Elcano vs Hill

Facts: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case
against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed
a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if
ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an
emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil
action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of
his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled
since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only
as a matter of equity.
Cinco vs. Canonoy
90 SCRA 369 (May 31, 1979)
Facts: On Feb 25, 1970, Cinco filed a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular
accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana
Pepito and Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising
from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit invoking Rule 111, Section
3(b) of the Rules of Court, which provides: (b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil
action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended in whatever
stage it may be found, unitl final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. The City
Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Issue: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.
Held: Yes, the civil suit for damages brought by the petitioner is based on quasi-delict predicated on
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Thus, the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action: Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penalcode. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. The
separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court:
Sec 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the

criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted, is that arising
from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict.
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
38 Phil 768 (October 14, 1918)
Facts: Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk. He
lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company. Everyday, he comes by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he works
and he uses a pass, supplied by the company, which entitles him toride the trains free of charge. One
day, Jose Cangco stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons causing his feet to slip making him fell violently on the platform. His body rolled from the
platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It
appears that after the plaintiff alighted from thetrain the car moved forward possibly six meters before
it came to a full stop. Cangco was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it
appeared that the injuries he had received were very serious. He was brought at once to hospital in the
city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. He instituted this
proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages from the defendant
company. His action is founded upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in
placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the
security of passenger alighting from the trains. The trial judge concluded that, although negligence
was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to
obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use
due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was
accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Manila Railroad can excuse its liability upon the ground that the breach was due to
the negligence of their servant.
2. Whether Cango is negligent when he alight from the moving train.
Held: (1) No. Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that the breach was due
to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the latter exercised due diligence in the
selection and control of the servant. It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad company
were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their
presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted
an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the
defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the
plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these
conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined. It is important to note that the
foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to
respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by
reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is
direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for
the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by
proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the
technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
(2) No. it is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train. As pertinent to the
question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances
are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed
and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident

to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to
the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of
the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the
train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the
question of contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted
prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances
necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Again, it may be noted
that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train
at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of
the step, which he was required to take, or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our
conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly
under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals
241 SCRA 671 (February 23, 1995)
Facts: Private respondent Luis Luna applied for and was accorded a Fareastcard issued by petitioner
FEBTC. Upon his request, a supplemental card was issued to Clarita Luna. In August 1988, Clarita lost
her card and FEBTC was forthwith informed. Due to bank policy, petitioner recorded the lost card,
along with the principal card as a hot card or a cancelled card. In October, Luis used his card to
pay for lunch at the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. However, after verifying with the bank, the card was
not honored and Luis had to pay cash. He was embarrassed by this incident. Luis, through counsel,
wrote to petitioner and asked for the payment of damages. The VP of the bank wrote a letter to Luis
and expressed his apologies in their failure to inform the latter of the bank's security policy. Also, the
VP sent a letter to the hotel to assure the latter that the private respondents were very valued clients.
Still feeling aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for damages in the RTC. The RTC ruled in
their favor and ordered FEBTC to pay moral and exemplary damages. CA affirmed the said decision.
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
Held: NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to
have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of contract. (Art. 2220 NCC) While it is true that
the bank was remiss in neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation, there is no
finding that there was deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to Luis. Neither could
FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to
malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act
for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that
malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.
Thus, the award of moral damages is inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis. Exemplary or
corrective damages are awarded, in the case of quasi-delicts, if the defendant is shown to have been
so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. And in case of contracts and quasi-contracts, it
is awarded when the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner. Thus, the award of exemplary damages is improper. NEVERTHELESS, the bank's
failure to honor its credit card issued to Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages
sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Air France vs. Carrascoso
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
Facts: Plaintiff Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
Manila for Lourdes. Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff
a first class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled
in first class, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the first
class seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
white man who, the Manager alleged had a better right to the seat. When asked to vacate his first

class seat, the plaintiff refused, and told defendants Manager that his seat would be taken over his
dead body. A commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernnesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino
passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Casrrascoso was having a
hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man and plaintiff reluctantly gave his first class seat in the
plane. Carrascoso filed a case for damages. The CFI of Manila sentenced Air France to pay rCarrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome. The CA
slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoss plane ticket.
Issue: WON Carrascosos action is planted upon breach of contract, with the existence of bad faith,
entitling him to the award of damages.
Held: There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the
Bangkok-Teheran leg. The said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok. The evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of transportation
with plaintiff in bad faith, with the ggravating circumstances that defendants Manager in Bangkok
went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown
out of the airplane to give the first class seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a white man whom he (defendants manager) wished to accommodate,
and the defendant has not proved that this white man had any better right to occupy the first class
seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding first class ticket
was issued. The responsibility of an employer for the act of its employees need not be essayed. It is
well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioners manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal percept; and, held upon the provisions of
Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rude or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier. Thus, Where a steamship company had accepted a passengers check,
it was a breach of contract and tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third
persons to falsely notify her, that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of
ejection; though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected. Although the relation of
passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract may
also be a tort. And in another case, Where a passenger on a rail-road train, when the conductor
came to collect his fare, tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to
stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that
point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in
using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina
there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger. Petitioners contract with
Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carasscosos action as we have said, is
placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case
of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the
Court ample to power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only
condition is that defendant should have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner. The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits
into this legal precept. And this is in addition to moral damages.

