. Petitioners defense of expressio unius est exclusio alteri
us is weak and incomplete. It would make n

o sense if possession of a fan knife, which is less lethal than a bayonet, would
b e punishable while possession of a bayonet would not. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 30a

129 SEC Legal Opinion re BIR Employees Association Inc. Case No. 142 Oct. 23, 19
87 FACTS: Petitioners inquired as to whether or not past presidents can run as b
oard members or are merely ex-officio board members. ISSUE: W/N past presidents
of the association can run again as members of the board or are automatically ex
officio members. HELD: Past Presidents may run again for positions in the board
. There is nothing in th e rules and regulations of the association or the BIR t
hat past presidents of the association may not run again for board membership ev
en as they are automaticall y made ex officio members of the board. LATN MAXIM:
9a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Roldan v Villaroman Case No. 262 G.R. No. 46825 (Octob
er 18, 1939) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 229 FACTS: Respondents were charg
ed of murder. During the trial, Respondent Cuevas became ill and had to be confi
ned to a hospital. Judge Roldan, the Petitioner, denied the Respondents for post
ponement of the trial on the ground of illness of Cuevas. The court also compell
ed the counsel of the accused to present evidence and their witnesses and ordere
d to arrest the accused. Respondents then institut ed a certiorari proceeding in
the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner, impugning the decision of the judg
e for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas. The CA then issued a wr
it of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from conti nuing with the tri
al. ISSUE: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: No. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely p
rincipally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. CFI of Laguna, w
hich held that the phrase in aid of its appellate jurisdiction only refers to it
s proxi mate antecedent and to all other auxiliary writs and process. This rulin
g is in conjunc tion with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase sh
ould be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. Moreover, the rule in
the interpretation ap plied is in fact the general rule in the interpretation o
f qualifying or conditional phra ses found in a law, but this rule is subject to
the exception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all
the antecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be made extensive to
the whole. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6d, 9c, 33, 36b, b2

130 Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons Case No. 122 G.R. No. L-278 (July 18
, 1946) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 230 FACTS: Petitioner was apprehended
by the US Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment under Security Commitment Order
No. 286 wherein she was specifically charged with (a) active collaboration with
the Japanese, and (b) previous association with the enemy. When she, along with
her co-detainees and coPetitioners in that case, was delivered by the US Army to
the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the proclamation of General Douglas Mac
Arthur of December 29, 1944, she was detained by said Government under that char
ge. And under the same charge during all the time referred to, she has remained
in custo dy of the Commonwealth Government. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is constitutio
nally entitled bail. HELD: Yes. The constitutional mandate laid down the rule th
at all persons shall before conviction be bailable, except those charged with ca
pital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Since the People s Court Act an
d the Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one
law, and since the lan guage used in this court in construing the Constitution
and other statutes on the matt er of bail is substantially the same as the langu
age used by the People s Court Act on t he same subject, the most natural and lo
gical conclusion to follow in cases of capi tal offenses before conviction is th
at discretion refers only to the determination o f whether or not the evidence o
f guilt is strong. To hold that the People s Court ha s uncontrolled discretion
in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence o f guilt is not strong o
r there is absolutely no evidence at all, is to make the Ac t offensive not only
to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution, which is cont rary to
the most elementary rules of statutory construction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 11g,
12a, 26, 35, 37, 38b, 42a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker
Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation

Case No. 170 G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 231
FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable
in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued t o do s
o despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the cont
racts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the fou r c
ontracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lot
s, except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the govern
men t, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.
D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the facilities, improvements, and infrastruc
tures fo r the lots, and other forms of development if offered and indicated in
the approved subdivision plans. ISSUE: W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts inclu
de and incorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent, making the
cancellation of the contracts of sal e incorrect. HELD: No. Labrador has every r
ight to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract
for the reason of the lapse of five years of defau lt payment from Mapa. P.D. 95
7 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contract
s involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20 , no further written com
mitment was made by the developer. The words which are offered and indicated in
the subdivision or condominium plans refer not only to other forms of developmen
t but also to facilities, improvements, and infrastructures . The word and is no
t meant to separate words, but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a un
ion. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7a, 33

131 People of the Philippines v. Teodoro Tamani Case No. 227 G.R. No. L-22160 an
d G.R. No. L-22161 (January 21, 1974) Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 232 FACT
S: Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court on Feb
ruary 14, 1963. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel subseque ntly
filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963, which was denied. The lower
court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on J
u ly 13, 1963 through the counsel s wife. Counsel filed his appeal only on Septe
mber 10, 19 63, forty-eight days from July 24th , which is the reglementary fift
een-day period f or appeal. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed
on the ground that t he appeal was forty-eight days late. They invoked Sec. 6, R
ule 122 of the Rules of Court which states that an appeal must be taken within f
ifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appeal
ed from. ISSUE: W/N the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of prom
ulgation of the decision. HELD: Yes. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis
, the word promulgation should be construed as referring to judgment , while not
ice should be construed as referring to order . Tamani s appeal is therefore 58
days late, not 47, as Appelle es contend; he only had a day left from the receip
t of his wife of the notice on Ju ly 13. Nonetheless, the court decided to act u
pon the appeal at hand to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice . LATIN MA
XIM: 6c, 7a, 8a 11g, 34 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Andres Borromeo v. Fermin Mariano
Case No. 38 G.R. No. L-16808 (January 3, 1921) Chapter V, Page 236, Footnote No
. 240 FACTS:

Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twentyfourth Judi
cial District, effective July 1, 1914. On February, 25, 1920, he was appointed J
udge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Ju
dge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter
date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial Dis
trict . The Attorney-General assails the validity of the later appointment by ar
guing on the basis of Sec. 155 of the Administrative Code, which states that not
hing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one distr
ict from being appoin ted to be judge of another district. ISSUE: W/N Borromeo h
as the right to sit as the Judge of the 24th Judicial District. HELD: Yes. The c
oncluding part of Sec. 155 of the Administrative Code used by the Attorney-Gener
al should be construed as a proviso, although it did not start wit h the usual i
ntroductory word, provided . The word appointed in the proviso should be given i
ts meaning in the ordinary sense, and thus, should mean the nomination or design
ation of an individual . The provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unamb
iguous. Judges of First Instance are appointed Judges of the Courts of Firs t In
stance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They ho l
d these positions of Judges of First Instance of definite districts until they r
esign, r etire or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The power to appo
int lies on the appointing officer, but the power to accept lies solely on the a
ppointee. Hence, appointee s consent is needed and he has power to refuse an app
ointment. In upholding the independence of the judiciary and the state s separat
ion of powers, the only way to remove Borromeo from power is by impeachment. LAT
IN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9a, 9c, 12a, 24a, 37

132 ALU-TUCP v. NLRC Case No. 2 G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1994) Chapter V, Pag
e 240, Footnote No. 250 FACTS: Petitioners were employed by the National Steel C
orporation for their five year expansion program. The workers contend that they
should be considered regular workers as opposed to project workers, as the NSC a
nd NLRC ruled. ALU-TUCP claim s that they have been working in NSC for more than
6 years and that their work is necessary for the business, and that would have
been more than enough to conside r them as regular employees. Petitioners conten
tions stemmed from Art. 280 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners should be
considered regular employees. HELD: No. The provision calls for casual employees
. Since Petitioners were considered project employees, this provision does not a
pply to them. Moreover, t he fact that they have been working in NSC for more th
an a year does not mean they are automatically converted into regular employees.
(They were hired as project employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once th
at project is done, their services will no longer be needed.) In Mercado, Sr. vs
. NLRC, the proviso in par . 2 of Art.280 relates only to casual employees and i
s not applicable to those who do n ot qualify under the definition of such worke
rs in par. 1. The proviso is to be con strued with reference to the immediately
preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to other sectio
ns thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6, 33 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Arenas v. City of San C
arlos, Pangasinan Case No. 20 G.R. No. L-34024 (April 5, 1978) Chapter V, Page 2
40, Footnote No. 251 FACTS: RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges
would receive an annual salary of P18,000. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary
of P1000.00, P350 of wh ich was from the national government and the remaining
P650 comes from the city

government. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA bu
t the Respondent City refused. ISSUE: W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the in
crease in his salary from P12,000 to P18,000. HELD: Looking at the Senate delibe
rations, the intention in enacting the RA was that the salary of a city judge sh
ould not be higher than the salary of the city mayo r. Moreover, exceptions, as
a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably const rued; they extend only s
o far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in fa
vor of the general provisions rather than the exception. In case t here is repug
nancy between the proviso and the main provision, the latter provision, whether
a proviso or not, is given preference because it is the latest expressio n of th
e intent of the legislation, but more so because provisos are negatively written
a nd gives off a more mandatory tone. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 33, 43,48, b2

133 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance Case No. 292 G.R. No. 115852 (August 25, 1
994) Chapter V, Page 243, Footnote No. 266 FACTS: Petitioner assail the constitu
tionality of RA 7716 saying that S. No. 1630 did n ot pass three reading on sepa
rate days as required in the Constitution because the second and the third readi
ngs were done on the same day. The President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent
and the presidential certification dispensed wit h the requirement not only of
the printing but also that of reading the bill on three separate days. ISSUE: W/
N RA 7716, an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system an
d enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code, has
been constitutionally passed. HELD: There is no merit in the contention that pr
esidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of
the bill and its distribution thre e days before its passage but not with the r
equirement of three readings on separate days. The phrase "except when the Presi
dent certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Se
c 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i)
the bill has passed three reading s on separate days and (ii) it has been printe
d in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. In
other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" claus
e, because the two are really coordinate clause s of the same sentence. To const
rue the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the
"unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution t hree days before final approv
al) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the ver
y premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactm
ent of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency
. LATIN MAXIM: 33 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ALDECOA v. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank

Case No. 126 30 Phil. 228, (March 23, 1915) Chapter V, Page 245, Footnote No. 27
2 FACTS: The mother of the Plaintiffs, Isabel Palet, was a general partner in th
e firm, Aldecoa & Company. The said firm, however, was heavily indebted to the D
efendant corporation. Isabel s remedy for this was to furnish certain securities
and obligations to the Defendant Corporation, and to mortgage certain real prop
ertie s of her sons. In order to mortgage these properties, she emancipated her
sons and mortgaged their properties with her consent. The Petitioners now seek t
o cancel the instruments of mortgage executed by them. ISSUE: W/N Isabel Palet c
an legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force in this country in 1
903, and in so doing, confer upon them the capacity to execu te a valid mortgage
on their real property with her consent. HELD: We must look at the provisions o
f the Code of Civil Procedure (American) relating to guardianship and upon certa
in provisions of the Civil Code (Spanish) relating to the control of the parents
over the person and property of their min or children. The Code of Civil Proced
ure impliedly repealed some parts of the old Spanish code. According to the Code
of Civil Procedure, there is no longer a nee d to be formally emancipated by th
e parents after attaining the age of majority. At t he time of the furnishing of
the mortgage emancipation documents, Joaqin was alread y of legal age and so hi
s mortgage remained valid, while Zoilo s mortgage was not valid even if he signe
d it with his mother because he was a minor when he execut ed the mortgage. LATI
N MAXIM: 49

134 Ocampo v. Buenaventura Case No. 88 G.R. No. L-32293 (January 24, 1974) FACTS
: On September 11, 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained Edgardo
Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 228 which fix
ed curfew hours. The minors were then convicted for violation of said ordinance.
On appeal, the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated t he ordina
nce was to attend a birthday, which is considered as a wholesome assemblage, and
therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. Roberto Ocampo filed a
complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct, grave abuse of authori
ty, and commission of a felony. The Mayor issued an ordinance exonerating the po
licemen. On March 17, 1969 a complaint was lodged with the Police Commission for
the same grounds. ISSUE: W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrat
ive cases involving police service and personnel. HELD: The Respondents argument
is devoid of merit. The power of local officials to investigate and decide admi
nistrative cases involving police service and personn el has been transferred to
the POLCOM under RA 4864. According to Commission v. Hon. Bello, Sec. 26 of the
Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to administrative cases invo
lving police personnel and service pending at the time of the effectivity of the
Act (September 8, 1969). Sec. 26 may not be interpreted t o mean that the Board
of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally function to carry into
effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of th e 100 days. LATIN MAX
IM: 1, 6c, 6d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aisporna v. Court of Appeals and People Cas
e No. 6 G.R. No. L-39419 (April 12, 1982) Chapter VI, Page 248, Footnote No. 8 F
ACTS: Petitioner Mrs. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. 189 of the

Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing
a certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance Commi
ss ioner. Mrs. Aisporna, however, maintained that she was not liable because she
only assi sted her husband, and that she did not receive any compensation. ISSU
E: W/N the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of Sec.
189. HELD: Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance a
gent. Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts,
a kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment, and not separately an
d independently. The term agent used in par. 1 of Sec. 189 is defined in par. 2
of t he same section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. 2 to
the age nt in par. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of S
ec. 189. A statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all i
ts provisio ns wherever possible. Every part of the statute must be considered t
ogether with th e other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9c, 28, 36b, 36c, 36d, 37

135 Gaanan v. Indeterminate Appellate Court Case No. 108 G.R. No. L-69809 (Octob
er 16, 1986) Chapter VI, Page 249, Footnote No. 11 FACTS: Atty. Pintor called Le
onardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal of his complaint for dire
ct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu. That same day, Laconico
called the Appellant, Atty. Edgardo Gaanan to come to his office and advise him
on the settlement of the direct assault case. When complainant Pintor called up,
Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone call th
rough the extension phone. ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohi
bited devices covered by Sec. 1 of RA 4200. HELD: Telephone party lines were int
entionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. There must be either a physic
al interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate insta llation of a device. A
n extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as the devices enume
rated in Sec. 1 RA 4200. In order to determine the true intent of t he legislatu
re, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be tak en as de
tached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be co
nsidered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In the case of Empire Insu r
ance Company v. Rufino, held that the phrase device or arrangement in Sec. 1 of
RA 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed
to comprehend instruments of the same nature, that is, instruments the use of wh
ich would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. Furthermore, it
is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of th
e accu sed. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11g, 29, 30a, 36c, 36d, 48, b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTI
ON Radiola-Toshiba Phils. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Case No. 249 G.R. No. 7
5222 (July 18, 1991)

Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 20 FACTS: The levy on attachment against the
subject properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March
4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. However, the insolvency proceed
ing in the Court of First Instance of Ange les City was commenced more than four
months after the issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, Peti
tioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. contended that its lien on the subject properties
overrode the insolvency proceeding and w as not dissolved thereby. ISSUE: W/N th
e levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against Respondent spo
uses even though it commenced four months after said attachment. HELD: No. Sec.
32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period one month in at
tachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior t
o the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no conflict betwee n Sec. 32 and Se
c. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretat ion, the cour
t should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will rende r the p
rovision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other. LATIN M
AXIM: 6c, 36a, 37

136 Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino Case No. 152 G.R. No. L-22678 (January 12, 1925)
Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No. 16 FACTS: Pursuant to a contract of loan and
mortgage, El Hogar Filipino caused the mortgaged properties to be sold publicly
in an extra-judicial sale. Lopez and Javelona, in whose favor the loan was made,
sought to have the contract of loan and mortgage annulled on the ground that th
e agreement was usurious. They contended that the court erred in holding that th
e word void , as used in the Usury Law, was intended to make the entire transact
ion a nullity. ISSUE: W/N the meaning of the word void , as used in the Usury La
w, was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. HELD: No. From the ver
y context of the law, the legislature, in using the word void , did not intend t
hat the transaction should be a complete nullity. It was only wi th respect to t
he usurious interest. The intention of the legislature must be ascer tained, not
from the consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law, b ut
from the context of the whole law or from a portion thereof, as compared with t
he who le. Every part of the act should be read with the purpose of discovering
the mind of the legislature. LATIN MAXIM: 9b, 25a, 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION JMM
Promotions v. NLRC Case No. 136 G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993) Chapter VI,
Page 251, Footnote No. 21 FACTS: JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P
30, 000 and posted a cash bond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of P50,000, as req
uired by the POEA Rules. When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decisi
on rendered by POEA, the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the req
uired appeal bond as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond, as req
uired by Art. 223 of the Labor Code, considering it has already posted a cash bo
nd and surety bond, as required by the POEA? HELD: Yes. The POEA Rules regarding
monetary appeals are clear. A reading of the POEA Rules shows that, in addition
to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decisio
n of the POEA. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 6d, 7a, 12a, 36a, 37

137 Araneta v. Concepcion Case No. 17 G.R. No. L-9667, (July 31, 1956) Chapter V
I, Page 252, Footnote No. 24 FACTS: The husband filed a case for legal separatio
n against his wife on the ground of adultery. After the issues were joined, Defe
ndant therein filed an omnibus pe tition to secure the custody of their three mi
nor children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the
return of her passport; to enjoin Plaintiff f rom ordering his hirelings from h
arassing and molesting her; and to have Plaintiff t herein pay for the fees of h
er attorney in the action. The judge rendered his decision regarding the omnibus
petition and granted the custody of the children to Defendant, a monthly allowa
nce of P2,300 for support for her and the children, P 300 for a house, and P2,00
0 as attorney s fees. The judge refused to reconsider the or der. ISSUE: W/N the
parties are required to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition. H
ELD: No. If the parties are allowed to present evidences regarding the omnibus p
etition, it would violate the intent of the law regarding the 6-month cooling p
eriod contained in Art. 103 of the Civil Code. A recital of grievances in court
may fa n their grievances against one another; the legislature s intent is to gi
ve them opportuni ty for dispassionate reflection. Note, however, that the case
was filed after 6 months of the filing of the legal separation case. As such, th
e determination of the custody a nd alimony must have been given force and effec
t, provided it did not go to the ext ent of violating the policy of the cooling
off period. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 27, 36a, 36c, 36d, 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lichau
co vs. Apostol Case No. 147 G.R. No. L-19628 (December 4, 1922)

Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 23 FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged
in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals. It now desires to
import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manu
facture of serum. However, the Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cat
tle, except upon the condition stated in Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bure
au of Agriculture that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest bef
ore embarkation at Pnom-Pehn. Legislations involved in the case: Sec. 1762 of th
e Administrative Code prohibition against bringing of animals fro m infected for
eign country Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code Bringing of diseased animal in
to islands forbidden Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No.
3052 Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Isl
ands ISSUE: W/N Sec. 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052
, has been repealed by the implication in Sec. 1770. HELD: No. Sec. 1762, as ame
nded, is of a general nature, while Sec. 1770 deals with a particular contingenc
y not made the subject of legislation in Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 therefore is not c
onsidered as inconsistent with Sec. 1762 and it must be consid ered as a special
qualification of Sec. 1762. Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code re mains in fu
ll force and effect, being a special law having special contingency not dea lt w
ithin Sec. 1762, which extends merely to the importation of draft animals for pu
rposes of manufacturing serum. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 36a, 38b, 50

138 Cassion v. Banco Filipino Case No. 51 G.R. No. L-3540 (July 30, 1951) Chapte
r VI, Page 256, Footnote No. 31 FACTS: Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land
to PNB for P600. Plaintiffs defaulted and PNB extra judicially foreclosed the mo
rtgage and sold it to Cabatigan. After 1 year but before the expiration of 5 yea
rs, Plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land but PNB turned down the offer. PNB
relied on RA 2938 and RA 3135, which created the PNB and authorizes it to have
extra judicial foreclosure of mortgage respectivel y, while Plaintiffs relied on
RA 2874, known as the Public Land act, which provided that every conveyance of
land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shal l be subject to rep
urchase by the applicant for a period of 5 years from date of conveyance ISSUE:
Which of the conflicting statues should prevail? HELD: When two or more conflict
ing statues exist, as when general and special provisions are inconsistent, the
latter is paramount to the former and a particu lar intent will control a genera
l one that is inconsistent with it regardless of to the respective dates of pass
age. RA 2874 specially relates to specific property, thu s it is an exception to
the coverage of RA 2938 and 3135. LATIN MAXIM: 9, 38a, 38b, 40b, 50 STATUTORY C
ONSTRUCTION People v. Palmon Case No. 220 G.R. No. L-2860 (May 11, 1950) Chapter
VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 35 FACTS: Palmon was charged with serious physical i
njuries (prision correctional in med and max period 2 yrs, 4 mos. 1 day 6 yrs) b
efore the CFI of Capiz. Before the arraignment of the accused, the judge motu pr
oprio dismissed the case on the ground that under Sec. 87 of RA 296, the crime f
alls under the jurisdiction of t

he justice of the peace. However, the solicitor general contended that CFI has j
urisdiction. ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction to try the case? HELD: Sec 44(f
) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI over all
criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more th an 6 mo
nths. Sec. 87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justic e
of the peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relatin
g to ass aults where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial. Hence, th
e CFI and justi ce of the peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction ove
r the case. LATIN MAXIM: 36c, 36d, 37

Chartered Bank v. Imperial and National Bank Case No. 57 G.R. No. 17222 (March 1
5, 1921) Chapter VI, Page 257, Footnote No. 35 FACTS: Umberto de Poli was declar
ed to be in a state of insolvency at the instance of Plaintiff, and the sheriff
was ordered to take possession of all property of sai d Defendant. In an earlier
case, the PNB had obtained a writ by virtue of which th e sheriff also seized c
ertain goods owned by the insolvent. Plaintiff asserted tha t since the insolven
t had been declared as such, all civil proceedings against him shoul d have been
suspended according to the last portion of Sec. 60 of the insolvency l aw. ISSU
E: Which provision is controlling upon the case? HELD: To ascertain the meaning
of the various provisions of the insolvency law, every section, provision and cl
ause of a statue must be expounded in reference to ever y other. Thus, Sec. 60 s
hould be understood in reference with the other provisions of the same law, and
as such the PNB falls under the exception to Sec. 60 as stated in the other prov
ision of the same law. LATIN MAXIM: 9, 36c, 36d, 36e, 37, b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCT
ION Montenegro v. Castaeda and Balao Case No. 179 G.R. No. L-4221 (August 30, 1952
) Chapter VI, Page 258, Footnote No. 39 FACTS: Maximino Montenegro was arrested
in Manila by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the AFP for complici
ty with a communistic organization i n the commission of acts of rebellion, insu
rrection or sedition. Maximino s father then submitted an application for writ s
eeking the release of his son. Three days aft er, Pres. Quirino issued Proclamat
ion No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habe as corpus.

ISSUE: 1. W/N Proclamation No. 210 is erroneous since it included sedition, whic
h is not under the Constitution. 2. W/N the Bill of Rights prohibited the suspen
sion of the privilege of the writ. HELD: There is no doubt that it was erroneous
to include sedition. Art. 7 only provides invasion, insurrection, rebellion or
imminent danger as grounds for suspension. Sedition should be deemed as a mistak
e or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole. Also, as posed by Pro
f. Aruego, the Bill of Rights impliedly denied suspension in case of imminent da
nger, while Art. 7 expressly authorized the President to suspend when there is i
mminent danger. Moreover, during the Constitutional Convention, the debates vote
d down an amendment to add another cause, which is imminent danger of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 15a, 20b, 36f, b2

140 Arabay Inc. v. CFI of Zamboanga Case No. 16 G.R. No. L-37684 (September 10,
1975) Chapter VI Page 259, Footnote No. 43 FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog en
acted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for the selling and distribution of gaso
line, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, an d petroleumbased products. Arabay I
nc., distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum product s, contested the validi
ty of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to l
evy under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that municipali ties may not imp
ose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline. ISSUE: W/N Arabay I
nc. is entitled to a refund. HELD: The ordinance levied a sales tax not only bec
ause of the character of the ordinance as a sales tax ordinance, but also becaus
e the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impos
e a tax on sale. It is ev ident from the terms that the amount of the tax that m
ay be collected is directly dependent upon to the volume of sales. Since Sec. 2
of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits th e municipality from imposing sales and sp
ecific tax, with the exception of gasolin e, there subsists the right of Arabay
Inc. to a refund. The reasonable and practica l interpretation of the terms of t
he proviso in question resulted in the conclusio n that Congress, in excluding g
asoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such
local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11
e, 12a, 14, 20a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Paras v. COMELEC Case No. 196 G.R. No. 12
3169 (November 4, 1996) Chapter VI, Page 259, Footnote No. 50 FACTS:

A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Baran
gay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner s opposition that und er
Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the dat
e of the official s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a reg
ular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the
first Mond ay of May 2006, no recall may be instituted. ISSUE: W/N the SK elect
ion is a local election. HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept subs
ervient to its general intent. T he evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an e
lective local official to recall onc e during his term, as provided in par. (a)
and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter o f a law, determines its const
ruction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK elec
tion will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election
rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court a ssumed
that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation shoul
d be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, me
aningless, inoperative or nugatory. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11d, 25b, 27, 36b, 37, 38

141 Javellana v. Kintanar Case No. 138 G.R. No. L-33169 July 30, 1982 Chapter VI
, Page 262, Footnote No.55 FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a market (building
and lot) in Crossing Bago, Bago City, which consists of store spaces and of perm
anent and movable stalls leased to vendors. Said market has served the general p
opulation of the City of Bago for m ore than twenty (20) years already when it w
as denied the payment of Petitioner for a municipal license for the 3rd quarter
of 1968 on the ground that Ordinance No. 1 50 had been enacted prohibiting the e
stablishment, maintenance or operation of a public market in the City of Bago by
any person, entity, or corporation other th an the local government. Appellant
claims that a public market is one that is not owned privately; whereas the appe
llees say that is one that serves the general public. ISSUE: W/N the marketplace
owned by Petitioner is a public market. HELD: The test of a public market is it
s dedication to the service of the general public and not its ownership. A scrut
iny of the charter provision will readily s how that by public market, it is mea
nt one that is intended to serve the general public. The Petitioner himself so d
eclared when he testified that his market is engaged in servicing the public, no
t only in Bago City, but also those coming from other municipalities. LATIN MAXI
M: 1, 2a, 6d, 40c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Niere v. CFI of Negros Occidental, Bran
ch II Case No. 188 G.R. No. L-30324 November 29, 1973 Chapter VI, Page 262, Foot
note No.60 FACTS: Petitioner is a Civil Service eligible and was appointed city
engineer of La Carlota City by the City Mayor pursuant to the provisions of Sec.
21 of RA 4858 (the

City Charter). After the enactment of the Decentralization Act, Private Responde
nt was appointed by the President of the Philippines as city engineer of La Car
lota City. Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the on
e legally appointed as city engineer under RA 4858. House Bill No. 9711, which b
ecame RA 4585, originally expressly included city engineer as one of those whom
the city mayor can appoint under Sec. 21 of said RA, but during the period of am
endment in the Senate, the position of said engineer was deleted in the final dr
aft of Sec. 21. ISSUE: 1. W/N deletion of the position of city engineer in Sec.
21 of RA 4585 an amendm ent purely of form only or not. 2. W/N appointing author
ity for the post of city engineer belongs to the city Ma yor or not. HELD: 1. NO
, it is a substantial amendment. Nothing could be more substantial than the vest
ing of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city engine er.
If Congress wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and employe
es o f city department, it could have easily re-phrased Sec. 21 of the City Char
ter to that effect. Such section expressly limits the appointing authority of th
e mayor. 2. NO. Since the city mayor under Sec. 21 is without authority to appoi
nt the ci ty engineer, this prerogative can only be exercised by the President o
f the Philipp ines, who, under Sec. 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitutio
n, shall nominate wi th the consent of the Commission on Appointments all other
officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 29, 30a, 32, 38b, b2

