SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P.

MORADA and
HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, respondents.
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the
Resolution[1] dated September 27, 1995 and the Decision[2] dated April 10, 1996 of the Court of Appeals[3] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 36533,[4] and the Orders[5] dated August 29, 1994[6] and February 2, 1995[7] that were issued by
the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394.[8]
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in the questioned Decision [9],
are as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. x x x
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow
crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was
almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room
of Thamer. When they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer
attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for
help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the
latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the
Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer
and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with
the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because plaintiff
refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not want because
of her inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document
written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her
from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian
authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were
again put in service by defendant SAUDI (sic). In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred
plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her
superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to
make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the
police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the
departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a
certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and
Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993.
Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see
Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIAs Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no
danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing
happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about
the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as
her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take
flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took
away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to
1

her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five
months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her,
together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1)
adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.[10]
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately,
she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is
on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer
and Allah continued to serve in the international flights.[11]
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed
her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, [12] she was terminated from the service by
SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint [13] for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi
(Al- Balawi), its country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss [14] which raised the following
grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is
not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned
or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) [15] Saudia filed a reply[16]
thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint [17] wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as party
defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint[18].
The trial court issued an Order [19] dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint filed by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent Judge [20] denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20,
1994, its Motion for Reconsideration[21] of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable
is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition [22] (To
Defendants Motion for Reconsideration).
In the Reply[23] filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its Motion for
Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even
if that ground is raised for the first time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not
have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate
the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order[24] dated February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIAs
Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on
September 20, 1994, and the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October 14,
1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on
October 24, 1994, considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which is one for
the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees, upon the basis of the
applicable Philippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within the
jurisdiction of this Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing new of substance
which might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to be reconsidered, the motion for
reconsideration of the defendant, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order [26] with the Court of
Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining Order [27] dated
February 23, 1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise
directed, in the interim.
In another Resolution[28] promulgated on September 27, 1995, now assailed, the appellate court denied
2

SAUDIAs Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED, after
considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply
and Rejoinder, it appearing that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled thereto (Unciano Paramedical
College, et. Al., v. Court of Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993, Second Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant Petition [29] for Review with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the Decision [30]
dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that
the Amended Complaints basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within
the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a
Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling,
find recourse in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order[31] dated April 30, 1996, given due course by this Court. After both parties submitted their
Memoranda,[32] the instant case is now deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
I
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based on Article 21 of the New
Civil Code since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this case
involves what is known in private international law as a conflicts problem. Otherwise, the Republic of the
Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts done by another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II.
Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the matter as
to absence of leave of court is now moot and academic when this Honorable Court required the respondents to
comment on petitioners April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary
Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be
construed with liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III.
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 entitled Saudi
Arabian Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al. and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review
With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day
reglementary period as provided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, the
decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 has not yet become final and executory and this Honorable Court can take
cognizance of this case.[33]
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues emerge for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO.
Q-93-18394 ENTITLED MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES.
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THE CASE
PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset. It maintains
that private respondents claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges
that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.[34]
3

On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles
19[35] and 21[36] of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law.[37]
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the interplay of events occurred
in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint[38] dated June 23, 1994:
2.
Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporation doing
business in the Philippines. It may be served with summons and other court processes at Travel Wide
Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114 Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati,
Metro Manila.
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6.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian
authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were
again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred
plaintiff to Manila.
7.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her,
her superiors requested her to see MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police took her
passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put
pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed
to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
8.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the
departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a
certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer
and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993.
Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
9.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and
see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIAs Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no
danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993.
Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport,
however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had
forbidden her to take that flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary
of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters,
until further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the
judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her
to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had
tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing, and listening to the music in violation of Islamic
laws; (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
12.
Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff sought the help of the
Philippine Embassy in Jeddah. The latter helped her pursue an appeal from the decision of the court.
To pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights of defendant SAUDIA while, ironically,
Thamer and Allah freely served the international flights.[39]
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree with
petitioner that the problem herein could present a conflicts case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states
is said to contain a foreign element. The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and
economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or
conception.[40]
4

The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many.[41] The foreign element may simply consist
in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between
nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may
assume a complex form.[42]
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many
occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and
vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.
We thus find private respondents assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem
presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction[43] confronts the court a quo.
After a careful study of the private respondents Amended Complaint, [44] and the Comment thereon, we note
that she aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides;
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals,[45] this Court held that:
The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we
agree with private respondents assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially
enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.
Based on the allegations[46] in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on
jurisdiction[47] we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit.[48] Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 7691, to wit:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
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(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned
items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
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xxx

xxx

And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Courtthe venue, Quezon City, is
appropriate:
SEC. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. [Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) x x x

xxx

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(b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC
5

Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a
judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally
important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, vex, harass, or oppress the defendant,
e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.[49]
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines.
Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek
remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been
shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing her
Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to
the jurisdiction of the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions[50] praying for the dismissal of
Moradas Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February 20,
1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under
the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction by
praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.:[51]
We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside from disputing the lower courts
jurisdiction over defendants person, prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
plaintiffs cause of action has prescribed. By interposing such second ground in its motion to dismiss,
Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of which it prayed the court to resolve
controversy in its favor. For the court to validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it
necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latters person, who, being the proponent of the
affirmative defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its special appearance and voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that:
When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If
his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he
thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general
appearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the
further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.[52]
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we
find that the trial court has jurisdiction over the case and that its exercise thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important
questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred
in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.[53]
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should ultimately control.
Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and
predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these
two important values should be stressed.[54]
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts
or rules fall. This process is known as characterization, or the doctrine of qualification. It is the process of
deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule. [55] The purpose of
characterization is to enable the forum to select the proper law.[56]
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative fact. [57]
An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a test or connecting factor or point of contact.
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contact, such as thesitus of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.[58]
6

Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of
the applicable law.[59] These test factors or points of contact or connecting factors could be any of the
following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the
lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has
been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual
duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex forithe law
of the forumis particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of procedure not
going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies
whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given
case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship
and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment.[60] (Underscoring ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended Complaint deemed
submitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private
respondents assertion that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the
pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA
crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made
to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the handing over or turning over of the
person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer.
Petitioners purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation,
misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and
prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioners authority as employer, taking advantage of the
trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged
conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm
allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide
compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factor or point of
contact could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the
torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where
the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly
deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed
that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, act with justice, give her
her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain
acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is
important here is the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation,
social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private
respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories
and rules on tort liability[61] have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In
keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the State of the
most significant relationship rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual
context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following
7

contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.[62]
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines.
There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a
resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the relationship
between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor
law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter
in this dispute,[63] raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our
view, has been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complaint of and the place having
the most interest in the problem, we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability
should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case.
Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter
of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law.
Moreover, we find untenable petitioners insistence that [s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has
the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter. [64] As aptly said by private
respondent, she has no obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause
of action is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and
subsequent pleadings she never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. [65] And as correctly held by the
respondent appellate court, considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law
of Saudi Arabia, thus the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.
[66]

Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the trial courts denial of
defendants (herein petitioners) motion to dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue
properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available, and the expeditious trial itself indicated by the
nature of the case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate
outcome of the case below not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but also for the vindication of the countrys
system of law and justice in a transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed
to try and adjudge the case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element
or elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging the results of the case
in any manner whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-93-18394
entitled Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines is hereby REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, petitioner,
vs.
ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, EUGENE ARTHUR PERKINS, and BENGUET
CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, respondents.
On July 6, 1938, respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for dividends amounting to P71,379.90 on 52,874 shares of
stock registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the company; and, for the recognition of
his right to the control and disposal of said shares, to the exclusion of all others. To the complaint, the company
filed its answer alleging, by way of defense, that the withholding of such dividends and the non-recognition of
plaintiff's right to the disposal and control of the shares were due to certain demands made with respect to said
shares by the petitioner herein, Idonah Slade Perkins, and by one George H. Engelhard. The answer prays that
the adverse claimants be made parties to the action and served with notice thereof by publication, and that
thereafter all such parties be required to interplead and settle the rights among themselves. On September 5,
1938, the trial court ordered respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins to include in his complaint as parties defendant
petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, and George H. Engelhard. The complaint was accordingly amended and in
addition to the relief prayed for in the original complaint, respondent Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah
Slade Perkins and George Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and
excluded from any claim they assert thereon. Thereafter, summons by publication were served upon the non8

resident defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard, pursuant to the order of the trial court. On
December 9, 1938, Engelhard filed his answer to the amended complaint, and on December 10, 1938, petitioner
Idonah Slade Perkins, through counsel, filed her pleading entitled "objection to venue, motion to quash, and
demurrer to jurisdiction" wherein she challenged the jurisdiction of the lower court over her person. Petitioner's
objection, motion and demurrer having been overruled as well as her motion for reconsideration of the order of
denial, she now brought the present petition for certiorari, praying that the summons by publication issued
against her be declared null and void, and that, with respect to her, respondent Judge be permanently prohibited
from taking any action on the case.
The controlling issue here involved is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the present petitioner as a non-resident defendant, or, notwithstanding the want of
such jurisdiction, whether or not said court may validly try the case. The parties have filed lengthy
memorandums relying on numerous authorities, but the principles governing the question are well settled in this
jurisdiction.
Section 398 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a non-resident defendant is sued in the
Philippine courts and it appears, by the complaint or by affidavits, that the action relates to real or personal
property within the Philippines in which said defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or
in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding such person from any interest therein,
service of summons maybe made by publication.
We have fully explained the meaning of this provision in El Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921,
wherein we laid down the following rules:
(1) In order that the court may validly try a case, it must have jurisdiction over the subject-matter and over the
persons of the parties. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is acquired by concession of the sovereign authority
which organizes a court and determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its
jurisdiction with reference to actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant. Jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties is acquired by their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority, or
by the coercive power of legal process exerted over their persons.
(2) When the defendant is a non-resident and refuses to appear voluntary, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction
over his person even if the summons be served by publication, for he is beyond the reach of judicial process. No
tribunal established by one State can extend its process beyond its territory so as to subject to its decisions either
persons or property located in another State. "There are many expressions in the American reports from which it
might be inferred that the court acquires personal jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by publication
and notice; but such is not the case. In truth, the proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident
cannot be acquired by publication and notice was never clearly understood even in the American courts until
after the decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the leading case of Pennoyer
v. Neff (95 U.S., 714; 24 Law. ed., 565). In the light of that decisions which have subsequently been rendered in
that and other courts, the proposition that jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus acquired by publication
and notice is no longer open to question; and it is now fully established that a personal judgment upon
constructive or substituted service against a non-resident who does not appear is wholly invalid. This doctrine
applies to all kinds of constructive or substituted process, including service by publication and personal service
outside of the jurisdiction in which the judgment is rendered; and the only exception seems to be found in the
case where the non-resident defendant has expressly or impliedly consented to the mode of service. (Note to
Raher vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 292; see also L.R.A. 585; 35 L.R.A. [N.S.], 312.)
(3) The general rule, therefore, is that a suit against a non-resident cannot be entertained by a Philippine court.
Where, however, the action is in rem or quasi in rem in connection with property located in the Philippines, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res, and its jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident is non-essential.
In order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual
custody of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the
nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law. "An
illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over theres, is found in the proceeding to register the title of
land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the
property , assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over
the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world."
9

