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ASSIGNMENT SOLUTIONS GUIDE (2014-2015)

M.P.S.E.-3
Western Political Thought
Disclaimer/Special Note: These are just the sample of the Answers/Solutions to some of the Questions given in the
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SECTION I
Q. 1. Comment on Platos place in western political theory.
Ans. The 5th and 4th centuries B.C represent the classical period of Hellas. Of a galaxy of talent which has immortalized ancient Greece, Plato and Aristotle may be said to be the most outstanding. Plato was born in an aristocratic family
and lived at a time when the best days of Athenian democracy were over. He studied for eight years with Socrates and on
the latters death he travelled, for more than a decade, to Megara, Cyrene, Egypt and Southern Italy. He then founded his
Academy and wrote and taught there except for his short visit to Syracuse.
The Megarian and Pythagorean doctrines affected Plato's receptive mind but the chief source of inspiration for Plato
was Socrates. Plato agreed with Socrates in identifying virtue with knowledge. Virtue was knowledge, held Socrates and
single virtues were varieties of knowledge. Knowledge moulded and disciplined the will and emotions and virtues like
courage, temperance and justice flowed from knowledge. Another Socratic doctrine adopted by Plato is the doctrine of
the ideal being the real. This doctrine holds that reality inheres only in the ideas of things that is in the perfect, permanent,
immutable, self-existent entities which underlie the changing and imperfect object of perception, the latter are merely the
superficial appearances of things. Plato interpreted and developed this theory and its ethical application in the identification
of virtue with knowledge of absolute reality. Plato held that the world of reality lay embedded in and behind the world of
perception. What was real was not a particular concrete table but the table i.e. the abstract idea embodied in the concrete
table.
The method of teaching adopted by Socrates gathered round him a number of disciples; the greatest of whom was
Plato (427-347 B.C.).Like this master, Plato had an instinctive for practical reform of men and affairs. Plato taught in the
Academy and like Socrates awakened thought by dialogues. Plato was the friend and counsellor of king Dionysius of
Syracuse and thus had the opportunity to come into contact with practical politics.
While studying the political philosophy of Plato we must bear in mind that he was deeply affected by the death of
Socrates at the hands of the Athenian democracy and disapproved of a good deal in Athenian public and private life. We
must also remember that in the best of his dialogues, the republic, Plato tried to portray a state which could be an ideal
state from every point of view. Politics, with Plato, therefore, included our modern politics, sociology, much of our ethics
and pedagogy and a part of our theology.
It is no easy matter to follow the political philosophy of Plato because all the writings of our philosopher and thirty six
of them may more or less safely be ascribed to him are in the form of dialogue and his political philosophy is inextricably
woven into his general philosophic speculation. Besides, Plato in his dialogues always uses an analogy and deduces his
arguments from that analogy. This makes the understanding of Platonic line of argument and reason very difficult. His
writings have a poetic and idealistic tinge.
Plato wrote his dialogue during a period when Greece was subject to a process of decay and disintegration, politically,
socially and intellectually due largely to the teachings of the Sophists. He could not remain unaffected, positively or
negatively, by the teachings of the Sophists but in the content and form of his philosophy he was essentially Socratic. The

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very basis of Plato's philosophy is the Socratic doctrine of reality according to which the reality of a thing inheres, not in
its superficial material manifestation but in its idea which is perfect, permanent, immutable and self-existent. Plato also
agreed with Socrates in identifying virtue with knowledge. But there is also an essential difference between the master
and the pupil as shown by the attitude of the two towards truth. To Socrates, as we have seen, truth was the creature of
individual reason. This conception of truth precludes the possibility of there being any abstract principles of truth capable
of universal application. Plato, on the other hand, did believe in certain abstract principles representing truth. The chief
aim of Plato always was to promote justice and virtue. He entered into political speculation and tried to conjure up his
vision of an ideal state because he wanted the state to help in the promotion of these virtues. Only a perfect state could
represent the highest development of human virtue and produce the perfect citizen. Following his doctrine of reality, Plato
believed that reality belonged not to a man but to the Universal Man or to a corporate whole, the state. The state i.e. the
ideal state, therefore, was more real than the citizen or in Aristotelian phraseology, was prior to the man. In his consideration
of a form of government best suited to the promotion of justice and virtue it was, of course, inevitable for him to establish
a very close connection between politics and ethics. He practically made politics the handmaid of ethics.
Q. 2. Write essay on Aristotles theory of revolution.
Ans. Aristotle described two types of political revolution:
Complete change from one constitution to another.
Modification of an existing constitution.
In Book V of the Politics, is about the nature and causes of revolution, as well as how to prevent revolution. Factional
conflict results from disagreements about justice, because different parts of the city have different ideas of equality and
each has a partial claim to justice. Those outstanding in virtue would be most justified in engaging in factional conflict but
are the least likely to do so. Factional conflict can about a desire to change the type of regime or simply to change specific
elements or specific rulers in the regime.
Factional conflict is the result of inequality. The two types of equality are equality by number and inequality by merit.
Neither pure democracy nor pure oligarchy are lasting because they each have an extreme view of equality which
excludes one of the two types. A regime with a large middling element will be more stable.
People engage in factional conflict over issues of profit and honour, and are further stirred up because of fear,
contempt, and dissimilarity.
When office-holders are arrogant and aggrandize themselves, factional conflict arises. When a few people are preeminent to a great extent factional conflict may arise in reaction against them. When someone is frightened of paying a
penalty for an injustice he has committed, he may engage in factional conflict through fear. Factional conflict may also
result from disproportionate growth of one part of a city. A great shift in the regime could occur from overlooking small
gradual changes. Dissimilarity of the citys inhabitants could be a cause of conflict until cooperation develops, and a poor
location could cause conflict as well.
Factional conflict resulting from petty disagreements among the rulers can affect the whole regime. If one group in
the city gains a certain acclaim for some reason, the regime may shift in order to give that group more power. When
opposing parts of the city like the rich and the poor are equal in number they are more likely to engage in factional conflict
than if there are only a few in one group and many in another.
In democracy revolution often occurs because of the irresponsible behaviour of popular leaders. In democracies
where the popular leader was the general, the democracy often turned into a tyranny.
There are also specific causes of revolution for oligarchies. The first cause is unjust treatment of the multitude.
Sometimes even the well-off themselves begin a revolution in an oligarchy if office-holding is limited to very few.
