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Copyright(c)TheRegentsoftheUniversityofCalifornia1995.
UCLALawReview
October,1995
43UCLAL.Rev.139
LENGTH:8000words
BOOKREVIEW:TheModernMachiavelli:Legitimacy,ConflictandPowerintheInternationalLegalOrderReviewof
HenryKissinger'sDiplomacy
NAME:ElizabethKopelman*
BIO:

*ActingAssistantProfessorofLaw,StanfordLawSchool,andResearchFellow,StanfordCenteronConflictandNegotiation.Theauthor
thanksKurtBorgwardt,ThomasEhrlich,BrianGanson,MelanieGreenberg,DavidM.Kennedy,MarcMiller,JackRakove,andDouglasStonefor
theircommentsonthisEssay.

LEXISNEXISSUMMARY:
...ArguingthatKissinger'snostalgicharkingbacktotheEuropeanbalanceofpowersystemisasahistoricalandunworkable
asitisundesirable,KopelmanhighlightsthreefactorsinpostColdWardiplomacythatKissinger'sanalysisleavesout:(1)the
roleofthedemocraticprocessingarneringlegitimacyfordefiningandpursuingthe"nationalinterest"(2)theroleofpublic
internationallawinaddressingconflictthroughinstitutionaldesignandconsensusbuildingandfinally,(3)theburgeoning
roleof"transformative"diplomacy,inotherwords,thecontributionsof"citizendiplomats"whochangenotonlytherulesbut
alsothecontoursoftheplayingfielditselfbyworkingoutsideformalgovernmentalnegotiationchannels....Amoreexpansive
definitionoftheconceptof"power"could,forexample,encompassthepowerofideasinforeignpolicythepowerof
a"specialrelationship"betweenalliesthepoweroflegitimacyinademocracyorthepowerofdefttimingincapitalizingona
uniquelyfluidhistoricalmoment,suchastheendoftheSecondWorldWar,asdiscussedbelow....
TEXT:
[*139]
Abstract

ThisReviewEssaysummarizesandcritiquesHenryKissinger'sapproachtotheroleofpowerintheinternationallegalorder.
ArguingthatKissinger'snostalgicharkingbacktotheEuropeanbalanceofpowersystemisasahistoricalandunworkableasit
isundesirable,KopelmanhighlightsthreefactorsinpostColdWardiplomacythatKissinger'sanalysisleavesout:(1)therole
ofthedemocraticprocessingarneringlegitimacyfordefiningandpursuingthe"nationalinterest"(2)theroleofpublic
internationallawinaddressingconflictthroughinstitutionaldesignandconsensusbuildingandfinally,(3)theburgeoning
roleof"transformative"diplomacy,inotherwords,thecontributionsof"citizendiplomats"whochangenotonlytherulesbut
alsothecontoursoftheplayingfielditselfbyworkingoutsideformalgovernmentalnegotiationchannels.
TheEssayrejectsKissinger'simplicitimageofpowerinforeignaffairsasastackofpokerchipsinthegameofnations,
andpositsinsteadanimageofpowerasprocessthatsuggeststhepossibilityofgametransformingmovesaswellaspoint
scoringmoves.TheauthorconcludesbyframingconflictintheinternationalsphereneitherasthenorminaHobbesianjungle
norasanaberrationinaworldofpeaceandunderstanding,butratherasaninevitablebyproductoftheinteractionofstates
andotherentitiesthatcanbemanagedwiselyandcreatively.[*140]DiplomacybyHenryKissinger.NewYork:Simon&
Schuster.1994.912pp.$35.00(hardcover).
HenryKissinger'sDiplomacyisthelatestinstallmentintheformerSecretaryofState'ssearchforausablepast.n1
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Kissingerdoesnotpurporttopredictthefuture,butratheroffersinstructiveexamples,dissectsmistakes,andattemptsto
vindicateparticularhistoricalactors,includingbutnotlimitedtohimself.
TheEssaybeginswithadiscussionofKissinger'sperspective,andhowonemightsituateDiplomacyinthecontextof
howotherpractitioners,historians,andsocialscientistswriteaboutAmericanforeignpolicy.Kissinger'sbookisbothmemoir
andhistoryitcombinesthereminiscencesofaconsummateinsiderwiththereflectionsofanacademicobserver.Diplomacy
simultaneouslyembodiesthetwodominanttraditionsfoundinnarrativeanalysesofAmericanforeignrelations:thepersonal,
anecdotal"portraitgallery"ofelites,n2aswellasaseeminglydispassionateanalysisoftheimpersonalworkingsofwhat
Kissingerlovestocall"geopolitics."n3
TheEssaygoesontohighlightthreeaspectsofacontemporaryunderstandingofdiplomacythatKissinger'sanalysis
leavesout:(1)theroleofthedemocraticprocessingarneringlegitimacyfordefiningandpursuingthe"nationalinterest"(2)
theroleofpublicinternationallawinaddressingconflictthroughinstitutionaldesignandconsensusbuildingandfinally,
(3)theburgeoningroleof"transformative"diplomacy,inotherwords,the[*141]contributionsof"citizendiplomats"who
changenotonlytherulesbutalsothecontoursoftheplayingfielditselfthroughtheirworkoutsideformalgovernmental
negotiationchannels.n4WhileKissinger'svisionencompassesthebackroomdiplomacyofSecretaryofStateJamesBaker
duringtheGulfCrisis,itdoesnotextendtothecitizendiplomacyofJimmyCarterinHaiti.Kissingertakesaccountofthe
summitdiplomacyofReykjavik,butnotthebackchanneldiplomacyoftheOsloConnection.n5Tomorrow'sdiplomacywill
needtotakeinthewholespectrumastransnationalactivitycontinuestochallengetraditionalnotionsofsovereignty.
I.KissingerinContext:WritingAboutAmericanForeignPolicy

