IX.

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920]
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the
petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to
prove the determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such
physical examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her
constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or not requiring a pregnancy test would be a violation of the petitioners
constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty,
that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to
a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
PEOPLE VS. YATAR (2004)
FACTS: On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmothers (Isabel Dawangs) house
where she was raped. When subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA
comprising the sperm specimen is identical to Yatars genotype. Yatar was accused of the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the same by the Regional Trial Court
of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court in order to
assail the court a quos decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving
much weight to the evidence DNA testing oranalysis done on him, in lieu of the seminal fluid
foundinside the victims (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample taken from is violative of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on
prohibition against ex-post facto laws.
MAIN ISSUE
Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as
evidence for Yatarsconviction?
HELD
Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004, which was three (3) years before the Rules
on DNA evidence took effect. The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of
Daubert vs. Merrell Dow as a precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used, so long as the same is RELEVANT
and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then as the DAUBERT TEST.
RULE: At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the legal basis. Sec. 7 of
the Rules on DNA evidence, which took effect on 2007, provides for the factors to beconsidered in
assessing the probative weight or value to be given on evidence derived or generated from DNA
testing. Such factors, are, to wit:
(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were
handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;
(b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the
advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid
standards in conducting the tests;
(c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting
institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not
accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be
properly established; and
(d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided
APPLICATION DAUBERT TEST:

The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the probative value of the DNA test result
yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood sample from that of the semen specimen obtained from
the cadavers vaginal canal. Accordingly, it held that the DNA evidence is both reliable and
relevant. In ascertaining the relevance of the evidence in a case, it must be determined whether
or not the same directly relates to a fact in issue, as to induce belief in its existence or
nonexistence. In this case, the evidence is relevant in determining the perpetrator of the crime; In
giving probative value on the DNA testing result, yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood sample
from that of the biological sample (semen) obtained from the victims vaginal canal, the trial court
considered the qualification of the DNA analyst, the facility or laboratory inwhich the DNA testing
had beenperformed, and the methodology usedin performing the DNA test. In the saidcase, the
DNA test was done at the UPNational Science Research Institute (NSRI). The method used was
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis,
which enables a tiny amount of DNA sequence to be replicated exponentially in a span of few
hours. Hence, sufficient DNA analysis may be made easier even with small DNA samples at hand.
The analyst who performed the procedure was Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria, who is a duly
qualified expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.
CONCLUSION:
Hence, apart from the other sets of circumstantial evidence correctly appreciated by the trial
court, the said DNA evidence is sufficient to be admitted as evidence to warrant the accusedappellants conviction of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
In the Matter for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio vs Hon. Sen. Richard Gordon
G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006
Facts: Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate
Res. No. 455) directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. The Senate invited
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) Chairman Camilo L. Sabio to be the resource
person in a public meeting that would deliberate on the issues presented in Senate Res. No. 455.
Chairman Sabio, however, declined the invitation, invoking Section 4, paragraph (b) of Executive
Order No. 1, which provides: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance. Senator Richard J. Gordon issued a subpoena ad testificandum,
requiring Chairman Sabio and the four PCGG Commissioners to appear in the public hearing
scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in
Senate Res. No. 455. Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. Another notice was sent to
Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter set on September
6, 2006, but Chairman Sabio still did not comply. Eventually, Chairman Sabio and the PCGG
Commissioners were arrested for contempt of the Senate and brought to the Senate premises
where they were detained.
Chairman Sabio filed the present petition for habeas corpus (G.R. No. 174340) and, together with
the four PCGG Commissioners and the PCGGs nominees to PHC, petition for certiorari and
prohibition (G.R. No. 174318). They allege that the investigating committees concerned
disregarded Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason, the inquiries conducted by the
said committees are not in aid of legislation, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly
published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, and the said
committees are not vested with the power of contempt.
Moreover, in G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and
officers alleged: that the conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. 455 constitutes
violations to petitioners rights against self-incrimination.
Issue: W/N petitioners rights against self-incrimination were violated.

