Lopez v. Orosa, Jr., and Plaza Theatre, Inc.

FACTS: Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. Orosa approached Lopez and invited the latter to
make an investment in the theatre business he was forming, the Plaza Theatre. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest.
Nonetheless, Lopez agreed to supply the lumber for the construction of the theatre. Lopez further agreed that that the payment
therefore would be on demand and not cash on delivery basis. Lopex delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of the
Plaza Theatre. However, of the total cost of materials amounting to P62, 255.85, Lopez was paid only P 20, 848.50, thus leaving a
balance of P 41, 771.35.
Due to Lopez demands, Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his shares of stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc. As there was still an
unpaid balance, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza Theatre. He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily for
the unpaid balance, and in case defendants failed to pay, the land and building should be sold in public auction with the proceeds to
be applied to the balance, or that the shares of stock be sold in public auction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building attaches to said structure alone
and does not extend to the land on which the building is adhered to.
HELD: No. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the
inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only
mean one thingthat a building is by itself an immovable property. In view of the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a
building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the
same owner. The lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was
incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches
only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors.
ASSOCIATED INSURANCE AND SURETY COMPANY V. IYA, ET. AL
FACTS:
Spouses Valino were the owners of a house, payable on installments from Philippine Realty Corporation. To be able to purchase on
credit rice from NARIC, they filed a surety bond subscribed by petitioner and therefor, they executed an alleged chattel mortgage on
the house in favor of the surety company. The spouses didnt own yet the land on which the house was constructed on at the time of
the undertaking. After being able to purchase the land, to be able to secure payment for indebtedness, the spouses executed a real
estate
mortgage
in
favor
of
Iya.
The spouses were not able to satisfy obligation with NARIC, petitioner was compelled to pay. The spouses werent able to pay the
surety company despite demands and thus, the company foreclosed the chattel mortgage. It later learned of the real estate mortgage
over the house and lot secured by the spouses. This prompted the company to file an action against the spouses. Also, Iya filed
another civil action against the spouses, asserting that she has a better right over the property. The trial court heard the two cases
jointly and it held that the surety company had a preferred right over the building as since when the chattel mortgage was secured,
the land wasnt owned yet by the spouses making the building then a chattel and not a real property.
MULLER v. MULLER
CASE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the February 26, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86
in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between petitioner and respondent, as
well as the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.

FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22,
1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting
to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On
September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the
petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

Thus However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse during the
marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded
from the absolute community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as
the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the
petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real
property.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial courts Decision. It held that
respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to
him. It also considered petitioners ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals
ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.

ISSUE: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the amount used to purchase the land as well as the costs for the construction of
the house?
HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of
P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the
Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community
between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the partition of the personal
properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.

DISCUSSION: Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony.

In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held: Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily
be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this
result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It
would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated
upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result
would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and
whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories,
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of
other uses and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor Generals Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious
to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that
he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners
marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents disqualification from owning
lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an
existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold
otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that
equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant case,
respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the constitutional prohibition.

Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part.
To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO
FACTS:

Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He worked as a pilot with the New Guinea Airlines.
He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started engaging in business in the country two years thereafter, and married Teresita Santos, a
Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without obtaining a divorce.
Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to King's Cross, a night spot in Sydney, for a
massage where he met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was married to Klaus
Muller, a German national. She left Germany and tried her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she found employment as a masseuse in
the King's Cross nightclub. Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop working at King's Cross, return to the
Philippines, and engage in a wholesome business of her own. He also proposed that they meet in Manila, to which she assented.
Within two weeks of Ederlina's arrival in Manila, Alfred joined her. Alfred reiterated his proposal for Ederlina to stay in the Philippines
and engage in business, even offering to finance her business venture.
Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he was eager to divorce his wife in Australia. Alfred proposed marriage to Ederlina,
but she replied that they should wait a little bit longer.
Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina. On different occasions, Alfred bought several properties in the
Philippines for Ederlinas business and for the couples residence using his own funds but since Alfred knew that as an alien he was
disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlina's name would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer of
the property, as well as in the title covering the same. Alfred also sold his properties in Australia and the proceeds of the sale were
deposited in Alfred's account with the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), Kowloon Branch. When Ederlina opened her
own account with HSBC Kowloon, Alfred transferred his with the said bank to this new account.
Alfred received a Letter from Klaus Muller. Klaus informed Alfred that he and Ederlina had been married on October 16, 1978 and had
a blissful married life until Alfred intruded therein. Klaus stated that he knew of Alfred and Ederlina's amorous relationship and begged
Alfred to leave Ederlina alone and to return her to him. When Alfred confronted Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were,
indeed, married. But she assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus. Alfred was appeased. He agreed to continue the amorous
relationship and wait for the outcome of Ederlina's petition for divorce.
Ederlina's petition for divorce was denied twice because Klaus opposed the same. Klaus wanted half of all the properties owned by
Ederlina in the Philippines before he would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a bigamy case against Ederlina.
Alfred and Ederlina's relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could
charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live
separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her. Ederlina complained that he had ruined her life.
Shortly thereafter, Alfred filed a Complaint against Ederlina, with the RTC of Quezon City for recovery of real and personal properties.
In his complaint, Alfred alleged that Ederlina, without his knowledge and consent, managed to transfer funds from their joint account
in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own account with the same bank. Using the said funds, Ederlina was able to purchase the properties
subject of the complaints. Ederlina failed to file her answer and was declared in default.
In the meantime, Alfred also filed a complaint against Ederlina with the RTC of Davao City for specific performance, declaration of
ownership of real and personal properties, sum of money, and damages. He alleged that during the period of their common-law
relationship, he acquired solely through his own efforts and resources real and personal properties in the Philippines valued more or
less at P724,000.00
The RTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of Alfred. However, after due proceedings in the RTC of Davao City, the trial court ruled in favor
of Erlinda. The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence, the purchaser of the three parcels of land subject of the
complaint was Ederlina. The court further stated that even if Alfred was the buyer of the properties; he had no cause of action against
Ederlina for the recovery of the same because as an alien, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines. The
sale of the three parcels of land to the petitioner was null and void ab initio. Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the petitioner was
precluded from recovering the properties from the respondent.
The CA rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC Hence, the petition at bar.
ISSUES:
1.
2.

Can petitioner is entitled to recover the property under Article 1416 of the Civil Code?
Whether petitioner is entitled to recovery under Article 22 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
1. NO. Under Article 1416 of the Civil Code: When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the
prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has
paid or delivered.
The provision applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited, in order to benefit private interests. It does not apply to
contracts void ab initio. The sale of three parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions
are void ab initio because they were entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover the properties
or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of public policy.
2. NO. Article 22 of the Civil Code provides: Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion
in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the
pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or
from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson: "The
objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of
the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which
the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."
Failure of the parties to describe the subject property does not render the contract void; reformation is the remedy.
CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
FACTS

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his
widow, defendant appellee Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant appellee David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also
American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her
rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon. Among the said parcels of land
is that now in litigation, . . . situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters. On February 5,
1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee Emiliano Cataniag.
ISSUES
a. Whether or not the subjected land was rural
b. Whether or not the sale to Cataniag was valid.
HELD
The petition has no merit.a. Subject Land is Urban. The conclusion of the trial court -- that the subject property is urban land -- is
based on clear and convincing evidence. Finding the subject land was urban, the petitioners have no ground to invoke the right of
redemption, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits of no
ambiguity in construction:
ART. 1621.
The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed
one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land
.
b. Sale to Cataniag valid Helen Guzmans quitclaim, which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles
and interests over the property, collided with the Constitution which states that only the qualified, can acquire lands of the public
domain with the exception of hereditary succession. In the 1935 Constitution, aliens cannot acquire public as well as private lands. In
fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession.
Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a
citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Since the disputed
land is now owned by Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE VEGA
FACTS:
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m.
situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then
natural-born Filipino citizens.On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land
before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have
opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have
presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in
question.On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination: In the present case,
it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this
reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful
owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money.
Issue: Whether or not a foreign national can apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while
still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA
141).
Held: The Court disagreed on the petition to seek to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of foreign
nationality. This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated: As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private
respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the
Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from
an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion
con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or
possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183
[1968]). The primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a
contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the
case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of
them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed
the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an
additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the
maximum areas herein authorized.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said requirements are
primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated,
much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an
application for registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be confused with
the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the
application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec.
6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is
submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of
the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the
decree of registration is yet to be issued. The petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
Facts: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in December 1941. The registration was
interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish the said registration but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila

on the grounds that he is a foreigner and he cannot acquire a land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of Manila.
The CFI ruled that he cannot own a land, being an alien. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.
Held: No.
Ratio: Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about the conservation and utilization of natural resources. The said provision embraces
all lands of any kind of the public domain. Its purpose is to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and
utilization of all natural resources of the nation. Although it mentions agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held that in
determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to
cultivation for agricultural purposes. Hence, public agricultural land was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber
or mineral. Therefore, it includes residential lands.

1.
2.
1.

Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986)

FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the
non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within
the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the
Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
W/N the land is already a private land - YES
W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would
be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree,
if not by earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect
right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of
1,024 hectares
TAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
On June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9972, Cad-459-D of Indang Cadastre, situated in Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite and with
an area of 6,920 square meters. [3] The petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property from Gregonio Gatdula pursuant to
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1996; and they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. RTC issued a decision granting
petitioners application. CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property for the requisite period of 30 years.

Issue:
Whether the petitioners have proven themselves qualified to the benefits under the relevant laws on the confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles.

Property; acquisition by prescription; confirmation of incomplete or imperfect titles; requirements. Held: There must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of
the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the property as
patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.
Adverse, continuous, open, public possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law and the burden to prove it by clear,
positive and convincing evidence is on the applicant. A claim of ownership will not proper on the basis of tax declarations if
unaccompanied by proof of actual possession.
The counting of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can
only start from the issuance of DARCO Conversion Order. Before the property was declared patrimonial by virtue of such conversion
order, it cannot be acquired by prescription. Jean Tan, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012.

