Quasi-Delict: Definition

Art. 2176: Fault or negligence of a person, who, by his act or omission, connected or unconnected with,
but independent from, any contractual relation, causes damage to another.
Elcano v. Hill: An act, whether punishable or not punishable by law, whether criminal or not criminal in
character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent, which result in the damage to another.
Quasi-Delict v. Torts
QD is known as culpa-aquiliana is a civil law concept while Torts is Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is broader than culpa-aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional
criminal acts as well. However, Article 21 with Art 19 and 20, greatly broadened the scope of the law on
civil wrongs; it has become more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
Quasi-Delict: Scope
Art. 2176 and Elcano v. Hill: covers not only punishable by law, but also criminal in character, whether
intentional, voluntary, or negligent.
Presence of pre-existing contract generally bars the applicability of the law on quasi-delict. However, Air
France v. Carrascoso and some other cases provides that the mere existence of a contract does not
automatically negate the existence of quasi-delict xxx the act that breaks the contract may also be tort. Air
France is reiterated in PSBA vs. CA.
Types of Quasi-Delicts:
Intentional Torts: When the law tries to serve its highest purpose; to regulate the relations among men; to
promote mutual respect, dignity and justice.
Sea Commercial v. CA: Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrong which is impossible for human foresight to provide
specifically in statutory law.
Elements of Abuse of Right
1. there is a legal right or duty
2. which is exercised in bad faith
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Article 19 together with the succeeding articles on human relations was intended to embody certain basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability
of their social orders. (Sea Commercial supra)
Strict Liability Torts:
The rule on strict liability is said to be applicable in situations in which social policy requires the
defendant make good the harm which results to others from abnormal risks which are inherent in
activities that are not considered blameworthy because they are reasonably incident to desirable
industrial activities.

Provisions:
1. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
may cause, although it may escape or be lost (Art. 2183)
2. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, etc. (Art 2187)
3. RA 7394 or the Consumer Acts of the Philippines.
The product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevant
circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:
a. presentation of product
b. use and hazard reasonably expected of it
c. the time it was put into circulation
4. Head of the family that lives in a building is responsible for the damages causes by things thrown or
falling from the same ( Art 2193)
Nuisance
Refer to nuisance in property.
Scope: Public and private
Nature: per se and per accidense
Nuisance is the limitation of the use of property
Bengzon v. Province of Pangasinan: The pumping station should have foreseen the consequences of the
construction of such station. The duty shifted to pumping station that they should have thought that the
construction may give damage to Bengzons.
Attractive Nuisance: Requisites
1. it must involve children
2. it must have dangerous instrumentality
3. there is a failure to take reasonable precaution
Attractive nuisance is an implied license to enter and a breach of duty.
Quasi-Delict: Person Responsible
Art. 2176: One who directly responsible for the damages is responsible, others are:
1. Father or mother with respect to the damages of their minor child.
2. Guardians with authority to minor child or incapacitated who lives with them
3. Owners and managers of the establishment with respect to employees
4. Employers
5. The State
6. Teachers or heads of establishment of arts and trades with respect to students
Schloendoerff doctrine regards a physician, even if employed by a hospital, as an independent contractor,
because of his skill the exercises and the lack of control exerted over his work. Under this doctrine, the
hospital is exempt from the application of the repondeat superior principle for fault or negligence
committed by physician in the discharge of their profession. HOWEVER, Ramos v. CA weakens this
doctrine- hospitals are no longer exempt from universal rule of respondeat superior.

Doctrine of Corporate Negligence, hospitals have now the duty to make reasonable effort to monitor and
oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by physicians practicing in its premises.
Doctrine of ostensible agency- imposes liability upon hospital because of the hospitals actions as
principal or as employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the
authority exists.
Quasi-Delict: Requisites
Taylor v. Manila Electric Co.:
1. Fault or negligence of the defendant
2. Damage suffered or incurred by plaintiff
3. The relation of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff.
Traditional Quasi-Delict: Elements
Art. 2176:
1. act or omission
2. damage or injury is caused to another
3. fault or negligence is present
4. no pre-existing contractual obligation
5. causal connection between damage done and act or omission
Quasi-Delict and Crime: Difference
Barredo v. Garcia:
1. Crimes affect public interest, while quasi-delict concerns only private concerns
2. The RPC punishes the criminal act, while NCC, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damages incurred
3. Crimes are not broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a law clearly
covering them, while the latter include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
Quasi-Delict and Culpa contractual: Difference
Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.: Culpa aquiliana (QD) the culpa is substantive and independent, which of
itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie,
while culpa contractual, culpa is considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation already
existing.
Test of Negligence
Negligence is statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time, and place (Art 1173)
Test: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not he is guilty of negligence. (Roman
Law paterfamilias).

