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Roque v.

Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that an action for


partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
involved. [G.R. No. 136803. June 16, 2000]
1[10]

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner, vs. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO,


respondent.
Since the original Complaint was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division of the
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-ownership.2[12] The settlement of
the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition. 3[13] This action will not lie if the claimant
has no rightful interest in the subject property. Parties filing the action are in fact required by the Rules of
Court4[14] to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be
premature to effect a partition thereof until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved.5
[15]

Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a
preponderance of evidence.6[16] Petitioners chief evidence of co-ownership of the property in question is
simply the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier, both the trial and
the appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over
the array of testimonial and documentary evidence that were adduced by respondents, as will be expounded
below.

An action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition
which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is
proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the
parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be. The first phase
of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or
not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase
may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because
a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the
other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are
able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,
and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. i[18]
1[10]

165 SCRA 118 (1988)

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

Viloria v. CA, 368 Phil. 851, June 30, 1999; Catapusan v. CA, supra.

[16]

Catapusan v. CA, supra; See also 1 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

Heirs of Velasquez v. CA, 382 Phil. 438, February 15, 2000; Catapusan v. CA, 332
Phil. 586, November 21, 1996.
Ibid.

1 of Rule 69 provides: A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate
may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of
his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and
joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.

[18]

Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, 329 SCRA 78, 89-90 [2000].

[G.R. No. 129017. August 20, 2002]

CONCEPCION V. VDA. DE DAFFON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LOURDES
OSMEA VDA. DE DAFFON, AILEEN DAFFON, JOSELITO DAFFON, JR., ANA VANESA DAFFON,
LEILA DAFFON and SUZETTE DAFFON, respondents.

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