Water Security, dam building and dam safety do

priorities need to clash?

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This presentation
Why and how often do dams fail?
What does this mean in the Indonesian Context
Reducing the risks - dam safety guidelines and their impact
The next 10 years in Indonesia
Further tools to reduce risk - Risk based assessment methods
Case Study The use of Risk Based Tools

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Dam Safety
A Historical Concern

Section 53 If somebody is too lazy to maintain his dam in adequate

conditions and does not do it, if the dam fails and the fields are flooded,
then that who caused the failure shall be sold for money, and the collected
money shall replace the wheat that was ruined because of him.
King Hammurabi Code, 1800 BC

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Why do dams fail?

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1. Overtopping
Gate Failure to Open
Inadequate Spill capacity

2. Foundation

Other
Foundation

6%

Concrete Dam Stability (Sliding)

Embankment Dam Slope Stability

23%

Piping

3. Internal Stability (Piping)

33%

Foundation
Embankment
Abutment
38%

Overtopping

4. Other

Gate Structural Failure

Debris
Human error
Sabotage

Source: ASCE/USCOLD, 1975

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Overtopping

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Foundation (piping) Failure

Swift 2 Failure - USA

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Sliding Failure - Taiwan

Sliding Failure - China

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Structural/Mechanical Equipment Failures

Gate Failure

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Risk of Gates Not Opening

Many non-structural possibilities why a gate

may fail to operate
Reservoir Debris
Access issues
Lack of redundancy

Overtopping risk not generally assessed in traditional dam

safety assessments

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Failure Frequency Which are the most Vulnerable

Dams

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Assessment of the Most Vulnerable dams Contd

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Probability of Dam Failure

The Impact of Improving Dam Safety Practices
In the United States, the probability of dam failure can be
expressed as equivalent to a probability that, on
average, every dam has an annual chance of 1:2500

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Similar frequencies are reported throughout the

world
Area

USA

World

Reference

No. of
Failures

Total Dam
Years
(x10-3)

Failure
Rate

Gruner (1963, 1967)

33

71

5 x 10-4

Babb & Mermel (1968)

12

43

3 x 10-4

USCOLD (1975)

74

113

7 x 10-4

Mark & Stuart-Alexander (1977)

4.5

2 x 10-4

Mark & Stuart-Alexander (1977)

125

300

4 x 10-4

Middlebrooks (1953) and

Mark & Stuart-Alexander (1977)

47

2 x 10-4

Japan

Takase (1967)

1 046

30 000

4 x 10-5

Spain

Gruner (1967)

150

235

6 x 10-4

World

Foster and Fells

11,192

27,300

4 x 10-4

Overall Average Dam Failure Rate

4 x 10-4

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Major dam construction programs brings with it

risks

FF to 5 years

> 5 years

> 20 years

Indonesia has both risks

Defects arising from design and construction result in most failures being
during first filling or in first five years
Indonesia also has a considerable stock of older dams which given the
challenging physical conditions (seismic, intense rainfall, volcanic soils) and
economic conditions may put them in doubt

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Water and security in Indonesia a vital concern

Law No. 17 of 2007
regarding the National
Long Term Development
Plan 2005-2025 targets
100 percent access to
safe water and sanitation
by 2019
Raw water security is a
vital ingredient but
Indonesia faces a major
challenge to raise stored
water from the current
very low 53m3/capita

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Reported Number of Large Dams in Indonesia

Today

Number of Large Dams (ICOLD, 2014)

10,000

9265

9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000

5102

5,000
4,000

3116

3,000
1392

2,000

1305

1166

1114

1082

976

1,000

132

0
USA

India

Japan

Brazil

N. Korea

Canada

South
Africa

Spain

Turkey

Indonesia

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Planned Dam Construction Program in Indonesia

Number of Large Dams (ICOLD, 2014)

10,000

9,265

9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000

5,102

5,000
4,000

3,116

3,132

3,000
1,392

2,000

1,305

1,166

N. Korea

Canada

1,114

1,082

976

1,000
0
USA

India

Japan

Brazil

South
Africa

Spain

Turkey

Indonesia

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Reducing the Risk - Modern Dam Safety Programs

The failure of the Teton dam in in the

United States (mid 1970s) was a
catalyst for new approaches for
ensuring the safety of dams
Previously dam design based on precedent and
the experience of the designer
Designs did not account implicitly for the risk the
dam presented
Design criteria varied