Urbano v. IAC
Facts: On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the
place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the
elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting
grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit

Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27,
1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of
Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and
convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing
wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty
both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based
on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the
shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latters death
Held:A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." If the
wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days
after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days.
Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at
the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was
not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected
by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the death of the victim
must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us
to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote
cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause
of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If
no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause."
Globe Mackay v. CA
176 SCRA 778 (August 25, 1989)
Facts: Restituto M. Tobias, the private respondent, was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. According to
Tobias it was him who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November 10, 1972 to
his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the
Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
However, his superiors twisted the facts and alleged that it was Tobias who was their number one
suspect. This led to the different investigations including a lie detector test to make Tobias admit
something he did not do. He was later on dismissed by Globe Mackay. Unemployed, Tobias tried
applying for a new job in RETELCO. However, the petitioner, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a

letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias filed
a civil case. The RTC awarded damages and the Court of Appeals affirmed said judgment.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Held: Yes. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be
justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee
to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such
employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right
to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination
from work. The damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in
which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by
petitioners such as the filing of six criminal complaints which amount to malicious prosecution.
PILIPINAS BANK v. CA and FLORENCIO REYES
1994 / Puno / Petition for review of a CA decision
The cause > Different categories > Proximate

Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation (20k~) and Vincent Tui
(11k~) as payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes. To cover the face value of the
checks, Reyes requested PCIB Money Shops manager to effect the withdrawal of 32k from his savings
account and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Roberto Santos was
requested to make the deposit. In depositing in the name of Reyes, Santos inquired from the teller
Reyes current account number to complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed
that it was 815 so that was the number he placed on the slip. Noting that the account number
coincided with the name Florencio, Efren Alagasi [Pilipinas Bank Current Account Bookkeeper]
thought it was for FlorencioAmador, so he posted the deposit in the account of Amador. The check in
favor of Winner was presented for payment. Since Reyes ledger indicated that his account only had
4k~ balance, the check was dishonored. This check was redeposited 4 days later but it was dishonored
again. This also happened with the check issued in Tuis favor. Tui returned the check to Reyes and
demanded a cash payment of its face value. Furious over the incident, Reyes proceeded to Pilipinas
Bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. It was then that the bank noticed the error.
The 32k posted in Amadors account was transferred to Reyes account upon being cleared by the
former that he did not effect a deposit of 32k. The bank then honored the check. RTC ordered Pilipinas
Bank to pay damages to Reyes, and the CA affirmed the RTC.
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY: ALAGASIS NEGLIGENCE IN ERRONEOUSLY POSTING REYES
CASH DEPOSIT IN THE NAME OF ANOTHER DEPOSITOR HAVING THE SAME FIRST NAME

For NCC 2179 to apply, it must be established that Reyes own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury.

Proximate cause any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have
occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of
ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural
and probable consequence.
Alagasi failed to exercise degree of care required in the performance of his duties

He posted the cash deposit in Amadors account from the assumption that the name Florencio
appearing on the ledger without going through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the
deposit slip

He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption and proceeded with clear
certainty, considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create --> checks issued by
Reyes were dishonored because his ledger indicated an insufficient balance

Saudi Arabia v. CA
297 SCRA 469 (October 8, 1998)
Facts: Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner Company. During a stopover in Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew members Thamer and Allah (both
surnamed Al-Gazzawi) and had breakfast in their hotel room. While there, Allah left and Thamer
attempted to rape her. She was saved by hotel security personnel who heard her cries for help. She
later filed a case against them. The two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When Morada
returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for
the release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. She was eventually
allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The Indonesian authorities eventually
deported the 2 men, through the intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of detention. They were
put back in service while respondent Morada was transferred to Manila. Two years later, she was asked
by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of Saudi Air, in Jeddah. When they met, he
brought her to the police station where herTwo years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr.
Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of Saudi Air, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police
station where her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy
merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case against the two men. Not until she
agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah.
A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain
Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in
Arabic. She was told that it was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
she signed a document to appear before the court a week later. When the date of appearance came,
she complied but only after being assured by Saudias Manila manager that the investigation was a
routine and posed no danger to her. She was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi
judge and let go, however, just as she was about to board a plane home, she was told that she had
been forbidden to take flight. She was later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again
confiscated. A few days later, she was again brought before the same court where the Saudi judge, to
her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did
she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah for what happened in
Jakarta. The court found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco, dancing and listening to music in
violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudi Arabian Air but she was denied
assistance of any kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her. Because she was wrongfully
convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia.
Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by Saudi Arabian Air without
being informed of the cause. She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudi Arabian Air and Mr.
Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudi Arabian Air filed a motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack of
cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether or not Morada had a cause of action
Held: YES, she has a cause of action. She aptly predicated her cause of action on Art.19 and Art.21 of
the CC. As held in PNB v CA, the aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand
the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes. Although Art.19
merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 gives flesh to its provisions. She was the one made to face
trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. Saudi
Arabian Air may have acted beyond its duties as employer in turning her over to Jeddah officials. Its
purported act contributed to or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of