REPUBLIC vs. RIZALVO

FACTS:
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court,
an application for the registration of a parcel of land, located in Bauang, La Union. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee
simple of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer 5 dated December 31, 1962,
and that he is currently in possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration for the year
1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition. The MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land
registration court, rendered its Decision, approving respondents application. The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a
Notice of Appeal. However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgated the assailed Decision, affirming the trial courts
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent have shown indubitably that he has complied with all the requirements showing that the property,
previously part of the public domain, has become private property by virtue of his acts of possession in the manner and length of time
required by law.
HELD:
NO. Under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part
of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and report dated July 17, 2001 of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La
Union, states that the entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified as such since January 21,
1987. Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession. The MTC and the CA both agreed that
respondent has presented sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question.
However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not been satisfied. Respondent only managed to

present oral and documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy
of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo. He presented Tax Declaration for
the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952. Even assuming that the 1948 Tax
Declaration in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts could be taken in this case as proof of a claim of
ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is categorically required
by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is enough to signify that the land is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth, respondent is still not entitled to registration because the land was
certified as alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen
(13) years after and far short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on prescription.

CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO v. SEVERINO and RAYMUNDO LANDICHO, et al.

To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports
of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.
FACTS: Crisologo Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, an application for registration of certain parcels of
land (the lots), which he supposedly purchased from one
Genoveva Manlapit in 1948, and has since been in continuous, open, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession thereof in the
concept of an owner.
Severino and Raymundo Landicho, Julian Abello, Marta de Sagun and Editha G. Sarmiento subsequently filed an Answer/Opposition to
Domingos application, claiming, among other things, that they have been the ones in open, continuous, adverse and actual
possession and cultivation of the lots in the concept of owners and have even been paying real estate taxes thereon.
The RTC approved Domingos application for registration. On appeal by Landicho, et al., the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the RTC Decision and dismissed Domingos application for registration of land title. Petitioner Domingo filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Court of Appeals which was subsequently denied by said court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domingo is entitled to the registration of the lots in question pursuant to Section 14, sub pars. (1) and (4) of
P.D. 1529
HELD: Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that to be entitled of a land, the applicant must prove that: (a) the land applied for forms
part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain and (b) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12,
1945.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, and unless it has been
shown that they have been reclassified by the State as alienable or disposable to a private person, they remain part of the inalienable
public domain. To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of
government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.
NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC. V. TANJUATCO
FACTS:
Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and
Damages against respondent Tanjuatco and the Register of Deeds of Calamba before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna. NRSI alleged that
in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land
by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name by paying P82,400.38 to the Bureau of
Lands. On January 2, 1995, Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreement over their shares of stock in the
corporation. Then, pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum
of P85,000. On March 12, 1996, the Director of Lands released an Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to
Tanjuatco. Transfer Certificates of Title were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Tanjuatco advanced the affirmative defense that the complaint stated no cause of action against
him. According to Tanjuatco, it was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He averred further that the
complaint did not charge him with knowledge of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI. RTC dismissed the complaint of petitioner
on demurrer to evidence and held that Tanjuatco is an innocent purchaser for value.
ISSUE: W/N NRSI was able to substantiate its claim of entitlement to ownership of the lands in Tanjuatcos name
HELD: No.
NRSI anchors its claim over the lands subjects of this case on the right of accretion. It submitted in evidence, titles to four parcels of
land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the name of Tanjuatco.

But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring

property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the deposition of
soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the
benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the

conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied
the foregoing requisites.
Further, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. Said parcels of land formed part of the Dried San Juan River Bed, which under Article 502
(1) of the Civil Code rightly pertains to the public dominion. The Certification issued by Forester III Emiliano S. Leviste confirms that
said lands were verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable, certified and declared as such on September 28, 1981. Clearly,
the Republic is the entity which had every right to transfer ownership thereof to respondent.
Next, petitioner sought to establish fraudulent registration of the land in the name of Tanjuatco. NRSI presented before the trial court
a copy of the Voting Trust Agreement which the spouses Cuevas executed in favor of Pauline Co. However, nothing in said agreement
indicates that NRSI empowered Cuevas to apply for the registration of the subject lots on its behalf. Neither did petitioner adduce
evidence to prove that Cuevas was its President and Chairman. Even assuming that Cuevas was the president of NRSI, his powers are
confined only to those vested upon him by the board of directors or fixed in the by-laws. In truth, petitioner could have easily
presented its by-laws or a corporate resolution to show Cuevass authority to buy the lands on its behalf. But it did not.
Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission/declaration of nullity of contract, reconveyance and damages against respondents. An
action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and
legal owner. In an action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, specifically the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
persons name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.

To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the

following requisites must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership or dominical
right over the land registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was
procured through fraud or other illegal means; (3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value; and (4)
the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and incontrovertible but within four years from the
discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust. Petitioner failed to show the presence of these
requisites.
Agne v. Director of Lands
Facts: The land subject matter of the case was originally covered by Free Patent 23263 issued on 17 April 1937 in the name of
Herminigildo Agpoon. On 21 May 1937, pursuant to the said patent, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued to said Herminigildo
Agpoon OCT 2370. Presentacion Agpoon Gascon inherited the said parcel of land upon the death of her father, Herminigildo, and was
issued TCT 32209 on 6 April 1960. Presentacion declared the said land for taxation purposes in her name under TD 11506 and taxes
were paid thereon in her name. On 13 April 1971, spouses Joaquin and Presentacion Gascon filed Civil Case U-2286 in the then CFI
Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages against Marcelino C. Agne, Felix Oriane, Agaton Taganas (represented by
Florentino C. Taganas), Hilario Escorpizo, Isabelo Mauricio, Heirs of Roman Damaso (Jorge Damaso and Alejandro Damaso), Heirs of
Francisco Ramos (Encarnacion R. Leano and Dominga R. Medrano), Heirs of Sabina Gelacio Agapito (Serapio Agapito and Nicolasa
Agapito), Feliza Diccion Agne, Estanislao Gorospe (represented by Elizabeth G. Badua), Librado Badua, Nicolas Villanieva, Heirs of
Carlos Palado (Fortunata Palado and Isabelita Palado), Primitivo Taganas, Panfilo Soingco, Bernardo Palattao, Marcelino S. Santos and
Paulino D. Agne Jr. (minor, represented by Feliza Diccion Agne). Their complaint states that they are the registered owners under TCT
32209 of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan which is now in the possession of Agne, et.al.; that during
the Japanese occupation, the latter, taking advantage of the abnormal conditions then obtaining, took possession of said land by
means of fraud, stealth, strategy and intimidation; that Gascon repeatedly demanded the surrender of the physical possession of said
property but the latter refused. Agne, et.al. alleged that the land in question was formerly a part of the river bed of the Agno-Chico
River; that in the year 1920, a big flood occurred which caused the said river to change its course and abandon its original bed; that
by virtue of the provisions of Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code which was then the law in force, Agne, et.al., by operation of law,
became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed bordering their properties; that since
1920, they and their predecessors in interest occupied and exercised dominion openly and adversely over said portion of the
abandoned river bed in question abutting their respective riparian lands continuously up to the present to the exclusion of all other
persons, particularly Herminigildo Agpoon; that they have introduced improvements thereon by constructing irrigation canals and
planting trees and agricultural crops thereon and converted the land into a productive area. On 6 March 1974, while the above case
was still pending, Agne, et.al. filed a complaint against Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon with the former CFI Pangasinan for
annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to a parcel of land, which action was docketed as Civil Case U-2649.
Agne, et. al. alleged in their said complaint that the land in question, which was formerly a portion of the bed of Agno-Chico river
which was abandoned as a result of the big flood in 1920, belongs to them pursuant to the provision of Article 370 of the old Civil
Code; that it was only on 13 April 1971, when spouses filed a complaint against them, that they found out that the said land was
granted by the Government to Herminigildo Agpoon under Free Patent 23263, pursuant to which OCT 2370 was issued in the latters
name; and that the said patent and subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto are null and void since the said land, an abandoned
river bed, is of private ownership and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a public land grant. On 21 June 1974, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case U-2286, ordering Agne, et.al. to surrender physical possession of land in question, to pay in soludum
the produce of the land (P5,000 per year) from the date of the filing of the action at the rate of 6% interest per annum until fully paid;
to pay in solidum the amount of P800 representing attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.
Agne, et.al. appealed to the appellate court. On 30 January 1985 the former IAC affirmed in toto in AC-GR CV 60388-R the decision of
the trial court, and with the denial of Agne et.al.s motion for reconsideration, Agne, et.al. filed a petition for review on certiorari with