Diplomacyoffersastimulating,ifsometimesexasperating,explorationofanunderstudiedaspectoftheAmericanexperience:
theparadoxofhowAmerica'svisionofitsroleintheworldholdsusbackevenasthatvisionconstitutesourmainstrength.
AlthoughtheheartofKissinger'sbookisitssweepingdepictionoftheriseandfalloftheConcertofEurope'selaborate
balanceofpowersystem,itsmissionistotellussomethingaboutourselvesasAmericans.
ThethemesthatrunthroughDiplomacywarnaboutthelimitationsofwhatKissingerperceivestobeapeculiarly
Americanworldview:amoralisticselfabsorption,adeepsuspicionofhistory,andanaiveandidealisticfaithinthevalueof
goodintentions.[*142]
Kissingersummarizesthisoutlookas"Americanexceptionalism,"andcontrastsitunfavorablywiththehardheaded,
pragmaticrealismofAmerica'snineteenthcenturyEuropeancounterparts.n6Hisbriefisbothdescriptiveandprescriptive:In
additiontoexaminingastaggeringvarietyofhistoricaleventsthroughhishighlypolishedlensofRealpolitik,heprodsusto
learnfromothers'mistakes,andtoavoidputtingtoomuchfaithinlegaldocuments,cordialrelations,orhighminded
principles.n7Inshort,thebookisdesignedasanextendedtutorialoftheNewWorldbytheOldintheeffectivedeploymentof
power.Likeanyrebelliousadolescentsubjectedtounsolicitedadvice,however,theNewWorldmaynottakeawaythelessons
thetutorintends.
ThehistoryofAmericanforeignpolicyisrepletewithintriguingdualities:powerversuslawisolationismversus
internationalismrealismversusidealismmoralprincipleversusRealpolitikandvisionsofcooperativesecurityversusthe
primacyofnationalsovereignty.Commentatorsandhistoriansontheleftofthepoliticalspectrum,suchasWilliamAppleman
WilliamsandGabrielKolko,tendtofocustheircritiquesontheinternalmotorsdrivingforeignpolicydecisionmaking,suchas
therapacityofcorporateandotherspecialinterests,thecontinuousneedfornewmarketsanddocilesuppliersofrawmaterials,
andtheutilityofperiodicnationalemergenciesforcrackingdownondomesticdissent.These"internalist"analysesofU.S.
foreignpolicygrowoutoftheirauthors'broaderpoliticalperspectivesonAmericancultureandsociety.n8Bycontrast,
"externalist"analysts,manyofthemformerpractitionerssuchasGeorgeKennan,GeorgeShultz,andKissingerhimself,
emphasizetheexogenousconstraintsimposedbytheinternationalsystemandtheessentialHobbesianamoralityofforeign
affairs.n9Theirconcernsusuallyreflectthepoliticalprioritiesofrightwingactivists:increaseddefensebudgets,ColdWar
interventionism,andlately,[*143]postColdWarisolationism.Often,analystsofU.S.foreignrelationsreproduceandextend
thecontraststheypurporttodissect.Withina"powerversuslaw"ora"realistversusidealist"duality,forinstance,an
"internalist"criticmightfocusontheneedtostrengthenrespectforinternationallaw,whilean"externalist"pessimistwould
stresstheirrelevanceofanyconsiderationbeyondsheerpowerpolitics.
Inadditiontosubstantive(powerversuslaw)andpolitical(internalistversusexternalist)dualities,writingabout
Americanforeignpolicyalsooffersmethodologicaldualities:historiansversussocialscientistsacademicsversus
practitionersandlawyersversusdiplomats.Historiansgenerallycreditgovernmentdecisionmakerswithmorecoherentintent
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thandosocialscientists,whilesocialscientistsaremorelikelytoemphasizethebureaucraticandorganizationalconstraintson
individualchoice.n10Lawyers,aparticularhobbyhorseofKissinger's,inhisviewtendtosettoomuchstorebylegislation,
whileprofessionaldiplomatsdisplaytoomuchdeferencetoprotocolandestablishedprocedures.n11
OneofthemostilluminatingaspectsofKissinger'sbookishowhisparsingofsomeofthesedualitiestransformsour
understandingofpreviousworkinthisfield.Forexample,underKissinger'sanalysis,thelongrunningdebateaboutAmerica's
isolationismversusitsinternationalismsuddenlyseemsofmarginalconcern.n12Forhim,isolationismandinternationalismare
bothexpressionsofthesamedeeprootedmoralismintheAmericanworldview.Whileisolationistslookinward,seekingto
perfectdemocracyathome,internationalistsseetheUnitedStatesasamissionary[*144]crusadingforthebenefitof
humanity.EachapproachisanexpressionofAmericanexceptionalism,stemmingfromavisionoftheAmericanpolityasa
microcosmforhumanity,possessedofuniversallyapplicableandinnatelysuperiorvalues.n13ThisAmericanexceptionalismis
inturnafoilforEuropeanrealism,whichlookstocontingentexpressionsofnationalinterestsratherthanuniversally
applicableprinciplesforguidanceonforeignpolicy.PartoftheappealofKissinger'sidealism/realismdualityisthatitdefies
thetraditionalleftrightcategoriesthatoftenobscuremorethantheyreveal.Forexample,asKissingerexplainsit,Ronald
Reaganbelongsinthemoralistic,visionarycamp,whileRichardNixonturnsupinthebunkerswithotherpractitionersof
EuropeanstyleRealpolitik.Kissingerconfusestheissuessomewhatwithsloppyequationsofterminology:moralist=idealist
=optimist.ThisformulaisproblematicforafiguresuchasTheodoreRoosevelt,whomJohnMiltonCooperpersuasively
showstobeanidealist,butwhoremainsthequintessentialrealistinKissinger'sview.n14
Kissinger'suseofideologicalcategoriesisinterestingonlyinsofarashehighlightsthesometimessurprisingcrosscutting
cleavagesamongthem.Whatismostdisappointingistheextenttowhichheletsthesecategorieslimithim.Kissingerposes,
forexample,abinarychoicebetweenmoralismandpragmatism,realismandoptimism.Yetitisarguablytherealistwhoisalso
anoptimistwhowilldominatethediplomaticgameinthenextcenturythe"ultimatelystrategic"playerwhocanputherself
inotherplayers'shoesandanticipatetheirmoves,yetalsoenvisionatransformedfutureofcollaborativeeffort.n15Itis
preciselythisindividualwhomgametheoretic"rationalactor"modelstellusshouldnotexist,muchlessthrive,ina
competitiveuniverse.This"transformativediplomacy"becomespossiblewhenfactorsthatwereformerlyfixedorslowto
changeininternationalnegotiations,suchastheplayers,context,orinterestsatstake,become[*145]variables.n16Kissinger's
balanceofpowerparadigmhasnowayofengagingthiskindoftransformativediplomacyhisapproachislikeamapistoan
interactivecomputergame:astaticmodelversusadynamicone.
II.Kissinger'sApproach:EverythingYouWantedtoKnowAbout"Geopolitics"

Kissinger'sbookhastwoparts,woventogetherthroughouthisnarrativeratherthanpresentedindistinctsections.Hefirst
tracesthefortunesofwhatheconsidersthekeyconceptindiplomatichistory,thenotionofthebalanceofpower,fromits
inceptionintheseventeenthcenturytoitsdemiseinthefirsthalfofthetwentieth.n17Kissingerexplainsthattheprimarygoal
ofthisbalancingperspectivewastopreservetheinternationalorder,notbypreventingconflicts,butbylimitingthem.n18He
definesabalanceofpowersystemasastateof"geopoliticalequilibrium"whereinstatesactingintheirownselfinterest
achievegreaterstabilitythanideologicallymotivatedactorsactivelypursuingpeace.n19Secondlyandmoretendentiously,
KissingerexploreshowU.S.foreignpolicyisaffectedby[*146]America'srejectionofthisEuropeanbalanceofpower
worldviewandofthatsystem'sunderlying"realist"philosophyofinternationalrelations.
Diplomacy'sstructureisingenious.TheformerSecretaryofStateframeshisenterprisethroughopeningandconcluding
chaptersonAmerica'sroleinpostColdWarpowerpolitics.HeplacestheentirenarrativeinanAmericancontextbysetting
upthecentralcontrastbetweenidealismandrealismasacontestbetweenthevisions,styles,andachievementsoftwo
Americanpresidents:WoodrowWilsonandTheodoreRoosevelt.n20Kissingercanthenreferbacktotheconceptsintroduced
inhisopeninganalysisashetakesupthechronologicalnarrativethatoccupiesmostoftherestofthebook.Thiscross
referencinggreatlyclarifieshisdiscussionsoftheoftenarcanepoliticalmachinationsofeighteenthandnineteenthcentury
statecraft.n21
Kissingerengaginglyoutlinesthecollapseofmedievalaspirationstoauniversalchurchandempiretheriseofthe
Europeansystemofnationstatestheadoption,afterthePeaceofWestphaliaof1648,ofraisond'etatasaguidingprincipleof
statecraftandtheimpactofEnlightenmentthinkingabouttheessentiallycompetitivenatureofthehumancondition.These
disparatedevelopmentsallculminatedinthe"newworldorder'inauguratedattheCongressofViennaattheendofthe
Napoleonicwarsin1814,andinthedevelopmentoftheCongresssystemasthegreatpinnacleofwhatKissingercalls
"geopoliticalequilibrium."Kissingercombineshisnarrativeofgreateventsandtrendswithvividprofilesofthevirtuosiwho
weretheantecedents,architectsandpreserversofthebalanceofpowersystemamongthemCardinalRichelieu,withwhom
theauthorseemsto[*147]identifyWilliamofOrangetheyoungerPittMetternichDisraeliandBismarck.n22
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Thebook'stitleissomewhatmisleading.Diplomacyisfarfrombeinganinsider'staxonomyoftheprotocol,methods,and
tacticsdeployedintheconductofinternationalrelations,despiteitsdedicationto"themenandwomenoftheForeignService."
n23ThereislittleofthesmokefilledroominKissinger'sapproach,anditwillfalltoanotherauthortoproduceatributetothe
colorfulworldofthe"stripedpantsboys"whoonceconductedAmericanforeignpolicy,evenasdiplomacy'srarefied
provenanceyieldstonegotiationsviasummitandmodem.Kissingerpreferstostakeoutaroleasamodernphilosopherof
greatpowerrelationships.But,asdiscussedintheremainderofthisEssay,hisconceptionofthebalanceofpowerderivesfrom
avisionofpowerthatisamuchmorelimitedandhistoricallycontingentconstructthanheiseverwillingtoconcede.
ThisEssaynextexploressomeoftheterrainleftunmappedbyKissinger'satlas,namely(1)theroleofdemocraticvalues
inlegitimizingthepursuitofthenationalinterest,and(2)theroleofpublicinternationallawinaddressingconflict,bothasan
"anchor"toconsolidateexistingconsensusandasa"sail"toleadtheinternationalcommunityintonewwaterswherefuture
consensusmightbepossible.n24TheEssayconcludesbyillustratingtherestrictivenessofKissinger'sboundariesthrough
sketchingout,asacounterexample,asetofinternationalnegotiationswherehiscategorieshavesharplydiminished
explanatorypower.
A.TheLimitsofKissinger'sNotionofLegitimacy

