G.R. No.

84811 August 29, 1989

SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

ADMIFACTS :
The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc.
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on
June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had
already paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and
interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver
the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared
later, the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. The
plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts
paid by her plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
the costs of the suit.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction,
this being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied.
The defendant repleaded the objection in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said decree
providing that "the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree." After trial,
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to her
the title to the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus interest from
1975 and until the full amount was paid. She was also awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P
5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. 1
ISSUE: Whether the RTC had no jurisdiction on the Issue, this being vested in the National
Housing Authority under PD No. 957.
HELD:
RTC doesnt have jurisdiction over the issue, thus the petition was granted and reverse the RTC
decision without prejudice to the filing of the case before the appropriate body, NHA.
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the
National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions
Under Presidential Decree No. 957." Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that
"exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is
vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL
JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR.,
City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.

FACTS :
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R. No. 107542 against the City
Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court referred
G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CAG.R. SP No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled
that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the
dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in
this petition, a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
LLDA discovered that the City Government of Caloocan has been maintaining the open
dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate from
the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR. They also found the water to have been
directly contaminated by the operation of the dumpsite.
LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government and other entities to
completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste
matter on the Camarin dumpsite.
The City Government went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to file an action
for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to be declared as the sole
authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in
Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.

LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the Pollution Control Law that the
review of cease and desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of Appeals and not the
RTC.
RTC denied LLDAs motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order during the pendency of the case.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA has no power and
authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage.
The residents seek a review of the decision.
ISSUE:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?

HELD:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO
No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the
other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws
creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the
lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since
it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be
given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered
by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other
hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de
Bay region and for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power
which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including
the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of
police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution
cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the
construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as
amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority
to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
.

G.R. No. 137473. August 2, 2001]

ESTELITO V. REMOLONA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in
Kiborosa Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, the District Supervisor of
Infanta inquired about Nerys Civil Service eligibility who purportedly got a rating of 81.25%.
Mr. America also disclosed that he received information that Nery was campaigning for a fee of
8,000 pesos per examinee for a passing mark in the board examination for teachers.
It was eventually revealed that Nery Remolonas name did not appear in the passing and failing
examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating belonged to a
certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of 65%.
Estelito Remolona in his written statement of facts said that he met a certain Atty. Salupadin in
a bus, who offered to help his wife obtain eligibility for a fee of 3,000 pesos. Mr. America
however, informed Nery that there was no vacancy when she presented her rating report, so
Estelito went to Lucena to complain that America asked for money in exchange for the
appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-1988, America was able to receive 6 checks at
2,600 pesos each plus bonus of Nery Remolona. Remolona admitted that he was responsible
for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no knowledge thereof.
On recommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service, the CSC found the
spouses guilty of dishonesty and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties.
On Motion For Reconsideration, only Nery was exonerated and reinstated.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and denied the motion for
reconsideration and new trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of due process as the extra-judicial admission
allegedly signed by him was in blank form and that he was not assisted by counsel.

HELD: NO. Right to Counsel is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial
investigation when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken in custody. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. The
exclusionary rule under Paragraph 2, Section 12 applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not those made in an administrative investigation.

G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on
Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding
Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant
City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.

FACTS : This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the
Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated
July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D.
Bagatsing, etc
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged
the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities:

To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and

corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other
activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to
submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379
and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and
acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints
against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and
prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the
powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative

Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum,
administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency,
issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a
subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the
PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to
declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
ISSUE: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in
its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of
fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for
all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending,
legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what
if anything should be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations,
not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may
be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory
nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings
to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from
Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon
witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" with the authority
"to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject
in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a
similar character." Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency
as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it
merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function
under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h)
interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of
the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in
the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasijudicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its
investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling
authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function
should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the
established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon
sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in
anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information
sought to be