private respondent, Morada. Saudi Air allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of
Morada under the guise of petitioners authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust,
confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged
conviction and imprisonment of Morada was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly
inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide
compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
Amonoy v. Gutierrez
351 SCRA 731 (2001)
Facts: The house of spouses Gutierrez was situated in a lot foreclosed and bought by Sergio Amonoy. In
April and May 1986, an Order of Demolition of the house was issued by the trial court but was enjoined
by a temporary restraining order (TRO) granted to respondents on June 2, 1986. In 1988, the TRO was
made permanent by the Court, but the house of respondents had already been destroyed. The Court of
Appeals held petitioner liable to respondents for P250,000.00 for actual damages thereof. Hence, the
appeal to the SC where petitioner asserted the principle of damnum absque injuria.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the Amonoy was liable to the
respondents for damages
Held: Yes. Amonoy invokes the principle of damnun absque injuria, the maxim that damage resulting
from the legitimate exercise of a person's rights is a loss without injury for which the law gives no
remedy. In other words, one who merely exercises one's rights does no actionable injury and cannot be
held liable for damages. The SC finds damnum absque injuria not applicable to this case. Amonoy did
not heed to the TRO issued by the Court. He was already in bad faith when he continued the
demolition despite the issuance of a TRO. The demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite
his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. Amonoys
liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by
reason of one's act or omission, whether done intentionally ornegligently and whether or not
punishable by law.
Garciano v. CA, et al.
G.R. No. 96126 (1992)
Facts: Esteria Garciano was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the Immaculate
Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. Before the school year ended, she applied for an
indefinite LOA because her daughter was taking her to Austria, her daughters place of employment.
The application was recommended for approval by the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and
approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors. On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo
addressed a letter to the Garciano, stating that by way of the decision of school founder, Fr. Joseph
Wiertz, the president of the PTA and the school faculty, they have decided to terminate her services
due to: a) absence of a written contract of employment due to Garcianos refusal to sign one, and b)
the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position
without a written contract. Upon Garcianos arrival from Austria, and after several inquiries about the
matter, the Board of Directors without the consent of the school founder signed a letter, reinstating
Garciano to her former position, with a statement declaring the previous communication received had
been declared null and void for not bearing the sanction or authority of the Board. Subsequently, the
president, vice president, secretary, and three members of the Board of Directors resigned from their
positions "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the
reinstatement of Garciano. A complaint for damages was filed in the RTC-Cebu against Fr. Wiertz,
Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and
illegal dismissal. After trial, the lower court ruled in favor of Garciano, ordering Wiertz and Co. to pay
200,000 as moral damages, 50,000 exemplary damages, 32,400 as lost earnings for 9 years and
10,000 as litigation and attorneys fees. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the ruling of the lower
court, dismissing the complaint and absolving Wiertz and Co. Following the denial of their motion for
reconsideration, Garciano seeks redress in the High Court.
Issues: Did the CA err in absolving Wiertz and Co. from liability by faulting Esteria Garciano for her
failure to report back to work? Should they be held liable for damages?

