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) Case No. 14-CV-2518-DDC-TJJ
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SUSAN MOSIER, M.D., in her official capacity
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as Secretary of the Kansas Department of
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Health and Environment and
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DOUGLAS A. HAMILTON, in his official
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th
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Capacity as Clerk of the District Court for the 7
Judicial District (Douglas county), and
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BERNIE LUMBRERAS, in her official capacity
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as Clerk of the District Court for the 18th
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Judicial District (Sedgwick County),
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NICK JORDAN, in his official capacity as
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Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue, )
LISA KASPAR, in her official capacity as Director )
of the Kansas Department of Revenues Division )
of Vehicles, and MIKE MICHAEL, in his official )
capacity as Director of the State Employee
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Health Plan,
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Defendants.
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_________________________________________ )
Defendants Susan Mosier, Nick Jordan, Lisa Kaspar, and Mike Michael, named in their
respective official capacities, oppose plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. The motion for
summary judgment does not present a prima facie case and so would not be grantable even if no
defendant responded to it. The motion does not address any of the issues raised in the pending
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motions to dismiss. The motion contains no argument or authorities that discuss a plaintiffs
burden of proof in a case seeking to declare a wide array of laws, most of which are not
specified, facially unconstitutional. The facts offered in support of the motion affirmatively
establish that the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to decide most if not all of the claims of
the various plaintiffs. The motion reinforces the propriety of granting the motions to dismiss
previously filed by all defendants. Defendants continue to press for a timely decision on those
motions and do not withdraw them by responding to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.
The motion for summary judgment is no more than a laundry list of special privileges
desired by plaintiffs. None of the defendants is preventing any plaintiff from marrying a spouse
of choice in Kansas. There is no present case or controversy between the original four plaintiffs
and any defendant, because the only reason these plaintiffs are not already married is their own
decision to forego marriage until after the lawsuit has been fully and finally concluded. There is
no present case or controversy against Susan Mosier, whose office is not a participant in any
grievance described in the First Amended Complaint. There is no justiciable claim for allegedly
discriminatory paperwork burdens in the operation of the Kansas personal income tax selfassessment process due to the Tax Injunction Act, and even if the Court had jurisdiction to
entertain that claim it would fail on the merits. There is no constitutional right to obtain a driver
license using an alias of choice, and no Kansas law prohibiting that result is being
discriminatorily applied to any plaintiff. There is no constitutional right to be insured under a
spouses employment-related health insurance policy, and no Kansas law relating to that subject
is being discriminatorily applied to any plaintiff by any defendant. Any claim seeking an order
compelling delivery of insurance benefits is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
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2. Controverted in part. The first sentence of paragraph two is not material to any issue
addressed in the motion for summary judgment. Because it is not yet known to this defendant
what sex was declared for each of these plaintiffs on their respective birth certificates, it is
not possible to determine whether they are a same sex couple for purposes of Kansas law.
The second sentence is controverted by the second declarations of Marie and Brown, who
state that they have no present intention of seeking a Kansas marriage license and will not
seek any such license during the pendency of this litigation. (Second Declaration of Marie,
7; Second Declaration of Brown, 7.) Both Marie and Brown are free to obtain marriage
licenses from Kansas court clerks at any time during the pendency of this litigation,
according to the affidavits of Hamilton and Lumbreras filed in support of those defendants
motion to dismiss. Additional factual support for the denial of this statement of fact will be
presented once plaintiffs Marie and Brown have given their depositions.
3. Controverted in part. The first sentence of paragraph three is not material to any issue
addressed in the motion for summary judgment. Because it is not yet known to this defendant
what sex is declared for each of these plaintiffs on their respective birth certificates, it is not
possible to determine whether they are a same sex couple for purposes of Kansas law. The
second sentence is controverted by the second declarations of Wilks and Ditrani, who state
that they have no present intention of seeking a Kansas marriage license and will not seek
any such license during the pendency of this litigation. (Second Declaration of Wilks, 7;
Second Declaration of DiTrani, 7). Wilks and DiTrani are free to obtain marriage licenses
from Kansas court clerks at any time during the pendency of this litigation, according to the
affidavits of Hamilton and Lumbreras filed in support of those defendants motion to dismiss.
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Additional factual support for the denial of this statement of fact will be presented once
plaintiffs Wilks and DiTrani have given their depositions.
4. Uncontroverted.
5. Uncontroverted.
6. Uncontroverted.
7. Uncontroverted.
8. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
9. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
10. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
11. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
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12. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
13. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
14. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
15. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
16. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
incorporate by reference whatever responses defendants Hamilton and Lumbreras choose to
make to these paragraphs, as permitted by F.R.C.P. 10(c).
17. Because paragraphs 8 through 20 relate to the claims against defendants Hamilton and
Lumbreras, these defendants defer to their response to the statement of facts and will
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these defendants any Kansas driver license issued to any plaintiff in this case shows that
persons legal name as required by all relevant state and federal laws, and only additional
discovery could establish otherwise. No plaintiff in this case alleges facts that would trigger
an obligation to issue a new driver license pursuant to Kansas laws. (Affidavit of Timothy
Parks)
37. Controverted. The paragraph misstates the substance of the referenced laws. Kansas law does
not require the issuance of a new driver license in any arbitrarily selected name, just because
a married person prefers to be known by that name. To the best knowledge and belief of
these defendants any Kansas driver license issued to any plaintiff in this case shows that
persons legal name as required by all relevant state and federal laws, and only additional
discovery could establish otherwise. No plaintiff in this case alleges facts that would trigger
an obligation to issue a new driver license pursuant to Kansas laws. (Affidavit of Timothy
Parks)
38. Controverted. The paragraph misstates the substance of the referenced laws. Kansas law does
not require the issuance of a new driver license in any arbitrarily selected name, just because
a married person prefers to be known by that name. To the best knowledge and belief of
these defendants any Kansas driver license issued to any plaintiff in this case shows that
persons legal name as required by all relevant state and federal laws, and only additional
discovery could establish otherwise. No plaintiff in this case alleges facts that would trigger
an obligation to issue a new driver license pursuant to Kansas laws. (Affidavit of Timothy
Parks)
39. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
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surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would now prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether these plaintiffs were able to obtain federal
documents using their pseudonyms of choice.
40. Controverted. K.S.A. 23-2506 permits issuance of a driver license in a new name acquired by
marriage only if the marriage is performed under Kansas law.
41. Controverted in part. It is uncontroverted that plaintiffs Bohnenblust and Hickman seek to
restore their premarital birth names by misusing the provisions of K.S.A. 23-2506. This
technique is not permitted by Kansas law, which allows only the adoption of a new name, not
reversion to an old name previously used by the applicant. Neither a heterosexual couple nor
a homosexual couple would be allowed to achieve the result sought by these plaintiffs.
