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REPORTABLE
... APPELLANT
Vs.
UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS.
SECRETARY & ANR.
...RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.
1
Leave granted.
In November, 2006, he
was posted as the Defence Estate Officer (DEO) Kashmir Circle, Jammu &
Kashmir.
land owned by the Union of India and held by the Director General Defence
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Lands, but were private lands in respect of which NOCs could be issued.
These NOCs were accordingly issued by the Appellant.
Thereafter, on
However, vide
letter dated 25.1.2011 the Appellant was asked to give his explanation for
issuing the factually incorrect NOCs.
his mistake, denied any mala fides in issuing the NOCs, and attributed the
issuance of the NOCs to the notes prepared by the subordinate staff of
SDOs/Technical Officer.
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The
challenge to these extensions did not meet with success before the CAT.
Thereafter, the third extension of the Appellants suspension was ordered on
21.12.2012, but for a period of 90 days.
fourth suspension for yet another period of 90 days with effect from
22.3.2013.
3
It appears that the Tribunal gave partial relief to the Appellant in terms
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the suspension would not be extended if the charge memo was served on the
Appellant after the expiry of 90 days from 19.3.2013 (i.e. the currency of the
then extant Suspension Order). This challenge has found favour with the
Court in terms of the impugned Judgment dated September 04, 2013. The
Writ Court formulated the question before it to be whether the impugned
directions circumscribing the Governments power to continue the
suspension and also to issue a chargesheet within a time bound manner can
be sustained.
This has led to the filing of the Appeal before this Court.
In the
hearing held on 11.07.14, it was noted that by letter dated 13.6.2014 the
suspension of the Appellant had been continued for a period of 90 days with
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effect from 15.6.2014 (i.e. the fourth extension), and that investigation
having been completed, sanction for prosecution was to be granted within a
period of two weeks. When the arguments were heard in great detail on 9 th
September, 2014 by which date neither a Chargesheet nor a Memorandum of
Charges had been served on the Appellant.
learned counsel for the Appellant that this letter, as well as the preceding one
dated 8.10.2013, had been back-dated.
served on the Appellant before 12.9.2014, (viz., before the expiry of the
fourth extension). However, we need to underscore that the Appellant has
been continuously on suspension from 30.9.2011.
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It is necessary to record that all the relevant files were shown to us, on
the perusal of which it was evident that reasons were elaborately recorded
for the each extension of suspension and within the currency of the then
prevailing period.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, however, has rightly relied
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Departmental/disciplinary proceedings
invariably commence with delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and
post the drawing up of the Memorandum of Charges, and eventually
culminate after even longer delay.
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regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be.
The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of
society and the derision of his Department, has to endure this excruciation
even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour, indiscretion or
offence. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will
inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to
its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or iniquity.
Much too
But we must
remember that both these factors are legal ground norms, are inextricable
tenets of common law jurisprudence, antedating even the Magna Carta of
1215, which assures that We will sell to no man, we will not deny or
defer to any man either justice or right.
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his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks. More recently, the European Convention on
Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that in the determination of his civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time. and in its
second sub article that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
10
The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the use of nolle
Constitution Bench of
speedy trial as a fundamental right, and we can do no better the extract these
paragraphs from that celebrated decision
86 The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as
an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right
to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by
arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all
stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial,
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10
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11
11
The Constitution
Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225,
underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the
Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Cr.P.C., 1973; that it
encompasses all stages, viz., investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and
re-trial; that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the
delay; that the Court must engage in a balancing test to determine whether
this right had been denied in the particular case before it.
Keeping these
factors in mind the CAT had in the case in hand directed that the Appellants
suspension would not be extended beyond 90 days from 19.3.2013.
The
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case, this Court reserved and set aside the High Court decision to quash the
Inquiry because of delay, but directed that the concerned officer should be
immediately considered for promotion without taking the pendency of the
Inquiry into perspective.
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proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate
to authorise detention of an accused person beyond period of 90 days where
the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment
for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a
period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence.
Drawing support from the observations contained of the Division Bench in
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Raghubir Singh vs. State of Bihar, 1986 (4) SCC 481, and more so of the
Constitution Bench in Antulay, we are spurred to extrapolate the
quintessence of the proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. 1973 to
moderate Suspension Orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary inquiries
also. It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person
be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though
accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension
should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period especially
when a Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet has not been served on the
suspended person.
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not extend beyond three months if within this period the Memorandum of
Charges/Chargesheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the
Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is served a reasoned order must be
passed for the extension of the suspension.
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any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or
personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing
the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from
contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of
his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard
the universally recognized principle of human dignity and the right to a
speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the
prosecution. We recognize that previous Constitution Benches have been
reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time limits
to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of
suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be
contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central
Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation departmental
proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the
stand adopted by us.
15
So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the Appellant has
now been served with a Chargesheet, and, therefore, these directions may
not be relevant to him any longer. However, if the Appellant is so advised
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he may challenge his continued suspension in any manner known to law, and
this action of the Respondents will be subject to judicial review.
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imposing costs.
J
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN]
J
[C. NAGAPPAN]
New Delhi;
February 16, 2015.
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