Held: The High Court ruled in the negative. It held that the board of directors of the Immaculate
Concepcion Institute, which possesses the authority to hire and fire teachers and other employees of
the school, did not dismiss the Garciano, but merely directed her to report for work. While the Wiertz
and Co. sent her a letter of termination through her husband, as discovered by the CA, Wiertz and Co.
were aware of their lack of authority to do so. The letter of termination they sent to Garciano through
her husband had no legal effect, and did not revent her from reporting for work. There was no reason
why she could not continue with her teaching in the school. No evidence had been presented to show
that defendants-appellants prevented her from reporting for work. An acidic reaction made by Wiertz
and Co. can be seen as nothing more than a reaction to what they perceived as an affront to their
collective prestige. It would appear, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee voluntarily desisted from her
teaching job in the school and has no right to recover damages from defendants-appellants. They
actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's
Board of Directors With regard to damages, liability under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or
public policy. Given that Garciano's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice, whatever loss
she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria. With
respect to Garciano's claim for moral damages, since the right to recover them under Article 21 is
based on equity, he who comes to court to demand equity must come with clean hands. In this case,
Garciano is not without fault. Her indefinite leave of absence, followed by her failure to report in time
for the opening of classes, as well as her refusal to sign a written contract of employment and her
ignorance of the Boards order to return to work are reflections of her fault.
Wassmer vs Velez
G.R. No. L-20089 (1964)
Facts: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left Wassmer with a
note stating that the wedding must be postponed, as Velezs mother opposes it. He also asked
Wassmer not to fuss. The following day, however, Velez sent Wassmer another telegram, stating that
nothing has changed, and he shall return very soon. Velez was never seen by Wassmer nor heard from
again after that. Wassmer filed a suit for damages against Velez. Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default. Judgment was rendered in favor of Wassmer, ordering Velez to pay P2,000.00 as
actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs of the suit. Velez filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for
new trial and reconsideration. Plaintiff moved to strike it out, but the Court ordered the parties to
explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement. Following
a series of failed attempts to amicably settle the matter, the court issued an order denying defendant's
aforesaid petition. Hence, Velezs appeal to the high Court. In support of his "motion for new trial and
reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that
"there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. As stated
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, a mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong.
Issue: Should the lower courts decision be set aside, removing Wassmers right to claim damages?
Held: The lower courts decision must be affirmed, as what was done by the high Court in this case.
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage." The record reveals that Wassmer and Velez applied for a license to contract marriage, set a
wedding day for September 4, 1954, Printed and distributed wedding invitations to relatives, friends
and acquaintances, purchased dresses and other apparel for the important occasion and the like. And
then, with but two days before the wedding, Velez simply left. Surely this is not a case of mere breach
of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. Velez also contends that the moral damages awarded were
excessive, and should be totally eliminated. This argument, however is devoid of merit. Under the
above-narrated c ircumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton, reckless and

oppressive manner." The high Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a
reasonable award.
Bunag vs Ca
G.R. No. 101749 (1992)
Facts: Conrado Bunag, Jr. and Zenaida Cirilo, after reaching a hotel/motel and having sexual
intercourse, went to Pamplona in Las Pias, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21
days, even filing an application for a marriage license in Cavite. Bunag, Jr., however, withdrew the
application on October 1, 1973. Cirilos version of the case recites that she and Bunag were lovers. She
also states was brought to the hotel/motel against her will where Bunag succeeded in raping her, and
that thereafter, she was allowed to go home only after they were married. They then went to Bunags
grandmothers house in Las Pias where they lived as husband and wife, but on September 29, 1973,
Bunag left and never returned, bringing Cirilo humiliation and shame because of Bunags deception.
This was corroborated by Cirilos uncle, Vivencio, who added that Bunags father, Bunag, Sr. wanted to
settle things and have the couple wed. Bunag, Jr., on the other hand, insists that he did not rape Cirilo.
In fact, he and Cirilo had plans to elope and get married. However, due to bitter disagreements over
money and threats to his person, Bunag, Jr. broke off the engagement. A complaint for damages was
filed by Cirilo for Bunag, Jr.s broken promise of marriage. In finding that Bunag, Jr. had forcibly
abducted and raped Cirilo, the trial court ruled for Cirilo ordering Bunag, Jr. to pay P80,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved
from any and all liability. On appeal, the CA ruled to affirm the decision of the lower court. Hence, this
petition for review.
Issue: Is Bunag, Jr. correct in asserting that since the action involved breach of promise to marry, the
trial court erred in awarding damages?
Held: The high Court held that while it is true that in this jurisdiction, the time-honored rule that an
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. The award of moral
damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to Article 2219 (10), any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless
gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for
in the statutes. Under the prevailing circumstances, the acts of Bunag, Jr. in forcibly abducting Cirilo
and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order
to escape criminal liability, only to renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one
days, constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and
reprehensible transgressions which justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to
Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Further, the dismissal of the criminal case against Bunag, Jr. for rape did not carry with it the extinction
of the civil action.
Singapore
FACTS:

Airlines

V.

Hon.

Ernani

Cruz

Pano,

Et

Al.

(1983)

August 21, 1974: Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment Engineer Officer with the opportunity
to undergo a B-707 I conversion training course requiring him to enter into a bond with Singapore
Airlines Limited for 5 years

Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave without approval
of the application during the second year, SIA filed suit for damages against Cruz and his surety,
Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions

RTC: dismissed

the

complaint,

counterclaim

and

cross-claim

for

lack

of

jurisdiction

ISSUE: W/N properly cognizable by Courts of justice and not by the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission
HELD: YES. records are hereby ordered remanded to the proper Branch of the Regional Trial Court

jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the civil Courts

Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Blg. 130 provides that all other claims
arising from employer-employee relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters

petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just
cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of
the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further
averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the
conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present
controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law

complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se but on the manner and consequent
effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which petitioner had to
suffer

The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The
other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of
in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items
claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil
dispute.

