Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Introduction
It has been more than two decades since James C. Scott published his Weapons
of the Weak, it would be too repetitive to provide yet another long list of
literature on what is commonly known as resistance studies. The output
of nearly 60 items in the Social Science Citation Index with a topic search of
Scott AND resistance simply tells the story.1 Being a critique of Gramscian
hegemony, Scotts model contends that in situations of relative safety,
subordinates display an impressive capacity to understand the larger realities
of capital accumulation, proletarianization and marginalization (Scott, 1985,
p. 304). They avoid direct and open defiance against external domination only
because they are aware rationally of their inferior position in the social
hierarchy. Brought under the empirical gaze is a spectrum of subordinates
actions against domination, actions which are largely invisible, individually
r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810 Acta Politica
www.palgrave-journals.com/ap/
Ho
Acta Politica
as fatefully political (Sahlins, 1993) and pits the subordinate towards simply
opposing domination. Such a conception undesirably places the opportunity
for cooperation and reciprocity outside the resistancehegemony formula
(Brown, 1996; Kerkvliet, 2002). Consequently, resistance becomes a virtually
mechanical re-action (Ortner, 1995, pp. 176177).3
Second, there is the missing link with collective action. The paradigm has been
criticized because it ostensibly concedes from an important empirical domain
that people do occasionally possess high internal cohesion and feel the need to
act collectively for a wider social cause. For instance, Escobar criticized Scotts
paradigm for not pushing the question of resistance towards one of its possible
logical conclusions, namely, that point at which resistance gives way to more
organized forms of collective action or social movement (Escobar, 1992a,
p. 399; Escobar, 1992b; Starn, 1992, Ho, 2006). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly
argued that Scotts concentration on individual resistance provided little
purchase on the question of when these low-level resentments would lead to
mobilization and collective action and when they would remain at the level of
individual resentment (McAdam et al, 1997) whereas Vandergeest remarked
that the paradigm failed to explicate a series of phenomena concerning why
people are willing to give up their lives for their nation (Vandergeest, 1993).
Third, there is the tendency toward psychologizing the concept of resistance.
Being usually relegated to a spectrum of trivialized reflexes in response to
oppression, resistance then becomes difficult to ascertain at the empirical level.
The difficulty rests upon the fact that resistance becomes a set of actions so
individualized to an extent that it seems to be recognizable only within the
subjectivity of the actor. For example, are the unlawful acts of the poor, which
involve only individualistic self interest (for example, burglars, pickpockets)
considered resistance? And, what about subordinates violent acts motivated
by the feeling of resentment toward vendettas (for example, killings, or
sabotage in cases of revenge) or subordinates counter-domination actions
provoked by solipsistic causes (for example, Don Quixotes attack on the
windmill)? Are these individualistic actions which are directed toward
superordinates considered resistance? Indeed, Scott himself was quickly aware
of this problem soon after the Weapons of the Weak was published. He then
further qualified his notion of resistance by asserting that at stake is the
intention that subordinates have in their act of resistance (Scott, 1985, p. 290;
Scott, 1986, p. 2). But this qualification only painted him to the corner as he
almost immediately admitted that assessing intention is difficult, and that it
had not been very successful in helping differentiate everyday resistance from
various survival methods (Scott, 1986, p. 2).
My reading of Scott takes on a slightly different approach from many critics.
I see that his notion of resistance is not purely a consequence of the power
relations created by class cleavages, and hence, cannot be simply re-action
r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810
Acta Politica
45
Ho
Acta Politica
Acta Politica
47
Ho
historical force makes the actors believe that the existing pattern of
exploitation and status degradation is not just material hardship but infers,
for example, a world turned upside down (Scott, 1985, p. 80) or a loss of
everyday social meaning (Scott, 1977b, p. 232), the actors will swiftly walk out
of the shadow of the little tradition, and only face dyadically with real
people. The oppressed are then engaged in the politics within (inter-)personal
bonds. In question then relates to my enemies, not the enemies. Consequently,
subordinates experience is totally stripped of the impersonal elements when
they are experiencing with superordinates. What I attempt to argue in the rest
of this essay is that this move is theoretically unwarranted.