the Supreme Court (GR 72255). On 24 June 1974, the CFI Pangasinan, acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the Director of Lands
and spouses Agpoon, issued an order dismissing Civil Case U-2649 for annulment of title by merely citing the statement in the case of
Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al. that an action to annul a free patent many years after it had become final and indefeasible states no
cause of action. Agne, et.als motion for the reconsideration of the order was denied on 11 September 1974, hence the petition for
review on certiorari (GR L-40399) The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the assailed decision of IAC in AC-GR CV 60388-R and the
questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case 2649, and rendered judgment ordering the Gascon to reconvey the
parcel of land to Agne, et.al.
1. Case of Antonio v. Barroga not controlling The lower court erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case U-2649, as the case of
Antonio relied upon in the dismissal order is not controlling. In that case, the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action, not only because of the delay in the filing of the complaint but specifically since the ground relied upon by the plaintiff therein,
i.e. that the land was previously covered by a titulo real, even if true, would not warrant the annulment of the free patent and the
subsequent original certificate of title issued to defendant.
2. Cause of action; Facts alleged in complaint hypothetically admitted upon the filing of the motion to dismiss The facts alleged in the
complaint, which are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of the motion to dismiss, constitute a sufficient cause of action
against private respondents.
3. Agne owns property; Riparian owners ipso facto owners of abandoned river bed (Old Civil Code) The old Civil Code, the law then in
force, provides that the beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally changed belong to the
owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners,
the new dividing line shall run at equal distance therefrom. Thus, once the river bed has been abandoned, the riparian owners
become the owners of the abandoned bed to the extent provided by this article. The acquisition of ownership is automatic. There need
be no act on the part of the riparian owners to subject the accession to their ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the
moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident, without the need of any formal act of acquisition. Such abandoned river bed had
fallen to the private ownership of the owner of the riparian land even without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant
thereof will be considered as a trespasser. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory, as it is a mode of
acquisition provided by law, as the result of the right of accretion. Since the accessory follows the nature of the principal, there need
not be any tendency to the thing or manifestation of the purpose to subject it to our ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from
the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident. The right of the owner of land to additions thereto by accretion has been said
to rest in the law of nature, and to be analogous to the right of the owner of a tree to its fruits, and the owner of flocks and herds to
their natural increase. In the present case, Agne, et.al. became owners of aliquot portions of said abandoned river bed as early as
1920, when the Agno River changed its course, without the necessity of any action or exercise of possession on their part, it being an
admitted fact that the land in dispute, prior to its registration, was an abandoned bed of the Agno River and that Agne, et. al. are the
riparian owners of the lands adjoining the said bed.
4. Ownership of accession governed by Civil Code, imprescriptibility of registered land governed by Land Registration Act;
Imprescriptibility does not apply as title based on public grant The failure of Agne et.al. to register the accretion in their names and
declare it for purposes of taxation did not divest it of its character as a private property. Although an accretion to registered land is not
automatically registered and therefore not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property
under the Torrens system. The said rule is not applicable to the case since the title claimed by spouses Gascon is not based on
acquisitive prescription but is anchored on a public grant from the Government, which presupposes that it was inceptively a public
land. Ownership over the accession is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is a concern of the Land
Registration Act.
5. Land of private ownership; Director of Lands does not have authority to grant free patent for said land Under the provisions of Act
2874 pursuant to which the title of Gascons predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the
Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private
ownership, and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover
lands privately owned. The purpose of the Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act, Act 2874, was and is to limit its
application to lands of the public domain, and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any
manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee title, or of private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and
cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act 2874, inasmuch as the subject of such freehold or private land is not embraced
in any manner in the title of the Act and the same are excluded from the provisions or text thereof. In the present case, the land in
dispute since early 1920 was already under the private ownership of Agne et.al. and no longer a part of the lands of the public
domain, the same could not have been the subject matter of a free patent. Free Patent 23263 issued to Herminigildo Agpoon is null
and void and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto cannot become final and indefeasible.
6. No title acquired by applicant patentees if land already a private property of another As ruled in Director of Lands vs. Sisican, et al.
that if at the time the free patents were issued in 1953 the land covered therein were already private property of another and,
therefore, not part of the disposable land of the public domain, then applicants patentees acquired no right or title to the land.
7. Void patents produce no legal effects A certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the fraud consisted in
misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although it is not. The nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit but, from
the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Being null and void, the free patent granted and the
subsequent titles produce no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum.
8. Rule on incontrovertibility of certificate of title upon expiration of 1 year, does not apply in the present case The rule on the
incontrovertibility of a certificate of title upon the expiration of one year, after the entry of the decree, pursuant to the provisions of
the Land Registration Act, does not apply where an action for the cancellation of a patent and a certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto is instituted on the ground that they are null and void because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at all, the
land in question having been withdrawn from the public domain prior to the subsequent award of the patent and the grant of a
certificate of title to another person. Such an action is different from a review of the decree of title on the ground of fraud.
9. Action to annul void title issued pursuant to a public grant does not prescribe Although a period of one year has already expired
from the time a certificate of title was issued pursuant to a public grant, said title does not become incontrovertible but is null and
void if the property covered thereby is originally of private ownership, and an action to annul the same does not prescribe.

10. Action to quite title imprescriptible since petitioners are in possession of land Since Agne, et.al. are in possession of the land in
dispute, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible. Their action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property in
ones possession is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession for a number of years gave them a continuing right to seek the aid
of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claims of a third party and the effect on her title. As held in Caragay-Layno
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., an adverse claimant of a registered land, undisturbed in his possession thereof for a period of more than
50 years and not knowing that the land he actually occupied had been registered in the name of another, is not precluded from filing
an action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property as against the registered owner who was relying upon a
Torrens title which could have been fraudulently acquired. To such adverse claimant, the remedy of an action to quiet title is
imprescriptible. In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was void ab initio, a
claim of prescription of the action would be unavailing.
11. Land Registration Act and Cadastral Act does not give anybody better title than what he really or lawfully has A free patent which
purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the
patentee as against the true owner. As stated in Gustillo v. Maravill (48 Phil 838), the Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral
Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another. The Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to the provisions
thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of his
neighbor, more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title, which may have been issued to
him under the circumstances, may and should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590).
12. Agnes title superior over Gascons; Possession The title of Agne, et.al. over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the
registered owner, Gascon, which is a total nullity. The long and continued possession of the former under a valid claim of title cannot
be defeated by the claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning.
13. Conclusiveness of a Torrens title not available for use to perpetual fraud and chicanery; Land Registration Act; Registration is not a
mode of acquiring property The quality of conclusiveness of a Torrens title is not available for use to perpetrate fraud and chicanery. To
paraphrase from Angeles vs. Samia, the Land Registration Act does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title already
existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. It cannot be a shield for the commission of fraud. It does not
permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title
to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have on the land. Where the applicant
possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens system of registration. Resort to the
provisions of the Land Registration Act does not give one a better title than he really and lawfully has. Registration does not vest title.
It is not a mode of acquiring property. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not give the holder any
better title than what he actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration
was made at all.
14. Laches The failure of the spouses Gascon to assert their claim over the disputed property for almost 30 constitute laches and bars
an action to recover the same. The registered owners right to recover possession of the property and title thereto from Agne, et. al.
has, by long inaction or inexcusable neglect, been converted into a stale demand. 15. Authority of the Court to order the
reconveyance of property Where the evidence show that the plaintiff is the true owner of the land subject of the free patent and title
granted to another and that the defendant and his predecessor in interest were never in possession thereof, the Court, in the exercise
of its equity jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of said title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant registered
owner to reconvey the property to the plaintiff. Further, if the determinative facts are before the Court and it is in a position to finally
resolve the dispute, the expeditious administration of justice will be subserved by such a resolution and thereby obviate the needless
protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case of the trial court. On these considerations, as well as the fact that these
cases have been pending for a long period of time, the Court, in the present case, see no need for remanding Civil Case 2649 for
further proceedings, and hold that the facts and the ends of justice in this case require the reconveyance by the Gascons to Agne,
et.al. of the disputed lot.
REPUBLIC VS. CA
Alluvium must be the exclusive work of nature. It has 3 requirements: 1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) through
the current of the river; and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the river bank. Deposits made by human
intervention are excluded.
FACTS:
The respondents (Tancincos) were registered owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan, bordering on the Maycauayan and Bocaue Rivers.
They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond, but because of the recommendation of the
Commissioner, they only pushed for the registration of two. The RTC and CA granted the petition despite the opposition of the Bureau
of Lands.
The respondents based their claim on accretions to their fishponds. They presented a lone witness (their overseer). The Bureau of
Lands argue that the lands in dispute are not accretions. They assert that what actually happened was that the respondents simply
transferred their dikes simply further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if there was any accretion to speak of, it was
man-made.
Respondents counter that the their evidence shows that accretion happened without human intervention and that the transfer of the
dikes occurred only after.

ISSUE:
Whether accretion took place

10

RULING: No
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not evidence that the addition to said property was made gradually through
the effects of the currents of the two rivers. The lands in question total almost 4 hectares of land, which are highly doubtful to have
been caused by accretion. The lone witness testified that she observed an increase in the area in 1939, but the lots in question were
not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted in 1940. They were also not included in the Cadastral Survey of the
entire Municipality of Maycauayan between the years 1958-1960. If the overseer was indeed telling the truth, the accretion was
sudden, not gradual. When the respondents transferred their dikes towards the river beds, the dikes were meant for reclamation
purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river. The lots in question were portions of
the bed of the Meycauayan River and are therefore classified as public property.
Registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed. Note: The lands sought were not even dry land. The entire area was under one
to two meters of water.
Republic v. Munoz G.R No. 151910 October 15, 2007
FACTS: Respondent filed an application for registration of title of a parcel of land of 1,986 sq. Meters before RTC of Albay. The
application for registration, respondent averred that no mortgage or encumberance of any kind affects the property that no other
person has an interest, legal, on the subject lot. The property was acquired by donation inter vivos, executed by spouses Apolonio
Muoz and Anastacia Vitero on Nov. 1956 and the spouses and predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since time
immemorial for more than 70 years.
On Nov. 1996, petitioner through the OSG opposed the application. Alleging that 1) the applicant nor the predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto 2) the muniment/s of title and/or the tax payment/s receipts of application, if any, attached to or alleged in the application do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bonafide acquisition of the lands, 3)that the claim of ownership in gee simple on
the basis of Spanish titleor grant can no loner be availed because it failed to file for a period of 6 mos. from Feb. 1976 as required by
PD 892 4) the parcel applied for is part of public domain 4) filed beyond Dec. 31, 1987, which is filed out of time.
Respondent Answer to opposition, the said lot was originally owned and possessed by Puvinar and Lozada. In April 1917, Pulvinar sold
his share of the unregistered land to Sps. Muoz and Vitero to respondents parents. In June 1920, Lozada likewise sold his remaining
part to the parents of respondent. Ownership and possession of the property were consolidated by the spouses and declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Muoz in 1920.It was stated that during cadastral survey conducted in Lingao, Albay in 1928 the
land was designated as Lot 2276 as per Survey Notification Card issued to Muoz dated Oct. 2, 1928. Finally, respondent contended
that from 1920 up to 1996, the time of application, the land taxes for the property had been fully paid.
During the trial, respondent, as sole witness, who was 81 years old,testified that he acquired the property in 1956 when his parents
donated the same to him. He presented the tax declaration for payment of realty tax. A certification from the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer was showed for payment of real estate taxes from 1956 up to 1997. Declared that the property is residential with
improvements such as a house and fruit bearing trees. In 1957, he also constructed a concrete fence surrounding the entire property
and narrated that his childhood days. Also non of his sibling were claiming interests over the property.
The trial court noted the report of the Director of Lands, the land in question was covered by Free Patent application no. 10-2-664 of
Anastacia Vitero. The RTC granted the application for registration.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject lot: 1) the notice of initial hearing was
not timely filed; 2) the applicant failed to present the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be registered during the trial;
and 3) the applicant failed to present evidence that the land is alienable and disposable. The CA affirmed the decision of the court a
quo, that there was conclusive proof that the jurisdictional requirement of due notice had been complied with under Sec. 24 PD 1529.
Further the failure to present in evidence the tracing cloth plan of the subject property did not deprive the lower court of its
jurisdiction to act on the application in question. Lastly CA ruled that respondent need not adduce document proof that the disputed
property had been declared alienableand disposable for the simple reason that the lot had once been covered by free patent
application; hence, this alone is conclusive evidence that the property was already declared by the government as open for public
dominion.Hence this petition.
ISSUE: (a) Whether or not, failure to present the original tracing cloth plan is a fatal omission? NO.
(b) Whether or not, that in proving the alienable and disposable nature of the property, there has to be a certification from the DENR
and CENRO (Community Environment and Natural Resources Office)? YES
(a)The court has recognized instances of substantial compliance with this rule. It is true that the best evidence to identify a piece of
land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, but blueprint copies and other evidence
could also provide sufficient identification. In the present application for registration, respondent submitted the supporting documents:
1) blueprint copy of the survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands 2) technical description duly verified and approved by the
Director of Lands.
In Recto v. Republic, the blueprint copy of the cloth plan together with the lots description duly certified as to their correctness
by the Bureau of Lands are adequate to identify the land applied for registration.
If the survey plan is approved by the Director of Lands and its correctness has not been overcome by clear, strong and convince
evidence, the presentation of the tracing cloth plan may be dispensed with. All the evidence on record sufficiently identified the
property as the one applied for by respondent and containing the corresponding metes and bounds as well as area. Original tracing
cloth plan need not be presented in evidence.
(b)The CA said that the respondent need not to adduce documentary proof over the disputed property since it has been declared
alienable and disposable because it is covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 in the name of respondents mother. It is proof
enough that the property was declared by the government as open for public disposition, the court cannot sustain the argument of
respondent that subject property was declared alienable and disposable land.
The court also noted that neither the Director of Lands nor the LRA attested that the land subject of this proceeding is alienable or
disposable.