(4) As before stated, in an action in rem or quasi in rem against a non-resident defendant, jurisdiction over his
person is non-essential, and if the law requires in such case that the summons upon the defendant be served by
publication, it is merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. If any be said, in this
connection, that "may reported cases can be cited in which it is assumed that the question of the sufficiency of
publication or notice in the case of this kind is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is
sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. This phraseology was undoubtedly originally
adopted by the court because of the analogy between service by publication and personal service of process
upon the defendant; and, as has already been suggested, prior to the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff (supra), the
difference between the legal effects of the two forms of service was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that
the modes of expression which had already been moulded into legal tradition before that case was decided have
been brought down to the present day. But it is clear that the legal principle here involved is not affected by the
peculiar languages in which the courts have expounded their ideas."
The reason for the rule that Philippine courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident, as
laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States inPennoyer v. Neff, supra, may be found in a recognized
principle of public law to the effect that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory. Story, Confl. L., ch. 2; Wheat, Int. L., pt. 2, ch. 2. The several States are of equal
dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is
laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its
territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process
beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. "Any exertion of authority of
this sort beyond this limit," says Story, "is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in
any other tribunals." Story, Confl. L., sec. 539." (Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S., 714; 24 Law. ed., 565, 568-569.).
When, however, the action relates to property located in the Philippines, the Philippine courts may validly try
the case, upon the principle that a "State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated within its limits
owned by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own citizens against them; and the exercise of this
jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State where the owners are domiciled. Every
State owes protection to its citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise
of authority to hold and appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its
citizens. It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the property of the non-resident situated within its limits
that its tribunals can inquire into the non-resident's obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be
carried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property. If the non-resident has no property
in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can adjudicate." (Pennoyer v. Neff, supra.)
In the instant case, there can be no question that the action brought by Eugene Arthur Perkins in his amended
complaint against the petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, seeks to exclude her from any interest in a property
located in the Philippines. That property consists in certain shares of stocks of the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company, a sociedad anonima, organized in the Philippines under the provisions of the Spanish Code of
Commerce, with its principal office in the City of Manila and which conducts its mining activities therein. The
situs of the shares is in the jurisdiction where the corporation is created, whether the certificated evidencing the
ownership of those shares are within or without that jurisdiction. (Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Permanent
ed. Vol. 11, p. 95). Under these circumstances, we hold that the action thus brought is quasi in rem, for while the
judgement that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in rem, "it fixes and settles the title to the
property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of the judgment in rem." (50 C.J., p 503). As
held by the Supreme Court of the United States in Pennoyer v. Neff (supra);
It is true that, in a strict sense, a proceeding in rem is one taken directly against property, and has for its object
the disposition of the property, without reference to the title of individual claimants; but , in a large and more
general sense, the terms are applied to actions between parties, where the direct object is to reach and dispose of
property owned by them, or of some interest therein.
The action being in quasi in rem, The Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the person of the
non-resident. In order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process, summons has been served upon
her by publication. There is no question as to the adequacy of publication made nor as to the mailing of the
order of publication to the petitioner's last known place of residence in the United States. But, of course, the
action being quasi in rem and notice having be made by publication, the relief that may be granted by the
Philippine court must be confined to the res, it having no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against the
non-resident. In the amended complaint filed by Eugene Arthur Perkins, no money judgment or other relief in
personam is prayed for against the petitioner. The only relief sought therein is that she be declared to be without
10

any interest in the shares in controversy and that she be excluded from any claim thereto.
Petitioner contends that the proceeding instituted against her is one of interpleading and is therefore an action in
personam. Section 120 of our Code of Civil Procedureprovides that whenever conflicting claims are or may be
made upon a person for or relating to personal property, or the performance of an obligation or any portion
thereof, so that he may be made subject to several actions by different persons, such person may bring an action
against the conflicting claimants, disclaiming personal interest in the controversy, and the court may order them
to interplead with one another and litigate their several claims among themselves, there upon proceed to
determine their several claims. Here, The Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, in its answer to the
complaint filed by Eugene Arthur Perkins, averred that in connection with the shares of stock in question,
conflicting claims were being made upon it by said plaintiff, Eugene Arthur Perkins, his wife Idonah Slade
Perkins, and one named George H. Engelhard, and prayed that these last two be made parties to the action and
served with summons by publication, so that the three claimants may litigate their conflicting claims and settle
their rights among themselves. The court has not issued an order compelling the conflicting claimants to
interplead with one another and litigate their several claims among themselves, but instead ordered the plaintiff
to amend his complaint including the other two claimants as parties defendant. The plaintiff did so, praying that
the new defendants thus joined be excluded fro any interest in the shares in question, and it is upon this
amended complaint that the court ordered the service of the summons by publication. It is therefore, clear that
the publication of the summons was ordered not in virtue of an interpleading, but upon the filing of the amended
complaint wherein an action quasi in rem is alleged.
Had not the complaint been amended, including the herein petitioner as an additional defendant, and had the
court, upon the filing of the answer of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, issued an order under
section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, calling the conflicting claimants into court and compelling them to
interplead with one another, such order could not perhaps have validly been served by publication or otherwise,
upon the non-resident Idonah Slade Perkins, for then the proceeding would be purely one of interpleading. Such
proceeding is a personal action, for it merely seeks to call conflicting claimants into court so that they may
interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves, and no specific relief is prayed for against them,
as the interpleader have appeared in court, one of them pleads ownership of the personal property located in the
Philippines and seeks to exclude a non-resident claimant from any interest therein, is a question which we do
not decide not. Suffice it to say that here the service of the summons by publication was ordered by the lower
court by virtue of an action quasi in rem against the non-resident defendant.
Respondents contend that, as the petitioner in the lower court has pleaded over the subject-matter, she has
submitted herself to its jurisdiction. We have noticed, however, that these pleas have been made not as
independent grounds for relief, but merely as additional arguments in support of her contention that the lower
court had no jurisdiction over the person. In other words, she claimed that the lower court had no jurisdiction
over her person not only because she is a non-resident, but also because the court had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the action and that the issues therein involved have already been decided by the New York
court and are being relitigated in the California court. Although this argument is obviously erroneous, as neither
jurisdiction over the subject-matter nor res adjudicata nor lis pendens has anything to do with the question of
jurisdiction over her person, we believe and so hold that the petitioner has not, by such erroneous argument,
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. Voluntary appearance cannot be implied from either a mistaken
or superflous reasoning but from the nature of the relief prayed for.
For all the foregoing, petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,

vs.
WILLIAM FOWLER, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of champagne of the value of $20, on the
12th August, 1901, while on board the transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of
champagne formed part of the cargo of the said vessel and were the property of Julian Lindsay, and which were
taken lucri causa, and with the intent to appropriate the same, without violence or intimidation, and without the
consent of the owner, against the statute in the case made and provided.
The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting attorney being present on behalf of the
11