(Affidavit of Timothy Parks)
42. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether these plaintiffs have ever applied to some
unspecified motor vehicle office seeking documents issued in their pseudonyms of choice.
43. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether these plaintiffs have ever applied to some
unspecified motor vehicle office seeking documents issued in their pseudonyms of choice.
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44. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether plaintiff Fowler ever placed the described
telephone calls. K.S.A. 23-2506 permits issuance of a driver license in a new name acquired
by marriage only if the marriage is performed under Kansas law.
45. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether plaintiff Fowler ever placed the described
telephone calls. K.S.A. 23-2506 permits issuance of a driver license in a new name acquired
by marriage only if the marriage is performed under Kansas law.
46. Controverted. Plaintiffs Fowler, Bohenblust, and Hickman have filed this lawsuit using these
surnames, which is prima facie evidence that their legal names are the ones appearing in the
case caption rather than the pseudonyms they allege they would prefer to employ. Only
additional discovery could establish whether plaintiff Fowler ever placed the described
telephone calls. K.S.A. 23-2506 permits issuance of a driver license in a new name acquired
by marriage only if the marriage is performed under Kansas law.
47. Controverted. The paragraph misstates the substance of the controlling regulation,
K.A.R.108-1-1, as amended effective January 2, 2015. The regulation requires that the status
of dependent spouse be determined under Kansas law, not the law of any other state. The
regulation has no language expressly determining whether a spouse can or cannot be a person
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of the same sex as the employee requesting to add the dependent spouse. (Mike Michael
affidavit)
48. Uncontroverted.
49. Uncontroverted.
50. Controverted. Employee dependent eligibility is controlled by the provisions of K.A.R.1081-1, as amended effective January 2, 2015. The regulation requires that the status of
dependent spouse be determined under Kansas law, not the law of any other state. The
regulation has no language expressly determining whether a spouse can or cannot be a person
of the same sex as the employee requesting to add the dependent spouse. (Mike Michael
affidavit)
51. Uncontroverted.
52. Uncontroverted.
53. Uncontroverted.
54. Controverted. Peters alleges he was married in Iowa, not in Kansas, so his purported spouse
could not qualify as an insurable dependent under Kansas law as authorized by 28 U.S.C.
1738C. Plaintiffs are not challenging the constitutionality of the federal law that allows a
state to give no effect to another states recognition of a same-sex marriage, 28 U.S.C.
1738C (1996). (Plaintiffs response to Stipulation #1)
55. Controverted. Peters alleges he was married in Iowa, not in Kansas, so his purported spouse
could not qualify as an insurable dependent under Kansas law as authorized by 28 U.S.C.
1738C. Plaintiffs are not challenging the constitutionality of the federal law that allows a
state to give no effect to another states recognition of a same-sex marriage, 28 U.S.C.
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3. There is a rational basis for the Kansas statutory prohibition on underage marriages, and
that prohibition is constitutionally valid. (Plaintiffs response to Stipulations #11 and
#12).
4. There is a rational basis for the Kansas statutory prohibition on incestuous marriages, and
that prohibition is constitutionally valid. (Plaintiffs response to Stipulations #13 and
#14).
5. There is a rational basis for the Kansas statutory prohibition on bigamous marriages, and
that prohibition is constitutionally valid. (Plaintiffs response to Stipulations #15 and
#16).
FACTS RELATING TO DEFENDANT MOSIER
6. Neither the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment nor any other
KDHE employee participates in evaluating the qualifications of applicants to determine
whether they are lawfully entitled to the issuance of a marriage license consistent with the
statutory limitations set forth in K.S.A. 2014 Supp 23-2501 et seq. Decisions to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples or to refuse to issue licenses to those couples are
made by court personnel, without participation by the Secretary or by any KDHE
employee. (Robert Moser affidavit)
7. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 23-2507 requires the registration of all marriages under the
supervision of the secretary of health and environment as provided in K.S.A. 65-102.
K.S.A. 65-102 directs the KDHE secretary to prepare the blank forms used to gather vital
statistics related to marriages that have already been performed. It gives the KDHE
secretary no supervisory authority over decisions concerning denial of applications based
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12. The Kansas State Employees Health Care Commission is an independent agency of the
State of Kansas that is not subordinate to the Kansas Department of Health and
Environment. See K.S.A. 75-6502.
FACTS RELATED TO DEFENDANT MICHAEL
13. Health insurance for state employees and certain of their dependents is regulated by
statute and administrative regulations. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-6501(c) gives to the Kansas
State Employees Health Care Commission the authority to define what persons may or
may not qualify for insurance benefits under the plan. Eligibility rules are not made by
the Director of the Kansas State Employee Health Benefits Plan. (Mike Michael
affidavit)
14. Participation in the states health care benefits program is voluntary. Employees decide
whether to seek to add a dependent to an employees health insurance coverage. An
employees dependents have no right to apply for coverage themselves. (Mike Michael
affidavit)
15. The current categories of dependent persons who are potentially eligible for coverage if
an employee chooses to apply for that coverage are set forth in K.A.R. 108-1-1. This
regulation was amended effective January 2, 2015. The regulation requires that the status
of dependent spouse be determined under Kansas law, not the law of any other state. The
regulation has no language expressly determining whether a spouse can or cannot be a
person of the same sex as the employee requesting to add the dependent spouse. (Mike
Michael affidavit)
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16. Defendant Michael has not participated in any communications with plaintiffs Peters,
Mohrman, Bohnenblust, and Hickman concerning their alleged attempts to obtain
dependent spouse coverage. Neither Defendant Michael nor anyone employed in his
agency has authority to decide constitutional challenges to Kansas laws or administrative
regulations. Any state employee who wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a statute
or regulation would need to obtain a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction.
(Mike Michael affidavit)
FACTS RELATED TO DEFENDANT JORDAN
17. For taxpayers who use the filing status on their federal personal income tax returns of
married filing separately, there is no additional preparatory work needed to fill out their
state personal income tax returns using single filing status other than transferring the
information from the federal forms to the state forms. (Richard Cram affidavit)
18. Kansas imposes the same personal income tax rates on residents who file as single
unmarried persons or as married residents filing separately. (Richard Cram affidavit)
19. Kansas' Form K-40 personal income tax return is a "self-assessment" tax document. Once
the return is filed, and assuming that the same is not adjusted or audited by the
Department, the amount of tax shown on the return becomes the assessment of the filer's
Kansas personal income tax. (Richard Cram affidavit)
20. For same-sex taxpayers submitting a federal return as married filing separately, their
income would already be separated on the federal income tax return, and those numbers
could be used to submit the Kansas return. (Plaintiffs response to Stipulation #52)
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21. No Notice 13-18 worksheet is needed for couples filing federal returns under the status
married filing separately as their income is already separated. (Plaintiffs response to
Stipulation #53)
22. Plaintiffs Peters and Mohrman have not submitted a Kansas state income tax return for
2014. (Plaintiffs response to Stipulation #56)
FACTS RELATED TO DEFENDANT KASPAR
23. K.S.A. 23-2506 does not provide a method for obtaining restoration of a premarital
surname that was used prior to an earlier marriage.
