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MEMORANDUM DECISION
VICTORINO
C.
FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which started out
as an ordinary complaint for a sum of money. The question squarely presented to the
Court is the validity of the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of
B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private
respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month.
Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent deposited with the petitioner
the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased
premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the
private respondent vacated the property. He thereafter requested the refund of his
deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten
days of his occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this
request. He said the lessee still owed him for other charges, including the electricity
and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased premises to
restore them to their original condition. 1
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was denied
on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for reconsideration, on December
1, 1987. 4 He is now before us to fault the respondent court, principally for sustaining
the memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His contention is that it violates
Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
This provision reads as follows:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision
of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the legal basis therefor.
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the
submission of position papers by the parties, a summary judgment was rendered on
October 11, 1985, sustaining the complainant and holding that the repainting was not
chargeable to him. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P7,750.00, representing the balance of the deposit after deducting the water and
electricity charges. The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of P1,250.00 as attorney's
fees, plus the Costs. 2
Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present charter,
Section 14 has been in force since the Constitution of 1935. The provision was recast
in affirmative terms in the 1973 Constitution but has been virtually restored to its
original form in the Constitution of 1987, to apply to all courts, including the
municipal courts. The purpose has always been the same, viz., to inform the person
reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court
after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws.
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was affirmed
by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum
decision reading in full as follows:
The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure them that the
court rendering the decision actually studied the case before pronouncing its
judgment. But there are more substantial reasons. For one thing, the losing party
must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may
elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For another,
the decision, if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its
merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the
litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition
of the facts and the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the
Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful
references and even as precedents in the resolution of future controversies. As the
Court said in Rosales v. Court of First Instance. 5
Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours
or
at
least
substantially
Identical
with
previous
litigations. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Earlier decisions are
guideposts that can lead us in the right direction as we tread the
highways and byways of the law in the search for truth and justice.
These pronouncements represent the wisdom of the past. They are
the voice of vanished judges talking to the future. Except where
there is a need to reverse them because of an emergent viewpoint
or an altered situation, they urge us strongly that, indeed, the
trodden path is best.
According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision rendered by the regional trial
court should be revoked for non-compliance with the above-quoted constitutional
mandate. He asks that the case be remanded to the regional trial court for a full
blown hearing on the merits, to be followed by a decision stating therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For his part, the private
respondent demurs. He justifies the memorandum decision as authorized by B.P. Blg.
129 and invokes the ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals, 6 Which
sustained the said law.
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:
Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. Every decision or
final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and
distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on
which it is based which may be contained in the decision or final
resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the
decision, order or resolution appealed from.
The above section was applied in the Romero case, together with a similar rule
embodied in Section 18 of P.D. No. 946, providing that:
many of the other cases submitted to it, which require more time to write, not to
mention the antecedent research that may have to be made.)
Viewed in the light of these practical considerations, the memorandum decision can
be welcomed indeed as an acceptable method of dealing expeditiously with the case
load of the courts of justice, But expediency alone, no matter how compelling,
cannot excuse non-compliance with the Constitution; or to put it more familiarly, the
end does not justify the means. It is plain that if Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 is
unconstitutional, it must be struck down.
In the case at bar, we find that a judgment was made by the metropolitan trial court
in compliance with the rule on summary procedure. The decision consisted of three
typewritten pages, single space, and stated clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it was based. It was a concise and well-written decision, and a correct one
to boot, for which Judge Paciano B. Balita is to be commended.
The problem, though, as the petitioner sees it, is that in affirming this judgment, the
regional trial court of Makati rendered a mere memorandum decision that simply
adopted by reference the findings of fact and law made by Judge Balita and then
concluded, without saying more, that "there was no cogent reason to disturb the
same." It is claimed that as Judge de la Rama did not make his own statement of the
facts and the law as required by the Constitution, his memorandum decision was a
total nullity. Worse, when the appeal was taken to the respondent court, what it
reviewed was not the memorandum decision of the regional trial court but the
decision rendered by the metropolitan trial court which, legally speaking, was not
before the appellate court.
It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did not review the
memorandum decision of the regional trial court which was the subject of the
petition for review. A reading of its own decision will show that it dealt extensively
with the memorandum decision and discussed it at some length in the light of the
observations and reservations of this Court in the Romero case. Moreover, in
reviewing the decision of the metropolitan trial court, the Court of Appeals was
actually reviewing the decision of the regional trial court, which had incorporated by
reference the earlier decision rendered by Judge Balita.
The question, of course, is whether such incorporation by reference was a valid act
that effectively elevated the decision of the metropolitan trial court for examination
by the Court of Appeals.
To be fair, let it be said that when Judge dela Rama availed himself of the
convenience offered by Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, he was only acting in
accordance with the ruling announced in Romero permitting the use of the
memorandum decision. It must also be observed that even if the respondent court
appeared to be partial to the reservation rather than the rule in the said case, it
nevertheless had the duty which it discharged to abide by the doctrine
announced therein by the highest tribunal of the land. The respondent court could not
have acted otherwise.
This Court is not hampered by such inhibitions. As we may re-examine our own
rulings and modify or reverse them whenever warranted, we take a second look at
the memorandum decision and the Romero case and test them on the touchstone of
the Constitution.
The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply suggests that the
court may adopt by reference the findings of fact and the conclusions of law stated in
the decision, order or resolution on appeal before it. No particular form is prescribed;
the conditions for its use are not indicated. In fact, B.P. Blg. 129 does not even
employ the term "memorandum decision" in Section 40 or elsewhere in the rest of
the statute. This phrase appears to have been introduced in this jurisdiction not by
that law but by Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, reading as follows:
Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. -The judgment or final
resolution of a court in appealed cases may adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision or
final order appealed from.
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the
findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a memorandum
decision as envisioned in the above provision. The distinctive features of the
memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it
incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in
the decision, order or ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the
decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of fact by the
lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any
rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the
cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in
the decision of the higher court. The Idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of
the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being
approved or adopted anyway.
Parenthetically, the memorandum decision is also allowed in the United States, but
its form (at least) differs from the one under consideration in this case. Such a
decision is rendered in that country upon a previous' determination by the judge that
there is no need for a published opinion and that it will have no precedential effect.
The judgment is usually limited to the dispositive portion but a memorandum is
attached containing a brief statement of the facts and the law involved, mainly for the
information of the parties to the case.
When a law is questioned before the Court, we employ the presumption in favor of
its constitutionality. As we said in Peralta v. Commission of Elections, "to justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication." 7 Courts will bend over
backward to sustain that presumption. In case of doubt, it is the duty of the judiciary
to exert every effort to prevent the invalidation of the law and the nullification of the
will of the legislature that enacted it and the executive that approved it. This norm is
based on a becoming respect that the judiciary is expected to accord the political
departments of the government which, it must be assumed in fairness, thoroughly
studied the measure under challenge and assured themselves of its constitutionality
before agreeing to enact it.
The Court has deliberated extensively on the challenge posed against the
memorandum decision as now authorized by law. Taking into account the salutary
purpose for which it is allowed, and bearing in mind the above-discussed restraint we
must observe when a law is challenged before us, we have come to the conclusion
that Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, as we shall interpret it here, is not unconstitutional.
What is questioned about the law is the permission it gives for the appellate court to
merely adopt by reference in its own decision the judgment of the lower court on
appeal. It is easy to understand that this device may feed the suspicion feared by
Justice Feria that the court has not given the appeal the attention it deserved and thus
deprived the parties of due process. True or not, this impression is likely to
undermine popular faith in the judiciary as an impartial forum which hears before it
decides and bases its decision on the established facts and the applicable law.
No less objectionable is the inconvenience involved in having to search for the
decision referred to, which, having been incorporated by reference only, does not
have to be attached to the memorandum decision. The Court had occasion earlier to
complain about this difficulty in the case of Gindoy v. Tapucar, 8 where we said:
was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced binding legal effect. We also affirm
the finding of the respondent court that the summary judgment without a formal trial
was in accord with the Rule on Summary Procedure and that the award of attorney's
fees is not improper.
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein
set forth both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be
rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section
14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless
disobedience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. This
decision is immediately executory. It is so ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
contested land in Civil Case No. B-398, Judge Villamor dismissed the criminal cases
against her and her co-accused.
Judge Villamor likewise granted execution pending appeal of his decision in Civil
Case No. B-398. This order was challenged by Carlos in the Court of Appeals and in
this Court, both without success.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p
In 1977, Civil Case No. B-398 (Gloria Naval vs. George Carlos) for recovery of
ownership of a parcel of coconut land was filed and subsequently raffled to the sala
of the petitioner, Judge Adriano Villamor. While the civil case was pending there,
respondent Carlos filed Criminal Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-991, N-992 and N993 for qualified theft against Gloria Naval and her helpers. The criminal cases were
also assigned to the sala of Judge Villamor.
Due to the pendency of Civil Case No. B-398, the criminal cases were temporarily
archived.
After trial in Civil Case No. B-398, a decision was rendered in favor of Naval who
was declared the lawful owner and possessor of the disputed land. Carlos was
ordered to vacate the land.
Thereafter, respondent Carlos, through counsel, moved to activate the archived
criminal cases. Having declared Naval the lawful owner and possessor of the
Afterwards, Carlos filed an administrative case, A.M. No. RTJ-87-105, against Judge
Villamor, charging him with having issued illegal orders and an unjust decision in
Civil Case No. B-398. On November 21, 1988, this Court, in an En Banc resolution,
summarily dismissed the administrative case.
Dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative case, respondent Carlos filed a
civil action for damages (Civil Case No. CEB-6478) against Judge Villamor for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment when he dismissed the five (5) criminal
cases against Naval, et al.
The summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 was served upon Judge Villamor on
December 10, 1987. The next day (December 11, 1987), instead of answering the
complaint, Judge Villamor issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993 an order of
direct contempt against Carlos and his lawyer. Attorney Antonio T. Guerrero, "for
degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and
contemptous language before the court," and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P500.
Carlos immediately filed in this Court a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Judge (G.R. Nos. 82238-42).
We promptly restrained Judge Villamor from enforcing his Order of Contempt
against Carlos and Attorney Guerrero. On November 13, 1989, we annulled the
contempt order. (See pp. 26-34, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041.)
Back to Civil Case No. CEB-6478; Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion. The order of
dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 20657, June 26,
1990). Carlos appealed to this Court which also denied the petition. (p. 125, Rollo of
G.R. No. 101296.)
Unfazed by these setbacks, Carlos and his counsel, Attorney Antonio Guerrero, filed
separate complaints for damages against Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an
unjust order of contempt.
Attorney Guerrero's complaint for damages (Civil Case No. CEB-8802) was raffled
to Branch 21, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, presided over by Judge Peary G.
Aleonar. Carlos' complaint for damages was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8823
and raffled to Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City presided over by Judge
Bernardo LL. Salas.
On March 30, 1990, Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB8802 but it was denied by Judge Aleonar (p. 33, Rollo of G.R. No. 101296).
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order docketed as
G.R. No. 101296.
On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order against
Judge Aleonar to stop him from proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8802 (pp. 4546, Rollo of G.R. No. 101296).
On May 20, 1991, a Manifestation was filed by Judge Villamor praying Judge Salas
to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8823 but the motion was denied by respondent Judge
on July 2, 1991 (pp. 13-16, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041).
Hence, this second petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order (G.R.
No. 101041).
On August 21, 1991, a Resolution was issued by this Court: 1) temporarily
restraining Judge Salas from further proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8823; and 2)
granting the petitioner's prayer that this case be consolidated with G.R. No. 101296
(pp. 37-39, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041).
The sole issue here is: whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas may take cognizance
of the actions for damages against Judge Villamor for allegedly having rendered an
unjust order of direct contempt against Carlos and Attorney Guerrero which this
Court subsequently annulled.