In Domination and the Arts of Resistance published in 1990, Scott reiterated
this position lucidly. He addressed that his analysis was only concerned with
structures of personal domination, such as serfdom and slavery, and admitted
that it was exactly where he departed from Foucault whose preoccupation
was with the impersonal, scientific, disciplinary forms of the modern
state (Scott, 1990, p. 62, original emphases). I believe that Scotts attempt to
appropriate the construct of personal domination out of Foucaults corpus of
work is problematic. It is not just because Foucault endows primordiality to
the impersonal power-knowledge sovereignty in his own work.6 More
importantly, personal domination is exactly what Foucault overtly disclaims
as the defining feature of his power relation. He stated repeatedly and with
exceptional clarity that the power relation is neither a binary [i.e., dyadic]
structure with dominators on the one side and dominated on the other
(Foucault, 1980, p. 142), nor a political structure, a government, a dominant
social class, the master facing the slave, and so on.7 To overemphasize the
personalized forms of human experience of oppression in dyadic, face-to-face
situations would easily confine an actors resistance to a welter of personal
specific re-actions, susceptible to the influences of the fleeting psychological
statuses of particular individuals. However, it is only a restricted view on
the concept of resistance which once again diverges deeply from that of
Foucault.
Throughout his work, Foucault deems resistance simply as an irreducible
opposite to power, a natural consequence of disciplinary practices of power.8
His notion of resistance only represents a prototype of human agency in
response to the constraining system. Resistance is considered a fountain
of vastly multifarious courses of actions ranging from the possibility of
committing suicide, of jumping out of window or of killing the other; to that
of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, of strategies; to that of a revolution
(Foucault, 1994, p. 18; Foucault, 1998, p. 96). Thus, put in Foucauldian terms,
resistance is an open concept as there is always a whole field of responses,
reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up [in any relation of
power] (Foucault, 1982, p. 220).
48
Acta Politica
Acta Politica
49
Ho
with the other in the world of consociates. She/he must consciously adjust to
the emergent exigencies of changing situations within real-world circumstances
(that is, the world of contemporaries).12 In short, when Scott claims that he
can see subordinates directly experiencing and consciously directing their anger
onto their exploiters as enemies, as real people, he is making a paradoxical
phenomenological statement in a way similar to saying that he can see a circle
out of a square. This is because his usage of the notion of direct experience
has mistakenly conflated two highly distinctive categories (that is, the world of
consociates and the world of contemporaries) in social phenomenology.13
Therefore, I deem that Scotts attempt to dispel the impersonal elements from
the political experience through emphasizing the actors direct experience of
particular individuals is theoretically problematic.
Acta Politica
Acta Politica
51
Ho
Acta Politica
Acta Politica
53
Ho
Concluding Remarks
The ubiquitous presence of Scotts concept of resistance in social science
research has confirmed the importance of the R/H paradigm. However, my
view is that the R/H paradigm has unwarrantedly taken for granted the
existence of an impersonal element in the actors experience in facing
oppression. This impersonal dimension of political experience can take the
forms of values, traditions or the symbolic universe which is understood and
shared across contexts for particular groups of actors in particular situations. I
contend that the political experience is overwhelmingly characterized by the
dimension of personal rule owing to Scotts two-fold problematic appropriation of Foucault and phenomenology, as well as his theoretical predilection for
a rational-choice theory of social action. To strip the political experience of its
impersonal flavor, one consequence is that the R/H paradigm has the meaning
of resistance within the confines of individualistic, subdued and unobtrusive
discontent. By only attending to a particular experience bound within (inter-)
personal ties, the paradigm has aroused criticism for its inability to grasp the
complexity of human agency and the experience of domination.