Government, counsel for the defendants presented a demurrer, alleging that the Court of First Instance was
without jurisdiction to try the crime charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the crime was
committed on the high seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within the territory comprising the Bay of Manila,
or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to which the jurisdiction of the court extends, and asked, upon these
grounds, that the case be dismissed.
This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the court has original jurisdiction in
all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six month's imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in
accordance with the orders of the Military Governor and the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all
crimes committed on board vessel flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws and orders he cited the order of August 14, 1898, and Acts
Nos. 76 and 186 of the United States Civil Commission. He argued that the President of the United States had
unquestionable authority to authorize the commanding general and the Civil Commission to establish a judicial
system with authority to take cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in support of this doctrine, which was applicable to this Archipelago, which is now
analogous to the status of some of the States of the Union during the Mexican war and the war of secession.
The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held that the court was without jurisdiction to
try the accused for the theft alleged to have been committed on the high seas, sustained the demurrer, and
ordered the discharge of the defendants, with the costs to the Government. Against this order the prosecuting
attorney appealed, and the case was brought before this court.
This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the high seas. Act No. 136 of the
organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil Commission, and which repealed the former law, Act
No. 76, do not expressly confer jurisdiction or authority upon this court to take cognizance of all crimes
committed on board vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of the law are clear and precise with respect
to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true with respect to criminal cases. If any doubt could arise
concerning the true meaning of the law applicable to the case, Act No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubts.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the Philippine Islands were
organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting of seven paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which
reads as follows: "Of all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any
country, or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of
any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of
this law was to define the jurisdiction of the courts of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on
board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this
class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.
Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be affirmed, with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case and in which the
appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and it will or
will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein
involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the
12

French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted
in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission
affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and
followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general
triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that
obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on
this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice
Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and
dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to
degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the high seas
or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within three miles of a line drawn
from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new
set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le
Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the
jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that
sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the
Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the peace of the ship
or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those
which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper
authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which of the two
jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending
circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local
jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has
no right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign
vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the
Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply
when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon Philippine
soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a
violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that
established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a
part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the
crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page
625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories of His Britanic
Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively,
shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and
rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same,
and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and
warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation
respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always
13

to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not
triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship,
without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a
breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within
our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila
in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of
public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into
the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
ILLUH ASAALI, HATIB ABDURASID, INGKOH BANTALA, BASOK INGKIN, and MOHAMMAD
BANTALLA,petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
The policy relentlessly adhered to and unhesitatingly pursued to minimize, if not to do away entirely, with the
evil and corruption that smuggling brings in its wake would be frustrated and set at naught if the action taken by
respondent Commissioner of Customs in this case, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals, were to be set aside
and this appeal from the decision of the latter were to succeed. Fortunately, the controlling principles of law do
not call for a contrary conclusion. It cannot be otherwise if the legitimate authority vested in the government
were not to be reduced to futility and impotence in the face of an admittedly serious malady, that at times has
assumed epidemic proportions.
The principal question raised by petitioners, owners of five sailing vessels and the cargo loaded therein declared
forfeited by respondent Commissioner of Customs for smuggling, is the validity of their interception and
seizure by customs officials on the high seas, the contention being raised that importation had not yet begun and
that the seizure was effected outside our territorial waters..
Why such a plea could not be given the least credence without doing violence to common sense and placing the
law in disrepute would be apparent from a statement of the case and the findings of facts as set forth in the
decision now under review, of the Court of Tax Appeals, dated November 19, 1964, the opinion being penned
by the late Associate Judge Augusto M. Luciano.
His opinion starts thus: "This is an appeal from the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Customs in
Customs Case No. 113, dated September 26, 1961, (Jolo Seizure Identification Cases Nos. 38, 39, 40, 41 & 42)
decreeing the forfeiture of five (5) sailing vessels (kumpits) named 'Iroc-Iroc,' 'Lahat-lahat,' 'Liberal Wing III,'
'Sulu Area Command,' and 'Business,' with their respective cargoes of blue seal cigarettes and rattan chairs for
violation of Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 20 of Republic Act No. 426 in
relation with Section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code."1
The facts according to the above opinion "are not controverted." Thus: "It appears that on September 10, 1950,
at about noon time, a customs patrol team on board Patrol Boat ST-23 intercepted the five (5) sailing vessels in
question on the high seas, between British North Borneo and Sulu while they were heading towards Tawi-tawi,
Sulu. After ordering the vessels to stop, the customs officers boarded and found on board, 181 cases of 'Herald'
cigarettes, 9 cases of 'Camel' cigarettes, and some pieces of rattan chairs. The sailing vessels are all of
Philippine registry, owned and manned by Filipino residents of Sulu, and of less than thirty (30) tons burden.
They came from Sandakan, British North Borneo, but did not possess any permit from the Commissioner of
Customs to engage in the importation of merchandise into any port of the Sulu sea, as required by Section
14

