Michael Lacewing

Gettier and the analysis of knowledge

The tripartite definition of knowledge claims that knowledge is justified true belief. If you have a
justified true belief that p, you know that p; the conditions are sufficient for knowledge. Edmund
Gettier famously presented cases in which we want to say that someone has justified, true belief but
not knowledge. They show that the three conditions of the tripartite definition are not sufficient for
knowledge.

Gettier, is justified true belief knowledge?

Gettier starts by claiming, uncontroversially, that deductive argument preserves justification. Suppose
you are justified in believing that p (say, that Socrates is a man and that all men are mortal), and p entails
another proposition, q (that Socrates is mortal). If you deduce that q from p, you are also justified in
believing that q.
He then gives two counterexamples to the tripartite definition. Well just look at the first one. Smith and
Jones are applying for the same job. Smith has excellent reason to believe that Jones will get the job, e.g.
Smith has been told this by the employer. Smith also has excellent reason to believe that Jones has ten
coins in his pocket, e.g. Smith has just counted them. Therefore, both of these beliefs are justified. Smith
then puts the two beliefs together and deduces that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his
pocket. This belief is justified, because it is inferred deductively from justified beliefs. It turns out that
Jones doesnt get the job, Smith does. It also so happens that, unknown to him, Smith also has ten coins
in his pocket. So Smiths belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is true.
Smiths belief is both true and justified, but we shouldnt say that Smith knows that the man who will get
the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith inferred his belief from a false belief, namely that Jones would
get the job. So the reason Smith has for his belief is false. What makes his belief true (Smith, who has ten
coins in his pocked, gets the job) has come apart from what justifies his belief (his justified belief that
Jones, who has ten coins in his pocket, will get the job). There is no connection between what justifies his
belief and his beliefs being true.
Other examples of justified true belief without knowledge became known as Gettier cases. They all
describe situations in which we have justified true belief, but not knowledge, by demonstrating how the
belief is only accidentally true, given the evidence that justifies it. So justified true belief is not sufficient
for knowledge. That means it is not the same as knowledge. If knowledge isnt justified true belief in
these cases, then knowledge is never justified true belief.
How might the defender of the tripartite theory of knowledge reply?

Add a no false lemmas condition (J+T+B+N)

Smith doesnt know that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, we said, because he
inferred this belief from a false belief, namely that Jones will get the job. So all we need to do is rule this
out in the definition of knowledge by adding an extra condition. You know that p if

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p is true
you believe that p

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your belief that p is justified

you did not infer that p from anything false.

Condition (4) is called the no false lemmas condition. A lemma is a claim part way through an argument.
Smith concluded that Jones will get the job from being told by the employer; and he then used that
information to conclude that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job. So Jones will get the
job is a lemma.
This addition certainly deals with Gettiers examples. But it doesnt deal with the underlying worry about
truth and justification coming apart. There are Gettier cases in which you dont make an inference, so
condition (4) is satisfied, but you still dont have knowledge. Heres a famous example from Alvin
Goldman, Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge: Henry is driving through the countryside. He
doesnt know it, but in this part of the country call it Barn County there are lots of fake barns, just
barn facades. But they have been built so that they look just like real barns when seen from the road. As he
drives along, Henry often thinks Theres a barn, or Hey, theres another barn. These beliefs dont count
as knowledge because they are false. But just once, Henry thinks Theres a barn when he is looking at the
one and only real barn in the area. This belief is true. And it is justified it is formed from normal
perception and Henry, of course, has no reason to suspect that he is the victim of an elaborate hoax. If our
normal perceptual beliefs are justified, then so is Henrys belief. But it is not knowledge, because as in
Gettier cases it is only a matter of luck that Henrys belief is true in this one instance.
Henry hasnt inferred that theres a barn from something false. First, forming beliefs from perception isnt
a matter of inference we simply believe what we see. Second, suppose it were a matter of inference.
Suppose Henry thinks It appears to me as though there is a barn. Appearance is a good guide to reality.
Therefore, there is a barn. None of these claims is false, so he has not inferred There is a barn from any
false lemmas. (If Henry relies on the belief Appearance is a good guide to reality around here, then this
would be a false lemma. But who thinks like this?!)