11

Application for confirmation of imperfect title must be able to prove the following:
1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of public domain; 2) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
The Public Land Act remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of the public domain,
other than timber and mineral lands.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, embodied in the Constitution, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public domain.
Under the jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State
or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. In the present case, respondent failed to submit a certification from proper
government agency to prove that the land subject of registration is indeed alienable and disposable. A CENRO certificate, which
respondent failed to secure, could have evidence the alienability of the land involved. Respondent failed to convince the court that the
land applied for is alienable and disposable character. The Court cannot approve the application
HELD: The instant petition is granted. Accordingly, the decision dated August 29, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
58170, as reiterated in its resolution of January 29, 2002, is reversed and set aside, and the application for registration filed by
respondent Ludolfo V. Muoz is denied.
CAOIBES JR vs. CAOIBES-PANTOJA
Petitioners Jose Caoibes, Jr., Melencio Caoibes and Loida Caoibes, as FIRST PARTY, and respondent Corazon Caoibes-Pantoja, as
SECOND PARTY, forged on May 10, 1982 an agreement entitled RENUNCIATION AND TRANSFER OF CLAIMS, RIGHTS, AND INTERESTS
(the agreement) covering a parcel of land, Lot 2 of plan Psd-162069 (Lot 2), situated in Calaca, Batangas containing an area of 54,665
sq. m., the pertinent portions of which agreement read:
xxxx
THAT under and by virtue of a court approved document entitled Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties in
Special Proceeding No. 857 and Civil Case No. 861 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VII, in particular
Paragraph 4 (b) of aforesaid document, the FIRST PARTY are to receive, among others, in full ownership pro indiviso, and free
from all liens and encumbrances, the following described real property, to wit:
A parcel of land (Lot 2 of plan Psd-162069), situated in the sitio of Taklang-Anak, Barrio of
Calantas, Municipalityof Calaca, Province of Batangas. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2, by center of Creek and
property of Felimon Las Herras (Lot 1 of plan Psu-101302); on the SE., along lines 2, 3, 4 and 5, by Lot 1 of plan
Psu-162069; on the S., along lines 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, by Creek; on the NW., along lines 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 1, by
center of Creek and property of Felimon Las Herras (Lot 1 of plan Psu-101302). x x x containing an area of FIFTYFOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE (54,665) square meters.
THAT issuance to the FIRST PARTY of the proper title to the aforesaid property is presently the subject of a land registration
proceeding LRC No. N-411 pending before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VII, acting as a land registration
court.
THAT for and in consideration of the payment by the SECOND PARTY[-herein respondent Corazon Caoibes-Pantoja] of the
loan secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on the property described and delineated in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. P-189 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas, said loan in the principal amount of NINETEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P19,000.00) exclusive of accrued interest being presently outstanding in the name of GUILLERMO C. JAVIER with the LEMERY
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Balayan Branch, and the further undertaking of the SECOND PARTY to forthwith deliver
upon release to the FIRST PARTY aforesaid TCT No. P-189 free from all liens and encumbrances, the FIRST PARTY hereby
RENOUNCE, RELINQUISH and ABANDON whatever rights, interests, or claims said FIRST PARTY may have over the
real property in paragraph 1 hereof x x x [illegible] hereby TRANSFER, CEDE, and CONVEY said rights x x x
[illegible] and claims, in a manner absolute and irrevocable,unto and in favor of the SECOND PARTY, her heirs,
successors and assigns;
THAT by virtue of aforestated renunciation and transfer, the SECOND PARTY is hereby subrogated and/or substituted
to whatever rights, interests or representations the FIRST PARTY may have in the prosecution of the proper land
registration proceeding mentioned elsewhere in this instrument.[1]
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As reflected in the abovequoted agreement of the parties, petitioners, as FIRST PARTY, renounced, relinquished, abandoned and
transferred, ceded and conveyed whatever rights [they] may have over Lot 2 in favor of respondent, as SECOND PARTY, and on

12

account of the renunciation and transfer, petitioners transferred whatever rights . . . [they] may have in the prosecution of the land
registration proceeding, LRC No. N-411.

About 14 years after the execution of the parties above-said agreement or in 1996, respondent filed a motion to intervene and be
substituted as applicant in LRC Case No. N-411. The motion was opposed by petitioners who denied the authenticity and due
execution of the agreement, they claiming that the same was without the consent and conformity of their mother, the usufructuary
owner [sic] of the land. The land registration court, finding for petitioners, denied respondents motion by Order of March 2, 1999.

Respondent thus filed on March 16, 2000 a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioners before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan, Batangas, docketed as Civil Case No. 3705, for the enforcement of petitioners obligation under the
agreement. To the complaint, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss anchored on prescription, laches and prematurity of action on
account of respondents failure to refer the case to the barangay lupon for conciliation.

On their defense of prescription, petitioners argued:

It was clearly alleged in the complaint that the purported RENUNCIATION AND TRANSFER OF CLAIMS, RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS was . . . entered into on or about May 10, 1982 a period of almost 18 LONG YEARS [BEFORE] THE PRESENT
ACTION. Under Article 1144 (1) of the New Civil Code, it is required that an action founded upon a written contract must be
broughtWITHIN TEN (10) YEARS FROM THE TIME THE RIGHT OF ACTION ACCRUES. [2] (Underscoring supplied)

Branch 9 of the Balayan RTC, by Resolution [3] dated July 12, 2000, granted petitioners motion in this wise:
The Court is of the view that immediately after the execution of the RENUNCIATION contract, herein defendants
were deemed to have renounced and transferred their rights or whatever claim they may have on the subject property and
the latter should have at once acted to make the renunciation effective by having herself substituted to petitioner in the land
registration proceedings. Her failure to make immediately effective the terms of the said RENUNCIATION was constitutive of
what is referred to as the requisite cause of action on the part of the plaintiff.
A cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been
done is done, and in cases where there is no special provision for such computation, recourse must be had to the rule that
the period must be counted from the day on which the corresponding action could have been instituted (Central Philippine
University vs. CA, 246 SCRA 511).
The fact, that, from the day immediately following the execution of the RENUNCIATION contract up to the present,
with the defendants still continuing the land registration proceedings without any substitution of plaintiff, could only be
interpreted as a clear manifestation of defendants willful violation of the claimed RENUNCIATION contract. It is quite
incorrect, therefore, to say that the violation happened only when the defendants objected that they be substituted by
plaintiff in an intervention proceedings filed by the latter.
The added fact that plaintiff did not raise this glaring violation earlier is something that eludes the comprehension of
this Court. What separates the execution of the contract and the filing of this case is a period of almost EIGHTEEN (18) long
years way beyond the prescriptive period set by law. [4] (Underscoring supplied)
On appeal by respondent, the Court of Appeals, by Decision [5] of December 4, 2003 subject of the present petition for
review on certiorari, reversed the trial courts Resolution, it holding that prescription had not yet set in. The Court of
Appeals reasoned:
x x x It is not from the date of the instrument but from the date of the breach that the period of prescription of action
starts. Since, it was only in 1996 when plaintiff-appellant moved to intervene and be substituted as the applicant in the land
registration proceeding involving the subject property that defendants-appellees raised the issue of genuineness and due
execution of the instrument, it is only from this date that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellant accrued. The period
should not be made to retroact to the date of the execution of the instrument on May 10, 1982 as claimed by the
defendants-appellees for at that time, there would be no way for the plaintiff-appellant to know of the violation of her rights.
[6]
(Underscoring supplied)

The appellate court thus ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

13

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court having been denied, the present petition for review on
certiorari was filed, faulting said court to have
I.
. . . ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT AND LABOR[ING] UNDER A GROSS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS IN
HOLDING THAT THE ACTION OF RESPONDENT HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED.
II.
. . . ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED ONLY IN 1996 WHEN SHE MOVED TO
INTERVENE AND BE SUBSTITUTED AS AN APPLICANT, IN LIEU OF PETITIONERS IN THE LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING (LRC
N-411) BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 11 OF BALAYAN, BATANGAS.
III.
. . . COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO
RETROACT TO THE DATE OF THE EXECUTION OF THE INSTRUMENT ON MAY 10, 1982.
IV.
IN.[7]

. . . ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT JUST THE SAME BY NOT FINDING THAT LACHES HAD ALREADY SET

By the earlier-quoted pertinent portions of the agreement, petitioners renounced and transferred whatever rights, interests, or claims
they had over Lot 2 in favor of respondent for and in consideration of her payment of the therein mentioned loan in the principal
amount of P19,000 which was outstanding in the name of one Guillermo C. Javier.