However, one should remember that the way the impersonal dimension of
experience manifests itself to actors does not simply mean that social values, such
as religious ideals and traditional moral yardsticks, play an important part in
guiding various courses of action. Indeed, considerable ethnographic effort have
already been put into showing that religious values, traditional beliefs and
practices, and indigenous political ideology may constitute vital and relatively
autonomous forces that explain and justify resistance and revolt on the part
of subordinates.20 The key issue that this essay attempts to bring up is to
(re-)introduce the impersonal dimension into the empirical investigation of
subjective experience in the field of power and politics. It implies that actors
derive subjective experience from encountering the impersonal objective reality
not as static things but as something extended beyond their immediate here
and now, something of the transcendence but it is experientially real and comes
to bind them and guide their action. Rather than a reified entity that reduces the
complexity of human ingenuity to a limited set of antinomic forces between
subordinates and super ordinates, the domination emanated from the pertinent
objective structures constitutes the more or less open field of possibilities in
which the actors cannot have complete control of its consequences.
Notes
1 Fifty-nine items were found in a search conducted on 5 August 2008. For those wanting
to understand the early theoretical formulation of the resistance/hegemony paradigm, Scott
54
Acta Politica
4
5
8
9
(1972) is an essential reference. For those who first touch on resistance studies, Susan
Seymour (2006) offers an instructive and most recent bibliography relevant to political
anthropologists.
The term episteme is Foucauldian. The terms features Foucaults much debated account of
power such that discursive formations, that is, the structures of epistemes (knowledge), both
constitute and exert power over social objects, including human bodies.
However, it should be noted that scholars did make attempts to repair such a (Mertonian)
ritualistic view on resistance. For instance, Ortner (1995) argued for a more comprehensive
framework as to look also into the cooperation and reciprocity manifested by subordinates.
Brown (1996, p. 731) suggests that subordinates who inserted themselves into this conflict were
not only responding to external challenge but also advancing their own vision of existential
redefinition or transcendence. Kerkvliet (2002) observed that everyday politics featured
cooperation and conflict among people in different classes and statuses; and proposed to delve
into the contending moral values that constituted a significant, and relatively autonomous,
motivational force behind their resistive actions.
Two notable exceptions are Skrimshire (2006) and Sivaramakrishnan (2005).
Although Escobar is one of the representative figures who criticizes the resistance/hegemony
paradigm as having no concern with collective action, his notion of submerged network of
meanings in mediating collective movements I suggest has strong resemblance to Scotts
little tradition. Escobar suggested that in engaging in collective action, people do not mimic
dominant ideological models, such as those derived directly from the Marxist cannon, but
appropriate them and remodel them into their own distinctive system. He suggested that
collective identities are constructed through processes of articulation that start out of a
submerged network of meanings, proceed through cultural innovation in the domain of
everyday life, and may result in visible and sizable forms collective action for the control of
historicity Escobar, 1992a, pp. 395432).
In Foucaults work, there is an organic linkage between the impersonal power-knowledge
sovereignty in Foucaults work set out to examine in The Other of Things and The
Archaeology of Knowledge, and the personal domination in his later Discipline and Punish.
Although the former outlines the historical a priori (that is, the episteme) that
grounds knowledge and its discourses within a particular epoch, the latter substantiates
the rules as derived from the a priori conditions of possibility by the minutiae of various
corporeal rituals of bodily discipline. Here, I generally concur with Smart regarding
the logical sequence between The Order of Things and Discipline and Punish; he remarks:
Only after having attempted to reveal the epistemological configuration on which the human
sciences depend for their possible does Foucault proceed, in Discipline and Punish
and subsequent works, to a discussion of the disciplinary methods, the technology
of power, and the administrative extraction of knowledge, which provided the extra- or
non-discursive conditions of possibility for the human sciences (Smart, 1982, p. 125); see also
Hook (2001).