142 Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines Case No. 307 G.R. No. L-6379 (Septe
mber 29, 1954) Chapter VI, Page 263, Footnote No.61 FACTS: Petitioner-appellee w
as born, of Chinese parents in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental n October 6, 1927. Aft
er finishing primary and secondary education here in the Philippines, he went to
the United States to further his studies from the ye ar 1947-1950. In April of
the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. On Ju
ly 15, 1950, he filed for naturalization. Forthwith, he returned to the United S
tates and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in July 1951l bu t he di
d not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the original da t
e of hearing the case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had
to be postponed. ISSUE: 1. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted
, notwithstanding the fa ct that petitioner left the Philippines immediately aft
er the filing of his petitio n and did not return until several months after the
first date set for the hearing thereof . 2. W/N domicile and residence are syno
nymous. HELD: 1. No. Section 7 of C.A. No. 473 requires applicant for naturaliza
tion to reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of th
e petition up t o the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. 2. No. Al
though the words residence and domicile are often used interchangeably, each has
, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and diff erent from that of the o
ther. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, not legal residen
ce or domicile, is required. Residence indicates permanency of occupation, disti
nct from lodging or boarding, or temporary occupation. Domicile is residence wit
h intention to stay. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7, 11a, 25a, 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Man
ila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 165 G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012 (September 30, 1976) Chapter VI
, Page 264, Footnote No. 63 FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 130
6 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The re
claimed area was to form part o f the Luneta extension. The act provided that th
e reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is au
thorized to set aside a tract of the recla imed land for a hotel site and to lea
se or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila con veyed a portion of the rec
laimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, toge ther with all the
improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC). ISSUE: W/N the subje
ct property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila. HELD: The petitions
were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to analyze all the p
rovisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative inten
t. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is
a grant of a public nature. Such grants have always been strictly constr ued ag
ainst the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resou r
ces, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, t
he ar ea reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and
without c ost to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be
narrowed to ex clude matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legi
slation. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 9a, 36b, 37, 43

143 Almeda v. Florentino Case No. 10 G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965) Chapter
VI, Page 265, Footnote No. 67 FACTS: RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted
June 21, 1947), provides in its Sec. 1 4 that the Board shall have a secretary w
ho shall be appointed by it to serve durin g the term of office of the members t
hereof On June 18, 1960, RA 2709 amended Sec. 12 of RA 183. On the strength of P
ar. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City Charter, as am ended, the Vice-Mayor of Pasay
City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the Municipal Board of said Ci
ty. The very next day, the Board refused to recognize Petitioner as its secretar
y and, in turn, appointed Respondent Florentino to the position, purportedly und
er Sec. 14 of the City Charter. ISSUE: Which law applies on the matter of the ap
pointment of the Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City? HELD: The petit
ion was dismissed. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any intention on t
he part of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the provisions
of Sec. 14 of R.A 183. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is man
ifested that the legislature so intended. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 37, 49, 50 STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION Abellana v. Marave Case No. 3 G.R. No.L-27760 (May 29, 1974) Chapte
r VI, Page 266, Footnote No. 71 FACTS: Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The criminal case was filed with
the city court of Ozamis City, whic h found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petit
ioner appealed such decision to the CFI . At this stage, the Private Respondents
as the offended parties filed with another b ranch

of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge, a separate and in

dependent civil action for damages. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of suc h
action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing t
h ereof in the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issue
d the order to deny Petitioners ISSUE: W/N the order was issued with grave abuse
of discretion. HELD: Petition for certiorari is dismissed. Petitioner s literal
reading of the Sec. 1 o f Rule 111 of the Rules of Court ignores the de novo as
pect of appealed cases from city courts as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 123. Such
interpretation, does likewise, gi ve rise to a constitutional question that may
trench on a substantive right in accordance t o Art. 33 of the Civil Code.2 As s
tated in Art. X, Sec. 5, par.5 of the 1973 Constituti on, the grant of power to
this Court does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substa
ntive rights. Thus, it is a well-settled doctrine that a c ourt is to avoid cons
truing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitu
tional doubt. Lastly, in the case at bar, literal construction of the la w is no
t favored. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function
if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, part
icularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being gi
ven an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 12a, 37 mot
ion to dismiss.

Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad Case No. 317 G.R. No. L-20479 (February 6, 1925) Chapter
VI, Page 267, Footnote No. 78 FACTS: Act 2972 prohibited record books of Mercha
nts from being written in a language other than English, Spanish, or a local dia
lect. Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, was penalized for keeping books written i
n Chinese. He and other Chine se merchants challenged the constitutionality of t
he law. ISSUE: Is Act 2972 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. The purpo
se of the Act is to prevent fraud in book keeping and evasion of taxes for the p
rotection of the public good. This decision is con sistent with the ruling in Kw
ong Sing v. City of Manila, where laundrymen were prohibite d from issuing recei
pts written in Chinese. Class legislation is thus allowed if i t is for the publ
ic good. Instead of interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against ke epi
ng books in Chinese, it may be interpreted as a directory measure that records p
ertaining to taxes must be written or annotated in English, Spanish, or a local
dialect, or have a duplicate in any of these languages. This liberal interpretat
ion is re asonable and it upholds constitutionality. LATIN MAXIM: 1a, 6d, 9c, 11
e, 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION City of Naga v. Agna Case No. 63 G.R. No. L-36049 (
May 31, 1976) Chapter VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 83 FACTS: The City of Naga chan
ged its tax system from graduated tax to percentage tax. Respondent taxpayers in
sisted on paying the new taxes the following year, pursuant to the Revised Admin
istrative Code (Sec. 2309). It stated that tax enactments changing the current s
ystem prior to December 15 should take effect the following year. The Naga City
government, on the other hand, claimed that under the Local Autonomy Act (RA 226
4), tax ordinances take effect 15 days after

publication; this allegedly impliedly repealed Sec. 2309 of the Admin Code. ISSU
E: Did RA 2264 repeal Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code? HELD: No, it
did not. There is a presumption against implied repeal; a subsequent provision
only repeals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. If two law s can be
harmonized, then the Courts shall do so. Sec. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code app
lies in this case because the new tax changed a prior tax system. RA 2264 onl y
applies for entirely new tax provisions. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38a, 38b

145 Tan v. COMELEC Case No. 152 G.R. No. 112093 (October 4, 1994) FACTS: BP 885
is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte. The plebiscite for the
approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospective ly comp
osing the new province. The parent provinces, which will get also affected, were
not included in the plebiscite. ISSUE: Is BP 885 unconstitutional? HELD: It is
unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must be held in al
l units affected, including the parent province, and not just the new areas . Th
e draft bill provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units, and not jus
t the areas constituting the new province, but the final bill only limited it to
the latter. LATIN MAXIM: 12a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Government v. Mu
nicipality of Binangonan Case No. 118 G.R. No. L-10202 (March 29, 1916) Chapter
VI, Page 268, Footnote No. 84 FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Cardona challeng
ed the constitutionality of EO 66 by the Governor-General granting Binangonan mu
nicipal authority over 7 additiona l barrios. Petitioner claimed that the Govern
or-General has no legislative authori ty and that this legislation was not for t
he public good. ISSUE: Is EO 66 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. Ever
y act of legislation is presumed to be constitutional

and for the public good; facts need not be stated to prove it. LATIN MAXIM: 12a,
37

People v. Del Rosario Case No. 105 G.R. No. L-7234 (May 21, 1955) FACTS: On July
27, 1953, information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay charging Paz M.
del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28, 1 953. The accus
ed presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that the offense ch
arged had already prescribed in accordance with Art. 90 and Art. 91 of the RPC.
The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Hence, an appea
l against the dismissal is made to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: 1. Whether the pres
criptive period should commence from the very day on which the crime was committ
ed, or from the day following that in which it was committed; 2. W/N the term mo
nth in the RPC should be understood to be a month of 30 days, instead of the civ
il/calendar month. HELD: 1. In computation of the period of time within which an
act is to be done, the l aw has always directed that the first be excluded and
the last included (Art. 13, Civil Code). Art. 18 of the CC directs that any defi
ciency in any special law must be supplie d by its provisions. As the RPC is def
icient in that it does not explicitly define ho w the period is to be computed,
resort must be had to Art. 13 of the CC. 2. By express provision of Article 13 o
n the new Civil Code, a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month. I
n accordance therewith, the term month used in Art. 90 of the RPC should be unde
rstood to mean the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month. Hence,
the Court held that the offense charged had not yet prescribed because July is
the 60th day from May 29. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 38b, 46a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salva
tierra v. Court of Appeals Case No. G.R. No. 107797 (August 26, 1996) FACTS: Enr
ique Salvatierra died intestate and was survived by his legitimate brothers, Tom
as, Bartolome, Venancio, and Macario, and a sister, Marcela. His estate

consisted of 3 parcels of land (Lots 25, 26, & 27). Macario sold the 405 sq. mts
. out of the 749 sq. mts. total area of Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo. Eventually,
an extraju dicial partition with confirmation of sale was executed by and among
the surviving legal heirs of Enrique, which consisted of the aforementioned lot
s. Thereafter, Venanc io sold Lot No. 7 (which belonged to him by virtue of the
said partition), and a 14 9-sq. m. portion of Lot 26 to spouses Longalongs. It t
urned out, however, that Anselmo al ready obtained an OCT covering the whole of
Lot No. 26. The complaints for reconveyanc e were filed 5 years after the issuan
ce of such OCT to Anselmo. ISSUE: 1. Which prescriptive period for actions for a
nnulment should prevail, Art. 1391 of the new CC or Art. 1144 of the same Code?
2. W/N there was a double sale. HELD: 1. Art. 1144 of the CC prevails. The presc
riptive period for such actions is 10 years, as held in previous cases. Hence, t
he action for reconveyance had not yet prescribe d. There is no ambiguity in the
terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partiti on. Thus, the literal and p
lain meaning thereof should be observed. What Anselmo bought from his father was
only 405 sq. m of Lot 26. The registration of the whole Lot 26 in the name of A
nselmo was, therefore, done with evident bad faith. 2. There was no double sale.
Both parties did not dispute the contents of the extrajudicial partition. LATIN
MAXIM: 5a, 6c, 7a

147 Pasno v. Ravina and Ravina Case No. 199 G.R. No. 31581 (February 3, 1930) Ch
apter VI, Page 273, Footnote No. 104 FACTS: Labitoria, during her lifetime, mort
gaged 3 parcels of land to the PNB. When Labitoria died, a petition was presente
d for the probate of her last will and testament. During the pendency of the cas
e, a special administrator of the estat e of the deceased was appointed by the c
ourt. The special administrator failed to comply with the conditions of the mort
gage, and the PNB asked the sheriff to proceed with the sale of the parcels of l
and. The CFI ruled in favor of the spec ial administrator requiring the sheriff
to abstain from selling the said lands. ISSUE: 1. W/N the will is valid 2. W/N t
he PNB had the right to foreclose in its favor the mortgage which was executed b
y Labitoria now that the mortgaged property is in custodia legis. HELD: 1. The l
aw does not require that the will shall be dated. Accordingly, an errone ous dat
e will not defeat a will. 2. Yes. The PNB had the right to foreclose the said mo
rtgaged property. The mortgagee should foreclose the mortgage in accordance with
Sec. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since Act 3135 fails to make provision
regarding the sale of the mortgaged property which is in custodia legis, it wou
ld be logical to suppose Se c. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure would govern l
atter contingency. Act 3115 must be presumed to have been acquainted with the pr
ovisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. LATIN MAXIM: 38a, 38b STATUTORY CONSTRU
CTION C & C Commercial v. NAWASA Case No. 42 G.R. No. L-27275 (November 18, 1967
) Chapter VI, Page 274, Footnote No. 107 FACTS: NAWASA conducted three separate
bids for the three different waterworks projects in Manila, Davao and Iloilo. Ho
wever, C & C Commercial Corporation, one

of those who participated in the bidding but eventually lost, filed three corres
ponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterworks projects con
tending that NAWASA violated Sec. 1 of RA 912, which should give preference to l
ocal materials that are available, practicable and usable. The sa id law also pr
ovides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produ ced materi
als is in relation to the construction or repair work undertaken by the Governme
nt. NAWASA alleged that it should not be included within the meaning of the term
Government as used in the said law. ISSUE: W/N NAWASA falls under the term HELD
: Yes. The NAWASA should be deemed embraced within the term government found in
RA 312, and in the construction of their works or purchase of materials thereof,
local material should be given preference whenever available, practicable and u
sable. Government-owned or controlled corporations are not exempted from RA 912.
Two laws are being considered in this case: C.A. No. 138 a nd RA 912. Both rela
te to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic purpose or object
which is to give preference to locally produced materials in purchases, works or
projects of the Government (referring to Filipino-First poli cy). LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 35, 36, 37, 38a, 38b government under RA 912.

148 Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan Case No. 41 G.R. No. L-21516 (April 2
9, 1966) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 119 FACTS: The Petitioner was grante
d a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an electric light, heat, and power sy
stem in Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, together with th e issuance of a certific
ate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Serv ice Commission. Howev
er, the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered 11, 131 and 148 imposing a 2%
tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in the city. Butuan
Sawmill, Inc. questioned the validity of the taxing ordinance which is deemed to
have impaired the obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitio ner of p
roperty without due process of law. On the other hand, Respondent maintained tha
t it was vested with the power to provide for the levy and collection of taxes f
or general and special purposes as stipulated in its charter which was granted i
n 19 50. ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the franchise business of Petitioners falls
within the coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant to the city s power of ta
xation. HELD: No. the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill,
Inc. by the City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city un
der its chart er. Neither could the latter s power therein granted be taken as a
n authority delegate d to the city to amend or alter the franchise, considering
the absence of an expre ss or specific grant of power to do so. Where there are
two statutes, the earlier spec ial and the latter general and the terms of the g
eneral are broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special the fa
ct that one is special and the othe r is general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as a remainin g exception to the general as a genera
l law of the land, while the other as the la w of a particular case. LATIN MAXIM
: 25, 50, d

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty Case No. 168 G.R. No. 142
05 (September 30, 1919) Chapter VI, Page 279, Footnote No. 124 FACTS: The Defend
ant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal revenue taxes upon o
il and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue of an act of Congre
ss in 1913. The latter contended that the taxes had been illegally collected pur
suant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906. On t he other han
d, Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 pri vate cha
rter. ISSUE: W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. HEL
D: No. A special law (including private charters) having the character of a priv
ate contract, supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the specia l f
acts and circumstances, the consideration of such being embodied in the special
law. A general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot be taken to ha
ve modified or altered the charter, unless the intent to modify or alter is mani
fes t. Where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as
remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary i
mplication. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 50

149 De Jesus v. People of the Philippines Case No. 87 G. R. No. L-61998 (Februar
y 22, 1983) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 117 FACTS: The Petitioner, COMELE
C registrar of Casiguran, was charged by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan
with the violation of the 1978 Election Code . He filed a motion to quash the i
nformation on the ground that the jurisdiction t o investigate, prosecute and tr
y the offense charged against him is lodged with th e COMELEC, and, coincidental
ly, the Court of First Instance (now RTC). ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has juri
sdiction over election offenses with respect to public officers. HELD: No. Sec.
2 of Art. XII [C] of the 1973 Constitution granted COMELEC the power to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, while Sec 182 of t
he 1978 Election Code vested the Commission with authority to conduct preliminar
y investigation and subsequently prosecute all election offenses punis hable und
er the same Code. The legislative intent in granting COMELEC the said power i s
to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections. To divest the COMEL
EC of its authority would seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving the af
oremention ed constitutional mandate. At the same time, Sec 184 of the Election
Code, which de als specifically with election offenses, must be favored over pro
visions of P.D. 160 6 which speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committ
ed by public officers in rel ation to their office. The former cannot be constru
ed as impliedly repealed by the lat ter thereby continuing to be an exception gr
anted the more specific legislative inte nt it evinces. LATIN MAXIM: 6, 9, 37, 3
8, 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION US v. Almond

Case No. 157 G.R. No. 2517 (June 2, 1906) FACTS: The complaint alleges that R.W.
Almond, master and in charge of the steamship Rubi brought Tawas Tahan, is an a
lien of East India who is afflicted w ith trachoma. He permitted Tawas Tahan to
land in the Philippine Islands from the steamship at a place and time other than
that designated by the immigration officers. The evidence showed that Defendant
adopted due precautions to prevent the landing of Tawas Tahan, and that if the
landing was made, it was made withou t the Defendant s knowledge or consent. ISS
UE: W/N a conviction can be sustained when it appears that there was no consent,
either tacit or express, to the landing of the alien. HELD: Sec. 18 imposes upo
n one who has brought immigrant aliens into a United States port the duty of ado
pting due precautions to prevent the landing of any s uch alien at any time or p
lace other than that designated by the immigration officer s and fixes a penalty
for permitting an alien so to land. The word permit implies that t he landing o
f the alien must be with the express or tacit consent of the owner, off icer, ag
ent or person in charge of the vessel. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11e, 41a, 48

US v. Estapia Case No. 298 G.R. No. 12891 (October 19, 1917) Chapter VII, Page 2
89, Footnote No. 23 FACTS: A case was filed against Defendants for having engage
d in cockfighting, in violation of Sec. 1 of Act. No. 480. The Defendants held a
cockfight on a cleari ng near a grove of buri palms. The prosecution argued tha
t the term cockpit should be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight ta
kes place. ISSUE: W/N the clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendant
s is a cockpit within the contemplation of the law. HELD: The term cockpit as us
ed in the statute has a limited meaning so it cannot be construed to mean or inc
lude a clearing such as had been used by the Defendants. Penal provisions of a s
tatute are to be construed strictly and parti cular words used in the law should
be construed in relation to the context. LATIN MAXIM: 25, 37, 48 STATUTORY CONS
TRUCTION U.S. v. Abad Santos Case No. 294 G.R. No. 12262 (February 10, 1917) Cha
pter VII, Page 290, Footnote No. 28 FACTS: The Appellant was accused of violatin
g the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law by failing to make an entry for the
January 5, 1915 indicating whether any business was done on that day or not. He
had employed a bookkeeper with the expectation that the latter would perform al
l the duties pertaining to his posit ion, including the entries required to be m
ade by the Collector of Internal Revenue. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant is guilty of
violating the Internal Revenue Law. HELD: The Appellant must be acquitted since
it is undisputed that he took no part in the keeping of the book in question and
that he never personally made an entry i n it as he left everything to his book
keeper. Courts will not hold one person crimina lly responsible for acts of anot
her done without his knowledge or consent, unless th

e law clearly so provides. LATIN MAXIM: 41a, 48

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 151 ROUND 3

152 People v. Atop Case No. 202 G.R. Nos. 124303-05 (February 10, 1998) Chapter
VII, Page 290, Footnote No. 29 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of 3 counts of
rape. The trial court sentenced him to 2 terms of reclusion perpetua for the fir
st two counts, and to death for the third, holding that his common-law relations
hip with the victim s grandmother aggravated the penalty. Private complainant Re
gina Guafin, 12 years old, is the granddaught er of Trinidad Mejos, the common-l
aw wife of the Appellant. ISSUE: 1. W/N the trial court erred in appreciating th
e nighttime and relationship as aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape a
llegedly committed. 2. W/N the trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty bey
ond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. HELD: 1. The trial court erred. Noct
urnity must have been deliberately sought by the Appellant to facilitate the cri
me or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or facilitate his escape. Neith
er can we appreciate relationship as aggravating. Th e scope of the relationship
under Art. 15 of the RPC encompasses only the spouse, ascendant, descendant, le
gitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, and rel ative by affinity in the
same degrees. Outside these enumerations and consistent with t he doctrine that
criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused, no other rel
ationship between the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposable penalt
y for the crime committed. 2. The Appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable d
oubt. The offended party s straightforward and unequivocal statements show indel
ible badges of truth. LATIN MAXIM: 30a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Padilla
Case No. 113 G.R. No. 47027 (February 4, 1941) Chapter VII, Page 291, Footnote N
o. 30 FACTS: Appellants Padilla, a Filipino citizen, and Von Arend, a German cit
izen, acting

jointly and conniving with each other, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally ev
aded the provisions of Art. 4 of C.A. No. 138, which requires Philippine or U.S
. citizens hip before the exercise or enjoyment of the privilege established in
said article. It is co ntended, however, that notwithstanding the infringement o
f Sec. 4. of Act No. 138, the Appellants cannot be punished therefore since the
said Act imposes no penal sanction whatsoever. ISSUE: W/N a violation of C.A. No
. 138 may be prosecuted under C.A. No. 108, entitled An Act to punish acts of ev
asion of the laws on the nationalization or c ertain rights, franchises or privi
leges. HELD: Yes. Any citizen of the Philippines or of the United States who kno
wingly allows his name or citizenship to be used so that a person not so qualifi
ed may enjoy t he privilege granted to domestic entities by C.A. No. 138, as wel
l as any alien pro fiting thereby, is guilty of violation of C.A. No. 108. The v
ery title of Act No. 108 gives unmistakable notice of the legislative inten t an
d purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationalization of
certain rights, franchise or privileges. Sec. 1 of the same Act applies punishm
e nt provided therein to all cases in which any constitutional or legal provisio
n requ ires Philippine or United States citizenship as a requirement for the exe
rcise or enj oyment of a right, franchise or privilege. Under Act No. 108, any l
egal provision, whene ver existing at the time of the passage of said Act or pro
mulgated thereafter, would fall within its scope. One of such legal provision is
Art. 4 of Act No. 138. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 6c, 9a

153 People v. Salazar Case No. 223 G.R. No. L-13371 (September 24, 1959) Chapter
VII, Page 292, Footnote No. 36 FACTS: The Appellant was charged with the crime
of malversation of public funds. The Appellant being the then Deputy Provincial
and Municipal Treasurer, and as such, accountable for the funds collected and re
ceived by him, did willfully, feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, mi
sappropriate, and convert to h is own personal use and benefit, from said funds,
the sum of P13,897.77. Upon arraignment, the Appellant pleaded not guilty, whic
h he later withdrew and changed to guilty. He was sentenced to be imprisoned, to
suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, to pay a fine, to ind
emnify the Government without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs. The Appellant contends that the lower court committed an erro
r in sentencing him to suffer the aforementioned penalty on the ground of lack o
f malice in the commiss ion of the crime, in that, he did not apply the missing
funds to his personal use an d benefit but lost the same while he was drunk. ISS
UE: W/N the penalties imposed by the lower court were excessive given the conten
tion of Appellant. HELD: No. There is nothing in the record that supports the cl
aim that missing funds were lost while the Appellant was drunk. When he entered
the plea of guilty, he thereby admitted, not only his guilt, but also all the ma
terial facts alleged in the information, namely, that he willfully, feloniously
and with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, misapply, embezzle, and conv
ert to his own personal use and benefit, from said funds, the sum of P13,897.77,
thus clearly indicating malice or evil intent on his part. His plea of guilt ca
rried with it the acknowl edgement or admission that the willful acts charged we
re done with malice. LATIN MAXIM: 7b, 11e, 41a, 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People
v. Garcia Case No. 209 No. L-2873 (February 28, 1950) Chapter VII, Page 293, Fo
otnote No. 41

FACTS: The lower court, ignoring the Appellant s minority, sentenced him to an i
ndeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8
years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. RA 47 which amended Art. 80 of
the RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to be c
ommitted to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitabl
e institution, instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given ris
e t o the controversy. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by impl
ication ha s also amended par. 2 of Art. 68 of the RPC, which provides that when
the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. ISSUE:
W/N the Appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the c
rime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. 68, pa r. 2
of the RPC. HELD: Yes. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68, par.
2, as it now stand s and Art. 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility betwee
n granting Appellant o f the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstan
ce and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reforma
tory institution. All pa rts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so
that effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting i
nterest in the same statute a re never to be supposed or so regarded, unless for
ced upon the court by an unambiguous language. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b

154 People v. Terrada, et. al. Case No. 229 G.R. No. L-23625 (November 25, 1983)
Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 42 FACTS: On November 1951 and May 1952, Ap
pellees Obo, Gundran, and Terrado applied for and were issued free patents for c
ontiguous parcels of land situated in Camarines Sur. These parcels of land were
forest land and as such are not disposable. On March 1962, three separate inform
ations for falsification of publ ic document were filed against the Appellees fo
r having conspired with one another through false and fraudulent misrepresentati
ons alleging that they had all the qualifications and had complied with all lega
l requirements of the law to entitl e them to a free patent. Appellees claim tha
t the crime has already prescribed accordin g to the RPC, but the State argues t
hat the crime has not prescribed under Act No. 3585 where the crime of perjury p
rescribes in 8 years. ISSUE: W/N the prescriptive period to be applied should be
10 years under the RPC or 8 years under Act No. 3585. HELD: The 8 year prescrip
tive period should be applied. Penal statutes must be strictly applied. Where a
crime is punishable by both a special law and the RPC but with different prescri
ptive periods, the one favorable to the accused or the sho rter prescriptive per
iod should be applied. LATIN MAXIM: 43, 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION US v. Toribo C
ase No. 304 G.R. No. 5060 (January 26, 1910) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No.
48 FACTS: Evidence suggests that Appellant slaughtered the carabao for human co
nsumption, which is in violation of Act No. 1147, An Act Regulating the Registra
tion, Branding, Slaughter of Large Cattle. It appears that in the town of

Carmen in Bohol, there aren t any slaughterhouses. Appellant suggests that under
such circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not penalize slaughter of
large cattle without permit. Appellant also alleges that it is an infringement
on his right over his property (carabao). ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1147 applies only w
hen there is a municipal slaughterhouse, and the slaughter of a carabao is made
therein. HELD: No. As long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumptio
n is done without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penal
ty under t he Act applies. The Act primarily seeks to protect the large cattle o
f the Philippine I slands, against theft and to make recovery and return of the
same easy. More importantly , it is to protect the very life and existence of th
e inhabitants of the Philippines, imperiled by the continued destruction of larg
e cattle by disease, making it reasonable fo r the legislative to prohibit and p
enalize a perfectly legal act utilizing personal pr operties of citizens (cattle
) if not for the extraordinary conditions/threat present. Well s ettled is the d
octrine of the State s legitimate exercise of the right of eminent domain lai d
down in jurisprudence. Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible o
f many interpretations, that which stays true with the intent of the law must b
e observed. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 37

155 US v. Go Chico Case No. 299 G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909) Chapter VII,
Page 295, Footnote No. 49 FACTS: Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec.
1 of Act No. 1696 or the Flag Law, displaying in his store a number of medallio
ns, in the form of a small butt on, upon the faces of which were imprinted in mi
niature the picture of Emilio Aguina ldo, and the flag or banner or device used
during the late armed insurrection in the Philippine Islands against the U.S. Ap
pellant claims that he is ignorant of the law and consequently, had no corrupt i
ntention to violate the law. He claims acquittal o n the ground that his guilt m
ust be proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the law wa s referring to identic
al banners, emblem, flag, etc. ISSUE: 1. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law,
Appellant must have acted with criminal intent. 2. W/N the wording of the law e
xempts the articles displayed by the Defendant. HELD: 1. No, criminal intent isn
t necessary for violation of the Flag Law. 2. The medallions, though not exactl
y identical, comes within the purview of the class of articles referred to by th
e law. Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made by statutory requirement, crim
inal intent is not necessary. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immateria
l bec ause to hold otherwise would render the statute substantially worthless, a
nd its executi on impossible. The statute did not include intent as an element o
f a crime, and it is clear so no interpretation is required. Clearly therefore,
ignorance of the law is not a valid defense for violation thereof. The descripti
on in the law refers not to a partic ular flag, but to a type of flag. LATIN MAX
IM: 5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Arriete v. Director of Pub
lic Works Case no. 22 G.R. No. 37125 (September 30, 1933)