1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code. Their cargoes were not covered by the required import license
under Republic Act No. 426, otherwise known as the Import Control Law."2
Respondent Commissioner of Customs, as noted at the outset, affirmed the decision rendered by the Collector
of Customs of Jolo, who found cause for forfeiture under the law of the vessels and the cargo contained therein.
He was, as also already made known, sustained by the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence this petition for review.
The first two errors assigned by petitioners would impugn the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs to institute
seizure proceedings and thereafter to declare the forfeiture of the vessels in question and their cargo. They
would justify their stand thus: "In the light of the fact that the vessels involved with the articles laden therein
were apprehended and seized on the high seas, beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines, the said vessels
could not have touched any place or port in the Philippines, whether a port or place of entry or not,
consequently, the said vessels could not have been engaged in the importation of the articles laden therein into
any Philippine port or place, whether a port or place of entry or not, to have incurred the liability of forfeiture
under Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code."3
Such a contention was advanced by petitioners before the Court of Tax Appeals. It met the repudiation that it
deserved. Thus: "We perfectly see the point of the petitioners but considering the circumstances surrounding the
apprehension of the vessels in question, we believe that Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code
should be applied to the case at bar. It has been established that the five vessels came from Sandakan, British
North Borneo, a foreign port, and when intercepted, all of them were heading towards Tawi-tawi, a domestic
port within the Sulu sea. Laden with foreign manufactured cigarettes, they did not possess the import license
required by Republic Act No. 426, nor did they carry a permit from the Commissioner of Customs to engage in
importation into any port in the Sulu sea. Their course announced loudly their intention not merely to skirt along
the territorial boundary of the Philippines but to come within our limits and land somewhere in Tawi-tawi
towards which their prows were pointed. As a matter of fact, they were about to cross our aquatic boundary but
for the intervention of a customs patrol which, from all appearances, was more than eager to accomplish its
mission."4
The sense of realism and the vigorous language employed by the late Judge Luciano in rejecting such a plea
deserve to be quoted. Thus: "To entertain even for a moment the thought that these vessels were probably not
bound for a Philippine port would be too much a concession even for a simpleton or a perennial optimist. It is
quite irrational for Filipino sailors manning five Philippine vessels to sneak out of the Philippines and go to
British North Borneo, and come a long way back laden with highly taxable goods only to turn about upon
reaching the brink of our territorial waters and head for another foreign port."5
1. We find no plausible reason not to accept in its entirety such a conclusion reached by the Court of Tax
Appeals. Nor, even if the persuasive element in the above view were not so overwhelming, could we alter the
decisive facts as found by it. For it is now beyond question that its finding, if supported by substantial evidence,
binds us, only questions of law being for us to resolve. Where the issue raised belongs to the former category,
we lack the power of review.6
Moreover, for understandable reasons, we feel extreme reluctance to substitute our own discretion for that of the
Court of Tax Appeals in its appreciation of the relevant facts and its appraisal of their significance. As we had
occasion to state in a relatively recent decision: "Nor as a matter of principle is it advisable for this Court to set
aside the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax Appeals which is, by the very nature of its
function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an
expertise on the subject, ..., there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority."7
2. We thus could rest our decision affirming that of the Court of Tax Appeals on the above consideration.
It might not be amiss however to devote some degree of attention to the legal points raised in the above two
assignment of errors, discussed jointly by petitioners-appellants, alleging the absence of jurisdiction, the
deprivation of property without due process of law and the abatement of liability consequent upon the repeal of
Republic Act No. 426. Not one of the principles of law relied upon suffices to call for reversal of the action
taken by the respondent Commissioner of Customs, even if the facts presented a situation less conclusive
against the pretension of petitioners-appellants.
From the apprehension and seizure of the vessels in question on the high seas beyond the territorial waters of
the Philippines, the absence of jurisdiction of Commissioner of Customs is predicated. Such contention of
petitioners-appellants is without merit.
15