The answer is no.
A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful
conduct in rendering it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67 SCRA 161).
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for certiorari are GRANTED, Civil Cases
Nos. CEB-8802 and CEB-8823, respectively, pending in the salas of respondents
Judge Peary G. Aleonar and Judge Bernardo LL. Salas, are hereby dismissed. The
temporary restraining orders issued by this Court in these cases are hereby made
permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
appeal.[15] As a consequence, the attached conjugal property was levied upon and
sold through public auction by the deputy sheriff to the Bank on October 10, 1983.[16]
On September 5, 1984, in an effort to prevent the deputy sheriff from
consolidating the sale, petitioners filed a second annulment case [17] with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.[18] Petitioners sought to declare void the levy and sale
on execution of their conjugal property by reiterating the same argument raised in the
first annulment case, i.e., that the branch sheriff had no authority to levy upon a
property belonging to the conjugal partnership.[19]
On November 15, 1985, while the second annulment case was pending, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed in the collection case and affirmed in
toto the summary judgment rendered by the CFI of Manila. [20] The matter was
elevated to us on a petition for review,[21] but was eventually dismissed for having
been filed out of time and for lack of merit. [22]Hence, the decision in the collection
case became final.
On November 13, 1990, the RTC of Makati rendered judgment in the second
annulment case in favor of petitioners and declared null and void the levy and sale on
execution upon the conjugal property.[23] Respondents elevated the decision to the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 31795. On October 27, 1994, the Court of
Appeals issued the assailed decision, reversing and setting aside the decision of the
RTC of Makati.[24] The Court of Appeals declared that the Makati annulment case is
barred
by res
judicata because
of
the
prior Rizalannulment
case
and Manila collection case. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals on the
following grounds:[25]
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the decisions rendered in
the Manila collection case and Rizal annulment case, taken together, constitute res
judicata or bar by prior judgment to the annulment case filed with the RTC of
Makati. Assuming there is res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the Court of
Appeals erred in not holding that respondents have waived this defense.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner Encarnacion Ching waived or
abandoned her right or claim on her conjugal property when she did not intervene in
the Manila collection case.
III
In any event, the Court of Appeals erred in not deciding the Makati annulment case
on its merits on equitable considerations.
We deny the petition.
The Makati annulment case should have been dismissed from the start for lack
of jurisdiction. The RTC of Makati does not have the authority to nullify the levy and
sale on execution that was ordered by the CFI of Manila, a co-equal court. The
determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in execution of a
judgment was valid, properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered
the judgment and issued the writ of execution.[26]
Beginning with the case of Orais v. Escao,[27] down to the subsequent cases
of Nuez v. Low,[28] Cabigao v. del Rosario,[29] Hubahib v. Insular Drug Co., Inc.,
[30]
National Power Corp. v. De Veyra,[31] Luciano v. Provincial Governor,[32] De Leon
v. Hon. Judge Salvador,[33] Cojuangco v. Villegas,[34] Darwin v. Tokonaga,[35] we laid
down the long standing doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or equal
authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective
cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously
lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.
There is no dispute that the subject conjugal property was under custodia
legis of the CFI of Manila. It was initially attached under a writ of preliminary
attachment issued by the CFI of Manila. Said property was later on levied upon and
sold under a writ of execution issued by the same court. Since the attachment, levy
and sale have been carried out upon orders of the CFI of Manila, any and all
questions concerning the validity and regularity thereof necessarily had to be
addressed to the CFI of Manila.
Petitioners, however, contend that one of the owners of the property, petitioner
Encarnacion Ching, was not a party to the collection case. Not being a party thereto,
Encarnacion Ching should be allowed to file a separate case as a third-party claimant
xxx
Is a spouse, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal
property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment
obligor, considered a stranger? InMariano v. Court of Appeals,[39] we answered
this question in the negative. In that case, the CFI of Caloocan City declared the wife
to be the judgment obligor and, consequently, a writ of execution was issued against
her. Thereupon, the sheriff proceeded to levy upon the conjugal properties of the
wife and her husband. The wife initially filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals praying for the annulment of the writ of execution. However, the petition
was adjudged to be without merit and was accordingly dismissed. The husband then
filed a complaint with the CFI of Quezon City for the annulment of the writ of
execution, alleging therein that the conjugal properties cannot be made to answer for
obligations exclusively contracted by the wife. The executing party moved to dismiss
the annulment case, but the motion was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals,
in Mariano, ruled that the CFI of Quezon City, in continuing to hear the annulment
case, had not interfered with the executing court. We reversed the Court of Appeals
ruling and held that there was interference by the CFI of Quezon City with the
execution of the CFI of Caloocan City. We ruled that the husband of the judgment
debtor cannot be deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against
his wife, which would allow the filing of a separate and independent action.
The facts of the Mariano case are similar to this case. Clearly, it was
inappropriate for petitioners to institute a separate case for annulment when they
could have easily questioned the execution of their conjugal property in the
collection case. We note in fact that the trial court in the Rizal annulment case
specifically informed petitioners that Encarnacion Chings rights could be ventilated
in the Manila collection case by the mere expedient of intervening therein.
[40]
Apparently, petitioners ignored the trial courts advice, as Encarnacion Ching did
not intervene therein and petitioners instituted another annulment case after their
conjugal property was levied upon and sold on execution.
There have been instances where we ruled that a spouse may file a separate
case against a wrongful execution.[41] However, in those cases, we allowed the
institution of a separate and independent action because what were executed upon
were the paraphernal or exclusive property of a spouse who was not a party to the
case. In those instances, said spouse can truly be deemed a stranger. In the present
case, the levy and sale on execution was made upon the conjugal property.
In any case, even without the intervention of Encarnacion Ching in the
collection case, it appears that Alfredo Ching was able to raise the conjugal nature of
the property in both the trial court and appellate court. A perusal of the records
reveals that petitioner Alfredo Ching filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to
Quash Writ of Execution before the CFI of Manila. In the motion, he specifically
argued that the execution was invalid for having been enforced upon their conjugal
property.[42] Alfredo Ching raised this argument again on appeal in CA G.R. CV No.
02421.[43] Evidently, due process has been afforded to petitioners as regards the
execution on their conjugal property.
Considering that that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to hear Civil
Case No. 8389, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
- versus -
LUCIO TAN,
R e s p o n d e n t.
Promulgated:
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 20 August 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days
from notice.[8] Both petitioners and respondent complied.[9]
Petitioners assigned the following as errors:
A.
B.
[10]
Petitioners state that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code vests
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal complaints for libel on the RTC of the place:
(1) where the libelous article was printed and first published; or (2) where the
complainant, if a private person, resides; or (3) where the complainant, if a public
official, holds office. They argue that since the original complaint only contained the
office address of respondent and not the latters actual residence or the place where
the allegedly offending news reports were printed and first published, the original
complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction
on the lower court.
The question to be resolved is: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over
the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages?
We rule in the affirmative.
2.
If the offended party is a public officer with office
in Manila at the time the offense was committed, the venue
is Manila or the city or province where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
3.
Where an offended party is a public official with
office outside of Manila, the venue is the province or the city
where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense
or where the libelous article is printed and first published.
4.
If an offended party is a private person, the venue is
his place of residence at the time of the commission of the offense
or where the libelous article is printed and first published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether
the offended party is a public officer or a private person, he has
always the option to file the action in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed or first
published.
was rendered in the forcible entry case, the tenants of the property already filed a suit
with the DARAB for the annulment of the real estate mortgage executed by
respondent over the same in favor of DBP and the subsequent foreclosure and
auction sale in favor of petitioners. The DARAB's decision declaring the mortgage,
foreclosure and auction sale null and void became final as regards petitioners who
did not appeal from the decision. Respondent asserts that the complaint for forcible
entry filed by petitioners had lost its legal basis after the DARAB declared that the
foreclosure and auction sale of the subject property were null and void.
Petitioners filed a Reply10 dated July 28, 2006, insisting that the tenant-farmers
involved in the DARAB case were not parties to the forcible entry case, the only
defendant therein being respondent in this case. Respondent, in turn, raised the
defense of ownership, thereby joining the issues regarding possession and
ownership.
Petitioners further note their argument in their Motion for Reconsideration 11 of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals that the subject property had been declared as
wilderness area and the same had been classified as alienable and disposable on
December 22, 1987. In support of this contention, they submitted a Department of
Agrarian Reform Order12 dated September 12, 1997 to the effect that the subject
property falls within the administrative authority or competence of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The order directed the PARO of Cebu
and the MARO of Bantayan, Cebu to cease and desist from further activities
affecting the subject property under Operation Land Transfer, and to refer the matter
to the DENR.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint.13 In ascertaining, for instance, whether an action is one for forcible entry
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined.14
A review of the complaint reveals that the pertinent allegations thereof sufficiently
vest jurisdiction over the action on the MCTC. The complaint alleges as follows:
III
That the plaintiffs are the owners and legal as well as actual possessors of a
parcel of agricultural land more particularly described as follows:
xxx
IV
That the defendant, sometime in the second week of March 1988, by
strategy and through stealth entered the above-described land of the
plaintiffs and took possession thereof; thus, depriving said plaintiffs of the
possession thereof;
V
That several demands were made the plaintiffs upon the defendants to
restore to them the possession of the above-described parcel of land; but,
"to transmit" to the Regional Trial Court "the original record of case AC-G.R. No.
13912 immediately upon receipt of this order." (p. 106, Rollo) (sic) But no records
can be transmitted back to the lower court simply because no records were elevated
in that, as aforesaid, the case was filed here as an original action.
The [petitioners] have manifested in their motion that they were not given an
opportunity to answer or at least comment on the petition. Now the same is in the
lower court as directed in the decision sought to be clarified. Indeed, issues cannot be
joined if the lower court will deprive the [petitioners] (of) their right to respond to
the petition.
WHEREFORE, for the sake of clarity the dispositive portion of the decision
dated April 13, 1988 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby decides to
REFER this case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pablo
City, for trial on the merits as to which of the parties are legally
entitled to the custody of the child, Joyce Orda Galang. FOR
ISSUES TO BE JOINED, THE LOWER COURT IS HEREBY
ORDERED TO REQUIRE THE [petitioners] TO ANSWER THE
PETITION."
SO ORDERED." 7
Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution.
Petitioners contended that respondent Court of Appeals had no authority to refer the
case to the lower court for trial on the merits because said court, in the original
habeas corpus case filed by private respondent, had never acquired jurisdiction over
their persons. Further, that respondent court had no power to order a case docketed
with the lower court without private respondent having paid the docketing fee and
filing an appropriate pleading therein. Private respondent, on the other hand, also set
forth similar contentions and prayed that trial on the merits be resumed by
respondent Court.
The Court of Appeals 8 resolved both motions for reconsideration on 13 March 1990
as follows:
We entertain no doubt that [petitioners] had never been brought to the
jurisdiction of the lower court in SP: PROC. No. SP-719 (87)and agree with
the claim that the Order of dismissal issued in said case had already become
final and executory. But then, it must be pointed out again that with the
filing of another petition for habeas corpus before this Court (docketed as
AC [sic] G.R. SP No. 13912), an entirely new proceeding was commenced.
Unlike the lower court in the previous habeas corpus case, this Court
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of [petitioners] upon their filing of an
Opposition/Answer on April 4, 1988 (p. 14, Rollo).