Chapter VII, Page 296, Footnote No. 52 FACTS: Appellant Arriete, as legal guardi
an on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap, sought to recover the title and possession
of three lots which were sold by the sheriff in a public auction to Appellee Le
desma (and thereafter sold to Fermin Caram) to satisfy the judgment of a lien fo
r nonpayment of taxes, under the Irrigation Act No. 2152. However, it was found
that the delinquent taxpayer was not the owner of sa id lots, but Carmen Jagunap
was. ISSUE: W/N Appellee Ledesma has any rights over the lots acquired in good
faith under the final deed of sale of the provincial sheriff. HELD: No, she acqu
ired no right at all. Act No. 2152 provided that regarding expropriation of land
, the list of lands filed by the Director of Public Lands m ust be published, an
d notice should be given to the owners to file answer or appear in the civil cas
e. No such publication or notice was evident in this case. It is not sufficient
that they had actual knowledge. Statutes in the derogation of rights are constru
ed strictly. This is because people in a republi can state like ours enjoy inher
ent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or protecte d by law, like the right a
gainst undue deprivation of property. Thus, whenever there are statutes authoriz
ing the expropriation of private land or property, these statut es are construed
strictly. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

156 Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. COMELEC Case No. 246 G.R. No. L-53460 (May 2
7, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57 FACTS: Nacionalista Party (NP) f
iled a petition against Respondent San Luis of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)
for turncoatism. When Respondent San Luis ran as Governor of Laguna under Liber
al Party (LP) in 1972, he won. The normal expiry f or the term was 1975, but it
was extended lawfully by the President. Now (1980) he is running for Governor ag
ain under KBL. Under the law, No elective public officer may change his politica
l party affiliation during his term of office or within six months immediately p
receding or following an election. ISSUE: W/N COMELEC was correct in dismissing
petition which contended that Respondent San Luis should be disqualified from ru
nning due to turncoatism. HELD: No, he cannot be disqualified. He did not change
affiliations during his term. He was expelled from the LP in 1978 and this can
t be construed as a willful chang e of affiliation. At that time, no one even kn
ew when the next elections were, so Respondent could not have changed affiliatio
ns simply to anticipate the next election. The constitutional prohibition cannot
be applied to the period beyond the frame-up (1971-1975) term to which public o
fficials were elected in 1971 because this would unduly impinge on freedom of as
sociation guaranteed to all. Between two constructions, one of which would dimin
ish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do
so, the latter construction must be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 37, 48 STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION Genaro B. Reyes Construction Inc. v. Court of Appeals Case No. 51 G
.R. No. 108718 (July 14, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57 FACTS:

Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the notice
of pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood contro l faci
lities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a publi c b
idding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negative sli
ppage (delay in the infrastructure project), the government was either author iz
ed to take over the project or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners how
eve r claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by DPWH, but al
so termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches
15% . ISSUE: W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid. HELD: No, Re
spondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the contract to
other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or res cind the co
ntract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurre d a n
egative slippage of 15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No. 10
2. The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed constru
ction projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily to save money
and to avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the go
vernment. Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously disqua
lified bidder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government . LAT
IN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 12a

157 Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co. Case No. 289 G.R. No. L-6690 (March 29, 1912)
Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 62 FACTS: Defendant company took possession
of and occupied a small parcel of land without the express consent of Plaintiff
and without having made payment therefo re, alleging that the land is a part of
certain lands described in condemnation proceedings. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff has t
he right to maintain this separate action for damages for trespass on his land o
n the ground that it was his duty to seek redress in the condemnation proceeding
s instituted by Defendant company. HELD: As a general rule, the steps prescribed
by the statute must be followed or the proceedings will be void. Since these st
atutes are in derogation of general righ t and of common-law modes of procedure,
they must be strictly construed in favor of th e landowner, and must be at leas
t substantially or fully and fairly complied with. In the absence of proof of a
substantial compliance with the provisions of law touching such proceedings, the
Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute any appropriate action to recover t
he damages which she may have suffered as a resul t of an unauthorized and unlaw
ful seizure and occupation of her property. The theory on which the trial judge
correctly proceeded was that Defendant company having unlawfully taken possessio
n of a part of the tract of land in question, and by its operations thereon rend
ered the whole tract worthless to th e Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to
abandon the entire tract, and recover damages for its full value. LATIN MAXIM:
21a, 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et
al. Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919) Chapter VII, Page 297, Foot
note No. 64 FACTS:

Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands,
be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement the extensi
on of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or exped ient t
hat the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes. ISSUE: W/N in expro
priation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire into, and hear pro
of upon, the necessity of the expropriation. HELD: In our opinion, when the legi
slature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascerta
in upon trial whether the right exists fo r the exercise of eminent domain, it i
ntended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those question
s (of necessity). It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question m
ay be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general accep
tation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in questi
on public property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be denie
d, for the reason that the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to
expropriate public prop erty. Even granting that a necessity exists for the open
ing of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of
opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjac
ent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every
purpose of the Plaintiff. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, 43

Velasco v. Republic of the Philippines Case No. 165 G.R. No. L-14214 (May 25, 19
60) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76 FACTS: Petition for naturalization of
Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the requirements of the law. ISSUE: W
/N the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturalization. HELD: No. C
onsidering that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly cons
trued in favor of the government and against the applicant , we are constrained
to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for naturalizat
ion. LATIN MAXIM: 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippin
es Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footn
ote No. 76 FACTS: Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the
law requires that he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citize
n one year prior t o the filing of application unless he is exempt from complyin
g with said requirement. The law exempts one from filing a declaration of intent
ion in two cases: (a) if he i s born in the Philippines and has received primary
and secondary education in any school recognized by the government; and (b) if
he has continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of 30 years or more
provided that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children e
ither in a public school or private sch ools recognized by the government. In th
e instant case, Petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become
a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Phi
lippines for a period of more than 30 years and h as given primary and secondary
education to all his children in private schools recognized by the government.
ISSUE:

W/N the Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his du
ty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children. HELD: No. The
government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education to his dau
ghters Angelita and Lourdes. The reason that Angelita was not able to complete h
er studies because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betr ays the s
incerity of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. It was further shown t hat
in spite of Lourdes s alleged sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese s
chool which strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisi
ons of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its lau
dable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court conclu
ded that Petitioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so hi
s petitio n should be denied. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

159 Co v. Republic of the Philippines Case No. 24 G.R. No. L-12150 (May 26, 1960
) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76 FACTS: Petitioner filed his petition fo
r naturalization in the trial court. The court ordered that a certificate of nat
uralization be issued to Petitioner after the l apse of two years from the date
the decision became final and all the requisites provide d for in RA 503 were me
t. The government appealed the decision contending that from the evidence itself
introduced by Petitioner it would appear that he failed to c omply with some of
the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to becom e a Filipin
o citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the princi
ples underlying the constitution, but rather stated that he believes in democrac
y upo n cross-examination. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to
comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles
underlying our constitution. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in finding that Pe
titioner had all the qualifications for naturalization and none of the disqualif
ications mentioned in the law. HELD: Yes. In so stating that he believes merely
in our laws, Petitioner did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied i
n our constitution which are ref erred to in the law. He has also failed to cond
uct himself in a proper and irreproacha ble manner in his relation with our gove
rnment as evidenced by his failure to regist er his family with the Bureau of Im
migration and to file his income tax return. Conside ring that "naturalization l
aws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in f avor of the governmen
t and against the applicant," the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred
in granting the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43 STATUTORY C
ONSTRUCTION

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos Case No. 157 G.R. No. L-12
0082 (September 11, 1996) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85 FACTS: Responde
nt Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for
realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the Petitioner, who objecte
d to such demand claiming in its favor Sec. 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from p
ayment of realty taxes. Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and a pol
itical subdivision, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes
within its jurisdiction . Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhan
ced further by the LGC. While i t may be true that under its Charter the Petitio
ner was exempt from the payment of realty taxes, this exemption was withdrawn by
Sec. 234 of the LGC. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is a HELD: Yes. Petitioner cannot cl
aim that it was never a taxable person under its Charter. It was only exempted f
rom the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respe
ct of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislat ive intent to make it a taxab
le person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Even if the Petitioner
was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light
of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, a taxable person for suc
h purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Sec. 234 of exempti
ons from the payment of real property taxes. Since taxes are what we pay for civ
ilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemp
tions from taxation and statutes granting ta x exemptions are thus construed str
ictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liber ally in favor of the taxing auth
ority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefore is the except
ion. LATIN MAXIM: 43 taxable person.

160 The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines v. A. W. Hastings, As

sess or and Collector of the City of Manila, and the City of Manila Case No. 136
G.R. No. 1974 (March 15, 1906) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 79 FACTS: In
1901, Appellant imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic archbish
op of Manila, overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation as provided
by Sec. 48 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission. The Appellant contended
that the said property was not a parsonage and not adjacent to the cathedral, be
ing 80 to 100 meters distant from the church, and that the exemptio n privilege
was already exhausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoini ng chapel
. ISSUE: W/N the house of the archbishop of Manila should be exempted from tax.
HELD: In enacting its exemption laws, the Commission had in view not only the co
nditio ns peculiar to and inherent in Roman Catholic parishes in the Islands, bu
t their in tent was to extend the exemption to the parsonages appurtenant to all
churches. And it is a general rule that statutes exempting charitable and relig
ious property from taxa tion should be construed fairly and not unnaturally thou
gh strictly and in such manne r as to give effect to the main intent of the legi
slators. Although separated from th e cathedral by an intervening block, and alt
hough a parsonage within the area was already exempt, the residence of the archb
ishop should still be exempted from taxation as a parsonage adjacent to the cath
edral. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9b, 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal R
evenue v. Court Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and Ateneo de Manila University
Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115349 (April 18, 1997) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No
. 81 FACTS:

Private Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with auxil

iary units and branches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Insti tute
of Philippine Culture (IPC), which is engaged in social sciences studies of Phi
lipp ine society and culture. In 1983, Petitioner issued a demand letter regardi
ng the institution s tax liabilities. Petitioner contended that private Responde
nt was an independent contractor within the purview of Sec. 205 of the Tax Code,
and was conducting studies for a fee, and therefore subject to 3% contractor s
tax. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent, through its auxiliary unit or branch, the IP
C, performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus subject to 3% cont
ractor s tax levied by Sec. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code. HELD: No.
The research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining privat e
Respondent s university status and not in the course of an independent business
of selling such research with profit in mind. There was no evidence that the IPC
ev er sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in business apa
rt from the academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying th
e principles of tax exemption without first applying a strict interpretation of
the tax laws. LATIN MAXIM: 43

161 Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs Case No. 167 G.R. No
. 30264 (March 12, 1929) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84 FACTS: Appellee
Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all of its railway wag
ons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil deposi ted therein wh
ich serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. Under par. 141 o f Sec. 8
of the Tariff Law of 1909, manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for ar e
subject to 40% ad valorem. On the other hand, under par. 197 of same law, vehic
l es for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are subject to
10% ad valorem. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust shields
as manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for. Upon appeal, however, the C
FI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as detached parts of vehic
les f or use on railways. ISSUE: Whether dust shields should be classified as ma
nufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways. HELD: D
ust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of vehic
les under par. 197. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levyi
ng taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language
use d. In case of doubt, they should be construed strictly against the governmen
t and in f avor of the citizen. And when there is in the same statute a particul
ar enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would include wh
at is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and th
e general one must be taken to affect only such cases within its general languag
e as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. LATIN MAXIM: 38a
, 43, 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No
. 256

G.R. No. L-69344 (April 26, 1991) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84 FACTS:
Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1,283, 621.63 f
or taxes from the years 1955-1959. A reinvestigation of their debt was m ade and
the amount was changed to P17,117.08. They applied for tax amnesty under P.D. 2
3, 213 and 370. Due to this, their debt even decreased to about P12,000. T hey p
aid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such. The Governme
nt contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213
because of Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not allowed
for those who had pending assessments with the BIR. Respondent spouses then cont
ended that Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null because P.D. 213 did not contain
any exemption wherein one should not be allowed to amnesty. ISSUE: W/N Responde
nt spouses were properly given tax amnesty. HELD: Yes, because Revenue Regulatio
n No. 8-72 was null and void. If Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 provided an excepti
on to the coverage of P.D. 213, then such provision is null and void for being c
ontrary to the Presidential Decree. Revenu e regulations shall not prevail over
provisions of a Presidential Decree. LATIN MAXIM: 8, 26

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secr

etary Case No. 82 G.R. No. 108524 (November 10, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 301, Foo
tnote No. 85 FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buy
ing and selling copra. Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91, copra w
as classified as a food product under Sec. 103(b) of the National Internal Reven
ue Code and therefore exempt from tax in all stages, including distribution. Und
er Sec. 103(a), the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original sta
te is exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owne r
of the land which the same is produced. Under Sec. 103(b), the sale of agricultu
ral food products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages. RMC
47-91 then reclassified copra as a non-food product. ISSUE: W/N copra is an agri
cultural food product which is exempt from VAT and thus not under the purview of
RMC 47-91. HELD: No, it is not an agricultural food product, thus it is not exe
mpt from VAT. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue s interpretation is entitled
to great respect because it is the government agency charged with the interpreta
tion and implementation of tax laws. In fact, although copra is from coconut, an
d 80% of the coconut plant is edible, copra per se is not intended for human con
sumption. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 42a, b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Acting Commissioner of
Customs v. Manila Electric Company Case No. 3 G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977) C
hapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85 FACTS: RA 1394 exempted payment of special
import tax for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all tax
es of whatever nature. Respondent con tends that their insulating oils are exemp
t from taxes. ISSUE:

W/N insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its taxe
s. HELD: No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme Court look
ed into the definition of insulating oils under Materials Handbook by George J.
Brady, 8th Edition. The court found out that insulating oils are used for coolin
g as well as insulating. And there is no question that the insulating oil that R
espondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns
on exemption from taxa tion; hence an exempting provision must be construed sti
ctissimi juris. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 43, b

Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Jockey Club Inc. Case No. 68 G.R. No. L8755 (March 23, 1956) Chapter VII, Page 304, Footnote No. 97 FACTS: Respondents
Manila Jockey Club Inc. and Philippine Racing Club Inc. are corporations organiz
ed primarily for holding horse races. Petitioner is contendi ng that payments fo
r renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lea se are sub
ject to the 20% amusement tax in the National Internal Revenue Code. ISSUE: W/N
rentals received by the Respondents from private horse owners or trainers, the P
CSO, the White Cross, the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society ar e subject to t
he 20% amusement tax. HELD: The law refers to gross receipts and not gross incom
e . This clause is plain demonstration that the gross receipts refer to the coll
ections on days when the race track is open to the general public and admission
fees are or are not charg ed. This necessarily excludes income of the Respondent
s received on days when they d o not legally and actually hold horse races. The
lease by the Respondents of the l and clearly has nothing to do with horse racin
g. It is to be remembered that the law makes the proprietor, lessee, or operator
, of the amusement place liable for the amusement tax, the three tax payers bein
g connected by the disjunctive conjunction or , thereby positively implying that
the tax should be paid by either the proprietor, the lessee, or the operator, a
s the case may be, singly and not all at one and the same time. LATIN MAXIM: 6c,
7a, 27 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Castaeda Jr. Case No. 104 G.R. No. L-4688
1 (September 15, 1988) Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 102 FACTS: Respondent
s were charged of 8 criminal cases for violating the National Internal Revenue C
ode for manufacturing alcoholic products subject to specific t

ax without having paid the annual privilege tax therefore. Respondents argued th
at they are exempt from taxes because they are entitled to the benefits availabl
e under P.D. 370 which declares tax amnesty. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is entitled t
o the benefits of tax amnesty under the P.D. HELD: To be entitled to the extinct
ion of liability provided by P.D. 370, the claimant must have voluntarily disclo
sed his previously untaxed income or wealth and paid the required 15% tax on suc
h previously untaxed income or wealth. Where the disclosu re was not voluntary,
the claimant is not entitled to the benefits expressly exclud ed from the covera
ge of P.D. 370. In the instant case, the violations with which the Respondents w
ere charged had already been discovered by the BIR when P.D. 370 took effect. It
is necessary to note that the "valid information under RA 2338" referred to in
Sec. 1(a)(4) of P.D. 370 refers not to a criminal information filed in cou rt by
a fiscal or special prosecutor, but rather to the sworn information or complain
t f iled by an informer with the BIR under RA 2338 in the hope of earning an inf
ormer's rewa rd. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, 43

164 Zamora v. City of Manila Case No. 175 G.R. No. 3433 (March 2, 1907) Chapter
VII, Page 306, Footnote No. 102 FACTS: Act No. 975 is a remedial statute which p
rovides for relief of persons who have paid an excessive assessment on taxes pri
or to the creation of the Board of Tax revision. Petitioner prays that the word
land in the title and body of the statute be interpreted to mean land including
buildings and improvements thereon . ISSUE: W/N the word land should be interpre
ted liberally to mean land with the buildings and improvements thereon. HELD: Wh
ile the distinction does not appear to have been consciously made in Act No. 123
, it is disregarded in Act Nos. 82 and 551. The rule of strict constructi on of
statutes granting exemptions from taxation is not applicable in this case. This
rule is not without its exceptions and limitations, and the plain principles of
justice suggest that the act under consideration should be construed with some l
iberality. It is a remedial statute, providing for a refund of taxes which have
been collected unju stly and upon an unfair and inequitable valuation of land. W
hile some of the Acts of the Commission have consciously sought to give to the w
ord land and real estate a special signification, nevertheless such use has not
been uniform and the deviat ions therefrom have been so frequent that it affords
no safe rule from interpretation . LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 9f, 27, b2 STATUTORY CO
NSTRUCTION Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case N
o. 259 G.R. No. L-25602 31 (February 18, 1970) Chapter VII, Page 306, Footnote N
o. 103 FACTS: In 1957, Petitioner was granted tax-exemption privileges pursuant
to RA 901.

In 1958, Petitioner imported a quantity of wheat grains, part of which was not u
sed in the business that year. The surplus of wheat grains were finally utilize
d into f lour and sold in 1959. Petitioner paid sales tax of P37,275.55, but the
cost of wheat lef t over was treated as deductible item from gross sales in 195
9. Respondent Commissioner finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency tax of
P23,170.17 because material s purchased from tax-exempt industries were not acqu
ired from one enjoying taxexemption privilege under our laws. ISSUE: W/N Respond
ent Commissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales tax. HELD: No. Sec.
186-A of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a tax-free product is utilized
in the manufacture or production of any article, in the determinatio n of the v
alue of such finished article, the value of such tax-free product shall be dedu
cted. While It is true that tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in t
he law , and are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer, it is equall
y a recognize d principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unamb
iguous, so that there is n o occasion for the court s seeking the legislative in
tent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction
. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

165 Ajero v. Court of Appeals Case No. 5 G.R. No. 106720 (September 15, 1994) Ch
apter VII, Page 309, Footnote No. 117 FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for pr
obate of holographic will left by the late An nie Sand. They alleged that the de
cedent was of sound and disposing mind, and was capacitated to dispose of her es
tate by will. Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testa
ment was not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure
. It was also opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero claiming that the decedent was not the s
ole owner of the property. The trial court granted and/or admitted the decedent
s holographic will to probate. On appeal, said Decision was reversed by the CA f
or its failure to comply with Art. 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: W/N
the CA is correct that the will did not comply with the law. HELD: No. Failure
to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallo wance of a
holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. Art. 8 13 o
f the New Civil Code affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will,
bu t not its probate. A holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwi
thstanding no ncompliance with Art. 814. In case of alterations, cancellations o
r insertions, the lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of suc
h changes, but not its entirety. The CA, however, correctly held that Annie Sand
could not dispose the other property including the house and lot, which she sha
res with her father s other hei rs. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 9a STATUTORY CONSTRU
CTION In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-14322 (February 25,
1960) Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote No. 117 FACTS: In the matter of Petition
for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu, the

will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the testatr
ix and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but the t
esta trix failed to sign the left margin of the first page. The lower court deni
ed the petition because the will was not executed in accordance with law, citing
Sec. 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. ISSUE: W/N the probate court (CFI) is corr
ect in denying the petition for the allowance of the will. HELD: Yes. Sec. 618 o
f Act No. 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the will and each and
every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign t
he will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the test ator and of
each other, which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clau se. Th
is requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the val i
dity of the will. Thus, it has been held that Statutes prescribing the formaliti
es to be obse rved in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will
must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is
entirely void. All t hese requirements stand as of equal importance and must be
observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of the will. Accordi
ngly, we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law
and therefore, cannot be admitted to probate. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

166 A.L. Ammen Transportation Company, Inc. v. Borja Case No. 1 G.R. No. L-17750
(August 31, 1962) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 123 FACTS: Respondent fil
ed an action against Petitioners in the CFI of Albay to recover compensation for
overtime work rendered, and damages. Pending this, Respondent filed the present
proceedings on the Court of Industrial Relations. ISSUE: 1. W/N the scope of th
e term action falls under RA 1994. 2. W/N the Court of Industrial Relations has
jurisdiction. HELD: 1. The Petitioner contends that the phrase action already co
mmenced employed in the statute should be construed as meaning only actions file
d in a regular court of justice. With this limited and narrow interpretation, we
cannot agree. The statute under consideration is undoubtedly a labor statute an
d as such must be liberally construed in favor of the laborer concerned. 2. The
allegation in the complaint filed by the Respondent employee that he was separat
ed automatically from the said employment with Defendants, and notwithstanding p
leas for reinstatement, Defendants refused and still refuse to reinstate Plainti
ff, and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs justif y the conclusio
n that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages. This was w
ithin the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. LATIN MAXIM: 9a STA
TUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lazo v. Employee s Compensation Commission Case No. 70 G.R.
No. 78617 (June 18, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 123 FACTS: Petitio
ner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned t o its
main office. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. On June 18, 1986, the
Petitioner rendered full duty. But, as the security guard who was to relieve hi
m failed to arrive, the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the next day
. On his way home, he met an accident and as a result, he sustained injuries. Fo
r injuries su stained, he claimed for disability benefits under P.D. 626 but was
denied by the GSIS.

ISSUE: W/N the denial of compensation under P.D. 626 was valid. HELD: No. In the
case at bar, it can be seen that Petitioner left his station at the Central Ban
k several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not come on
time. There is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from h is usu
al, regular homeward route. While presumption of compensability and theory of ag
gravation under the Workmen s Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the
New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in ge neral fa
vor of the workingman still subsists. LATIN MAXIM: 9a

167 Villavert v. Employee s Compensation Commission Case No. 313 G.R. No. L-4860
5 (December 14, 1981) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124 FACTS: The Petitio
ner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert, who died of acute hemorrhagic
pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabula ry. She fi
led a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. 626, a s ame
nded, with the GSIS. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that ac
ute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner ha
d failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of
Marcelino and the nature of his employment. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC
which affirmed the denial. ISSUE: W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretio
n in denying the claim of the Petitioner. HELD: From the foregoing facts of reco
rd, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic which was di
rectly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as coder verifie
r, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. There is n
o evidence at all that Marcelino had a bout of alcoholic intoxication shortly be
fore he died. Neither is there a showing that he used drugs. All doubts in the i
mplementation and interpretation of this Code, includi ng its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor. LATIN MAXIM: 9a STATUT
ORY CONSTRUCTION Abella v. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. 2 G.R. N
o. 71813 (July 20, 1987) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124 FACTS: Petition
er leased a farm land, Hacienda Danao Ramona, in Negros Occidental for a period
of ten years. It is renewable at her instance, which she

opted to do, for another ten years. During the existence of the lease she employ
ed the private Respondents. Upon expiration of the leasehold rights, Petitioner
dismiss ed the two Respondents. ISSUE: W/N the Respondents are entitled to separ
ation pays. HELD: Yes. The applicable law on the case is Art. 284 of the Labor C
ode. Notwithstanding the contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned pr
ovisi on violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations
and contracts, because when she leased the farm land, neither she nor the lesso
r contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to the worke
rs upon the expiration of the lease. The court held such contention untenable as
th e issue had already been adjudicated in the case of Anucension v. NLRC. It w
as sta ted in the said case that the prohibition to impair the obligation of con
tracts is no t absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general. The court f
urther stated th at the purpose of Art. 284 is for the protection of the workers
whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment. Without
such law, employees like the Respondents will lose the benefits to which they a
re entitled. Moreover , it is well settled that in the implementation and interp
retation of the provisions of the Labor Code, the worker s welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration, and that all doubts shall be resolved i
n favor of labor. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 9d

168 Del Rosario & Sons v. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. 36 No. L64204 (May 31, 1985) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124 FACTS: Petitioner,
a logging company, entered into a contract of services with Calmar Security Agen
cy to supply the Petitioner with security guards. The securi ty guards, herein R
espondents, filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against the Petitioner
and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter found the security age ncy to be liab
le for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging company. The
security agency appealed the case to the NLRC. The latter allowed the appeal eve
n though there were formal defects in the procedure by which the appeal was made
. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late. ISSUE: W/N the formal
defects of the appeal of the security agency should invalidate the appeal. HELD:
No. According to Art. 221 of the Labor Code, in any proceeding before the Commi
ssion or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in cou rts
of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of
the Code that the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of ju
stice. The lack of verification could have easily been corrected by making an oa
th and even though the payment was late, it was still paid. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d,
40b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manahan v. Employee s Compensation Commission Case N
o. 79 G.R. No. L-44899 (April 22, 1981) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124
FACTS: Nazario Manahan, Jr., died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a te
acher in the Las Pias Municipal High School. The claimant, the widow of the

deceased, filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husba
nd was due to his occupation. However, GSIS denied such claim. Claimant filed f
or a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health
prio r to his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable t
o his employment. Again she was denied by the GSIS. She then appealed her case t
o the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim. ISSUE: W/N
the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits. HELD: Yes. The findings
of the commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to hi
s employment as a teacher and that in the course of hi s employment, he was trea
ted for Epigastric pain-and ulcer-like symptoms. This was supported by his medic
al records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernabe . Epigastric pain is
a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Ente ric Fever. Pursuan
t to the doctrine of Corales v. ECC, the provisions of the Workmen s Compensatio
n Act shall be applied, thus the presumption of compensability should be in favo
r of the claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of doubt, the case
should be resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberall
y construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9
a, 9d, 40b

169 Liwanag v. Workmen s Compensation Commission Case No. 75 G.R. No. L-12164 (M
ay 2, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124 FACTS: Appellants Benito Liw
anag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of Liwanag Auto Suppy. They hired Roq
ue Balderama as a security guard, who was killed in the line of duty by criminal
s. His widow and children filed a claim fo r compensation with the Workmen s Com
pensation Commission, which was granted in an award that ordered the Appellants
to pay jointly and severally the amount of P3,494.40 to the claimant in lump sum
. Appellants did not question the right of Appellees to compensation nor the amo
unt awarded. However, they claim that because the Workmen s Compensation Act did
not give an express provision declaring solidary obligations of business partne
rs, the compensation should be divisible. ISSUE: W/N the Commission erred in ord
ering the Appellants to pay jointly and severally. HELD: No. Although the WCA do
es not contain any provision expressly declaring that the obligation arising fro
m compensation is solidary, other provisions of l aw show how their liability is
solidary. Art. 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and Se c. 2 of the WCA reaso
nably indicate that in compensation cases, the liability of busines s partners s
hould be solidary. If the responsibility were to be merely jointly, an d one of
them happens to be insolvent, the award would only be partially satisfied, which
is evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to emplo
yees . The WCA should be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally for the empl
oyee and dependents. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 36, 38, 40 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Sibulo v. Altar Case No. 279 G.R. No. L-1916 (April 30, 1949) Chapter VII, Page
310, Footnote No. 125 FACTS:

Petitioner, owner of first class agricultural land, entered into a contract of t

enancy with Respondent. Petitioner was to furnish the work animals and farm impl
ements and Respondent was to defray all expenses of planting and cultivation . T
he net produce was to be divided equally. The contract was disapproved by the Te
nancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice because the divisi o
n contravenes with a provision of the Tenancy Law. It was taken to the Court of
Industrial Relations, which declared the contract illegal as against public poli
cy as contemplated in Sec. 7 of the Tenancy Law, for the reason that instead of
receiv ing 60% of his total share, the tenant shall receive 50% only. Petitione
r claimed th at the contract is not among those expressly declared to be against
public policy in Se c. 7 of the Tenancy Law, which he argues to be an exhaustiv
e list. ISSUE: W/N the contract is against public policy as contemplated in Sec.
7 of the Tenancy Law. HELD: No. In declaring certain stipulations to be against
public policy, the legislatu re could not have meant to sanction other stipulat
ions which, though not specified, are similar to those expressly mentioned. The
purpose of the law might easily be defeated otherwise. The Tenancy Act is a reme
dial legislation intended to better the lot of the share-cropper by giving him a
more equitable participation in the pro duce of the land which he cultivates. B
eing a remedial statute, it should be construe d to further its purpose in accor
dance with its general intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 12a, 36, 40

170 Guerrero v. Court of Appeals Case No. 54 G.R. No. L-44570 (May 30,1986) Chap
ter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 126 FACTS: Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Pet
itioners to work in their plantation. He was allowed for that purpose to put up
a hut within the plantation. He shared 1/ 3 of the proceeds with his coconut-rel
ated responsibilities. Afterwards, the Petition ers and Benitez executed an agre
ement allowing Benitez to continue working as tenant; th e Agricultural Tenancy
Act would govern their relationship. Later the Petitioners ordered Benitez out.
Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian Relations, which ordered his reinstatement
. The Petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed the Court of Agrarian Refor
m s decision. The Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court. Pending appeal
, the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed repealing the Agricultural Tenancy Act
. The Petitioners then claimed that since the basis of t he suit was a share ten
ancy agreement, the decisions lost their validity. ISSUE: W/N share tenancy ende
d. HELD: No. An agreement is not abrogated by the subsequent repeal of the law.
The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenan
ts into farmhands or hired laborers with no rights. The Agricultural Tenancy Ac
t an d Agricultural Land Reform Code have not been entirely repealed by the Code
of Agrarian Reform. But assuming that they were, the rule that the repeal of a
stat ute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the exceptio
n when vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. LATI
N MAXIM: 9a, 12, 32, 38 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vicente v. Employee s Compensatio
n Commission Case No. 168 G.R. No. 85024 (January 23, 1991) Chapter VII, Page 31
0, Footnote No. 127 FACTS:

Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. At the course of his employment, h

e had several physical complications which forced him to retire. So at the age o
f forty-five, he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to income benefit
s under the GSIS retirement program. The application was supported by a physicia
n s certification that Petitioner was classified as under permanent total disabi
lity. The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner coul
d avail of the full income benefits. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only per
man ent partial disability . The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision. ISSUE: Whether
Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial disability.
HELD: Petitioner was under permanent total disability. The test of whether or n
ot an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capac
ity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disabili
ty he incur red. The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding c
oncern for the we lfare of government workers, especially the humble rank and fi
le. It is for this reaso n that the sympathy of the law on social security is to
ward its beneficiaries and requi res a construction of utmost liberality in thei
r favor. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11b, 12a

171 Tamayo, et al. v. Manila Hotel Company Case No. 283 G.R. No. L-8975 (June 29
, 1957) Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No. 128 FACTS: 265 employees of Appellee
Manila Hotel Co., who had to be dismissed and paid the value of their accumulat
ed leave under Sec. 266 of the Administrative Code, as amended by RA 611, when t
he hotel was leased to a private concern on June 30, 1954, brought the present a
ction to recover from the Appellee Manila Ho tel Co. an additional amount for ac
crued leave alleged to be due them under the same section of the Administrative
Code, as later amended by RA 1081, approved on June 15, 1954, that is to say, 15
days before they were separated from the company. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners could
avail of the alleged accrued benefits. HELD: No. Art. 4 of the New Civil Code pr
ovides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provide
d. As RA 1081 does not provide that it is t o have a retroactive effect, it can
only be given effect from the date of its approval. LATIN MAXIM: 46a STATUTORY C
ONSTRUCTION Corporal v. Employee s Compensation Commission Case No. 83 G.R. No.
86020 (August 5, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No. 131 FACTS: Norma Corp
oral was an employed public school teacher. During the course of her work, she h
ad several pregnancies. On her 4th pregnancy, she suffered complete abortion. On
her 5th pregnancy, she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a hilot . An h
our later, she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vagi nal bleeding. She
underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. Her husband, herein Petitioner,
filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. But said ag ency denied. The m
atter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed becau se the cause
of his wife s death was non-work-related. ISSUE:

W/N Petitioner could avail the compensation benefit. HELD: No. The determination
of whether the prolapse of Norma s uterus developed before or after her 5th pre
gnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her physiological struc
ture and changes in the body. While as a rule that labor and social welfare legi
slation should be liberally construed in favor of the applica nt, there is also
a rule that such liberal construction cannot be applied if the pertinent provisi
ons of the Labor Code are clear. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 43

172 People v. Moran Case No. 216 G.R. No. 17905 (January 27, 1923) Chapter VII,
Page 320, Footnote No. 167 FACTS: Appellant was punished for violating the Elect
ion Law. When the decision was published, it was increased to 6 months. Defendan
t alleges that the crime ha s already prescribed, pursuant to Sec. 71 of Act No.
3030, which was enacted by th e Legislature on March 9, 1922. ISSUE: W/N Act No
. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether the said act sho
uld be retroactive with respect to Art. 22 and 7 of the RPC. HELD: Act No. 3030
is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the Administrative Code. Fur
thermore, Art. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with reference to some other pe
nal law. Hence with regard to Art. 7, the SC contends that Art. 22 should still
apply to special laws. Also, the prescription of the crime is intimately connect
ed with that of the penalty. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no
other purpose than t o annul prosecution of the offender. When the statute makes
no distinction, it mak es no exception. Statutes are not construed to have retr
ospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the i
ntention. The new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sov
ereign acknowledges that the previous one was unjust and enforcing the latter wo
uld be contradictory. LATIN MAXIM: 26, 37, 46a, 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People
v. Reyes Case No. 222 G.R. Nos. 74226-227 (July 27, 1989) Chapter VII, Page 320
, Footnote No. 168 FACTS: On June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered th
at the property of their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mizaph Reye
s through falsified

signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. However as the

deed was registered on May 26, 1961, the lower courts held that the period of p
rescri ption has long passed. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in di
smissing the case due to the passing of the prescriptive period. HELD: The SC ru
led affirmed the decision of the lower court, as the registration of land acts a
s a notice to the whole world. Under this, it is also presumed that t he purchas
er has examined the instruments of the record. The court will not hesitate to ap
ply rules of construction in civil cases to tha t of criminal ones, should the c
ircumstances warrant. Rights should not be left on a precarious balance, always
susceptible possible challenges. This should also app ly to criminal cases. Furt
hermore, as stated in People v. Moran, in the interpretation of the law and that
of the prescription of crimes, a liberal reading that is most favorable to the
accused is the one to be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 48

173 Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista Case No. 37 G.R. No. L-37867
(February 22, 1982) Chapter VII, Page 321, Footnote No. 170 FACTS: Respondent Ga
silao, a veteran, failed to present all the necessary papers to receive his pens
ion. After finally complying with all the necessities, he was aw arded with the
full benefits of RA 65, Sec. 9 and RA 1920, for P100 a month and an additional P
10 per minor. Later, on June 22, 1969, RA 5753 was approved. However , due to th
e lack of funds, Respondent Gasilao only received a 25% increase and on ly after
January 15, 1971. The lower court granted Respondent Gasilao his pension, start
ing from December 18, 1955 at the rate of P50, and then P100 plus P10 per minor,
from Jun e 22, 1957 up to August 7, 1968. To pay the difference of P100 plus P3
0 per month and P20 per month for each minor from June 22, 1969 up to January 15
, 1971, the difference of P75 plus P22.50 per month for his wife, and P20 per mi
nor from Jan uary 16, 1971 up to December 31, 1971. ISSUE: W/N the lower court e
rred in the retroactivity of Respondent Gasilao s pension. HELD: Respondent Gasi
lao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the prescriptive period
for filing for his pension. The laws on veteran pension must be liberally constr
ued as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. Granting su ch pensions the
earliest possible time is more in tune with the spirit of RA 65. Bu t, as the g
overnment has yet to provide the necessary funds, the judgment of the lower cou
rts is modified as, effective December 18, 1955 at P50 plus P10 per month for ea
ch minor, increased to P100 from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968. The difference
fr om June 22, 1969 to January 14, 1972 is subject to the release of funds by t
he government. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Legaspi v. Executive Secretary and Agrarian Reforms Case No. 145 No. L-36153 (No
vember 28, 1975) Chapter VII, Page 322, Footnote No. 173 FACTS: Petitioner, an e
mployee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, sent a letter to the Respondent S
ecretary of the Department, Conrado Estrella. Petitioner expressed his desire to
be laid-off under the provisions of RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389, on the cond
ition that he would also be paid the gratuity benefits to which he might be enti
tled under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616. GSIS approved his retirement gra
tuity under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616 but denied his cla im for gratui
ty under RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to bo
th gratuity benefits under C.A. No. 186, as amended by RA 1616, and RA 3844, as
amended by RA 6389. HELD: No. There is nothing in RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389
, that would suggest that an employee who is laid-off or prefers to be laid-off
can receive two pensi on benefits, one under its provisions and another pursuant
to C.A. No. 186. This interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law
embodied in C.A. No. 186 prohibiting an employer from paying double retirement
benefits to an employee. Being the law governing the retirement of government em
ployees, all other laws extending retirement benefits to government employees sh
ould, in case of ambiguity, be construed in relation to C.A. No. 186 and in the
light of its prov isions. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the l
egislature enacts a provision , it is understood that it is aware of previous st
atutes relating to the same subject ma tter, and that in the absence of an expre
ss repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should be deemed enacted pursu
ant to the legislative policy embodied i n prior statutes, which should all be c
onstrued together. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 38b

174 Re: Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Case No. 60 A.M. No. 09-9-019-SC
(October 4, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 322, Footnote No. 174 FACTS: This matter was
brought about due to two separate publications in the Official Gazette of the s
ame amendment to RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges and Justices). P.D. 14
38 was published in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 30, w hich did not prov
ide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retiremen
t. However, in Vol. 74 of the Official Gazette, No. 41 provided that th e monthl
y pension starting from the sixth year of retirement is equivalent to the monthl
y salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. Since 1978 however, GSI
S computed the monthly pension as follows: 1) highest salary, plus 2) highest re
presentation and transportation allowances (RATA), plus 3) longevity pay (whic h
was considered part of the salary starting in 1983 pursuant to Sec. 42, BP 129)
. The basis was the copy of P.D. 1438 which was published in Vol. 74 of the Offi
cial G azette, No. 30. ISSUE: Which version of P.D. 1438 must be followed. HELD:
The Court directed GSIS to continue implementing RA 910, as amended by P.D. 143
8, in the same manner as it has done since 1978. This is definitely more in keep
ing with and gives substance to the elementary rule of statutory constructio n t
hat, being remedial in character, retirement laws should be liberally construed
and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts
as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achie
ve its humanitarian purposes. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent m
en and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire theref
rom wit h relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor bu
t, more so , for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a, 40b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Re: Application For Retirement Under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B.
Britanico of the IAC Case No. 128 A.M. No. 6484-Ret. (May 15, 1989) Chapter VII,
Page 323, Footnote No. 177 FACTS: Justice Britanico requested that he be grante
d retirement benefits under RA 910 in addition to or in lieu of benefits he rece
ived under RA 1616 upon termina tion of his service in the Judiciary by the acce
ptance of his courtesy resignation by Pr esident Aquino, pursuant to Proclamatio
n No. 1 dated February 25, 1986, requiring all appointive public officials to su
bmit their courtesy resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court
. Justice Britanico served the government for 36.23 years, of which 10 years, 2
months, and 27 days were served in the Judiciary. As provided in Sec. 1 of RA 91
0, the judges or justices who may enjoy retirement be nefits with their lifetime
annuity, should have rendered at least 20 years service in th e judiciary or in
any other branch of the government or both. They fall into three categories: XX
X 2. those who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their o
ffice and had rendered at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any othe
r branch of the government or both XXX ISSUE: Which category Justice Britanico b
elongs to. HELD: He belongs to the second category of Sec. 1. The acceptance of
his courtesy resignation, not being a voluntary resignation (as held in Ortiz v.
COM ELEC), resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, wh
ich he could have very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age o
f 70 years. Retirement laws should be liberally construed to and applied in favo
r of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 40b, 43c

175 Re: Gregorio G. Pineda Case No. 132 A.M. No. 6789-RET (Jul 13, 1990) Chapter
VII, Page 323, Footnote No. 178 FACTS: These are petitions or motions for recon
sideration filed by six retired judges, namely Pineda, Montesclaros, de Lara, Mo
ntecillo, Paredes and Gerochi, asking th at they be granted gratuity and/or reti
rement benefits under RA 910, as amended, in addition to or in lieu of the benef
its under RA 1616 or P.D. 1146. They want to take advantage of the Plana and Bri
tanico ruling. ISSUE: W/N they should be granted benefits under RA 910 pursuant
to the Plana or Britanico ruling. HELD: No. A close scrutiny into the service re
cords as well as the conduct of the judges is necessary to determine their quali
fication to receive benefits under R A 910. The rule is that retirement laws are
construed liberally in favor of the retirin g employee. When the court allows e
xemptions to fix rules for certain judges, ther e are ample reasons behind each
grant. The crediting of leaves is not done indiscriminately. The court only allo
ws the use of the Plana or Britanico ruling if the career of the judge was marke
d by competence, integrity and dedication to the public service. Most of the jud
ges however retired bowing to policy consideratio ns, id est courtesy resignatio
ns. The De La Llana ruling is an essential factor in dete rmining whether or not
the judges should be granted the benefits they ask for. It stated that if a jud
ge was not recommended for reappointment following their courtesy resignations t
hen the relevant factors were considered and they were found wanting. LATIN MAXI
M: 9c, 9e, 37, 42a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramirez v. Arrieta Case No. 130 G.R. N
o. L-19183 (Nov. 29, 1962)

Chapter VII, Page 325, Footnote No. 181 FACTS: Petitioner filed an action agains
t Apolinar Serina seeking the annulment of a transfer certificate of title over
a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation. The CFI dismissed the complaint. Th
e Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. The e nd of the 30 day period fe
ll on a Sunday hence it was moved to the following Monday bu t one of the two bo
ndsmen was unable to sign the appeal bond. The clerk of court suggested that the
document first be completed by the Plaintiff before filing it . Petitioner foll
owed the suggestion and filed the complete document the next day. Defendant file
d an opposition to the approval of the appeal bond since it was fi led one day a
fter the end of the reglementary period. The judge disapproved the bond and rend
ered the judgment final and executory. Plaintiff interposed a petition f or mand
amus to the SC saying that the CFI committed a grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE:
W/N the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the appeal bond.
HELD: Yes, it did. The action of the CFI is harsh and improvident according to
the SC. The bond would have been filed on time if it had not been for the defect
. According to the Rules of Court, a personal appeal bond need not necessarily b
e subscribed by 2 sureties, it would suffice that the court approves such. Furth
er more, the Rules of Court also state that the appeal needs only one surety. So
long as the surety is solvent and acceptable to the court, it should suffice. M
oreover, the defect in the appeal bond, even if indeed 2 sureties were needed, t
he court would not have been deprived of jurisdiction since it was filed within
the reglementary pe riod. Rules of procedure should be liberally construed in or
der to promote their objec t and assist the parties in obtaining a just determin
ation of their cases. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 9e, 11b

International Corporate Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 63 G.R. No

. L-6970 (Jan. 30, 1988) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181 FACTS: Private
Respondent secured a loan from Petitioner s predecessor in interest by mortgagin
g her properties. The amount approved for release was used to pay for h er other
obligations to Petitioner. Thus, private Respondent claimed that she never rece
ived anything from the approved loan. Private Respondent made a money market pla
cement. Meanwhile, she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the ban k refused
to pay the interest earned by the placement, applying the amount instead to the
deficiency in the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were auctioned. Private Re
spondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the money
market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. The court issued
a writ of execution against Petitioner s property. Private Respondent filed an
ex parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the total amount
of the money market interest, which was granted. Petitioner failed to comply wit
h all t he said orders. The supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was
marred by erasures, alterations, and/or additions. Such bond was therefore rende
red withou t force and effect. Private Respondent contends that the alterations
were all made by the insurance company itself since there were no ready-made for
ms available. ISSUE: W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at bar. HEL
D: Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the setoff
against the other is neither clear nor liquidated. Compensation cannot extend t
o unliquidated disputed claim arising from breach of contract. Petitioner is ind
eb ted to private Respondent in the amount of the money market interest. The deb
t of P6.81 M of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. This preve
nts legal compensation from taking place under Art. 1290 of the Civil Code. The
filing of insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and uncond
itionally the injunction issued. The decision of the CA is affirmed. LATIN MAXIM
: 9c, 9d, 11b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Del Rosario v. Hamoy Case No. 35 No. L-77154 (June 30, 1987) Chapter VII, Page 3
26, Footnote No. 181 FACTS: For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a specia
l power of attorney for pre-trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance o
f Plaintiff, the Res pondent Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the com
plaint for failure of the Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference. ISSUE: W
/N Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case because the document did not ha
ve the required one-peso documentary stamp. HELD: Yes. Had Respondent Judge been
less technical and more sensible, the present proceedings and the consequent wa
ste of time of this Court would have been avoided. By such rigidity, Respondent
denied the Petitioner substantial jus tice. He could have easily required counse
l for Plaintiff to buy the documentary stamp and affix it to the special power o
f attorney and it would not have taken ten mi nutes. The Respondent Judge lost s
ight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themsel ves, fortified by jurispru
dence, mandate a liberal construction of the rules and plea dings in order to ef
fect substantial justice. LATIN MAXIM: 8c, 9d, 18a, 18b

Lacsamana v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 69 No. L-73146-53 (August 26,
1986) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181 FACTS: A decision was rendered ag
ainst Petitioner by the RTC, thus counsel for Petitioner filed a motion with Res
pondent court for 15 days extension to file a petition for review. However, a de
cision was promulgated by the Respondent court ruling that the period for appeal
ing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended and declared t
he case terminated. The Respondent court cited a Supreme Court decision where th
e issue was regarding an extension to file a moti on for reconsideration of a fi
nal order or ruling and not the question of granting a motion for extension of t
ime to file a petition for review. ISSUE: W/N Respondent court erred in terminat
ing the case. HELD: Yes. The Court rules, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, tha
t a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review under Sec. 22 of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act and Sec. 22(b) of the Interim Rules, may proper
ly be filed wi th and granted by the IAC (now the Court of Appeals). The Court f
urther restates an d clarifies the modes and periods as follows: (6) Period of e
xtension of time to f ile petition for review: Beginning one month after the pro
mulgation of this Decision , an extension of only 15 days for filing a petition
for review may be granted by the CA, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. Th
e motion for extension of time must b e filed and the corresponding docket fee p
aid within the reglementary period of appeal. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 5b, 27 STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION Gimenez v. Securities and Exchange Commission Case No. 52 No. L-685
68 (December 26, 1984) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 181 FACTS: Gimenez St
ockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the

Commissioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. The SEC denied
their motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. The SEC ruled that
the 3 0-day period provided for in Sec. 6 of P.D. 902-A was modified by Sec. 39
of the Judic iary Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days fo
r appealing from fi nal order, resolutions, awards of decisions of any court. IS
SUE: W/N Sec. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC. HELD: No. Sec. 39 of BP 129 expre
ssly refers to courts . The SEC is not a court. It is an administrative agency.
Repeals by implication are not favored. The 30-day period fixed by P.D. 902-A, t
he organic law of the SEC, is still in force. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 38b

Blanco v. Bernabe and Lawyers Cooperatuve Publishing Co. Case No. 36 G.R. No. L44970 (March 31, 1936) Chapter VII, Page 326, Footnote No. 183 FACTS: To comply
with the requirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the notice along w
ith a money order for the sum of P16 to the Collector of Internal Revenue. Howev
er the Collector returned the said money order to sender for the reason that he
had no authority to be its depositary. With such, the appeal was not deemed file
d for failure to comply with the requirements. ISSUE: W/N the requisites were co
mplied with and W/N the court should grant the remedy prayed for by the Petition
ers. HELD: Under Sec. 76 of Act No. 190 on how appeals are perfected, The bond t
o be given shall be filed with the justice of peace . In lieu of such bond the A
ppe llant may file with the justice a certificate of the proper official that th
e Appellan t has deposited P25 with the municipal treasurer (In Manila with the
Collector of Inte rnal Revenue). The Petitioners therefore have complied with sa
id requirements. The non-presentation of this certificate was not due to the Pet
itioner s failure or omission but to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Re
venue to receive t he deposit tendered by the Petitioner. The fact that the corr
esponding receipt ther efore has not been issued or the failure to present the s
ame in due time should not af fect the remedy. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION Case and Nantz v. Jugo Case No. 49 G.R. No. L-832 (October 14, 194
6) Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No. 187 FACTS: Herein Defendants were to pay
a counterbond to which they had complied with. They furnished the Sheriff with a
copy of the said counterbond to comply w ith the requirement. The Sheriff is th
en tasked to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy . On the

occasion when the Sheriff received the copy of such, the counsel of the Plaintif
f was present in his office. He asked the latter if there were objections to th
e said counterbond and the counsel replied none. Due to unfortunate circumstance
s the Sheriff failed to deliver a copy of such counterbond to the counsel to for
malize the act of furnishing a copy. ISSUE: W/N the Defendants complied with the
requirement of filing a counterbond and W/N the Plaintiff was furnished a copy
of such. HELD: Yes to both issues. Negligence or unavoidable circumstances shoul
d not adversely affect the Defendant under the circumstance of this case. The so
le purpose of the counterbond is to enable the Plaintiff to see that the bond is
in the prescribed form and for the right amount. There was substantial complian
ce with this when their attorney was shown in the Sheriff s office the Defendant
s counterbond. LATIN MAXIM 6d, 9a, 9d

179 C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-45155 (July 31, 1936
) Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No. 189 FACTS: Petitioner is the Respondent in
another case and she contends that the opposing party failed to file her brief
within the 15-day period which makes her appeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA
had no authority to grant additional 5 da ys to file her brief. ISSUE: W/N the C
A had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the Appellant an additional
3 days with which to file her brief. HELD: Yes. Under the Rules of Court the co
urt may, on motion to the Appellee and notice the Appellant or on its own motion
dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal. The word may implies that the mat
ter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the cou
rt. LATIN MAXIM: 9d STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Javellana v. Mirasol and Nuez Case No.
65 G.R. No. 14881 (February 5, 1920) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192 FAC
TS: A redemption in behalf of n this case as void redemptioner of property from
an execution sale, which had been effected a brother of the execution debtor (Ju
lio Javellana), was attacked i because of a supposed collusive agreement between
the (Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuez) whereby the latter agreed
to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the redem
ptioner if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to t he s
ame property in other litigation. ISSUE: W/N the redemption has been effected in
good faith and in accordance with the requirements of law.