Held:
This Court holds that the respondent Senate Committees inquiry does not violate the petitioners
right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
Anent the right against self-incrimination, this may be invoked by the PHC officers and directors
only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in
advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them. That this right may possibly
beviolated or abused is no ground for denying the investigating committees their power of inquiry.
So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will
be respected by the investigating committees, it is the duty of the former to cooperate with the
latter in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting
obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and
its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.
Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board
G.R. No. 157870, 158633, 161658, November 3, 2008
Facts: Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 36of
RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with
certain offenses.
According to Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004
elections, said mandatory drug testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators beyond
that which are provided by the Constitution. No provision in the Constitution authorizes the
Congress or the COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It also violates the equal protection clause as
it can be used to harass a student or employee deemed undesirable. The constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached.
In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and
taxpayers maintains that said provision should be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on
the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.
Issue: W/N Sections 36 (c) (d) (f) and (g) should be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing
on the constitutional right to privacy, against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self-incrimination.
Held: Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug
test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not

randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.
People vs Awid/ People vs GANIH
FACTS: On January 9, 2000 only Mrs. Lee was left in the house, accompanied by three
housemaids, and the accused Ernesto Andagao, a gardener-houseboy. They all slept in an
extension of the main house, which extension had three rooms. Mrs. Lee was in one with her 11
Japanese Spitz puppies. Next to hers was the room where Andagao slept, and then there was the
room of the housemaids.
Part of Mrs. Lees night routine was to let her puppies out of her room about midnight so they
could take a leak. At the early dawn of January 10, 2000, after opening the door of her room to let
her puppies out, Mrs. Lee was surprised to see a stranger, a man, standing a few meters from her
door. She immediately went back in and tried to shut her door close but the man succeeded in
pushing the door open and pulling her out of the room just as another man appeared. Someone
struck Mrs. Lee with a gun on both shoulders and kicked her on the ribs. When she fell down, she
received a kick on her buttocks.
Although she cannot recognized the faces of her abductors because she was blindfolded and
covered by black cloth, she noticed that they left Zamboanga City. After traveling three to four
hours, they arrived in a house which she later knew that it belonged to a certain SuodHussain. On
January 10, 2000, Mrs. Lee met accused MadumGanih. She was held for 20 days and during that
time she communicated her husband with the order of Ganih to prepare a ransom of P15,000,000.
Mr. Lee asked the kidnappers to lower the amount since he could only raise an amount of
P1,000,000. Calling her family a third time, the kidnappers reduced their demand to P4 million and
threatened to cut off Mrs. Lees head unless this was paid.
In the evening of May 5, 2000, Ganih told Mrs. Lee that they would release her the next day. At
about 4:00 a.m. of May 6, 2000, her abductors brought Mrs. Lee to Arena Blanco in Zamboanga
City where Ganih gave her P100.00 for fare and an M203 bullet as memento. She eventually got
home.
Sometime after, the police arrested some men which in a police line-up, Mrs. Lee later positively
identified as her abductors. For his part, Ganih denied the allegations and claimed an alibi that he
was in his house at the said incident.
On May 21, 2002 the RTC rendered judgment,convictingGanih of the crime charged and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The RTC, however, acquitted Awid for insufficiency
of evidence.
ISSUE: Is accused Ganih, in conspiracy with others, guilty of kidnapping for ransom?
RULING: To prove the crime charged, the prosecution had to show (a) that the accused was a
private person; (b) that he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her
liberty; (c) that the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (d) that the victim was kidnapped or
detained for ransom. All these have been proved in this case.
Significantly, Ganih offered nothing but his bare denial and unsubstantiated alibi to counter the
overwhelming evidence that the prosecution adduced against him. His other contention is that the

police made Mrs. Lee identify him, not in a proper police line-up but in a mere show-up after giving
her some improper suggestions.
What the Court condemns are prior or contemporaneous improper suggestions that point out the
suspect to the witness as the perpetrator to be identified. Besides, granting that the out-of-court
identification was irregular, Mrs. Lees court testimony clearly shows that she positively identified
Ganih independently of the previous identification she made in front of the police station. Mrs. Lee
could not have made a mistake in identifying him since she had ample opportunities to study the
faces and peculiar body movements of her kidnappers in her almost four months of ordeal with
them.Indeed, she was candid and direct in her recollection, narrating events as she saw them take
place. Her testimony, including her identification of the appellant, was positive, straightforward,
and categorical.
The totality of the prosecutions evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that Ganih and
the others with him kidnapped Mrs. Lee for ransom. The crime was punishable by death at the
time of its commission but, with the enactment of Republic Act 9346 that prohibits the imposition
of such penalty, the CA was correct in lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
LUMANOG vs PEOPLE
Facts: Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of the
Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary (now the
Philippine National Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard employed assigned at
211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the ambush-slay happened. As a purported
eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during the fateful day, including the faces of the accused.
All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and
fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial of
constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the
credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial court their respective
positions and participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely
how they committed the crime.
Issue: Was the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial
investigation valid?
Ruling: NO, the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial
investigation was NOT valid.
Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the
right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot
afford the services of counsel he will be provided with one (1). However, since these rights can
only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been such a
valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall only
the following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was brought to said counsel.
Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels execution of his statement
before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be invalidated. To be
acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is
not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of
persons under custodial investigation.

Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while responding to
questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether he had properly discharged
his duties to said client. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he
understood his answers to the questions of the investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel
from answering certain questions, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place,
verified from them the date and time of Joels arrest and the circumstances thereof, or any
previous information elicited from him by the investigators at the station, and if said counsel
inspected Joels body for any sign or mark of physical torture.
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of
Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for
alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his
first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection,
relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being awitness against himself. Petitioner
then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at
the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against
self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only
when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged
that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the
first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative
charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the
Self-Incrimination Clause. YES.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the selfincrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the
accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to
take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer
not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right
to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a
defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand
with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands
for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the
high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is
given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
Galman vs Pamaran

Facts: On 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death inside
the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City.
To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and
exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad
hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board.
Pursuant to PD 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared
and testified by obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board.
Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon JulianoAgrava; and another one, jointly authored by
the other members of the Board namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante
Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera.
The reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the Tanodbayan for appropriate action.
After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan filed with the
Sandiganbayan 2 Informations for murder one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino (Criminal
Case 10010) and another for the killing of Rolando Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who was found
dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful
day.
In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and
one accomplice.
Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
In the course of the joint trial, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the Agrava Board
were marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence,
Ver, et. al., through their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits.
Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding
Board as Evidence against him in the above-cases" contending that its admission will be in
derogation of his constitutional right against self incrimination and violative of the immunity
granted by PD 1886, and thus prayed that his testimony be rejected as evidence for the
prosecution.
Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed separate motions to exclude their
respective individual testimonies invoking the same ground.
The Tanodbayan opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by Ver, et. al. in
support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not available to them
because of their failure to invoke their right against self incrimination before the ad hoc Fact
Finding Board.
On 13 June 1985, The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting all the evidences offered by
the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by Ver, et. al. in view of
the immunity granted by PD 1886.
The Tanodbayan, along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved for the reconsideration of the
said
Resolution, but were denied. They filed two separate petitions for certiorari before the Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against oneself applies also
in the proceeding before the Agrava Board. YES.
Held: Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and
in fact, andto all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of
determining the facts andcircumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the
determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be
brought before the bar of justice.
The investigationtherefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the
ascertainment and/or determinationof the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and
ultimately, their conviction.
And as safeguard, thePresidential Decree guarantees "any person called to testify before the
Board the right to counsel at any stageof the proceedings."
Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the courseof
receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also
thosesuspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing.
And when suspects are summoned and called totestify and/or produce evidence, the situation is
one where the person testifying or producing evidence isundergoing investigation for the
commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the factsand surrounding
circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character andextent of
his participation therein.
Among this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the saidassassination, all of
whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they
were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD
1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses
against themselves.
Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or
produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so, the jeopardy of being
placed behind prison bars
even before conviction dangled before their very eyes.
Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are
sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law.
Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself were right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886. When they so testified and produced
evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by
them.
It must be noted that initially the provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of
the United States and was as follows: "That no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself."
As now worded,Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except
to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal.
Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies toVer, et. al.
notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a
criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not merely denied the said sacred constitutional rights,
but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness.

The review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations
and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and compliance with due process.
The manner in which the testimonies were taken from Ver, et. al. fall short ofthe constitutional
standards both under the "due process clause" and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section 20,
Article IV.
In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al.cannot
be admitted against them in any criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of
constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law.
People Vs. Judge Ayson 175 SCRA 216 July 7, 1989
FACTS: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City
station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.
A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of
the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating
that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did
not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not
guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the
prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.
HELD: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination
(only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime
charged- not present in case at bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to
be a witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions
and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at
the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should
know. He must claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused
include:
1)

he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.

2)
nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him.
3)

any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at
the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO
v.
HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al. G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006,
FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time
invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.
RULING: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to
the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.
Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the
mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions
are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,
where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and
that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns
the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even
extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the
power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact;
or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose
or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent
with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle
of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right
of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the
absence of any constitutional basis.