Section 9[1] in relation to Section 21 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 confers upon the
Court of Appeals authority to try and decide habeas corpus cases concurrent with the
Regional Trial Courts. Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction has been defined as that
which is possessed by a court together with another or others over the same subject
matter. Clearly, therefore, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides the basis for Us to refer
AC (sic) G.R. SP No. 13912 to the lower court for trial on the merits. With the
referral of AC (sic) G.R. SP No. 13912, the jurisdiction which this Court acquired
over the persons of [petitioners] was transferred to and conferred upon the Regional
Trial Court, which necessarily must treat said case as a separate and distinct
proceeding from the one it earlier dismissed. This means that the Regional Trial
Court must assign the referred case a new number, but need not require the [private
respondent] to remit the prescribed docketing fee inasmuch as the same had already
been paid with this Court. What the parties need to do though is to reproduce the
pleadings they filed in AC (sic) G.R. SP No. 13912 before the Regional Trial Court
in order for issues to be joined therein.- nad
Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the Decision dated April 13, 1988 is hereby
further clarified to read thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby decides to REFER
this case to the regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pablo City, for trial on
the merits as to which of the parties are legally entitled to the custody of the
child, Joyce Orda Galang. FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PARTIES ARE
DIRECTED TO REPRODUCE ALL THE PLEADINGS THEY FILED IN
AC (sic) G.R. SP NO. 13912 BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
UPON THE RECEIPT OF WHICH, SHALL ASSIGN THE CASE A NEW
NUMBER WITHOUT REQUIRING [private respondent] TO PAY THE
DOCKETING FEE."
SO ORDERED. 9
In this special civil action for Certiorari petitioners assign the following as errors
committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred, as it is without authority [to do so],
in referring the original action for habeas corpus filed before it to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pablo City, for trial on the merits
to determine the issue as to which of the parties are legally entitled to
the custody of the child, its reliance on Section 9[1] in relation to
Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 21 being specious.
2. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in ordering the parties to the original
action for habeas corpus filed before it to reproduce before the
Regional Trial Court all the pleadings they filed in AC-G.R. SP No.
13912 (sic).
3. Respondent Court of Appeals erred, as it is without authority [to do so],
in directing the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pablo City, to
assign the case a new case number without requiring herein private
respondent (as petitioner therein) to pay the docket fee therefor. 10
Attention is also directed to the fact that the foregoing provision is silent as to
whether or not the hearing may be delegated, unlike that of the provision on
annulment of judgments, Section 1(c)(3) of the same Rule, where, on motion of the
parties, referral of any of the issues to a Commissioner is allowed in accordance with
Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.
Under the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals was in error in ordering the
remand and later on the referral of the original petition for habeas corpus filed with it
to the Regional Trial Court. What respondent court should have done was to conduct
the reception of evidence and pass upon the merits of the conflicting allegations of
the parties insofar as the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is concerned.
While We agree with the conclusion reached by respondent court that the case
requires a full-blown trial of the facts, the same should be done in the context of the
special proceedings for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, and
not a remand or referral of the original action for a writ of habeas corpus filed with
the respondent court. Parenthetically, the proper venue in this action is the place
where the petitioner therein resides. 14 Petitioners' third assigned error is disposed of
accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
decision and resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and a
new one is rendered DISMISSING the petition for habeas corpus WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to the filing by private respondent of the appropriate special
proceedings to gain custody of his minor child. Let copies of this decision be
furnished all Members of the respondent Court of Appeals. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
OF
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:*
This is a sequel to our decision [1] of 5 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428,
entitled Isabelita Vital-Gozon v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., which held
that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, in a special civil action
for mandamus against a public officer (docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 16438
and entitled Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente v. Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, et al.), to take
cognizance of the claim for damages against respondent public officer.
Specifically, the instant petition seeks to reverse the Resolution of 7 May
1997[2] of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 awarding to
petitioner below, now private respondent, moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees after hearing the evidence thereon sometime after this Courts
decision in G.R. No. 101428 became final.
The factual antecedents then, as found by us in G.R. No. 101428, must be
restated, thus:
In the early months of 1987 -- and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119
issued on January 30, 1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino
-- reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health
commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel
effected.
At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the
Chief of Clinics of the National Children's Hospital, having been
appointed to that position on December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he
occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, a position to which he was
promoted in 1977 after serving as Medical Specialist I of the same
hospital for six (6) years (since 1971).
2.
(3)
xxx
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or
anyone in her behalf, or any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution
of August 9, 1988 would be obeyed, and apprehensive that the funds to
cover the salaries and allowances otherwise due him would revert to the
General Fund, Dr. de la Fuente repaired to the Civil Service Commission
and asked it to enforce its judgment. He was however told to file in court
a petition for mandamus because of the belief that the Commission
had no coercive powers -- unlike a court -- to enforce its final
decisions/resolutions.
So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an action
of mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction to compel
Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier
of the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution of the Civil
Service Commission. He prayed for the following specific reliefs:
(1) (That) xxx a temporary restraining order be issued immediately,
ordering the principal and other respondents to revert the funds of
the NCH corresponding to the amounts necessary to implement the
final resolution of the CSC in CSC Case No. 4 in favor of herein
which three levels of courts -- the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial
Court, and the Court of Appeals -- were conferred concurrent original
jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the Court of Appeals was given power
to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To
require him to separately litigate the matter of damages, he continued,
would lead to that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law.
While his motion for reconsideration was pending, de la Fuente sought to
enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 -- directing
his reinstatement pursuant to the Civil Service Commissions Resolution
of August 9, 1988, supra. He filed on July 4, 1989 a Motion for
Execution, alleging that the judgment of June 9, 1989 had become final
and executory for failure of Gozon, et al. -- served with notice thereof on
June 16, 1989 -- to move for its reconsideration or elevate the same to the
Supreme Court. His motion was granted by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated July 7, 1989, reading as follows:
The decision of June 9, 1989 having become final and
executory, as prayed for, let the writ of execution issue
forthwith.
The corresponding writ of execution issued on July 13, 1989, on the
invoked authority of Section 9, Rule 39. The writ quoted the dispositive
portion of the judgment of June 9, 1989, including, as the Solicitor
Generals Office points out, the second paragraph to the effect that the
petitions are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim of
damages; (hence,) the prayer therefor is denied.
The writ of execution notwithstanding, compliance with the June 9, 1989
judgment was not effected. Consequently, de la Fuente filed, on July 20,
1989, an Urgent Ex ParteManifestation with Prayer to Cite Respondents
for Contempt, complaining that although Gozon and her co-parties had
been served with the writ of execution on July 14, they had not complied
therewith. By Resolution dated July 26, 1989, the Court required Gozon
and Merencilla to appear before it on August 3, 1989 to answer the
charge and show cause why they should not be adjudged in contempt for
disobeying and/or resisting the judgment.
At the hearing Gozon and Merencilla duly presented themselves,
accompanied by their individual private lawyers -- one for Gozon (Felipe
Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals in an undated Report. [8] He further disclosed
that the pleading was transmitted to the Archives Section on 19 September 1992.
The Court of Appeals then ordered the parties to submit their respective
memoranda,[9] after which, the Court of Appeals promulgated, on 20 March 1997, a
resolution denying petitioners motion to admit her Answer to the petition and
supplemental/amended petition for mandamus with damages, on the ground that the
period to file the answer had long prescribed, thus:
It was too late that the answer was filed in this Court on September 18,
1992, after promulgation on August 5, 1992, of the decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 101428. The prescribed period to file such
answer as well as the extended period had long expired on January 24,
1989 (pp. 35, 37, 55, Rollo) by the time respondents answer was filed in
this Court on September 18, 1992. She had another opportunity to
answer when petitioner filed a supplemental/amended petition. (pp. 57,
72, Rollo). Still, she filed none. It is evident respondent just ignored the
case filed against her or gave no importance to the petitions and the
notices sent to her by this Court. The delay in filing her answer is
inexcusable.
After promulgation and upon finality of this Courts decision granting the
principal relief sought by the petitioner, the instant case
for mandamus was virtually disposed of with theexception of the
incidental damages that petitioner has claimed. It was uncontested in
view of respondents failure to answer the petition setting up her
defenses. Consequently, the allegations in the petition and supplemental
petition were deemed admitted; unpleaded defenses were deemed waived
and any counterclaim not set up, barred (Sections 1, 2 and 4, Rule 9,
Revised Rules of Court). Such procedural rules would become
meaningless unless strictly complied with by litigants. As clearly
indicated in the proposed answer, respondents purpose is to set up a
counterclaim already barred and to plead defenses already waived.
Besides, the parties as well as this Court are bound by the comprehensive
findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court in its final decision in
G.R. No. 101428, based on the uncontroverted allegations of the verified
petitions. So are they bound thereby in this proceeding which deals with
the lone issue of incidental damages claimed by petitioner. What remains
to be done by this Court is but the determination of whether respondents
2)
3)
4)
5)
expenses for litigation which he could hardly afford; and that he had to
spend no less than P5,000 for court fees and incidental expenses and to
pay his counsel P10,000 at the end of the litigation (pp. 6, 7, 12, 13, t.s.n.,
Dec. 7, 1995). All these respondent has not successfully rebutted by her
evidence since she adduced none in her behalf.
6)
7)
To all these, her reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of Health
concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor the
Health officials concerned accorded said acts and events any importance. She never
bothered to find out what was being done to contest or negate de la Fuentes petitions
and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by, de la Fuentes efforts were being
met with success.
Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Vital-Gozon merits relief from the
final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. This Court will not
disturb that Resolution. It is satisfied that no procedural or substantive errors taint
that Resolution, or its becoming final and executory.
The Court of Appeals then considered the evidence for private respondent and
the applicable law, thus:
Upon respondents continued refusal without justifiable cause to
implement the final resolution of the Civil Service Commission
upholding petitioners right to the position he has been claiming with
back salaries, transportation, representation and housing allowances and
other benefits withheld from him, petitioner is entitled to the damages he
claims. Testifying in his own behalf petitioner declared that he was
greatly disturbed, shocked and frustrated during the three months
preceding the filing of his petition; that he had sleepless nights and
suffered from mental anxiety, mental anguish, worry, tension and
humiliation when respondent ignored and disregarded the final resolution
of the Civil Service Commission; that he felt harassed by her refusal
because he had to go to court to obtain relief and had to incur additional
decision of this Court of 4 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428, she immediately filed
her answer with a corresponding motion for its admission; and (f) while her motion
for admission of the answer had been pending since 18 October 1992, the Court of
Appeals did not act on it until it was already her turn to present her evidence on the
claim for damages.
In his comment on the petition submitted in compliance with the Resolution of
21 July 1997, private respondent contends that: (a) petitioners incomplete and
slanted version of the facts of the case cannot be relied upon; (b) the factual findings
of this Court in G.R. No. 101428 are conclusive and binding, hence the Court of
Appeals did not err nor abuse its discretion in relying on said findings; (c)
petitioners invocation of state immunity is untenable as she was sued not in her
official capacity, and assuming otherwise, petitioner could nevertheless be held liable
for damages under Articles 20, 27 and 2176 of the Civil Code and Section 3, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court; (d) the Court of Appeals did not err in denying petitioners
motion to admit her answer; and (e) the Court of Appeals awards of moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees were proper, fair, reasonable, justified and in
accord with the law and precedent.
Two principal issues thus confront us, viz: (a) whether petitioner was denied
due process when her answer to the petition was not admitted; and (b) whether the
awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees were proper. These will
be resolved in seriatim.
I
We do not hesitate to rule that petitioner was not denied due process. The
record of CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 shows that in the resolution of 29 December 1998,
the Court of Appeals gave due course to private respondents petition and required
herein petitioner and the other respondents to answer the petition within 10 days
from notice of the resolution.[21] On 9 January 1988, petitioner and the other
respondents, represented by Atty. Jose Fabia, filed a motion for an extension of 15
days from said date within which to file their answer, which respondent court granted
in its resolution of 17 January 1989. [22] Likewise, on 17 January 1989, private
respondent, as petitioner below, was granted leave to file a supplemental/amended
petition.[23]
The Supplemental/Amended Petition was filed on 3 February 1989, [24] and in
the resolution of 9 February 1989,[25] the Court of Appeals required petitioner herein
and her co-respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 to file their answer thereto within
10 days from notice. However, no such answer was filed, and on 9 June 1989, the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision. [26] De la Fuente seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration,[27] principally as regards the holding that the petitions are not the
vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim of damages. A copy of this motion
was furnished counsel for respondents. Respondents therein were then required, in
the resolution of 5 July 1989,[28] to comment within 10 days from notice. However,
respondents below once more failed to comply. Thus, on 27 September 1989, the
Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution[29] granting the motion for reconsideration
by deleting therefrom the challenged portion of its decision of 9 June
1989. Respondent court then set reception of evidence on the claims for damages on
9 and 11 of October 1989.