24. K.S.A. 23-2506 is normally relied upon by the drivers license examiner to make changes
expressed in the Kansas marriage license that are associated with couples middle names
and/or surnames. Other legal procedures that do not involve Kansas Department of
Revenues Division of Vehicles should be employed to initiate a restoration. An example
of another legal procedure would be a name restoration order resulting from a divorce.
25. Any applicant who wishes to obtain a driver license using the applicants name as shown
on his or her birth certificate will be required to provide additional documentation (i.e. a
name change order) if the applicant has an existing record with the Kansas Department of
Revenues Division of Vehicles with a name that deviates from the applicants name on
the birth certificate.
26. The above described policies concerning the names that are permissible under K.S.A. 232506 are applied the same to both men and women, whether they are heterosexual
couples or otherwise.
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laws cannot be facially invalid, because they may be constitutionally applied in some
circumstances.
Plaintiffs also articulate no facial challenge to any Kansas law that refuses to give effect
in Kansas to a homosexual marriage entered into in another state. Such laws are facially valid by
reason of 28 U.S.C. 1738C; Williams v. State of N.C., 325 U.S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed.
1577 (U.S. 1945); and In re Estate of Gardiner, 29 Kan. App. 2d 92, 22 P.3d 1086 (2001), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 273 Kan. 191, 42 P.3d 120 (2002).
The motion fails to present a prima facie case that any Kansas law is being applied to any
of them unconstitutionally by any of the defendants, either to prevent them from marrying or to
deny them equal treatment of the law without rational purpose. The four original plaintiffs are
not being prevented from marrying by anyone at all, let alone any of the defendants in this case.
The motion offers neither argument nor factual support for any grievance against Susan Mosier,
whose sole role has been to continue to distribute gender neutral standard forms. The motion
does not establish a plausible inference of an ongoing violation of any plaintiffs constitutional
rights by any defendant, or any justiciable challenge to Kansas laws as they are now being
applied to the plaintiffs, let alone an uncontrovered right to a permanent injunction.
The motion assumes without argument or factual support that every Kansan except
homosexuals has the right to change his or her name to anything at all just by endorsing the new
name on a marriage certificate. This is a mistaken conclusion both as a matter of law and as a
matter of fact. Plaintiffs Fowler and Braun allege that defendants Jordan and Kaspar refuse to let
them rely on Illinois marriage papers to accomplish a name change. But again there is no
evidence offered that a heterosexual couple from Illinois would be treated differently under
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Kansas law. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 23-2506 plainly limits the procedure they sought to invoke for
change of name to marriages performed in the State of Kansas pursuant to K.S.A. 2014 Supp.
23-2511. No unequal application of the law is threatened with regard to Fowler and Braun.
Plaintiffs Bohnenblust and Hickman allege that they were not allowed to restore their
premarital surnames appearing on their respective birth certificates by presenting a marriage
license that purported to legitimize those changes. But they do not establish that a heterosexual
couple would have been permitted to achieve name restoration in this manner. The statute relied
upon, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 23-2506, only permits certain new names to be approved, and does not
authorize restoration of a former name using this method. No unequal treatment of similarly
situated persons occurs in the application of these laws.
Not every claim of discrimination invalidates state regulations under a strict scrutiny
analysis, just because the plaintiffs claim to be same-sex partners. Alleged discrimination based
on sexual orientation is subject only to a rational basis analysis in the context of law enforcement
and employment rights. See Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2008); Walmer
v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 52 F.3d 851, 854 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 974, 116 S. Ct.
474, 133 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1995); and Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 630 (10th Cir.1992), cert.
denied 508 U.S. 952, 113 S. Ct. 2445, 124 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1993). No Tenth Circuit case has
concluded that statutes applying traditional marriage definitions violate the rational basis test.
See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1223 (10th Cir. 2014) at footnote 11; Bishop v. Smith,
760 F.3d 1070, 1114 (10th Cir. 2014) separate opinion of Judge Kelly at footnote 2.
There is no federal constitutional right to be taxed as a married person rather than as a
single person. No right to equality of taxation under the Fourteenth Amendment has ever been
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recognized, and states are allowed more freedom in crafting tax laws than they are permitted in
other areas of the law. See Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88, 60 S.
Ct. 406, 408, 84 L. Ed. 590 (1940). The discriminatory state income tax laws of Kansas meet the
rational basis test imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Peden v. State, 261 Kan. 239, 930
P.2d 1 (1996).
Not every grievance concerning deprivation of an alleged right gives rise to a federal civil
rights lawsuit. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97,
109 S. Ct. 998, 1003-04, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989). The First Amended Complaint assumes that
there is a constitutional right to receive state-supported medical insurance. This assumption is
legally mistaken. There is no valid federal statutory right to obtain spousal health insurance
benefits from a nonconsenting state. See discussion in Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566, 183 L. Ed. 2d 450, (2012). The mechanics of the KSEHCP are set forth in
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-6501, et seq., including the fact that it is funded by the State of Kansas.
The plan is obviously a governmental plan that is exempt from ERISA. The motion does not
assert that the Plan is not being administered in accordance with its black letter provisions, or in
violation of any applicable state and federal statute or regulation.
No federal statute or constitutional provision requires a state to give effect to marriages
entered into in another state. States are expressly authorized to deny effect to out-of-state
marriages under 28 U.S.C. 1738C. The marriage laws of Kansas violate no constitutional
principle by refusing to give effect to the domestic relations laws of other states, according to In
re Estate of Gardiner, 29 Kan. App. 2d 92, 22 P.3d 1086 (2001), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 273
Kan. 191, 42 P.3d 120 (2002), cert. denied sub nom Gardiner v. Gardiner, 537 U.S.825, 123
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S.Ct. 113, 154 L.Ed.2d 36 (2002). If a constitutional right to full faith and credit is to be found, it
will be announced by the United States Supreme Court this term. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 83
USLW 3315, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015).
There is no federal right, whether statutory or constitutional, to the issuance of a drivers
license in the name of the licensees preference. See Jorgensen v. Larsen, 930 F.2d 922, 1991
WL 55457 (10th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Cooke, 362 F. App'x 897, 2010 WL 227574 (10th Cir.
2010). Recognition of a constitutional right to select a name of choice to appear on a drivers
license would require invalidation of the Real ID Act, 49 U.S.C. 30301, et seq.