Revolution may also occur from the rise of a popular leader either with the well-off or with the masses. If the wealthy
expend all their resources in wanton living, or if the type of rule is too much like masterly rule rather than political rule,
a revolution may result. If offices are allotted on the basis of property assessment, revolution could come about because
the assessments were arranged with a view to the situation when the regime was founded and that situation could change.
In aristocracies, revolutions occur because few share in ruling prerogatives, much like in oligarchies. Above all,
however, revolutions in polities and aristocracies are the result of a deviation from justice in the regime. For the most part,
revolutions in aristocracies occur gradually.
There are several methods by which regimes can be preserved from revolution. First of all, it is necessary to ensure
that the laws are enforced. Also, in aristocracies and oligarchies, it is necessary that the rulers act justly toward the
multitude, which has no share in ruling. It is also helpful to avoid factional conflicts within the ruling class itself. To
prevent revolution in oligarchy or polity where offices are based on assessments, there should be a mechanism for adjust-

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ing the assessments when the economic conditions of the citizens change. For all regimes, it is important to prevent any
one person from becoming overly powerful in a short period of time, or else he will surely be corrupted. It is excellent if
a regime arranges its laws and offices in such a way that it is impossible to profit from the offices. In such a case, the poor
will not want to rule because they will make no money from it, and thus the well-off will rule and the poor will be able to
spend their time at work and become well-off. In a democracy, the rich should be treated well their property should not be
redistributed. In oligarchies, it is important to treat the poor very well, such that there is an opportunity for the poor to
become well-off. It is advantageous to assign equality or precedence to those who participate least in the regime the welloff in democracies, and the poor in oligarchies.
Rulers need an affection for the regime, a capacity for ruling, and virtue and justice relative to the regime. Advantageous laws are laws that help to preserve the regime. The middling element should also not be neglected in this discussion, because they can act as a stabilizing force.
The greatest thing that helps to make regimes lasting is education relative to the regime. This means not that democratic people should be educated democratically, but rather that they should be educated oligarchically, and vice-versa, to
counteract the natural tendency of the regime toward its extreme form. The problem with democracies is that they define
freedom badly.
In monarchy, the causes of revolution are as follows. Kingship and tyranny are distinguished from one another in that
the tyrant seeks his own pleasure while the king seeks noble goals. Tyranny encompasses the evils of both democracy and
oligarchy. Attacks on monarchs occur sometimes because of their disgraceful behaviour to others, or because of fear,
contempt, ambition, or desire for profit. Tyranny is often destroyed from the outside by a superior regime. It is also
destroyed from within when the rulers fall into factional conflict. Kingship is rarely destroyed from outside.
Kingships are preserved by limiting the kings authority. Tyrannies are preserved by eliminating all potential rivals to
power. Extreme democracy is basically the same as tyranny. A tyrant above all needs military virtue, and should command
awe but not fear. He should be moderate in his dealings with women and strong drink, and he should show himself to be
attentive to the gods. He should honour the good citizens personally and make other officials punish the offenders. The
tyrant should not give preferential treatment either to the poor or the well-off. If a tyrant does these things his rule will be
long-lasting and not completely vicious.
Oligarchy and tyranny are the most short-lived regimes. Socrates is wrong when he argues that there is a cyclical
pattern of revolution for regimes. Why should the best regime ever undergo revolution? Also, it more frequent for regimes
to undergo revolution into their opposite than into a similar type of regime.
SECTION II
Q. 3. (a) Edmund Burkes critique of natural rights and social contract.
Ans. Burke opposes to the doctrine of natural rights, yet he takes over the concept of the social contract and attaches
to it divine sanction. But his support of the proposals for relaxing the restrictions on the trade of Ireland with Great
Britain, and for alleviating the laws against Catholics, cost him the seat at Bristol (1780), and from that time until 1794 he
represented Malton. When the disasters of the American War brought Lord Norths government to a close, Burke was
paymaster of the forces under Rockingham (1782) and also under Portland (1783), After the fall of the Whig ministry
in1783, Burke was never again in office. In 1788 he opened the trial of Warren Hastings by the speech which will always
rank among the masterpieces of English eloquence.
Restraint upon the passions rather than their sacrifice on the altar of reason is the central operation in Burkes
political anthropology:
Government is not made in virtue of natural rights, which may and do exist in total independence of it, and exist in
much greater clearness and in a much greater degree of abstract perfection; but their abstract perfection is their practical
defect. By having a right to everything they want everything. Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide
for human wants. Men have a right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom. Among these wants is to be
reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. Society requires not only that the
passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations
of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection. This can only be
done by a power out of themselves, and not, in the exercise of its function, subject to that will and to those passions which
it is its office to bridle and subdue. In this sense the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among
their rights. But as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and circumstances and admit to infinite modifications,
they cannot be settled upon any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as to discuss them upon that principle.

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No aspect of legal theory during Burkes time was more prescient than the theory of rights. Unlike the topic of
societal origins, Burke did not hesitate to enter into the debate concerning a proper definition of rights. The importance of
clear thinking concerning rights to both pillars of Burkes thought caused Burke to insist that rights be properly defined as
the blessings of society and not as claims set up against society.
Burke clearly recognized the existence of natural rights, but no aspect of his thought is more nuanced. He made a
strong distinction between real natural rights and false ones. Burke accepted natural rights in the sense that the Scholastics
hada right to life, liberty, and property that every ruling power in every society must respect. Natural rights are not rights
enjoyed by man qua man the scientific being, who once enjoyed them to their fullest in a primordial state of nature, but by
man who is bound to the social and ethical duties incumbent upon him by the natural law. False natural rights may also be
termed, as by Burke, the supposed rights of man as man. Burke would not entertain any notion of individuality that set
itself up as adverse to society. To him, this was the same arbitrariness as that of a ruler who set himself up as higher than
the natural law. To those claiming antisocial rights of man, all natural rights must be the rights of individuals, as by
nature there is no thing as a corporate personality: all these ideas are mere fictions of the law, they are creatures of
voluntary institution; men as men are individuals, and nothing else. As the preceding passage suggests, Burke went so
far as to claim that as far as man-in-society is concerned there is no dichotomy between natural and civil rights; to man,
who is born into society, the artificial is natural: For man is by nature reasonable; and he is never perfectly in his natural
state, but when he is placed where reason may be best cultivated and most predominates. Art is mans nature. Man best
cultivates this reason in the civil society that comes naturally to him, and not in a savage and incoherent mode of life. It
is this rejection of a distinction between the natural and the artificial that set Burke at odds with the natural rights theorists
of the Enlightenment. Civil society and its prescriptive constitution have existed from time out of mind-there is no state
of nature alternative for man to his social existence. Everything to man, quite naturally, is artificial, as it had developed
over the course of centuries of social life.