Cruz v CA:
G.R. No. 122445 November 18, 1997
DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, respondents.
(digested by Norietess De los Reyes)
Facts:
The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical malpractice suit, which in
simplest terms is the type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong
committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm.The petitioner and one Dr. Lina
Ercillo who was the attending anaesthesiologist during the operation of the deceased were charged
with "reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic) homicide for the untimely death of said
Lydia Umali on the day following her surgical operation.
Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother, Lydia, to the Perpetual Help Clinic and
General Hospital. Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and
scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Because of the untidy state of the
clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. The following day,
before her mother was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation
could be postponed. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be
operated on as scheduled. Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while
Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and
instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour
had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. After the lapse
of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. Some thirty minutes
after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and
the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with
petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person
arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia.
Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath.
Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the
accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of
oxygen as soon as it arrived. But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood
pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo
District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. Upon Lydia's arrival
at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr.
Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. While the
petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her
death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular
Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.
Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded not guilty to the abovementioned charge. On March 4, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City
rendered a decision finding the accused Dra. Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for
insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for the
death of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals affirmed the MTCC in toto and further directed petitioner to pay the
heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death.
Issue: Won petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide?
Held:
No. This Court finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The elements of
reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the
failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4)that material damage results from
the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the
lack of provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent
transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner do
indicate, even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of
her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's
death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person
or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment
of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. The prosecution's expert
witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the
court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised. Expert testimony
should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of
conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when
performing the same operation. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are
admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the
necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless
the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so
sadly lacking in the case at bench.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of
duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death
of his patient. It is significant to state at this juncture that the autopsy conducted by Dr. Arizala on
the body of Lydia did not reveal any untied or unsutured cut blood vessel nor was there any indication
that the tie or suture of a cut blood vessel had become loose thereby causing the hemorrhage. This
Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense
witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death
was DIC which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or

negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has
engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal
of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, but this Court finds the petitioner civilly
liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia
Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary
damages

SALUDAGA vs. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY

G.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern
University when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at the
school premises on August 18, 1996. Rosete was brought to the police station where he
explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering that no
formal complaint was filed against him.
Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide
security services within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Galaxys President), to
indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of student-school
contract for a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning.
Issue:
WON FEU was not negligent and such shooting was tantamount to a caso fortuito? NO, it
was negligent and such is not a fortuitous case.
Held:

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a

contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
schools academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Respondent FEU failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence
in providing a safe learning environment for their students. It failed to show that they
undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually
possess the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not proven that
they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents
enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency about these
matters or failure to check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence
on the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be allowed to completely
relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it hired. To do
so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning
environment for its students.
Respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for damages.
FEU cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code because
respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The
instructions issued by respondents Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are
ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered
into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of
control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete. It had no hand in selecting
thesecurity guards. Thus, the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family
cannot be demanded from the said client
FALLO:
For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualified
security guard, which resulted to the latters breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to
hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned

amounts awarded to petitioner. Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be

solidarily liable with Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing the affairs of the security
agency
plaintiff's confinement, the defendants or any of their representative did not bother to visit and inquire
about his condition. This abject indifference on the part of the defendants continued even after plaintiff
was discharged from the hospital when not even a word of consolation was heard from them. Plaintiff
waited for more than one (1) year for the defendants to perform their moral obligation but the wait was
fruitless.
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security
guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It
was not proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital
documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency about these
matters or failure to check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of
respondents.