In the context of insurance coverage, even apparently arbitrary distinctions among classes
of potential beneficiaries are not considered per se irrational or arbitrary, and similar laws have
repeatedly been held to pass constitutional scrutiny. See for example Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749, 95 S. Ct. 2457, 45 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1975); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 99 S. Ct.
2767, 61 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1979); Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 182
L. Ed. 2d 887, (2012); Johnson v. Califano, 656 F.2d 569 (10th Cir. 1981).
2. THERE IS NO CASE OR CONTROVERSY, AND PLAINTIFFS LACK
STANDING TO PURSUE GENERAL RELiEF FOR EVERY HOMOSEXUAL
COUPLE IN KANSAS.
The court would be doing plaintiffs a favor by dismissing this lawsuit without prejudice
for lack of standing and absence of a case or controversy. This lawsuit was filed in haste on
behalf of four plaintiffs who did not really want to take advantage of the relief the Court has
granted to them. Whatever grievance these four plaintiffs may have considered pursuing in
October of 2014 is no longer a live controversy because Kansas court clerks have been issuing
same sex marriage licenses since mid November of 2014 with the blessing of the Kansas
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Supreme Court. The six additional plaintiffs were not selected wisely, and have no justiciable
grievances to state either. Perhaps if other plaintiffs with real claims decide to sue other
defendants, the declaratory relief might still be available to those potential plaintiffs, depending
upon what happens in the United States Supreme Court this spring. But continued insistence on
pressing a lawsuit pursuing misguided claims challenging inoffensive state practices is likely to
result in nothing more than a waste of effort for all concerned.
The Eleventh Amendment bars federal court lawsuits against a state or its officials acting
within their official capacities, with a narrow exception allowing for prospective injunctive relief
against individual officials for their ongoing violations of federal rights. See Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). When a claim for injunctive relief is brought
against a state official who is not involved in the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional
statute, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies and requires dismissal of the claim. See Peterson
v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205-1206 (10th Cir. 2013).
A federal court has no power to answer abstract questions posed by litigants who have no
personal stake in the interpretation or application of a challenged law. Jurisdictional limits
imposed by Article III require that a plaintiff present a case or controversy that the parties have
standing to litigate. To establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, __US__, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 185 L.Ed.2d 264
(2013):
To establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual
or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, , 130 S.Ct. 2743,
2752, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010); see also Summers, supra, at 493, 129 S.Ct. 1142;
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Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S., at 560561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Although imminence is
concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which
is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposesthat the
injury is certainly impending. Id., at 565, n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, we have repeatedly reiterated that threatened injury must be certainly
impending to constitute injury in fact, and that [a]llegations of possible future injury
are not sufficient. Whitmore, 495 U.S., at 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 565, n. 2, 567, n. 3,
112 S.Ct. 2130; see DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, at 345, 126 S.Ct. 1854; Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190, 120 S.Ct.
693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct.
2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979). (Clapper, 133 S.Ct at p. 1147)
See also Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1
(2009); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 34 ERC 1785, 119
L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675
(1983). The American Civil Liberties Union has not filed suit in its own name, and has instead
chosen to provide legal representation to ten persons who do not have individual standing to
obtain the relief that the lawyers seem sure that the Court would grant to other same sex couples
who are not parties. Assuming some of these ten plaintiffs could possibly establish standing to
challenge what is left of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, that claim has been forfeited for no
apparent reason, and is not in issue in this litigation.
Plaintiffs lack standing to sue Secretary Mosier, who is not a proper party defendant in
this lawsuit under the analysis followed in Bishop v. Oklahoma, 333 Fed. Appx. 361, 2009 WL
1566802 (10th Cir. 2009) and Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (2014). As an executive officer
appointed as per K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 75-5601, Secretary Moser has no supervisory authority over
the judicial officials who would be called upon in appropriate cases to enforce the asserted rights
of same-sex couples. As the records custodian for marriage certificates, she has insufficient
involvement in the issuance of marriage licenses to be a defendant amenable to suit under the
26
Eleventh Amendment. See Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013) and American
Tradition Institute v. Colorado, 876 F.Supp.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 2012). Judicial officers are not
employees, agents, or subordinates of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment, an
executive agency, but rather are part of the Kansas Judicial Branch and subject to its supervision
and control. Neither is the Kansas State Employees Health Care Commission subordinate to
KDHE. Plaintiffs own affidavits establish that KDHE is handling same-sex marriage certificates
routinely as vital statistics records.
Defendants Kaspar and Jordan are also not proper defendants in this litigation, which can
involve only the legal rights and grievances of these ten plaintiffs. No federal question has been
presented with respect to driver licensing, and the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain a challenge to the tax assessment methods employed by the Kansas Department of
Revenue. See Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, No. 13-1032, 2015 WL 867663 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2015).
Because the only plaintiffs who complain about income taxation have filed their federal returns
separately rather than jointly, there is no grievance against Secretary Jordan to litigate on that
account. No cognizable federal question is raised with respect to driver licensing, whether the
claim is directed at defendant Kaspar or at Secretary Jordan.
The Eleventh Amendment would restrict any otherwise proper litigation to prospective
declaratory and injunctive relief that is not merely a disguised demand for payments out of the
state treasury. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction is presumed.
The burden of establishing federal court jurisdiction falls on the party asserting that jurisdiction
exists. See Devon Energy Production Co., L.P. v. Mosaic Potash Carlsbad, Inc., 693 F.3d 1195,
1201 (10th Cir. 2012); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114
27
S. Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L. Ed.2d 391 (1994). Invocation of the remedy of declaratory judgment
does not itself provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 964 (10th Cir.1996). The Eleventh Amendment bars federal
court lawsuits against a state or its officials acting within their official capacities, with a narrow
exception allowing for prospective injunctive relief against individual officials for their ongoing
violations of federal rights. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714
(1908). The claim against defendant Michael clearly seeks financial relief, and the declaratory
relief relates solely to events that occurred in 2014 rather than anything continuing to day under
current Kansas laws and policies.
3. THE DEFENSES RAISED IN OPPOSITION TO THE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND IN THESE DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS ALSO
PREVENT THE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANTS.
The federal rules of civil procedure allow parties to incorporate the contents of another
pleading by reference. See F.R.C.P. 10(c). To avoid placing undue burdens on the Court these
defendants would incorporate the contents of all defendants previous submissions in opposition
to the preliminary injunction motion, including documents 7, 14, 15, 23, and 24, as well as any
attachments to those documents. These defendants would also incorporate by reference the
motions to dismiss previously filed by any defendants, including documents 57, 58, 59, 60, 77,
78, 79, 89, 90, and 99, together with any attachments to those documents.
