Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
192
ELITE REVOLUTIONS
elites and not an aristocracy or ruling
c13.5s. In 19th-century Japan and Turkey
there was a small aristocracy based on
kinship and wealth-the family of the
Sultanate in Turkey; the Tokugawa
family and 280 feudal lords in Japan-but
this aristocracy had lost effective control
of the State. They retained status and
prestige, but both their power and moral
authority had eroded. In both countries
the political rulers, and the primary
guardians of effective social values, were a
group of civil and military bureaucrats
appointed to specialized offices (Ward
and Rustow, 1964; Gibb and Bowen,
1967, vo\. 1; Dore, 1965; Hall, 1955).
Although these bureaucrats were most
often recruited from a small number of
families with hereditary social status,
they were not a ruling class: (1) While
ruling classes have historically derived
their political power from control of
economic resources, the elite families in
Japan and Turkey were not landlords or
entrepreneurs. 2 Insofar as they were
wealthy, they derived their income from
long association with State offices-from
political power and not from economic
activity. (2) Political and military State
offices were not hereditary, and their
incumbents were recruited to some
degree on the basis of education and
merit from within the highest social
stratum. Both Tokugawa Japan and
Ottoman Turkey also possessed institutionalized means to recruit a few officials
from outside the highest status groups.
Thus, the Japanese and Turkish rulers
were elites whose prestige was based on a
combination of functional expertise,
power derived from control of organizational resources, and moral eminence
resting on a cohesive set of social values. 3
193
It was both the bureaucratic character
of the prerevolutionary ruling elites in
Japan and Turkey, and their ability to
redefine traditional values in order to
maintain moral cohesion, that were basic
prerequisites for their revolutionary transformation from within. From the 17th
century on, segments of the Japanese and
Ottoman elites in civil administration
became increasingly bureaucratized. The
rise in power and prestige of these
administrative officials led to polarization
of the traditional elites into three social
groups: a hereditary status aristocracy, a
bureaucratic elite, and a lower elite-of
traditional military officers (and also
religious officials in Turkey) who lost
status, privileges, and productive work to
the new administrative elite. The increasing dissatisfaction of these declining elites
led to organized conflict which threatened the power and authority of the
bureaucrats, but also produced reformers
from within the bureaucratic stratum. It
was the success of these reformers in
increasing the power and rationality of
the bureaucracy that further distinguishes
the Japanese and Turkish ruling elites
from other traditional aristocracies or
ruling classes. Because these reforms
legitimized the utility of change, and
made the Tokugawa and Ottoman bureaucracies more open to talent, they also
laid the foundation for a creative response to the subsequent threat of
Western intervention. Moreover, the penetration of Western influence in the 19th
century led to the early. development of
nationalistic ideologies which tried to
combine traditional and Western values.
These ideological developments were essential to the reform and revitalization of
elite values, and served to maintain an
elite coherence that made possible the
genesis of a cohesive revolutionary movement from within the bureaucratic
stratum (Davison, 1963; Lewis, 1962;
194
195
ELITE REVOLUTIONS
separation of specialized bureaucrats, and
to mobilize elite support. Nationalism is
the predominant ideological appeal in an
elite revolution. Because bureaucrats (unlike other types of revolutionaries) hold
important positions in the old regime,
traditional values will play an important
role in their nationalist ideology. Yet it is
only to the extent that their ideology also
incorporates new political values and
social and economic appeals, that elite
revolutionaries maintain the potential for
revolutionary change after a seizure of
power.
of an Elite
196
ELITE REVOLUTIONS
to obtain them voluntarily. What the
revolutionaries do need, at a minimum, is
some assurance that the peasants will not
voluntarily aid the regime or willingly
(without coercion) take up arms against
the revolutionary forces. Such neutralization of the rural masses is easiest to
obtain where the political forces of the
old regime are concentrated in the capital
city with only minimal control over the
countryside. 6 But even where the regime
has more control, tacit support of the
masses is often assured by limited foreign
intervention in the conflict between
rebels and the government. The collaboration of loyal government officials with a
foreign power increases the nationalistic
appeal of the rebels, as does a military
stand by the revolutionaries against
foreign troops. Under such conditions,
elite revolutionaries have no need or
incentive for the selective use of terror
commonly employed by guerrillas. If the
revolutionary threat, however, triggers
massive foreign intervention, the revolutionaries will be forced to mobilize mass
support for a conventional civil war or for
a guerrilla movement. In this case, an elite
revolution changes into some form of
mass revolution and the level of violence
increases.