In short, natural rights derive from natural law and not a hypothetical state of nature. Peter Stanlis, a leading scholar
of the natural law, describes the difference between Burkes conception of natural law and the one held by Hobbes and
Locke, which Burke rejected:
Under the added impact of natural science and deistic speculation, as the 18th century unfolded the classical and
Scholastic Natural law was ripped completely loose of its divine origin, so that from a law fitted to the spiritual nature of
man, as a being of supernatural destiny, it became merely a fancied description of the physical order of nature, or a
hedonistic and utilitarian precept for the survival of man as a biological creature in the jungle of nature.
According to Burke, government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants. The creation of
government involves some refraction of natural rights into a new species of rights that crop up when this society is
formed, leading Burke to conclude that any rights worth discussing have their origin in civil society and do not have the
simplicity of natural rights.
Indeed in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns, the primitive rights of men undergo such
a variety of refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they are continued in the simplicity of
their original direction.
While Locke maintained that civil society protected natural rights, Burke does not dwell on natural rights but stresses
that civil society originates new rightsrights to be venerated because they provide a vindication of Lockean natural
rights, as modified by society, that could not be made in their absence. All rights actually enjoyed by man are civil ones,
and it is these rights that concerned Burke most. Civil society provides for natural wants, not rightsrights are those things
produced in societys complex business of satisfying mans natural needs. Russell Kirk puts it thusly: Every society
develops such rights through its historic experience; the form of such rights will vary from one people to another, but their
source is Providential intent; through these rights, man becomes truly human; the oppressor, depriving men of rights,
dehumanizes men.
Upon the institution of society, man must divest himself of the rights he enjoyed as an uncovenanted man to obtain
the satisfaction of his wants necessarily afforded by civil society. Burke cited as examples the forfeiture of the right of
self-defence and the right to judge ones own case. They would be enjoyed by unfettered man, yet they are inconsistent
with civil societyrepugnant to it. Burke ridiculed the French revolutionaries who at once claim a natural right of suffrage
only to riddle the exercise of it with technicalities and qualifications.This served for Burke as yet another example of the
refraction of a natural right to conform to the needs of society. Men cannot enjoy the rights of an uncivil and a civil state
together. Instead, these natural rights, which allow for unchecked individual action, must take on form consistent with
society.

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Prudence determines to what extent natural rights will be curbed by positive law. For example, few would dispute a
natural right of self-defence. For Burke: This, though one of the rights by the law of Nature, yet is so capable of abuses
that it may not be unwise to make some regulations concerning the use of arms. A man desires a sword: why should he
be refused? A sword is a means of defence, and defence is the natural right of man,--nay, the first of all his rights, and
which comprehends them all. But if I know that the sword desired is to be employed to cut my own throat, common sense,
and my own self-defence, dictate to me to keep out of his hands this natural right of the sword.
The natural right of self-defence does not prevent the state from disarming the assassin.
But in Ireland, the regulation of arms had gone too far. Catholics were forbidden from owning them, and were subject
to having their homes searched without warrant for unauthorized firearms. In fact, periodic searches of homes were
required by law. Universal proscription of arms for any people, for Burke, is an example of a natural right not prudently
regulated but completely ignored. Any law completely abridging, rather than prudently regulating, the exercise of natural
rights is void.
The inclinations and passions of man must be thwarted by what Burke called a power out of themselves. The very
restraints placed upon an individuals passion, Burke famously posited, are to be reckoned among his rights. Since
society exists for the satisfaction of a persons wants, this satisfaction becomes a right to him. In order to have these things
provided for in this society (which are a right), there must be a restraint on all individual action harmful to society. It is in
the interest of the person restrained to be so thwarted, so that he might instead partake of the benefits that accrue to him
in society.
Burke did not exalt the state to the detriment of any individuals rights. He simply maintained that real natural rights
life, liberty, and propertyare incapable of any realization without the civilizing effect of society. Any rights not consistent
with society are but pretensepurely a historical and theoretical. The rights of menthat is to say, the natural rights of
mankindare indeed sacred things; and if any public measure is proved mischievously to affect them, the objection ought
to be fatal to that measure, even if no charter at all could be set up against it. The sovereign recognition of the natural
rights of mankind in chartered form is yet one of the inestimable advantages of civil society; one commentator refers to
Burkes chartered rights are the complex of liberties, privileges, and immunities which men (including Indians) had
acquired through the growth of a society. As for Burkes false rights: political power and commercial monopoly are
not the rights of men; these are, in fact, in derogation of the real rights of liberty and property. To put this in context, the
East India Company had no right (its Parliamentary charter notwithstanding) to despoil the people of India, to execute
them without trial, and to plunder their property. It is the solemn obligation of Parliament to correct, and if necessary for
the purpose.wholly destroy, every species of power and authority exercised by British subjects to the oppression,
wrong, and detriment of the people, and to the impoverishment and desolation of the countries subject to it. A political
charter may very well recognize rights, as did the Magna Carta. But the true test is whether the rights recognized therein
are real or contrived.
The pretended rights of mancannot be the rights of the people. For to be a people, and to have these rights, are
things incompatible. The one supposes the presence, the other the absence, of a state of civil society. Proponents of
rights of man theories believe that all government is usurpation, and is so far from having a claim to our obedience, it
is not only our right, but out duty, to resist it. Those who embrace true natural rights are not so foolish to share in this
philosophy, lest the civilizing medium allowing for the fulfilment of modified natural rights disappears entirely. Indeed, it
is part of the law of nature that man is a political animal, and he is destined to enjoy the rights that the natural law confers
on him only by living in society.
Recall that Burke made little of the artificial and natural distinction, such that law, rights, and institutions could
be both. His natural rights are a matter of politics, subject to historical changes and the slow course of civilization,
because civil society is absolutely necessary in fulfilling the natural law in the life of man. Burke knows that if the claims
of those seeking anti-social rights of man were to be realized, those claimants would bring the European order to anarchy
and eventually the total state.
All of this led Burke to conclude that rights cannot rest upon an abstraction; they must vary with times and circumstances.
Human wants and passions are infinite, and as rights exist to redress the balance of human wants and societal needs they
must not be categorical. Burke holds that the rights of men are in sort of a middle, incapable of definition, not possible
to be discerned. The rights of men in governments are their advantages; and these are often in balances between differences
of good; in compromises sometimes between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil.The rights of men are
subject to moral, not metaphysical calculation. They depend upon prudence and not science.