CONCLUSION
The motion for summary judgment should be denied, either upon the factual showing or
upon the more complete factual showing that will be made possible by the completion of
28
discovery. The motions to dismiss previously filed by these defendants should be granted instead.
Respectfully submitted,
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEREK SCHMIDT
s/ Steve R. Fabert
Steve R. Fabert, #10355
Assistant Attorney General
Memorial Bldg., 2nd Floor
120 SW 10th Avenue
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1597
Tel: (785) 368-8420; Fax: (785) 296-6296
Email: Steve.Fabert@ag.ks.gov
Attorney for Defendants Mosier, Jordan, Kaspar
and Michael
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this 6th day of March, 2015, a true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing was filed and served via the Courts electronic filing system upon Plaintiffs
counsel of record, Stephen Douglas Bonney, ACLU Foundation of Kansas, 3601 Main Street,
Kansas City, MO 64111, Mark P. Johnson, Dentons US, LLP, 4520 Main Street, Suite 1100,
Kansas City, MO 64111, dbonney@aclukansas.org and Mark.johnson@dentons.com and Joshua
A. Block, American Civil Liberties Foundation, 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor, New York, NY
100004, jblock@aclu.org.
s/Steve R. Fabert
Steve R. Fabert
Attorney for Defendants Mosier, Jordan, Kaspar
and Michael
29
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permitted by the Courts order. See Doc. 75. Plaintiffs now respond to the
stipulations of fact requested by Defendants as follows:
1. Plaintiffs are not challenging the constitutionality of the federal law that allows a
state to give no effect to another states recognition of a same-sex marriage, 28 U.S.C.
1738C (1996).
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. 28 U.S.C. 1738C speaks for itself but has no
application to this case. Plaintiffs do not concede the statutes constitutionality.
Plaintiffs do not challenge the statute in this litigation.
2. Persons who have not entered into a marriage in Kansas have no constitutional
right to be afforded the legal status of married persons in Kansas.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate
licenses to same-sex couples. Although other district courts are currently not
enforcing the same-sex marriage bans, they are doing so because of the preliminary
injunction entered by the Court in this case on November 4, 2014.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiffs may not use the same procedures
established by law that are available to different-sex married couples.
2
9. At the time the present marriage laws of Kansas were enacted there was no
judicial precedent suggesting that their adoption would violate the United States
Constitution.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority decision suggested that state
marriage bans are unconstitutional)
10. The marriage laws of Kansas have never permitted any person to marry any
other person without restriction.
Response: Stipulated
11. There is a rational basis for the Kansas statutory prohibition on underage
marriages.
Response: Plaintiffs stipulate that they Plaintiffs are not challenging the
constitutionality of such laws.
Response: Plaintiffs stipulate that they are not challenging the constitutionality of
such laws.
14. The Kansas statutory prohibition on incestuous marriages is constitutionally
valid.
Response: Plaintiffs stipulate that they are not challenging the constitutionality of
such laws.
3
15. There is a rational basis for the Kansas statutory prohibition on bigamous
marriages.
Response: Plaintiffs stipulate that they are not challenging the constitutionality of
such laws.
16. The Kansas statutory prohibition on bigamous marriages is constitutionally
valid.
Response: Plaintiffs stipulate that they are not challenging the constitutionality of
such laws.
18. In the Matter of the Estate of Marshall G. Gardiner, 273 Kan. 191, 42 P.3d 120
(2002) determined that Kansas is not required to recognize the marriage-related
laws and orders of other states.
Response: The case speaks for itself.
19. A petition for certiorari was filed in response to the decision in In the Matter of
the Estate of Marshall G. Gardiner, 273 Kan. 191, 42 P.3d 120 (2002) refusing to give
effect to the law of another state, and was denied by the United States Supreme
Court.
Response: Stipulated that the Court denied certiorari in Gardner. Plaintiffs do not
stipulate to the defendants characterization of the holding in that case because the
case speaks for itself.
20. The factual statements appearing in the separate opinions of Judge Kelly in
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.2014) and Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d
1070 (10th Cir. 2014) are true and correct.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate
21. The factual statements appearing in the separate opinions of Judge Sutton in
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) are true and correct.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate.
Response: Stipulated
23. The State of Kansas is one of the fifty states to the United States, having been
admitted to the Union as a sovereign state.
Response: Stipulated
24. The Secretary of Revenue is an official of the State of Kansas, appointed by the
Governor of the State of Kansas as per K.S.A. 75-5101.
Response: Stipulated
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Among other things, the terms personally and
direct responsibilities are vague and undefined.
26. The Division of Taxation is responsible for administration and compliance of a
variety of Kansas taxes, including but not limited to individual state income tax.
Response: Stipulated
28. To avoid interest or penalty, taxpayers filing state income tax returns within the
State of Kansas are required to file on or before April 15.
Response: Stipulated.
29. For the tax year 2014, state income tax returns are not required to be filed until
April 15, 2015.
Response: Stipulated.
30. Under current law for tax year 2014, resident taxpayers filing under the status of
married filing jointly are taxed as follows: taxable income not over $30,000: 2.7%:
(K.S.A. 79-32,110); taxable income over $30,000: $810 plus 4.8% of excess over
$30,000 (K.S.A. 79-32,110).
Response: K.S.A. 79-32,110 speaks for itself.
5
31. Under current law for tax year 2014, resident taxpayers not filing under the
status of married filing jointly, including married not filing joint and unmarried
taxpayers are taxed as follows: taxable income not over $15,000: 2.7% (79-32,110);
taxable income over $15,000: $405 plus 4.8% of excess over $15,000 (K.S.A. 7932,110).
Response: K.S.A. 79-32,110 speaks for itself.
32. The current standard deduction is $3000 for single, $4500 for single head of
household, $3750 for married filing separately, and $7500 for married filing jointly.
K.S.A. 79-32, 119.
Response: K.S.A. 79-32,119 speaks for itself.
33. Tax rates are determined by the Legislature and are subject to change.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.
34. Receipts from state income tax revenues are remitted to the State General Fund.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.
35. The State of Kansas operates on a fiscal year which begins July 1 of each year.
Response: Stipulated.
36. A taxpayer may apply for and receive a tax refund if he or she has overpaid taxes
for a tax year in accordance with the time frames set forth in K.S.A. 79-3230(c).
Response: K.S.A. 79-3230(c) speaks for itself.
39. If a taxpayers return were to be adjusted or a claim for refund were denied by
the Director of Taxation, the taxpayer is notified by notice as per K.S.A. 79-3226.
40. As per K.S.A 79-3226, the taxpayer has 60 days from the notice in which to
request an informal conference with the secretary of revenue or the secretarys
designee.