The establishment of a revolutionary
regime before the overthrow of the
government is thus facilitated by the
special qualities and resources of revolutionary bureaucrats. But the process of
mobilizing a rebel movement also politicizes and radicalizes these bureaucrats.
Civil and military officials who take to
the hills to organize a countergovernment
are not likely to take with them a
comprehensive ideology or even a clear
conception of, and commitment to,
revolutionary change. Yet the immediate
problems created by establishing a rebel
government destroys the bureaucrats'
197
commitment to-and identity with-sanctioned political values and familiar procedures of rule. The intense interaction
among a small cadre of rebels also
stimulates a search for new organizational
forms and novel political values. Moreover, the process of consolidating dissident officials and factions into a
revolutionary government turns bureaucrats into political organizers. 7 Hence,
when bureaucrats, who by training and
position tend to be moderates, defect to
create a countergovernment, they are
likely to be radicalized to the point of
favoring complete abolition of the old
regime and the creation of a completely
new political system.
Unlike radicals who arise outside the
structure of the old regime, radical
bureaucrats have politico-administrative
experience and control of administrative
and military resources. This experience
and control permits such radicals to
retain a stronger position vis-a-vis moderate elites 8 than is true in other types of
revolution. In contrast to the French and
Russian revolutions where moderates
took power after the fall of the monarchy, moderates in the Meiji and Ataturk
revolutions were always subordinatr to
the radicals. Because the moderates were
never a political threat, radical bureaucrats in Japan and Turkey could concentrate on trying to radicalize them to
support complete abolition of the old
regime. The methods used to win and
coerce such moderate support were the
means to destroy the old regime politically, rather than through military or
198
ELITE REVOLUTIONS
today. It was not that the Meiji oligarchs
or Ataturk envisioned such destruction
beforehand, but that when it became
necessary within the logic of their radical
action, they were willing and able to
execute it.
An important tactical prerequisite to
the ability of radical bureaucrats to
mobilize enough resources and support to
destroy traditional elite institutions was
that they had not attempted to stage a
coup d'etat, but had actually mobilized
elite support for a political movement. It
was in the organization of a rebel army, a
countergovernment, and later, a revolutionary regime, that the radical military
and civil bureaucrats formulated their
programs of change and developed elite
support to implement them. Moreover,
the building of a revolutionary political
organization conditioned these bureaucrats to take risks that they would not
have taken under ordinary circumstances.
Later when faced with a direct conflict
between the requirements for economic
and military development of the new
State (upon which their own power and
status now rested) and the social and
economic interests of the traditional elite
from which they had come, they invariably chose the former.
Yet the pragmatic and instrumental
style of these bureaucratic revolutionaries, their elitism, and their continued
commitment to some traditional institutions and values also minimized their use
of destruction and coercion in the process
of economic and social change_ In the
Ataturk and Meiji revolutions, deliberate
social destruction was a pragmatic decision, its execution was in stages, and all
destruction was linked to concrete plans
for positive reform (Frey, 1965; Kinross,
1964; T.e. Smith, 1955; Silberman and
Hartoonian, 1966; Iwata, 1964).
The decision by the leaders of the
Meiji Restoration to abolish the traditional samurai elite and all its privileges
was not an ideological decision, but was
directly connected to the needs of
industrialization. As such, the progressive,
199
step-by-step destruction of samurai prerogatives and institutions was directly
linked to specific steps to promote
economic development and military expansion. For example: (1) the need to
stimulate commercialism and free trade
led to the abrogation of feudal prohibitions on the sale of land and on peasant
commerce. (2) The need for industrial
entrepreneurs and a labor force led to the
abolition of samurai restrictions on occupation. Samurai were now encouraged to
engage in all occupations, and a standard
education was given to all children5amurai and nonelite alike. (3) The need
for a technical, efficient, and inexpensive
army led to the abolition of samurai
monopoly of military service. The new
government could not afford to equip,
feed and train a force of the size that
would incorporate all the traditional elite.
(4) The need for government revenue to
finance military reform and to stimulate
industrialization through government investment led directly to the most drastic
reform-the abolition of the traditional
samurai stipend and its compulsory
commutation into government bonds on
which the government paid only a small
interest. Yet, as the traditional elite was
displaced from its political, economic,
and social positions, the revolutionary
government sought to propel progressive
members of the ex-samurai into business
and managerial occupations, by providing
both material and ideological incentives
for such transformation. While the
majority oC samurai failed to make the
transition necessary to achieve an elite
position in the new industrial society, the
vast majority of industrialists, businessmen, and financiers in Meiji Japan were
recruited from former samurai. Thus, the
traditional samurai elite were both the
main victims and the primary beneficiaries of elite revolution in Japan.