These are therefore not natural; they are positively instituted by a particular society as a way to preserve the modified

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exercise of natural rights. Rights rest on the convention called societyall other claims of right, such as the rights of
man, are outside the convention and are null and void. He asks rhetorically, How can any man claim under the convention
of civil society, rights which do not so much as suppose its very existence? Rights which are absolutely repugnant to it?
One cannot claim the protection of society while at the same time claim the natural rights of man as man.
(b) The Panopticon (Jeremy Bentham)
Ans. The Panopticon: Jeremy Benthams ideas on how the greatest happiness principle should be applied were not
always well-conceived. Bentham spent much of his time and fortune on designs for the Panopticon. The Panopticon (allseeing) was a prison. It was designed to allow round-the-clock surveillance of the inmates by their superintendent.
Benthams intention was humanitarian; but penitentiaries are not the best advertisement for a utilitarian ethic.
The greatest happiness principle dictates the construction, not of prisons, but the secular equivalent of Heaven-onEarth. When harnessed to biotechnology, this utopian-sounding vision is feasible albeit implausible. Yet the ideological
obstacles to global happiness may prove greater than the practical challenges: the contemporary utilitarian project needs
more visually compelling symbols than an image of discipline and punishment. On utilitarian grounds, the Panopticon is
perhaps best forgotten.
Bentham derived the idea from the plan of a military school in Paris designed for easy supervision, itself conceived
by his brother Samuel who arrived at it as a solution to the complexities involved in the handling of large numbers of men.
Bentham supplemented this principle with the idea of contract management; that is, an administration by contract as
opposed to trust, where the director would have a pecuniary interest in lowering the average rate of mortality.
The Panopticon was intended to be cheaper than the prisons of his time, as it required fewer staff; Allow me to
construct a prison on this model, Bentham requested to a Committee for the Reform of Criminal Law, I will be the
gaoler. You will see ... that the gaoler will have no salary will cost nothing to the nation. As the watchmen cannot be
seen, they need not be on duty at all times, effectively leaving the watching to the watched. According to Benthams
design, the prisoners would also be used as menial labour walking on wheels to spin looms or run a water wheel. This
would decrease the cost of the prison and give a possible source of income.
Bentham devoted a large part of his time and almost his whole fortune to promote the construction of a prison based
on his scheme. After many years and innumerable political and financial difficulties, he eventually obtained a favourable
sanction from Parliament for the purchase of a place to erect the prison, but in 1811 after the King refused to authorize the
purchase of the land, the project was finally aborted. In 1813, he was awarded a sum of 23,000 in compensation for his
monetary loss which did little to alleviate Benthams unhappiness for the miscarriage.
While the design did not come to fruition during Benthams time, it has been seen as an important development. For
instance, the design was invoked by Michel Foucault (in Discipline and Punish) as metaphor for modern disciplinary
societies and their pervasive inclination to observe and normalise. Foucault proposes that not only prisons but all hierarchical structures like the army, schools, hospitals and factories have evolved through history to resemble Benthams
Panopticon. The notoriety of the design today (although not its lasting influence in architectural realities) stems from
Foucaults famous analysis of it.
The Panopticon is widely, but erroneously, believed to have influenced the design of Pentonville Prison in North
London, Armagh Gaol in Northern Ireland, and Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia. These, however, were Victorian examples of the Separate system, which was more about prisoner isolation than prisoner surveillance; in fact, the
separate system makes surveillance quite difficult. No true panopticons were built in Britain during Benthams lifetime,
and very few anywhere in the British Empire.
Many modern prisons are built in a podular design influenced by the Panopticon design, in intent and basic organization if not in exact form. As compared to traditional cellblock designs, in which rectangular buildings contain tiers
of cells one atop the other in front of a walkway along which correctional officers patrol, modern prisons are often
decentralized and contain triangular or trapezoidal-shaped housing units known as pods or modules designed to hold
between 16 and 50 prisoners each. Cells are laid out in three or fewer tiers arrayed around either a central control station
or a desk which affords a single correctional officer full view of all cells within either a 270 or 180 field of view (180
is considered a closer level of supervision).
In 1791, Jeremy Bentham proposed a new era in penal reform with the publication of his book, Panoptican or The
Inspection House. He envisioned a novel prison architecture based on a simple idea: implied surveillance. A central tower
was placed at the hub of a circular building, the individual prison cells fanning out from this tower in a mandala-like pattern.
The key to Benthams design was the towers visual supremacy. All inmates could see the tower, the tower could see
into every cell. But inmates never knew whether anyone was in the tower or whether they were watching. Bentham

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suggested that this ever-present surveillance, whether actual or implied, would stop the inmates of his Panopticon from
behaving in an inappropriate manner.
Q. 4. (a) Hegels views on history.
Ans. The philosophy of history espoused by George Frederick Hegel, philosopher and historian, has often been
viewed as largely teleological. It has often been speculated that this philosophical presumption arose from the historical
context of Hegels life, whether negatively through his fear of the French Terror or positively from his dedication to the
Romantic thesis that Reason shapes the universe. Nonetheless, Hegels commitment to the dialectical progression of time
and to the triumphant end of history is taken to be a largely deterministic and ahistorical philosophy. Such a reading, I
would argue, would be a mistaken.
It is not difficult to see how this interpretation of Hegel arose. In Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel openly espouses
determinism by stating that world history exhibits nothing other than the plan of providence. He further develops this
belief in his Introduction to the Philosophy of History, explaining that in the pure light of this divine Idea... the illusion
that the world is a mad or foolish happening disappears. Indeed, at no point in his writings does Hegel appear willing to
place conditions upon these dogmatic statements. He is consistent in his assertion that history follows a specific path, one
predetermined by the purposeful movement of Spirit through time:
Spirit does not toss itself about in the external play of chance occurrences; on the contrary, it is that which determines
history absolutely, and it stands firm against the chance occurrences which it dominates and exploits for its own purpose.
Any reasonable analysis of such statements could only result in a single conclusion: Hegel views the course of history
as a fixed, immutable fact.
Despite these seemingly self-evident statements of absolute determinism, however, Hegel clearly recognized that
contingency continued to exist in the world. He concurred that chance occurrences were indeed a part of history, but did
not see them as an active or even particularly noteworthy element. They simply were not significant in terms of what
really mattered: the meaning of history itself.
To some extent, this confusion can be traced to the fundamental differences between philosophy and history. Whereas
philosophy deals primarily with universal rules and meanings, history generally applies itself to definite periods of change
or unrest. Philosophy sees all things as essentially the same; history engages events as particular products of their time
and space. And Hegel, a philosopher of history, is caught in the middle of this gap.