Response: K.S.A. 79-3226 speaks for itself
41. The purpose of the informal conference is to review and reconsider all facts and
issues that underlie the proposed liability or proposed denial of refund. The
Secretary of Revenue or his designee shall hold an informal conference with the
taxpayer and shall issue a written final determination thereon.
42. The Secretary of Revenue or the Secretarys designee shall issue a written final
determination within 270 days of the date of the request for informal conference
unless the parties agree in writing to extend the time for issuing such final
determination.
Response: K.S.A. 79-3226 speaks for itself
43. A final determination issued within or after 270 days constitutes final agency
action subject to administrative review by the state board of tax appeals.
Response: K.S.A. 79-3226 speaks for itself
44. In the event that a written final determination is not rendered within 270 days,
the taxpayer may appeal to the state board of tax appeals at any time provided that
a written extension of time is not in effect.
Response: K.S.A. 79-3226 speaks for itself
45. A taxpayer is encouraged to take advantage of the states e-filing system, called
KSWebtax, which eliminates paper returns.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.
46. The states e-filing system requires only that the taxpayer input data into the
system, which allows the system to compute the tax due.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.
47. The states e-filing system is designed so that taxpayers may utilize it without
the need for accountants, lawyers or other income tax preparers.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.
7
49. Taxpayers needing help with taxes are also encouraged to utilize tax assistance
available on KDORs website, call the Kansas Taxline at 1-785-368-8222, or visit the
Docking State Office Building in Topeka at 915 Southwest Harrison during office
hours.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.
50. The State does not require submission of a copy of a federal return with the state
income tax return.
Response: The Kansas tax laws speak for themselves.
51. Notice 13-18, along with a worksheet, was issued in October 2013.
Response: Stipulated
52. For same-sex taxpayers submitting a federal return as married filing separately,
their income would already be separated on the federal income tax return, and
those numbers could be used to submit the Kansas return.
Response: Stipulated
53. No Notice 13-18 worksheet is needed for couples filing federal returns under the
status married filing separately as their income is already separated.
Response: Stipulated
55. A lawsuit is presently pending in the District Court of Shawnee County entitled
Nelson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 2013 C 1,465, challenging Notice 13-18 on
grounds that the Notice violates Kansas statutes and that the Notice was enacted
without compliance with statutorily required procedure.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate as phrased above. The pleadings in Nelson v.
Kansas Dept. of Revenue speak for themselves. Plaintiffs would stipulate to the
authenticity of the pleadings as an exhibit.
56. Plaintiffs Peters and Mohrman have not submitted a Kansas state income tax
return for 2014.
8
Response: Stipulated
57. Kansas law provides a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy for challenge to its
taxes within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act.
58. Douglas A. Hamilton is currently serving as Clerk of the District Court for
Douglas County, Kansas.
Response: Stipulated
61. Bernie Lumbreras is currently serving as the Clerk of the District Court in
Sedgwick County, Kansas.
Response: Stipulated
64. Chief Judge Robert Fairchild is the current Chief Judge of the 7th Judicial District,
having been appointed by the Supreme Court to that position.
Response: Stipulated
65. Chief Judge James Fleetwood is the current Chief Judge of the 18th Judicial
District, having been appointed to that position.
Response: Stipulated
66. As Clerks, Mr. Hamilton and Ms. Lumbreras are officers of the State of Kansas,
appointed by and subject to supervision by the Chief Judges of their respective
9
67. Appointed clerks, their deputies and assistants have such powers, duties and
functions as are prescribed by law, prescribed by rules of the supreme court or
assigned by the chief judge. K.S.A. 20-343.
Response: Stipulated
68. The clerks of the district court shall do and perform all duties that may be
required of them by law or the rules and practice of the courts. . .. K.S.A. 20-3102.
Response: Stipulated
70. Hamilton and Lumbreras do not have a role in determining whether a person is
entitled to inherit property through intestate succession in Kansas.
Response: Stipulated
71. Hamilton and Lumbreras do not file out-of-state marriage licenses in their
respective offices.
Response: Stipulated
72. Hamilton and Lumbreras do not determine eligibility requirements for who is
considered married for insurance purposes.
Response: Stipulated
73. Hamilton and Lumbreras do not authorize persons to perform marriage rites.
Response: Stipulated
74. Hamilton and Lumbreras have no role in the function set forth in K.S.A. 23-2504.
Response: Stipulated
75. Kansas is a unified court system. K.S.A. 20-101, Kan. Const. Art. 3, 1 ([t]he
supreme court shall have general administrative authority over all courts in this
state); K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-318, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-319.
10
Response: Stipulated
76. In Kansas, the district courts are organized into thirty-one (31) judicial districts.
Kan. Const., Art. 3, 6; K.S.A. 4-202, et seq.
Response: Stipulated
77. Chief Judges, including Judge Fairchild and Judge Fleetwood, are subject to
appointment by and supervision of the Kansas Supreme Court. See, e.g., K.S.A. 2014
Supp. 20-329.
Response: Stipulated
78. Clerks of the District Court Hamilton and Lumbreras, are Kansas Judicial Branch
officers, appointed by their respective Chief Judges and are Judicial Branch
employees. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-343, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-345.
Response: Stipulated
79. Under the Kansas Constitution, the Judicial Branch is constitutionally separate
from the Executive and Legislative Branches in Kansas. 80. As of June 30, 2013,
there were 246 district judges in Kansas
Response: Stipulated
82. In Kansas, marriage licenses may be issued by judges or district court clerks.
Response: Stipulated
83. By statute, district court clerks are prohibited from giving legal advice.
Response: Stipulated
84. In administering the marriage license issuance function, district court clerks act
as aides to the judges of their judicial districts who would otherwise be performing
this function.
Response: Stipulated
85. In the Seventh Judicial District, there are currently six (6) judges.
11
Response: Stipulated
86. In the 18th Judicial District, there are currently twenty-eight (28) judges.
Response: Stipulated
Response: Stipulated
88. As of at least October 7, 2013, clerks had been given the legal advice of the Office
of Judicial Administration for judges to make the determination of whether a samesex applicant for marriage license was legally entitled to the issuance of such
license.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. The meaning of this sentence is unclear.
89. On October 8, 2014, Kail Marie appeared in person at the Office of the Clerk of
the District Court of Douglas County, Kansas, requested and was given an
application which was returned to the deputy clerk who then gave her a marriage
license worksheet along with the instruction to return no sooner than Tuesday,
October 14, 2014, absent a waiver of the three-day statutory waiting period, or
words to that effect.
Response: Stipulated
90. Neither Kail Marie nor Michelle Brown returned to the Clerks Office on or after
October 14, 2014, as instructed.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiffs Marie and Brown returned to the
clerks office on October 16, 2014, were denied a marriage license, and were given a
copy of Administrative Order 14-13.