This resulted in the growth of dam

safety regulations world wide

June 5, 1976
Consequences
11 people died
Millions in damages

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Dam Safety Globally

Argentina
(Federal regulations for privatized dams only)
Australia
(Dam safety governed by the individual provinces)
Austria
(Federal Law governing large (>30m) dams only
Canada
(Provincial regulations since the mid 1970s)
China
(Federal Regulation)
Finland (Federal regulation, 1984 governing all dams >3m in
height)
France
(Federal regulation dating to 1960 for dams greater than 20m high or dams that
present a hazard)
Germany
(State Regulations)
Ireland
(Federal Regulation)
Italy
(Federal, dams >15m in height, smaller dams covered by regional legislation)
Latvia
(Federal Regulation)
Mexico
(Federal Regulation)
Netherlands
(Flood defenses act, 1996)
New Zealand
(Federal Regulation)
Norway (Federal Regulation, dams > 4m)
Portugal(Federal, amended in 1994 to cover dams < 15m in height)
Romania
(Federal Regulation, National Commission for Safety of Dams)
Russia
(Federal Regulation)
Spain
(Federal Regulation dating to 1967)
South Africa
(Federal Regulation, since 1998)
Sweden
(Federal Regulation)
Switzerland
(Federal Regulation dating from 1998)
United Kingdom
(Federal Regulation, the Reservoir Act, dating from 1975)
USA
(Federal Regulations (FEMA, FERC) and state laws)

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Dams In Canada

21

There are over 14,000 registered dams in Canada large and small and
many more that are not registered
The Rideau Canal was Canadas first engineered system of dams
constructed in the 1830s

The Rideau Canal 1830s

The Jones Falls Dam

on the Canal System
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A Short History of Dam Safety in Canada

1978 - Alberta Dam Safety Act

1979 - B.C. Hydro - EPPs mandatory
1985 - Canadian dam owners begin meeting
1985 - Quebec Hydros Dam Safety Program established
1986 - Ontario Hydro - Dam Safety Assessment Program
1987 - Manitoba Hydro - Began Dam Safety Inspections
1989 - Inaugural Meeting of the Canadian Association of Dam Safety Officials;
changed to CDA in 1995
1996 Saguenay Dam Failures
1999 - CDA Dam Safety Guidelines published
2007 Update to the CDA Dam Safety Guidelines published
2011 - Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) tabled the Ontario Dam Safety
Guidelines
2012 MNR commissions task force (hatch, MNR, OPG to develop risk
assessment tool
2013 CDA issues update of dam safety guidelines to better incorporate risk
concepts

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The Saguenay Flood, Canada

July 20, 1996

20 collapsed dams
$800 million in damages
2,600 houses destroyed
16,000 people displaced
7 killed

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The Dam Safety Management Approach

A Common Theme
Dam safety programs have evolved to deal with the major
dam failure risks through the use of standards based
assessments with Factors of Safety used as a proxy for risk
How then is modern dam safety practiced?

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Typical Objectives
Typically the objectives of a dam safety program are two-fold
To ensure the long-term safe operation of a dam
To protect the public from unacceptable losses in case of a dam break

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Assessing Dam Safety Based on Consequence

The fundamental assumption in any dam safety plan is that a
dam can fail, regardless of whether or not the dam is well
designed. Statistics back this up:
Failure rates of 10-4 per dam year are seen world-wide,
Foster and Fell, 2000 note the impact of modern dam safety
practices.
Failure rates before 1950
Failure rates after 1950

8.6 x 10-4
2.7 x 10-4

The ongoing evolution of dam safety programs will reduce this

number further.

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Overview of Dam Classification

Dam Classification- How is it used

The standard of care to be exercised by the dam designer and owner
should be commensurate with the consequences of dam failure
(Principle 1.2): Canadian dam association Guidelines (2005 update)
The dam classification determines:
Frequency of periodic reviews
Frequency of maintenance activities
Level of details of an emergency preparedness plan
Design standards for flood
Design standards for earthquake
Maintenance/upgrade prioritization

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A Typical Classification Scheme

29

Dam Hazard Categories1) or Consequence Categories2)

Very Low

Low

Significant

High C

Population at
Risk (PAR)

Severity of Damage and Loss

Negligible

Minor

Medium

Major

Very Low

Very Low

Low

Significant

1 to 10

Low

Low

Significant

High C

High B

11 to 100

Significant

High C

High B

High A

101 to 1000

High A

High A

Extreme

>1000

Extreme

1) ANCOLD
2) New

Guidelines on Dam Safety Management, August 2003

South Wales (NSW) Dam Safety Committee DSC 13, March 2002

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The Indonesian Context

Statistical Potential for Dam Failure Incidents Associated with the
Planned 5 Year program
Statistical Number of Dam
Failures