PerhapsKissingerisattachedtothebalanceofpowerideabecauseheinternalizeditasthestandardforinternationalrelations
inhisintellectually[*148]formativeyears.n25HearguesthatthegenesisofWorldWarIlaynotinthisequilibriummodel's
inherentlimitationsinthefaceofincreasingdemocracyandnationalistpassions,butratherinGreatBritain'slossofinterestin
maintainingthebalance,andintheGermanEmpire'slackofinterestinpanderingtoit.Similarly,WorldWarIIwasunleashed
becauseAmericawassuspiciousoftheconceptof"balance,"andbecauseBritainwasnolongercapableofrestoringit.
KissingerarguesthatwearenowinamultipolarworldthatagainmakesaMetternichianbalancingactdesirable:"atimewhen
Americaisableneithertodominatetheworldnortowithdrawfromit."n26
Yetentanglingalliancesmayexacerbateconflictsamonghostileregimesanddragstatesintowarinsteadofkeepingthem
safeandpeaceful.WhilethebalanceofpowermayhaveservedEuropeandiplomacyintheeighteenthandnineteenth
centuries,itseemsbizarretoharkbacktothatnarrowandcontingenteraofregionalhistory,asKissingerdoes,asifitwerea
universaldefaultplanforinternationalpolitics.Themostglaringanachronismresultingfromsounwarrantedageneralization
isthewayinwhichKissingerconsistentlyignoresdomesticconsiderationsandthesocialandeconomictransformationsthat
madeupthecontextofforeignpolicies.
Forexample,themuchadmiredRichelieu'slegacyincludedabrutalseriesofcivilwarsfinancedbyoppressivetaxes.
Ensuingdomesticunrestwasinturncrushedbyarelentlessdespotism.Kissingerconsistentlyrefusestopursuethe
implicationsofthedomesticideologiesofthoseregimesheholdsupasforeignpolicymodels,writingasthoughforeignand
domesticpoliciesexistedinwhollyseparatespheres.n27
WhenKissingerwritesof"sharedvalues"intheconductofforeignrelationsduringtheeighteenthandnineteenth
centuries,heoftenexplains[*149]thattheleadersintheseerashadcomplementaryperceptionsoftheirrespectivenational
interests.Yetamongthe"sharedvalues"oftheleadersattheCongressofViennawasabitterhostilitytoliberal
constitutionalismandnationalselfdetermination.AsKissingerputsit,thepeaceofEuropedeterioratedbecausestatesmen
fromBismarckon"ignoredMetternich'soldpieties:thatintheinterestofstabilitythelegitimatecrownedheadsofthestatesof
Europehadtobepreserved,thatnationalandliberalmovementshadtobesuppressed,andthat,aboveall,relationsamong
stateshadtobedeterminedbyconsensusamonglikemindedrulers."n28Severalpageslaterhedefineslegitimacyas"the
principleoftheunityofconservativerulersthathadmitigatedtheharshnessofthebalanceofpowersystemduring
theMetternichyears."n29ThereisnosenseinKissinger'sanalysisthattheconceptoflegitimacyhadbeenundergoingadrastic
transitionduringthisera,fromanintrinsicfeatureofthebloodlinesofheadsofstatetoamoreamorphousqualityinherentin
theworkingsofthedemocraticprocess.Legitimacybecamesomethingthatcouldbegeneratedbyadulyelectedparliament,
say,orevenmoreradically,somethingresidingwiththepeoplethemselves.n30
Itwasnot,asKissingerimpliesthroughouthisargument,becauseofunskillfuladministrationthatthisequilibriummodel
hadfailedbythebeginningofthetwentiethcentury.Instead,itwasbecausethehermeticallysealedpoliticalapparatusof
eighteenthandnineteenthcenturyEuropewasthrownintochaosbyincreasingdemocracy.Between1650and1850inEurope,
transnationalinterestswerealsominimal,theconductofforeignpolicywasinthehandsofatinyelitewhosharedtiesof
bloodandmarriage,andpublicopinionandnationalismdidnotplaymuchofarole.Themessyvicissitudesofpublicopinion
wereanathematothetightlycontrolledimageofthenationstateasahomogenous,unitary"actor"ontheworldstage.
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Kissingerisanunrepentantadherentofthe"greatman"theoryofhistorythenotionthatthereiswisdomforthepresent
instudyingthechoicesofleaderspast.Thisapproachrestsonthetheorythathistorical[*150]leadersactuallymadechoices
andthatthesechoicesmattered.n31Thereisofcourseadistinguishedtradition,reachingsomethingofanapexinMachiavelli's
Discourses,ofusing"greatman"historyasateacherofstatecraft.n32Certainly,itwouldbeavirtualcontradictionintermsto
adopta"grassroots"approachtodiplomacyinatextcoveringanyerabeforeWorldWarIIindeed,thefieldofdiplomacyis
oftenusedasanexampleoftheultimatein"highpolitics."Thestudyofinternationalrelationsingeneralsimplydoesnotlend
itselftothesamekindof"bottomup"socialhistoryorwiderangingintellectualhistorythatispossiblewithdomesticissues.
YetrecentinterdisciplinaryworksuchasBenedictAnderson'sImaginedCommunitiessuggeststhatthereareways,other
thanstudyingthelifeandtrialsofgreatmen,tothinkandwriteabouthowleadersmightdiscoverandpursuethenational
interestintherealmofforeignaffairs.n33Anderson'ssyntheticinquiryintohowconceptionsof"thenation"areshapedboils
downtoasharednotionof"nationalinterests"onthelevelofakindofculturalcommunion,andhedevotesmostofhisshort
booktodissectinghowthisprocessworks.UnlikeKissinger,however,Andersonshowshow,atleastsincethemidnineteenth
century,nationalinterestshavebeendistilledbymeansofaniterative,interactiveprocessbetweenelitesandmasses.n34While
Kissinger'sconcludingchaptercentersaroundacallforredefiningAmerica'snationalinterests,thereisnosenseofhowthis
redefinitionmighthappen,wherenationalinterestscomefrom,andbywhatprocesstheyareabletochangeovertime.Once
democraticprocessesbecomethemajorsourceoflegitimacyforpolicy,equilibriumtheoriesthat[*151]seestatesas
monolithicactorssubjecttothewhimofisolated,secretivedecisionmakersaremissingabigpieceoftheexplanatorypuzzle.
Kissingerrealizesthisonsomelevel,ashedidina1973speechwhereheobservedthat"noforeignpolicynomatter
howingenioushasanychanceofsuccessifitisborninthemindsofafewandcarriedintheheartsofnone."n35Hefalls
shortbothintheoryandinpractice,howeverinbothhiscurrentMachiavelliandiscoursesandinhisearlierappliedstatecraft
thatreliedonsecretbombingsand"doublebookkeeping"whenitcomestoworkingthroughtheimplicationsofdemocratic
legitimacyforAmericandiplomacy.n36Kissingerwritesthattoday,theUnitedStates

findsitselfincreasinglyinaworldwithnumeroussimilaritiestonineteenthcenturyEurope,albeitonaglobalscale.Onecan
hopethatsomethingakintotheMetternichsystemevolves,inwhichabalanceofpowerisreinforcedbyasharedsenseof
values.Andinthemodernage,thesevalueswouldhavetobedemocratic.n37