HELD: A liberal construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption

of property, to the end that the property of the debtor may be made to satisfy a
s m any liabilities as possible. Redemption of property sold under execution is
not rend ered invalid by reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for
the purpose of redemption is effected by means of a check for the amount due. An
y ordinary creditor, or assignee as such, having a judgment subsequent to that u
nder which the property was sold may exercise the right of redemption. The act o
f the redemptio ner in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appe
als was not an officious act in any sense. It was on the contrary necessary to t
he reasonable protection of his right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maxim
ino Mirasol. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 41

180 Del Rosario v. Equitable Ins. and Casualty Co., Inc. Case No. 34 G.R. No. L16215 (June 29, 1963) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192 FACTS: Defendant c
ompany issued Personal Accident Policy No. 7136 on the life of Francisco del Ros
ario, binding itself to pay the sum of P1,000 to P3,000, as ind emnity for the d
eath of the insured. Petitioner, father of the insured, filed a claim f or payme
nt with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after being forced to ju
mp off the motor launch ISLAMA on account of fire. Defendant company refused to
pay more than P1,000 since they alleged that their liability was only said amoun
t pursuant to Sec. 1, Part I of the provisions of the policy. ISSUE: How much th
e Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Francisco del Rosar
io. HELD: The policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be r
ecovered in case of death by drowning. There is an ambiguity in this respect in
the policy, which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and stri
ctly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Petitioner is entit
led to recove r P3,000. The insurance company has already paid the amount of P1,
000 to Petitioner so tha t there still remains a balance of P2,000 of the amount
to which he is entitled to recover. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 38 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
De la Cruz v. Capital Ins. & Surety Co. Case No. 156 G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29
, 1961) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192 FACTS: Eduardo de la Cruz was th
e holder of an accident insurance policy underwritten by the Capital Insurance &
Surety Co., Inc. In a boxing contest participated into by the insured, Eduardo
slipped and was hit by his opponent on

the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hi
ttin g the rope of the ring. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intr
acranial, l eft. Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured, filed a claim with
the insurance co mpany for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy.
Defendant company set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by h
is participation in a b oxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not co
vered by insurance. ISSUE: W/N Eduardo s death falls under the definition of the
policy disability caused by accidental means. HELD: The terms accident and acci
dental , as used in insurance contracts, have not acquired any technical meaning
, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. Ther
e is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unex
pected, independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings abo
ut the result of injury or death. T he failure of the Defendant company to inclu
de death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive ris
ks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from
the liability for such death. LATIN MAXIM: 3, 25a, 30a against death or

181 Ty Vs. First National Surety & Assurance Co., Inc. Case No. 156 G.R. No. L-1
6138 (April 29, 1961) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192 FACTS: Plaintiff D
iosdado C. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies, among which being
the eight above named Defendants, which issued to him personal accident policie
s. On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway C
otton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, Plai ntiff was injured on th
e left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total disability of his lef
t hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of acciden t and notice of clai
m with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the policy bu
t the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reaso n that t
here being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered
by him was not covered by his policy. ISSUE: W/N it is necessary that there shou
ld be an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff before he can recover on t
he insurance policies. HELD: The clear and express conditions of the insurance p
olicies define partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through t
he bones of the wrist. There was no such amputation in the case at bar. All that
was found by the trial court , which is not disputed on appeal, was that the ph
ysical injuries "caused temporar y total disability of plaintiff's left hand." I
n addition, the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between
the parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that
only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an inte
rpretation that would include the mere frac ture or other temporary disability n
ot covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 7a,
9c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Capati v. Ocampo

Case No. 46 G.R. No. L-28742 (April 30, 1982) Chapter VIII, Page 330, Footnote N
o. 8 FACTS: Plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a sub-contract with
the Defendant, a resident of Naga City. The Defendant completed a construction j
ob for the Plaintiff. However, the construction was completed on a date later th
an what was agreed in their contract. Hence, Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampa
nga an a ction for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay. Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was
improperly laid. The CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint on grou
nd of improper venue. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
improper venue was correct. HELD: No. The rule on venue of personal actions cog
nizable by the CFI is found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which pr
ovides that such "actions may b e commenced and tried where the Defendant or any
of the Defendants resides or may be found, or where the Plaintiff or any of the
Plaintiffs resides, at the el ection of the Plaintiff." The word "may" is merel
y permissive and operates to confer discr etion upon a party. Under ordinary cir
cumstances, the term "may be" connotes possibili ty; it does not connote certain
ty. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or po
ssibility. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, b

182 Chartered Bank v. National Government Auditing Office Case No. 58 G.R. No. L
-38513 (March 31, 1987) Chapter VIII, Page 331, Footnote No. 10 FACTS: Iloilo ci
ty branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order from the general p
ublic since 1946. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city of fice for pay
ment and if said office could not pay in full, they would issue receipts for the
ir remaining balance. On 1968, the Bureau of Posts issued an unnumbered circular
: "Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of Money Orders," e
ffective October 1, 1968, involving the installation of a new postal money orde
r system which requires that all commercial banks, regardless of location, must
cl ear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank
at Manila. Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the post office unde
r the old pr actice through the latter's Acting Cashier beyond October 1, 1968.
The post office said that the arrangements made by the acting cashier and the Pe
titioner bank were private , unauthorized arrangements and any claim for settlem
ent of any unpaid money orders should be directed against the said cashier. ISSU
E: W/N the unnumbered circular and the undated memorandum of understanding are d
irectory and permissive in nature. HELD: Respondents are correct by saying that
the purposes of the new postal money order system negate the contention that sai
d circular and memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the
convenience of commercial bank s operating in the Manila area only. LATIN MAXIM:
7a, 9a, 36a, 36b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Guiao v. Figueroa Case No. 121 G.R. No.
L-6481 (May 17, 1954) Chapter VIII, Page 333, Footnote No. 17 FACTS:

In the trial of People v. Gopez, the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio Dizon
and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. After the reinvestigation, an a
mended information was filed, and two new accused were included, namely, Jesus G
uiao and Eulogio Serrano. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. In view of th
e failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, the action for
ma ndamus was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon and Man
alo as accused in his information. ISSUE: W/N a fiscal may be compelled by manda
mus to include in an information persons who appear to be responsible for the cr
ime charged therein. HELD: Yes. Sec. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court taken f
rom Act No. 2709 states that, Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the name
of the United States aga inst all persons who appear to be responsible therefor
, except in the cases determine d in Sec. 2 of this Act. A perusal of Act No. 27
09 discloses the legislative intent to require that all persons who appear to be
responsible for an offense should be included in the information. The use of th
e word "shall" and of the phrase "except in cases determined" shows Sec. 1 is ma
ndatory, not merely directory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 25a

183 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 153 G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote
No. 22 FACTS: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was r
egistered with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the
sole homeowners organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its cor
porate bylaws. Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations
within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then i
nformed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved
because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. T
his resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained an
d got a favorabl e result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Pet
itioner association cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said d
ecision. Hence, Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: W
/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the da
te of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. HELD: No. The legi
slature s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for it s failure
to pass its by-laws. The word must in a statute is not always imperative b ut i
t may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statute
sh ould be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislatur
e in usi ng the word must or shall . LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 38b, b STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals Case No. 95 G.R. No. 102858
(July 28, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 23 FACTS:

Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration o

f a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died and his heirs
were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue
the petition. The trial court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction .
However , it was found that the applicant had been in open, continuous and exclu
sive possessi on of the subject land since 1938. The reason for the dismissal is
that the applica nt failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspa
per of general circulation p ursuant to a law. The CA set aside the decision of
the trial court. Thus, Petitioner bro ught the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE:
Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an origin
al land registration case is mandatory or directory. HELD: It is mandatory. The
law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner
of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the c ourt order setting the
time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates
the mandatory character of a statute. While such literal mandate is not an abso
lute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its c
ontext in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term mu
st be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of
due process. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a

184 Bersabal v. Salvador Case No. 34 G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978) Chapter VI
II, Page 335, Footnote No. 25 FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit
against the Petitioner. The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner
and during its pendency, the court issued an order stating that counsels for bot
h parties are given 30 days fro m receipt of this order within which to file the
ir memoranda in order for this cas e to be submitted for decision by the court.
After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30
days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic not
es taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. But the
Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the ca se for failure to prosecute P
etitioner s appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the sub
mitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. ISSUE: W/N the mere failure of a
n Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss
the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecut e. HELD: The court is not empowe
red by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit h
is memorandum. The law provides that Courts shall decide cases on the basis of t
he evidence and records transmitted from the city courts: Provided parties may s
ubmit memoranda if so requested It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the
submission of memoranda is optional. LATIN MAXIM: 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Rep
ublic Planers Bank v. Agana Sr. Case No. 133 G. R. No. 51765 (March 3, 1997) FAC
TS: Private Respondents filed in court a quo, an action for specific performance
to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face value
o f P8,000.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend owi
ng t hem under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock. The court
a quo ren

dered judgment in favor of Private Respondents. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge comm
itted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in c
ompelling Petitioner bank to redeem Private Respondents preferred shares HELD: Y
es. Respondent Judge, in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in questi
on, stated that, On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of said pref
erred shares of stock, the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said sto
ck certificates clearly allows the same. What Respondent Judge failed to recogni
ze was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption, the option to do
so was clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. The redemption therefore is clearl
y the t ype known as "optional". Furthermore, the terms and conditions set forth
therein use the word "may". It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction
that the word "ma y" denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having a man
datory effect. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6b, 7a, 30b, 36a

185 Phil. Consumers Foundation , Inc. v. Nat l Telecommunications Commission Cas

e No. 121 G.R. No. L-63318 (November 25, 1983) FACTS: Respondent Commission appr
oved a revised schedule for Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) filed by Private Re
spondent. Petitioner states that SIP sc hedule presented by the Private Responde
nt is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because the Respondent Co
mmission has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing
Sec. 2 of P.D. 217 which provides, Th e Department of Public Works, Transportat
ion and Communications through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate ag
ency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industr
y are immediately implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules and regulatio
ns may be promulgated ... ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission acted with grave abus
e of discretion. HELD: Yes. P.D. 217 deals with matters so alien, innovative and
untested such that existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applic
able. Thus, the SIP was so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of
public telecommunicatio ns companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the
population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone facility. Without promul
gation of rules and regulati on there would be confusion among the rights of Pri
vate Respondent, the consumers and the government itself. The plan to expand the
company program and/or improve its service is laudable, but the expenses should
not be shouldered by th e telephone subscribers. Considering the multi-million
profits of the company, the cost of expansion and/or improvement should come fro
m part of its huge profits. LATIN MAXIM: 8b, 9d, 11b, 12a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. NTC and PLDT (Resolution) Case No. 94 G.R.
No. L-63318 (August 18, 1984) FACTS: Respondent Commission filed a manifestation
that it is joining Private Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration
and adopting it as its own.

The decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Secti

on 2 of P.D. 217 to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Comm
unications as mandatory, which construction is not supported by the actual phras
eology of said Section 2. ISSUE: W/N the previous decision rendered making it ma
ndatory to set rules and regulations implementing P.D. 217 should be reconsidere
d. HELD: Yes. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used
in the la w must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is mani
fest from th e law itself. Hence, the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be
construed to mean "shall" or "must". LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 9f, 30b, 24, 36, 39c

186 Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-4712 (Ju
ly 11, 1952) Chapter VIII, Page 336, Footnote No. 32 FACTS: Petitioner, the hold
er of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA 304, sought to comp
el Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan
from the latter. His basis was Sec. 2 of RA 304, which pr ovides that investment
funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlle d by the gove
rnment shall subject to availability of loanable funds accept or discoun t at no
t more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate for certain
specified purposes. Respondent company contended however that the word shall use
d in this particular section of the law is merely directory. The low er court su
stained Respondent company. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certifica
te to pay for his loan to Respondent company. HELD: No. It is true that in its o
rdinary signification, the word shall is imperative. However, the rule is not ab
solute; it may be construed as may when required by the context or by the intent
ion of the statute. The modifier, at not more than tw o per centum per annum for
ten years. , the interest to be charged, that the verbphrase is mandatory becau
se not only the law uses at not more but the legislative purpose and intent, to
conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the be nefit of the holders,
for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maxi
mum limit for discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptan ce shall be
made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If th e accept
ance or discount of the certificate is to be subject to the condition of the ava
ilability of loanable funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the acc
eptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are available loanable fund
s. In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there ar e
loanable funds. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25a, 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Berces v. Guingona, et. al. Case No. 33 G.R. No. 112099 (February 21, 1995) Chap
ter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 34 FACTS: Petitioner filed two administrative c
ases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi, Albay for 1) abuse of authority; and 2) d
ishonesty, with the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan. Respondent mayor was convicted, a
nd accordingly, suspended in both cases. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office
of the President and prayed for stay of execution under Sec. 67(b) of the LGC.
The Office of the President s tayed execution, citing Sec. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec
. 6 of A.O. No. 18. According to Petitioner, the governing law is RA 7160, which
contains a mandatory provision t hat an appeal shall not prevent a decision fro
m becoming final and executory. Petitioner further contends that A.O. No. 18 was
repealed by RA 7160. ISSUE: W/N R.A. 7160 repealed A.O. No. 18. HELD: No. Sec.
530(f), RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. 6, A.O. No. 18 because it failed t
o identify or designate the laws on executive orders that are intende d to be re
pealed. If there was any repeal, it was by implication which is not favored. I n
the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repea
ling a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists be
tween t he two. There is none in this case. The first sentence of Sec. 68 provid
es that an a ppeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory
. It gives discretio n to reviewing appeals to stay execution. The term shall ma
y be read mandatory or directory, depending upon consideration of the entire pro
vision where it is foun d. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 26, 50

Mers Shoes Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. Ca

se No. 81 G.R. No. 123669 (February 27, 1998) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote N
o. 35 FACTS: Petitioner hired Respondent workers as piece rate workers. Alleging
serious business decline, Petitioner barred its workers from entering the compa
ny to wor k. The workers challenged the legality of Petitioner s stoppage of ope
rations. The Labor Arbiter found the shutdown with cause but without the require
d notice, and order ed Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. Petitione
r appealed to Responden t NLRC but sought a reduction of the cash or surety bond
. Despite the reduction granted, Petitioner still failed to post bond within 10
days, resulting to the d ismissal of appeal for failure to perfect it. ISSUE: W/
N Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: No. Under Art. 223
of the Labor Code, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting
of cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to th e monetary award. Perfectio
n of appeal is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is
fatal. The word only makes it perfectly clear that the posting of bond is to be
the exclusive means by which an employer s appeal may be perfected. LATIN MAXIM
: 25a, 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fule v. Court of Appeals Case No. 48 G.R. No. L
-79094 (June 22, 1988) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 37 FACTS: Petitioner
, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made out check No. 26
741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the reason that the sa
id checking account was already closed, thus in violation of B P 22, the Bouncin
g Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and the Petit
ioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirmi ng the Stipu
lation of Facts. He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, th e Appell
ate Court.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipul
ation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel. HELD: The
CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. Sec. 4 of the Rul
es on Criminal Procedure provides, No agreement or admission made or entered dur
ing the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unles
s reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel . Because of the word sha
ll , in its language, the rule is mandatory. Negative words and phrases are to b
e regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. The
refore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. Also, pena
l statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the acc used. LATIN MAXIM: 9
d

188 McGee v. Republic Case No. 174 G.R. No. L-5387 (April 29, 1954) Chapter VIII
, Page 337, Footnote No. 37 FACTS: Petitioner, an American citizen married to Le
onarda Crisostomo, wants to adopt her children by her first husband. However, he
is barred from doing so und er Art. 335 of the old Civil Code which states that
those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natur
al children by legal fiction cannot adopt. Petitioner and Leonarda have one legi
timate child. Despite Art. 33 5, the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption,
invoking Art. 338 which states t hat a step-child, by the step-father or step-m
other can be adopted. ISSUE: W/N a husband having a legitimate child may adopt a
step-child. HELD: No. One strong argument presented by the trial court in uphol
ding the adoption is that to hold otherwise would render Art. 338 meaningless an
d a surplusage. However, it must be noted that Art. 335 and Art. 338 should be c
onsidered in relation to each other. That a parent can adopt a step-child is li
mited by Art. 335 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to qu
alify as an adopter. One principle behind this is to protect the successional ri
ghts of the legitimate child. In addition, under the laws of statutory construct
ion, negativ e words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in
the affirmative are merely directory. Art. 335 is phrased in a negative manner:
cannot adopt. While Art. 338 is positive: the following may be adopted. LATIN MA
XIM: 15a STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Penid v. Virata Case No. 101 G.R. No. L-44004 (M
arch 25, 1983) Chapter VIII, Page 338, Footnote No. 40 FACTS: Confidential Infor
mation No. 28 of the BIR was filed by the Petitioners. It is a

sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had been false
ly declaring their gross earnings on the basis of a parity rate of P2.00 to US $
1.00 defrauding the Philippine Government of millions of pesos in taxes. Further
, Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the Con
fi dential Information. One of these was Pan Fil Co. Inc. Now the Petitioners se
ek their 25 % reward taken from the total revenue collected from shipping compan
ies in payment for their deficiencies ISSUE: as provided by RA 2338.
W/N the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Fil Co. Inc, a company which is
not included in the Confidential Information. HELD: Yes. According to Sec. 4 of
RA 2338, In order to entitle an informer to a reward, the information given by h
im must lead to or be instrumental in the disc overy of the fraud or violation a
nd results in the recovery of collection of revenues Not only did the BIR rely o
n the Confidential Information submitted by the Petitioners for their investigat
ion, but also on the categorical statement that other shipping companies falsely
declared their gross earnings, which led to further investigations and, consequ
ently, recovery of collection. Therefore, this inform ation was instrumental in
the discovery of the fraud or violation. In jurisprudence, statues offering rewa
rds must be liberally construed in favor of informers and with regard to the pur
pose for which they are intended. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9d
.

189 Pahilan v. Tabalba, et al. Case No. 96 G.R. No. 110170 (February 21, 1994) C
hapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote No. 63 FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were can
didates for Mayor of Guinsiliban, Camiguin. Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Ma
yor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an election protest although the docket fees he pa
id were insufficient. The trial c ourt dismissed the election protest for non-pa
yment on time of the required fees for filing an initiatory pleading. Within the
5-day period to appeal, Petitioner filed a ver ified appeal brief. But the Cler
k of Court said that his office did not receive any noti ce of appeal from Petit
ioner. Petitioner s appeal was then dismissed for failure to appeal within the p
rescribed period. ISSUE: 1. W/N the verified appeal was validly dismissed. 2. W/
N the trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner f or n
on-payment on time of the required fees. HELD: 1. No. The notice of appeal can b
e validly substituted by an appeal brief. The filing and approval of the record
on appeal necessarily involves the filing of t he notice of appeal. The RTC was
sent copies by registered mail within the prescrib ed period, and is assumed to
be received in the regular course of the mail, filed a s of the date of mailing.
2. No. The docket fee was paid although insufficient. Statutes providing for el
ection contests are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in t h
e choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. LA
TIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 9d, 40b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pimentel v. Festejo Case No. 1
24 G.R. No. L-2327 (January 11, 1949) Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote No. 64 FA
CTS: Festejo was proclaimed Mayor of Santa Lucia with Appellant protesting. Appe
llant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 59 bal

lots which would have made him win. Appellant s name in the 59 ballots were writ
ten on different lines such as those corresponding to vice-mayor, member of the
provinc ial board or councilor. Appellant claimed that his name was only misplac
ed but the intention to elect him as mayor was apparent. ISSUE: W/N Appellant ca
n claim as votes in his favor ballots with his name which does not appear writte
n in the space reserved for mayor. HELD: No. For any ballot to be counted for a
candidate for mayor, it is indispensable that his name be written by the voter i
n the ballot and cannot be mistaken by a person who, as provided by the Constitu
tion, is able to read. A name can be counted for any office only when it is writ
ten within the space indicated upon t he ballot for the vote for such office. It
is impossible to count a ballot as vote for a candidate for mayor, when his nam
e is clearly written in the space reserved for another office. Considering that
in 59 ballots claimed by Appellant in this appeal his name does not appear writt
en in the space reserved for mayor, he cannot claim them as votes in his favor a
s candidate for mayor. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 7b, 43

Roxas v. Rafferty Case No. 264 G.R. No. L-12182 (March 27, 1918) Chapter VIII, P
age 345, Footnote No. 75 FACTS: Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. In the latter
part of 1913, the construction of a reinforced concrete building was begun. It
was finished in all respects on Feb ruary 15, 1915. The city assessor and collec
tor of Manila, under the date of December 1, 1914, sent Plaintiffs notice, recei
ved by them on December 25, 1914, requiring t hem to declare the new improvement
s for assessments for the year 1915. Plaintiffs pa id the amount of the taxes, w
hich amounted to P3,000, under protest. Suit was begun in the CFI of Manila to r
ecover this sum with interest at the legal rate from th e date of payment. ISSUE
: W/N the assessment was legal. HELD: No. The assessor cannot make a valid asses
sment unless he has given proper notice. The law requires that the assessor shou
ld have notified the Plaintiffs d uring November. His attempted notification on
December 25, 1914, was not given during the time fixed by statute, thus there wa
s no legal assessment of the Roxas Build ing for the year 1915. Furthermore, the
city assessor and collector were under the obligation to add any completed impr
ovements to the assessment list. The city assessor and collect or could not prem
aturely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 19
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Serfino v. Court of Appeals Case No. 145 G.R. No. 40858
(September 15, 1987) Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote No. 75 FACTS: A parcel of
land, consisting of 21.1676 hectares situated in Sagay, Negros

Occidental, was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor, under Homestead Pate
nt No. 44139. Upon registration of said patent, OCT No. 1839 was issued by s aid
office in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. In 1945, Casamayor sold the land in f
a vor of Nemesia Baltazar. Apparently, OCT No. 1839 was lost during the war and
upon t he petition of Baltazar, the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in
the name o f Casamayor. On the same day, TCT No. 57-N was issued in the name of
Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT No. 14-R. In 1951, Baltazar s
old the property to Respondent Lopez Sugar Central, which did not present the do
cuments for registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds.
Said of fice refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was
covered by another certificate of title, TCT No. 28985, in the name of Petition
er. ISSUE: W/N the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in ques
tion was null and void from the beginning. HELD: No, applying Sec. 118 of C.A. N
o. 141, which prohibits the alienation of homestead lots to private individuals
within 5 years from the date of the issuan ce of the patent, and not Sec. 121 wh
ich governs sale to corporations. Since the grant was more than 5 years before,
the transfer to Nemesia Baltazar was valid and legal. LATIN MAXIM: 37b, 43

191 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines Case No. G. R. No. 26419 (Oct
ober 16, 1970) FACTS: Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent whic
h was approved. The loan was to be released in installments. The outstanding obl
igation of the petitioners with respondent, including interests, amounted to P13
,983.59. Petiti oner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P14,0
00 for his outstandin g obligation, out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant
to RA No. 897 (RA 897). Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of
the offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on
June 20, 1953 when RA 897 was approved. ISSUE: W/N petitioner s obligation is su
bsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. HELD: No. The provision expressl
y provides that the obligations must be subsisting at the time of the approval o
f RA 897. Hence, when such backpay certificates are offered in payment to a gove
rnment-owned corporation of obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the t
ime of the enactment of said Act on June 20, 1953, su ch corporation may not leg
ally be compelled to accept the certificates. The Court cannot see any room for
interpretation or construction in the clear and unambigu ous language of the pro
vision of law. LATIN MAXIM: 28, 7a, 6c, 1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Romualdez-Marco
s v. Commission on Elections Case No. 137 G.R. No. 119976 (September 18, 1995) C
hapter VIII, Page 347, Footnote No.84 FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Pr
ivate respondent Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and a candidate for the same posit ion,

filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with respondent COMELEC a

lleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residen
cy. ISSUE: W/N petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First Di
strict of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1995 elections. HELD
: Yes. Residency qualification pertains to domicile. As a minor, petitioner foll
owed the domicile of her parents in Tacloban, Leyte. As domicile, once acqui red
, it is retained until a new one is gained. In spite of the being born in Manila
, Tacloban was her domicile of origin by operation of law. Parenthetically, when
she marrie d then Congressman Marcos, petitioner was obliged, by virtue of Art.
110 of the Ci vil Code, to follow her husband s actual place of residence fixed
by him. Although Mr. Marcos has different places of residence, and even if he h
ad designated one, wha t petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. T
herefore, she did not los e her domicile of origin. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 37, 39a

192 Portillo v. Salvani Case No. 243 G.R. No. L-32181 (March 10, 1930) Chapter I
II, Page 101, Footnote No. 130 FACTS: Appellant Salvani won the elections in 192
8 for the office of provincial governor of Antique. Appellee Portillo, his neare
st opponent, filed an election protest on July 9, 1928. Decision was rendered on
August 15, 1929 declaring appellee Por tillo the winner. ISSUE: W/N the decisio
n by the trial judge declaring appellee Portillo is valid. HELD: The decision is
void for want of jurisdiction. The Election Law provides that al l proceedings
in an electoral contest shall be terminated within one year. Legisla tive histor
y of the said legislation reveals that the shift of the tenor of the statu te fr
om silence to mild admonition to stronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic
and explicit provision suggests the legislative intent to make the provision man
dato ry. One year having already elapsed, the proceeding is deemed terminated an
d the court loses jurisdiction rendering any subsequent decision void for want o
f juri sdiction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 7b, 9a, 43, 45, b2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Querubin v. Court of Appeals Case No. 247 G.R. No. L-2581 (December 2, 1948) Cha
pter VIII, Page 332, Footnote No. 14 FACTS: Petitioner defeated Felipe Mamuri in
the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan. Mamuri filed an election protest in t
he court, lost and filed an appeal thereaft er. The appeal was not acted upon fo
r three months hence the petition to dismiss the cas e for the court had lost ju
risdiction.

ISSUE: W/N the CA had lost their jurisdiction to decide the appeal. HELD: No. Se
c. 178 of the Election Code provides that appeals from decisions in election con
tests should be decided within three months after filing. However, t his provisi
on is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defe at the
purpose of due process of the law. The dismissal in such a case will constit ut
e a miscarriage of justice. The doctrine in Portillo v. Salvani should be abando
ned. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2, 5b, 18b, 39b

193 Nilo v. Court of Appeals Case No. 189 G.R. No. L-34586 (April 2, 1984) Chapt
er III, Page 89, Footnote No. 59 FACTS: Private respondent Gatchalian is the own
er of a parcel of Riceland at Bulacan with an area of 2 hectares. Petitioner ele
cted to use the leasehold syst em. Private respondent then filed for ejection ci
ting personal cultivation on March 7, 1968. Private respondent won the case and
petitioner filed an appeal citing that RA 3844 was amended on September 10, 1971
removing personal cultivation from the grounds for ejectment. ISSUE: W/N the am
endment of RA 6389 has retroactive effect. HELD: No. Art. 4 of the New Civil Cod
e provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless it is explicitly pr
ovided. The legislation involves social justice , however the landowners being h
olders of only small parcels of land should also be entitl ed to social justice.
Furthermore, to rule against the small landowners would be thwar ting legislati
ve intent of creating independent and self-reliant farmers. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 46a
, 46b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon Case No.
138 G.R. No. L-4495 (June 6, 1951) FACTS: Petitioners were appointed members of
the Board of Dental Examiners. RA 546 was approved and Sec. 1 thereof amended Se
c. 10 of the Reorganization Act No. 4007. By virtue of this law, a Board of Dent
al Examiners was appointed by th e President, whose terms directly overlapped an
d conflicted with that of the petitioners. ISSUE: W/N it was the intention of Co
ngress, in enacting RA 546, to abolish all the

pre-existing Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enactment thereo
f. HELD: Appointment of the respondents is valid. It is obvious that it is the
intention of Congress to do so, because the provisions of said Act are inconsist
ent with thos e of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 4007. I
n the case of Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a
well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception, that a r
etrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes
a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past
; but that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts
for i ts operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action a
nd applica tion is drawn from a time antedating its passage. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9c
, 46, 49

194 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc. C
ase No. 78 G.R. No. L-23771 (August 4, 1988) Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No.
14 FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from respon
dent deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate o
f 5% as prescribed in Sec. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, instead o
f the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Pending the case, RA
3843 w as passed, granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the ope
ration of light, heat, and power. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%.
ISSUE: W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equality of t
axation clause of the Constitution. HELD: It is valid. Sec. 259 of the Tax Code
was never intended to have a universal application. RA 3843 did not only fix and
specify a franchise tax of 2% on its g ross receipts, but made it in lieu of an
y and all taxes, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding, thus leaving no room
for doubt regarding the legislative intent. Charters or special laws granted and
enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts. They do not
constitute a part of the machinery of t he general government. The Legislature c
onsiders and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case. RA
3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. LATIN MAXIM: 6
c, 9c, 46, 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gallardo v. Borromeo Case No. 50 G.R. No. L
-36007 (May 25, 1988) FACTS: Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the
respondent tenant so he (plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired f
rom his government job a uniformity and

s a letter carrier. Upon appeal, the CA applying Sec. 7 of RA 6389, held that th
e landowner s desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dis
possessing the tenant. ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application
to Sec. 7 of RA 6389. HELD: No. The applicable law when petitioner filed his com
plaint was RA 3844 which provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant shoul
d the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding. The newer
law, R.A. 6389 elimina ted this ground. In applying Art. 4 of the New Civil Cod
e, RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory prov
ision for retroactivity or a clear impl ication of the law to that effect. Since
Congress failed to express an intention to make sa id RA retroactive, it may no
t apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudicati on by the courts. LAT
IN MAXIM: 6c, 46e

195 Cebu Portland Cement v. CIR Case No. 52 G.R. No. 20563 (October 29, 1968) Ch
apter IX, Page 355, Footnote No. 15 FACTS: The case involves petitioner s claim
for refund of sales tax paid from November 1954 to March 1955, and ad valorem ta
x paid from April 1955 to September 1956 from the sale of APO Portland cement pr
oduced by petitioner. Since 1952, however, petitioner had been protesting the im
position of the sales tax on its APO Portland cement, and on January 1953, it al
so protested the payment of t he ad valorem taxes. Petitioner claimed for refund
and brought its case to the Cour t of Tax Appeals. Petitioner contends that the
percentage taxes collected by responde nt are refundable since under RA 1229 (e
ffective June 1955), producers of cement ar e exempt from the payment of said ta
x. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise. ISSUE: Whether RA 1229 applies pros
pectively or retroactively. HELD: A statute operates prospectively only and neve
r retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest
either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. In every
case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. Whi
le the purpose of the amendment, a s mentioned in the explanatory note to the bi
ll, was not only to accelerate the collection of mining royalties and ad valorem
taxes but also clarify the doubt o f the tax-paying public on the interpretativ
e scope of the two terms, it certainly coul d not have been the intention of the
lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated transactions between the taxpayer
and the Government. LATIN MAXIM: 46a, 46c, 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commission
er of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros Case No. 76 G.R. No. 148
80 (April 29, 1960) Chapter IV, Page 134, Footnote No. 41 FACTS:

Respondent, an insurance company, was engaged in business as a real estate deale

r. RA 1612 amended the National Internal Revenue Code and provided for a scale o
f graduated rates; this took effect on August of 1956. Petitioner a ssessed agai
nst the respondent taxes (to which the insurance company has already paid in ful
l on January 1956) for the year 1956 based on RA 1612. Respondent appealed to th
e Court of Tax Appeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was gran t
ed a decision in favor of it. ISSUE: W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroactively
. HELD: No. As a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is p
rovided. The rule applies with greater force to the case at bar, considering tha
t RA 1612 , which imposes the new and higher taxes, expressly provides that said
Act shall t ake effect upon its approval. LATIN MAXIM: 46a, 46c, 46e

196 Laceste v. Santos Case No. 140 G.R. No. 36886 (February 1, 1932) Chapter IX,
Page 351, Footnote No. 1 FACTS: Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas La
chica. The crime took effect before the effectivity of the RPC. However, Lachica
married the victim, Magdalen a de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from cri
minal prosecution. The petitione r continued to serve his sentence but now prays
for the Court to set him at libert y through the writ of habeas corpus, pleadin
g that there is no sufficient legal gr ound for continuing his imprisonment any
longer based on the last sentence of Art. 344 of the RPC. ISSUE: W/N the last pa
ragraph of Art. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect. HELD: Yes. The petition f
or habeas corpus was granted. The principle granting to the accused in certain c
ases an exception to the general rule that laws shall no t be retroactive when t
he law in question favors the accused applies. Conscience and good law justify t
his exception. LATIN MAXIM: 48 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Balatbat v. Court of Appea
ls and Passion Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-36378 (January 27, 1992) Chapter IX, Page
363, Footnote No. 73 FACTS: Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. Ana, Pam
panga containing 18,490 square meters of land owned by Garcia. Garcia sold the l
and to private responden t Pasion and had declared it for taxation purposes unde
r Tax Declaration No. 126. Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultiva
te the land pursuant to Sec . 36(1) of RA 3844. However, petitioner maintains th
at the case should have been decided in light of Sec. 7 of RA 6389 since, in vie
w of the appeal the respondent still

does not have the vested right to acquire the land. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 7 of RA 6389
should be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Art. 4 of the Civil Code provides
that there should be no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided by law. In
order for a law to have a retroactiv e effect it should have a provision statin
g its retroactivity, otherwise nothing s hould be understood which is not embodi
ed in the law. Furthermore the law is a rule established to guide our action wit
h no binding effect until it is enacted, thus laws have no effect in past times
but laws look forward in the future. LATIN MAXIM: 20, 46b, 46e

People v. Zeta Case No. 232 G.R. No. L-7140 (December 22, 1955) Chapter VI, Page
266, Footnote No. 72 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for
having collected fees in excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as
compensation for services rendered. At the time the agreement was made the law i
n force was C.A. No. 675 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of an
y amount that the claimant would collect. The trial court in convicting appellan
t held that the agreement for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected wa
s void and illegal. ISSUE: W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect. HELD: No. It doe
s not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given retroactive effec
t. There is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on
cases under the old law. Laws cannot be given retroactive effect unless i t is
specifically stated in the provision. Furthermore, strict construction on the la
w was made so as not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor a
nd for the law not to have any retroactive effect. LATIN MAXIM: 11b, 20, 46e STA
TUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Jose v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp. Case No. 271 G.R. N
o. L-7766 (November 29, 1955) Chapter IX, Page 369, Footnote No. 104 FACTS: Plai
ntiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in her
pre-war loan with defendant. The basis of the suit was RA 671 amending RA 40 1,
the former law condoning the pre-war loans and the interest corresponding from J
anuary 1, 1946 to March 14, 1951. The lower court decided for defendant to retu
rn the interest to the plaintiff. ISSUE: W/N the lower court was correct in impo
sing the return of interest to plaintiff

by the defendant. HELD: Yes. RA 671 is made to condone only the unpaid interest.
It did not include within its term completed payment and paid interest. Where a
statute was amended and reenacted, the amendment should be construed as if it h
ad been included in the original act; but it could afford no retroactive effect
unless plainly made so by the terms of the amendment. LATIN MAXIM: 20, 46e

198 People v. Sumilang Case No. 226 G.R. No. L-49187 (December 18, 1946) Chapter
IX, Page 371, Footnote No. 111 FACTS: The petitioner was convicted of the crime
of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months a
nd 21 days of prision correctio nal to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. On a
ppeal, both the CA and the SC affirm ed the sentence of the lower court. Based o
n the records, a copy of the resolution of the Court denying the motion for reco
nsideration was mailed to the petitioner s attorney. However, the attorney alleg
es in his petition that he did not receive the notice because then he was alread
y hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Marki ngs gueri
lla. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be suspended and t hat
petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Hono
rable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner. ISS
UE: W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or moti
on should be granted. HELD: No. It is a well established rule of statutory const
ruction that statutes regula ting the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending a nd undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. LATIN MAXIM
: 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Palomo Building Tenants Association v. Intermediate
Appellate Court Case No. 97 G.R. No. L-68043 (October 31, 1984) FACTS: Petition
er filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Damages with

Preliminary Injunction before the then Court of First Instance of Manila against
respondents Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Capitol Hills, as pr
incipal defendants, and the five (5) judges of the then City Court of Manila i n
the injunction aspect of the case. Respondent GSIS and Capitol Hills filed sepa
rate motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of act
ion a nd that there are other actions pending between the same parties for the s
ame cause . Respondent judge granted private respondents' motion to dismiss. ISS
UE: W/N the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) erred in sustaining the order of
respondent, denying petitioner's motion for approval of the record on appeal due
to failure to amend the record on appeal within the period granted them. HELD:
Yes. Petitioners invoke Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (
BP 129) which dispensed with the record on appeal and claim that herein responde
nt IAC erred in not applying retrospectively the said law. Ruled in Alda y vs. C
amilon, "[t]he reorganization having been declared to have been completed, BP Bi
g. 129 is now in full force and effect. A Record on Appeal is no longer necess a
ry for taking an appeal. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim R
ules an d Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being procedural
in nature, those provision s may be applied retroactively for the benefit of pet
itioners, as appe llants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of th
eir passage. Procedural laws a re retrospective in that sense and to that extent
' (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 7 64 [19461.] " LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 46e

199 MRCA, Inc. v. Court of Appeals Case No. 78 G.R. No. 86675 (December 19, 1989
) FACTS: The petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the CA affirming the
order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing f
ees as th e prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damag
es, exemplar y damages, attorney s fees and litigation expenses sought to be rec
overed by it from the defendants but left them to the discretion of the Honorabl
e Court. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. HELD: Yes. It is a well established
rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the cou
rts will be construed as applicable to action s pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to th
at extent. LATIN MAXIM: 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ocampo v. Court of Appeals Ca
se No. 89 G.R. No. 7960 (December 8, 1989) FACTS: Petitioner began construction
of his house without permit from the owner, while being informed of P.D. 772. Pe
titioner never showed title to the land he claimed to have purchased. Sec. 1 of
P.D. 772, otherwise known as the Anti Squatting Law has three elements: (a) accu
sed is not the owner of the land; (b) he succeeded in occupying or possessing th
e property through force, intimidation, or threat or by taking such advantage of
the absence or tolerance of the owner; (c) such occupation of the property is w
ithout the consent or against the will o f the owner. Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the R
ules on Criminal Procedure states that after prosecution has rested its case, th
e court may dismiss the case on the ground of

insufficiency of evidence. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner is guilty of the crime of sq

uatting. 2. W/N a motion to dismiss bars a petitioner from presenting his eviden
ce. HELD: Yes on both counts. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficienc
y of evidence, petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate h
is de fense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evid
ence for the prosecution. LATIN MAXIM: 45a, 46b

Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals Case No. 315 G.R. No. 91856 (October 5, 1
990) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 117 FACTS: Petitioner argues that the ci
vil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence, be
ing without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under A
rt. 33 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: W/N a civil action instituted after the crimina
l action was filed may prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separa
te civil action. HELD: Yes. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civi
l action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the cr
iminal action unl ess the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his r
ight to institute it separ ately or institutes the civil action prior to the cri
minal action. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aris (Phil.) Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission Case No. 21 G.R. No. 90501 (August 5, 1991)
Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 119 FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutio
nality of Sec. 12 of RA 6716 to Art. 223 of th e Labor Code, and Transitory Prov
isions of the said Interim Rules on the basis of being in violation of due proce
ss and non retroactivity of laws, respectively. ISSUE: W/N amendments introduced
by Sec. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, and Transitory Provisions
of the said Interim Rules are constitutional. HELD: Yes on both counts. The prov
ision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose
dismissal is found unjustified by the labor a rbiter is a valid exercise of the
police power of the state, and the contested provisio n is

then a police legislation . The questioned Interim Rules can be given retroactiv
e effect for they are procedural or remedial in character. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 46e

201 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. v. Court of Appeals Case No. 2
5 G.R. No. L-54305 (February 14, 1990) Chapter IX, Page 373, Footnote No. 124 FA
CTS: Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby th
e said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging to
the latter located at Toledo City, Cebu. Petitioner also entered into a similar
agreement with BIGA COPPER; subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining c
laims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu. However, of the tot
al mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER,
9 mining claims overlap. These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject of
administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. During the pendency of this appeal
, CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise agreement. This compro
mise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlappin
g mining claims. Due to the promulgation of P.D. 1281, a number of the defendant
s filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. They alleged that the operati ng agree
ment which BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a lett
er and that by reason of this rescission, the trial court is deemed to hav e los
t jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 7(a)(c) and Sec. 12 of P.D. 1281. ISSUE: W/N P.D
. 1281 prevails. HELD: P.D. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes
or laws of general application. LATIN MAXIM: 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Governme
nt of the Philippine Islands v. Municipality of Binalonan Case No. 117 G.R. No.
L-8243 (December 24, 1915) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No. 44 FACTS: This is a
registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands under Sec . 61 of A
ct No. 926, seeking to compel the registration of all private property wi thin a

prescribed area in the municipality of Binalonan, Pangasinan on two parcels of l

and. Act No. 926 is not applicable to any other than public lands, or, at most,
lands claimed by the Government. The Act does not touch upon the compulsory reg
istration of private titles. Cadastral Act (No. 2259) authorizes the Director of
Lands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all owners and c
laimant s of property within any area which has been regularly surveyed and plat
ted under the procedure prescribed in the Act. Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 does not p
ermit of simil ar proceedings. The title of the Public Land Act contains no ment
ion of compulsory registration proceedings. No reference is made in Act No. 2259
to the repeal or amendment of Sec. 61 of Act No. 926. ISSUE: Whether Sec. 61 of
Act No. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration proceedings a
gainst private owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands.
HELD: Act No. 2259 was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of existing legislati
on on the same subject. The fact that the new Act does not expressly state that
it amends or repeals Sec. 61 of Act No. 926 does not necessarily rebut this conc
lus ion. LATIN MAXIM: 46e

202 Development Bank of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals Case No. 92 G.R. No. L-287
74 (February 28, 1980) Chapter IV, Page 175, Footnote No. 199 FACTS: The Board o
f Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing project for its em
ployees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for 20 years. However, th
e area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because the subdivision
plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bureau of Lands, the sales
agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for registr
ation by the DBP. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it could acquire the pr
operty in question for the intended purpose of a housing project in the light of
the then Sec. 13 of RA 85. However, without the knowledge of the DBP, a portion
of t he property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP, were segregated and a
separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name
of PHHC w herein there was no annotation whatsoever to the title. Then, RA 3147
was enacted, amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA 85), among which
was Sec. 13. ISSUE: W/N there is retroactivity of the amendment of Sec. 13 of R
A 85, by RA 3147. HELD: Yes. One of the purposes of Congress when it enacted RA
3147, by amending Sec. 13 of RA 85, was to erase any doubts regarding the legali
ty of the acquisit ion by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing
project which it intended to establish for its employees who did not yet have ho
uses of their own. It is, the refore, a curative statute to render valid the acq
uisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC. LATIN MAXIM: 46e STATUTORY CO
NSTRUCTION Briad Agro Development Corp. v. Hon. dela Serna, and dela Cruz, et al
. Case No. 39 G.R. No. 83225 (June 29, 1989)

Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote No. 136 FACTS: The case arose out of a complaint
filed by Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services WFTU Local Chapter N
o. ROI-005 against respondent agricultural f irm for alleged underpayment/non-pa
yment of minimum wage, ECOLA, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, night shift diffe
rential pay, 13th month pay and service ince ntive leave pay. Respondent failed
to submit controverting evidence despite due notice ; Director Balbin thus ruled
in favor of the employees and ordered respondent to p ay P5,369,909.30. In its
appeal to the NLRC, Briad Agro questioned the Regional Director s authority to e
ntertain the pecuniary claim of workers, which NLRC dismissed on t he strength o
f E.O. 111 amending Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, which granted to Regional Dir
ectors jurisdiction over monetary claims. ISSUE: W/N the jurisdiction over money
claims is exclusive to the Labor Arbiters, by force of Art. 217 of the Labor Co
de. HELD: The Court held that E.O. 111 has the character of a curative law to re
medy a defect that attached to the provision subject of the amendment. This was
clear f rom the proviso: The provisions of Art. 217 of this Code notwithstanding
The intended effect was clearly to make the Secretary of Labor and the various
Regional Direc tors have concurrent jurisdiction. E.O. 111 therefore has retroac
tive effect. LATIN MAXIM: 6a, 9, 30b, 38b, 46e

Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Hon. Andres, Jr. and Burg
os Case No. 99 G.R. No. 104215 (May 8, 1996) Chapter IX, Page 377, Footnote No.
140 FACTS: Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a servic
e contract driver. Months after, another contract was executed which changed his
position into that of a helper/laborer. When private respondent returned to the
Philippines, he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the
difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract a
n d the amount actually paid to him, plus his contractual bonus. Private respond
ent filed the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E.O. No. 797 was passed, crea
ting the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), vested with the o
riginal and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between employers and emplo
yees abroad. The Labor Arbiter still proceeded with the case and rendered a Deci
sion in favor of private respondent. ISSUE: W/N E.O. 797 should be given retroac
tive effect and thus divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. HELD: No. E.O. 79
7 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the exception to th
e rule on prospectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectivel y unless the l
egislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly decla red or is n
ecessitated. Furthermore, the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determine
d by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action; in this cas
e, th ese were P.D. 1691 and 1391. LATIN MAXIM: 35, 46a, 46c, 46e STATUTORY CONS
TRUCTION Santos v. Duata and the Court of Appeals Case No. 274 G.R. No. L-20901
(August 31, 1965) Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote No. 134 FACTS: Duata and Aguila
r bought a parcel of land which subsequently became a quarter part of Lot No. 37
. The lot was purchased by Santos, Gaanan and Aguilar. For convenience, the titl
e was issued in Santos s name.

On August 3, 1955, private respondent Duata, the daughter of the Duata spouses,
instituted an action for reconveyance of of Lot No. 37. Santos denied t he spouse
s ownership, claiming that the land had been sold to her by Aguilar in a private
document. The trial court pronounced the document as a pacto de retro sale and
ruled in favor of Santos. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the transactio n was ac
tually an equitable mortgage under Art. 1602 of the New Civil Code and set asi d
e the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether Santos and Aguilar, in executi
ng the said private document, intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. H
ELD: It is a mortgage. Art. 1602 was designed primarily to curtail the evils bro
ught about by contracts of sale with right of repurchase; it envisioned contract
s of sale with right to repurchase where the real intention of the parties is th
at the pre tended purchase price is money loaned, and in order to secure the pay
ment of the loan, a contract purporting to be a pacto de retro sale is drawn up.
Said article is remedial in nature and can thus be applied retroactively to cas
es arising prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code. LATIN MAXIM: 8c, 17,
21, 46e

204 Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr. Case No. 182 G.R. No. 103
702 (December 6, 1994) Chapter IX, Page 381, Footnote No. 150 FACTS: President C
. Garcia, issued E.O. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon.
Then by virtue of E.O. 174, issued by President D. Macapagal, th e municipal di
strict of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status o
f a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. 2 of RA 1515. It was t hen att
acked of its validity. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 71
60 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipalit
y, they cont end that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior t
o the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right t
o seek the nullificati on of E.O. 353, and any attempt to apply Sec. 442 of RA 7
160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause o
f the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the E.O. creating the municipality of San Andres
was cured by Sec. 442(d) of RA 7160. HELD: Yes. The de jure status of the Munici
pality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded. Sec. 442(d) of
the LGC of 1991, which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to p
residential issuances or executives o rders and which have their respective sets
of elective municipal officials holding off ice at the time of the effectivity
of the code shall henceforth be considered as regula r municipalities, is also c
urative statute, as it validates the creation of munici palities by executive or
ders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power. LATIN
MAXIM: 46e, 6c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank & Trust Case
No. 193

G.R. No. L-24670 (December 14, 1979) Chapter VIII, Page 312, Footnote No. 133 FA
CTS: Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a bu
ilding on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes. Appellant demand
ed that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said lo
ts. The latter refused to comply, contending that the building was being constru
cted in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant having filed building
and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong. ISSUE: W/
N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5 a
nd 6, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municip
ality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appe llant
on the lots in question and if Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of p
oli ce power. HELD: The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subo
rdinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27. It upheld the classification by the Muni
cipal Council of the area along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone,
and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restriction
s in question as against defendant. Resolution No. 27 was passed in the valid ex
ercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good o
rder and general welfare o f the people in the locality. Even if the subject bui
lding restrictions were assumed by the defendant as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6,
in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractua l obligations so assumed ca
nnot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. 27. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 46e

205 Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations Case No. 35 G.R. No. L-17566 (July
30, 1965) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 119 FACTS: Petitioners were allege
dly employees of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, which required them to work 18 h
ours a day without giving them additional compensation. There was an amicable se
ttlement but petitioners disclaimed having knowledge stating they did not author
ize the filing. Respondent contends that petitioners are barred due to prescript
ion under Sec. 7-A of C.A. No. 144, as amended by RA 1993. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 7-A o
f C.A. No. 144, as amended by RA 1993 to the effect that any action to enforce a
ny cause under this Act shall be commenced within three years after such cause o
f action accrued; otherwise it shall be barred forever. HELD: It would have appl
ied, provided that actions already commenced before the effective date of this a
ct shall not be affected by the period prescribed. As th e statute shortened the
period of action accrued, it was contended that to give it retroactive effect w
ould impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude the six years from
their accrual. The court ruled that a statute of limitations is p rocedural in n
ature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. Because the st
atute shortened the period within which to bring an action and in order not to v
iolate the constitutional mandate concerning due process, claimants whose claim
s were injuriously affected thereby should have a reasonable period of one year
fr om the time the new statute took effect within which to sue on such claims. L
ATIN MAXIM: 6c, 46e STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion
Case No. 237 G.R. No. L-46095 (November 23, 1977) Chapter X, Page 387, Footnote
No. 3

FACTS: On January 1963, Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted Fabar Incorporate
d a loan secured by joint signatures of Jose Barredo, Carmen and Tomas Borromeo
and Manuel Barredo. By May, 1977 the outstanding balance was over P8 million. PN
B filed a case against all 4 signatories. However, before the case was decided,
Ma nuel Barredo passed away. The case was dismissed pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 86
of the R ules of Court that the claim of PNB should be filed with the estate pr
oceedings of M. Barredo and cannot be brought against other surviving debtors. I
SSUE: W/N the Courts interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 86 prevents a creditor from
proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors is accurate. HELD: No. Art. 12
16 of the New Civil Code gives the creditor the right to proceed against anyone
of the solidary debtors, or some, or all . Thus, the choice is left up to PNB to
decide. Sec. 6 of Rule 86 simply provides the procedure if in case the cr edito
r desires to go against the deceased debtor. To require PNB to go against the es
ta te would deprive PNB of his substantive rights provided by Art. 1216. In this
case, the Rules of Court may not prevail over Art. 1216 because substantive law
cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Moreover, the 1987 Constitution states
that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish, increase of mod
ify substantive rights. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c

206 Ongsiako v. Gamboa Case No. 90 G.R. No. L-1867 (April 8, 1950) FACTS: In 194
6, Ongsiako (landowner) and Gamboa (tenant) entered into a contract pursuant of
Sec. 8 of Act 4054. This act provided that the palay would be divide d equally b
y the 2 parties. However, later that same year, Act 4054 was amended by RA 34. D
uring liquidation, Gamboa sought application of the amendatory law which provide
d for crop division on a 55-45 basis in favor of the tenants. Ongsiako in sists
that RA 34 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot be given retroactive e
ffect . Because of this, the original contract starting an equal sharing of prof
its shou ld be followed. ISSUE: W/N RA 34 is remedial in nature and should be gi
ven retroactive effect. HELD: Yes. In the past, laws concerning this issue have
been amended with the intent of being remedial and therefore, producing retroact
ive effect. Moreover, it is clearly shown in the recommendation of the President
concerning RA 34 that this b ill seeks to amend the Rice Share Tenancy Act in s
uch a way to make the division of the crops more equitable to the tenants The pr
incipal feature of this bill is to incr ease the participation of the tenants in
the production of the land he is cultivating . LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6b, 9a, 49 STAT
UTORY CONSTRUCTION Amandy v. People Case No. 7 G.R. No. 79010 (May 23, 1988) FAC
TS: Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1.6 grams of marijuana.
Because he pleaded guilty in his trial, he was given a sentence of six years and
1 day

(the minimum time for his offense). Petitioner then filed for probation alleging
P.D. 968. However, the petition was denied because P.D. 1990 had repealed P.D.
968, n o longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligible for probation
. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in disapproving Amandy s petition for probati
on. HELD: No. The law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and who are
n t. Petitioner does not fall under those entitled because those who have been s
entenced to serve a maximum term of more than six years are excluded from the be
nefits of the Probation Law. Because P.D. 1990 was promulgated after P.D. 968, t
he former prevails. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken as
it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 7b, 22a,
25a, 36a, 43, 49

207 Parras v. Land Registration Commission Case No. 197 G.R. No. L-16011 (July 2
6, 1960) Chapter X, Page 390, Footnote No. 16 FACTS: Petitioner was required by
the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) to remit to the Commissioner's office,
pursuant to Special Provisions of RA 2300, otherwi se known as the Appropriation
s Act for the current fiscal year, the sum of P57.00 a s estimated cost of publi
cation in the Official Gazette of the initial notice of t he hearing of the case
. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such insertion is uncon
stitutional being as it is revenue-raising. He prays that he be exempt from such
a deposit and that the LRC and the Director of Printing be ordered to publish t
h e notice in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner can be exempted. 2.
W/N the law states that persons will be made to pay for the publication. HELD:
Petitioner was made to pay. The law that petitioner relies on was Sec. 114 of Ac
t 496. The reenactment of the same law as RA 117 did not include the said provis
ion of Act 496. LATIN MAXIM: 11, 32, 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Diu v. Court of
Appeals Case No. 96 G.R. No. 115213 (December 19, 1995) Chapter X, Page 391, Foo
tnote No. 28 FACTS: On several occasions, private respondent Pagba purchased on
credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store all valued at P7,
862.55. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. Petitioners
brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman and the latter set the case for
hearing, but private respondents failed to appear. When the par ties

met, they failed to reach an amicable settlement. Private respondents in their A

nswer, while admitting indebtedness, interposed two counterclaims: (1) for P6,22
7.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and rep air of the boat belonging to pe
titioners, and (2) another for P12,0000.00 representi ng the cost of the two tir
es which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. ISSUE: W/N parties did not meet
in presence of a Pangkat as required by law. HELD: Petition was granted without
prejudice to the re-filing of the case by petitioners after due compliance with
the provisions of P.D. 1508, otherwise kno wn as the "Katarungang Pambarangay La
w". It must be noted that P.D. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the LGC
of 1991. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court be
f ore the effectivity of the LGC. Nevertheless, Sec. 4 and 6 of the former law h
ave been substantially reproduced in Sec. 410(b) and 412 respectively, of the la
tter law. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 5b, 9a, 36b

Government v. Springer Case No. 119 G.R. No. L-26979 (April 1, 1927) Chapter I,
Page 38, Footnote No. 166 FACTS: The National Coal Company elected its board of
directors via vote in accordance with its by-laws. However, the respondents are
stated as usurping and illegally occupying said positions since they were not el
ected by the proper shareholders. The National Coal Company was formed by the Ph
ilippine Government. The Government intended to retain a majority stake in the s
aid company; however, it ended up occupying almost 90% of the stock. During the
election of directors, th ree members of the government appeared, two from the l
egislative and one from the executive. ISSUE: W/N the executive is the sole admi
nistrator of the Philippine Government. HELD: Yes. Sec. 4 of Act No. 2705, as am
ended by Sec. 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the gov
ernment-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. L
ATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a, 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mecano v. Commission on Audi
t Case No. 176 G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992) Chapter X, Page 395, Footnote
No. 45 FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Aud
it (COA) embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under S
ec. 699 o f the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended. Petitioner is a D
irector II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He wa s hospitalized f
or cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7, 1990, on account of whi ch he incurre
d medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming
from the COA. However, the reimbursement process was stalled because of the iss
ue that the RAC Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner can claim from the COA. 2. W/N Sec. 699 of RAC was repe
aled by the Administrative Code of 1987. HELD: Petition was granted. The questio
n of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Se
c. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. The Court finds that that section although
not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely und
er implied repeal, and the Court consid ers such implied repeal as not favorable
. Also the Court finds that laws must be in accord with each other. The second s
entence of Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended b y P.D. 1921, expressly provi
des that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recover
y of benefits as provided for in Sec. 699 of the RAC whose benefits are administ
ered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of th e government. LATIN
MAXIM: 30a, 32, 37, 38b, 49

209 Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee v. Concepcion and Lee Voo Case No. 20 G.R. No. 3328
1 (March 31, 1930) FACTS: The accused, one Chan Sam, was acquitted of murder but
was ordered to be committed to an asylum. The court permitted accused to leave
the hospital two years later on the strength of doctor s reports. In issuing the
order of release t he respondent judge relied upon Art. 8, par. 4, of the Penal
Code. On the other han d, Sec. 1048 of the Administrative Code confers on the D
irector of Health the autho rity to say when a patient may be discharged from an
insane asylum. ISSUE: W/N the court which ordered the confinement of an insane
person in an asylum possesses the power to permit said insane person subsequentl
y to leave th e asylum without the approval of the Director of Health. HELD: It
is a well-known rule of statutory construction that when there is no express rep
eal, none is presumed to be intended. Likewise, when two portions of the law can
be construed so that both can stand together, this should be done. Art. 8 of th
e Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by Sec. 1048 of the Administrative
Code. The powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary with
each other. Thus, any person confined in any asylum by order of the court in ac
cordance with Art. 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody without
the acquiescence of the Director of Health. The converse proposition equ ally h
olds true. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ynchausti & Co v. Stanley
Case No. 174 G.R. No 12330 (January 25, 1917) FACTS: The petitioner, a company
engaged in the coastwise shipping business, sought to prohibit the Insular Colle
ctor of Customs from enforcing the requireme

nt, which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the off
icer s on each vessel. The petitioner relied upon the ground that Act No. 2614 w
as not and could not have been repealed by the Administrative Code; Act No. 2614
being specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels. ISSUE: W/N
there is a conflict between Act No. 2614 and paragraph (e) of Sec. 1312 of the A
dministrative Code. HELD: There is no express repeal of Act No. 2614. It is appa
rent that there was no specific intention to repeal the statute. The Philippine
Legislature could not h ave intended to repeal said Act within less than three w
eeks after its passage and substitute in its place absolutely nothing except the
uncontrolled judgment of t he Insular Collector of Customs. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c
, 49, 50