91. The only claim in the Amended Complaint against Clerks Hamilton and
Lumbreras is an official capacity claim by Plaintiffs Marie, Brown, DiTrani and Wilks
for injunctive and declaratory relief.
Response: Stipulated
92. The claims in the Amended Complaint against Clerks Hamilton and Lumbreras
are based upon events pled in the Amended Complaint which occurred on or before
October 9, 2014.
Response: Stipulated
12
93. As of November 13, 2014, Hamilton and his office have been operating under
Administrative Order 14-17.
Response: Stipulated
94. Administrative Order 14-17 instructs the Clerk of the District Court to issue
marriage licenses to all otherwise qualified applicants without regard to the gender
of each applicant.
Response: Stipulated
Response: Stipulated
97. Since Administrative Order 14-17 was entered, Hamilton and his subordinates
have been issuing marriage licenses to applicants without regard to gender.
Response: Stipulated
98. Except for recognized holidays, Hamiltons office is open for business, including
but not limited to accepting applications for marriage licenses and issuing licenses
every week day from 8 a.m. to 12 noon and 1 p.m. to 4 p.m.
Marie and Brown have not tendered to Hamiltons office the required fee for a
marriage license.
Response: Stipulated
99. On October 10, 2014, the Kansas Supreme Court issued a stay of a Tenth Judicial
District Administrative Order authorizing same-sex marriages citing the need for
uniformity among judicial districts.
Response: Stipulated
101. Administrative Order 14-13 was file-stamped 4:51 p.m. on October 8, 2014.
13
Response: Stipulated
102. On November 13, 2014, Chief Judge James R. Fleetwood issued Administrative
Order No. 14-08 for the 18th Judicial District.
Response: Stipulated
103. Administrative Order 14-08 directs the clerk of the court and her staff to issue
marriage licenses without consideration of gender of the applicants in accordance
with existing court orders and to otherwise comply with all requirements relating to
issuing said marriage licenses generally.
Response: Stipulated
104. Since November 13, 2014, Lumbreras and her Office have been issuing
marriage licenses without regard to the gender of the applicant.
Response: Stipulated
105. On October 7, 2014, a person identifying herself as Kerry Wilks appeared in the
Office of the Clerk of the District Court for the 18th Judicial District in Wichita,
Kansas seeking to apply for a marriage license and, on the express direction of Chief
Judge James Fleetwood, did not receive an application on that date.
Response: Stipulated. Plaintiffs request that the words a person identifying herself
as be dropped since Kerry Wilks so appeared.
106. On October 7, 2014, Chief Judge Fleetwood conveyed the substance of his legal
determination to Wilks.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate that Chief Judge Fleetwood made a legal
determination but stipulate that he informed Wilks on October 7, 2014 that a
marriage license would not be issued.
107. On October 7, 2014, Wilks dealt with Chief Judge Fleetwood in his official
judicial capacity, in the Sedgwick County Courthouse.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. This is a conclusion of law. Wilks dealt with
Chief Judge Fleetwood in his official administrative capacity.
108. On October 9, 2014, persons identifying themselves as Kerry Wilks and Donna
DiTrani appeared in the Office of the Clerk of the District Court for the 18th Judicial
District and sought to apply for a marriage license.
109. On direction of Chief Judge Fleetwood, Wilks and DiTrani were given an
application which was filled out and returned to the deputy clerk.
Response: Stipulated
110. On direction of Judge Eric Yost, the Clerk informed Wilks and DiTrani of his
legal determination that same-sex persons were not legally entitled to marriage
licenses in Kansas as of that date.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate that Judge Yost made a legal determination, but
they stipulatie that at the direction of Judge Yost, the Clerk informed Wilks and
DiTrani that same-sex persons were not legally entitled to marriage licenses in
Kansas as of that date.
111. Lumbreras Office accepted Wilks and DiTranis application even though they
had not checked a box on the form for Bride or Groom.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate that the application was accepted.
112. Marriage license applications in the 18th Judicial District are kept on file for a
year.
Response: Stipulated
113. Since October 9, 2014, neither Wilks nor DiTrani returned to Lumbreras Office
to submit a completed worksheet.
Response: Stipulated
114. Since October 9, 2014, neither Wilks nor DiTrani returned to Lumbreras Office
to pay the required fee.
Response: Stipulated
115. Except for recognized holidays, Lumbreras Office is open for business
including but not limited to accepting applications for marriage licenses and issuing
licenses, every week day from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. for regular business, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.
for applications for marriage licenses.
Response: Stipulated
116. Since October 9, 2014, neither Wilks nor DiTrani has returned to Lumbreras
Office to pick up a marriage license.
Response: Stipulated
15
117. By Order dated November 18, 2014, the Kansas Supreme Court lifted the stay
on issuance of same-sex marriage licenses in the Tenth Judicial District in State ex
rel. Schmidt v. Moriarty, case number 112,590.
Response: Stipulated
118. In its November 18, 2014 Order, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that
Chief Judge Moriarty of the Tenth Judicial District was engaged in a judicial function
when he issued his Administrative Order.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. The Order speaks for itself.
119. Since November 18, 2014, marriage licenses have been available to same-sex
couples in Johnson County, Kansas.
Response: Stipulated
120. Neither Kail Marie nor Michelle Brown have sought to receive a marriage
license from Johnson County, Kansas.
Response: Stipulated
121. Neither Kerry Wilks nor Donna DiTrani have sought to receive a marriage
license from Johnson County, Kansas.
Response: Stipulated
123. Neither Marie, Brown, Wilks nor DiTrani have sought a marriage license from
any Kansas county since November 13, 2014.
Response: Stipulated
124. Plaintiffs Wilks and DiTrani told a newspaper reporter in October of 2014 that
they are already married.
Response: If defendants provide a copy of the article, Plaintiffs will determine
whether they will stipulate to its authenticity and accuracy.
125. Plaintiffs Wilks, DiTrani, Marie and Brown are considered married at common
law.
16
126. Kail Marie told Peter Hancock in an article published by the Lawrence Journal
World on November 12, 2014 that she and plaintiff Brown have chosen not to
proceed with their marriage plans at this time.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Kail Marie never spoke to Peter Hancock. If
defendants provide a copy of the article, however, Plaintiffs will determine whether
they will stipulate to the authenticity and accuracy of any purported quote of or
statement attributed to Kail Marie.
127. Kerry Wilks was previously married in Iowa.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiff Kerry Wilks has never been married.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiff Donna DiTrani has never been
married.
129. Kail Marie was previously married.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiff Kail Marie has never been married.
130. Michelle Brown was previously married.
Response: Plaintiffs do not stipulate. Plaintiff Michelle Brown has never been
married.