Likewise, the decision by the leaders
of the Ataturk revolution to suppress the
traditional religio-imperial superstructure
of the Ottoman empire, and hence
destroy the politico-economic hegemony
200
201
ELITE REVOLUTIONS
for industrialization, the elite revolutionaries gave commercial incentives to the
richest stratum of peasants and permitted
them to buy large tracts of land. While
one of the major results of many
revolutions (French, Soviet, Chinese and
Mexican) has been to free peasants from
exploitative landlords, elite revolution in
Japan and Turkey created landlords
where none had previously existed and
increased economic dependency (tenancy, sharecropping and wage labor) for
the majority of the peasant masses (Dore,
1959; Moore, 1966; Szyliowicz, 1966).
This new landlord class, with help from
the State apparatus, extracted an increasing surplus from the peasantry through a
mixture of capitalist and traditional
controls.
In both Japan and Turkey the revolutionaries created a rural and urban
bourgeoisie,
which
reinforced
and
widened the distance between the peasant
masses and the modernizing elites. Industrialization through expansion of a repressive and labor-intensive agriculture maintained the traditional structure of rural
society. As a result, the basic economic
occupations and mode of ~ife of the
common people remained substantially
unaltered for the first 25 years after the
elite revolutions in Japan and Turkey. In
neither Japan nor Turkey did industrialization lead to rapid urbanization.
Rather, it was the deliberate policy of the
revolutionary elites and their immediate
heirs to hold the population in the
villages and small towns, while creating
strong social and political controls over
the slowly increasing industrial work
force (Robinson, 1963; Dore, 1959). This
elitist mode of economic development
had serious repercussions for the longterm social and political evolution of
Japan and Turkey. 1 3
202
COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIO~AL
DEVELOPMENT
ELITE REVOLUTIONS
represent new and vested economic
interests, but even the elites who arose
through postrevolutionary openings in
administrative, military, and party bureaucracies tended to be specialists with a
narrower vision than the revolutionaries,
and with a particularistic wish to consolidate and preserve their own newly
acquired power and prerogatives. The
revolutionaries, using a strategy of concession (parliamentary integration of the
bourgeoisie) and control (retention of
ultimate decision-making power in their
own hands) were able for some time to
co-opt the support of rising middle class
elites and prevent polarization within the
ranks of the revolution (Najita, 1967;
Karpet, 1959). Yet, because the revolutionaries had not mobilized mass support,
their position vis-a-vis the new bourgeoisie was very unstable.
In both countries the rising middle
class of businessmen, technical and managerial bureaucrats, and landlords sought
to win power legally by creating massbased political parties which could exploit the constitutional and parliamentary
institutions created by the revolutionary
elites. These parties sought to mobilize
the peasant masses with conservative and
even reactionary appeals which upheld
the bourgeoisie's own, basically conservative, interests, but which also spoke to
the traditional values and way of life of
the peasants who had not been transformed by the revolution. In Turkey, the
bourgeois Democratic Party did manage
to gain power legally by mobilizing
conservative peasant support. Once they
controlled the government, the bourgeoisie turned Turkey in a more conservative
direction, economically and socially
(Weiker, 1963; Karpet, 1959). "The shift
to a competitive party system after World
War II made politics more democratic,
but also slowed down and in some areas
even reversed the process of socialeconomic
reform"
(Huntington,
1968:357). In contrast, bourgeois political parties in pre-World War II japan
were not able to mobilize a solid base of
mass support, and never captured power
from the administrative and military
203
elites who inherited political control from
the revolution (Duus, 1968).
Yet in both japan and Turkey,
attempts by the rising bourgeoisie to
mobilize peasant support in a challenge to
the power and goals of the revolutionary
leaders ended in extreme elite polarization and the breakdown of civil government. Military intervention and increasing
factionalization were the ultimate result
of these two revolutions which, in the
beginning, had moved away from the
pattern of instability and stagnation so
often generated by military coups.' 6
In japan, the military intrusion into
politics was much more extensive than in
Turkey, (precisely because of the failure
of japanese political parties to mobilize
peasant support), but in neither country
was the military able to rule effectively.
In both japan and Turkey, polarization
of values and objectives between senior
and junior officers prevented the consolidation of a stable military regime.