PNR vs.Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. L-55347 October 4, 1985)
FACTS:
Winifredo Tupang, husband of respondent Rosario Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of petitioner at
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the
train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before the train could resume
its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off
the train resulting in his death. The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers
that somebody fell from the train. Instead, the train conductor Perfecto Abrazado, called the station agent
at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the information. Police authorities of Lucena City
were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang.
Upon complaint filed by the deceased's widow, Rosario Tupang, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
after trial, held the petitioner PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage and ordered "to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P12,000,00 for the death of Winifredo Tupang, plus P20,000.00 for loss of his
earning capacity and the further sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and costs.
On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR did not exercise the

utmost diligence required by law of a common carrier. It further increased the amount adjudicated by the
trial court by ordering PNR to pay the plaintiff an additional sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable as a common carrier.
HELD:
The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo
Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open
platforms between the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down
when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, Neither did the train stop, despite
the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge.
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe
extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the
presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus,
as correctly ruled by the respondent court, the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of
negligence with clear and convincing evidence.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, 8 it appears that the
deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform
between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar
found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence,
while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated
as moral damages. By the same token, the award of exemplary damages must be set aside. Exemplary
damages may be allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. There being no evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of
petitioner, the grant of exemplary damages should be discarded.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby modified by eliminating therefrom
the amounts of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00 adjudicated as moral and exemplary damages, respectively.
No costs

GAID VS PEOPLE
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the 12 July 2005 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals and its subsequent Resolution3 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide in an
information which reads as follow:
That on or about 12:00 high noon of October 25, 2001, infront of the Laguindingan National High School,
Poblacion, Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused mentioned above while driving a passengers jeepney color white bearing plate no.
KVG-771 owned by barangay captain Levy Etom has no precautionary measure to preempt the accident,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ran [sic] over Michael Dayata resulting of [sic] his
untimely death as pronounced by the attending physician of Northern Mindanao Medical Center Hospital,
Cagayan de Oro City.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
At around 12:00 noon on 25 October 2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane
road where the Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis
Oriental. His jeepney was filled to seating capacity.5 At the time several students were coming out of the
school premises.6Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by
eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of the road. From where he
was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioners jeepney 7 which was
traveling on the right lane of the road.8 However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos
(Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point. 9
The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayatas feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he
laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney.10 Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was
also situated on the left side of the street but directly in front of the school gate, heard "a strong impact
coming from the jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle an
obstacle."11 Dayata was then seen lying on the ground12 and caught in between the rear tires.13 Petitioner
felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side. 14
Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the victim.
Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of the victim. 15 Mellalos loaded the victim on a
motorcycle and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought to the Laguindingan Health Center,
but it was closed. Mellalos then proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of its doctors,
however, Dayata was brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical Center where he was pronounced dead
on arrival.16
Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause of death. 17 She
testified that the head injuries of Dayata could have been caused by having run over by the jeepney.18

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laguindingan19 found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. The lower court held petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the
victim was dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters from the point of impact. He was also scored for "not
stopping his vehicle after noticing that the jeepneys left rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to tilt towards
the right."20 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)21 affirmed in toto the decision of the MCTC.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification in that it found petitioner guilty
only of simple negligence resulting in homicide.1avvphi1.zw+
The Court of Appeals exonerated petitioner from the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
on the ground that he was not driving recklessly at the time of the accident. However, the appellate court
still found him to be negligent when he failed "to promptly stop his vehicle to check what caused the
sudden jotting of its rear tire."22
In its 6 February 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. 23
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that "there is (sic) absolutely lack of
precaution on the part of the petitioner when he continued even after he had noticed that the left rear tire
and the jeep tilted to its right side."24 Petitioner stressed that he, in fact, stopped his jeep when its left rear
tire bounced and upon hearing that somebody had been ran over.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in convicting
him of the offense of simple negligence resulting in homicide. Assuming arguendo that he failed to
promptly stop his vehicle, petitioner maintains that no prudent man placed in the same situation could
have foreseen the vehicular accident or could have stopped his vehicle in time when its left rear tire
bounced due to the following reasons: (1) the victim was only a trespasser; (2) petitioners attention was
focused on the road and the students outside the schools gate; and (3) the jeepney was fully loaded with
passengers and cargoes and it was impossible for the petitioner to promptly stop his vehicle. 25
The Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that petitioner was negligent when he continued to
run towards the direction of Moog, Laguindingan, dragging the victim a few meters from the point of
impact, despite hearing that a child had been run over.26
The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative events
leading to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began
when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and ended when he
was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered the span between the moment immediately after
the victim was run over and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt.
During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent.
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act.27