Respectfully submitted,
I certify that, on January 20, 2015, the foregoing document was served by e-mail
on the following: Steve R. Fabert, Assistant Attorney General (counsel for Defendant
Mosier), Steve.Fabert@ag.ks.gov; M.J. Willoughby, Assistant Attorney General (counsel
17
for Defendant Douglas A. Hamilton, Clerk of the Douglas County District Court,; and
Defendant Bernie Lumbreras, Clerk of the Sedgwick County District Court),
MJ.Willoughby@ag.ks.gov.
/s/ Stephen Douglas Bonney
18
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* PLEASE NOTE MARRIAGE CERTIFICATES ARE ON FILE FROM May 1, 1913 TO PRESENT
Today's Date:
Name of Requestor:
(person requesting the certificate)
Address:
City/State:
Zip:
Email:
Phone Number:
Requestor's Signature:
*IMPORTANT: The person requesting the vital record must submit a copy of their identification. See list on reverse side.
Self
Mother
Sister
Current Spouse
Paternal Uncle
Maternal Uncle
Paternal Aunt
Maternal Aunt
Fees
Marriage Information
Party A
Name of Record:
Date of Birth:
FIRST
MIDDLE
MO/DAY/YEAR
LAST
Party B
Name of Record:
Date of Birth:
FIRST
MIDDLE
MO/DAY/YEAR
Date of Marriage:
MONTH
DAY
YEAR
COUNTY
STATE(MUST BE KANSAS)
$Total:
0.00
Walk-in Hours:
9:00a.m.-4:00 p.m.
Monday-Friday
Case
Case2:14-cv-02518-DDC-TJJ
2:14-cv-02518-DDC-TJJ Document
Document102-6
57-2 Filed
Filed12/10/14
03/06/15 Page
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Detailed Information
Identification
Requestor's current ID required To Get a Certificate:
Who's Eligible to Obtain Most Certificates: Must provide ID and proof of direct interest
Eligibility
Parents
Current Spouse
Adult Children
Grandparents
Siblings
Aunts/Uncles
Niece/Nephew
Must be age 18 or older
If legal guardianship has been established through the courts, please provide a
copy of the guardianship papers.
If you do not have a government issued photo ID, you must send photocopies of any two of the following: *Photocopies must be
of the complete document, able to be read and be the Requestor's with current address
Case
Case2:14-cv-02518-DDC-TJJ
2:14-cv-02518-DDC-TJJ Document
Document102-6
57-2 Filed
Filed12/10/14
03/06/15 Page
Page55of
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KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT
Office of Vital Statistics
PARTY A:
Bride
Spouse (This is the label that will appear on the marriage license.)
MIDDLE
LAST
5.
6.
COUNTY OR PROVINCE
7.
8.
9.
BIRTHPLACE (State or
Foreign Country)
PARTY B:
Bride
SUFFIX
CITY OR TOWN
Spouse (This is the label that will appear on the marriage license.)
MIDDLE
LAST
SUFFIX
PARTY B
Yes
Yes
No
Emancipated
Parent(s) Deceased
No
Emancipated
Parent(s) Deceased
26. TITLE
27. ADDRESS OF PERSON PERFORMING CEREMONY (Street and No. or Rural Route, City or Town, State, Zip Code)
This section is to be completed if either party desires to designate a new legal name at the time of marriage.
28. PARTY A: NAME- FIRST
MIDDLE
LAST
MIDDLE
LAST
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30a. PARTY A
31a. PARTY A
31b PARTY A
30b. PARTY B
31c. PARTY B
31d. PARTY B
34b. PARTY B
35a. PARTY A
White
Black or
African American
American Indian or
Alaska Native
(Name of the enrolled
or principal tribes)
Yes, Cuban
Yes, Central American
Yes, South American
Yes, other Spanish/
Hispanic/Latina
(Specify)
(Specify)
Unknown
35. COUPLES RACE (Check one or more boxes to indicate what race(s) you consider yourself to be.)
Unknown
Asian Indian
Chinese
Filipino
Japanese
Other (Specify)
35b. PARTY B
Vietnamese
Korean
White
Black or
African American
American Indian or
Alaska Native
(Name of the enrolled
or principal tribes)
Samoan
Other Pacific Islander
(Specify)
Native Hawaiian
Guamanian or Chamorro
Asian Indian
Chinese
Filipino
Japanese
Other (Specify)
Unknown
Korean
Vietnamese
Other Asian (Specify)
Native Hawaiian
Guamanian or Chamorro
Samoan
Other Pacific Islander
(Specify)
Unknown
36. EDUCATION (Check the box that best describes the highest degree or level of school completed.)
36a. PARTY A - EDUCATION
Unknown
Unknown
Doctorate (e.g., PhD, EdD) or Professional degree (e.g., MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
9th - 12th grade; no diploma
Associate degree (e.g., AA,AS)
Doctorate (e.g., PhD, EdD) or Professional degree (e.g., MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
PARTY A GENDER
PARTY B GENDER
Male
Male
Female
Female
PARTY A SIGNATURE
PARTY B SIGNATURE
Page 2 of 2
Case
Case2:14-cv-02518-DDC-TJJ
2:14-cv-02518-DDC-TJJ Document
Document102-6
57-2 Filed
Filed12/10/14
03/06/15 Page
Page77of
of77
STATE OF KANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT
Office of Vital Statistics
Marriage License
State File number
1.
GROOM
MIDDLE
LAST/SUFFIX
5.
6.
COUNTY OR PROVINCE
7.
8.
9.
BIRTHPLACE (State or
Foreign Country)
12. BRIDE
CITY OR TOWN
MIDDLE
LAST/SUFFIX
23a. GROOM
23c. BRIDE
23b. GROOM
23d. BRIDE
Yes
No
Emancipated
BRIDE
Parent(s) Deceased
Yes
No
Parent(s) Deceased
Emancipated
Completed marriage license is to be returned to Issuing District Court within 10 days after marriage:
24. DISTRICT COURT OF ISSUANCE
25. DATE LICENSE ISSUED (Month, Day, Year)
This License Authorizes the Marriage in This State of the Parties Named Above By Any Person Duly Authorized to Perform a Marriage Ceremony Under the Laws of the State of Kansas.
30. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE NAMED PERSONS
31. WHERE MARRIED COUNTY
32. CITY OR TOWN
WERE MARRIED ON: (Month, Day, Year)
33. SIGNATURE OF PERSON PERFORMING CEREMONY
34. NAME AND PHONE NO. OF PERSON PERFORMING CEREMONY (Please type or print)
35. TITLE
36. ADDRESS OF PERSON PERFORMING CEREMONY (Street and No. or Rural Route, City or Town, State, Zip Code)
MIDDLE
LAST
39.
MIDDLE
LAST
BRIDE
NAME FIRST