4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
0

10

12

Statistical # of Failures per year

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Reported Age of Oldest Dam (ICOLD, 2014)

However, dams can last a very long time

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Spain

Canada

India

Afghanistan

Czech Republic

Japan

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The Use of Risk Assessment Methodologies to

Reduce the Probability of Failure further

32

The use of risk assessment is gaining popularity in North America and

Australia to better understand and reduce the risk

Reasons are associated with an increasing awareness that failures can and
do occur as a result of issues that cannot be readily analyzed

human error
Debris blockage
gate operation problems
instrumentation in the wrong location

For example, BC Hydro demonstrated that the probability of overtopping at

one of their dams changed from;
about 1:100,000,000 if everything works
about 1:1000 if random gate failures occurred at realistic, historical failure rates
1: a few thousand if there was one gate outage for 12 hours at the same time as
adverse weather conditions

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Quantitative Risk Assessment

Dam safety analysis has traditionally been standards based;
deterministic.
Many failure modes cannot be readily assessed;

Dam safety risk assessment is gaining international support as the

next step in Dam safety,
but detailed risk analysis can be very expensive

In Canada Hatch, OPG and the Ontario regulator developed a

Risk Screening Tool to overcome this problem
can assess the risk for a portfolio of dams from existing standards based data
in an inexpensive, consistent, repeatable manner
The calculated risk can be systematically and easily compared to acceptability
thresholds to determine whether remediation is required
These measures can be checked for cost effectiveness using an appropriate
and agreed ALARP test.

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RISK MODEL OVERVIEW PRELIMINARY STEPS

Select Dam
Components

Tool Generates
Risk Table and
Failure Modes

Assess
Probabilities

Input Data From

DSR

Assess
Consequences

34

Graph Results

Data Input By
User

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RISK MODEL OVERVIEW REMEDIATION STEPS

Assess
Probabilities

Assess
Consequences

35

Graph Results
ALARP Test

Remediation
Measures

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BASIS OF PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ESTIMATES

Other
Piping

36

Foundation

6%

23%
33%

Module

Basis of
Estimate

Remarks

Probability of Gates
Not Opening

Expert judgement

Feeds into Overtopping

module

Overtopping

Statistical Analysis 38% of all failures

Embankment Dam
Internal Stability

Empirical Analysis

Concrete Gravity Dam

Stability

Mathematical
Analysis

Embankment Dam
Slope Stability

Empirical Analysis

Gate Structural
Failure

Mathematical
Analysis

38%

Overtopping

33% of all failures

23% of all failures

Part of 8% of all failures

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APPLICATION OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL

A Canadian Example

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PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT
Table 1: Failure Modes
Component
Number
Name
Type
1
Main Dam
Concrete - Spillway Structure
2
Left Embankment
Embankment - Homogeneous Earthfill - Sheetpile face
3
Right Embankment Embankment - Homogeneous Earthfill - Sheetpile face
Note: Manually enter names for the station components

Seismic

Hydrologic

Piping

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

Sliding
Yes
No
No

Stability
Embankment
No
Yes
Yes

Mechanical
Gate
Penstock
No
No
No
No
No
No

Stability
Embankment

Mechanical
Gate
Penstock

Table 2: Probability of Failure

Component

Hydrologic
Seismic
Number
Name
Type
1
Main Dam
Concrete - Spillway Structure
1.42E-05
1.10E-07
2
Left Embankment
Embankment - Homogeneous Earthfill - Sheetpile face
2.80E-08
6.09E-05
3
Right Embankment Embankment - Homogeneous Earthfill - Sheetpile face
2.80E-08
6.09E-05
Note: Manually transfer the probabilities to this table from workbooks completed for each component

Piping

Sliding
7.64E-04

5.00E-04
5.00E-04

8.60E-06
8.60E-06

7.78E-04
5.70E-04
5.70E-04

Total
1.92E-03

5.14E-03
3.38E-03
3.38E-03

Total
1.19E-02

ILOL
6.20

9.34E-03
6.14E-03
6.14E-03

Total
3.35E-02

IEcon
17.48

Table 3: Consequence of Failure

Component
Number
Name
Type
1
Main Dam
Concrete - Buttress Dam
2
Left Embankment
Embankment - Homogeneous Earthfill - Concrete Face
3
Right Embankment
Embankment - Central Core and Rockfill
Note: Manually enter the consequences in this table