In Manzanares v. People,28 this Court convicted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide and serious physical injuries when he was found driving the Isuzu truck very fast before
it smashed into a jeepney.29 Likewise, in Pangonorom v. People,30 a public utility driver, who was driving
very fast, failed to slow down and hit a swerving car. He was found negligent by this Court.
In the instant case, petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident, as testified to by two
eyewitnesses. Prosecution witness Actub affirmed this fact on cross-examination, thus:
Petitioner stated that he was driving at no more than 15 kilometers per hour.33
It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left side of the street. Petitioner, who was driving the
jeepney on the right lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He also failed to see him go near the
jeepney at the left side. Understandably, petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In Dayatas haste to
board the jeep which was then running, his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated by
Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a strong impact coming from the jeep.
With the foregoing facts, petitioner can not be held liable during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be
held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate cause
of the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the
moving jeepney to get a ride.
In the instant case, petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the
vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the
left side.
However, the Court of Appeals found petitioner guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide for failing
to stop driving at the time when he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle. Verily, the appellate court was
referring to the second stage of the incident.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.34
The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and
(2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. 35
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take
precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.36
In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 37 the petitioner was the franchisee
that operates and maintains the toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways. It failed to
exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane
dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The

highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should have
foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee
hours of the morning.38 Consequently, it was held liable for damages.
In an American case, Hernandez v. Lukas,39 a motorist traveling within the speed limit and did all was
possible to avoid striking a child who was then six years old only. The place of the incident was a
neighborhood where children were playing in the parkways on prior occasions. The court ruled that it
must be still proven that the driver did not exercise due care. The evidence showed that the driver was
proceeding in lawful manner within the speed limit when the child ran into the street and was struck by the
drivers vehicle. Clearly, this was an emergency situation thrust upon the driver too suddenly to avoid.
In this case, the courts below zeroed in on the fact that petitioner did not stop the jeepney when he felt the
bouncing of his vehicle, a circumstance which the appellate court equates with negligence. Petitioner
contends that he did not immediately stop because he did not see anybody go near his vehicle at the time
of the incident.40
Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have
occurred.41 In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be
shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages
complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the causation of the
accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.42
The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his
death, as indicated in the post-mortem findings.43 His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had
petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the
injuries he suffered were fatal.
The evidence on record do not show that the jeepney dragged the victim after he was hit and run over by
the jeepney. Quite the contrary, the evidence discloses that the victim was not dragged at all. In fact, it is
the other way around. Bongolto narrated that after the impact, he saw Dayata left behind the
jeepney.44 Actub saw Dayata in a prone position and bleeding within seconds after impact. 45 Right after
the impact, Mellalos immediately jumped out of the jeepney and saw the victim lying on the ground. 46 The
distance of 5.70 meters is the length of space between the spot where the victim fell to the ground and
the spot where the jeepney stopped as observed by the trial judge during the ocular inspection at the
scene of the accident.47
Moreover, mere suspicions and speculations that the victim could have lived had petitioner stopped can
never be the basis of a conviction in a criminal case.48 The Court must be satisfied that the guilt of the
accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 49 Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty of the guilt of the accused. The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains doubt as to his guilt. 50
Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the victims death was
petitioners alleged negligence, if at all, even during the second stage of the incident.

If at all again, petitioners failure to render assistance to the victim would constitute abandonment of ones
victim punishable under Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the omission is not covered by
the information. Thus, to hold petitioner criminally liable under the provision would be tantamount to a
denial of due process.
Therefore, petitioner must be acquitted at least on reasonable doubt. The award of damages must also be
deleted pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code which states that when the plaintiffs own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 July 2005 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Norman A. Gaid is ACQUITTED of the crime of Simple
Negligence Resulting in Homicide as found by the Court of Appeals and of the charge of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in Criminal Case No. 1937 of the MCTC of Laguindingan, Misamis
Oriental.
SO ORDERED.

To avoid liability for acts of an employee, the employer must overcome the presumption by presenting
convincing proof that he exercised the required diligence both in the selection andsupervision of his
employee. It's not enough that the employees chosen be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the
employer is still required to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees. Due diligence in
supervision requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance
with the rules. (Source: Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. vs. C&A Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 156034, 1
October 2003
Delsan Transport Lines Inc. v C&A Construction | Ynares-Santiago.
G.R. No. 156034, October 1, 2003 |
FACTS

NHA contracted with C&A to build a deflector wall for Vitas Reclamation Area in
Vitas, Tondo. Project was finished in 1994. In October 20, 1994 12mn Captain
Jusep of Delsan lines owned ship M/V Delsan express received information that
there was a typhoon coming in from Japan. At 8.35AM M/V Delsan Express
attempted to get into North Harbor but could not. 10.00AM M/V Delsan Express
dropped anchor off of Vitas 4 miles away from Napocor barge. M/V Delsan
Express nearly collided with the Napocor barge but managed to avoid it and
instead
hit the deflector wall causing almost 500,000 in damage. Petitioner refused to pay
and thus a civil case was filed against Delsan by C&A. TC Ruled emergency rule
applied, CA found captain negligent.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N Captain Jusep is negligent