Respondents below, represented by new counsel, Atty. Pedro Martinez, and the
rest by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed motions to reconsider the resolution
of 27 September 1989, primarily on the ground that the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction over the claim for damages in the petition for mandamus. The incidental
issue of the authority of the Solicitor General to appear for herein petitioner in
respect of the claim for damages against her in her personal capacity was also
raised. These matters became the subject of various pleadings.
Eventually, on 11 January 1991, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
resolution[30] which gave rise to G.R. No. 101428, after the Court of Appeals denied
herein petitioners motion for reconsideration.
filing the answer or the reply in special civil actions, a case is deemed submitted for
resolution. Thus, after the expiration of the 10-day period granted to herein
petitioner to file her Answer to the Supplemental/Amended Petition, and in light of
her failure to file her answer to the original petition despite the grant of her motion
for extension of time to file it, then the case was automatically deemed submitted for
decision. After the decision was rendered, she could then no longer be heard to raise
a defense which, by her inaction, she indubitably expressed no desire to raise.
It cannot then be successfully maintained that the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion, when it denied admission to
an answer that was filed only after this Courts decision in G.R. No. 101428 had long
become final and immutable.
What further militates against petitioners advocacy is that the Court of
Appeals, aside from affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard through the filing
of pleadings, likewise sustained petitioners right to due process at the hearing. What
petitioner neglects to mention is that respondent court did not deprive her the right to
cross-examine private respondent when the latter testified as to the matter of
damages. Through the exercise of the right, petitioner could have negated private
respondents claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis
therefor. Moreover, the Court of Appeals explicitly allowed petitioner to present her
evidence against the claim for damages. However, petitioner again failed to take the
opportunity to have herself heard.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners failure to file the answer to the petition was due
to her fault or negligence. She was, by formal resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
required to file answers to both the original petition and the Supplemental/Amended
Petition; yet, she failed to heed both resolutions. As regards the resolution to answer
the Supplemental/Amended Petition, herein petitioner totally disregarded the
same. And if only to further evince that herein petitioner had no one to blame but
herself for her plight, as regards the resolution to answer the original petition, this
she spurned despite the fact that she asked for and was granted an extension of 15
days within which to do so. That she questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals over the claims for damages is entirely irrelevant, considering that she did
so only after the Court of Appeals promulgated its Resolution of 27 September
1989. Up to that time, petitioner had absolutely no responsive pleading setting forth
her defense.
It may be pointed out that in her Answer,[31] she interposed the following
defenses against the claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees,
namely: (1) the claim was effectively and exclusively a suit against the State, but
without its consent; (2) she had not committed any actionable wrong as she acted in
good faith and without malice or negligence; and (3) whatever injury private
respondent may have suffered were mere consequences of his indiscretion,
negligence and/or ignorance of the law which, at best, constituted damnum absque
injuria. From the nature of these defenses, they could very well have been taken up,
even indirectly, on cross-examination of private respondent or in the course of
petitioners testimony had she chosen to present her evidence. All told, the above
discussion should readily refute petitioners claim of a denial of due process.
It may likewise be stressed that under Section 2.c.(4) of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals then in force, after the expiration of the period for
II
and similar injury. They may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission.[32] The instances when moral damages may be
recovered are, inter alia, acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 32, 34 and 35 of the Civil Code,[33] which, in turn, are found in the Chapter on
Human Relations of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code. Relevant to the instant
case, which involves public officers, is Article 27,[34] which provides:
ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file
an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Article 27 must then be read in conjunction with Section 1 of Article XI
(Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution,[35] which provides:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and 2217 of
the Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable for moral
damages for as long as the moral damages suffered by private respondent were the
proximate result of petitioners wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an
official duty or neglect in the performance thereof. In fact, if only to underscore the
vulnerability of public officials and employees to suits for damages to answer for any
form or degree of misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance, this Court has had
occasion to rule that under Articles 19 and 27 of the Civil Code, a public official may
be made to pay damages for performing a perfectly legal act, albeit with bad faith or
in violation of the abuse of right doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of
the Civil Code concerning Human Relations.[36]
deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.[38]
There can be no question that private respondent was entitled to be restored to
his position as Chief of Clinics by virtue of the final and executory decision of the
Civil Service Commission. Petitioner, as head or chief of the National Childrens
Hospital, then had the duty to see to it that the decision be obeyed and
implemented. This she failed to do and private respondents two official demands
for compliance with the Civil Service Commissions decision were merely referred
by petitioner to the Legal Department of the Department of Health; and as further
noted by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. 101428, she did not answer [private
respondents] letters not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant
Secretary [for Legal Affairs]. She chose simply to await legal guidance from the
DOH Legal Department. This Court further noted:
To all these, [petitioners] reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of
Health concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor
the Health Department officials concerned accorded said acts and events any
importance. She never bothered to find out what was being done to contest or negate
[private respondents] petitions and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by,
[private respondents] efforts were being met with success.
That petitioner then committed an actionable wrong for unjustifiably refusing
or neglecting to perform an official duty is undeniable. Private respondent testified
on the moral damages which he suffered by reason of such misfeasance or
malfeasance of petitioner, and the attorneys fees and litigation expenses he incurred
to vindicate his rights and protect his interests. The Court of Appeals which heard
him gave full faith and credit to his testimony. Private respondent declared that by
reason of the unjust action or refusal of petitioner when she did not recognize,
ignored and disregarded the final and executory Civil Service Resolution, he:
Private respondents anguish even continued during the 5-month period while the
case was pending with the Court of Appeals, thus:
During this period my sleepless nights and my moral sufferings continued. As a
matter of fact, even worsened. I just could not understand, actually I could not
understand the action here of Dr. Gozon for having not followed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. And that is why I felt very much aggrieved during this period. I
could not sleep at all and this has weakened me.[40]
Private respondent further testified that he spent not less than P5,000.00 for court
fees and as incidental expenses and had committed himself to pay P10,000.00 to
his counsel at the end of the case.[41]
While private respondent did not quantify the extent of his moral damages, the
Court of Appeals fixed the same at P50,000.00. Since moral damages are, in the
language of Article 2217 of the Civil Code, incapable of pecuniary estimation,
courts have the discretion to fix the corresponding amount, not being bound by any
self-serving assessment by the claimants. On the other hand, a claimants failure to
state the monetary value of moral damages suffered presents no legal obstacle to a
courts determination thereof, as long as there is factual basis for the award such as
the claimants testimony as to his sufferings. As a matter of fact, it is not unusual for
claimants to leave the determination of the amount of the award to the discretion of
the court.
Under Article 2233 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages cannot be recovered
as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages
in the amount of P20,000.00. Considering that a public official is the culprit here,
the propriety of such an award cannot be questioned. It serve as an example or
deterrent so that other public officials be always reminded that they are public
servants bound to adhere faithfully to the constitutional injunction that a public office
is a public trust. That the aggrieved party happened to be another public official will
not serve to mitigate the effects of petitioners having failed to observe the required
degree of accountability and responsibility.
As to attorneys fees as actual damages, the Court of Appeals determination of
its propriety in this case and the extent thereof were well within its discretion. The
agreement between private respondent and his counsel as to the amount does not
control.
Petitioners contention that she cannot be liable for damages since she was sued
in her official capacity is without merit. Whether petitioner was impleaded as
respondent in an official capacity, i.e., solely in her capacity as Chief of the National
Childrens Hospital, is best determined from the Petition as well as the
Supplemental/Amended Petition. For one, in the captions in both, she is named as
one of the respondents without any express mention that she was so sued in her
capacity, as Chief of the National Childrens Hospital. For another, the allegations
in the body of the Petition clearly show that she was sued in both her official and
private capacities. As to the former, paragraphs 1 and 7 respectively allege
petitioners position as a public official, and specifically as Head of the Childrens
Hospital; her duty to restore private respondent to his position by virtue of the final
decision of the Civil Service Commission; and her refusal to allow private
respondent to perform and discharge his duties and responsibilities as Chief of
Clinics. As to the latter, paragraph 16 of the Petition explicitly speaks of
petitioners personal liability, thus:
16. For causing such mental suffering and anguish, etc., [42] principal respondent
[herein petitioner] ought to and must be, in accordance with the Civil Code, held
personally answerable and liable to the petitioner in the sum of not less
than P100,000.00 as moral damages, and another sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, by way of example or correction for the public good. [43] (emphasis
supplied)
In maintaining then that she was sued merely in her official capacity, petitioner has
either overlooked paragraph 16 or sought to deliberately mislead this Court.
WHEREFORE, for utter failure to show that respondent Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in the challenged resolutions, the instant petition is
denied.
Costs against petitioner.
relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction
over the case. 3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC
contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence
submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an
employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or
a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee
relationship between him and petitioner. 4
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal
filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private
respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of
employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the
semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment
for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by
petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but
only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral
Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an
overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita.
Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the
mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the
management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the
payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show
that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business
operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate
in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging
that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. 2
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned
decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings. 5 Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, 6 hence the
present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. 7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is
now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic
practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with
respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find
their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the
provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines
and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)
now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the
Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were
expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the
President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same
to take effect six months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the
present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for
program and policy coordination only. 9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223)
thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the
NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said
provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been
provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals
from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present Section 223, as last amended by
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall
decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and
that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of
Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review
is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial
rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts
the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now
fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously,
although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already
have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that
this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional
and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule
65. 14
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129
originally provided as follows:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall
exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship
speech 19 from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme
Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be
deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House
of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the
House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr.
President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of
Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was
passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third
reading followed. 21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and
House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of
Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20,
1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier
discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review
of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals
by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review
addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however,
and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action
ofcertiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court
of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the
opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the
process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings.
On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure
would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be
appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the
advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and
reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said
bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly
the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final
and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal
of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and
may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the
wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing
number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact,
has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of
unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally
equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component
divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on
labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to
mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the
relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in
accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs.
Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before
us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same
is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED,
to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the
views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
NATIONAL
(NWRB),
WATER
RESOURCES
Petitioner,
- versus -
BOARD
Promulgated:
A. L. ANG NETWORK, INC.,
Respondent.
April 8, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City against petitioner and BACIWA. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the proper recourse of respondent was to
the Court of Appeals, citing Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC, by Order of April 15, 2005, [4] dismissed respondents petition for
lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order[s] or
awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission[s] . . .
except those within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . . Thus the
RTC explained:
Art. 89 of P.D. 1067 having been long repealed by BP 129, as
amended, which has effectively and explicitly removed the
Regional Trial Courts appellate jurisdiction over the decisions,
resolutions, order[s] or awards of quasi-judicial agencies such as
[petitioner] NWRB, and vested with the Court of Appeals, very
clearly now, this Court has no jurisdiction over this instant
petition.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals, which, by Decision of January 25,
2008,[5] annulledand set aside the RTC April 15, 2005, holding that it is the RTC
which has jurisdiction over appeals from petitioners decisions. Thus the appellate
court discoursed.