Articles 1458, 1498 and 1307 of the Civil Code which are pertinent to the resolution of the petition provide:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver
a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.

xxxx
Art. 1498. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of
the thingwhich is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
xxxx
Art. 1307. Innominate contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the provisions of Title I and II of this
Book,by the rules governing the most analogous nominate contracts, and by the customs of the place.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The agreement of the parties is analogous to a deed of sale in favor of respondent, it having transferred ownership for and in
consideration of her payment of the loan in the principal amount of P19,000 outstanding in the name of one Guillermo C. Javier. The
agreement having been made through a public instrument, the execution was equivalent to the delivery of the property to respondent.
[8]

In respondents complaint for specific performance, she seeks to enforce the agreement for her to be subrogated and/or substituted as
applicant in the land registration proceeding over Lot 2. The agreement is of course in consonance with Sec. 22 of P.D. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree which became effective on June 11, 1978) reading:
SEC. 22. Dealings with land pending original registration. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the
decree of registration, the land therein described may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in part, in which case the
interested party shall present to the court the pertinent instruments together with the subdivision plan approved by the
Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof, and the court, after notice to the parties, shall order such land
registered subject to the conveyance or encumbrance created by said instruments, or order that the decree of registration
be issued in the name of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. (Underscoring supplied)

14

In Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,[9] this Court, passing on Sec. 29 of Art. No. 496, as amended (Land Registration Act), which is
substantially incorporated in the immediately-quoted Sec. 22 of the Property Registration Decree, held:
The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the buyer or the
person to whom the property has been conveyed for the applicant. Neither does it require that the buyer or the
person to whom the property has been conveyed be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to the
land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the
interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice
be given to the parties to the case. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

In light of the law and jurisprudence, the substitution by respondent of petitioners as applicant in the land registration case over Lot 2
is not even necessary. All respondent has to do is to comply with the requirements under the above-quoted Sec. 22 of the Property
Registration Decree. Ergo, it was unnecessary for respondent to file the case for specific performance subject of the present petition
against petitioners to honor their agreement allowing her to be substituted in their stead as applicant in the land registration
proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of respondent,

docketed by the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas as Civil Case No. 3705, Corazon Caoibes-Pantoja is, in light of the foregoing
ratiocination, DISMISSED.
REPUBLIC vs VDA DE NERI

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50139 affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, which, in turn, dismissed the petitioners
complaint for the annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0662 and reversion. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside
is the appellate courts Resolution dated August 4, 1999, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are summarized as follows:
Lot 2821, Plan (LRC) SWO-150, approved by the Land Registration Commission, is a parcel of land with an area of 105.568 hectares
located along the Cagayan de Oro River in Sitio Taguanao, Indahag, Cagayan de Oro City. On September 3, 1973, the Bureau of Forest
Development certified that the property was alienable and disposable. 2 On July 24, 1974, the heirs of Graciano Neri, Sr. 3 filed an
application with the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, docketed
as Land Registration Case No. N-531, LRC Record No. 46236. They alleged, inter alia, thus:
1. That applicants GRACIANO B. NERI, JR. is of legal age, married to VICTORIA BABIERA, Filipino and residing at 833 Recto Avenue,
Cagayan de Oro City; JOSEFINA B. VDA. [DE] NERI is of legal age, widow of GRACIANO A. NERI, Filipino and residing at 833 Recto
Avenue, Cagayan de Oro City; VICTORIA N. FERNANDEZ is of legal age, married to MARIO FERNANDEZ, Filipino and residing at 832
Recto Avenue, Cagayan de Oro City; RAMON B. NERI is of legal age, single, Filipino and residing at 833 Recto Avenue, Cagayan de Oro
City; and MA. TERESA N. YRASTORZA is of legal age, married to ALBERT YRASTORZA, Filipino and residing at 833-Y Recto Avenue,
Cagayan de Oro City, hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act,
and to have the title thereto registered and confirmed;
2. That the applicants are the owners in fee simple of a certain parcel of land situated at Barrio Indahag in the City of Cagayan de Oro,
the said land bounded and described on the plan and technical description, attached hereto and made a part hereof;
3. That said land at the last assessment for taxation was assessed for P33,820.00;
4. That applicants do not know of any mortgage or encumbrances affecting the said land, or that any other person has any estate or
interest therein legal or equitable possession, remainder, reversion or expectance;
5. That applicants obtained title on said property by virtue of intestate succession from the late GRACIANO A. NERI who died on
December 20, 1971 in the City of Cagayan de Oro;
6. That applicants herein together with their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, peaceful, adverse, and continuous
possession in the concept of owners and have been paying taxes thereon;

15

7. That the said land is legally occupied by the following persons together with their families in the concept of Tenants, namely:
a) PEDRO CABALUNA residing at Indahag, Tibasak, Cagayan de Oro City
b) CERELO BADETAH residing at Indahag, Tibasak, Cagayan de Oro City
8. That the names and addresses so far as known to applicants of the owners of all land adjoining the land above-mentioned are as
follows:
a) JOSE F. MARFORI of Cagayan de Oro City
b) INSULAR GOVERNMENT of the PHILIPPINES
c) CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY (Cagayan River)
9. This application is accompanied by the following documents:
a) Tracing plan of the lot together with a blue print copy thereof;
b) Technical description of the land;
c) Tax Declarations:
1. T.D. No. 1096
2. T.D. No. 22280
3. T.D. No. 10964
4. T.D. No. 81439
10. That by the application of Sections: 47, 48, 49, 50, and 51 of Com. Act 141 as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 107, 1942, 2061 and
2036, this application is in order and the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court exist and can be exercised in connection with this instant
application.4
The applicants prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that after due notice, the validity of the alleged title or claim be
inquired into and after due hearing an order be issued directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree
over the said parcel of land so that a Certificate of Title be issued in favor of the applicants under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act.
Prays for other relief in the premises. 5
The applicants thereafter filed an amended application in the same case on December 17, 1974. On January 27, 1975, the Court,
through the Land Registration Commission, issued a notice of initial hearing addressed, among others, to the Director of the Bureau of
Lands, the Solicitor General, and the Bureau of Forest Development. 6 The notice was published in the February 17 and 24, 1975 issues
of the Official Gazette. Copies thereof were sent by ordinary mail to the persons named therein; the copies intended for the Director of
the Bureau of Lands and the Office of the Solicitor General were sent by special messenger. 7 The Solicitor General and the Director of
the Bureau of Lands failed to file any opposition thereto.
On the designated time and date of the hearing, no representative from the Office of the Solicitor General and the Bureau of Lands
appeared in court. The court granted the motion of the applicants for an order of general default "against the whole world," except
those who filed their opposition or appeared during the hearing. The court thereafter issued an order allowing the applicants to
adduce evidence ex parte.
On February 5, 1976, the court rendered judgment granting the application. The Office of the Solicitor General, as well as the Director
of the Bureau of Lands, failed to appeal the same. Thus, the court issued Decree No. N-361749, on the basis of which OCT No. 0662
was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City on September 26, 1976.
On January 5, 1981, the Office of the Solicitor General, for and in behalf of the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the
Director of the Bureau of Lands, filed with the court a quo a complaint for annulment of OCT No. 0662 and the reversion of the
property covered by the said title against herein respondents. 8 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7514.
In its complaint, the petitioner alleged inter alia that it is the true owner of a parcel of land of the public domain surveyed as Lot No.
2821 (subject lot) containing an area of 1,055,684 square meters or 105.5684 hectares situated in Cagayan de Oro City. 9 The

16

petitioner also alleged that the Bureau of Forest and Development had classified the subject lot as alienable and disposable; as such,
it was under the direct executive control, administration and disposition of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Despite the fact that
the Solicitor General and the Director of the Bureau of Lands were not served copies of the respondents application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title in LRC Case No. N-531, in violation of Section 51 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the said case was set
for initial hearing on June 18, 1975. The petitioner also averred that although the survey plan of the subject lot, Plan (LRC) SWO-150,
was processed and approved by the Land Registration Commission, it was not submitted to the Director of the Bureau of Lands for reverification and approval as required by Sections 2 and 3 of Presidential Decree No. 239. As such, according to the petitioner, the
court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the property.
The petitioner prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered nullifying the proceedings in LRC No. N-531, as well as the
courts decision therein, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as well as the property subject matter of the case.
According to the petitioner, this is in view of the courts failure to comply with Section 51 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which
mandates that a copy of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title should be duly served on the Director of the Bureau
of Lands; and the private respondents failure to comply with Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239, which requires the plan to be re-verified
and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, in this case, Plan (LRC) SWO-150. The petitioner prayed OCT No. 0662 issued in
favor of the private respondents be declared null and void.
In their answer, the private respondents averred that the subject lot had been theirs and their predecessors private and exclusive
property for more than fifty years, and that OCT No. 0662 covering the same was issued in their favor on September 20, 1976. The
private respondents contended that the duty to comply with the requirement under Section 51 of CA No. 141, that the Solicitor
General through the Director of the Bureau of Lands be served a copy of the application for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title, devolved upon the clerk of court of the land registration court. They also averred that a report on the pre-verification
and approval of Plan (LRC) SWO-150 had been forwarded by the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands to the Director of the Bureau
of Lands. Moreover, Plan (LRC) SWO-150 covering the subject lot had been duly processed and approved by the Land Registration
Commission. According to the respondents, even if there were deficiencies on the part of the administrative officials in complying with
the procedures relative to land registration, the same was not jurisdictional, but merely a procedural flaw. As such, the failure of the
Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission to comply with the law did not result in nullifying the proceedings in LRC Case
No. N-531. Finally, the respondents countered, the action of the petitioner had long since prescribed.
In its reply, the petitioner alleged that Plan (LRC) SWO-150 was never submitted, much less approved, to the Director of the Bureau of
Lands. The report required by Section 2 of P.D. No. 239 is one which the Director of the Bureau of Lands actually submitted to the
court. The petitioner alleged that no such report was submitted in this case.
On October 16, 1976, the private respondents filed a motion in LRC Case No. N-531 for the issuance of a writ of possession and the
demolition of the houses of the occupants. The court granted the motion. The Director of the Bureau of Lands, likewise, prayed for the
suspension of the enforcement of the writ pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 7514. The court refused to suspend the
enforcement of its decision.
On November 19, 1981, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Director of the Bureau of Lands, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 58823, with the following prayer:
1. Declaring as null and void the decision rendered by the court in Land Registration Case as plan (LRC) Swo-150, Cagayan de Oro
City, in favor of the private defendants;
2. Declaring as null and void the corresponding Decree No. N-361749 and Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 issued by the same
court in favor of the private defendants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 issued in the name of the
private defendants;
4. Ordering the reversion of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 to the State and declaring the same as owned
and belonging to the latter; and
5. Awarding such further reliefs and remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises. 10
On March 18, 1985, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition without prejudice to the outcome of the petitioners action
against the private respondents in Civil Case No. 7514. The decision of the Court became final and executory.
On July 17, 1985, Leonel Valdehuesa and 22 others filed a motion for leave to intervene, and alleged, as follows: (a) They were
members of the Cagayan de Oro Green Revolution Movement Association (COGREMA); (b) They had been occupying the property
even before 1969 and commenced working extensive improvements thereon in 1969; (c) They filed a petition with the Presidential
Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) in 1973, and sought the subdivision of the property and the distribution of the lots to
the occupants thereof; and, (d) As occupants, they were never informed of Graciano Neris application in LRC Case No. N-531. The
intervenors prayed that OCT No. 0662 be nullified.
In an Order dated September 6, 1985, the court a quo dismissed the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention for lack of
jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the CFI in LRC No. N-531, in view of the promulgation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. However, on
petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner, docketed as G.R. No. 72218, this Court, in its Resolution dated July 21, 1986, set aside the
said order and directed the court a quo to proceed with the hearing of the case. 11
In the meantime, the court issued an Order on April 6, 1988 denying the said motion for leave to intervene. The court later denied the
motion for the reconsideration of the said order. Thereafter, Undersecretary and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands Rolleo