W/N under Art. 2180 Delsan liable for the quasi-delict
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Captain Jusep is negligent by waiting for 8.35AM before bringing the ship to
North Harbor
Petitioners are vicariously liable under 2180
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code states that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Captain Jusep received the report 12MN and waited for more than 8 hours to move
the ship, he likewise ignored the weather report and in all angles failed to take
action
to prevent the damage.
Under Art. 2180 whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to
another there arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise
due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
Petitioner failed to present evidence that showed it formulated guidelines/rules
for
the proper performance of functions of employees and any monitoring system.
Not necessary to state petitioner is negligent in selecting or supervising
employees as
negligence is presumed by operation of law. Allegations of negligence of the
employee and existence of employer-employee relationship in complaint are
enough
to make out a case of quasi-delict under 2180.

College Assurance Plan and Comprehensive Annuity Plan and Pension Corporation vs
Belfranlt Development Inc.
Belfranlt Development, Inc. (respondent) is the owner of Belfranlt Building in Angeles City,
Pampanga. It leased to petitioners College Assurance Plan Phil., Inc. (CAP) and
Comprehensive Annuity Plans and Pension Corporation (CAPP) several units on the second
and third floors of the building.
On October 8, 1994, fire destroyed portions of the building, including the third floor units
being occupied by petitioners. An October 20, 1994 field investigation report by an unnamed
arson investigator assigned to the case disclosed that the origin of the fire was the store
room occupied by CAP. Respondent sent petitioners on November 3, 1994 a notice to vacate
the leased premises to make way for repairs, and to pay reparation estimated at P1.5
million.

Respondent wrote petitioners another letter, reiterating its claim for reparation, this time
estimated by professionals to be no less than P2 million.
On November 11, 1994, petitioners vacated the leased premises, including the units on the
second floor, but they did not act on the demand for reparation, pointing out that the fire
was a fortuitous event for which they could not be held responsible.
The issue is whether the fire that partially burned respondent's building was a fortuitous
event
.
The Supreme Court held in the negative since it was fire that caused the damage to the
units being occupied by petitioners. The legal presumption therefore is that petitioners were
responsible for the damage. Petitioners insist, however, that they are exempt from liability
for the fire was a fortuitous event that took place without their fault or negligence
The CA correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under which expert testimony may be dispensed with35 to
sustain an allegation of negligence if the following requisites obtain: a) the accident is of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
in charge and c) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.36The fire that damaged Belfranlt Building was not a spontaneous natural occurrence but the outcome
of a human act or omission. It originated in the store room which petitioners had possession and control of.
Respondent had no hand in the incident. Hence, the convergence of these facts and circumstances speaks for itself:
petitioners alone having knowledge of the cause of the fire or the best opportunity to ascertain it, and respondent
having no means to find out for itself, it is sufficient for the latter to merely allege that the cause of the fire was the
negligence of the former and to rely on the occurrence of the fire as proof of such negligence.37 It was all up to
petitioners to dispel such inference of negligence, but their bare denial only left the matter unanswered.
The CA therefore correctly affirmed the RTC in holding petitioners liable to respondent for actual damages consisting
of unpaid rentals for the units they leased.
The CA deleted the award of actual damages of P2.2 million which the RTC had granted respondent to cover costs of
building repairs. In lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.00 were awarded by the
CA. We find this in order.

LIABILITY OF HOSPITALS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY AND DOCTRINE OF

CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE
The case of Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana, G.R. No. 126297; Agana, et al. v. Fuentes, G.R. No.
126467; Ampil v. Agana, et al., G.R. No. 127590, January 31, 2007 set the precedent for the liability of
hospitals for the negligence of doctors employed by it, or even consultants. The SC said that courts in
holding a hospital liable for damages, having undertaken one of mankinds most important and delicate

endeavors, must assume the grave responsibility of pursuing it with appropriate care. The care and
service dispensed through this high trust, however technical, complex and esoteric its character may be,
must meet standards of responsibility commensurate with the undertaking to preserve and protect the
health, and indeed, the very lives of those placed in the hospitals keeping. (Beeck v. Tuzon General
Hospital, 500 P. 2d 1153 (1972), citing Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill. 2d 326,
211 N.E. 2d 253).

Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection
surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary,
necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads
husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, to perform hysterectomy on her.

After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and
closed the incision.

The operation appeared to be flawed, because the attending nurse entered these remarks:

sponge count lacking 2

announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for closure.

Natividad was released from the hospital, but later on complained of excruciating pain in her anal region.
She consulted both doctors about it. They told her that the pain is the natural consequence of the surgery.
Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were
not removed during the operation.

Accompanied by her husband she went to the United States to seek further treatment. After four months
of consultations and laboratory examinations, she was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was
advised to return to the Philippines.
After her return to the Philippines, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon

being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece
of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish.

Dr. Ampils assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek
treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the
presence of another foreign object in her vagina a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width
badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced
stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus,
in October 1984, she underwent another surgery.

The spouses filed a complaint for damages alleging that the doctors are liable for negligence for leaving
two pieces of gauze inside Natividads body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence.

On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above case, she died and was duly substituted by her
children.

The trial court rendered a judgment holding the doctors liable for negligence and malpractice.

On appeal, the CA dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes but affirmed the judgment against Dr. Ampil
and the hospital.

On September 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision jointly disposing of CA-GR CV No.
42062 and CA-GR SP No. 32198, dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes and holding PSI and Dr. Ampil
solidarily liable.

Only Dr. Ampil filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied.

PSI alleged in its petition that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: (1) it is estopped from raising the
defense that Dr. Ampil is not its employee; (2) it is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil; and (3) it is not entitled to

its counterclaim against the Aganas. PSI contended that Dr. Ampil is not its employee, but a mere
consultant or independent contractor. As such, he alone should answer for his negligence.

The Aganas maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Dr. Fuentes is not guilty of
negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. They contended that the
pieces of gauze are prima facie proofs that the operating surgeons have been negligent.

Dr. Ampil asserted that the Court of Appeals erred in finding him liable for negligence and malpractice
sans evidence that he left the two pieces of gauze in Natividads vagina. He pointed to other probable
cause, such as: (1) it was Dr. Fuentes who used gauzes in performing the hysterectomy; (2) the attending
nurses failure to properly count the gauzes used during surgery; and (3) the medical intervention of the
American doctors who examined Natividad in the United States of America.

The issues submitted to the court were: first, whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Dr. Ampil
liable for negligence and malpractice; second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Dr.
Fuentes of any liability; and third, whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.

Held: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice.
Dr. Ampil argued that the Court should not discount either of the following possibilities: first, Dr. Fuentes
left the gauzes in Natividads body after performing hysterectomy; second, the attending nurses erred in
counting the gauzes; and third, the American doctors were the ones who placed the gauzes in Natividads
body.

The arguments are purely conjectural and without basis. Records show that he did not present any
evidence to prove that the American doctors were the ones who put or left the gauzes in Natividads body.
Neither did he submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the record of operation, particularly the number
of gauzes used. As to the alleged negligence of Dr. Fuentes, Dr. Ampil examined his work and found it in
order.

The glaring truth is that all the major circumstances, taken together, as specified by the Court of Appeals,
directly point to Dr. Ampil as the negligent party, thus:

First, it is not disputed that the surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the patient
during the surgical operation.
Second, immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the surgery noted in their support
that the sponge count (was) lacking 2; that such anomaly was announced to surgeon and that a search
was done but to no avail prompting Dr. Ampil to continue for closure x x x.
Third, after the operation, two (2) gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs. Agana
where the surgery was performed.

An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are
properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound
after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. (Rule v.
Cheeseman, 317 P. 2d 472 (1957), citing Russel v. Newman, 116 Kan. 268 P. 752; Bernsden v. Johnson,
174 Kan. 230, 255 P. 2d 1033). To put simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to
raise an inference of negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is
negligence per se.

The SC further ruled that it is not blind to the reality that there are times when danger to a patients life
precludes a surgeon from further searching missing sponges or foreign objects left in the body. But this
does not leave him free from any obligation. Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was required by the
urgent necessities of the case to leave a sponge in his patients abdomen, because of the dangers
attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to so inform his patient within a reasonable time thereafter by
advising her of what he had been compelled to do. This is in order that she might seek relief from the
effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit. In Smith v. Zeagler, it was ruled,
thus:

The removal of all sponges used is part of a surgical operation, and when a physician or surgeon fails to

remove a sponge he has placed in his patients body that should be removed as part of the operation, he
thereby leaves his operation uncompleted and creates a new condition which imposes upon him the legal
duty of calling the new condition to his patients attention, and endeavoring with the means he has at hand
to minimize and avoid untoward results likely to ensue therefrom. (157 So. 328 Pla. (1934)).

Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that
the pain she was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more
candid, Natividad could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to remove the gauzes
from her body. What was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful
act of deceiving his patient.

To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed
to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused
injury to the patient. (Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, G.R. No. 118141, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 769).
Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Dr. Ampil, as the lead surgeon,
had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividads body before closure of the
incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both
duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American
doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampils negligence is the proximate cause of Natividads injury
could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses
that two pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividads vagina
established the causal link between Dr. Ampils negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated
such injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and
her family.

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability.
The Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial court of the case against Dr. Fuentes on the ground that it
is contrary to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. According to them, the fact that the two pieces of gauze

were left inside Natividads body is a prima facie evidence of Dr. Fuentes negligence.

Held: The SC ruled otherwise.

Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for itself. It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence of
an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet
with an explanation. (Ramos v. CA, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA 584). Stated
differently, where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault of the injured, is under the exclusive
control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not have occurred if he, having such control
used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation that the injury arose from
the defendants want of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed
due care and diligence. (Africa v. Caltex (Phils.) Inc., 123 Phil. 280).
From the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control
and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things,
would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence
of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the control and
management of the thing which cause the injury.

The element of control and management of the thing which caused the injury are wanting in the case.
Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie

People vs. Ritter Rape!

Rape of a 12-yr-old girl allegedly by Appellantwho inser ted a foreign into her vagina
causingher death. Criminal case and civil case was filedagainst the defendant.Issue:
WON def liable on both cases.H e l d : N o . O n l y w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e c i v i l c a s e . Crim case
requires evidence beyond reasonable d o u b t .

W h i l e c i v i l c a s e s r e q u i r e o n l y preponderance of
evidence.S o u r c e : C r i m i n a l o ff e n s e s . A c t s o r o m i s s i o n punished by the law.**Institution of
Civil Case while pending
criminalc a s e , i s r e s e r v a t i o n t o t h e r i g h t t o fi l e t h e former necessar y or can
fi le anytime within the pendency of the criminal case?

apellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12 years old who had been
allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal.
October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl
namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along
Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children were chosen from among a
bunch of street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath.
Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to take a bath and when he came out Rosario
Baluyot went to the bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the
bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures depicting dressed up young boys, and
put them on top of the table. Other things which were taken out and placed on top of a
table were three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One
of these objects the accused played with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color
of which is grayish blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which was inserted
inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were later established to be antinasal inhalers against pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went
there as a tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down
on bed, and so did the accused. He then started masturbating the young boy and also
guided the boy's hand for him to be masturbated, so that they masturbated each other,
while they were both naked, and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When Rosario
Baluyot came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to
join him in bed. The accused then placed himself between the two (2) children and
accused started fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his attention.
He looked, and he saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that
he was trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did
not anymore bother to look because he was sleepy and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an "American, paid
Ramirez alias "Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After
the American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American
inserted something in her vagina. But they could not do anything anymore, because the
American had already left, and neither did they report the matter to the police. Sometime
the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already
removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that
on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her
vagina and when Egan asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed.
Then there was another occasion wherein Jessie was summoned and when he came he
saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with

defamatory remarks. Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore because he already
went home to his aunt's house who resided at Barrio Barretto and resumed his studies in
the primary grades.

Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate
of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop near
Lot 21, being ogled by people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was
unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her
condition and brought her to the Olongapo City General Hospital in an unconscious
condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk and he was the one who gave the
personal circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw,
Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario
was already in the emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not
know the name of Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the hospital, this is belied by
the testimony of the Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified
that it was Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario

Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the hotel incident.
Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used" by a "Negro" three (3) months prior to
admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility that she
could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a vibrator or
vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged crime renders the
evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish appellant's guilty connection with the requisite moral
certainty. (See People v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a
foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that the
appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon
mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against
the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken into
account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates the
mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must survive the test of reason. The
strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment.
in the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the guilt of
the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house. Circumstances forced her
to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have
certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as
reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with
homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the

constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is
the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the
vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil
liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity
on the facts found in the records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy
(see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them
with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines,
including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the appellant should
not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case, we are awarding
damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.