It is unquestioned that all vessels seized are of Philippine registry. The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as
to its applicability and enforceability not only within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but
also outside of its jurisdiction against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship ... 8 The principle of
law that sustains the validity of such a provision equally supplies a firm foundation for the seizure of the five
sailing vessels found thereafter to have violated the applicable provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.9
Moreover, it is a well settled doctrine of International Law that goes back to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Church v. Hubbart,10 an 1804 decision, that a state has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not
limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas. In the language of Chief Justice Marshall: "The
authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within the range
of its cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile act which it is its duty to repel.
But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory."
The question asked in the brief of petitioners-appellants as to whether the seizure of the vessels in question and
the cargoes on the high seas and thus beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines was legal must be
answered in the affirmative.
4. The next question raised is the alleged denial of due process arising from such forfeiture and seizure. The
argument on the alleged lack of validity of the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs is made to rest on
the fact that the alleged offense imputed to petitioners-appellants is a violation of Section 1363(a) and not
Section 1363(f). The title of Section 1363 is clear, "Property subject to forfeiture under customs laws." The first
subsection thereof, (a) cover any vessel including cargo unlawfully engaged in the importation of merchandise
except a port of entry. Subsection (f) speaks of any merchandise of any prohibited importation, the importation
of which is effected or attempted contrary to law and all other merchandise which in the opinion of the
Collector of Customs have been used are or were intended to be used as instrument in the importation or
exportation of the former.
From the above recital of the legal provisions relied upon, it would appear most clearly that the due process
question raised is insubstantial. Certainly, the facts on which the seizure was based were not unknown to
petitioners-appellants. On those facts the liability of the vessels and merchandise under the above terms of the
statute would appear to be undeniable. The action taken then by the Commissioner of Customs was in
accordance with law.
How could there be a denial of due process? There was nothing arbitrary about the manner in which such
seizure and forfeiture were effected. The right to a hearing of petitioners-appellants was respected. They could
not have been unaware of what they were doing. It would be an affront to reason if under the above
circumstances they could be allowed to raise in all seriousness a due process question. Such a constitutional
guaranty, basic and fundamental, certainly should not be allowed to lend itself as an instrument for escaping a
liability arising from one's own nefarious acts.
5. Petitioners-appellants would further assail the validity of the action taken by the respondent Commissioner of
Customs by the plea that the repeal of Republic Act No. 426 abated whatever liability could have been incurred
thereunder. This argument raised before the Court of Tax Appeals was correctly held devoid of any persuasive
force. The decision under review cited our opinion in Golay-Buchel & Cie v. Commissioner of Customs 11 to the
effect that the expiration of the Import Control Law "did not produce the effect of declaring legal the
importation of goods which were illegally imported and the seizure and forfeiture thereof as ordered by the
Collector of Customs illegal or null and void."
Roxas v. Sayoc 12 announced that principle earlier. Thus: "Herein, we are concerned with the effect of the
expiration of a law, not with the abrogation of a law, and we hold the view that once the Commissioner of
Customs has acquired jurisdiction over the case, the mere expiration of Republic Act No. 650 will not divest
him of his jurisdiction thereon duly acquired while said law was still in force. In other words, we believe that
despite the expiration of Republic Act No. 650 the Commissioner of Customs retained his jurisdiction over the
case and could continue to take cognizance thereof until its final determination, for the main question brought in
by the appeal from the decision of the Collector of Customs was the legality or illegality of the decision of the
Collector of Customs, and that question could not have been abated by the mere expiration of Republic Act No.
650. We firmly believe that the expiration of Republic Act No. 650 could not have produced the effect (1) of
declaring legal the importation of the cotton counterpanes which were illegally imported, and (2) of declaring
the seizure and forfeiture ordered by the Collector of Customs illegal or null and void; in other words it could
not have the effect of annulling or setting aside the decision of the Collector of Customs which was rendered
while the law was in force and which should stand until it is revoked by the appellate tribunal."
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As late as 1965, in Bombay Dept. Store v. Commissioner of Customs,13 we had occasion to reaffirm the doctrine
in the above two decisions, the present Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, stating that such expiration of the
period of effectivity of Republic Act No. 650 "did not have the effect of depriving the Commissioner of
Customs of the jurisdiction, acquired by him prior thereto, to act on cases of forfeiture pending before him,
which are in the nature of proceeding in rem...."
It is thus most evident that the Court of Tax Appeals had not in any wise refused to adhere faithfully to
controlling legal principles when it sustained the action taken by respondent Commissioner of Customs. It
would be a reproach and a reflection on the law if on the facts as they had been shown to exist, the seizure and
forfeiture of the vessels and cargo in question were to be characterized as outside the legal competence of our
government and violative of the constitutional rights of petitioners-appellants. Fortunately, as had been made
clear above, that would be an undeserved reflection and an unwarranted reproach. The vigor of the war against
smuggling must not be hampered by a misreading of international law concepts and a misplaced reliance on a
constitutional guaranty that has not in any wise been infringed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 19, 1964, is affirmed. With costs
against petitioners-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
TIME, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, ELISEO S. ZARI, as Deputy
Clerk of Court, Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS and JUAN
PONCE ENRILE,respondents.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to annul certain orders of the respondent
Court of First Instance of Rizal, issued in its Civil Case No. 10403, entitled "Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce
Enrile vs. Time, Inc., and Time-Life International, Publisher of 'Time' Magazine (Asia Edition)", and to prohibit
the said court from further proceeding with the said civil case.
Upon petitioner's posting a bond of P1,000.00, this Court, as prayed for, ordered, on 15 April 1968, the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition alleges that petitioner Time, Inc., 1 is an American corporation with principal offices at Rocketfeller
Center, New York City, N. Y., and is the publisher of "Time", a weekly news magazine; the petition, however,
does not allege the petitioner's legal capacity to sue in the courts of the Philippine. 2

In the aforesaid Civil Case No. 10403, therein plaintiffs (herein respondents) Antonio J. Villegas and Juan
Ponce Enrile seek to recover from the herein petitioner damages upon an alleged libel arising from a publication
of Time (Asia Edition) magazine, in its issue of 18 August 1967, of an essay, entitled "Corruption in Asia",
which, in part, reads, as follows:
The problem of Manila's mayor, ANTONIO VILLEGAS, is a case in point. When it was discovered
last year that the mayor's coffers contained far more pesos than seemed reasonable in the light of his
income, an investigation was launched. Witnesses who had helped him out under curious circumstance
were asked to explain in court. One government official admitted lending Villegas P30,000 pesos
($7,700) without interest because he was the mayor's compadre. An assistant declared he had given
Villegas loans without collateral because he regarded the boss as my own son. A wealthy Manila
businessman testified that he had lent Villegas' wife 15,000 pesos because the mayor was like a brother
to me. With that, Villegas denounced the investigation as an invasion of his family's privacy. The case
was dismissed on a technicality, and Villegas is still mayor. 3

More specifically, the plaintiffs' complaint alleges, inter alia that:

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(4) Defendants, conspiring and confederating, published a libelous article, publicly, falsely and
maliciously imputing to Plaintiffs the commission of the crimes of graft, corruption and nepotism; that
said publication particularly referred to Plaintiff Mayor Antonio J. Villegas as a case in point in
connection with graft, corruption and nepotism in Asia; that said publication without any doubt referred
to co-plaintiff Juan Ponce Enrile as the high government official who helped under curious
circumstances Plaintiff Mayor Antonio J. Villegas in lending the latter approximately P30,000.00
($7,700.00) without interest because he was the Mayor's compadre; that the purpose of said
Publications is to cause the dishonor, discredit and put in public contempt the Plaintiffs, particularly
Plaintiff Mayor Antonio J. Villegas.
On motion of the respondents-plaintiffs, the respondent judge, on 25 November 1967, granted them leave to
take the depositions "of Mr. Anthony Gonzales, Time-Life international", and "Mr. Cesar B. Enriquez, Muller &
Phipps (Manila) Ltd.", in connection with the activities and operations in the Philippines of the petitioner, and,
on 27 November 1967, issued a writ of attachment on the real and personal estate of Time, Inc.
Petitioner received the summons and a copy of the complaint at its offices in New York on 13 December 1967
and, on 27 December 1967, it filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper
venue, relying upon the provisions of Republic Act 4363. Private respondents opposed the motion.
In an order dated 26 February 1968, respondent court deferred the determination of the motion to dismiss until
after trial of the case on the merits, the court having considered that the grounds relied upon in the motion do
not appear to be indubitable.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the deferment private respondents again opposed.
On 30 March 1968, respondent judge issued an order re-affirming the previous order of deferment for the
reason that "the rule laid down under Republic Act. No. 4363, amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
is not applicable to actions against non-resident defendants, and because questions involving harassment and
inconvenience, as well as disruption of public service do not appear indubitable. ..."
Failing in its efforts to discontinue the taking of the depositions, previously adverted to, and to have action
taken, before trial, on its motion to dismiss, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The orders for the taking of the said depositions, for deferring determination of the motion to dismiss, and for
reaffirming the deferment, and the writ of attachment are sought to be annulled in the petition..
There is no dispute that at the time of the publication of the allegedly offending essay, private respondents
Antonio Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile were the Mayor Of the City of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance
and concurrently Acting Commissioner of Customs, respectively, with offices in the City of Manila. The issues
in this case are:
1. Whether or not, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 the respondent Court of First Instance of
Rizal has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civil suit for damages arising from an allegedly libelous
publication, considering that the action was instituted by public officers whose offices were in the City of
Manila at the time of the publication; if it has no jurisdiction, whether or not its erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction may be challenged by a foreign corporation by writ of certiorari or prohibition; and
2. Whether or not Republic Act 4363 is applicable to action against a foreign corporation or non-resident
defendant.
Provisions of Republic Act No. 4363, which are relevant to the resolution of the foregoing issues, read, as
follows:
Section 1. Article three hundred sixty of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
Numbered Twelve hundred and eighty-nine, is further amended to read as follows:
'ART. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
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The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the extent
as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or
city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; Provided, however, That where one of the
offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission
of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city
or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does
not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published;
Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed
and vice versa; Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for
damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts; And provided finally,
That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions
which have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of the law
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect only if and when, within thirty days from its approval, the
newspapermen in the Philippines shall organize, and elect the members of, a Philippine Press Council,
a private agency of the said newspapermen, whose function shall be to promulgate a Code of Ethics for
them and the Philippine press investigate violations thereof, and censure any newspaperman or
newspaper guilty of any violation of the said Code, and the fact that such Philippine Press Council has
been organized and its members have been duly elected in accordance herewith shall be ascertained
and proclaimed by the President of the Philippines.
Under the first proviso in section 1, the venue of a civil action for damages in cases of written defamations is
localized upon the basis of, first, whether the offended party or plaintiff is a public officer or a private
individual; and second, if he is a public officer, whether his office is in Manila or not in Manila, at the time of
the commission of the offense. If the offended party is a public officer in the office in the City of Manila, the
proviso limits him to two (2) choices of venue, namely, in the Court of First instance of the City of Manila or in
the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published ..."
The complaint lodged in the court of Rizal by respondents does not allege that the libelous article was printed
and first published in the province of Rizal and, since the respondents-plaintiffs are public officers with offices
in Manila at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, it is clear that the only place left for them
wherein to file their action, is the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The limitation of the choices of venue, as introduced into the Penal Code through its amendments by Republic
Act 4363, was intended "to minimize or limit the filing of out-of-town libel suits" to protect an alleged offender
from "hardships, inconveniences and harassments" and, furthermore, to protect "the interest of the public
service" where one of the offended parties is a public officer." 4 The intent, of the law is clear: a libeled public
official might sue in the court of the locality where he holds office, in order that the prosecution of the action
should interfere as little as possible with the discharge of his official duties and labors. The only alternative
allowed him by law is to prosecute those responsible for the libel in the place where the offending article was
printed and first published. Here, the law tolerates the interference with the libeled officer's duties only for the
sake of avoiding unnecessary harassment of the accused. Since the offending publication was not printed in the
Philippines, the alternative venue was not open to respondent Mayor Villegas of Manila and Undersecretary of
Finance Enrile, who were the offended parties.
But respondents-plaintiffs argue that Republic Act No. 4363 is not applicable where the action is against nonexistent defendant, as petitioner Time, Inc., for several reasons. They urge that, in enacting Republic Act No.
4363, Congress did not intend to protect non-resident defendants as shown by Section 3, which provides for the
19