17

Ignacio executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Atty. Vicente Seria of the Office of the Regional Director of the Bureau of
Lands to represent the petitioner during the pre-trial. 12
During the hearing of March 27, 1989, the parties agreed to forego a full-blown trial and to instead file their respective "Memorandum
of Authority" and to submit evidence in support of their respective contentions. The court issued an order on the said date, giving the
parties thirty days to submit their respective memoranda and evidence.
The petitioner submitted its memorandum, appending thereto the documents marked respectively as follows:
1) Exhibit A The Certification made by the Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Directors Office for Forestry that the property had been
certified on September 3, 1973 as alienable and disposable. 13
2) Exhibit B The letter of the representatives of the Philippine Constabulary Provincial Commander and those of the Bureau of Lands,
Bureau of Forest Development, and Department of Agrarian Reform to the Provincial Commander that there were 73 bona fide tillers
on the property seeking to have the property subdivided and distributed to them. 14
3) Exhibit C The Letter dated October 3, 1977 from the Chief, Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands directing the District Land
Officer of Cagayan de Oro to submit a report within two days from notice thereof on the letter of the occupants requesting for the
subdivision of the property, viz.:
Considering the urgency of the case, you are hereby directed to submit the report within five (5) days from receipt hereof. In your
report you should state whether the copy of the petition for registration was received by that Office considering that the case has
come into your knowledge and if so, the date of its receipt thereof, and why the same has not been forwarded to us immediately. You
should also secure a certification from the District Forest Office regarding the date of release of the area from the forest zone, as it
appears that the land was only released on September 13, 1973. This information is necessary to determine whether the applicant
has acquired a registerable title to the land.15
4) Exhibit D The Report dated July 15, 1975 of the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission and Acting Chief, Division of
Original Registration of the Land Registration Commission to the Court in LRC Case No. N-531. Thus:
That a certain parcel of land described on plan LRC Swo-1507, Lot 2821, Cagayan Cadastre 237, Case 1, is applied for registration of
title in the above-entitled land registration case;
That upon verification of our Record of Cadastral Lots, Book No. 64, under Cad. Court Case No. 17, LRC (GLRO) Cadastral Record No.
1561, Cagayan Cadastre, Province of Misamis Oriental, it was found that said Lot 2821 is subject of the following annotations, to
quote:
"Lot 2821 (129-1) Pte. de Subd. Parte Public Land."
That it is gleaned from the aforequoted annotations that a decision has been rendered for said Lot 2821 in cadastral proceedings
under Cad. Court Case No. 17, LRC (GLRO) Cadastral Record No. 1561, Cagayan Cadastre, Province of Misamis Oriental, but no decree
of registration has been issued for said lot pursuant to the decision rendered in the aforementioned cadastral case. Copy, however, of
said decision is not among our salvaged records. It likewise appears in the above annotations that Lot 2821 is pending subdivision and
that portion of the same was declared public land;
That it is further informed that this Commission is not in a position to verify whether the land described on plan Swo-1507, Lot 2821,
Cagayan Cadastre 237, Case 1, subject of this application for registration is already covered by a patent previously issued or within
the forest zone.16
5) Exhibit E The application in LRC Case No. N-531.17
6) Exhibit F Photographs showing the Taguanao District Elementary School which stood on a portion of the subject property, to prove
that more than 300 hundred families resided on the property and that its occupants had made extensive improvements thereon.
For their part, the private respondents appended to their memorandum documentary evidence marked as follows:

Exhibit
No.

Brief Description

Tax Declaration No. 10994 covering 1948 Lot 2821-C-1 with an

area of 101.5618

2 to 2G

Tax receipts over lots from 193819

Letter of Commissioner of Land Registration to the Court dated

October 31, 1974 acknowledging receipts of the duplicate records
of the application and its answer in LRC Case No. N-531 20

18

Notice of Initial Hearing in LRC Case No. N-531 dated January 27,
197521

Certificate of Publication from Land Registration Commission dated

March 24, 197522

Letter of Land Registration Commission to counsel of applicants

dated March 12, 197523

Report of Land Registration Commission 24

Letter of the Geodetic Engineer dated July 20, 1973, to the

respondents25

Letter of the Administrative Assistant of the District Lands Office to

the Bureau of Lands through the District Land Office dated June 3,
1975.

On January 31, 1995, the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove the
factual averments therein. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the above, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the Republic of the
Philippines:
1. Dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled case and no pronouncement will be made on the civil aspect herein as the answer
did not claim any damages, etc.;
2. Declaring as valid and legal all the proceedings taken by the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch 1, regarding OCT
No. 0662;
3. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 issued on September 20, 1976 involved herein;
4. Declaring the order for issuance of a decree to issue Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 as valid and lawful; and
5. Costs against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.26
The trial court declared that the requisite copies of the notice of initial hearing had been transmitted to the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Bureau of Lands as confirmed by Josefina Bacarusso, the incumbent Branch Clerk of Court when LRC Case No. N-531
was being heard. The court further stated that the petitioner failed to adduce at least prima facie evidence to prove the material
allegations of the complaint. The presumption, then, the trial court declared, was that the personnel of Branch 1 of the CFI and the
officers of the Bureau of Lands performed their duties in accordance with law, there being no evidence to the contrary. The court even
noted the fact that the petitioner, through counsel, agreed to dispense with the trial and to submit the case for decision after the
submission of the parties respective memoranda and documentary evidence.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that:
I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING SOLELY ON PRESUMPTIONS AS THE BASIS OF ITS DECISION.
II. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT HOLDING A TRIAL AND GIVING AN OPPORTUNITY TO
APPELLANT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE.27
The Office of the Solicitor General alleged that the trial court acted arbitrarily when it rendered judgment based on the pleadings
notwithstanding the following factual issues that were raised by the parties:

APPELLANTS
POSITION

APPELLEES POSITION

1. Service of copy of application and its

annexes to the Director of Lands

No compliance

The Clerk of Court complied or is supposed to comply therewith

2. Service of copy of application and its

annexes to the Solicitor General

No compliance

The Clerk of Court complied or is supposed to comply therewith

3. Submission of the survey plan to the

Director of Lands for reverification and

No compliance

The survey plan has been duly processed and approved by the
Land Registration Commission

FACTUAL ISSUES

19

approval
4. Submission of the report by the Director of
Lands

No compliance

A Report has been made to the Director of Lands, Manila by the

Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands in Cagayan de Oro 28

The Office of the Solicitor General contends that the trial court should have conducted a full-blown trial instead of allowing the parties
to forego with the same. The private respondents, for their part, admitted that the Land Registration Commissions survey plan had
not been re-evaluated much less approved, by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. They averred, however, that the same was merely
a procedural defect.29
On April 29, 1999, the CA rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the CFI holding that: (a) the petitioner failed to prove the material
allegations of its complaint; and, (b) the personnel of the CFI and the Land Registration Commission are presumed to have performed
their duties as the law mandated.30 The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
The petitioner filed its petition for review on certiorari praying that the court resolve the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN AFFIRMING THE APPEALED JUDGMENT DATED JANUARY 31, 1995, COMMITTED GRAVE
ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
AND THE PARTIES IN LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 531, COURT (SIC) ON THE BASIS OF THE DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY OF PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL ACTS (SECTION 3[m], Rule 131 OF THE RULES OF COURT).
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE APPEALED JUDGMENT DATED
JANUARY 31, 1995 NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT WAS RENDERED WITHOUT A TRIAL. 31
In their comment on the petition, the private respondents assert that the issues raised by the petitioner pertain merely to factual
matters and not to questions of law. Furthermore, as shown by the records of Branch 1 of the CFI in LRC Case No. N-531, the petitioner
received a copy of the application, the amended application, as well as the notice of the initial hearing of the case.
The threshold issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether or not the Court may review the decision of the appellate court on the
issues raised herein; (b) whether the RTC erred in rendering the decision without a full-blown trial, based solely on the pleadings of the
parties and the documents appended to their memorandum; and (c) whether the decision of the trial court was made in accordance
with law.
On the first issue, the rule is that only questions of law may be reviewed in this Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. However, it has also been held that the finding of facts of the appellate court may be questioned in this
Court, where as in this case, the latters judgment is based on a misapprehension of the facts, or such findings are contrary to the
admissions of the parties, or when certain relevant facts are overlooked, which, if property considered, would justify a different
conclusion.32
In this case, the petitioner avers that the trial court erred when it rendered a decision without conducting a full-blown trial, and based
its ruling merely on the pleadings of the parties and the documents appended to their respective memoranda. The petitioner asserts
that under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the court may render judgment on the pleadings only when the respondents answer fails to
tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings. Furthermore, it was not proper for the
trial court to render summary judgment under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that the private respondents, in
their answer, tendered genuine issues of fact which called for the presentation of evidence.
We do not agree with the petitioner. The trial court dispensed with a full-blown trial because, precisely, the parties themselves agreed
thereto, on the claim that the issues raised may be resolved on the basis of the pleadings, the memoranda and the appended
documents, without need of presenting witnesses thereon. A party may waive its right to present testimonial evidence and opt to
adduce documentary evidence and thereafter, submit the case for resolution based solely on their pleadings and documentary
evidence. In this case, no less than the petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General through Special Attorney Vicente
Seria, agreed to dispense with a full-blown trial.
On the second issue, we agree with the petitioner that the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the private respondents
and that the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the same.
The CA ruled that the petitioner was burdened to prove that the issuance of OCT-0662 was marred by irregularities. It further held that
a title issued under the torrens system of registration is presumed valid, and unless and until the petitioner adduced competent and
strong evidence to prove otherwise, government officials such as the personnel of the CFI and the Land Registration Commission and
the Director of the Bureau of Lands are presumed to have performed their duties in accordance with law. According to the CA, the
petitioner failed to adduce such evidence. The appellate court took note that the private respondents even appended documentary
evidence to their memorandum showing compliance with the statutory requirement.
For its part, the petitioner contends that as defendants in the trial court, it was the burden of the private respondents to prove the
existence of a fact that the land registration court had acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition and over the
persons of the respondent therein; conversely, the private respondents, as applicants therein, were obliged to adduce in evidence the
survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands as required by P.D. Nos. 239 and 1529. According to the petitioner, there
is no presumption in favor of the jurisdiction of a court of limited jurisdiction, such as a land registration court. It contends that where
the jurisdiction of a court depends upon the existence of facts, it has no right or power to proceed or act upon a pleading which does
not substantially set forth such facts.