In the analogous case of BF Northwest Homeowners
Association, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court[,] the
Supreme Court . . . categorically pronounced the RTCs
jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the NWRB
consistent with Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and ratiocinated in this
wise:
x x x x.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of NWRC
decisions lies with the Regional Trial Courts, particularly,
when we take note of the fact that the appellate
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over NWRC
decisions covers such broad and all embracing grounds as
grave abuse of discretion, questions of law, and questions
of fact and law (Art. 89, P.D. No. 1067). This conclusion
is also in keeping with the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, which vests Regional Trial Courts with original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, etc. (Sec. 21 [1], B.P. Blg. 129) relating to
acts or omissions of an inferior court (Sec. 4, Rule 65,
Rules of Court).
x x x x.
Similarly, in Tanjay Water District vs. Pedro Gabaton,
the Supreme Court conformably ruled, viz:
Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 8144 involves the
appropriation, utilization and control of water, We hold
that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute in the
first instance, pertains to the Water Resources Council as
provided in PD No. 1067 which is the special law on the
subject. The Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) has only appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, there is no doubt
that [petitioner] NWRB is mistaken in its assertion. As no repeal
is expressly made, Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 is certainly meant
to be an exception to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over appeals or petitions for certiorari of the decisions of quasijudicial bodies. This finds harmony with Paragraph 2, Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is stated that, If it
involves the acts of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. Evidently, not all
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 involving the decisions of
quasi-judicial agencies must be filed with the Court of
Appeals. The rule admits of some exceptions as plainly provided
by the phrase unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules and Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 is verily an example of
these exceptions. (italics and emphasis partly in the original;
underscoring supplied)
Petitioner maintains that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over a petition
for certiorari and prohibition to annul or modify its acts or omissions as a quasijudicial agency. Citing Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
contends that there is no law or rule which requires the filing of a petition for
certiorari over its acts or omissions in any other court or tribunal other than the Court
of Appeals.[8]
Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in holding that Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act did not expressly
repeal Article 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (PD 1067) otherwise known as
the Water Code of the Philippines.[9]
agencies, like petitioner, should be filed with it. This is what Rule 65 of the Rules
imposes for procedural uniformity. The only exception to this instruction is when
the law or the Rules itself directs otherwise, as cited in Section 4, Rule 65. [12] The
appellate courts construction that Article 89 of PD 1067, which reads:
reading of said Article 89 shows, however, that it only made grave abuse of
discretion as another ground to invoke in an ordinary appeal to the RTC. Indeed,
the provision was unique to the Water Codeat the time of its application in
1976.
ART. 89.
The decisions of the [NWRB] on water rights
controversies may be appealed to the [RTC] of the province
where the subject matter of the controversy is situated within
fifteen (15) days from the date the party appealing receives a copy
of the decision, on any of the following grounds: (1) grave abuse
of discretion; (2) question of law; and (3) questions of fact and
law (emphasis and underscoring supplied),
The general repealing clause under Section 47 predicates the intended repeal under
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. [13]
In enacting BP 129, the Batasang Pambansa was presumed to have
knowledge of the provision of Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and to have intended to
change it.[14] The legislative intent to repeal Article 89 is clear and manifest given the
scope and purpose of BP 129, one of which is to provide a homogeneous procedure
for the review of adjudications of quasi-judicial entities to the Court of Appeals.
More importantly, what Article 89 of PD 1067 conferred to the RTC was the
power of review on appeal the decisions of petitioner. It appears that the appellate
court gave significant consideration to the ground of grave abuse of discretion to
thus hold that the RTC has certiorari jurisdiction over petitioners decisions. A
Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton[19] is not in point either as the issue raised
therein was which between the RTC and the then National Water Resources Council
had jurisdiction over disputes in the appropriation, utilization and control of water.
IN FINE, certiorari and appellate jurisdiction over adjudications of
petitioner properly belongs to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 15, 2005 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City dismissing petitioners petition for lack of
jurisdiction is UPHELD.
No costs.
- versus -
Puno, J.,
Chairman,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
Tinga, and
*
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation
(Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneers letter of undertaking,
to consider it as counter-bond and to discharge the attachment. On May 29, 1996,
the trial court granted the motion; thus, the letter of undertaking was approved as
counter-bond to discharge the attachment.
For failing to file their respective answers and upon motion of petitioner
Crescent, the trial court declared respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or
Transmar in default. Petitioner Crescent was allowed to present its evidence exparte.
On July 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioner
Crescent, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff [Crescent] and against the
defendants [Vessel, SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar].
Consequently, the latter are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff
jointly and solidarily, the following:
(a) the sum of US$103,544.00, representing the
outstanding obligation;
(b) interest of US$10,978.50 as of July 3, 1996,
plus additional interest at 18% per annum for
the period thereafter, until the principal
account is fully paid;
(c) attorneys fees of P300,000.00; and
(d) P200,000.00 as litigation expenses.
On November 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued its assailed Decision,
which reversed that of the trial court, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
July 25, 1996, issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 10, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
one is entered DISMISSING the instant case for want of
jurisdiction.
The appellate court denied petitioner Crescents motion for reconsideration
explaining that it dismissed the instant action primarily on the ground of forum non
conveniens considering that the parties are foreign corporations which are not doing
business in the Philippines.
Hence, this petition submitting the following issues for resolution, viz:
1.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction over a foreign
vessel found inside Philippine waters for the
enforcement of a maritime lien against said vessel
and/or its owners and operators;
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
SO ORDERED.
On August 19, 1996, respondents Vessel and SCI appealed to the Court of
Appeals. They attached copies of the charter parties between respondent SCI and
Halla, between Halla and Transmar, and between Transmar and Portserv. They
pointed out that Portserv was a time charterer and that there is a clause in the time
charters between respondent SCI and Halla, and between Halla and Transmar, which
states that the Charterers shall provide and pay for all the fuel except as otherwise
agreed. They submitted a copy of Part II of the Bunker Fuel Agreement between
petitioner Crescent and Portserv containing a stipulation that New York law governs
the construction, validity and performance of the contract. They likewise
submitted certified copies of the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Lien Act of
the United States (U.S.), some U.S. cases, and some Canadian cases to support their
defense.
conveniens is
7.
8.
9.
10.
created under Section 580 but also for the collection of any kind
of lien whatsoever.[8] In the Philippines, we have a complete
legislation, both substantive and adjective, under which to bring
an action in rem against a vessel for the purpose of enforcing
liens. The substantive law is found in Article 580 of the Code of
Commerce. The procedural law is to be found in Article 584 of
the same Code. The result is, therefore, that in the Philippines any
vessel even though it be a foreign vessel found in any port of
this Archipelago may be attached and sold under the substantive
law which defines the right, and the procedural law contained in
the Code of Commerce by which this right is to be enforced. [9] x x
x. But where neither the law nor the contract between the parties
creates any lien or charge upon the vessel, the only way in which
it can be seized before judgment is by pursuing the remedy
relating to attachment under Rule 59 [now Rule 57] of the Rules
of Court.[10]
But, is petitioner Crescent entitled to a maritime lien under our laws?
Petitioner Crescent bases its claim of a maritime lien on Sections
21, 22 and 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1521 (P.D. No. 1521), also known as
the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978, viz:
Sec. 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; persons entitled
to such lien. - Any person furnishing repairs, supplies, towage,
use of dry dock or maritime railway, or other necessaries, to any
vessel, whether foreign or domestic, upon the order of the owner
of such vessel, or of a person authorized by the owner, shall have
a maritime lien on the vessel, which may be enforced by suit in
rem, and it shall be necessary to allege or prove that credit was
given to the vessel.
Sec. 22. Persons Authorized to Procure Repairs,
Supplies and Necessaries. - The following persons shall be
presumed to have authority from the owner to procure repairs,
supplies, towage, use of dry dock or marine railway, and other
necessaries for the vessel: The managing owner, ships husband,
master or any person to whom the management of the vessel at
the port of supply is entrusted. No person tortuously or
unlawfully in possession or charge of a vessel shall have authority
to bind the vessel.
has or will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the
supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.[15] This principle was
laid down in the 1888 case of The Scotia,[16] reiterated in The Kaiser Wilhelm
II[17] (1916), in The Woudrichem[18] (1921) and in The City of Atlanta[19] (1924).
Two. The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced
such single-factor methodologies as the law of the place of supply.[20]
In Lauritzen v. Larsen,[21] a Danish seaman, while temporarily in New
York, joined the crew of a ship of Danish flag and registry that is owned by a Danish
citizen. He signed the ships articles providing that the rights of the crew members
would be governed by Danish law and by the employers contract with the Danish
Seamens Union, of which he was a member. While in Havana and in the course of
his employment, he was negligently injured. He sued the shipowner in a federal
district court in New York for damages under the Jones Act. In holding that Danish
law and not the Jones Act was applicable, the Supreme Court adopted a multiplecontact test to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional directive as to
the statutes reach, which jurisdictions law should be applied. The following factors
were considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance
or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place
of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum.
Several years after Lauritzen, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case
of Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. [22] again considered a foreign
seamans personal injury claim under both the Jones Act and the general maritime
law. The Court held that the factors first announced in the case of Lauritzen
were applicable not only to personal injury claims arising under the Jones Act
but to all matters arising under maritime law in general.[23]
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis[24] was also a suit under the Jones Act by a
Greek seaman injured aboard a ship of Greek registry while in American waters.
The ship was operated by a Greek corporation which has its largest office in New
York and another office in New Orleans and whose stock is more than 95% owned
by a U.S. domiciliary who is also a Greek citizen. The ship was engaged in regularly
scheduled runs between various ports of the U.S. and the Middle East, Pakistan, and
India, with its entire income coming from either originating or terminating in the
U.S. The contract of employment provided that Greek law and a Greek collective
bargaining agreement would apply between the employer and the seaman and that all
claims arising out of the employment contract were to be adjudicated by a Greek
court. The U.S. Supreme Court observed thatof the seven factors listed in the
Lauritzen test, four were in favor of the shipowner and against jurisdiction. In
arriving at the conclusion that the Jones Act applies, it ruled that the application of
the Lauritzen test is not a mechanical one. It stated thus: [t]he significance of one
or more factors must be considered in light of the national interest served by the
assertion of Jones Act jurisdiction. (footnote omitted) Moreover, the list of seven
The principles enunciated in these maritime tort cases have been extended
to cases involving unpaid supplies and necessaries such as the cases of Forsythe
International U.K., Ltd. v. M/V Ruth Venture,[25] and Comoco Marine Services v.
M/V El Centroamericano.[26]
Three. The factors provided in Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
Law have also been applied, especially in resolving cases brought under the Federal
Maritime Lien Act. Their application suggests that in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties, the forum contacts to be considered include: (a) the
place of contracting; (b) the place of negotiation of the contract; (c) the place of
performance; (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract; and (e) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties.[27]
In Gulf Trading and Transportation Co. v. The Vessel Hoegh Shield,
[28]
an admiralty action in rem was brought by an American supplier against a vessel
of Norwegian flag owned by a Norwegian Company and chartered by a London time
charterer for unpaid fuel oil and marine diesel oil delivered while the vessel was in
U.S. territory. The contract was executed in London. It was held that because the
bunker fuel was delivered to a foreign flag vessel within the jurisdiction of the U.S.,
and because the invoice specified payment in the U.S., the admiralty and maritime
law of the U.S. applied. The U.S. Court of Appeals recognized the modern approach
to maritime conflict of law problems introduced in the Lauritzen case. However, it
observed that Lauritzen involved a torts claim under the Jones Act while the present
claim involves an alleged maritime lien arising from unpaid supplies. It made a
disclaimer that its conclusion is limited to the unique circumstances surrounding a
maritime lien as well as the statutory directives found in the Maritime Lien Statute
and that the initial choice of law determination is significantly affected by the
statutory policies surrounding a maritime lien. It ruled that the facts in the case
call for the application of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law. The U.S.