Infallibilism
The tripartite definition of knowledge does not tell us what it is for a belief to be justified. Gettier has
assumed that Smiths beliefs that Jones will get the job and that he has ten coins in his pocket are
justified. Because they are justified, his deduction that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his
pocket is justified. But we can challenge Gettiers assumption. Perhaps Smiths initial beliefs are not
justified or, better, not justified enough to count as knowledge. If so, then his deduction will not be
justified enough either.

Smith has excellent reasons for both his beliefs about Jones getting the job and having ten coins in his
pocket. But infallibilism argues that knowledge is certain. Only certainty can provide the degree of
justification needed to turn true belief into knowledge. We can either say that a belief is not justified if it
is not certain or that it is not sufficiently justified to count as knowledge if it is not certain. The
implication that we should draw from Gettier cases is that our beliefs are rarely sufficiently justified to
count as knowledge.
Descartes, Meditations I Descartes begins Meditation I by declaring that he has known for a long time that
in order to establish anything in the sciences that was stable and likely to last (p. 1), he would have to
start from the foundations. He does not need to reject as false everything he thinks he knows, but he needs
to avoid believing things that are not completely certain and indubitable. To establish this certainty, he
seeks to test his beliefs by doubting them. As he tries to call his beliefs into question, he repeatedly asks
how he can know they are true. So he understands knowledge in terms of what is completely certain and
indubitable. If we can doubt a belief, then it is not certain, and so it is not knowledge.
So what can we doubt? Descartes doubts the beliefs formed on the basis of what he perceives and even
whether he knows if he is awake or not. He then wonders if he can know what exists at all. Of course, his
habitual opinions are highly probable, but they are not certain. To remind himself of this, he supposes
that he is the victim of a massive deception by an evil demon, telepathically controlling his experiences
and thoughts.
Discussion By indubitable, Descartes doesnt mean that he has a feeling of certainty. That could vary
from one person to another, e.g. you might feel certain that God exists or that your friends will never
betray you. We can all make mistakes, and be certain of something when it is not certain. For Descartes,
for a belief to be indubitable, it must be infallible in some way. This is where Descartes method of doubt
comes in. Using his best, most careful judgement, what he judges must be true it is impossible that he
could be making a mistake.

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No one can know what is false.

Therefore, if I know that p, then I cant be mistaken about p.
Therefore, for justification to secure knowledge, justification must guarantee truth.
Therefore, if I am justified in believing that p, I cant possibly be mistaken.
Therefore, if it is possible that I am mistaken, then I cant be justified in believing that p.
Therefore, infallibilism is true.

Infallibilism defends the tripartite definition of knowledge and rules out Gettier cases, because in these
cases I do not have justified true belief.
However, it is rare that our evidence rules out the possibility of error. Infallibilism entails that we have
very little knowledge (even if we still have many beliefs that are very probably true). Descartes brings
everything into question. Unless he can build his way back out using only infallible beliefs, then
infallibilism leads to scepticism, rather than secure knowledge. It would be better to find a definition
of knowledge that allowed us more of it.
Rejecting the argument for infallibilism The argument for infallibilism rests on a logical error. Premise (2),
if I know that p, then I cant be mistaken about p, has more than one meaning, depending on how one
understands cant:

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It cant be the case that if I know that p, I am mistaken that p.

We should agree with this, because of (1) No one can know what is false.

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If I know that p, (I am in a position that) I cant possibly be mistaken that p.

This is what infallibilism assumes in moving from (2) through (3) to (4). It is a much stronger claim than
(2), because it says that not only am I not mistaken, but I cant possibly be mistaken that p. Obviously,
there are many cases of perception or memory in which I could be mistaken that p, but in fact I am not,
and my true belief rests on evidence, so there are good reasons why I am not mistaken.
The argument for infallibilism slips from (2) (inferred from (1)) to (2) (to support (4)). But this is a
mistake, confusing one claim for another. (This is called the fallacy of equivocation.) The two claims are
distinct, since one is a claim about whether I am mistaken, and the other is a claim about whether I could
be mistaken. So the argument fails. To accept infallibilism, we need some other, independent reason to
believe (2).