210 U.S. v. Tantoco Case No. 164 G.R. No. 11338 (August 15, 1916) FACTS: The def
endant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under his control
a certain amount of opium. The trial court dismissed the complaint o n the theo
ry that Act No. 2381 and all other laws had been repealed by the Act of the Unit
ed States Congress. The Government appealed. ISSUE: What the effect of said Act
was upon local legislation dealing with the subject of opium. HELD: That the Uni
ted States Congress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws dealing with
the subject of opium appears from the law itself. Whether or not an Act is impli
edly repealed is a question of legislative intent to be ascertained by a n exami
nation of both statutes, and in the light of the reason, purpose, and objec t of
both. The United States Congress never intended to relax the stringent provisio
n s relating to the smoking of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fabros, et al. v. Laya Case No. 44 G
. R. No. 70832 (December 18, 1987) FACTS: This is a consolidated case involving
the allocation of the incremental proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases o
f private schools provided for in Sec. 3(a) of P.D. 451, and thereafter, under t
he Education Act of 1982 (BP 232). Then Minister of Education Jaime C. Laya prom
ulgated the disputed MECS Order No. 25, entitled Rules and Regulations to Implem
ent the Provisions of BP 232, The Educat ion Act of 1982, relative to Student Fe
es for School Year 1985-1986. Petitioners pra yed for temporary restraining orde
r on the Rules and Regulations, which was granted to them. However, four schools
prayed for the lifting of the TRO on the ground that their

tuition fee increase has already been approved pursuant to P.D. 451, which the C
ourt thereby lifted. ISSUE: W/N BP 232 has repealed P.D. 451 which thereby makes
MECS Order No. 25 valid. HELD: Yes. Under P.D. 451, the authority to regulate t
he imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges by private schools is
lodged with the Secretary of Education and Culture, where Sec. 42 of BP 232 libe
ralized the procedure by empowering each private school to determine its rate of
tuition and other school fees or charges. P.D. 451 provides that 60% of the inc
remental proceeds of tuiti on fee increases shall be applied or used to augment
the salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other employees of the scho
ol; while BP 232 provides that the increment shall be applied or used in accorda
nce with the regulations promulgated by the MECS. Hence, there was a repeal. LAT
IN MAXIM: 4, 39b

211 Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano Case No. 127 G
.R. No. L-24022 (March 3, 1965) Chapter X, Page 399, Footnote No. 61 FACTS: Priv
ate respondent Feliciano, the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate impo
rtation of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pur
suant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its
Resolution No. 70, series of 1964. It was approved. The Presiden t designated th
e Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake
the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an invitation to
bid for said importation and set the bidding date. Petitioners con tend that the
importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importin
g rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. ISSUE:
W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452. HELD: The importation may be illegal on the
ground that such importation belong exclusively to private parties, thereby pro
hibiting any government agency from d oing so. RA 2207 provides that should ther
e be an existing or imminent shortage in th e local supply of rice of such gravi
ty as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the National
Economic Council, the President may authorize such importation thru any governme
nt agency that he may designate. The two laws, although with a common objective,
refer to different methods applicable to diffe rent circumstances. The two laws
can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of th e legislative expression o
f its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In orde r to effect a repeal by
implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably incons istent and repugn
ant to the prior existing law, hence there was no repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 39a
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Brias de Coya v. Tan Lua, et al. Case No. 16

G.R. No. 30756 (September 22, 1931) FACTS: Defendant-appellant Tan Lua was decla
red an insolvent in the Philippines while she was in China. At this, she appoint
ed her son to manage, sell and encum ber her properties situated in the Philippi
nes. A certain Vicente Nepomuceno was appointed assignee of the involuntary inso
lvency. Defendant-appellant executed a mortgage deed of a parcel of land to peti
tioner so as to secure a loan. The assi gnee filed his appointment for the purpo
se of transferring the property to him. ISSUE: W/N the mortgage given by respond
ent to petitioner was valid and legal considering the fact that the assignee rec
orded his appointment after the transf er has been made. HELD: The Insolvency La
w and the Land Registration Act compliment each other and are both intended to p
rotect the rights and interests of creditors, accordin g the latter a means for
securing their insolvent debtor's property, against which the y may enforce thei
r credits. Construing the Insolvency Law together with the Land Registration Act
, we reach the conclusion that in order that the assignment of t he insolvent de
btor's real property made by the clerk of the proper court to the as signee may
operate to vest in said assignee all of said estate from the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings, both such proceedings and the assignment must have been
recorded in the registry of deeds, the former from their commencement. Petition
er is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore the mortgage upon the land given t
o him by the latter, which was registered with a Torrens title, is legal and val
id. LATIN MAXIM: 38b, 39a

212 Villegas vs. Subido Case No. 314 G.R. No. L-31711, (September 30, 1971) Chap
ter X, Page 411, Footnote No.96 FACTS: The Secretary of Finance authorized Jose
R. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of
Assistant City Treasurer. In an Administrative Order, series of 1968, Petitioner
, Mayor of the City of Manila, d irected Gloria to desist and refrain from exerc
ising the duties and functions of the Ass istant City Treasurer, saying that Rom
ualdez is not empowered to make such designation. Petitioner, appointed Manuel D
. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer. Respondent, disapproved the appointment, ba
sing his action, on an opinion of the Secretary o f Justice, to the effect that
the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers i s still governed by Sec. 20
88a of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Sec. 4 of the Decentralizatio
n Law, RA 5185. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Law should govern. HELD: No. It
has been the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication are not
favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legis lature
so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908
decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it b
e shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject ma
tter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. A subsequent statute,
general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as
repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do
so is manifest. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9, 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jalandoni vs. Enday
a Case No. 137 G.R. No. L-23894, (January 24, 1974)

Chapter X, Footnote No. 62 FACTS: Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for

libel against a Serafin Cruz in t he Municipal Court of Batangas presided over
by the Respondent Judge. During the hearing of the libel case Cruz, through coun
sel manifested in open court that un der Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, (th
e court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the of fended parties actually resid
es at the time of the commission of the offense), Responde nt Judge was devoid o
f jurisdiction to do so. There was, as noted, a negative respo nse. Respondent s
till tried the case. ISSUE: W/N Municipal Court of Batangas has jurisdiction ove
r case at hand. HELD: No. As is clear from his well-written memorandum, he did b
ase his action on what for him was the consequence of the Judiciary Act as amend
ed by RA 3828, Sec. 87 of which would confer concurrent jurisdiction on municipa
l judges in the capital of provinces with court of first instance where the pena
lty provided for by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for
not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. Libel
is one of those offenses in cluded in such category. He would thus conclude tha
t as the amendatory act came into effect on June 22, 1963, the provisions of Art
. 360 as last amended by RA 1289 conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts of
first instance, was thus repealed by implication. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9, 49

213 CIR vs. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation. Case No. 79 G.R. Nos. 83583-84 S
eptember 30, 1991 Chapter X, Page 400, Footnote No.64 FACTS: Respondent Corporat
ion filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue two separate written claims
for refund in the amounts of P974,978.50 and P424,303.33 , respectively, represe
nting 25% of the specific taxes collected on the refined an d manufactured miner
al oils, motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utilized in its operations
as a mining concessionaire, using RA 1435 as basis. The Court of Tax Appeals dec
ided that Respondent Corporation can no longer claim this due to P.D. 231, 436 a
nd 711. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act No. 1435 (An Act To Provide Means of Increasing
the Highway Special Fund) or certain provisions thereof have been repealed by su
bsequent statutes. HELD: Yes. We find that the disputed proviso found in Sec. 5
of RA 1435 was drafted to favor a particular group of taxpayers-the miners and t
he lumbermen-because it was "unfair" to subject them to the increased rates and
in effect make them subs idize the construction of highways from which they did
not directly benefit. Given the present concept of the general fund and its wide
application, then the proviso i n Sec. 5 of RA 1435 has truly become an anachro
nism. It is inevitable that, sooner or later, the miners will stand to benefit f
rom any of the government endeavors and it will no longer be correct to assevera
te that the imposition of the increased rat es in specific taxes to augment the
general fund for government undertakings is "unfai r" to the miners because they
are not directly convenienced. While we generally do not favor repeal by implic
ation, it cannot be denied that situations can and do arise wherein we are left
with no other alternative b ut to concede the point that an earlier law has been
impliedly repealed or revoked by a later law because of an obvious inconsistenc
y. LATIN MAXIM:

49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Valdez v. Tuazon Case No. 111 G.R. No. L-14957 (March
16, 1920) Chapter X, Page 388, Footnote No. 9 FACTS: This is a petition for divo
rce filed by petitioner against his respondent wife. Act No. 2710 states that a
petition of divorce due to adultery or concubinage cannot be granted except upon
conviction. The respondent has never been convicted of the offense of adultery.
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce based on prevailing laws bef
ore the enactment of Act No. 2710. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 2710 should be applied in
the case. HELD: Act No. 2710 should be applied. Even if the said Act has no repe
aling clause, when there is a plain and unavoidable repugnancy between two laws,
the later mus t be given effect. Negative statutes are mandatory, and must be p
resumed to have been intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions. The sit
uation in this case does not require the application of any of the artificial ca
nons of interpretation, for the language of the statute is so plain that its mea
ning is unmistakable. LATIN MAXIM: 7a, 49

Estate of Mota v. Concepcion Case No. 42 G.R. No. L-34581 (March 31, 1932) FACTS
: In 1919, Lazaro Mota and Salvador Serra entered into a partnership to construc
t several kilometers of railroad in Occidental Negros. In 1920, Serra transferre
d his half interest to Concepcion and Whitaker. In December of the sam e year, M
ota also sold his half to the same purchaser. On the last sale, only part of the
price was paid, so Concepcion and Whitaker mortgaged to Mota the railroad. Mota
registered the contract as an unregistered real property. ISSUE: 1. W/N a mortg
age over an unregistered property is valid. 2. W/N enforcement of mortgage is fa
tal to right of rescission. HELD: 1. According to Standard Oil Co. vs. Castro, S
ec. 194 of the Administrative Code clearly recognizes the validity of such a con
tract between the contracting parties. 2. The election to enforce the contract o
f mortgage is fatal to the right of rescission. Serra foreclosed the mortgage gi
ven to him to secure the unpaid port ion of the selling price of the railway. LA
TIN MAXIM: 1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Torrente v. Grove Case No. 155 G.R. No. L-23
40 (December 21, 1905) FACTS: This case is an appeal from a habeas corpus procee
ding, discharging the petitioner from detention. It is alleged that the order of
arrest is illegal on its face in that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdict
ion to issue the order directing t he making of an arrest outside the Province o
f Cebu. It is contended that the arres t and detention of petitioner, were illeg
al and void. ISSUE: W/N the Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wh
erever he may be in the Philippines. HELD: Under the provision of Sec. 13 of G.O
. No. 58, a justice of the peace is vested

with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest, wherever he may be in the Phil
ippines. Due to contrary provisions, the general order has impliedly repealed t
he Spanish law. The contention of the petitioner that Act No. 59 is a proof that
the Civil Commi ssion deemed it necessary to make an express grant of such auth
ority and that they wer e of opinion that prior to the publication of the said l
aw the processes of the ju stices of the peace did not run throughout the provin
ce, much less the archipelago. The co urt however said that the opinion of the l
aw making authority as to the meaning and effect of the law does not determine w
hat the law actually is, it is entitled to respectful consideration, but it is n
ot conclusive on the courts. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 49

215 Pamil v. Teleron Case No. 195 G.R. No. L-34854 (November 20, 1978) Chapter I
, Page 33, Footnote No. 148 FACTS: Respondent Fr. Gonzaga was elected and procla
imed municipal mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. The petitioner, himself an aspirant
for the office, filed fo r Gonzaga s disqualification based on Sec. 2175 of the
Administrative Code which stated that in no case can ecclesiastics be elected to
a municipal office. ISSUE: W/N an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected. HELD:
The vote was indecisive. Seven believed Sec. 2175 was no longer operative. Five
believed that the prohibition was not tainted with any constitutional infir mit
y. Though the five were a minority, the votes of the seven were insufficient to
ren der the provision ineffective, hence it was presumed valid. Gonzaga was orde
red to vacat e the mayoralty. Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was sup
erseded by the 1935 Constitution, the supreme law, which mandated that no religi
ous test shall be required for the exercise of political rights. Sec. 2175 was a
lso repealed by th e Election Code for ecclesiastics are no longer included in t
he enumeration of ineligible persons. Also, legislation that intends to repeal a
ll former laws upo n the subject shows the legislative intent to repeal the form
er statutory law. Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there
must be such absolute repugnance between the two. No such repugnance is discerni
ble. Sec. 2175 has neither been repealed nor superseded. The section also admitt
ed no exception, therefore there can be none. The Court cannot rewrite the law u
nder t he guise of interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: Dissenting Seven: 9a, 30a, 32, 4
9 Minor Five: 6c, 7a, 7c, 37, 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Almuete Case N
o. 200 G.R. No. L-26551 (February 27, 1976)

Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote No. 61 FACTS: Almuete, et. al. were charged with
the violation of Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law (ATL). The accused, ten
ants of Fernando, allegedly pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests
without notifying her or obtaining her cons ent. The accused filed a motion to q
uash alleging that at the time of the supposed offens e, there was no longer any
law punishing the act. ISSUE: W/N pre-threshing was still a crime at the time t
he act was committed. HELD: Sec. 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural L
and Reform Code which was already in force at the time of the act. The ALRC susp
ended the ATL. It inst ituted the leasehold system and abolished the rice share
tenancy system. The prohibitio n against pre-threshing is premised on the existe
nce of the rice share tenancy sys tem and is the basis for penalizing clandestin
e pre-threshing. The evident purpose i s to prevent the tenant and the landholde
r from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. The legislative in
tent not to punish anymore the tenant s act of pre threshing is evident by not r
e-enacting Sec. 39 of the ATL. A subsequent statute , revising the whole subject
matter of a former statute operates to repeal the for mer statute. The repeal o
f a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with
a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 10, 47,
49

216 Smith Bell & Co. v. Municipality of Zamboanga Case No. 148 G.R. No. L-33318
(December 20, 1930) FACTS: Municipality of Zamboanga imposed upon the plaintiff
a license fee for its machine for the baling of hemp in accordance with Ordinanc
e No. 226. Plaintiff p aid the license fee under protest and contended that defe
ndant had no authority to impose such tax and that the ordinance in question is
null and void. The defenda nt argues that the latter has no power to levy the ta
x in question under Sec. 2625( d) of the Administrative Code but it does have su
ch power under a subsequent enactment of Act No. 3422. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 3422 r
epealed Sec. 2625(d) the Administrative Code. HELD: Repeals by implication are n
ot favored. If the legislature intended its repeal, it would have made specific
reference in the repealing clause as it did in expressl y repealing Sec. 2407 of
the Administrative Code. A general affirmative act will n ot be construed to re
peal a special or local statute unless the intention is manifest. LATIN MAXIM: 3
7, 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lechoco v. Civil Aeronautics Board Case No. 71 G.R.
No. L-32979-81 (February 29, 1972) FACTS: Petitioner contends that by the enact
ment of RA 2677 amending Sec. 13(a) and 14 of C.A. No. 146, jurisdiction to cont
rol rates of airships was taken away from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and
re-vested in the Public Service Commission (PSC) since RA 2677 impliedly repeale
d RA 776 which conferred to the CAB the power of control over air rates and fare
s. On the other hand, respondents argue that jurisdiction over air fares and rat
es were, under both statutes, exercisable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC. I
SSUE:

Whether the authority to fix air carrier s rates is vested in the CAB or in the
PS C. HELD: Authority to fix air carrier s rates is vested in both the CAB and t
he PSC. Under RA 776, the CAB can fix and determine reasonable individual, joint
or special ra tes charges or fares for air carriers but is subject to the maxim
um rates on freight s and passengers that may be set by the PSC under RA 2677. F
urthermore, implied repeal of statutes is not favored. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b

Villegas v. Enrile Case No. 171 G.R. No. L-29827 (March 31, 1973) FACTS: It is t
he contention of the petitioner that if Sec. 4 of the Decentralization Ac t be g
iven effect, then the authority to appoint a City Fiscal is not lodged in respon
dent Secretary of Justice but in him as Mayor of the City of Manila. The defense
of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity of the provi
sion of the Charter of the City of Manila, which negates the assumpt ion of auth
ority on the part of the petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Act implied
ly repealed the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila. HELD: No. The is
sue in this case was already decided in previous jurisprudence in the case of Vi
llegas v. Subido. Furthermore, petitioner ignored the provision that t he City F
iscal is not included in the enumeration made in the Decentralization Act. LATIN
MAXIM: 2a, 5a, 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villegas v. Subido Case No. 172 G.R. N
o. L-24012 & L-24040 (August 9, 1965) FACTS: The Commissioner of Civil Service c
laims that RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557and 409 providing for the removal an
d suspension of policemen. The City Mayor was ordered to cease from deciding adm
inistrative cases of officers and employee s in Manila and submit to the Commiss
ioner of Civil Service all pending disciplina ry cases. ISSUE W/N RA 2260 implie
dly repeal RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civ
il Service the exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove, suspend and separa
te policemen and employees of the City of Manila in the competitive service. HEL
D:

No. RA 2260 states that the removal and suspension by the City Mayor can be pass
ed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. It does not state that
the power of removal is conferred to the other body. RA 557 and 409 are special
laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the City of Man
i la, RA 557 and 409 subsists side-by-side with RA 2260 and are not impliedly re
pealed by the latter which is a general law. RA 2260 contemplates appeal from th
e decision of the City Mayor to the Commissioner of Civil Service, instead of to
the President . Repeal by implication is not favored and if two laws can be rec
onciled, the construction will be against such repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 38b, 50

218 U.S. v. Palacio Case No. 301 G.R. No. 11002 (January 17, 1916) Chapter X, Pa
ge 406, Footnote No. 77 FACTS: Respondent was accused of violating Sec. 87 of Ac
t No. 82 when he willfully omitted from the tax lists real property which he kno
ws to be lawfully taxable. He posits that Act No. 2238 repeals by implication Ac
t No. 82 because of the clause in Sec. 18 that states all acts or parts of Acts
in conflict therewith are repealed. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 2238 had repealed the pen
al effect of Act No. 82. HELD: No. Act No. 2238 had done nothing but to change t
he method and procedure provided in Act No. 82. Repeals by implication are not f
avored, unless it is manifest that such is the intention of the legislature. Act
No. 2238 provides no penalty thus, Sec. 87 of Act No. 82 continues in force. LA
TIN MAXIM: 9a, 38b STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Marin v. Nacianceno Case No. 171 G.R.
No. 5939 (March 29, 1911) Chapter X, Page 411, Footnote No. 100 FACTS: Felisa He
rnandez died before the testatrix, but the testatrix did not alter her will in r
espect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. The petitioners a re the s
urviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon Sec. 758 of the Code of Civil Pro
cedure which provides that When a devise or a legacy is made to a child and the
devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving issues such issue shall tak
e the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done unless a differe
nt disposition is required by law. The executor of the will opposes the payment
upon the ground that such legatee had no interest therein, having died before th
e tes tator so as to pass to the heirs.

ISSUE: W/N the heirs of Felisa Hernandez become the heir to her legacy after her
death even if the testator did not alter her will. HELD: Yes. The construction
by the respondent would repeal or annul the section absolutely. It is tantamount
to saying that the legislature enacted a law and repealed it at the same time.
If petitioners are not entitled to the payment of this legacy, then Sec. 758 wou
ld have no value and might as well have never been written which is an absurd in
terpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11

Velunta v. Chief, Philippine Constabulary Case No. 309 G.R. No. L-71855 (January
20, 1988) Chapter X, Page 412, Footnote No. 102 FACTS: Petitioner as patrolman
and member of the Integrated National police (INP) apprehended a motorcycle driv
er for violation of traffic rules. An altercation occurred which resulted in the
shooting and death of the driver Lozano. Anacorit a, the widow of Lozano then f
iled for a criminal case where it was found that there exists a prima facie evid
ence that petitioner, with deliberate intent and with intent to kill, shot Lozan
o during the performance of duty. Petitioner contends that General Cou rt Martia
l has no jurisdiction since P.D. 1850 was repealed by E.O. 1040 & 1012. ISSUE: W
/N the Court Martial has jurisdiction. HELD: Yes. It is specifically stated unde
r E.O. 1012 that it is only the operational supervision and direction over all u
nits of the INP that was transferred from the Constabulary to the city/municipal
government. Under E.O. 1040, it is the exerci se of administrative control and
supervision over units of the INP that was transferred to the President. The all
egation that P.D. 1850 has been expressly repealed by clea r and precise provisi
on of E.O. 1040 is inaccurate. Repeals by implication are not fav ored and will
not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators in manifested. LATIN MAX
IM: 9a, 20c, 27, 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pacis v. Averia Case No. 194 G.R. No.
L-22526 (November 29, 1966) Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105 FACTS: Petiti
oner, the Acting Collector of Customs, commenced a seizure and forfeiture procee
dings pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code referring to the incident wherein
sailors were wounded in a chase for boat loaded with untaxed cigarettes. On the
same day, Marges, the alleged boat owner, filed a Civil Case for replevin allegi
ng that the boat was stolen. The fishing boat therein was transfe

rred to the Provincial Sheriff, and later on to Marges as commanded by responden

t Hon. Averia. ISSUE: 3. W/N Marges could recover the fishing boat. 4. W/N Provi
ncial Sheriff may be held in contempt for failure to comply with the writ. HELD:
1. No. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in RA 1937
which took effect much later than the Judiciary Act. It is axiomatic that t he l
ater law prevails over the prior statute. 2. Yes. The writ was received by respo
ndent Sheriff. It has also caught the Supreme Court s notice that respondent she
riff has practically taken the cudge ls for the boat owner. He went beyond his o
fficial acts and proceeded to espouse th e cause of the boat owner giving impres
sion that his interest in the subject is mo re than just the interest of a publi
c official. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 20c, 49

Herman v. Radio Corporation of the Philippines Case No. 123 G.R. No. 26802 (July
15, 1927) Chapter X, Page 414, Footnote No. 107 FACTS: Two Philippine corporati
on attempting to develop the commercial radio business (Far Eastern Radio Inc. a
nd Radio Corp.) agreed to merge. The petitione r herein has been largely interes
ted in the respondent corporation, and in consideration of the cancelled contrac
t for his services to the respondent, it w as agreed in the contract of merger t
hat he should be offered the post of manager o f the traffic department. ISSUE:
W/N Herman s claim for salary has been expressly waived in the final agreement.
HELD: Yes. In Sec. 333 of the Code of Civil Procedures, it mentions that wheneve
r a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally or deliber
atel y led another to believe a particular thing is true and to act upon such be
lief, he ca nnot be permitted to falsify it. Sec. 1815 of the Civil Code also do
es not apply sinc e the transaction was more than a compromise. The Code of Civi
l Procedures must prevai l because it is a later expression of legislative will
than Art. 1815 of the Civil Code. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phi
lippine National Bank v. Cruz, et al. Case No. 239 G.R. No. 80593 (December 18,
1989) Chapter X, Page 414, Footnote No. 108 FACTS: Aggregate Mining Exponents (A
MEX) suffered huge financial losses and was unable to pay its remaining employee
s. Two years after, AMEX entered into an operation contract agreement with T.M.
San Andres Development Corporation, thus enabling the latter to acquire on lease
the equipment of AMEX. The unpaid workers filed for monetary compensation befor
e the Labor Arbiter. The said Arbiter awarded backwages and separation pay. AMEX
did not appeal but PNB, as mortgage-creditor, appealed and alleged that the wor
kers should be given

their unpaid wages only and not the termination pay. The NLRC denied the appeal
of PNB. Hence, this instant petition by the PNB on the grounds that Article 110
of the Labor Code does not create lien in favor of the workers for unpaid wages
upon th e properties of the employer. ISSUE: W/N Art. 110 of the Labor Code is t
o be construed as not favoring the unpaid workers because of the order of prefer
ence provided in Art. 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code. HELD: No. Art. 110 of the
Labor Code provides for worker preference in case of bankruptcy . It specificall
y states that In the event of bankruptcy of an employer s business, his workers
shall enjoy FIRST preference as regards to their unpaid wa ges, any provision of
law to the contrary not withstanding such unpaid wages shall be paid in FULL be
fore claims of the government and other creditors may be paid. LATIN MAXIM: 6a,
49

221 David v. Commission on Elections Case No. 85 G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997)
Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105 FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raise
d the question of when the barangay elections should be held and questions the C
OMELEC s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The C
OMELEC s basis is R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code which mandates barangay
elections every 3 years. Petitioner David contends that an earlier law, R.A. 66
79, should be the one foll owed. R.A. 6679 provides that barangay elections shou
ld be held every 5 years. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. 10,
Sec. 8 of the Constitution. ISSUE: 1. What the term of office of barangay offic
ials is. 2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution. HE
LD: 1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the
lat er legislative enactment prevails. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Paras
v. COMEL EC had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election shoul
d be when it stated that the next regular election involving the barangay office
is barely 7 months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997 . 2. No. Ar
t. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that, The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined b y law, s
hall be three years It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of of
f ice for barangay officials. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 20a, 49 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals Case No. 73 G.R. No. 95022
(March 23, 1992) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81 FACTS: This is a petiti
on to reverse the Decision ordering the refund of the GCL Retirement Plan repres
enting the withholding tax on income. RA 4917 exempted the GCL Retirement Plan,
including all the retirement

benefits given to officials and employees of private firms, from income tax. Soo
n after, P.D. 1959 was promulgated abolishing the exemption from withholding ta
x o f interest on bank deposits previously given by P.D. 1739 if the recipient o
f the interest is exempt from income taxation. The GCL Plan is one of those exem
pted from income tax under RA 4917. Petitioner contends that P.D. 1959 impliedly
repealed the provisions of RA 4917 and RA 1983, and that GCL Plan is subject to
the final withholding tax. ISSUE: W/N GCL Retirement Plan retains its tax exemp
tion after the promulgation of P.D. 1959. HELD: Yes. The deletion in P.D. 1959 o
f the provisions regarding tax exemption under the old law can t be deemed to be
applicable to the employees trusts. P.D. 1959 is a general law, hence, it can t
repeal a specific provision impliedly. It is known in statutory construction th
at a subsequent statute that is general in character can t be construed as repea
ling a special or specific enactment unless there is a legislative manifestation
of such effect. Also in Villegas v. Subido, such rule is upheld even if the pro
visions of the latter legislation are sufficiently compreh ensive to include wha
t was set forth in the special act. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 5a, 43, 50