Inotherwords,hewantshisconceptionsoflegitimacyandsharedvaluestobeintegratedwithdemocracy.Yet,especially
whereKissinger'snarrowdefinitionsoflegitimacyandsharedvaluesevolvedinexplicitlyantidemocraticcontexts,one
cannothelpbutfeelthatthe"democratic"featureisasomewhatincongruousaddonthatKissingerdoesnotreallyfeelthisin
hisheart.n38
B.LimitingConflictThroughPublicInternationalLaw

DiplomacyalsodisplaysKissinger'sownbrandofAmericanexceptionalism.Whenheassertsthatanaiveandidealistic
alternativetoRealpolitik[*152]isanexclusivelyAmericanvision,heignoresasignificantstrandofinternationalrelations
theorythatmakesitshomeintheunderstudiedrealmofpublicinternationallaw.Forexample,thetraditionofdeveloping
criteriaforjustandunjustwars,extendingbacktotheologianssuchasSaintAugustine(354430)andSaintThomasAquinas
(12251274),wasawellarticulatedbodyofworkbythemidseventeenthcentury.JuristssuchasHugoGrotius(15831645)
andtheologianssuchasFranciscoSuarez(15481617)analyzedthenatureofaggression,selfdefense,andtheprotectionof
civiliansininternationalconflict.Thesescholars'explorationsofmoderateconsensualregulationallofwhichenvisioneda
significantroleformoralconsiderationsaretheheritageofnineteenthcenturystatesmensuchasWilliamGladstone,aswell
asthetwentiethcenturyHagueandGenevaConventions.n39
Kissingeroughttohavepaidmoreattentiontothis"Grotiantradition."n40Inhisfirstbook,heobservedthat"whenever
peaceconceivedastheavoidanceofwarhasbeentheprimaryobjectiveofapoweroragroupofpowers,theinternational
systemhasbeenatthemercyofthemostruthlessmemberoftheinternationalcommunity."n41Thisstarkstatementofthe
"prisoner'sdilemma"dynamicinherentininternationalconflicthighlightsanimportantpoint:Lawmustembodypreexisting
valuesitcannotcreatevalues,orcommunity,ormoralitywherenoneexists.n42Yetwheredotheseunderlyingvaluescome
from,andhowcantheyeverevolveovertime?Perhapslawandlegalinstitutionscanplaytherolethat[*153]Kissingerinsists
individualleadersandstatesmenmustplayvisavistheirdomesticconstituencies:tobeoutaheadofthecommunitythat
supportsthem,justnotsofaraheadastolosetouchwiththe"wellspringsof[their]motivation."n43
KissingeriscontemptuousofutopianAmericanvisionsof"aglobalinternationalorderbasedondemocracy,free
commerce,andinternationallaw."n44Lawhasatleastthreepotentiallybeneficialfunctionsintheinternationalarena,yet
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Kissingerseemsblindtoallofthem:(1)toactasaconstraintonaction(2)asawayofjustifyingorlegitimizingactionand
(3)asofferingstructure,process,andforum.n45Tobesure,sweepinglegalisticprescriptionssuchastheKelloggBriandPact
of1928areeasytargetsforderision.n46WhatismoreinterestingisnotwhyaccordssuchastheGenevaConventions,theLaw
oftheSeaConvention,ortheNuclearNonProliferationTreatysooftenfallshortoftheirsignatories'hopes,butwhytheyeven
doanythingatall.n47Justaswiththe"realisticoptimist"mentionedinthefirstsectionofthisEssay,n48theseinternational
legalregimesshouldnotevenexistunderKissinger'srubric,muchlessfunctionbeneficially,andhisanalysishasnothingto
sayaboutthemthatwouldhelpusreplicateorextendtheirsuccesses.
C.AnAlternativeApproachtotheProblemofPowerinInternationalRelations