Michel Foucault (1994, p. 11). Another highly relevant, but longer quote from Foucault which
points to the impersonality of domination is that power is not something that is acquired,
seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away y [And,] neither the
caste which governs nor the groups which control the state apparatus nor those who make the
most important economic decisions direct the entire network of power that functions in a
society (Foucault, 1998).
Speaking of resistance, he puts: We all fight each other. And, there is always within each of us
something that fights something else (Foucault, 1980, p. 208).
To Scott it was the local social structure which was decisive, not the national parties and what
they stood for (1977b, 220221).
r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810
Acta Politica
55
Ho
10 The reason is that peasants (unlike urbanites) know the biography, family and peculiarities of
other people well within the community (Scott, 1977b, p. 219).
11 It is interesting to note that Scott seems to have quoted Berger and Luckmann only once when
illustrating his use of the concept of experience in Protest and Profanation though his stresses
on direct experience and concrete experience resonate in Weapons of the Weak and later
Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Another thing is that Scotts reference to Berger and
Luckmann in the endnote is problematic as I see no clear relation between the pages (pp. 2834,
with two pages being blank) Scott quoted and what had been discussed in the main text. See
Scott (1977b, p. 243).
12 The explication here is based on the premises that exploitation by nature invokes ones
conscious act of attention, and that resistance involves the practical-evaluative dimension of
agency, which inflects conscious and explicit actions. The latter premise is in line with the
categorization of Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische (1998, p. 1001). However, one should be
reminded that this categorization is opposite to the view of Gramsci who regarded resistance as
largely passive, and took it to contrast with agency (1971, p. 337). According to Kaplan and
Kelly, [to Gramsci,] resistance itself is largely unconscious activity, and revolution is only
possible through active agency (Kaplan and Kelly, 1994, p. 126).
13 It should be noted that Scott does not shy away from calling his approach phenomenological;
for example, see Scott (1985, p. 42).
14 It should be noted that this theoretical move is also similar to the poststructuralist,
deconstructive treatments to reject claims about the capacity of discourse to objectively
represent extra-linguistic realities. For example, an extreme postmodernist like Baudrillard
argues to explain away reality in terms of signs and images, or in what he calls the contingent
play of simulacra (Baudrillard, 1983).
15 Emirbayer writes in his seminal article Manifesto for a Relational Sociology that, Sociologists
today are faced with a fundamental dilemma: whether to conceive of the social world as
consisting primarily in substances or in processes, in static things or in dynamic, unfolding
relations (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 281).
16 For example, see Hannerz (1992, pp. 275276), Certeau (1984, p. 58), Mouzelis (1995,
pp. 118221), Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 983), and Farnell (2000, pp. 397418).
17 In the quote, subjectivity could never be nullified by collective representations as Durkheims
earlier work seemed to be suggesting. As a matter of fact, scholars now commonly recognize
two Durkheims in his writing. See Rawls (1996), Janssen and Verheggen (1997), Stone and
Farberman (1967).
18 In fact, such theoretical ambivalence remains unraveled in the theories of Durkheims
intellectual posterity. For example, Parsons had a formulation of social structure very close to
late Durkheim such that social structures are essentially interconnected institutional subsystems
comprising sets of activities and their underlying values and normative supports. These
normative elements, stressed Parsons, can be conceived of as existing [real] only in the mind of
the actor (Parsons, 1937, p. 733). But, like Durkhiem, he did not pursue further to discern the
ontological status of these normative elements which are essentially something other than the
actor.
19 For a theoretical exposition of my usage of the traditional Confucian value as an impersonal
component of human experience, see Ho (2008).
20 As mentioned in passing, Scott himself can be classified as an advocate for this view. Skrimshire
(2006, p. 208) has rightly pinpointed that in Scotts paradigm, the imaginations of a world
turned upside down performed in rituals such as the Carnival in the Catholic tradition or the
Saturnalia in classic Rome has continually provided the ideological motivation for revolt. Other
proponents for this view include Peel (1983), Comaroff (1985), Laitin (1986), Ong (1987), and
Owusu (1989).