ILOL
0.32
0.32
0.32

Flood
Economic (Million $) Environmental
0.6
0.6
0.6

ILOL
6.6
6.6
6.6

Normal
Economic (Million $) Environmental
12
12
12

Table 4: Loss of Life Risk

Stability
Seismic
Piping
Hydrologic
Number
Name
Type
Sliding
Embankment
1
Main Dam
Concrete - Buttress Dam
9.35E-05
3.52E-08
5.04E-03
2
Left Embankment
Embankment - Homogeneous Earthfill - Concrete Face
1.85E-07
1.95E-05
3.30E-03
5.68E-05
3
Right Embankment
Embankment - Central Core and Rockfill
1.85E-07
1.95E-05
3.30E-03
5.68E-05
Note: These cells are calculated by multiplying the probability of failure by the appropriate consequence. 'Flood' consequences apply to 'Hydrologic' failures only.
Component

Mechanical
Gate
Penstock

Table 5: Economic Risk

Stability
Seismic
Hydrologic
Piping
Number
Name
Type
Sliding
Embankment
1
Main Dam
Concrete - Buttress Dam
1.70E-04
6.60E-08
9.17E-03
2
Left Embankment
Embankment - Homogeneous Earthfill - Concrete Face
3.36E-07
3.65E-05
6.00E-03
1.03E-04
3
Right Embankment
Embankment - Central Core and Rockfill
3.36E-07
3.65E-05
6.00E-03
1.03E-04
Note: These cells are calculated by multiplying the probability of failure by the appropriate consequence. 'Flood' consequences apply to 'Hydrologic' failures only.
Component

Mechanical
Gate
Penstock

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Risk Summary Table Failure Modes

Table 1: Failure Modes

hfill - Sheetpile face

hfill - Sheetpile face

Seismic

Hydrologic

Piping

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

Sliding
Yes
No
No

Stability
Embankment
No
Yes
Yes

Mechanical
Gate
Penstock
No
No
No
No
No
No

Mixed
1.
2.
3.

Sliding
Slope Failure
Slope Failure

Overtopping
Piping

Sliding

Slope
Failure

Yes denotes that probability of failure was considered

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Risk Summary Table Probability of Failure

Table 2: Probability of Failure

Seismic
1.42E-05
- Sheetpile face
2.80E-08
- Sheetpile face
2.80E-08
kbooks completed for each component

Hydrologic
1.10E-07
6.09E-05
6.09E-05

Piping

5.00E-04
5.00E-04

Sliding
7.64E-04

Stability
Embankment

Mechanical
Gate
Penstock

7.78E-0
5.70E-0
5.70E-0

8.60E-06
8.60E-06

PoF Values entered for each failure mechanism considered

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The Advantage of Risk Assessment

The Risk Assessment methodology demonstrated that risks
could be reduced to tolerable levels by the following methods
Remedial Measure

Cost

Stability Enhancement

760,000

Piping Monitoring

173,000

Total

933,000

Traditional Standards Based assessments would have not

have identified these same issues
Remedial Measure

Cost

Stability Enhancement

760,000

Spillway Enhancement 5,000,000

Total

5,760,000

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The Advantage of Risk Assessment

Rectifying the deficiencies identified as a result of the
Standards Based review would cost five time more
and the risk would remain intolerable
The risk assessment process better reduced the risk at a
fraction of the cost
Methodology

Cost

Residual risk

Description

Risk Assessment

< 1 million

2 x 10-5

Tolerable

Standards Based Review

> 5 million

4 x 10-4

Intolerable

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Statistical Cumulative Number of Dam

Failures

The Potential Benefit of Risk Informed Assessments

5

Assume an order of magnitude reduction in the probability of failure

4

0
1

11

Risk Informed Dam Safety Assessments

Traditional Dam Safety Assessments

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Final Thoughts
Water security is dependent on dams functioning as intended
The planned program carries with it risks
even if dams are designed and constructed in accordance with average
modern standards

Well constructed Dam Safety Management programs have

been shown to reduce the risk
However, the potential for failures, statistically, still exists

Evolving concepts of risk informed dam safety can further

enhance safety
Keys to ensuring success
Ensure consistent design and construction standards are developed and
adhered to
Ensure there is adequate capacity and experience to apply these standards
Use the available modern dam safety tools

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45

For more
information, plea
se visit
www.hatch.ca

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