PowerforKissingerseemstoencompassatleasttwodistinctconcepts:astatusofcontrollingsuperiorresourcesvisavisone's
perceivedcompetitors,andaprocessofsuccessfullymatchinggoalstoresources.Thus,Diplomacydefinessuccessful
statecraftastherecognitionandacceptanceofthelimitsofone'sownpower(powerasstatus),butalsoastheactivityofsetting
prioritiesamongcompetingnationalinterests,realisticallycalculatingresources,andaligninginterestsandresources(poweras
process).Kissingerfavorstheprocessdefinition,mostmemorablyinthelastlineof[*154]thebookwherehequotesaSpanish
proverbthatsays,"Traveler,therearenoroads.Roadsaremadebywalking."n49YetKissingerfailstoexploretheimplications
ofthiswayofthinking,bothforimaginingthefutureofAmericanforeignpolicyandforexplainingitspast.
Powerasstatusandpowerasprocessarebothlinkedtoeffectivelyexertinginfluenceinacompetitiveworld.Themore
dynamic"process"definition,however,suggeststhepotentialforanexpandedapproachtothinkingabouttheproblemof
power,anapproachwhichcouldtranscendthenotionofthesuccessfulmanipulationofresources.
Amoreexpansivedefinitionoftheconceptof"power"could,forexample,encompassthepowerofideasinforeign
policythepowerofa"specialrelationship"betweenalliesthepoweroflegitimacyinademocracyorthepowerofdeft
timingincapitalizingonauniquelyfluidhistoricalmoment,suchastheendoftheSecondWorldWar,asdiscussedbelow.
Thesefactorsamounttomorethanamodernwayofthinkingaboutwhatconstitutesa"resource."Deployedjudiciously,they
havethepotentialtochangethegamefromazerosumtugofwar,wheremoreforonestateequalslessforanother,intoajoint
journeytowardtheParetofrontier,wherestatesnegotiateoveranexpandingsetofoptions.n50
Thenotionoftransformativediplomacycanbeillustratedconcretelywithabriefexamplefromtherealmofeconomic
diplomacy,bymeansofascenariothatshouldnothavebeenpossibleunderKissinger'snotionof"geopolitics."n51Arguably
themostsalientdevelopmentininternationalrelationsinthelasthalfcentury,intermsofbothitsimpactonpeople'sdaily
livesanditsimplicationsforthefuture,hasbeentheregimeforthemanagementofinternationaleconomicsthatemergedfrom
theBrettonWoodsAgreementof1944.n52Aglanceathowthatagreementwas[*155]negotiatedsuggestsanalternative
visionoftheroleofpowerindiplomacy.BritishandAmericanexpertswithvaryingdegreesofKeynesianorientation,suchas
HarryDexterWhiteandotherofficialsworkingunderTreasurySecretaryHenryMorgenthau(andofcourse,ontheBritish
side,Keyneshimself!),brokethroughearlierimpassestomoveAngloAmericandialogueawayfromthecontentioustrade
issuesthathadstallednegotiationsinthepast.Theyarticulatedasetoffreshideasaboutmonetarypolicyandaboutthe
organizationofthepostwarindustrialeconomies.Theseideasmarginalizeddifferencesandadvancedagreementonawide
rangeofpostwaraims.Thesepolicyexpertsfoundamiddlegroundbetweenlaissezfaireandinterventionismbasedona
robustconsensusthatNewDealassumptionsaboutthedomesticeconomycouldbeusefullyappliedintheinternationalarena.
Diplomacydoesnottakeplaceintheabstractitunfoldsintheparticular.TheBrettonWoodsexampleillustrateswaysin
whichKissinger'sdense,amalgamatedconceptsof"power"and"nationalinterest"canusefullybedisaggregatedand
redefined.ConsidertheBritishpositionintheBrettonWoodsscenario:Theyfoundpowerinanewoption,poweringood
timing,powerinthestrongworkingrelationshipbetweenBritainandtheUnitedStates,andpowerinthelegitimacyof
drawingonthememoryoftheirpasteconomicdominance,allfaroutofproportiontotheirresourcesasanation.Thesekinds
offactors,whiletheycouldnotmake,say,postwarBritain"morepowerful"thantheUnitedStatesintheabstract,nevertheless
helpexplainhowsmallstatesareroutinelyabletoleveragebigonesinspecificcases.
Thistransformativeperspectiveondiplomacywasalsoanoutgrowthoftheoptimistic"AtlanticCharter"ideologythat
exploredtheouterboundsofchangeatasingularlyflexiblehistoricaljuncture.n53TheUnitedStates,aswhatpolitical
scientistswouldcallan"ascendinghegemonicpower,"naturallysoughttobuildasystemconsonantwithitsinterests.n54But
to[*156]showhowagivenoutcomeadvancedtheinterestsofaparticularnationorgroupisnotsufficienttoexplainthat
outcome.n55Whilepowerstructuresandinterestgroupsmatter,thereareturningpointswhere"uncertaintiesaboutpower
structuresandunhappinesswithpastorcurrentdefinitionsofinterestsprovideopeningsforrethinking."n56
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AcontemporaryexampleoftheBrettonWoodsphenomenonisthenotionofsecondtrack,"transformative"diplomacy:
contacts,connections,andconciliationamongprivatesectorprofessionals,secondtierofficialswithsubstantiveexpertise,and
activistsinnongovernmentalorganizations.n57Thevalueoftheseinformalrolesisperhapsbestillustratedbywhathascome
tobeknownasthe"OsloConnection,"leadingtotheMideastPeacePactofSeptember1993,signedbyYitzhakRabinof
IsraelandYasirArafatofthePalestineLiberationOrganization.Inthelate1980s,aNorwegianacademichadextendeda
standingoffertoputanIsraelifriendintouchwithseniorPalestinianofficials,anoffertheIsraelioppositionmemberaccepted
uponbecomingDeputyForeignMinisterin1993.TheeffortsoftheNorwegianacademicandhiscolleaguesledtoNorway
servingasabehindthescenesconduitfordirecttalksbetweentheIsraeligovernmentandthePLO.Participantsinthoseback
channelnegotiationsemphasizedthattheinformalatmosphereandtheconfidentialnatureofthediscussionsweremajor
factorsintheirsuccess.n58Thefresh,forwardlooking,problemsolvingorientationofthelowprofile,nongovernmentalactors
intheOsloConnectionstorymakesKissinger'snostalgicdescriptionsofelite,highpoliticalminuetsseemmustyandoutdated.
III.Conclusion:TheTransformativePowerofProcess

Kissinger'sapproachinonesensevaluesprocessoverstatus:Itisbetter,byhislights,toseekaperpetuationofabalanceof
powerratherthanattemptsomesortofultimateresolutionofconflict.Buthedoesnotgofarenoughintermsof
conceptualizingwhat"process"reallymeans.For[*157]him,the"power"componentofhisbalanceofpowerformulaismore
likeasubstantiveentitythatistransferredamongcontendingplayerslikechipsinapokergame.Asnoted,thisisazerosum
notion,wheremoreforoneplayermeanslessforanother.Inaddition,Kissinger'sassumptionsaboutdiplomacy'splayers,
rules,andtheboundsoftheplayingfielditselfarehistoricallycontingentandincreasinglyirrelevant.Today,theexerciseof
powerintheinternationalarenaencompassesgameshapingandgametransformingmovesaswellaspointscoringmoves.
TheBrettonWoodsexampleshowssomethingofhowanalternativeapproachmightbegleanedfromthesamepostwar
historicalmoment.BrettonWoodswouldbeavirtuallyinexplicableanomalyundermoretraditionalmodelsofinternational
relations.A"process"focuseschewsboththesoftheadedmoralismthatKissingerdecrieswhereconflictistreatedasan
aberrationtobebanishedaswellasthesterile,Hobbesianrealismheadvocates,whereconflictisseenasthenorm.Itpoints
toathirdapproachthatviewsconflictneitherasadevianceresultingfromfalseconsciousnessinanotherwiseharmonious
world,norasthedefaultconditionprevailingbetweennaturallyantagonisticnationsandindividuals.Toillustratewitha
prosaicexamplefromtheenvironmentalfield,underthiswayofthinking,conflictismorelikegarbage:Everycommunity
producesit,andwisemanagementrequiresproceduresthatminimizehowmuchisgeneratedinthefirstplace,thendisposeof
therestsafely.n59Itwouldnotbe"natural,"however,foracommunitytoproducenogarbageatallnorwoulditbenaturalfor
wasteproductionandmanagementtobethedominantfocusofacommunity'slife.
ThisalternativeorientationtakesthehistorianSimonSchamauponhisdelightfullyexpressedadvicetoKissingerto
concentratehisgazeonthatjuncture"wherethebeadyeyedmeetsthestarryeyed."n60Itisaperspectiveanimatednotso
muchbyanidealistichopefulnessthatobstacleswillnotarise,asbyapragmaticoptimismthatpeoplecanfindawayaround
theobstaclesthatinevitablydoarise.
SuchanapproachpartakesofKissinger'sanalysisthatAmericanthinkingonforeignrelationshasbeenatriumphoffaith
overexperience,butitdivergesfromhisviewinseeingacontinuing,positiveroleforAmericanexceptionalism.Uponbeing
sworninasSecretaryofStateashisparentslookedon,GermanimmigrantandHolocaustrefugeeHenryKissingerremarked
thataprofessionalascendancysuchashisowncouldonlyhave[*158]happenedinAmerica.n61Yetwerewetotakethe
adviceKissingeroffersinDiplomacy,wewouldundercuttheveryaspectsoftheAmericantraditionthatmakethistradition
worthpreserving,andworthsummoninginemotionalswearinginceremonies.Kissinger'sconceptionsoflegitimacy,of
internationallawandofpowerareultimatelytoonarrowtogeneratethekindofpolicyAmericanscouldever"carryintheir
hearts."n62Similarly,hisuseofsecrecyandduplicityduringhistenureasSecretaryofState,oftenas"shortcuts"togood
outcomes,fundamentallyunderminedthelegitimacyofthoseoutcomes.Weshouldlistencarefullytothetalesofthis
experiencedtraveler,andthenchooseanotherpath.