56
Acta Politica
References
Bates, R. (ed.) (1988) Toward a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Bates, R., Rui, J., De Figueiredo Jr J.P. and Weingast, B. (1998) The politics of interpretation:
Rationality, culture, and transition. Politics and Society 26(4): 603642.
Baudrillard, J. (1983) Simulations. New York: Semiotext.
Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. (1972[1966] The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the
Sociology of Knowledge. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books.
Bourdieu, P. (1990) The Logic of Practice, Translated by R. Nice. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Brown, M.E. (1996) On resisting resistance. American Anthropologist 98(4): 729735.
Certeau, M.de. (1984) The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of
California Press.
Coleman, J. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of the Harvard
University Press.
Comaroff, J. (1985) Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African
People. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Durkheim, E. (1960) The dualism of human nature and its social conditions. In: K.H. Wolff (ed.)
Emile Durkheim, 18581917: A Collection of Essays, with translations and a bibliography.
Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press.
Elster, J. (1983) Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Emirbayer, M. (1997) Manifesto for a relational sociology. The American Journal of Sociology
103(2): 281317.
Emirbayer, M. and Mische, A. (1998) What is agency? The American Journal of Sociology 103(4):
9621023.
Escobar, A. (1992a) Culture, practice and politics: Anthropology and the study of social
movement. Critique of Anthropology 12(4): 395432.
Escobar, A. (1992b) Culture, economics, and politics in Latin American social movements:
Theory and research. In: A. Escobar and S.E. Alvarez (eds.) The Making of Social Movements in
Latin America: Identity, Strategies, and Democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 6285.
Ewick, P. and Silbey, S. (2003) Narrating social structure: Stories of resistance to legal authority.
The American Journal of Sociology 108(6): 13281372.
Farnell, B. (2000) Getting out of the habitus: An alternative model of dynamically embodied social
action. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 6: 397418.
Fletcher, R. (2001) What are we fighting for? Rethinking resistance in a Pewenche community in
Chile. Journal of Peasant Studies 28(3): 3766.
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 19721977, In:
C. Gordon, C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham and K. Soper (eds.) New York: Pantheon
Books, p. 142.
Foucault, M. (1982) The subject and power. In: H.D. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (eds.) Michel
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd edn. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, pp. 208226.
Foucault, M. (1994) The ethics of care for the self as a practice of freedom: An interview. In:
J. Bernauer and D. Rasmussen (eds.) Translated by J.D. Gauthier. The Final Foucault.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Foucault, M. (1998) The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality 1, Translated by R. Hurley
London: Penguin Books, pp. 9495.
Giddens, A. (1982) Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810
Acta Politica
57
Ho
Goffman, E. (1983) The interaction order. American Sociological Review 48: 117.
Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prisoner Notebooks, Translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell
Smith. New York: International Publishers.
Hannerz, U. (1992) Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Ho, W.C. (2006) From resistance to collective action in a Shanghai socialist model community:
From the late 1940s to early 70s. Journal of Social History 40(1): 85117.
Ho, W.C. (2008) The transcendence and non-discursivity of the lifeworld. Human Studies 31(3):
323342.
Hook, D. (2001) Discourse, knowledge, materiality, history: Foucault and discourse analysis.
Theory and Psychology 11(4): 521547.
Janssen, J. and Verheggen, T. (1997) The double center of gravity in Durkheims symbol theory:
Bringing the symbolism of the body back. Sociological Theory 15(3): 294306.
Kaplan, M. and Kelly, J.D. (1994) Rethinking resistance: Dialogics of disaffection in colonial Fiji.
American Ethnologist 6(2): 123151.
Kerkvliet, B.J. (1995) Towards a more comprehensive analysis of Philippine politics
beyond the patronclient, fractional framework. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 26(2):
401416.