effectivity of the statute only if and when the "newspapermen in the Philippines" have organized a "Philippine
Press Council" whose function shall be to promulgate a Code of Ethics for "them" and "the Philippine press";
and since a non-resident defendant is not in a position to comply with the conditions imposed for the effectivity
of the statute, such defendant may not invoke its provisions; that a foreign corporation is not inconvenienced by
an out-of-town libel suit; that it would be absurd and incongruous, in the absence of an extradition treaty, for the
law to give to public officers with office in Manila the second option of filing a criminal case in the court of the
place where the libelous article is printed and first published if the defendant is a foreign corporation and that,
under the "single publication" rule which originated in the United States and imported into the Philippines, the
rule was understood to mean that publications in another state are not covered by venue statutes of the forum.
The implication of respondents' argument is that the law would not take effect as to non-resident defendants or
accused. We see nothing in the text of the law that would sustain such unequal protection to some of those who
may be charged with libel. The official proclamation that a Philippine Press Council has been organized is made
a pre-condition to the effectivity of the entire Republic Act No. 4363, and no terms are employed therein to
indicate that the law can or will be effective only as to some, but not all, of those that may be charged with
libeling our public officers.
The assertion that a foreign corporation or a non-resident defendant is not inconvenienced by an out-of-town
suit is irrelevant and untenable, for venue and jurisdiction are not dependent upon convenience or
inconvenience to a party; and moreover, venue was fixed under Republic Act No. 4363, pursuant to the basic
policy of the law that is, as previously stated, to protect the interest of the public service when the offended
party is a public officer, by minimizing as much as possible any interference with the discharge of his duties.
That respondents-plaintiffs could not file a criminal case for libel against a non-resident defendant does not
make Republic Act No. 4363 incongruous of absurd, for such inability to file a criminal case against a nonresident natural person equally exists in crimes other than libel. It is a fundamental rule of international
jurisdiction that no state can by its laws, and no court which is only a creature of the state, can by its judgments
or decrees, directly bind or affect property or persons beyond the limits of the state. 5 Not only this, but if the
accused is a corporation, no criminal action can lie against it, 6 whether such corporation or resident or nonresident. At any rate, the case filed by respondents-plaintiffs is case for damages.
50 Am. Jur. 2d 659 differentiates the "multiple publication" and "single publication" rules (invoked by private
respondents) to be as follows:
The common law as to causes of action for tort arising out of a single publication was to the effect that
each communication of written or printed matter was a distinct and separate publication of a libel
contained therein, giving rise to a separate cause of action. This rule ('multiple publication' rule) is still
followed in several American jurisdictions, and seems to be favored by the American Law Institute.
Other jurisdictions have adopted the 'single publication' rule which originated in New York, under
which any single integrated publication, such as one edition of a newspaper, book, or magazine, or one
broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one cause of action, regardless of the number of times
it is exposed to different people. ...
These rules are not pertinent in the present scheme because the number of causes of action that may be available
to the respondents-plaintiffs is not here in issue. We are here confronted by a specific venue statute, conferring
jurisdiction in cases of libel against Public officials to specified courts, and no other. The rule is that where a
statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive; and where it confers
jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise provided. Hence, the
venue provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 should be deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action,
unless the question of venue should be waived by the defendant, which was not the case here. Only thus can the
policy of the Act be upheld and maintained. Nor is there any reason why the inapplicability of one alternative
venue should result in rendering the other alternative, also inapplicable.
The dismissal of the present petition is asked on the ground that the petitioner foreign corporation failed to
allege its capacity to sue in the courts of the Philippines. Respondents rely on section 69 of the Corporation law,
which provides:
SEC. 69. No foreign corporation or corporations formed, organized, or existing under any laws other
than those of the Philippines shall be permitted to ... maintain by itself or assignee any suit for the
recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever, unless it shall have the license prescribed in the
section immediately preceding. ..." ...;
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They also invoke the ruling in Marshall-Wells Co. vs. Elser & Co., Inc. 7 that no foreign corporation may be
permitted to maintain any suit in the local courts unless it shall have the license required by the law, and the
ruling in Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc. 8 that "where ... the law denies to a foreign
corporation the right to maintain suit unless it has previously complied with a certain requirement, then such
compliance or the fact that the suing corporation is exempt therefrom, becomes a necessary averment in the
complaint." We fail to see how these doctrines can be a propos in the case at bar, since the petitioner is not
"maintaining any suit" but is merely defending one against itself; it did not file any complaint but only a
corollary defensive petition to prohibit the lower court from further proceeding with a suit that it had no
jurisdiction to entertain.
Petitioner's failure to aver its legal capacity to institute the present petition is not fatal, for ...
A foreign corporation may, by writ of prohibition, seek relief against the wrongful assumption of
jurisdiction. And a foreign corporation seeking a writ of prohibition against further maintenance of a
suit, on the ground of want of jurisdiction in which jurisdiction is not bound by the ruling of the court
in which the suit was brought, on a motion to quash service of summons, that it has jurisdiction. 9

It is also advanced that the present petition is premature, since respondent court has not definitely ruled on the
motion to dismiss, nor held that it has jurisdiction, but only argument is untenable. The motion to dismiss was
predicated on the respondent court's lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action; and the rulings of this Court are
that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment of action on such a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
If the question of jurisdiction were not the main ground for this petition for review by certiorari, it
would be premature because it seeks to have a review of an interlocutory order. But as it would be
useless and futile to go ahead with the proceedings if the court below had no jurisdiction this petition
was given due course.' (San Beda vs. CIR, 51 O.G. 5636, 5638).
'While it is true that action on a motion to dismiss may be deferred until the trial and an order to that
effect is interlocutory, still where it clearly appears that the trial judge or court is proceeding in excess
or outside of its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would be useless and a waste
of time to go ahead with the proceedings. (Philippine International Fair, Inc., et al. vs. Ibaez, et al., 50
Off. Gaz. 1036; Enrique v. Macadaeg, et al., 47 Off. Gaz. 1207; see also San Beda College vs. CIR, 51
Off. Gaz. 5636.)' (University of Sto. Tomas v. Villanueva, L-13748, 30 October 1959.).
Similarly, in Edward J. Nell Co. vs. Cubacub, L-20843, 23 June 1965, 14 SCRA 419, this Court held:
'.......................................................... It is a settledrule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subjectmatter is determined by the allegations in the complaint; and when a motion to dismiss is filed for lack
of jurisdiction those allegations are deemed admitted for purposes of such motion, so that it may be
resolved without waiting for the trial. Thus it has been held that the consideration thereof may not be
postponed in the hope that the evidence may yield other qualifying or concurring data which would
bring the case under the court's jurisdiction.'
To the same effect are the rulings in: Ruperto vs. Fernando, 83 Phil. 943; Administrator of Hacienda Luisita
Estate vs. Alberto, L-12133, 21 October 1958.
Summing up, We hold:
(1) The under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, actions for
damages by public officials for libelous publications against them can only be filed in the courts of first instance
ofthe city or province where the offended functionary held office at the time ofthe commission of the offense, in
case the libelous article was first printed or published outside the Philippines.
(2) That the action of a court in refusing to rule, or deferring its ruling, on a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or for improper venue, is in excess of jurisdiction and correctable by writ of
21

prohibition or certiorari sued out in the appellate Court, even before trial on the merits is had.
WHEREFORE, the writs applied for are granted: the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal is declared
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of its Civil Case No. 10403; and its orders issued in connection
therewith are hereby annulled and set aside,. Respondent court is further commanded to desist from further
proceedings in Civil case No. 10403 aforesaid. Costs against private respondents, Antonio J. Villegas and Juan
Ponce Enrile.
The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Supreme Court is made permanent.

22