20

We find for the petitioner. As applicants in LRC Case No. N-531, the private respondents had the burden of complying with the
statutory requirement of serving the Director of the Bureau of Lands with a copy of their application and amended application, and to
show proof of their compliance thereon. However, we also agree with the CA that it was the burden of the petitioner in the trial court
to prove the material allegations of its complaint. This is provided in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
Obviously, the burden of proof is, in the first instance, with the plaintiff who initiated the action. But in the final analysis, the party
upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the defendant. The test for
determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show
the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain, 33 and based on the result of an inquiry, which party would be successful
if he offers no evidence. 34
In ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint which are denied by the
defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving the material allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter. All facts
in issue and relevant facts must, as a general rule, be proven by evidence except the following:
(1) Allegations contained in the complaint or answer immaterial to the issues.
(2) Facts which are admitted or which are not denied in the answer, provided they have been sufficiently alleged.
(3) Those which are the subject of an agreed statement of facts between the parties; as well as those admitted by the party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case.
(4) Facts which are the subject of judicial notice.
(5) Facts which are legally presumed.
(6) Facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party. 35
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case
created thereby which if no proof to the contrary is offered will prevail; it does not shift the burden of proof. 36 In this case, the
personnel of the Land Registration Commission and the CFI in LRC Case No. N-531 are presumed to have performed their duty of
serving a copy of the application and its appendages to the petitioner. It was thus the burden of the petitioner to prove that: (a) it was
not served with a copy of the application of the private respondents and its annexes; (b) the private respondents failed to append to
their application the survey plan of Lot No. 2821, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands as required by P.D. Nos. 1529
and 239. Unless the same were admitted by the respondents, the petitioner should have adduced in evidence the relevant portions of
the records of LRC Case No. N-531, including the decision of the trial court, to prove that the Director of the Bureau of Lands was not
served with a copy of the application and the amended application. 37
Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
SEC. 13. Proof of service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official return of the
server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by
ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If
service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the
certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Such proof of service should be found in the records of the case in which the application/amended application was filed, in this case,
LRC Case No. N-531. The same records will also show whether or not the private respondents appended the survey plan duly approved
by the Director of the Bureau of Lands to their application, as mandated by P.D. Nos. 1529 and 239, and whether the private
respondents adduced the said plan in evidence.
The petitioner should have moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for the Clerk of Court of Branch 1 of the RTC to bring to
the court the records of LRC Case No. N-531 to prove the material allegations of its complaint. The petitioner did not.
The question that comes to fore then is whether or not the petitioner was burdened to prove its allegation that the Director of the
Bureau of Lands had approved Plan (LRC) SWO-150. The answer to the question is dependent on the resolution of the issue of whether
or not the private respondents admitted the same, impliedly or expressly, in their answer to the complaint and in their pleadings.
A careful perusal of the records reveals that in paragraph 8 of its complaint, the petitioner alleged that the survey plan, Plan (LRC)
SWO-150 was not submitted to the Director of the Bureau of Lands for re-verification and approval as required by law, notwithstanding
which the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the applicants. Hence, the petitioner concluded, the said plan is void:
8. That the survey plan of the land applied for in said registration case, plan (LRC) SWO-150, is a plan processed and approved by the
Land Registration Commission, but the same plan was not submitted to the Director of Lands for re-verification and approval as
required by the provision of Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 239, series of 1973. Hence, the plan (LRC) Swo-150 submitted with the
application should be considered as void and non-existing. Furthermore, on February 5, 1976, the said land registration court, after

21

receiving the evidence of the applicants ex parte, rendered its decision in the land registration case without requiring the Director of
Lands to submit his report as required by the provision of Section 3 of the same Presidential Decree No. 239; 38
In paragraph 4 of their answer to the complaint, the private respondents denied the foregoing allegation in paragraph 8, but alleged
as follows:
4. That defendants DENY the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that the survey plan has been
duly processed and approved by the Land Registration Commission. As regards the Report required by the provisions of Section 3 of
PD 239, the records show that a Report has been made to the Director of Lands, Manila, by the Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands
in Cagayan de Oro City. Moreover, the deficiencies of the administrative officials of the government in following procedures or rules
and implementing circulars relative to land registration cases, if any, is not a ground for voiding the title already issued since the
defect, if any, is not jurisdictional but merely procedural in nature. Besides, the fault or omission, if any, is that of the Land
Registration Commission and the Director of Lands and not that of the defendants; 39
The private respondents failed to specifically deny the petitioners averment in its complaint that LRC Plan SWO-150 had not been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. The private respondents thereby impliedly admitted that the Director of the Bureau
of Lands had not approved any survey plan as required by Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 239. 40
In light of the private respondents admission, the petitioner was relieved of its burden of still proving that the Director of the Bureau
of Lands had not approved any survey plan of Lot 2821 before the trial court rendered its decision.
We reject the contention of the private respondents that the reevaluation and approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands of the
survey plan are not mandatory requirements and that the lack thereof did not render Original Certificate of Title No. 0662 void. Case
law has it that it is not the function of the Land Registration Commission to approve original plans. 41 The duty devolved upon the
Director of the Bureau of Lands, as mandated by Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Applicants for land registration are required to append a
survey plan to their application, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, thus:
Sec. 17. What and where to file. The application for land registration shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or
city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file together with the application all original muniments of titles or copies thereof
and a survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands.
The submission of the plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands is a statutory requirement which is mandatory in nature.
The plan approved by the Land Registration Commission is of no value. 42 It behooved the trial court not to take cognizance of any
application for land registration in the absence of a survey plan duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands appended
thereto. The private respondents admitted that the Director of the Bureau of Lands had not approved any survey plan for Lot No.
2821. Consequently, the title issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of the private respondents is null and void. Such title cannot
ripen into private ownership. As we held in a recent case: 43
No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands. The submission of the
plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director
of Lands, the same are of no value.
Thus, the allegation that the signature approval for the survey plan was nowhere to be found is an important jurisdictional fact that
must be ventilated before the trial court. In Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court stated that "void ab initio land titles
issued cannot ripen into private ownership." Thus, as OCT No. 17 is void and Segundina traces her rights to OCT No. 17, her claim
would have no basis as a spring cannot rise higher than its source.
We also reject the private respondents submission that they should not be faulted for the failure of the Director of the Bureau of
Lands to act on and resolve the recommendation of its Regional Director. The private respondents were mandated to comply with the
requirements of P.D. No. 1529 with fealty before they filed their application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in the court a
quo.
Parenthetically, the evidence of the petitioner shows that the private respondents failed to append a survey plan duly approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands to their application. 44
The records show that on October 3, 1977, or after the CFI had rendered judgment in LRC Case No. N-531, the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Lands directed the District Land Officer to report if the applicants in LRC Case No. N-531 had already furnished a copy to his
office and, if so, to explain why the same had not been forwarded to the Regional Office. 45 In fine, as of October 3, 1977, the copy of
the application of the private respondents in LRC No. N-531 had not been forwarded to the Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands.
Indeed, it appears, based on the evidence of the parties, that the trial court even ignored the Report of the Land Registration
Commission dated July 15, 1975 in LRC Case No. N-531 requiring the Directors of the Bureau of Lands and Forestry to submit a status
report of Lot No. 2821 before setting the case for hearing:
WHEREFORE, this matter is brought to the attention of this Honorable Court for its information and guidance in the disposition of the
instant land registration case. Further, to avoid duplication in the issuance of titles covering the same parcel of land and the issuance
of titles for lands within the forest zone which have not been released and classified as alienable, it is respectfully recommended that
the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, respectively, be required to submit a report on the status of the land applied for,
before the hearing of the case, to determine whether said land or any portion thereof is comprised in any patent or forest zone. 46
In recapitulation, then, the CFI committed a reversible error in dismissing the petitioners complaint and in not rendering judgment in
favor of the petitioner. In turn, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the CFI.