Hegels task becomes even more difficult by the question of where to search for this truth. As a philosopher of
history, Hegel concerns are primarily focused upon the finding basic truths regarding the nature of reality. Because he
seeks metaphysical first principles of nature, his results cannot judged through outside sources or objective facts, but
only through individual reflection and inspiration. In contrast, the philosopher of history is expected to rely almost wholly
upon facts, and to avoid the contamination of bias. Conclusions about the historical meaning follow not from preconceived
notions, but from facts and connections discovered from historical events alone. The chasm separating these two approaches
could hardly be more dramatic.
In arriving at his conclusions, Hegel acted much more the philosopher than the historian. His theory, though grounded
in historical facts, was based upon deductive and not inductive reasoning. The Hegelian model thus opens itself to
criticism as a preconceived (and therefore uninformed) assessment of world historical events. But to what extent does this
criticism damage Hegel as a philosopher of history? If we accept the metaphysical first principles he advances (which
cannot themselves be disproven by facts), his theory certainly does not need to encompass all historical phenomena to
be valid. The question then arises: how closely must a philosophy of history mirror the scope of world events to be
acceptable -- or useful?
The answer Hegel gives is that facts are important to theory, but only to a limited extent. As he asserts in Phenomenology,
the individual has the right to demand that science should at least provide him with the ladder to any philosophical
perspective. In other words, the objective facts should at least underlay the theory, offering empirical evidence of its
possible validity. Hegel recognizes the significance of historical events, but only insofar as they provide evidence to
confirm the underlying philosophy.
Hegels concept of sense-certainty is also useful in addressing this point. Just as our senses provide us with a very
basic level of reality, so too do facts in history offer meaningful insights regarding the purpose of existence. In neither
case, however, are these facts omnipotent or infallible. In the experience of our sense of sight, for instance, we sometimes
discover that our sensory perceptions deceive us about reality, such as in a heat-induced mirage. Though disconcerting,
such events do not cause us to worry about whether our eyes can ever perceive reality, but simply force us to recognize a
limitation to our sense-certainty. Hegel suggests the same response for philosophical quandaries. If the facts of history

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sometimes fail to match the theory, we should not abandon the concept altogether. Rather, we should ask whether it
generally apprehends reality at a most basic level. If it does, superficial or anecdotal evidence to the contrary should not
be debilitating.
The facts of history, then, do matter to Hegel, but only insofar as they do not wholly invalidate his system.
It appears that the only way in which Hegels philosophy might be salvaged would be through the conception of a
provisional end to history. Reason might be seen as achieved in history through the realization of Freedom in some
central facets of life, such as religion, art, and philosophy. The movement of history might then continue in auxiliary
forms. For instance, although international states will have achieved their fundamental standing in the world, continued
antagonisms between states might provide the essential life-preserving principle of opposition (i.e. dialectical rivalry).
Perhaps also the existence of contingency would fuel life: through aberrations in the modern state (which certainly
would continue), the dialectic might constantly struggle to perfect itself.
Both of these scenarios, admittedly, still appear problematic, as they accommodate an end to history in a somewhat
subjective or parochial fashion. Nonetheless, they provide an answer which would best satisfy the Hegelian system.
Moreover, they point out the essential facet of Hegel that often is overlooked: namely, that Hegel himself made distinctions
about what the meaning of the term history or an end to history could be. History to Hegel was not all-determinate
or all-encompassing; as discussed earlier, Hegel recognized that not all historical events or facts would be identifiable
through the dialectic. Indeed, as we shall see, contingency is a necessary component of Hegels world-view, for without
contingency, the Absolute could not continue the self-realization of Freedom.
Emil Fackenheim is most insistent and most persuasive in The Religious Dimension in Hegels Thought on this issue.
He points out that the philosophy of the Absolute in Hegel does not necessarily involve the absorption of all of reality
within the one Idea. Indeed, it is only in the victory of the Absolute over its antithesis (contingency) that an affirmation
could be complete. Whence does this contingency arise? From the Absolute itself. Necessity (which is defined by the
Absolute), consists in its containing its negation, contingency, within itself. Or, stated in a bit more arcane but complete
form: it is therefore necessity itself which determines itself as contingency -- in its being repels itself from itself, and in
this very repulsion has only returned into itself, and in this return, as its being, has repelled itself from itself. Thus the
antithesis, which is contingency, must be overreached, but can never be abolished else the dialectic be destroyed. As
Fackenheim argues, the entire Hegelian philosophy, far from denying the contingent, on the contrary seeks to demonstrate
its inescapability. Contingency must exist for absolute freedom to realize itself.
Since Hegels philosophy is a Christian one, it is interesting to note that this structure has a religious parallel. For just
as the central miracle of Christianity was that God actually descended to earth, merging His divine nature with that of a
human, so too does Hegels philosophy insist upon the union of infinite with the Finite. This necessary relationship of
absolute and particular underlies both Christianity and the Hegelian concept of history. Hegels philosophy, thoroughly
imbued with Christian references and ideals, therefore remains consistent in both form and content.
History is fundamentally the striving of Spirit for its own freedom, Reason is consistently manifesting itself in the
course of development, and the process is essentially a dialectical progression towards an end goal. Is this not deterministic?
Accepting Hegelian boundaries, can we not approach the course of world history with foreknowledge or will contingency
continue to confound such iron-clad predictability?
In order to soften the impact of Hegels statements, some interpretations have suggested that references to necessary
events in history could be inferred as rationally necessary. This would presumably reduce Hegels argument from one
of determinism to hopeful idealism. However, since Hegel states that the rational, like the substantial, is necessary, no
qualitative difference exists between the terms necessary and rationally necessary. In addition, we have already
proven that for either contingency or necessity to exist, the other must also exist. Any attempt to dilute the Hegelian
meaning of necessity therefore will not help us to encompass the contingency often seen in world events.
To understand the relative importance of contingency versus determinism in Hegels philosophy, it is most important
to note the distinction he makes between world history and particular history. What world history has to record, he
writes in his Introduction to the Philosophy of History, are the actions of the Spirit of peoples. The individual configurations
assumed by Spirit in external reality could be left to limited histories. Carefully analyzed in the context of Hegels work,
it becomes clear that Hegel views long-term history as the meaningful area for study of Spirits activity, whereas limited
histories merely reflect the external reality that Spirit assumes.