Kerkvliet, B.J. (2002) Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class and Status Relations in a Central
Luzon Village. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Knight, J. (1992) Institutions and Social Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Laitin, D.D. (1986) Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba.
Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press.
Levi, M. (1988) Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
McAdam, A., Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C. (1997) Toward an integrated perspective on social
movements and revolution. In: M.I. Lichbach and A.S. Zuckerman (eds.) Comparative Politics:
Rationality, Culture, and Structure. Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 142171.
Mouzelis, N.P. (1995) Sociological Theory: What Went Wrong? Diagnosis and Remedies. London:
Routledge.
Ong, A. (1987) Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.
Ortner, S. (1989) High Religion: A Cultural and Political History of Sherpa Buddhism. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ortner, S. (1995) Resistance and the problem of ethnographic refusal. Comparative Sociology 37(1):
173193.
Owusu, M. (1989) Rebellion, revolution, and tradition: Reinterpreting coups in Ghana.
Comparative Studies in Society and History 31(2): 372397.
Parsons, T. (1937) The Structure of Social Action. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Peel, J.D.Y. (1983) Ljeshas and Nigerians: The Incorporation of a Yoruba Kingdom 1890s1970s.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rawls, A.W. (1996) Durkheims epistemology: The neglected argument. The American Journal of
Sociology 102(2): 430482.
Sahlins, M. (1993) Waiting for Foucault. Cambridge: Prickly Pear Press.
Schutz, A. (1980[1932]) The Phenomenology of the Social World, Translated by G. Walsh and
F. Lehnert. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Scott, J.C. (1972) Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia. American Political
Science Review 65(1): 91113.
Scott, J.C. (1976) The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
58
Acta Politica
Scott, J.C. (1977a) Protest and profanation: Agrarian revolt and the little tradition, part I. Theory
and Society 4(1): 138.
Scott, J.C. (1977b) Protest and profanation: Agrarian revolt and the little tradition, part II. Theory
and Society 4(2): 211246.
Scott, J.C. (1985) Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Scott, J.C. (1986) Introduction. In: J.C. Scott and B.J. Kerkvliet (eds.) Everyday Forms of Peasant
Resistance in South-east Asia. London: Frank Cass.
Scott, J.C. (1990) Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Scott, J.C. (2005) Afterword to moral economies, state spaces, and categorical violence. American
Anthropologist 107(3): 395402.
Seymour, S. (2006) Resistance. Anthropological Theory 6(3): 303321.
Sil, R. (2000) The foundation of eclecticism: The epistemological status of agency, culture, and
structure in social theory. Journal of Theoretical Politics 12(3): 353387.
Sivaramakrishnan, K. (2005) Hegemony and hidden transcripts: The discursive arts of neoliberal
legitimation. American Anthropologist 107(3): 356368.
Skrimshire, S. (2006) Another what is possible? Ideology and Utopian imagination in anti-capitalist
resistance. Political Theology 7(2): 201219.
Smart, B. (1982) Foucault, sociology, and the problem of human agency. Theory and Society 11(2):
121141.
Starn, O. (1992) I dreamed of foxes and hawks: Reflections on peasant protest, new social
movements, and the Rondas Campesinas of Northern Peru. In: A. Escobar and S.E. Alvarez
(eds.) The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategies, and Democracy.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 89111.
Stone, G.P. and Farberman, H.A. (1967) On the edge of rapprochement: Was Durkheim moving
toward the perspective of symbolic interaction? Sociological Quarterly 8(2): 149164.
Taylor, M. (1983) Structure, culture, and action in the explanation of social change. In:
W. J. Booth, P. James and H. Meadwell (eds.) Politics and Rationality. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Vandergeest, P. (1993) Constructing Thailand: Regulation, everyday resistance, and citizenship.
Comparative Studies in Society and History 35(1): 133158.
Acta Politica
59