Lao vs. Associated Anglo American Tobacco

G.R. No. 47013 (2000)
Facts: The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (AATC) entered into a "Contract of Sales
Agent" with Andres Lao. Under the contract, Lao agreed to sell cigarettes manufactured and shipped
by the AATC to his business address in Tacloban City. Lao would in turn remit the sales proceeds to
AATC. For his services, Lao would receive commission depending on the kind of cigarettes sold, fixed
monthly salary, and operational allowance. As a guarantee to Lao's compliance with his contractual
obligations, his brother Jose and his father Tomas executed a deed of mortgage in favor of AATC in the
amount of P200,000.00. Lao regularly remitted the proceeds of his sales to AATC, generating, in the
process, a great deal of business. However, in February 1968 and until about seven (7) months later,
Lao failed to accomplish his monthly sales report. He was reminded of his enormous accounts and the
difficulty of obtaining a tally thereon despite Lao's avowal of regular remittances of his collections.
Sometime later, Esteban Co, the vice-president and general manager of AATC, summoned Lao to Pasay
City for an accounting where it was established that Lao's liability amounted to P525,053.47. And so,
Lao and his brother Lao Y Ka, enlisted the services of the Sycip Gorres and Velayo Accounting Firm
(SGV) to check and reconcile the accounts. Subsequently, AATC discovered that Lao was engaging in
the construction business so much so that it suspected that Lao was diverting the proceeds of his sales
to finance his business. In the demand letter of April 15, 1979,counsel for AATC sought payment of the
obligations of Lao, warning him of the intention of AATC to foreclose the mortgage. Attached to said
letter was a statement of account indicating that Lao's total obligations duly supported by receipts
amounted to P248,990.82. Ngo Kheng was sent by AATC to supervise the sales operations of Lao in
Samar and Leyte. It was discovered that, contrary to Lao's allegation that he still had huge collectibles
from his customers, nothing was due to AATC from Lao's clients. From then on, Lao no longer received
shipments from AATC which transferred its vehicles to another compound controlled by Ngo Kheng.
Shipments of cigarettes and the corresponding invoices were also placed in the name of Ngo Kheng.
On May 21, 1970, Andres, Jose and Tomas Lao brought a complaint for accounting and damages with

writ of preliminary injunction against AATC before the then CFI of Leyte in Tacloban City. The lower
court ordered AATC to undergo a court-supervised accounting and to pay Lao: a) P180,000
representing actual loss of earnings, b) moral damages in the amount of P130,000.00, c) exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, d) attorney's fees in the amount of P40,000.00, e) the
compensation of the commissioners pro-rata and f) the cost of the suit. Upon conclusion of the
accounting, the lower court revised its ruling, declaring Andres Lao's accountability to AATC in the
amount of P167,745.20 and ordering him to pay same to AATC. On appeal, AATC was ordered by the
CA to pay plaintiffs P150,000.00 actual damages for loss of earnings, P30,000.00 by way of moral
damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. The supplemental decision issued by the lower
court, further, was reversed and set aside. During the pendency of civil case, Esteban Co, as vicepresident of AATC filed a criminal case for estafa against Lao. Without awaiting the determination of
the criminal case, Lao lodged a complaint for malicious prosecution. The court ruled in favor of Lao
declaring that the estafa case was filed without probable cause and with malice and ordered AATC and
Esteban Co to jointly and severally pay Lao: a) P30,000 as actual damages, b) P150,000.00 as moral
damages, c)P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and, d) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
Issue: Is AATC liable for malicious prosecution?
Held: No. A reading of the complaint reveals that the complaint for malicious prosecution was founded
on the filing of estafa against Lao. As such, it was prematurely filed and it failed to allege a cause of
action. The Court ruled that the complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution and/or on
Articles 20 and 21 should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action. The Court of Appeals erred
in affirming the decision of the trial court. It should be stressed, however, that the dismissal of subject
complaint should not be taken as an adjudication on the merits, the same being merely grounded on
the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Malicious prosecution has been defined as an
action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.

Drilon vs CA
G.R. No. 107019 (March 20, 1997)
Facts: Drilon and company seek the reversal of the C.A. resolution affirming the orders of Judge Macliing denying their motion to dismiss the complaint of malicious prosecution filed by Homobono Adaza.
General Renato de Villa on March 20, 1990 requested the DOJ to order the investigation of several
individuals, including Adaza, which he believed participated in the failed December 1989 coup dtat.
Such was referred to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors for inquiry. Said team from sufficient
basis for Adazas prosecution and their report became the basis for the filing of a complaint for the
crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder on April 18, 1990 before the RTC of Quezon City.
Adaza then filed a complaint for damages on July 11, 1990 alleging that the information filed against
him was a clear case of wilful and malicious prosecution and that the crime of rebellion with murder
and frustrated murder was non-existent in the statute books. Drilon and company filed a Motion to
Dismiss Adaza's complaint on the ground that it states no actionable wrong constituting a valid cause
of action on October 15, 1990. On February 8, 1991, Judge Macli-ing denied petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss. Drilon and Company then filed on June 5, 1991 a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
the Court of Appeals; alleging Judge Macli-ing had committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying
their motion to dismiss Adazas complaint on the ground that the later had sufficient cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not Adazas complaint has sufficient cause of action.
Held: No, Adazas complaint does not have a sufficient cause of action. In fact his complaint suffers a
fatal infirmity as it does not state a cause of action on its face and must thus be dismissed. Malicious
prosecution has been defined in the Philippine jurisdiction as, An action for damages brought by one
against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other
proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in
force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R, November
19, 1956). The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the
provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21,