Court gave much significance to the congressional intent in enacting the Maritime
Lien Statute to protect the interests of American supplier of goods, services or
necessaries by making maritime liens available where traditional services are
routinely rendered. It concluded that the Maritime Lien Statute represents a relevant
policy of the forum that serves the needs of the international legal system as well as
the basic policies underlying maritime law. The court also gave equal importance to
the predictability of result and protection of justified expectations in a particular field
of law. In the maritime realm, it is expected that when necessaries are furnished to a
vessel in an American port by an American supplier, the American Lien Statute will
apply to protect that supplier regardless of the place where the contract was formed
or the nationality of the vessel.
The same principle was applied in the case of Swedish Telecom Radio v.
M/V Discovery I[29] where the American court refused to apply the Federal Maritime
Lien Act to create a maritime lien for goods and services supplied by foreign
companies in foreign ports. In this case, a Swedish company supplied radio
equipment in a Spanish port to refurbish a Panamanian vessel damaged by fire.
Some of the contract negotiations occurred in Spain and the agreement for supplies
between the parties indicated Swedish companys willingness to submit to Swedish
law. The ship was later sold under a contract of purchase providing for the
application of New York law and was arrested in the U.S. The U.S. Court of Appeals
also held that while the contacts-based framework set forth in Lauritzen was useful
in the analysis of all maritime choice of law situations, the factors were geared
towards a seamans injury claim. As in Gulf Trading, the lien arose by operation of
law because the ships owner was not a party to the contract under which the goods
were supplied. As a result, the court found it more appropriate to consider the factors
contained in Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law. The U.S.
Court held that the primary concern of the Federal Maritime Lien Act is the
protection of American suppliers of goods and services.
The same factors were applied in the case of Ocean Ship Supply, Ltd. v.
M/V Leah.[30]
II.
Finding guidance from the foregoing decisions, the Court cannot sustain
petitioner Crescents insistence on the application of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship
Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien exists.
First. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen,
Philippine law only falls under one the law of the forum. All other elements are
foreign Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of the
injured and the place of contract; India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the
defendant shipowner. Balancing these basic interests, it is inconceivable that the
Philippine court has any interest in the case that outweighs the interests of Canada or
India for that matter.
Second. P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 is
inapplicable following the factors under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.
Like the Federal Maritime Lien Act of the U.S., P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage
Decree of 1978 was enacted primarily to protect Filipino suppliers and was not
intended to create a lien from a contract for supplies between foreign entities
delivered in a foreign port.
Third. Applying P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and
rule that a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind the
enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping industry. Opening up our
courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien under our laws even if
they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum
shopping.
necessaries must have been necessary for the continuation of the voyage of the
vessel; (3) the credit must have been extended to the vessel; (4) there must be
necessity for the extension of the credit; and (5) the necessaries must be ordered by
persons authorized to contract on behalf of the vessel. [34] These do not avail in the
instant case.
First. It was not established that benefit was extended to the vessel. While
this is presumed when the master of the ship is the one who placed the order, it is not
disputed that in this case it was the sub-charterer Portserv which placed the orders to
petitioner Crescent.[35] Hence, the presumption does not arise and it is incumbent
upon petitioner Crescent to prove that benefit was extended to the vessel. Petitioner
did not.
Second. Petitioner Crescent did not show any proof that the marine
products were necessary for the continuation of the vessel.
Third. It was not established that credit was extended to the vessel. It is
presumed that in the absence of fraud or collusion, where advances are made to a
captain in a foreign port, upon his request, to pay for necessary repairs or supplies to
enable his vessel to prosecute her voyage, or to pay harbor dues, or for pilotage,
towage and like services rendered to the vessel, that they are made upon the credit of
the vessel as well as upon that of her owners. [36] In this case, it was the subcharterer Portserv which requested for the delivery of the bunker fuels. The
issuance of two checks amounting to US$300,000 in favor of petitioner Crescent
prior to the delivery of the bunkers as security for the payment of the obligation
weakens petitioner Crescents contention that credit was extended to the Vessel.
We also note that when copies of the charter parties were submitted by
respondents in the Court of Appeals, the time charters between respondent SCI and
Halla and between Halla and Transmar were shown to contain a clause which states
that the Charterers shall provide and pay for all the fuel except as otherwise
agreed. This militates against petitioner Crescents position that Portserv is
authorized by the shipowner to contract for supplies upon the credit of the vessel.
Fourth. There was no proof of necessity of credit. A necessity of credit
will be presumed where it appears that the repairs and supplies were necessary for
the ship and that they were ordered by the master. This presumption does not arise
in this case since the fuels were not ordered by the master and there was no proof of
necessity for the supplies.
Finally. The necessaries were not ordered by persons authorized to
contract in behalf of the vessel as provided under Section 22 of P.D. No. 1521 or the
Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 - the managing owner, the ships husband, master or
any person with whom the management of the vessel at the port of supply is
entrusted. Clearly, Portserv, a sub-charterer under a time charter, is not someone to
whom the management of the vessel has been entrusted. A time charter is a contract
for the use of a vessel for a specified period of time or for the duration of one or
more specified voyages wherein the owner of the time-chartered vessel retains
possession and control through the master and crew who remain his employees. [37]
Not enjoying the presumption of authority, petitioner Crescent should have proved
that Portserv was authorized by the shipowner to contract for supplies. Petitioner
failed.
A discussion on the principle of forum non conveniens is unnecessary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. CV 54920, dated November 28, 2001, and its subsequent Resolution of
September 3, 2002 are AFFIRMED. The instant petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED for lack of merit. Cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R.
No.
97805.
September
2,
1992.]
Barristers
Law
Office
for Petitioner.
DECISION
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order and preliminary
injunction to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
11, 1991 1 dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and prohibition which
assailed the Orders 2 dated June 1, 1990 3 and June 29, 1990 4 of the trial
court.chanrobles
lawlibrary
:
rednad
It appears on record that on July 5, 1989, the administrator of the Galleria de
Magallanes Condominium discovered that petitioner Nilo Raymundo, who was an
owner/occupant of Unit AB-122 of said condominium, made an unauthorized
installation of glasses at the balcony of his unit in violation of Article IV, Section 3
paragraph (d) of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions of the Association,
which
states
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"d. Nothing shall be done or placed in any unit or in the common areas which is
beyond or will impair the structural strength of the buildings or alter the original
architecture, appearance and specifications of the building, including the external
facade
thereof."
5
Thereafter, the administrator of said condominium reported said violation to the
Board of Directors of the private respondent Galleria de Magallanes Association, Inc.
in a special meeting held on July 8, 1989 and the former sent a letter dated July 12,
1989 6 to the petitioner demanding the latter to remove the illegal and unauthorized
installation
of
glasses
at
his
unit.
Petitioner refused, consequently, private respondent filed a complaint for mandatory
injunction against petitioner on February 21, 1990 with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati,
Branch
133
in
Civil
Case
No.
90-490.
On March 12, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for extension of time to file an Answer
7 as well as a Motion for production of document 8 which were granted in an Order
dated
March
16,
1990.
9
However, on March 23, 1990, instead of an Answer, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss with the trial court on the ground that said court has no jurisdiction over the
present case since a complaint for mandatory injunction is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The Motion to Dismiss was denied in the Order of June 1, 1990, the pertinent portion
of
which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This is a suit for mandatory injunction. Under Sec. 21 of BP 129, as amended, it is
the Regional Trial Court which has the legal competence to issue the same.
Corollarily, the second ground must be denied. The action is essentially one which
falls
within
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court.
We
do
not
agree.
"Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
original
jurisdiction:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their
respective
regions;"
A civil action in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation has invariably been held to be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the
Regional
Trial
Courts.chanrobles
law
library
"In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts [now municipal trial courts] or in the courts of
first instance [now regional trial courts] would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance [now regional trial courts]." 12
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, the question for resolution is whether or
not the petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of
Restriction of the corporation, and if so, to remove the illegal and unauthorized
installation of glasses at Unit AB-122 of the Condominium. Clearly, the issue is
incapable
of
pecuniary
estimation.
In the instant case. the claim of attorneys fees by the private respondent in the
amount of P10,000.00 is only incidental to its principal cause of action which is for
the removal of the illegal and unauthorized installation of the glasses made by the
petitioner and therefore, said amount is not determinative of the jurisdiction of the
court.
Note should be taken. however, that the trial court had erroneously considered the
complaint as one for mandatory injunction, misled perhaps by the caption of the
complaint.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
A writ for mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy. It is provisional because it
constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the main action
and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of
the
main
action.
13
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order and
preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 11, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the
document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land
among all the heirs.[1]
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss [2] the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total
assessed value of the subject land isP5,000.00 which under section 33 (3)[3] of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,[4] falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela. [5]
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss [6] saying that the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is
incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P.
129, as amended.[7]
On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion
to Dismiss.[8] A Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners on
January 30, 1995 alleging that the same is contrary to law because their action is not
one for recovery of title to or possession of the land but an action to annul a
document or declare it null and void, [9] hence, one incapable of pecuniary estimation
failing within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents did
not oppose the motion for reconsideration.
On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge issued another Order denying the
motion for reconsideration.[10]
Hence, this petition wherein the sole issue raised is whether or not the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MAN-2275.
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial
Court is for the annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF
HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION,"
which is clearly one incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus, cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court.
Private respondents, on the other hand, insists that the action is one for repartition and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint
is P5,000.00, then, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu.
For better appreciation of the facts, the pertinent portions of the complaint are
reproduced hereunder:
9. That pursuant to said document (Annex "B"), defendants had procured tax
declarations of the land for their supposed "shares" to the great damage and prejudice
of plaintiffs;
10. That the property in controversy should be divided into seven (7) equal parts
since Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho had seven children;
xxx
3. That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the legal heirs of spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho who died long time ago;
4. That in life the spouses became the owners in fee simple of a certain parcel of
land, which is more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land containing 56,977.40 square meters, more or less, located at Cotcot,
Liloan, Cebu.
designated as Lot 6149 per Technical Description and Certification issued by the
Office of the Land Management copy of which are hereto attached as Annexes "A"
and "A-1" and are made part hereof: total assessed value is P5,000.00;
11. That the parties had failed to settle the controversy amicably at the barangay
level; attached hereto as Annex "C" is Certification to file Action;
12. That by reason of the foregoing unjust and illegal act of defendants, plaintiffs
were forced to bring instant action and contract the services of the undersigned
counsel with whom they bind themselves to pay P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to declare null
and void the document (Annex "B") of declaration of heirs and confirmation and to
order the partition of the land into seven (7) equal parts; each part shall respectively
go to the seven (7) children of Casimero Tautho and considering six (6) of them died
already the same shall go to their children or descendants, and to order the
defendants to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
5. That the land passed to the children of the spouses.(who are all deceased except
for defendant Marcelo Tautho), namely: Zacarias, Epifania, Vicenta, Felicisimo,
Maria, Lorencia and Marcelo, and which in turn passed to the plaintiffs and
defendants upon their death they being their descendants and legal heirs;
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the
premises.[11]
6. That the subject parcel of land has for year been undivided by and among the
legal heirs of said previous owners;
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable
of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
8. That the instrument (Annex "B") is false and perjurious and is a complete nullity
because the defendants are not the only heirs of Casimero Tautho; plaintiffs are also
legal heirs and descendants of said deceased; moreover, there has been no oral
partition of the property;
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of
a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
The first [C]omplaint for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. 3648 and
entitled Brgy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna v. Emelita A. Reblara, Eugenia Almazan
& Devorah E. Bardillon, was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna (MTC) on February 23, 1998, following the failure of Barangay Masili to
reach an agreement with herein petitioner on the purchase offer of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00). The expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being
pursued in view of providing Barangay Masili a multi-purpose hall for the use and
benefit of its constituents.