LegalTopics:
Forrelatedresearchandpracticematerials,seethefollowinglegaltopics:
CivilProcedurePartiesInterventionGeneralOverviewCivilProcedureDiscoveryMethodsForeignDiscoveryInternational
LawSovereignStates&IndividualsGeneralOverview
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FOOTNOTES:

n1.AnalyzinghistoryasapossiblekeytoactionisanintellectualprojectoflongstandingpedigreeforKissinger.Hebeganhishistoricaland
philosophicalinquirywithhisundergraduatethesis,TheMeaningofHistory:ReflectionsonSpengler,ToynbeeandKant(1951)(unpublished
UndergraduateThesis,WidenerLibrary,HarvardUniversity),anddeepenedhisquestthroughhisdoctoraldissertation,Peace,Legitimacy,andthe
Equilibrium:AStudyoftheStatesmanshipofCastlereaghandMetternich(1954),submittedtoHarvardUniversityin1954andpublishedin1957as
AWorldRestored:Metternich,CastlereaghandtheProblemsofPeace181222(1957)[hereinafterKissinger,AWorldRestored].Kissinger
continuedtopublishassortedarticlesonrelatedthemesuntilheleftHarvardforWashingtonin1968seeespeciallyHenryA.Kissinger,The
ConservativeDilemma:ReflectionsonthePoliticalThoughtofMetternich,48Am.Pol.Sci.Rev.1017(1954)HenryA.Kissinger,TheCongressof
Vienna:AReappraisal,8WorldPol.264(19551956)HenryA.Kissinger,ReflectionsonPowerandDiplomacy,inTheDimensionsofDiplomacy
17(E.A.J.Johnsoned.,1964)HenryA.Kissinger,ClassicalDiplomacy,inPowerandOrder:6CasesinWorldPolitics1(JohnG.Stoessinger&
AlanF.Westineds.,1964)HenryA.Kissinger,TheWhiteRevolutionary:ReflectionsonBismarck,97Daedalus888(1968).

n2.ThehistorianSimonSchamahasdescribedDiplomacyas"asortofdiplomaticportraitgallery."SimonSchama,TheGamesofGreatMen,New
Yorker,May2,1994,at93(reviewingKissinger'sDiplomacy).Seeinfranotesandaccompanyingtextforadiscussionofthecontinuingvalidityof
"greatman"theoriesofhistory.

n3.OnKissinger'suseoftheterm"geopolitics,"seeinfranote.

n4.Thisnongovernmentalresolutionofpublicdisputes,orresolutionby"secondtier"expertsorofficialswithoutformalnegotiatingauthority,is
alsosometimesreferredtoas"tracktwodiplomacy."See,e.g.,PhilipD.Stewart,TheDartmouthConference:U.S.U.S.S.R.Relations,inForeign
Serv.Inst.,U.S.Dep'tofState,ConflictResolution:TrackTwoDiplomacy21(JohnW.McDonald,Jr.&DianeB.Bendahmaneeds.,1987)John
W.McDonald,FurtherExplorationofTrackTwoDiplomacy(July1989)(unpublishedworkingpaperonfilewiththeStanfordCenteronConflict
andNegotiation).

n5.TheReykjavicSummitofOctober1986betweenRonaldReaganandMikhailGorbachevwasatraditionalmeetingofheadsofstate,whilethe
socalled"OsloConnection,"seeinfratextaccompanyingnote,wasa"secondtrack"associationoflowerlevelofficials,academics,andother
expertsmeetingtodiscussPalestinianIsraelirelations.Other"secondtrack"diplomaticroleswouldincludetechnicalexperts,informationgatherers
fornongovernmentalorganizations,andconvenersofsmall,behindthescenesconferencessuchasthosesponsoredbytheStanfordCenteron
ConflictandNegotiation,theHarvardNegotiationProject,ortheCarterCenteratEmoryUniversity.See,e.g.,HerbertC.Kelman,Contributionsof
anUnofficialConflictResolutionEfforttotheIsraeliPalestinianBreakthrough,11NegotiationJ.19(1995)FrameworkforaPublicPeaceProcess:
TowardaPeacefulIsraeliPalestinianRelationship(1991)(FrameworkAgreementfacilitatedbyHaroldSaunders,formerAssistantSecretaryof
StateforNearEasternandSouthAsianAffairsavailableatStanfordCenteronConflictandNegotiation).

n6.SeeHenryKissinger,Diplomacy46,67(1994)[hereinafterKissinger,Diplomacy].

n7.Seeid.at1819.

n8.ThereisasubtlebutimportantdifferencebetweentheperspectivesofKolkoandWilliams.Williamsisadisillusionedliberal,disgustedwiththe
U.S.whenitdepartsfromitsideals.Kolkoisagenuineradical:Americanideals,tohim,arethemselvestherootoftheprobleminotherwords,the
realtragedyisnotthatAmericansfailtofulfilltheirideals,butthattheysooftensucceed.SeegenerallyGabrielKolko,ThePoliticsofWar:The
WorldandUnitedStatesForeignPolicy,19431945(2ded.1990)WilliamApplemanWilliams,TheTragedyofAmericanDiplomacy(2d.rev.ed.
1972).

n9.SeeKissinger,Diplomacy,supranoteseealsoGeorgeF.Kennan,AmericanDiplomacy19001950(4thed.1984)(originallypublishedasthe
famous"X"articleseeX,TheSourcesofSovietConduct,25ForeignAff.566(1947))GeorgeP.Shultz,TurmoilandTriumph:MyYearsas
SecretaryofState(1993)ArthurSchlesinger,Jr.,TheNecessaryAmoralityofForeignAffairs,Harper'sMag.,Aug.1971,at73.

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n10.Compare,e.g.,AlexanderL.George&RichardSmoke,DeterrenceinAmericanForeignPolicy:TheoryandPractice(1974)(socialscience)
withJohnMiltonCooper,Jr.,TheWarriorandthePriest:WoodrowWilsonandTheodoreRoosevelt(1983)andRobertDallek,FranklinD.
RooseveltandAmericanForeignPolicy19321945(1979)(history).SocialscientistsGeorgeandSmokeemployavarietyofhistoricalcasestudies
asawayofexplainingwhatarebasicallygametheoreticmodelsofdecisionmaking,whilethenarrativesofJohnMiltonCooperandRobertDallek
areoverwhelminglydrivenbypersonalities.

n11.OntheAmericantraditionofinvokingtheruleoflawandofappointinglawyersasdiplomatsKissingerobservedinanearlierexegesis:

Our[U.S.]traditionoflawencouragedrepeatedattemptstolegislatesolutionstointernationalconflicts.Arbitration,conciliation,internationallegal
arrangements,neutralitylegislation,collectivesecuritysystemsallthesewereinvokedtobanishtherealityofpower.

HenryKissinger,AmericanForeignPolicy201(3ded.1977).

n12.Classicquestionsintheisolationismversusinternationalismdebatewouldinclude:HowcouldAmericaadoptaninternationalistorientationto
worldaffairssorapidlyattheendofWorldWarII?WhydidAmericaabandonisolationismafterWorldWarIIbutnotafterWorldWarI?See
generallyRobertDallek,TheAmericanStyleofForeignPolicy:CulturalPoliticsandForeignAffairs(1983)ManfredJonas,Isolationismin
America19351941(1966).

n13.TheseAmericanvalueswereembodiedinwhatKissingertermsthe"crusadingideology"ofWoodrowWilson'sapproachtoAmericanforeign
relations:

.America'sspecialmissiontranscendsdaytodaydiplomacyandobligesittoserveasabeaconoflibertyfortherestofmankind.
.Theforeignpoliciesofdemocraciesaremorallysuperiorbecausethepeopleareinherentlypeaceloving.
.Foreignpolicyshouldreflectthesamemoralstandardsaspersonalethics.
.Thestatehasnorighttoclaimaseparatemoralityforitself.

Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at46.

n14.SeeCooper,supranote.

n15.JamesSebeniusoftheHarvardBusinessSchoolcoinedtheterm"ultimatelystrategic"aspartofhispioneeringofthefieldofnegotiation
analysis.SeeJamesK.Sebenius,NegotiationAnalysis:ACharacterizationandReview,38Mgmt.Sci.18(1992)seealsoRobertAxelrod,The
EvolutionofCooperation(1984)(especiallyPartIII,pp.73105,"CooperationwithoutFriendshiporForesight").

n16.Foradiscussionofsomeofthepsychologicalaspectsofthis"transformative"dynamic,seetherecentworkofDanielKahnemanandAmos
Tversky,especiallyDanielKahneman&AmosTversky,ConflictResolution:ACognitivePerspective,inBarrierstoConflictResolution44
(KennethArrow,RobertH.Mnookin,LeeRoss,AmosTversky&RobertWilsoneds.,1995).KahnemanandTverskyperceivea"certaintyeffect"
wherebynegotiatorstendtoweighmoreheavilythoseelementsthatarecertainrelativetothosethataremerelyprobable,orsimplyveryhardto
measure,suchasgoodwill.Inadiplomaticcontext,thiskindofpsychologicalphenomenoncanhaveprofoundconsequences.Forexample,ifitis
advantageoustoholdstrategicterritoriessuchastheGolanHeightsbothinwarandinpeacetime,thenlogicallyIsraelshouldnevergivesuch
territoriesup.Yetthisargumentdoesnotaccountforthepossibilitythatterritorialconcessionscouldsignificantlydecreasethechancesofwar
happeninginthefirstplace.Futuregoodwilldiffersfromotherconsequencesinthatitisnotnecessarilyinlimitedsupplyyetthewaypeoplethink
aboutuncertainoutcomesfavorsasystematicunderweightingoftheseintangible,transformativeconsequencesofagreement.

n17.Thereisavastliteratureontheconceptofthebalanceofpoweranditsroleinworldaffairs.Forexcellentintroductions,seegenerallyAHR
Forum,97Am.Hist.Rev.683(1992)(forumonthebalanceofpower)SpecialIssueontheBalanceofPower,15Rev.Int'lStud.75(1989)Alfred
Vagts&DetlevF.Vagts,TheBalanceofPowerinInternationalLaw:AHistoryofanIdea,73Am.J.Int'lL.555(1979).Classictextsinclude
LudwigDehio,ThePrecariousBalance:FourCenturiesoftheEuropeanPowerStruggle(CharlesFullmantrans.,1962),andEdwardV.Gulick,
Europe'sClassicalBalanceofPower:ACaseHistoryoftheTheoryandPracticeofOneoftheGreatConceptsofEuropeanStatecraft(1955).
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n18."Tothehardheadedstatesmenoftheeighteenthcentury,theeliminationofconflict(orofambitionorofgreed)wasutopianthesolutionwasto
harnessorcounterpoisetheinherentflawsofhumannaturetoproducethebestpossiblelongtermoutcome."Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at
67.

n19.Seeid.at5859,182.

n20.ThisisthesubjectofDiplomacy'ssecondchapter,awkwardlyentitled,"TheHinge:TheodoreRooseveltorWoodrowWilson"(presumablya
tipofthehattoWinstonChurchill'sWorldWarIImemoir,4WinstonChurchill,TheHingeofFate(1950)).Rooseveltislabeledthe"warrior
statesman"Wilsonthe"prophetpriest."Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at47.Surprisingly,JohnMiltonCooper'sdualbiographyofTheodore
RooseveltandWoodrowWilson,TheWarriorandthePriest,Cooper,supranote,isnotcredited,althoughalaterworkofCooper's,PivotalDecades,
iscitedlaterinthechapternotes,JohnMiltonCooper,Jr.,PivotalDecades:TheUnitedStates,19001920(1990).

n21.Forexample,ofGermanChancellorBismarck'sassessmentofEngland'sPrimeMinisterWilliamGladstone,Kissingerwrites:"Bismarck's
attitudetowardGladstoneparalleledthatofTheodoreRoosevelttoward[Woodrow]Wilson:heconsideredthegreatVictorianparthumbug,part
menace."Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at162.Thistypeofcommentalonemakesthebookworthits$35pricetag.

n22.KissingerwritesadmiringlyofCardinalRichelieu,France'sFirstMinisterfrom1624to1642,asastatesman"whoachievedvastsuccessesby
ignoring,andindeedtranscending,theessentialpietiesofhisage."Id.at58.CriticsofKissingermightcounterthatPopeUrbanVIII'sassessmentof
Richelieu'scareercouldserveasanepitaphforKissingerhimself:"IfthereisaGod,theCardinaldeRichelieuwillhavemuchtoanswerfor.Ifnot...
well,hehadasuccessfullife."Id.

n23.Id.atdedicationpageseealsoGordonCraig,LookingforOrder,N.Y.Rev.Books,May12,1994,at8(reviewingKissinger'sDiplomacy)
MichaelHoward,TheWorldAccordingtoHenry:FromMetternichtoMe,ForeignAff.,May/June1994,at132(reviewingKissinger'sDiplomacy).

n24.IamgratefultoThomasEhrlichofStanfordLawSchoolforthisimage.

n25.Seesupranote.

n26.Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at834.

n27.Arguably,partoftheappealofdiplomatichistory,andofitstheoreticalexpressioningametheory,ispreciselythissimplicityandsharpnessof
theissues.Thesamerationaleisprobablywhatunderliesthewidespreadfascinationwithmilitaryhistoryandwithgamessuchaschess:thenotionof
adefinedarenawherehumanagencyaffectsstrategicchoicesunderavarietyofwelldefinedconstraints.Unlikechess,however,moralambiguities
aboundininternationalrelations.See,e.g.,RichardA.Falk,What'sWrongwithHenryKissinger'sForeignPolicy?,PolicyMemorandumNo.39,at
18(July1974)(publishedaspartofapolicymemorandumseriesavailableatPrincetonUniversity,CenterofInternationalStudies)("The
attractivenessofKissinger'sapproachderives,inpart,fromitssimplicityandclarity.Assoonasissuesofdignityandequityaretakenintoaccount,
mattersofchoiceandpolicyenteramorecomplex,ambiguousframeofreference.").SeegenerallyMichaelWalzer,JustandUnjustWars:AMoral
ArgumentwithHistoricalIllustrations(2ded.1992).

n28.Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at104.

n29.Id.at119.
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n30.ThisargumentisofcourseamuchsimplifiedversionofanimportantstrandofpoliticalthoughtunderlyingtheAmericanRevolution:the
notionthatlegitimacywasforfeitedbytheBritishKingandParliamentthroughmisruleandthuscametoresidewiththecoloniststhemselves.See
generallyGordonS.Wood,TheCreationoftheAmericanRepublic17761787(1969).

n31.Whiletheseassumptionsmayseemliketruisms,Marxistandothermaterialisttheoriesofhistoricalchangeseetheindividualdecisionmakeras
constrainedbyforcesbeyondhisorhercontrol.Similarly,somesocialscienceapproachesseetheindividualdecisionmakeraspreemptedby
bureaucraticstructuresandthusasnotterriblyconsequential.Forananalysisfavoringthecontinuedexaminationofindividualchoiceasatoolfor
understandinghistoryandcurrentaffairs,seeRogerFisher,ElizabethKopelman&AndreaKupferSchneider,BeyondMachiavelli:ToolsforCoping
withConflict1012(1994).

n32.Foradiscussionofwhethersuchaheroichistoricalactorcanalsobeacriminal(orsimplyevil),seethefascinatingdiscussioninSanfordV.
Levinson,FidelitytoLawandtheAssessmentofPoliticalActivity(Or,CanaWarCriminalBeaGreatMan?),27Stan.L.Rev.1185(1975)(using
HenryKissingerasanexample).

n33.BenedictAnderson,ImaginedCommunities:ReflectionsontheOriginandSpreadofNationalism(rev.ed.1991).

n34.ForAnderson,factorsinthismixincludetheadventofprintcapitalismandwidespreadliteracytheexampleof"culturalrevolutions"in
eighteenthcenturyAmericaandFrance,aswellastheEuropeanrevolutionsof1848andthetransformationofroyalfamiliesintoemblematic
citizensratherthanasupranationalsodalityofelites.KaiserWilhelmIIwouldrefertohisroleasthe"NumberOneGerman"thatis,asfirstamong
equalsofthesamekindashimself.SuchaperspectivewouldhavebeenunthinkabletoaHabsburgtwocenturiesearlier.Id.at81.