26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To prove malicious prosecution the all the following elements
must be proven and concur: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was
himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the
action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or
impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. None of the above requisites were
shown in the complaint of Adaza, thus rendering it dismissible under Sec. 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The fact that Adaza was granted bail on account of a writ of habeas corpus is not
sufficient ground for the filing of his complaint. Moreover a complaint for malicious prosecution can
only be filed if legal prosecution has been carried out without probable cause. Probable cause has been
proven by the special composite team of prosecutors, and thus malicious prosecution has not been
committed. The prosecutors decision not to apply the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez which enunciates that murder and common crimes committed as a necessary means for
rebellion must be complexed, cannot be held as malicious as the prosecutors believed that the case
against Adaza could be differentiated. The prosecutors believe that said acts of murder and frustrated
murder committed by Adaza were not necessary for the rebellion. Adazas error of failing to allege
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for malicious prosecution on the face of his complaint
should have been painfully obvious to Judge Macli-ing. The judges failure to notice such and denying
the motion to dismiss the said complaint for said reason is indeed a grave abuse of discretion.

MHP Garments vs. CA

G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994
Facts: MHP Garments, Inc. had the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts
uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. When MHP Garments received information that Agnes Villa
Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia
without any authority, Larry de Guzman, an employee of MHP Garments, together with members of the
police constabulary, went to the stores of Cruz, Lugatiman, and Gonzales at the Marikina Public Market
and seized these items. The seizure caused a commotion to the embarrassment of Cruz, Lugatiman
and Gonzales. MHP Garments instituted a criminal complaint for unfair competition against the
vendors. The Provincial fiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized items. Cruz,
Lugatiman and Gonzales instituteed an action for sums of money and damages against MHP Garments
and de Guzman. MHP Garments contend that they should not be made liable for damages since they
did not commit the act of seizure.
Issue: Whether MHP Garments and de Guzman should be held liable for the seizure of the goods in
question although it was the Police constabulary who effected the seizure
Held: The seizure was conducted without a warrant in evident violation of the constitutional right of
the vendors. The facts of the case did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of the vendors
goods. There was sufficient time for de Guzman in behalf of MHP Garments to secure a warrant from
the time of receipt of the information and the raid of the stores. Although the Philippine Constabulary
conducted the raid, their omission as party to the complaint does not exculpate MHP Garments and de
Guzman from liability. The company was indirectly involved in transgressing the rights of Cuz,
Lugatiman and Gonzales. It was MHP Garments who instigated the raid and the raid was conducted
with the active participation of their employee, Larry de Guzman, who apparently assented to the
conduct of the raid and is as liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. The corporation is
also liable to the same extent as the officers when it received the goods for safekeeping and refused to
surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.

Philtranco vs. CA
G.R. No. 120553 (June 17, 1997)
Facts: The heirs of Ramon A. Acuesta instituted n action against Philtranco. They alleged that on March
24, 1990, about 6:00 o'clock, the victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along
the Gomez Street of Calbayog City. Philtranco Bus No. 4025 with plate No. EVA-725 driven by
defendant Rogasiones Manilhig y Dolira, was being pushed by some persons to start its engine. The

engine started and continued running. It bumped Acuesta and ran over him. Philtranco, on the other
hand, alleged that Manilhig, warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city
proper of Calbayog. While the bus was cruising along Gomez Street, the victim, who was biking
towards the same direction as the bus, suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center
of the road. The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and
blew the bus horn, the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus. The trial court
rendered judgment holding Philtranco and Manilhig jointly and severally liable. The CA affirmed the
trial courts decision.
Issues: (1) Is Article 2194, instead of Article 2180 of the Civil Code applicable, in other words, were
Philtranco and Manilhig solidarily liable? (2) Is the award of damages proper?
Held: Yes. The case is action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer, petitioner Philtranco, respectively. Under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like
petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and
joint and several or solidary with the drive. Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its
only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its
employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict.
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from
the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. The award of "P200,000.00 as
death indemnity" not as compensation for loss of earning capacity. There is no evidence on the
victim's earning capacity and life expectancy. Only indemnity for death under Article 2206 is due,
which is fixed at P50,000.