On March 5, 1999, the MTC issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 3648 for
lack of interest for failure of the [respondent] and its counsel to appear at the pretrial. The MTC, in its Order dated May 3, 1999, denied [respondents] [M]otion for
[R]econsideration thereof.
The second [C]omplaint for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. 2845-99C and entitled Brgy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna v. Devorah E. Bardillon, was filed
before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna (RTC)
on October 18, 1999. This [C]omplaint also sought the expropriation of the said Lot
4381-D for the erection of a multi-purpose hall of Barangay Masili, but petitioner, by
way of a Motion to Dismiss, opposed this [C]omplaint by alleging in the main that it
violated Section 19(f) of Rule 16 in that [respondents] cause of action is barred by
prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
On January 21, 2000, [the] Judge issued an order denying petitioners Motion to
Dismiss, holding that the MTC which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3648
has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding.
With the subsequent approval of Municipal Ordinance No. 2000-261 on July 10,
2000, and the submission thereof in compliance with [the] Judges Order dated June
9, 2000 requiring herein respondent to produce the authority for the expropriation
through the Municipal Council of Calamba, Laguna, the assailed Order dated August
4, 2000 was issued in favor of Barangay Masili x x x and, on August 16, 2000, the
corresponding order for the issuance of the [W]rit of [P]ossession over Lot 4381D.[5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the Petition, the CA held that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Calamba, Laguna (Branch 37)[6] did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed Orders. It ruled that the second Complaint for eminent domain (Civil
Case No. 2845-99-C) was not barred by res judicata. The reason is that the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), which dismissed the first Complaint for eminent
domain (Civil Case No. 3648), had no jurisdiction over the action.
[7]
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our
consideration:
A. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied and dismissed petitioners
appeal;
B. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it did not pass upon and consider the pending Motion for
Reconsideration which was not resolved by the Regional Trial Court before issuing
the questioned Orders of 4 and 16 August 2000;
C. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in taking the total amount of the assessed value of the land and building to
confer jurisdiction to the court a quo;
D. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in ignoring the fact that there is an existing multi-purpose hall erected in
the land owned by Eugenia Almazan which should be subject of expropriation; and
E. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in failing to consider the issue of forum shopping committed by
Respondent Masili.[8]
Simply put, the issues are as follows: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction
over the expropriation case; (2) whether the dismissal of that case before the MTC
constituted res judicata; (3) whether the CA erred when it ignored the issue of entry
upon the premises; and (4) whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner claims that, since the value of the land is only P11,448, the MTC had
jurisdiction over the case.[9]
On the other hand, the appellate court held that the assessed value of the
property was P28,960.[10] Thus, the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the
expropriation proceedings, because the amount involved was beyond the P20,000
jurisdictional amount cognizable by MTCs.
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather,
it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property
for public use.[11]As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed
with the regional trial courts.[12]
This was explained by the Court in Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco
Pastor:[13]
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is
whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the
requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the
authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the
governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms,
for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however,
is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined
only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that condemnation
proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance, the forerunners of
the regional trial courts. The said case was decided during the effectivity of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of
first instance had original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of
the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation. The 1997 amendments to the
Rules of Court were not intended to change these jurisprudential precedents.[14]
To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC
regardless of the value of the land, because the subject of the action is the
governments exercise of eminent domain -- a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
Second Issue:
[20]
Res Judicata
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent
after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required
was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites.
Petitioner claims that the MTCs dismissal of the first Complaint for eminent
domain was with prejudice, since there was no indication to the contrary in the Order
of dismissal. She contends that the filing of the second Complaint before the RTC
should therefore be dismissed on account of res judicata.
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or
decided, or settled by judgment.[15] It provides that a final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions
involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.[16]
The following are the requisites of res judicata: (1) the former judgment must
be final; (2) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the
second actions -- an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.[17]
Forum Shopping
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine
of res judicata finds no application even if the Order of dismissal may have been an
adjudication on the merits.
The test for determining the presence of forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present in two or more pending cases, such that a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.[23]
Third Issue:
Be it noted that the earlier case lodged with the MTC had already been
dismissed when the Complaint was filed before the RTC. Even
granting arguendo that both cases were still pending, a final judgment in the MTC
case will not constitute res judicata in the RTC, since the former had no jurisdiction
over the expropriation case.
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DENIED and
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
the
assailed
SO ORDERED.
Puno,
JJ., concur.
(Chairman),
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
PATRICIO
A.
vs.
PATRICIO S. PAYOYO, Respondent.
VILLENA, Petitioner,
On October 26, 1998, Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and
damages against Villena. Villena moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. He argued that there was no ground to cancel the contract; thus,
there was no basis for refund. The trial court denied his motion. Villena thereafter
filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim citing as an affirmative defense
Payoyos failure to state a cause of action.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated November 21, 2003
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70513 and its Resolution 2 dated March
18, 2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The appellate court had
affirmed with modification the Decision 3 dated April 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 78.
The facts are undisputed.
On October 28, 1997, respondent Patricio Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its
president, petitioner Patricio Villena, entered into a contract for the delivery and
installation of kitchen cabinets in Payoyos residence. The cabinets were to be
delivered within ninety days from downpayment of 50% of the purchase price. On
October 29, 1997, Payoyo paid Villena P155,183 as downpayment.
On December 9, 1997, Payoyo entered into another contract with Villena for the
delivery of home appliances. On the same day, Payoyo paid 50% of the purchase
price equal to P29,638.50 as downpayment.
However, Villena failed to install the kitchen cabinets and deliver the appliances.
Payoyo made several demands upon Villena but the latter failed to comply.
In a letter dated March 12, 1998, Payoyo demanded the cancellation of the contracts
and the refund in full of the downpayments amounting to P184,821.50. Villena
promised to install the kitchen cabinets on or before May 10, 1998 and to deliver the
appliances. Despite repeated demands, Villena again failed to do so.
Payoyo sent Villena two demand letters on June 24, 1998 and on July 28, 1998
asking the latter to either deliver all items or return the downpayments.
On June 1, 1999, immediately after the trial court issued a pre-trial order, Villena
filed a second motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but it was denied. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The trial court decided in favor of Payoyo, reasoning that the power to rescind is
implied in reciprocal obligations. Considering that Villena repeatedly failed to
comply with his obligation, Payoyo had the right to rescind the contract and demand
a refund. The trial court ordered petitioner to pay respondent P184,821.50 as actual
damages plus 12% interest per annum from the date of filing of the complaint
and P20,000 as moral damages plus legal interest from judicial demand until fully
paid.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with the following modifications:
1) [Petitioner Villena is] hereby ordered to pay [respondent Payoyo] actual
damages in the amount of P155,183.00 with 12% interest per annum from
the date of the filing of the complaint;
2) [Petitioner is] likewise ordered to deliver the Indesit Multifunction Oven
and Indesit Hob in favor of [respondent] within thirty (30) days from the
finality of this decision; and
3) [Respondent] is hereby ordered to pay the purchase price of the Indesit
Multifunction Oven and Indesit Hob in favor of [petitioner] on the day the
delivery is made.4
The appellate court reasoned that while there was delay in the delivery and
installation of the kitchen cabinets, there was none in the delivery of the appliances.
The contract for said appliances did not specify the date of delivery but that delivery
should be made upon payment of the 50% balance of the purchase price. Considering
that Payoyo failed to pay the balance, Villena did not incur delay.
Hence, the instant petition, where petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS (PETITIONER AND
NOVALINE, INC.), ARE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.5
Simply, the issue in this case is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the
complaint.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC should have dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. He posits that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint since it is
mainly for recovery of a sum of money in the amount ofP184,821.50 which is below
the jurisdictional amount set for RTCs.6 Moreover, petitioner contends that the issue
of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on appeal, since jurisdiction is
conferred only by law and cannot be acquired through or waived by any act or
omission of the parties.7
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be
ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends
on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.10
Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over
it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.11
In our considered view, the complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a sum
of money with damages, is one incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, one within
the RTCs jurisdiction. The allegations therein show that it is actually for breach of
contract, thus,
xxxx
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the RTC has jurisdiction over the
complaint as the allegations therein show that it is actually a case for rescission of
the contracts. The recovery of a sum of money is merely a necessary consequence of
the cancellation of the contracts.8
The pertinent portion of Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691,9provides:
7. Under their Contracts, prestation and/or delivery of the items will be performed
and delivered within NINETY (90) DAYS from the receipt of downpayment.
Plaintiff complied with its prestation but defendants defaulted with their obligation;
xxxx
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
10. On 12 March 1998, plaintiff sent letter to defendants requesting the latter for the
cancellation of the purchase contracts and refund in full the (50%) downpayment
paid in the total amount of (P 184, 821.50) within five (5) days upon receipt of the
letter
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
xxxx
xxxx
12. On 24 March 1998, plaintiff and defendant Patricio A. Villena, personally talked
[to] each other regarding the full refund of the (50%) downpayment in the amount of
P 184, 821.50. Defendant informed the plaintiff that it was their fault because the
order from their Australian supplier was made only on 15 December 1997.
Defendant promised plaintiff [delivery of] the three (3) Kitchen Cabinets on or
before 10 [M]ay 1998, and the three (3) home appliances were considered fully paid
applying the (50%) downpayment of (P 29,638.50) for home appliances only. But
defendant did not fulfill his promise;
13. Despite all these, repeated demands for the installation of the (3) three kitchen
[c]abinets and complete delivery of home appliances were made, but defendants did
nothing;
x x x x12 (Emphasis added.)
A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or
rescission of contracts.13 An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an
action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore
falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. 14 In the present case, the averments in the
complaint show that Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of
the downpayments since Villena failed to comply with the obligation to deliver the
appliances and install the kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts. The court then
must examine the facts and the applicable law to determine whether there is in fact
substantial breach that would warrant rescission or cancellation of the contracts and
entitle the respondent for a refund. While the respondent prayed for the refund, this is
just incidental to the main action, which is the rescission or cancellation of the
contracts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
November 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70513 and the
Resolution dated March 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION
DAVID LU,
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration[1] filed by petitioners John
Lu Ym and Ludo & LuYm Development Corporation (movants), praying that we
reconsider our Decision[2] dated August 26, 2008, where we disposed of the three
consolidated cases in this wise:
- versus -
SO ORDERED.[3]
DAVID LU,
Respondent.
JOHN LU YM and LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
CARPIO-MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
BRION, JJ.**
Promulgated:
August 4, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
We have earlier held that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon
the payment of the prescribed fees.[8] Hence, without payment of the correct docket
fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the action filed by David, et al.
We also stated in our Decision that the earlier rule in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals [9] has been relaxed. Subsequent
decisions now uniformly hold that when insufficient filing fees are initially paid by
the plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the government,
the Manchester rule does not apply.[10]
Addressing this point, movants argue that David, et al., were guilty of fraud
in that, while they did not mention any real property in their complaint, they were
able to obtain the annotation of notices of lis pendens on various real properties of
LLDC by alleging in their motion to conduct special raffle that there was an
imminent danger that properties subject matter of this case might be disposed
of. Moreover, David, et al., prayed for, among others, the liquidation and
distribution of the assets of the corporation, so that they may receive their share
therein. Among the assets of the corporation are real properties. Hence, the case
was, in actuality, a real action that had for its objective the recovery of real property.
Fraud is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human
ingenuity can devise and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an
advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth, and includes
all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is
cheated.[11] Since fraud is a state of mind, its presence can only be determined by
examining the attendant circumstances.[12]
It is true, as we held in our Decision, that David, et al., merely relied on the
assessment made by the Clerk of Court and cannot be faulted for their payment of
insufficient docket fees. However, movants now point out that when David Lu
moved for the annotation of notices of lis pendens on real properties owned by
LLDC, they in effect acknowledged that the case they filed was a real action.