This recognition uncloaks much of the historical misunderstanding of Hegelian philosophy. Hegel is not a determinist,
though he does believe that world historical events represent the necessary unfolding of the Spirit through time. Hegel is
not a contingency historian, though he believes that chance occurrences do in fact happen in particular (or limited)

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historical events. Like most historian-philosophers, Hegel sees both as co-existing (just as the absolute and the particular
must both co-exist).
The same point can be made through an analogy regarding rationality. Although many philosophers, historians, or lay
people might assert that the world is essentially rational, it is not necessarily true that all of the people in the world are
necessarily rational. And further, not each and every action of the people in the world will be rational. In fact, we would
not expect such a scenario to be true. Why then is it that we expect Hegels philosophy to provide a world system which
is absolutely rational? Just like people, world history may be eminently rational at a very fundamental level, and yet not
necessarily appear so in all cases and all events.
Surveying the Hegelian system, then, one is tempted to ask: what makes Hegel different from other philosophers of
history? Hegel, like the historians he so harshly criticizes, would like to create a bold new conception of history, and yet
at the penultimate moment, backs down in the recognition of contingency and a dual-tiered concept of history. The
distinction Hegel receives is more related to the power of his presentation and his rather infrequent references to contingency.
Regardless of his disdain for particular history and its inexplicable events, these clearly are a necessary component of
his system. Indeed, we have shown that without their presence, Hegelian terms such as Reason, the Absolute, and dialectical
progression would have no meaning whatsoever. Thus, Hegel is a contingency historian quite to the core, and yet this fact
remains one of the best kept secrets in the history of the philosophy of history.
(b) Alexis de Tocqueville on women and family.
Ans. When Describe only Tocqueville not both Tocqueville and Wollstonecraft analyze the appropriate role of women
in democratic society, they learned that women are expected to fulfil the role of being social tools expected to live with
limited liberty in order to obey the male-centred world in which they lived. The similarities in Tocqueville and
Wollstonecrafts methods of reaching this conclusion show another significant truth, that in order to assess the appropriate role of women, appealing to status quo prejudices is necessary to create political reform.
In both Wollstonecraft and Tocquevilles works, they adopt a male-centred point of view that in both European and
American societies, power, understanding and all social authority rests with men. For example, Tocqueville concedes the
patriarchial claim that womens education can cause the harm of making women chaste and cold rather than tender and
loving companions of men. This claim is clearly a means of appeasement to the readers (who are most likely men) as it
accepts their previous stereotype that women ought to be tender and loving above all else. Wollstonecraft uses this
strategy as well when she uses the rhetorical device of appealing to analogy: she appeals to the analogy of mens rights in
order to equate how women ought to be given those same rights. Specifically, she says that for men character is directly
linked to a mans profession. Weakness is being told your social role by someone else, which reveals a lack of independence.
The argument then goes that because it is bad to have weak men in democracy, it is also inappropriate to have weak women
as well. This rhetorical strategy is a crucial similarity because it underscores the historical point of view about appropriate
behaviour for women in democracy: women are required, at all costs, to maintain feminine traits like beauty, chastity and
tenderness. This claim is empirically true as society gives women the concept that such abstract goods are the end goal of
womens lives and that rejecting these goods is a rejection of what it means to be a woman. In the status quo, womens
appropriate role in democracy is not to engage in male-dominated activities like negotiation, ethical public service, or hard
labour as doing such things show[s] minds and heart of men. Consistent with this belief many European women centre
their efforts and hopes upon meeting such limiting social expectations as they gain self-esteem from appearing futile, weak
and timid. Such expectations were so powerful in the cause against womens rights that in Europe, these appeals to feminine
values acted as a disincentive for people to challenge or change this gender role.
These expectations were also powerful enough to influence Wollstonecraft away from arguing how current gender
roles were completely wrong. Instead, she claimed that current gender roles were misguided but true based on a limited
amount of social experience. In other words, she does not reject current social roles, but she merely edits them to the
context of preexisting European view of the appropriate role of women in democracy. Because these traits are assumed by
society and the authors as inherently valuable, this situates both Wollstonecraft and Tocqueville as two authors who take
considerable effort to make their own conclusions about the role of women in democracy within the context of preexisting
limiting social expectations in order to persuade their audiences for reform.
Overall, both Tocqueville and Wollstonecraft share similar views of equality within the societies in which they live.
Both authors supported Americas view of gender equality: maximize the natural roles of each different sex. This similarity
has significance as it demonstrates the truth that to completely dispute the accuracy of natural roles is impossible. Consider
the example of the rejection of womens suffrage in France. If gaining suffrage was not possible, trying to eliminate the
prejudicial assumptions that were the backing for such a decision would be impossible as well. Meanwhile, both authors

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openly criticize the European interpretation of gender equality: to assign women some new responsibilities and rights, but
only a limited amount. The value of this similarity is that both authors can claim that gender distinctions as they exist can
be questioned and modified (even though not eliminated). Wollstonecraft uses this exact strategy in her use of religion to
refute common religious claims in the inferiority of women. Ironically, in a patriarchial system like Europe, there is an
internal contradiction: as women are valued for feminine traits like innocence, Tocqueville points out that there is less, not
more value placed on female will and labour. This is noticeable by Europes apathy about rape. This observation establishes
that the appropriate role for women is to be objects and tools for others pleasure, specifically the self-interest of males.
However, one key difference between these two authors is that Tocqueville uniquely notices that Americas treatment
of women is similar but more leinient than that in Europe. This difference comes from the variation of intent between
Tocqueville and Wollstonecraft: Tocqueville desired to analyze the equality of conditions in America while Wollstonecraft
spends her effort criticizing European society and its gender roles. In Tocquevilles view of the United States, women
have more independence than England and other European societies. In fact, the American woman can already think for
herself, speak freely and act on her own.. In contrast, in Europe, women are continually criticized for their weaknesses.
In sum, the difference in historical environments gives Tocquevilles arguments a slight positive bias toward American
view of womens rights.
Nevertheless, he still criticizes the American system, although he argues for its superiority over Europes treatment of
women. Between these two interpretations of equality, there exists one similarity between Tocquevilles America and
Wollstonecrafts European historical background. The family exists in both systems as a pervasive social force in terms of
social structure and womens rights. The family is a hierarchical social structure that is the backbone of both American
and European society as it is used to justify social roles between men and women. Such familial hierarchy is paternalistic
as the father is viewed as the king and supreme leader while the females (wives and daughters) are viewed as subjects to
the will of the father. The power of the family structure is so great that its bias toward men exists permanently as there is
a system of inheritance from father to oldest son. The fact that such inheritance never includes women offers proof that
the family hierarchy was definitely a major force in both authors interpretations of womens appropriate social role in
democracies.