n35.HenryA.Kissinger,AddressDeliveredtotheInternationalPlatformAssociation,Washington(Aug.2,1973),inHenryA.Kissinger,American
ForeignPolicy181,186(expandeded.1974)[hereinafterKissinger's1973Address].

n36.OnKissinger'spenchantforsecrecyandduplicity,especiallyasregardsthesecretbombingofCambodia,his"doublebookkeeping"systemof
disseminatingseveralversionsofthesamememo,andsecretwiretappingofhisrivalsandevenhisownstaff,seeWalterIsaacson,Kissinger21256
(1992).

n37.Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at166.

n38.WhatKissingerisreallylookingfor,arguesdiplomatichistorianJohnLewisGaddis,are"waysinwhichdemocraticstatescouldbehavewith
authoritarianpurposefulnesswhentheirglobalinterestsrequiredit,withoutatthesametimesacrificingthosedemocraticprinciplesthatprovidedthe
reasonsuchstatesexistedinthefirstplace."JohnLewisGaddis,RescuingChoicefromCircumstance:TheStatecraftofHenryKissinger,inThe
Diplomats,19391979,at571(GordonCraig&FrancisLoewenheimeds.,1994).ItisdebatablewhetherKissingereverfoundtherightbalancehere,
seeinfraConclusioninanyevent,suchanapproachframesdemocracyasmoreofanobstaclethanavirtue.

n39.SeeConventionRelatingtoPrisonersofWar,July27,1929,47Stat.2021,118L.N.T.S.343[hereinafterGenevaConvention]Protocolforthe
ProhibitionoftheUseinWarofAsphyxiating,PoisonousorOtherGases,andofBacteriologicalMethodsofWarfare,June17,1925,26U.S.T.571,
94L.N.T.S.65[hereinafterGenevaProtocol]ConventionRespectingtheLawsandCustomsofWaronLand,Oct.18,1907,36Stat.2277,205
Consol.T.S.277ConventionRespectingtheLawsandCustomsofWaronLand,July29,1899,32Stat.1803,187Consol.T.S.429.SeeElizabeth
Kopelman,IdeologyandInternationalLaw:TheDissentoftheIndianJusticeattheTokyoWarCrimesTrial,23N.Y.U.J.Int'lL.&Pol.373,396
401(1991)foradiscussionoftheGrotiantraditioninthecontextofWorldWarIIeradiplomaticpolicymaking.

n40.Indeed,hisanalysishasnothingtosayaboutitatall.SaintAugustine,SaintThomasAquinas,Grotius,andGandhiarenotmentionedin
Kissinger'sindexEmmerichdeVattelgetsonedisparagingreference.
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n41.Kissinger,AWorldRestored,supranote,at1.

n42.KissingerciteswithapprovalMetternich's"rationalistconvictionthatlawsandrightsexistedinnatureandnotbyfiat.[Metternich's]formative
experiencehadbeentheFrenchRevolution,whichstartedwiththeproclamationoftheRightsofManandendedwiththeReignofTerror."
Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at85.ItisworthrememberingthatmanyofKissinger'sownformativeexperiencesoccurredinGermanyduring
theNaziHolocausthemaybemorethanusuallyawareofthedarksideofthepopularwill.SeeIsaacson,supranote,at2932.

n43.Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at91.

n44.Id.at18.

n45.ParaphrasedfromAbramChayes,TheCubanMissileCrisis7(1974).

n46.SeeTreatyfortheRenunciationofWarasanInstrumentofNationalPolicy,Aug.27,1928,46Stat.2343,94L.N.T.S.57(KelloggBriand
Pact).

n47.GenevaConvention,supranoteGenevaProtocol,supranoteTreatyontheNonProliferationofNuclearWeapons,July1,1968,21T.S.483,
7I.L.M.809ThirdUnitedNationsConferenceontheLawoftheSea:UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea,U.N.Doc.A/Conf.62/122
(1982).

n48.Seesupratextaccompanyingnote.

n49.Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at835.

n50.Inasense,ofcourse,thediplomaticgamehasalwaysbeennonzerosum:Itisalwayspossibleforallsidestolose,asinanuclearexchange.
OnParetooptimalityinnegotiations,seeHowardRaiffa,TheArtAndScienceofNegotiation15864(1982).

n51.Indeed,Kissinger'sconstrictedconceptionofpowerishighlightedbyhiseverpresentuseofthemuddyterm"geopolitics,"usuallyasaproxy
for"powerpolitics."SometimesKissingerusesitasasynonymfor"power"or"strategy,"asin,"TheGermantermswerebothmorepreciseand
moregeopolitical,"or,"Wilsonwasproposingaworldorderinwhichresistancetoaggressionwouldbebasedonmoralratherthangeopolitical
judgments."Kissinger,Diplomacy,supranote,at220,227.Othertimes,thetermisdeployedmerelyasawayofavoidingthestuffyterm
"internationalrelations,"asin,"Amongpostwarpresidents,onlyNixonconsistentlydealtwiththeSovietUnionasageopoliticalchallenge."Id.at
813.

n52.TheBrettonWoodssystemcalledfortheoperationofarelativelyopensystemoftradeandpaymentswhilealsoprovidingarrangementsto
supportdomesticfullemploymentandsocialwelfare.Inaddition,itcreatedtheinstitutionstosupporttheseobjectives:theInternationalTrade
Organization(latertheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade,nowtheWorldTradeOrganization),theInternationalMonetaryFund,andthe
WorldBank.SeegenerallyG.JohnIkenberry,CreatingYesterday'sNewWorldOrder:KeynesianNewThinkingandtheAngloAmericanPostwar
Settlement,inIdeasandForeignPolicy:Beliefs,InstitutionsandPoliticalChange57(JudithGoldstein&RobertKeohaneeds.,1993).

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n53.TheAtlanticCharter,promulgatedbyPresidentFranklinRooseveltandPrimeMinisterWinstonChurchillafterasecretmeetingin1941aboard
awarshipoffthecoastofNewfoundland,wasoneofthefirstdocumentsspellingoutaspirationsforapostwarinternationallegalorder.TheCharter
listed"fourfreedoms":freedomofexpressionandworship,andfreedomfromfearandwant.AngloAmericanConference,AtlanticCharter(Aug.
14,1941),reprintedinU.S.Dep'tofState,TheAxisinDefeat:ACollectionofDocumentsonAmericanPolicyTowardGermanyandJapan12
(1945).

n54.Ikenberry,supranote,at60.

n55.Butcf.Kolko,supranote.Kolkoarguespreciselythishegemony,forhim,explainsoutcomes.

n56.Ikenberry,supranote,at59.

n57.Seesupranotes.

n58.Incontrasttothehighpoliticsofformaldiplomacy,theOsloConnectionoffered"amoresubtlecombinationofrelaxedsettings,homecooked
meals,mutualesteem,aknackfortellingtherightjoketoeaseatensesituationand,moreimportant,anabilitytokeepsecrets."ClydeHaberman,
HowOsloHelpedMoldtheMideastPact,N.Y.Times,Sept.5,1993,atA1,A10seealsoJaneCorbin,TheNorwayChannel:TheSecretTalksThat
LedtotheMiddleEastPeaceAccord(1994)Fisher,Kopelman&Schneider,supranote,at13536(discussinginformalthirdpartyroles).

n59.IamindebtedtoLoreleiKellyofStanfordUniversity'sProgramonInternationalPolicyStudiesforthisillustration.

n60.Schama,supranote,at97.

n61.Isaacson,supranote,at506.

n62.Kissinger's1973Address,supranote.

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