Higher military officers in japan and
Turkey wanted to increase administrative
control by the State in order to prevent
the rise to power of bourgeois counterelites. These officers had little interest in
popUlist reforms and wished only to
reinforce the status quo-modernization
for urban elites and traditional subordination for the peasant masses. In contrast,
lower and younger military officers in the
two countries-officers drawn more often
from rural and peasant social originsadvocated social and economic reforms
for the peasants, while, at the same time,
they turned against many of the rational
204
and modernizing values of the revolutionary elites. The traditional values which
younger officers shared with the peasant
masses from which they had come led
them to advocate elite guidance of a
nationalistic mass movement, which
would seek a return to a simpler and
more traditional society (Morris, 1957;
Storn' 1957' Ozbudun, 1966). It was this
comb'i~ation' of social reformism, antidemocratic elitism, and traditionalistic
ultra-nationalism that gave a fascist tinge
to the politics of younger officers in
japan and Turkey. I 7
This polarization between senior and
junior military officers in japan and
Turkey forced the military to continue a
civilian regime which they could influence but not control. In both japan and
Turkey, government by a system of
behindthe-scenes bargaining between
milit<iry, administrative, and party elites
permitted factionalism to permeate the
whole structure of power. Such elite
factionalism prevented the mobilization
of any stable base of mass support, but
also a\'erted any effective move toward
totalitarian cont~ols o\'cr the masses. I 8
Government through bargaining between elite factions, supported by conservative appeals to the rural masses, still
characterizes the parliamentary regimes
reestablished in japan in 1945 and in
Turkey in 1965 as military power
receded. In both japan and Turkey
today, one political party predominates
(the Liberal Democratic Party in japan
and the justice Party in Turkey) through
traditional appeals to rural, and some
urban, lower classes. Yet as the peasant
population continually declines, these
parliamentary regimes are threatened
from both the Left and the Right. On the
Left, they must combat elites who wish
ultimately to mobilize the urban working
class and the peasants for a democratic
and socialist revolution. On the Right
they are faced with either the prospect of
increasingly reactionary military coups
(in Turkey) or the possibility that
embattled capitalists will cooperate with
a fascist movement (in japan) (Scalapino
and Masumi, 1962; Rustow, 1966; Sherwood, 1967).
In contrast to those social scientists
who stress the dangers and disadvantages
of rapid mass mobilization in a revolutionary situation (most recently Huntington, 1968), the analysis presented here
demonstrates that the failure to involve
the masses in revolutionary transformation has very detrimental consequences
for the long-term social and political
development of a society. Although an
elite revolution facilitates industrialization and social mobility, it also creates a
ELITE REVOLUTIONS
society that is often more socially and
economically stratified than the traditional society. The most serious defect of
an elite revolution is in the political
realm. Revolutionaries who consolidate
elite support for the new regime by
granting parliamentary concessions prevent either the creation of a revolutionary
political party which could mobilize mass
support for continuing economic and
social change, or the creation of democratic institutions with the potential for
increasing mass participation in politics.
Rather, an elitist parliamentary regime
institutionalizes political machinery that
can later be used by the rising middle
class to both undermine the political
control of the revolutionaries and prevent
the sharing of social and economic
benefits of modernization with the
masses. In the end, elite revolutions
produce a conservative parliamentary
regime which is both factionalized, unstable, and subject to military inten'ention.
In Summary: An elite revolution
manifests the following attributes:
1) An elite revolution is generated
primarily by contradictions external to
the society which precipitate internal
social conflicts. That is, an elite revolution is a national rather than a class
revolution induced by conflicts between a
society and one or more foreign powers.
As a result, the goal of elite revolutionaries is to redistribute power between
nations by fostering economic development of their country, rather than
redistribute resources between social
strata within the society.
2) Elite revolutionaries are generated
from within a bureaucratic social stratum,
independent of the most important
economic means of production. Unlike
bureaucratic elites which try to generate
social change from within a given regime
(e.g. in 19th-century Germany), bureaucrats become revolutionary only when
they seek to overthrow the existing order
and create a new political system with a
different distribution of power and a new
basis of legitimacy. While the primary
motivation of elite revolutionaries is to
205
build national power vis-a-vis a foreign
enemy, they soon discover that this
necessitates the creation of a new social
and economic foundation for the State.
They are inevitably led to abolish the
privileges, way of life, and traditional
values of their own social stratum, and to
begin recruiting their successors from a
broader social base.
3) Elite revolutionaries preempt organs
of the established regime (including army
units) and exploit their own legitimacy in
order to organize a revolutionary movement against their peers. Unlike a coup
d'etat, an elite revolution mobilizes
nonmilitary elites into an organized
countergovernment and establishes a
"movement in the hills." This resistance
precipitates armed conflict with the old
regime but not a full-scale civil war.