22

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Court of First Instance in Civil
Case No. 7514 is SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The Decision of the Court of First Instance appealed from is also SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED. The Court hereby nullifies Original Certificate of Title No. 6662 under the names of the private respondents and orders the
reversion of the property covered by the said title to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DIVINA vs CA
Before us is a petition for review of the decision [1] dated October 27, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03068 reversing
and setting aside the judgment dated July 7, 1979 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II, in LRC Case No. N-147.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Lot No. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Antonio Berosa. On July 22, 1960, he sold it to Teotimo Berosa. The
portion is particularly described as:
A parcel of land unirrigated situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, with an area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000)
square meters and bounded on the North by Lot #1464 - Fausto Ayson and Lot #1888 - Gloria Fajardo: on the East, by Lot # 1446 Silverio Garcia: on the South, by Lot #1891 - Antonio Escobedo and on the West, by Lot #1880 - Federico Faronas and Lot #1890 Eugenia Espedido. Cadastral concrete posts are the visible signs of boundary. It has no permanent improvement
thereon. Designated as Lot 1893 of Antonio Berosa. Declared under Tax No. 13038, valued at P760.00 for the current year in the
name of ANTONIO BEROSA[2]
On March 23, 1961, the Berosa spouses sold the same Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos. In the deed of sale to Gamos, the lot was more
particularly described as:
A parcel of RICE land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, with an area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square
meters and bounded on the North, by Lot #1462 - Fausto Ayson and Lot #1888 - Gloria F. Estonante: on the East, by Lot #1464
Zacarias Espadilla; and Lot #1466 - Felix Arimado; on the South, by Lot #1898 - Silverio Garcia; and on the West, by Lot #1890 Eugenia Espedido and Lot #1892 - Antonio Escobedo. Concrete cements posts are the visible signs of boundary. No permanent
improvements thereon. Covered by Lot #1893 of Teotimo E. Berosa, anddeclared under Tax No. 13039, valued at P760.00 for the
present year in the name of TEOTIMO E. BEROSA.[3]
On April 26, 1960, Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix Arimado, a boundary owner of Lot 1893, a 20,687 sq. m. parcel of land
identified as Lot 1466, also in Gubat. It adjoins Lot 1893. On March 28, 1961, Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax
Declaration No. 13237 and declared it had a total area of 4.0867 hectares. He also had the property resurveyed by private land
surveyor Antonio Tiotangco. In 1967, Tax Declaration No. 13237 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 9032 in Gamos name.
The re-survey plan (AP-9021), of Lots 1466 and 1893 conducted on June 16, 1961 for Gamos, showed that the consolidated properties
contained atotal area of 100,034 sq. m. This plan was approved on July 12, 1961 by the Acting Director of Lands.
On November 23, 1968, Tax Declaration No. 12927 which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 9032 was secured by Gamos and declared
therein that the area of the consolidated property was 10.0034 hectares with 2500 sq. m. planted to coconut, 3.8187 irrigated for rice
planting and 5.9347 were thickets.
On January 19, 1967, Teotimo Berosa conveyed to Vicente G. Divina, herein petitioner, a portion of Lot 1893 referred to as Lot 1893B. It is described as follows:
A parcel of dry and thicket land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, having an area of 54,818 square meters and
bounded on the N., by Lot 1888 (Inocencio Eroe); Lot 1887 (Jaime Enaje); and Lot 1462 (Heirs of Zacarias Espadilla); on the (Illegible),
by Lot 1466; on the SE, by Lot 1893-A; on the S., by Lot 1898 (Heirs of Silverio Garcia); on the E., by Lot 1892 (Antonio Escobedo) and
Lot 1890 (Eugenia Espedido); and on the NE, by Lot 1889 (Pedro Fajardo); all of Gubat Cadastre. NOTE: This lot is designed as Lot
1893-B, a portion of Lot 1893, Cad 308-D. [4]
On November 28, 1968, two years from the date of said sale and five (5) days after November 23, 1968, when Gamos secured Tax
Declaration No. 12927 declaring the consolidated property as containing 100,034 sq. m., the deed of sale was registered. An
undated Subdivision PLAN of Lot 1893, was prepared for petitioner. The plan, without Bureau of Lands approval, showed that Lot
1893 was divided into two, Lot 1893-A and Lot 1893-B.
On July 24, 1970 Gamos sold the consolidated property to private respondent Vilma Gajo-Sy, for P20,000.00. The land was
particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land located at San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, under Tax Declaration No. 12927 in the name of Jose P. Gamos, covered by
Lots No. 1466 and 1893 of the Gubat Cadastre, with an area of 100,034 sq. m., more or less. [5]
On July 29, 1970, Tax Declaration No. 13768 secured by private respondent, was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 12509.

23

On August 28, 1972, she filed an application for registration of title to the property at the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon,
docketed as LRC Case No. N-147, GLRO Record No. 42920. The application was amended on March 8, 1973, on order of Branch II of
the said court to include therein the postal address of Inocencio Erpe, adjoining owner of Lot No. 1893 described in Plan AP-9021.
The land registration court, by Decision of July 29, 1975, ordered the registration of private respondents title over Lots Nos. 1466 and
1893.
On July 13, 1977, pending issuance of the final decree of registration petitioner filed before the same court a Petition for Review of the
July 29, 1975 judgment. He alleged that he is the owner of a portion of Lot 1893 consisting of 54,818 sq. m. conveyed to him by
Teotimo Berosa on January 19, 1967; that he was unaware of the registration proceedings on Lot 1893 due to private respondents
failure to give him notice and post any notice in the subject lot; and that private respondent fraudulently misrepresented herself as
the owner of the disputed portion despite her knowledge that another person had acquired the same.
Private respondent opposed the petition alleging that the registration case had long become final and the court no longer had any
jurisdiction thereon; and that lack of personal notice to the petitioner of the registration proceedings did not constitute actual fraud.
The trial court, in its Decision [6] dated June 7, 1979, found that the petition for review was timely filed. It also ruled that the failure of
private respondent to include a known claimant in her application for registration constituted deliberate misrepresentation that the
lot subject of her application is not contested when in fact it was. Private respondent, according to the trial court, should have
included in her application at least the person of petitioners cousin, Elena Domalaon who had, before respondent filed her
application for registration, made known to the latters sister her apprehension of their land being included in respondents
application for registration. This misrepresentation, according to the court, amounted to fraud within the contemplation of Section 38
of Act 496.[7] The trial court in its decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Setting aside the Decision rendered in the land registration case and revoking the order for the issuance of a Decree;
(b) Declaring petitioner Vicente G. Divina the owner of the portion of the land applied for containing an area of 54,818 square
meters which is described in paragraph 3 of the Petition for Review of Judgment; and
(c) Allowing this land registration case to proceed as to the portion applied for which is outside the limits of the portion herein
awarded to the petitioner Vicente G. Divina; and
(d) Ordering a subdivision survey of the lots applied for, delimiting therein the area not contested and which is registrable in
favor of applicant Vilma Gajo-Sy, and the area herein adjudicated to petitioner Vicente G. Divina, as to whom the land
registration proceedings shall likewise be allowed to proceed after he shall have adduced such other evidence as are appropriate
in land registration cases.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Private respondent assailed the decision of the trial court before the Court of Appeals. It averred that the trial court erred (1) in
declaring petitioner-appellee owner of a portion of Lot 1893, in ordering a subdivision survey, and allowing petitioner-appellee to
proceed with registration after adducing evidence as are appropriate; (2) in declaring respondent-appellant guilty of actual fraud in
the land registration case; (3) in taking cognizance of the petition for review of judgment, setting aside the decision dated June 29,
1975, and revoking the order of the issuance of the final decree in the land registration case; and (4) in not dismissing the petition for
review of judgment with cost.[9]
The CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the petition. It ruled:
In the case at bar, petitioner-appellee did not indeed appear in the survey plan as an adjoining owner of the subject property. Neither
was he a known claimant or possessor of the questioned portion of Lot 1893 which was found by the court a quo to be untouched and
thickly planted with bigaho. Afortiori, there was no need to mention in the application for registration the apprehension or claim of at
least petitioner-appellees cousin Evelyn (sic) Domalaon in the application for registration, nor to personally notify Elena about
registration proceeding.
There could, therefore, have been no misrepresentation in any form on the part of respondent-appellee.
xxx
There being no extrinsic or collateral fraud attendant to the registration of the property in the name of respondent-appellee, We find it
unnecessary to discuss the rest of the assigned errors. Suffice it to state that Lot 1893 bought by Teotimo Berosa which he sold to
Jose P. Gamos who in turn sold it to respondent-appellee in 1970 was designated by boundaries in such a manner as to put its identity
beyond doubt; that the total area of Lot 1893 lot was determined after a resurvey/relocation was conducted for Gamos in 1961 the
result of which is reflected in the Plan approved by the Bureau of Lands also in 1961; that what really defines a piece of land is not the
area but the boundaries therein laid down (Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 Edition, p. 213); that the Lot 1893-B
sold to petitioner-appellee made no mention of any tax declaration covering it, unlike the different deeds of sale covering Lot 1893,
thereby raising the presumption that Lot 1893-B was really part of the Lot 1893 sold by Gamos to respondent-appellant; and that
the subdivision of Lot 1893 into Lots A and B, caused to be made by petitioner-appellee who claims Lot 1893-B to have
been the Lot 1893-B subject of the January 19, 1967 Deed of Sale in his favor which was registered on November 28, 1968, appears
to have been made in 1977, ten years from the date of said deed of sale, a confirmation that there was no such Lot 1893-B subject

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of his purchase in 1967; and in any event, as the subdivision survey prepared for petitioner-appellee was not approved by the Bureau
of Lands, it is not of much value (vide Flores vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 512 [1910]).
In fine, not all the basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of the judgment rendered in the land registration case
in respondent-appellants favor are present. The present appeal is thus meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another rendered DISMISSING petitioner-appellees
petition at the court a quo.[10]
Hence, the present petition. Petitioner now assails the reversal of the Court of Appeals of the trial court decision. In substance, he
raises the primary issue of whether or not, there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting actual fraud on private respondents
part when she failed to give or post notice to petitioner of her application for registration of the contested land, such that it was error
for the trial court to declare private respondent owner of the disputed land.
Prefatorily, on the timeliness of the petition for review of judgment, we have repeatedly said that the adjudication in a registration of a
cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of then final decree. As long
as the final decree is not issued, and the one year within which it may be revised had not elapsed, the decision remains under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing may set aside the decision or decree or
adjudicate the land to another party. [11] In the present case, a certification was issued by the Land Registration Commission that no
final decree of registration had yet been issued and by the order of the trial court dated September 28, 1977, it restrained the
Commission from issuing such a decree. Clearly, the tolling of the one year period has not even began. Thus, the trial court did not
err when it entertained the petition.
Now, we consider the crux of the petition. Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioners name did not appear in the
survey plan as an adjacent owner, nor claimant nor possessor. However, the trial and appellate courts differed in their conclusion on
whether or not there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud in private respondents part when it failed to give notice or
post notice to potential claimant and include their names in the application for registration. The trial court said there was, but the
appellate court disagreed.
Section 15 of P.D. 1529 [12] is explicit in requiring that in the application for registration of land titles, the application shall also state
the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it shall state
the extent of the search made to find them. As early as Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 22 [1980] we emphasized that a
mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining owners is not sufficient but what search has
been made to find them is necessary. The trial court was correct when it took notice that respondents sister Lydia Gajo-Anonuevo
admitted that she had a conversation with petitioners cousin Elena Dumalaon about the latters apprehension that their land may
have been included in respondents application for registration of the disputed land. [13] Respondents omission of this material
information prevented petitioner from having his day in court. The trial court in its decision more than amply supported its conclusion
with jurisprudence to the effect that it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a
third person.[14] Such omission can not but be deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud, a basis for allowing a petition for review
of judgment under Section 38 of Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act.
Additionally, it should be noted that petitioner acquired the bigger portion of Lot 1893 long after the initial survey of Barrio San
Ignacio. Teotimo Berosa sold Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos who in turn sold it to respondent in 1970. Clearly, going by the records,
petitioners name would not be found on the said survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1961, years before his purchase of
the portion of Lot 1893. Petitioners claim is clearly meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 24, 1994 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The judgment in LRC Case No. N-147 of the then Court of First Instance, Branch II in Gubat, Sorsogon is REINSTATED. Costs
against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

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