A notice of lis pendens is governed by Rule 13, Section 14 of the Rules of
Court, which states:
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the
title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the
defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may
record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in
which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the
object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in
that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such
notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the
property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of
the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the
parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be
cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that
the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that
it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to
be recorded.[13]
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be
availed of are as follows: (a) an action to recover possession of real estate; (b) an
action for partition; and (c) any other court proceedings that directly affect the title to
the land or the building thereon or the use or the occupation thereof. Additionally,
this Court has held that resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases
that involve title to or possession of real property. This annotation also applies to
suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific real
property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it.[15]
From the foregoing, it is clear that a notice of lis pendens is availed of
mainly in real actions. Hence, when David, et al., sought the annotation of notices
of lis pendens on the titles of LLDC, they acknowledged that the complaint they had
filed affected a title to or a right to possession of real properties. At the very least,
they must have been fully aware that the docket fees would be based on the value of
the realties involved. Their silence or inaction to point this out to the Clerk of Court
who computed their docket fees, therefore, becomes highly suspect, and thus,
sufficient for this Court to conclude that they have crossed beyond the threshold of
good faith and into the area of fraud. Clearly, there was an effort to defraud the
government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees. Consequently, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Anent the issue of estoppel, we earlier ruled that the movants are barred
from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court because of their participation in
the proceedings therein. In passing upon this issue, we take heed from the
pronouncement of this Court in the recent case Vargas v. Caminas:[16]
the plaintiffs to exert efforts towards a compromise. When the trial court denied this,
they went up to the CA on certiorari, where they were sustained and the appellate
court ordered the dismissal of the complaint below.
Next, the Lu Ym father and sons filed a motion for the lifting of the
receivership order, which the trial court had issued in the interim. David, et al.,
brought the matter up to the CA even before the trial court could resolve the
motion. Thereafter, David, et al., filed their Motion to Admit Complaint to Conform
to the Interim Rules Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies. It was at this point
that the Lu Ym father and sons raised the question of the amount of filing fees
paid. They raised this point again in the CA when they appealed the trial courts
decision in the case below.
We find that, in the circumstances, the Lu Ym father and sons are not
estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court. They raised the
insufficiency of the docket fees before the trial court rendered judgment and
continuously maintained their position even on appeal to the CA. Although the
manner of challenge was erroneous they should have addressed this issue directly
to the trial court instead of to the OCA they should not be deemed to have waived
their right to assail the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The matter of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court is one that may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings. More importantly, this Court may pass upon this
issue motu proprio.
Hence, notwithstanding that the petition in G.R. No. 170889 is a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing an interlocutory resolution of the
CA, we have the power to order the dismissal of the complaint filed in the court of
origin and render all incidents herein moot and academic.
With the foregoing findings, there is no more need to discuss the other
arguments raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.
In summary, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for
failure of David, et.al. to pay the correct docket fees. Consequently, all interlocutory
matters pending before this Court, specifically the incidents subject of these three
consolidated petitions, must be denied for being moot and academic. With the
dismissal of the main action, the ancillary motions have no more leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by John Lu Ym and Ludo & LuYm Development Corporation
is GRANTED. The
Decision
of
this
Court
dated August
26,
2008 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in SRC Case No. 021CEB, now on appeal with the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 81163,
is DISMISSED.
All interlocutory matters challenged in these consolidated petitions
are DENIED for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Present:
Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion to Dismiss [4] (Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam)
on the following grounds: (1) the claim or demand has been extinguished by virtue
*
CARPIO, J.,
of the valid sale of Lot No. 1615 to Eugenio; (2) the action is barred by extraordinary
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, acquisitive prescription; (3) the action is barred by laches; and (4) plaintiff failed to
PERALTA,
state a cause of action, or filed the case prematurely for failure to resort to
ABAD, and
prior barangay conciliation proceedings.
MENDOZA, JJ.
Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss [5] raising the
following additional grounds: (1) plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the
court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in
full. Respondents filed their Opposition thereto.
On November 19, 1999, the RTC issued an Order[6] denying the motion to
Promulgated:
dismiss, to wit:
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[10] asking the RTC to resolve the issues of
(1) whether or not the complaint should be dismissed or expunged from the records
pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 7; (2) reconsidering the findings
contained in the Order dated February 4, 2000; and (3) holding in abeyance the
submission of the answer to the complaint.
On March 30, 2000, the RTC issued a Clarificatory Order [14] reading as
follows:
Pending resolution of the motion, respondents filed a Motion to Allow [11] them
to continue prosecuting this case as indigent litigants.
On March 8, 2000, the RTC resolved the Omnibus Motion in an Order [12] that
read in this wise:
In an Order dated May 31, 2000, the RTC again denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioner sought the nullification of the Order dated November 19, 1999
and the subsequent orders issued by the RTC thereto for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents
filed their Comment thereto.
In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA
found that SC Circular No. 7 would not apply where the amount of damages or value
of the property was immaterial; that the Circular could be applied only in cases
where the amount claimed or the value of the personal property was determinative of
the court's jurisdiction citing the case of Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte.
[16]
The CA found that respondents had paid the corresponding docket fees upon the
filing of the complaint, thus, the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the case despite
the failure to state the amount of damages claimed in the body of the complaint or in
the prayer thereof. The CA found that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss. It noted that the RTC's Clarificatory Order dated March 30, 2000, which
stated that if after hearing the Clerk of Court determines that the filing fee is still
insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien on the judgment that may be
entered was in accordance with the rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion.[17] The CA proceeded to state that a judicious examination of the
complaint pointed to a determination of the respective rights and interests of the
parties over the property based on the issues presented therein which could only be
determined in a full-blown trial on the merits of the case.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated September 17, 2004. The CA ruled, among others, that the
defenses of acquisitive prescription and laches were likewise unavailing. It found
that the subject property is covered by a Torrens title (OCT No. V-19556); thus, it is
axiomatic that adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim of
ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens title; that unless
there are intervening rights of third persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a
decision directing the return of the lot to petitioner, the equitable defense of laches
will not apply as against the registered owner.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the
following assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO DISMISS DESPITE RESPONDENTS' NONPAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE ACTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS
BARRED
BY
LACHES
AND
EXTRAORDINARY
[18]
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.
xxxx
(a) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiffs actual and compensatory damages such as are proved
during the hearing of this case;
(b) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiffs attorneys' fees and moral damages, all to be proved
during the hearing of this case.[28]
A reading of the allegations in the complaint would show that the amount of
the rental due can only be determined after a final judgment, since there is a need to
show supporting evidence when the petitioner and the other defendants started to
possess the subject land. Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA
when it ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in
issuing its Order dated March 30, 2000, where the RTC stated that since there was
no hearing yet, respondents are not in a position to determine how much is to be
charged and that after hearing, the Clerk of Court determines that the filing fee is still
insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien on the judgment that may be
entered.
x x x x[36]
would not conclusively establish laches. Thus, it is necessary for petitioners to
proceed to trial and present controverting evidence to prove the elements of laches.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has
caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation, wounded feelings,
anxiety and sleepless nights;
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as
well as its Resolution[2]denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said
decision.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an
order be issued for the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs
the occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:
The Antecedents
a.
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all
surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They
alleged therein, inter alia, as follows:
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691. [5] He
averred that
(1)
the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;
(2)
the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of
land referred to as the subject-matter of this action;
On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the
petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court
where the case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in
question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in
the relief prayed for which can be picked-up for determining the Courts jurisdiction
as provided by law.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador
appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003
reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for want of
jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the
case DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refilling in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of
ownership and possession of real property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of
the assessed value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive
jurisdiction over the action, conformably to Section 33[15] of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which
the appellate court denied.[16] Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE
ERROR
IN
HOLDING
THAT
THE
INSTANT
CASE, ACCION
REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON, AND
NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.
II
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon
which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the
court a quo.[24]
It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the
property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper
government agency.[25]
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an
allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. [21] The
court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands. [22] Absent
any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus
be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the petitioners action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax
Declaration No. 8590-A, showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991
was P5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the
tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their
complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991
was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the
action of the petitioners since the case involved title to or possession of real property
with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00.[23]
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691
discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the
provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and the
MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to
the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the
tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and
presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them
that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely
no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed
value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other
kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
The said provision is applicable only to all other cases other than an action
involving title to, or possession of real property in which the assessed value is the
controlling factor in determining the courts jurisdiction. The said damages are
merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of
possession of real property.[26]
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the
proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The
complaint should perforce be dismissed.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
- versus -
Promulgated:
July 22, 2009
Respondents.
This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 15,
2003 andJune 1, 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978, be reversed and set
aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
Sometime in July 2001, private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio and
Valeriana Dionisio, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 42, a Complaint[2] against herein petitioners and Wood Crest Residents
Association, Inc., for Accion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and Damages, with
Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Private respondents alleged that
subject property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an assessed value
of P32,100.00, was titled in the name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio;
but petitioners, with malice and evident bad faith, claimed that they were the owners
of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject property. Private
respondents had allegedly been prevented from entering, possessing and using
subject property. It was further alleged in the Complaint that petitioners' Transfer
Certificate of Title over their alleged property was spurious. Private respondents
then prayed that they be declared the sole and absolute owners of the subject
property; that petitioners be ordered to surrender possession of subject property to
them; that petitioners and Wood Crest and/or its members be ordered to pay actual
and moral damages, and attorney's fees.
Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss [3] said complaint on the
ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, as the
subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The MeTC then issued an Order[4] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion
to dismiss, ruling that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, the
MeTC
had
exclusive
original
jurisdiction
over
actions
involving title to or possession of real property of small value.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order dated July 4, 2002 was denied.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
ownership and possession of real property located in Quezon City, with an assessed
value not exceeding P50,000.00. A Motion for Reconsideration[6] of the Decision
was filed by petitioners, but was denied in an Order[7] dated July 3, 2003.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition
for certiorari, insisting that both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not ordering the dismissal of
the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdiction over the same. In
the assailed CA Resolution dated September 15, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition
outright, holding that certiorari was not available to petitioners as they should have
availed themselves of the remedy of appeal. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration
of the resolution of dismissal was denied per Resolution[8] dated June 1, 2004.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition and, in support thereof, they allege
that:
The present Petition for Certiorari is doomed and should not have been
entertained from the very beginning.
The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of
the CA should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari, as provided for
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, in Pasiona, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals,[10] the Court expounded as follows:
The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision
or final order of the CA via Rule 65, because such recourse is
proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate
remedy, namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. A petition for review oncertiorari, not
a special civil action for certiorari was, therefore, the correct
remedy.
xxxx
Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the
aggrieved party, the special civil action for certiorari will not be
entertained remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not
and cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's
own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such
loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no
available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where
an appeal was available, as in this case, certiorariwill not
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioner's resort to this Court by Petition
for Certiorari was a fatal procedural error, and the instant petition
must, therefore, fail.[11]
For the very same reason given above, the CA, therefore,
acted properly when it dismissed the petition for certiorari outright,
on the ground that petitioners should have resorted to the remedy
of appeal instead of certiorari. Verily, the present Petition
for Certiorari should not have been given due course at all.
Moreover, since the period for petitioners to file a petition for
review on certiorari had lapsed by the time the instant petition was
filed, the assailed CA Resolutions have attained finality.
Nevertheless, just to put the matter to rest, the Court
reiterates the ruling in Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses
Lumocso,[12] to wit:
In a number of cases, we have held that
actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title
to or to quiet title over real property are actions that
fall under the classification of cases that involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein.
xxxx
Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction
over private respondents' complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria.
x x x Thus, under the old law, there was no
substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is
one, the subject matter of which was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P.
129, or one involving title to property under Section
19(2). The distinction between the two classes
became crucial with the amendment introduced by