Indeed, the family was a large obstacle for womens rights because the family defined male-dominated responsibilities
and rights outside of the domain of womens appropriate social role. Tocqueville provides several examples of this
exclusion as You will never find American women in charge of the external relations of the family, managing a business
or interfering in politics.
In this manner, Tocquevilles claim includes all leadership responsibilities as well.
This treatment reflects in Wollstonecrafts analogy about the relationship between women and the father in a family
unit. Women are taught to willingly accept the paternalism in society that restricts their rights. One way society convinces
women to such acceptance is to make women believe that accepting weaker gender roles as their identity provides selfprotection and security from men.
This relationship is analogous to the relationship between a strict parent and child where like the child, the womans
rights would be violated for some perceived utilitarian purpose that would only be realized through obedience of the
parent (in the case of women, this involves obedience to the father of the family. Therefore, the family structure defined
womens appropriate role in democracy as a role of subservience and guardianship under mens control.
However, the long reaching impact of the family on womens social rights in democracy extends beyond the husbandwife relationship previously mentioned. The family also limits womens rights through the concept of marriage.
Marriage is a consensual, but sever limitation of womens rights. Within this family system, marriage is the initial
barrier to womens total freedom as the husbands [house] is a cloister (a term used to describe severe entrapment in a
confined space). Tocquevilles point here makes sense because women and American and European societies already
lives in subservience because of preexisting gender roles. Marriage harms the rights stance of women in democracy by
obligating women to less autonomy: in marriage women gain social responsibility while the sexist society would deny
them corollary rights and freedom (i.e. suffrage).
Tocqueville is right that women have the freedom to select the person they marry, that choice does not reform womens
typical role in democracy because even the choice of a groom is tainted. The limitations of a narrow scope of education
and life experience makes the ability to make informed, literate decisions about potential mates much more difficult than
for men. It is even ironic that this lack of education originates from the wife-husband relationships where women are
given substandard education. For example, women are not taught higher-level thinking that men receive. Men receive
focused study on one particular subject in depth, which develops their mental capacity and literacy. In contrast, women

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are limited to learning by snatches and having to deprioritize education for corporeal accomplishment and societal
desires of maintaining values of femininity and patriarchy.
Finally, the poor education women receive represents societys intent to maintain the argument that the appropriate
role of women is subservience, or using women as a social tool. As Wollstonecraft elaborates that tyrants and sensationalists
are in the right when they endeavour to keep women in the dark because the former only want slaves and the latter a
plaything. With this argument, Wollstonecraft is establishing that limiting educational opportunities for women is a
method to limit womens role in participating in democracy. If women are not able to gain education, consequently they
would not be able to fully maximize their potential for gaining equal rights with men. Further, this lack of sufficient
education for women is probably a result of the patriarchal system of the family. If the father is primarily responsible for
economic and political affairs, then socially that would establish that for women, their sole role is not political involvement
but merely actions that exist within their domestic sphere like cooking, rearing children, and providing emotional support
by displaying feminine traits. In sum, the existence of the family in Wollstonecrafts world, establishes social conditions
that severely limit womens potential to take active, substantial roles in democracy.
First, the existence of family gives women more responsibility with only a minimal (if any) increase in freedoms and
rights exercise. Further, the family unit is a breeding ground for social discrimination: as men enjoy more familial authority
over women and childrens freedoms, women become treated like subservient kids which devalues their worth and
which devalues the possibility that women can have an equal opportunity to establish their own role in democracy.
Finally, consider the end goals that both Tocqueville and Wolstonecraft shared for womens role in democracy. First,
they believed that women should maintain their current domestic duties, but those domestic duties are secondary in value
compared to goals of self-fulfilment and the maximization of virtue. Specifically, while men in society work toward selffulfillment, women too need to be allowed this possibility, where as most of society teaches women that they are social
tools that do not have special consideration, except for having to take care of a family.
In sum, Tocqueville and Wollstonecraft shared many relevant similiarities in their ideas. They both used status quo
concepts of womens rights to create their own position and they also each present arguments that show that womens
rights were necessary for women to participate in society. Finally, both works expressed in detail justifications for improving
womens rights with the necessity for education being a crucial example. Overall, both authors expressed ideas which
proved that society, in the status quo, viewed women as not only inferior to men, but subservient to them. In democracy,
the appropriate role of women is so defined and narrow that it affects both Tocqueville and Wollstonecrafts argumentation:
neither can fully reject all of the social norms concerning gender rights, since they must appeal to society in order to
spread their ideas. Both Tocqueville and Wollstonecraft agree that women need more rights and their role in democracy
ought to maximize their opportunities in a male-centered world.
Q. 5. (a) John Stuart Mill on womens equality.
Ans. In The Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill sets forth what has often been viewed as a progressive theory
espousing equality for women in society. Mill argues that social and legal conditions which restrict the liberty of women
serve as one of the chief hindrances to human improvement. Mill likens the position of women in society and particularly their position in the marital relationship in the 19th century to that of slaves subject to the will of their masters (i.e.
Mill argues that marriage is the legal equivalent of slavery). Mill argues that numerous benefits will follow from allowing
women the liberty to control their own destiny and the freedom to hold an equal position in society.
Among these benefits are:
1. Improved conditions for women in marital relationships so that they are no longer legally subject to the will of a
cruel husband but are, instead, equal partners in the marriage;
2. The removal of the `self-worship instilled in men who believe they are better than women merely because of
their gender and not for any substantive reason;
3. The creation of the family as a model of the virtues of freedom;
4. Most importantly, the promotion of human progress and the greatest happiness for all through the addition to
society of new and diverse intellectual forces which will result from improved and equal education and opportunities
for women.
Mill argues that the subjection of women has been justified by the claim that it is natural for men to dominate women.
Women, so the claim goes, are naturally inferior to men. Mill, on the other hand, argues that it is impossible to know the
true nature of women. Mill argues that womens subordinate position in society is a remnant of the past practice of the rule
of the physically strong over the weak. The practice of men dominating women has since become customary (though the
rule of the physically strong over the weak has become obsolete in civilized society) and has been mistaken as the
natural order. Women are believed to be naturally inferior because of the unquestioning acceptance of this order and a

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resulting socialization process which creates women who will act in such a way to fill these inferior positions. Mill
argues that we cannot claim to know the true nature of women based on their behaviour because this behaviour is a
product of social forces that have conditioned women to behave in a certain way and have thus hidden and suppressed
their true natural inclinations.