Light Rail Transit vs. Navidad

G.R. No. 145804 (February 6, 2003)
Facts: On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform
near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No
evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered
the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an
LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving
train, and he was killed instantaneously. Nicanors widow filed a complaint for damages against
Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and
Prudent for the death of her husband. The trial court rendered decision holding Prudent and Escartin
jointly and severally liable. On appeal, the CA exonerated Prudent from any liability and, instead, held
the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.
Issue: (1) Is LRTA liable? (2)Is Roman an employee of LRTA and also liable?
Held: (1)Yes. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business
and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring
the safety of passengers. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation
to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the
high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety
of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. Prudents liability, If any, could only be for
tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the
Civil Code. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes
the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil
Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the
parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to

apply.However, the Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is
nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its
employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the appellate court is not without
substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.
(2) No. There being no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission,
he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and
Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable
only for his own fault or negligence.

McKee vs. IAC

211 SCRA 517 (68102) (1992)
Facts: A cargo truck driven by Ruben Galang and owned by private respondents Tayag and Manalo was
travelling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Manila. On the other
hand, a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When
the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving
back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the
horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he
could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was
the opposite lane, on the said bridge. The said collision resulted to the death of Jose Koh, Kim Koh
McKee, and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee, and
Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort. In the statement of Ruben Galang to the
investigating police officers immediately after the accident, he admitted that he was travelling at 30
miles per hour (48 kph). Two civil cases for damages were filed before the CFI of Pampanga. The first
civil case was for damages for the death of Jose Koh. The second civil case, on the other hand, was for
the damages for the death of one and a half year old Kim Koh McKee and the physical injuries
sustained by George and Araceli. About a month later, a charge of reckless imprudence resulting to
multiple homicide, physical injuries and damage to property was filed against Ruben Galang and was
raffled in the same court where the second civil case was assigned. In their Answer with Counterclaim
for the first civil case, private respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded and
bumped the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award of
attorney's fees, actual and liquidated damages, moral damages and business losses. In the second
civil case, private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action
and failure to implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck river; they also filed a motion
to consolidate the case with the first civil case pending before Branch III of the same court, which was
opposed by the plaintiffs. Both motions were denied by Judge Capulong. In the criminal case, a
judgment of conviction was rendered against Ruben Galang. Subsequently, Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr.
dismissed the two (2) civil cases and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees. Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction but it was affirmed.
Plaintiffs (McKee) on the other hand, appealed the dismissal of the civil cases to the appellate court.
The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. The decision is anchored principally on the
respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which
caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of
the defendants (private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the
latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of
having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of
facts and on the basis of which, respondent court affirmed the trial court's decision in dismissing the
civil cases. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Jose Koh's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Held: NO. The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck
and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car, Jose
Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately
concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate

and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the
petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the
southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of
the car. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his
mind at that time, a greater peril-death or injury to the two boys. Such act can hardly be classified as
negligent. No negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were
even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the
natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters
away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.
Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself
is brought about by his own negligence." Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all
negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the
eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening cause, the negligent
act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of
the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given
by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of
slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure
under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. Moreover, the
truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30
miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge
is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Clearly,
therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and
degree of care necessary tomishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Clearly, therefore, it was
the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care
necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident. Even if Jose
Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is
a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not
defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such
cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences thereof

Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan

171 SCRA 382 (Mar 21, 1989)
Facts: Florentina Guilatco, a Court Interpreter, was about to board a tricycle along a sidewalk when she
accidentally fell into a manhole that was partially covered by a concrete flower pot leaving a gaping
hole about 2 ft long by 1 feet wide and 150 cm deep. Florentina suffered a fracture on her right leg
and as result thereof, had to be hospitalized. Florentina averred that she suffered mental and physical
pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She became incapable of reporting for duty within quite
some time and thus lost income. She also lost weight, and is no longer her former jovial self. Florentina
sued the City of Dagupan. The City contends that the manhole is owned by the National and the
sidewalk on which it is found is located in Perez Blvd., which was also under the supervision of the
National Government. While the lower court held the City of Dagupan liable, the appellate court
reversed the ruling on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that the City of Dagupan
had "control or supervision" over the Boulevard, where the manhole is located
.Issue: Whether or not the City of Dagupan is liable for damages?
Ruling: Yes. The City of Dagupan is liable for damages. The liability of public corporations for damages
arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians by reason of the defective condition of roads is expressed
in the Art. 2189 of Civil Code, which states:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision.
For liability to attach, it is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province,
city or municipality. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street. In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of
Dagupan City and is exercised through the City Engineer. This function of supervision over streets,
public buildings, and other public works is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance
Engineer. Although these last two officials are employees of the National Government, they are
detailed with the City of Dagupan and receive instruction and supervision from the city through the
City Engineer. The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries
sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the
charter, cannot be used to exempt the city from liability. The charter only lays down general rules
regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability
arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public works.