222 People v. Leachon, Jr. Case No. 108 G.R. No. 108725-26 (September 25, 1998)
FACTS: The Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate inform
ation for violation of P.D. 772, also known as Anti-Squatting Law before t he RT
C presided over by respondent judge. After presenting the evidence, the prosecut
io n rested the cases. Almost a year after the prosecution has rested, responden
t judge issued an order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Thereafter, the CA ordered the continuation of trial of the sub
ject case. A mont h after, the respondent judge dismissed the case again, opinin
g that P.D. 772 is obsolete and deemed repealed by Sec. 9 and 10 of Art. 13 of t
he 1987 Constitutio n, which provide that, urban or rural poor dwellers shall no
t be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in
a just and humane manner. ISSUE: W/N responded judge acted in grave abuse of di
scretion in dismissing the subject criminal case. HELD: Yes. The Anti-Squatting
law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. Unless otherwise repealed by a
subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this cour t, a law will always be
presumed valid. At the time the order was issued by respond ent judge, P.D. 772
was still effective. Neither has this court declared its unconstitutionality, n
otwithstanding the social justice provision of the Constit ution. LATIN MAXIM: 3
7, 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Airlines Inc. v. National Labor Relation
s Commission Case No. 118 G.R. No. 114307 (July 8, 1998) FACTS: Private responde
nt Edilberto Castro was hired as manifesting clerk by petitioner PAL. Respondent
was apprehended by government authorities while about to board a

flight en route to Hongkong in violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular 265, as a

mended by CB Circular 383, in relation to Sec. 34 of RA 265, as amended. PAL pl
aced Castro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. Three years and six m
onths after his suspension, PAL issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of
the offense charged but nonetheless reinstated the latter. The said resolution
likew ise required respondent to affix his signature therein to signify his full
conformity to the action taken by PAL. Upon his reinstatement, respondent filed
a claim against PAL for backwages and salary increases granted under the collec
tive bargaining agreement (CBA) coverin g the period of his suspension. ISSUE: W
/N Castro is entitled to backwages and salary increases granted under the CBA du
ring his period of suspension. HELD: Yes. The rules clearly provide that a preve
ntive suspension shall not exceed a maximum period of 30 days, after which perio
d, the employee must be reinstated t o his former position. If the suspension is
otherwise extended, the employee shall be entitled to his salaries and other be
nefits that may accrue to him during the period of such suspension. LATIN MAXIM:
7a, 13b

Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc. C
ase No. 127 G.R. No. 45355 (January 12, 1990) FACTS: Respondent CEPALCO was gran
ted a franchise under RA 3247, 3570, and 6020 to install, operate and maintain a
n electric light, heat and power system i n Cagayan de Oro City and its suburbs
including the municipalities of Tagoloan, Op ol, Villanueva, and Jasaan. The fra
nchise of CEPALCO expressly exempts it from payment of all taxes of whatever aut
hority except 3% tax on its gross earnings. The Provincial treasurer of Misamis
Oriental, however, demanded payment of the provincial franchise tax from CEPALCO
in accordance with the Local Tax Code (P.D. 231) and pursuant thereto, the Prov
incial Revenue Ordinance No. 19. ISSUE: W/N CEPALCO is exempt from paying the pr
ovincial franchise tax. HELD: No. No provision in P.D. 231 expressly or impliedl
y amends or repeals RA 3247, 3570 and 6020. A special and local statute applicab
le to a particular case is no t repealed by a later statute which is general in
its terms, provisions and applic ation even if the terms of the general act are
broad enough to include cases in the sp ecial law unless there is manifest inten
t to repeal or alter the special law. Also, th e Secretary of Finance made it cl
ear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax Code may only be imposed on
companies with franchise that do not contain exempting clause. LATIN MAXIM: 2a,
50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Joya v. Lantin Case No. 31 G.R. No. L-24037 (April
27, 1967) FACTS: Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile fro
m Cebu Company Ernerose Commercial. However, the Bureau of Customs discovered th
at the goods to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. Cus
tom s took custody of the shipment. Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance for Customs to release the goods. Francindy insisted th
at the CFI had jurisdiction o n the basis of the Judiciary Act and not the Burea
u of Customs. RA 1937 and 1125,

on the other hand, vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proce
edi ngs to the Bureau of Customs. ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the shipment.
HELD: The Bureau of Customs does. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws, whereas th
e Judiciary Act is a general law. In case of conflict, special laws prevail over
g eneral ones. LATIN MAXIM: 50

224 Arayata v. Joya Case No. 9 G.R. No. L-28067 (March 10, 1928) FACTS: Cecilio
Joya was leasing six friar lots, and he started paying the Government for such.
Because the number of lands he can hold is limited, he conveyed some o f the lot
s to respondent F. Joya as administrator. Cecilio died before fully paying the G
overnment for the lands. His widow, herein petitioner, was ruled to own only one
-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision on conjugal property. The cou
rt then sought to deliver the property to Florentino for liquidation and distrib
ution. Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120, Sec. 16, the widow receives all d
eeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the law. ISSUE:
Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act 1120 s fu
ll conveyance of the property to the widow. HELD: Act 1120 prevails. It lays dow
n provisions regarding acquisition, disposition, and transmission of friar lands
, which are contrary to the Civil Code. The Civil Code is a general law, while A
ct 1120 is a special law. The special law must prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 50 STATUTOR
Y CONSTRUCTION Sitchon, et al. v. Aquino Case No. 147 G.R. No. L-8500 (February
27, 1956) FACTS: Respondent Aquino, the City Engineer of Manila, demolished the
houses of the six petitioners in this class suit, because their houses were publ
ic nuisance s built on public streets and river beds. Petitioners contend that u
nder the Civil Code, Art. 701 and 702, it is the distr ict health officer who sh
ould remove public nuisances. Respondent, on the other hand ,

argues that RA 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, grants the power
to remove public nuisances to the City Engineer. ISSUE: Whose job it is to deter
mine and demolish public nuisances, the health officer under the Civil Code or t
he city engineer under RA 409. HELD: The City Engineer, under RA 409, has jurisd
iction. The Civil Code is a general law applicable throughout the Philippines, w
hereas RA 409 is a special law that pertains solely to the City of Manila. When
a general and a special law are in c onflict, the latter prevails. LATIN MAXIM:
50

225 Bellis v. Bellis Case No. 14 G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967) FACTS: Amos Bel
lis, a citizen of Texas USA, died. He had 7 legitimate and 3 illegimate children
, all surnamed Bellis. After the execution of the decedent s will, which w as ex
ecuted in the Philippines where the properties involved were situated, the exe c
utor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the t
estat or s 7 legitimate children. Herein appellants filed their respective oppos
itions on the ground that the partition deprived of their legitimes as illegitim
ate children. Relying on Art. 16 of the New Civil Code which provides that the n
ational law of the decedent shoul d apply (Texas Law), which did not provide for
legitimes, the CFI of Manila denied such oppositions. ISSUE: Whether Texas Law
or the Philippine Law must apply in intestate and testamentary succession. HELD:
Texas Law should apply. Art. 16, par 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary succes
sions. It must have been the purpose of the Congress to make Art. 16, par. 2 a s
pecific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succ
ession. As further indication of this intent, Art. 1039 provides that the capaci
ty to su cceed is governed by the national of the decedent. It is thus evident t
hat Congress has n ot intended to extend our system of legitimes to the successi
on of foreign national s. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine
Trust Co. v. Macuan Case No. 123 G.R. No. 32280 (March 24, 1930) FACTS:

Defendant Macuan married F. Tormo, who became mentally incapacitated. Defendant

filed a petition to the Court asking that he be appointed guardian of the person
and estate of his wife, the latter consisting in undivided half in a cert ain l
and with improvements, which is claimed to be conjugal property. Subsequently, M
. Tormo, et. al., filed a motion, which was later granted by the Court, praying
th at the guardian be instructed to file a complete inventory of all the propert
y belongin g to his ward. A special guardian, Philippine Trust Co., was appointe
d for the recove ry of the ownership and possession of the property herein invol
ved. ISSUE: 1. W/N a married woman judicially declared mentally incapacitated is
entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is conjugal. 2.
W/N the defendant may be compelled to include in the inventory of his mentally
incapacitated wife s property, her undivided half of the conjugal propert y. HEL
D: 1. No. She is not entitled to include half of the legal conjugal partnership,
which still subsists, in the inventory of her property. 2. The defendant, being
the guardian, cannot be compelled to include in the inventory of the same, said
half of the conjugal property. The Court relied on 1 ) the Code of Civil Proced
ure, which is general in character; and 2) the Civil Code, w hich is more specif
ic, referring to the management of the property of a demented ward who is marrie
d. Thus, Civil Code takes precedence over the Code of Civil Procedu re. LATIN MA
XIM: 50

Tan Liao v. American President Lines, Ltd. Case No. 153 G.R. No. L-7280 (January
20, 1956) FACTS: This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tan Liao for th
e recovery of P92,755.00, with interest from the damages allegedly suffered by p
laintiff due t o the wrongful and unauthorized delay and careless handling in th
e transportation of a cargo of eggs undertaken by defendant for plaintiff from t
he port of New York, U SA to the port of Manila. The suit was brought more than
a year from the receipt of the goods, and thereby, claimed by the defendant to h
ave already prescribed in accordance with the prescription given by the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act. ISSUE: W/N the action for damages had already prescribed,
and thus, barred the appellant to receive compensation for damages. HELD: Yes, i
t has already prescribed. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that loss or
damage suit must be brought within one year after the delivery of t he goods. R
elying on the ruling in previous cases, the Court held that the prescrip tive pe
riod of 1 year established by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act modified pro ta n
to the provisions of Act No. 190 as to goods transported in foreign trade, the f
orm er being a special act while the latter is a law of general application. LAT
IN MAXIM: 5a, 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Cour
t of Tax Appeal Case No. 75 G.R. No. 44007 (March 20, 1991) Chapter X, Page 415,
Footnote No. 115 FACTS: Private respondent, a British-owned foreign corporation
was granted a legislative franchise, pursuant to RA 808, which included a tax e
xemption from t he payment of all taxes except a franchise tax of 5% on the gros
s earnings and tax on its real property. The CIR assessed the corporation in the
amount of 7M pesos representing deficiency income tax maintaining that the fran
chise was inoperativ e

for failure to comply with Sec. 8, Art. 14 of the 1935 Constitution which limits
the grant of franchise to Filipino-owned corporations. The Court of Tax Appeals
rendered t he franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitioner s assessmen
t without effect having been made beyond the prescribed period stipulated in the
Tax Code. ISSUE: W/N the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of on
ly 5% of the gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is unenforceable and wi
thout legal e ffect, for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with th
e 1935 Constitution, the Corporation Law and the Public Service Act. HELD: No. T
he legislative franchise was valid. As a charter is ate contract, the imposition
of another franchise tax on the l authority would constitute an impairment of t
he contract and the corporation. RA 808 as a special statute must be the general
laws as it was meant to meet particular sets circumstances. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 50
in the nature of a priv corporation by the loca between the government deemed a
n exemption to of conditions and

227 NPVC v. Presiding Judge RTC Br. XXV Case No. 87 G.R. No. 72477 (October 16,
1990) FACTS: The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the Regiona
l Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collect
ion of real property tax covering the period 1978 to 1984. Petitioner contends t
hat the court has no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper fo
rum for the ad judication of the case pursuant to P.D. 242 which provides that d
isputes between agencies o f the government including GOCC s shall be administra
tively settled or adjudicated b y the Secretary of Justice. On the other hand re
spondent invokes P.D. 464 which governs the appraisal and assessment of real pro
perty for purposes of taxation b y provinces, cities and municipalities thereby
justifying its position in favor of the concerned municipal corporations. ISSUE:
W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction over the civil action. HELD: Yes. P.D
. 242 must yield to P.D. 464 on the matter of which tribunal or agency has juris
diction over the enforcement and collection of real property taxes. gra nted tha
t the latter is a special law dealing specifically with real property taxes w he
reas P.D. 242 is a general law that deals with a broad coverage concerning admin
istra tive settlement of disputes, claims and controversies between or among gov
ernment agencies and instrumentalities. Special laws ought to be upheld and cons
trued as exceptions to the general law in the absence of special circumstances c
alling fo r a contrary conclusion LATIN MAXIM: 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez,
Jr. v. Civil Service Commission Case No. 150 G.R. No. 87119 (April 16, 1991) Cha
pter X, Page 415, Footnote No. 116

FACTS: The Vice-mayor of Manila submitted to the Civil Service Commission the ap
pointment of 19 officers in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding O
fficer pursuant to the provisions of RA 409. However, the City Budget of Manila
questio ned whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may be paid out
of city fun ds on the basis of the appointments signed by the Vice Mayor. The C
ity Legal Office r then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer i
s the City Mayor an d not the City Council. ISSUE: W/N the Charter of the City o
f Manila has been repealed by RA 5185 giving mayors the power to appoint all off
icials entirely paid out by city funds and BP 337 empowering local executives to
appoint all officers and employees of the city. HELD: No. Regardless of their d
ate of passage, a special law (RA 409) providing specifically for the organizati
on of the Government of the City of Manila prevai ls over a general law. RA 5185
and BP 337 as general laws were not meant to deprive the City Council of Manila
of its appointing power. Also, since repeals by implicati on are not favored, c
onflict between the statutes should be very clear to favor the assumption that t
he latter in time repeals the other. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38b, 50

228 Manzano v. Valera Case No. 80 G.R. No. 122068 (July 8, 1998) FACTS: A crimin
al complaint for libel was filed in the sala of herein petitioner, who initially
recognized that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the cas e therea
fter forwarding the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Ho wever
, the latter opined that the MTC should take cognizance of the case based on Rep
ublic Act 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of Metropolitan, Municipal Tri al
, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to hear and decide criminal cases where the
penalty does not exceed 6 years. Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon
the respondent s acceptance of the case for the MTC s lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged. ISSUE: W/N the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over complai
nts for libel. HELD: No. The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are l
odged with the Co urts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). Although R
A 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trial Courts
by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, the said law is of general
character and doe s not alter the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC, which i
s a law of special nature. Gran ted that there seems to be no manifest intent to
repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libe l cases from the provisions of R.A. 76
91it must be maintained that a special law cannot be repealed, amended or altere
d by a subsequent general law by mere implication. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38, 50 STATU
TORY CONSTRUCTION Garcia v. Pascual, et al. Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-16950 (Decem
ber 22, 1961) Chapter VI, Page 277, Footnote No. 118 FACTS:

Petitioner, a junior typist civil service eligible, was appointed by the Justice
of Peace as clerk of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. When vouchers w
ere submitted to the mayor, he did not want to approve them. His reason was RA 1
551 has repealed Sec. 75 of RA 926, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act. Sec. 7
5 of the Judiciary Act provides that justices of peace may have clerks of court
at the expense of the municipalities and shall be appointed by respective justic
es. RA 1551 however, which is claimed to have repealed Sec. 75 of RA 296 provide
s that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the mun
icipalities shall be appointed by the mayor. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 75 of RA 926 has be
en repealed by RA 1551. HELD: The judge ruled that said RA 1551 did not expressl
y repeal Sec. 75 of the Judiciary Act and that the two laws may be reconciled fo
llowing the principle of law that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a
subsequent general law. Also, there being no specific grant of authority in favo
r of the mayor to appoint the clerk of court, the power to appoint should not be
considered lodged in the said mayor. Lastly, the intent of the law in placing t
he appointment of the clerks in the ju stice of the peace is to prevent the impo
rtunities and pressure of prejudicial politics. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9a, 32, 36d, 50
, b2

229 Lagman v. City of Manila, et al. Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-23305 (June 30, 196
6) Chapter X, Page 420, Footnote No. 126 FACTS: Petitioner operates 15 auto truc
ks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers a
nd freight. The Municipal of Manila repealed RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. 49
86, entitled An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City
of Manila, and For Other Purposes. ISSUE: W/N the enactment and enforcement of
Ordinance No. 4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.
HELD: No. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. No. 548 and
the Public Service Law, so that even if conflict exists between the provisions o
f th e former act and the latter acts, RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwea
lth Acts. Moreover, the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commissi
on were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governme
nts over motor traffic. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 11a, 49, 50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Baga
tsing v. Ramirez Case No. 28 G.R. No. L-41631 (December 17, 1976) Chapter VI, Pa
ge 268, Footnote No. 83 FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance N
o. 7522, An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing
Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof an
d for other Purposes. Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the
Ordinance for the reason that a) the publication requirement under the Revised C
harter of the City of Manila has not been complied with, b) the Market Committee
was not given any participation in the enactment, c) Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graf
t and Corrupt Pract

ices Act has been violated, and d) the ordinance would violate P.D. 7 prescribin
g the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products. ISSUE: Wh
at law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Bo
ard of Manila, the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code. HELD: The fact th
at one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that
the special law is to be considered an exception to the general . The Revised C
harter of Manila speaks of ordinance in general whereas the Local Tax Code relat
es to ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges particular. In
regard therefore, the Local Tax Code controls. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 11a, 17, 40
b, 49, 50
in

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 230 Latin Maxims Chapter II CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATI

ON
Chapter IV ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL INTERPRE
TATION B. POWER TO CONSTRUE 6. Index animi sermo est. 1. Legis interpretation le
gis vim obtinet. Speech is the index of intention. Judicial construction and int
erpretation of a statute acquires the force of law. Animus hominis est anima scr
ipti. The intention of the party is the soul. Chapter III AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of the statute there should be no
departure. C. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION Maledicta et exposition quae corrumpit
textum. It is bad construction which corrupts the text. 2. Contemporanea exposit
ion est optima et fortissimo in lege. Littera scripta manet. Contemporary constr
uction is strongest in law. The written word endures. Optima est legum interpres
consuetudo. Clausula rebus sic stantibus. Custom is the best interpreter of a s
tatute. Things thus standing. Regula pro lege, si deficit lex. In default of the
law, the maxim rules. 7. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent.

When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required. 3. Optimus in

terpres rerum usus. Dura lex sed lex. The best interpreter of the law is usage.
The law may be harsh but it is the law. Communis error facit jus. Hoc quidem per
quam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est. Common error sometimes passes as curren
t law. It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written. Quod ab initio non val
et in tractu temporis non convalescit. That which was originally void, does not
by lapse of time become valid. B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION 4. Ratih
abitio mandato aequiparatur. 8. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. Legislative
ratification is equivalent to a mandate. Equity never acts in contravention of t
he law. Aequum et bonum est lex legume. 5. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. W
hat is good and equal is the law of laws. Follow past precedents and do not dist
urb what has been settled. Jus ars boni et aequi. Interest republicae ut sit fin
is litium. Law is the art of equity. The interest of the state demands that ther
e be an end to litigation. 9. Ratio legis est anima legis. The reason of the law
is the soul of the law.

231 Littera necat spiritus vivificate. The letter kills but the spirit gives lif
e. Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservice. Words ought to be more subs
ervient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. Benignus leges interpret
andae sunt, quod voluntas eraum conservetur. Laws are to be construed liberally,
so that their spirit and reason be preserved . Qui haret in littera haret in co
rtice. He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep in
to its meaning. Quando verba statute sunt speciali, ratio autem generalia, statu
m generaliter est intelligendum. When the words used in a statute are special, b
ut the purpose of the law is general, it should be read as the general expressio
n. 10. Cessante rationi legis, cessat et ipsa lex. When the reason of the law ce
ases, the law itself ceases. 11. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda e
st ut evitetur inconveniens e t absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, the interpre
tation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted. Le
gis construction non facit injuriam. The construction of the law will not be suc
h as to work injury or injustice. Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in l
ege. An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law. Verba nihil operar
i melius est quam absurde. It is better that words should have no operation at a
ll than that they should operate absurdly. Lex simper intendit quod convenit rat
ioni. The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason. Ubi eadem
ratio ibi idem jus. Like reason doth make like law. Argumentum a simili valet in
lege. An argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law. De si
milibus idem est judicium. Concerning similars, the judgment is the same. STATUT
ORY CONSTRUCTION Ubi eadem est ratio, ibi est eadem legis disposition. Where the
re is the same reason, there is the same law 12. Ea est accipienda interpretatio
n quae vitio caret. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil
or injustice.

Lex injusta non est lex. An unjust law is not a law. 13. Fiat justitia, ruat coe
lum . Let right be done, though the heavens fall. Nemo est supra legis. Nobody i
s above the law. Nulla potential supra legis esse debet. No power must be above
the law. 14. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria
fieri locupletiorem. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a st
ranger should reap the pecuniary produce of another man s work. 15. Surplusagium
non nocet. Surplusage does not vitiate a statute. Utile per inutile non vitiatu
r. The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. ) 16. Falsa demostratio non noc
et, cum de corpore constat. False description does not preclude construction nor
vitiate the meaning of the statute. Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel
persona constat. Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the
description is sufficiently clear. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. That is
sufficiently certain which can be made certain. 17. Ibi quid generaliter concedi
tur, inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit co ntras jus basque. Where anythin
g is granted generally, exemption from rigid application of law is implied; that
nothing shall be contrary to law and right.

232 18. Summum jus, summa injuria. The rigor of the law would be the highest inj
ustice. Jus summum saepe, summa est militia. Extreme law is often extreme wrong.
19. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. The law obliges no one to perform an impossib
ility. Impossibilum nulla obigatio est. There is no obligation to do an impossib
le thing. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The law does not require an impossibili
ty. Lex non intendit aliquid impossible. The law does not intend the impossible.
C. IMPLICATIONS 20. Ex necessitate legis. By the necessary implication of law.
In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus. The greater includes the lesser. Cui
jurisdiction data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdictio
n explicari non potuit. When jurisdiction is given, all powers and means essenti
al to its exercise are also given. 21. Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is a r
ight, there is a remedy for violation thereof. Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum.
Where the law is uncertain, there is no right. 22. Ex dolo malo non oritur acti
on. An action does not arise from fraud. Nullius commodum capere potest de injur
ia sua propria. No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act. In pari d
elicto potior est condition defendentis. Where the parties are equally at fault,
the position of the defending party is the better one. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 2
3. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum. What cannot
, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Chapter V INTERPRETATION O
F WORDS AND PHRASES A. IN GENERAL 24. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intellige
nda. General words should be understood in their general sense. Generis dictum g
eneraliter est interpretandum.

A general statement is understood in its general sense. 25. Verba accipienda sun
t secundum subjectam materiam. A word is to be understood in the context in whic
h it is used. Verba mere aequivoca, si per communem usum loquendi in intellectu
certo sumuntur, talis intellectus preferendus est. Equivocal words or those with
double meaning are to be understood according to their common and ordinary sens
e. Verba artis ex arte. Words of art should be explained from their usage in the
art to which they belong. Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel
personam. General words should be confined according to the subject-matter or pe
rsons to which they relate. 26. Ubi lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemu
s. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. 27. Di
ssimilum dissimilis est ratio. Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar. B.
ASSOCIATED WORDS 28. Noscitur a sociis. A thing is known by its associates. 29.
Ejesdem generis. Of the same kind or specie.

233 30. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The express mention of one perso
n, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Expressum facit ces
sare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. 31. Argume
ntum a contrario. Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to t
hat which is implied. 32. Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, obje
ct or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intent
ionally. 33. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential. A q
ualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antece
dent. 34. Reddendo singular singulis. Referring each to each, or referring each
phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper
place. C. PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 35. Exceptio firmat regulam i
n casibus non exceptis. A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming wi
thin the purview of the general rule. STATUTE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE IN RELATION
TO OTHER STATUTES Chapter VI A. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 36. Optima statute
interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. The best interpreter of the statute is the st
atute itself. Ex tota materia emergat resolution. The exposition of a statute sh
ould be made from all its parts put together. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Injustum es
t, nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita indicare vel
respondere. It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a
law without examining the whole of the law. Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intel
ligere possit antequam totum interum atque interim perlegit. The sense and meani
ng of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole and no
t of one part only by itself. Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fit optima in
terpretation. A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which prec
edes and follows it. Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad priora quae
certitudine indigent sunt referenda. Reference should be made to a subsequent se
ction in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is doubtful.

37. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be in
terpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. B. STATUTE CONSTRU
ED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES 38. Pari materia. Of the same
matter. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus
. Every statute myst be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to fo
rm a uniform system of law. 39. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura. Distingui
sh times and you will harmonize law. -Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in illi
s. -Times have changed and laws have changed with them. Mutatis mutandis. With t
he necessary changes.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 234 Chapter VII L STATUTES STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

Chapter VIII MANDATORY AND DIRECTIONA
A. IN GENERAL A. MANDATORY STATUTES 40. Salus populi est suprema lex. 45. Vigila
ntibus et non dormientibus jura subv eniunt. The voice of the people is the supr
eme law. The law aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Statu
ta pro publico commodo late interpretantur. Potior est in tempore, potior e st i
n jure. Statutes enacted for the publc good are to be construed liberally. He wh
o is fir st in time is preferred in right. Privatum incommodum publico bono pens
atur. The private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation
of Ch apter IX PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES the public. A. IN GENERAL B
. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED 46. Lex prospicit, non respicit. 41. Actus non fac
it reum nisi mens sit rea. The law looks forward, not backward. The act does not
make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. Lex de fut uro, judex de p
raeterito. Actus me invito facturs non est meus actus. The law provides for the
future, the judge for the past. An act done by me against my will is not my act.
-Nova constitutio futuris forma m imponere debet non praeteritis. -A new statut
e should affect the future, not the past. 42. Privilegia recipiunt largam interp
retationem voluntate consonem concedentis. Leges quae retrospciunt, et magna cum
cautione sunt adhibendae neque Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance w
ith the will of him who grants e nim janus locatur in legibus. them. Laws which
are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received, for Janus has Renunciatio
non praesumitur. really no place in the laws. Renunciation cannot be presumed. L
eges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis, non ad facta pra
eterita revocari, nisi nominatim et de praeterito tempore et adhuc 43. Strictiss
imi juris. pendentibus negotiis cautum sit. Follow the law strictly. Laws should
be construed as prospective, not retrospect ive, unless they are expressly made
applicable to past transactions and to such as are still 44. Nullum tempus occu
rit regi. pending. There can be no legal right as against the authority that mak
es the law on which the right depends. B. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT 47.
Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege.

There is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law. 48. Favo
rabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. Penal laws which are favorable to t
he accused are given retroactive effect.

235 Chapter X AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL

A. REPEAL 49. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. Later statutes repe
al prior ones which are repugnant thereto. 50. Generalia specialibus non derogan
t. A general law does not nullify a specific or special law. BINDING FORCE OF RU
LES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION A. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Igno
rance of the law excuses no one. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE WHEN AMBIGUOUS B. In obscur
is inspici solere quod versimilius est, aut quod plerumque fieri solet. When mat
ters are obscure, it is customary to take what appears to be more likely or what
usually often happens. Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditu
r. A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence. PRESUMPTION AG
AINST INJUSTICE AND HARDSHIP C. Ad ea quae frequentibus accidunt jura adaptatur.
Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which most frequently occur. J
us constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non quae ex inordinato. La
ws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently, and
not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence. Quod semel aut bis exi
stit praetereunt legislatores. Legislators pass over what happens only once or t
wice. De minimis non curat lex. The law does not concern itself with trifling ma
tters. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TITLE OF THE ACT (INTRINSIC AID) D. Nigrum Nunquam
Excedere Debet Rubrum. The black (body of the act printed in black) should neve
r go beyond the red (title or rubric of the statute printed in red).