Although the rebels must win a few
military victories vis-a-vis the government
troops (and avoid massive defeat), they
cannot hope to take power through a
complete military victory. Rather, they
must count on the regime's moral
collapse before revolutionaries who have
gained mass ideological support through
their nationalistic appeals against the
government's capitulation to foreign demands and intervention. Such collapse is
most likely when there is no consolidated
upper class to support the government,
nor any massive foreign inten'ention.
4) An elite revolution does not involve
mass mobilization either prior to or after
the takeover of power. Before defeating
the old regime, revolutionary bureaucrats
try to neutralize the masses. Insofar as
nonelites are involved in revolutionary
violence it is only through spontaneous
uprisings (which quickly subside) or in a
military capacity under strict elite control. Nor is revolutionary change stimulated by mass demands or pressure.
Rather, all social, economic and political
change in an elite revolution is initiated
from the top, by the small group of rebels
who won power. The elitist nature of the
takeover of power-the lack of a consolidated ruling class in opposition, the
absence of great violence and social
upheaval, and the consolidation of an
206
ELITE REVOLUTIONS
HALL. JOHN W.
1955 Tanama Okitsuga: Forerunner of Mod
em Japan. Cambridge: Harvard Univer
sity Press.
HUr\TINGTOr\, SAMUEL
1968 Political Order in Changing Societies.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
IWATA. MASAKAZU
1964 Okubo Toshmichi: The Bismarck of
Japan. Berkeley: University of Cali
fornia Press.
JANSEN. MARIUS
1961 Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration. Princeton: Princeton Univer
sity Press.
KARPET. KEMEL
1959 Turkev's Politics: The Transition to a
Multi.Party System. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1964 "Society. Economics. and Politics in
Contemporary Turkey." World Politics
17.
Klr\ROSS. LORD
1964 A taturk: The Rebirth of a Nation.
London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
LEWIS. BERNARD
1961 The Emergence of Modem Turkey.
London: Oxford University Press.
LOCKWOOD, WILLIAM
1954 The Economic Development of Japan.
Princeton: Princeton University Press_
MARDIN. SERIF
1962 The Genesis of Young Ottoman
Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
MAXON, YALE
1957 Control of Japanese Foreign Policy:
1930-1945. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
MOORE, BARRINGTON
1966 Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press.
MORRIS. IV AN
1957 Nationalism and the Right Wing in
Japan. London: Oxford University
Press.
1963 Japan: 1931-1945. Boston: Heath &
CO.
NAJITA. TETSUO
1967 Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
OGATA. SADAO
1964 Defiance in Manchuria. Berkeley: University of California Press.
OZBUDIN. ERGUN
1966 The Role of the Military in Recent
Turkish Politics. Cambridge: Harvard
University Center for International
Affairs. Occasional Paper no. 14.
ROBINSON. RICHARD
1963 The First Turkish Republic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
207
RUSTOW, DANKWART
1959 "The Army and the Founding of the
Turkish Republic." World Politics 6:
513-22.
1966 "The Development of Parties in Turkey." In Joseph La Palombara (ed.).
Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
SANSOM. GEORGE
1950 The Western World and Japan. New
York: Knopf.
SCALAPINO. ROBERT. and JUNNOSUKO
MASUMI
1962 Parties and Politics in Contemporary
Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press.
SHERWOOD. W.B.
1967 "The Rise of the Justice Party in
Turkey." World Politics 20: 54-65.
SILBERMAN, BERNARD. and HARRY
HARTOONIAN
1966 Modem Japanese Leadership. Tucson:
University of Arizona Press.
SMITH, ELAINE
1959 Origins of the Kemalist Movement.
Washington. D.C.: Judd & Detweiler.
SMITH. THOMAS C.
1955 Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
1960 "Japan's Aristocratic Revolution."
Yale Review 5: 370-83.
STEINER, KURT
1965 Local Government in Japan. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
STORRY. RICHARD
1957 The Double Patriots: A Study of
Japanese Nationalism. London: Chatto
& Windus.
SZYLlOWICZ, JOSEPH
1966 Political Change in Rural Turkey. The
Hague: Mouton & Co.
WARD. ROBERT, and DANKWART RUSTOW
1964 Political Modernization in Japan and
Turkey. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
WEIKER, WALTER
1961 The Turkish Revolution: 1960-1961.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
YALMAN,NUR
1968 "Inte,,'ention and Extrication: The
Officer Corps in the Turkish Crisis." In
Henry Bienen (ed.). The Military
Intervenes. New York: Russell Sage.