Felina Rodriguez-Luna vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-62988 (February 28, 1985)
Facts: Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision took place on January 18,
1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Those involved were the gokart driven by the deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor
of 13 years who had no driver's license. Luna's heirs brought a suit for damages against Luis and his
father, Jose dela Rosa at the CFI Manila. The dela Rosas were sentenced to pay, jointly and severally,
to the heirs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship, with legal interest from the
date of this decision; plus attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. However, upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by the dela Rosa, the CA reduced the unearned net earnings to P450,000.00.
ISSUES: (1) Did the court err in reducing the amount of unearned income? (2) Should the award for
attorney's fees have legal interest?
HELD: (1)The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the deceased
Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net income was
P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.
The CA sustained the trial court's conclusion with respect to Lunas life expectancy of 30 years and his
annual income and expense. In reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years, the CA said that
his habit and manner of life should be taken into account, i.e. that he had been engaged in car racing
as a sport both here and abroad - a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy.
That Luna had engaged in car racing is not based on any evidence on record. That Luna was engaged
in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a
dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than
foot-pedalled four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to have
disturbed the determination of the trial court which it had previously affirmed. Similarly, it was error
for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the deceased by increasing his annual
personal expenses but without at the same time increasing his annual gross income. It stands to
reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the "escalating price of gas
which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing" [a statement which lacks complete
basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the
manifold sources thereof.
(2) Yes. The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under
the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (See Art.
2211, Civil Code.) As with the other damages awarded, the interest should accrue only from the date
of the trial court's decision.

FUELLAS v CADANO
Facts: Rico Fuellas took the pencil of one of his classmates. Pepito returned the pencil which angered
Rico who then held Pepitos neck and pushed him on the floor. Their teacher separated them and
ordered them to go home. Rico met Pepito outside and repeated what he did earlier which broke
Pepitos right arm. Rico was later convicted for intentional felony with discernment,and his father held
subsidiarily liable for damages.
Issue: Whether or not the father is liable should his minor child act with discernment in a criminal
offense?
Held: Yes. Since Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability in case a
minor child acts with discernment and become criminally liable so the resort should be referring to the
general law which is the Civil Code. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the
pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." To hold that this
provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasidelicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the
damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent.

Mercado vs. CA
G.R. No. L-14342, May 30, 1960
Facts: Manuel Quisimbing, Jr., son of private respondents Ana and Manuel, Sr., was the classmate of
Augusto Mercado in the Lourdes School of Kanlaon, Q.C. A melee ensued between the two on account
of the latters (Augusto Mercado) pitogo, an empty nutshell used by children as a coin bank. The said
coin bank was lent several times. As Mercado attempted to obtain the same, Manuel Jr. told him not to
do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the "pitogo". The fight started
thereafter. Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and as he clutched his stomach, which bore
the brunt of Augusto's anger, Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a razor. Private respondents
went to court asking for moral damages on account of a) the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado
(2,000) , and b) moral damages due to the mental anguish of seeing their son wounded (3,000).
Although originally dismissed by the CFI of Manila, on appeal, judgment was rendered in favor of
respondents, ordering petitioner to pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 as medical expenses.
Petitioner argues that since the infliction of the wound occurred in a Catholic School (during recess
time), through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the school should be
held responsible instead of the latter. Further, they claim that the award of moral damages was
excessive.
Issue: To whom does responsibility over the childs actions pass to, the teacher or the parent? Was the
award of moral damages excessive?
Held: As to the first issue, the Supreme Court held in Exconde vs. Capuno and Capuno that
responsibility over the childs actions must pass to the teacher. However, this provision only applies to
an institution of arts and trades not to an academic educational institution. Further, upon reading the
last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it would be seem that the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher,
such that control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. Such a
situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and
go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. Similarly, paragraph 2 of said article,
which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children, cannot
apply. The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to
be without merit. As to the amount of moral damages, the Court held that while moral damages

included physical suffering, the decision of the court below does not declare that any of the cases
specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or
occasioned the physical injury. The only possible circumstance in the case at bar in which moral
damages are recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been committed. It does
not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented. Further, the offender was
nine years old and did not appear to have acted with discernment when he inflicted the physical
injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. Further, even if we assume that the CA considered Mercado guilty of
a quasi-delict when it imposed moral damages, the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's
resentment, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the
attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause
of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered
with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy

PSBA vs. CA
G.R. No. 84698 (February 4, 1992)
Facts: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the
second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA). His parents filed a
suit in the RTC of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina
Ordoez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his
death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his
assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the
school. PSBA sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are being sued under Art 2180
of the Civil, the complaint lacks a cause of action because they, as an academic institution, were
beyond the ambit of the rule . The courts denied the motion.
ISSUE: Is the PSBA liable under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code?
HELD: Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco
parentis. Article 2180 plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils
or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students
while in its custody. This material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated,
the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made
liable. However, it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is exculpated from liability. When an academic
institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. The school undertakes to provide
the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and
skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by
the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Because the circumstances
of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on
quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasidelicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented the Court
from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. Jurisprudence indicates
that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then
there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict. In the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached
thru the former's negligence inIn the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, there is no finding
that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there
be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation
only. Using the test of Cangco, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In
fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and
Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs
under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. As the proceedings have yet to
commence, only the trial court can make a determination of material facts.