The radical nature of Mills call for womens equality is often lost to us after over a century of protest and changing
social attitudes. Yet the subordination of women to men when Mill was writing remains striking. Among other indicators
of this subordination are the following: (1) British women had fewer grounds for divorce than men until 1923; (2)
Husbands controlled their wives personal property (with the occasional exception of land) until the Married Womens
Property Acts of 1870 and 1882; (3) Children were the husbands; (4) Rape was impossible within a marriage; and
(5) Wives lacked crucial features of legal personhood, since the husband was taken as the representative of the family
(thereby eliminating the need for womens suffrage). This gives some indication of how disturbing and/or ridiculous the
idea of a marriage between equals could appear to Victorians.
The object of the essay was to show that the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two
sexesthe legal subordination of one sex to the otheris wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human
improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the
one side, nor disability on the other. This shows how Mill appeals to both the patent injustice of contemporary familial
arrangements and to the negative moral impact of those arrangements on the people within them. In particular, he discusses
the ways in which the subordination of women negatively affects not only the women, but also the men and children in the
family. This subordination stunts the moral and intellectual development of women by restricting their field of activities,
pushing them either into self-sacrifice or into selfishness and pettiness. Men, alternatively, either become brutal through
their relationships with women or turn away from projects of self-improvement to pursue the social consideration that
women desire.
It is important to note that Mills concern for the status of women dovetails with the rest of his thoughtit is not a
disconnected issue. For example, his support for womens equality was buttressed by associationism, which claims that
minds are created by associative laws operating on experience. This implies that if we change the experiences and upbringing
of women, then their minds will change. This enabled Mill to argue against those who tried to suggest that the subordination
of women to men reflected a natural order that women were by nature incapable of equality with men. If many women
were incapable of true friendship with noble men, says Mill, that is not a result of their natures, but of their faulty
environments.
(b) Karl Marxs theory of Alienation
Ans. In 1844, Marx wrote Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. In this work he developed his ideas on the
concept of alienation. Marx identified three kinds of alienation in capitalist society. First, the worker is alienated from
what he produces. Second, the worker is alienated from himself; only when he is not working does he feel truly himself.
Finally, in capitalist society people are alienated from each other; that is, in a competitive society people are set against
other people. Marx believed the solution to this problem was communism as this would enable the fulfilment of his
potentialities as a human.
Marxs concept of alienation is based on his analysis of alienated labour. Through political economy, he sees that the
worker is degraded to the most miserable commodity, i.e. the misery of the workers increases with the power and size of
their production. Marx depicts political economy as the following:
The worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces and the more his production increases in power and extent.
The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more goods he creates. The devaluation of the human world
increases in direct relation with the increase in value of the world of things. Labour does not only create goods; it also
produces itself and the worker as a commodity and indeed in the same proportion as it produces goods.
Consequently, the workers relate to the product of their labour as to an alien object. For it is clear on this presupposition
that the more the worker expends himself in work the more powerful becomes the world of objects which he creates in
face of himself, the poorer he becomes in his inner life, and the less he belongs to himself. Under the laws of political
economy, the more the workers produce, the less they have to consume, thus the more values they create the more
valueless and worthless they become. It is understandable that labour produces works of wonder for the rich, but nakedness
for the worker. It produces palaces, but only hovels for the worker; it produces beauty, but cripples the worker.
Marx explains four forms of alienated labour. First, it is the alienation of the product from the labourer. Marx points
out that the alienation of workers from their product means that the labour becomes an object, an external thing, which is
outside self and alien to them. The effort they make for the object becomes hostile to them. Furthermore, the labourer

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becomes a slave of the object, existing only as a worker and as a physical subject. If the products of labour do not belong
to the workers, but confront them as an alien power, this can only be because it belongs to a person other than the worker.
The objects of his own work become alien beings, and eventually rule over him; become powers independent of the
producer. Based on the economic fact, Marx observes that the worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces and
the more his product increases in power and extent. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more goods he
creates. The devaluation of the human world increases in direct relation with the increase in value of the world of things.
Secondly, there is the alienation of the worker from the process of labour. Since the product does not belong to the
workers, they cannot find achievement in their work; therefore they deny themselves. When they are working, they feel
miserable instead of happy. They feel at home only during their leisure time, while at work they feel homeless. Work is
not a voluntary but compelled labour. They cannot work to satisfy themselves; instead they work for others needs. It is
not their work but someone elses work; thus, the workers do not belong to themselves but to other people. Consequently,
the relationship of the workers to their activities is alien. Here he shows some contradiction: activity as suffering,
strength as powerlessness, creation as weakness.
Since the alien object dominates the workers, they become powerless and hostile to external world; in the meantime
they lose imagination and creativity in the objects, which they work on.
The third form is that alienated labour alienates itself from species being. Human beings are species-beings not only
because they live with nature, but also because they look at themselves as living species, as universal and free beings.
However, alienated labour takes away their species life. Since it transforms free and self-directed activity into a means
to life, it transforms the species life of human beings into a means of physical existence. Marx states, Alienated labour
turns the species life of man, and also nature as his mental species-property, into an alien being and into a means for his
individual existence. It alienates from man his own body, external nature, his mantel life and his human life.
The fourth form is that alienated labour alienates the self from other human beings. Alienated labour alienates the
product and process of labour, and its species resulting the alienation from workers themselves, from their fellows and
from nature. According to Marx:
A direct consequence of the alienation of man from the product of his labour, from his life activity and from his
species life is that man is alienated from other men. When man confronts himself he also confronts other men. What is
true of mans relationship to his work, to the product of his work and to himself, is also true of his relationship to other
men, to their labour and to the objects of their labour.
Concept of Private Property: Marx then analyzes the concept of private property based on the concept of alienated
labour.
Through alienated labour the worker creates the relation of another man, who does not work and is outside the work
process, to this labour. The relation of the worker to work also produces the relation of the capitalist to work. Private
property is therefore the product, the necessary result, of alienated labour, of the external relation of the worker to nature
and to himself. For Marx, private property is not only the basis and cause of alienated labour but also a consequence of
it; they are mutually influential.
Marxs final goal is to free workers from alienation. Increased wages would do little to emancipate human beings or
equalize income. Above all, emancipation includes the emancipation of humanity as a whole. Human slavery is
involved in the relation of the worker to production, and all types of slavery are only consequences of this relation.
To Marx, the ultimate goal of human beings is to pursue real freedom. Marx believes that human beings are creators
of history; and also they have the ability to emancipate themselves from being alienated. For Marx, human beings should
be freely associated people as a whole.

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