G.R. No.

181174 | December 4, 2009 | Carpio-Morales

Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristinas husband,
Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident inIndonesia. During the wake
following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular
began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as
her and Pablo's son.Petitioner thereupon made inquiries with the Local Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. Onthe annotation of Patricks birth
certificate reflects Patrick as having been acknowleged by Pablo (or Pablito)as son
on January 13, 1997, that he was legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of
parents on April 22,1998 at Manila, and that he shall be known as Patrick Titular
Braza.Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that
Pablo and Lucille were married onApril 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners
(her three legitimate children with Pablo) to file onDecember 23, 2005 before the
Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a
petition tocorrect the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register
.Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage
between Lucille andPablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid
and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristinaand Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1)
the
correction of the entries
in Patrick's birth record with respect to hislegitimation, the name of the father and
his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) adirective to Leon,
Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to
submit Parick to DNA testing
to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the
legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the
declaration of the marriage of Lucille andPablo as bigamous
. TC dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of
entry, the court, which is notacting as a family court under the Family Code, has no
jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the
legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence,the
controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.MR was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
WON the court
a quo

may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in
anaction to correct entries in the civil registrar. (WON substantial errors, such as
those sought to be correctedin the present case, can be the subject of a petition
under Rule 108)
Held:
NO. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages and rule on legitimacyand filiation.
Ratio:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
vis a vis
Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which anentry in the civil
registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may
generallybe used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry. Aclerical error is one which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk ora transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name
that isclearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentiousalterations may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded anddue process is
properly observed. The petitioners cause of action is actually to seek the
declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void forbeing bigamous and impugn
Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 butby
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the
Family Code, respectively,hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as
expressly provided in said Code.It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can bequestioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attacksuch as the
petition filed before the court
a quo
.Petition Denied.

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Haw Liong vs RP

Haw Liong seeks to change his name to Alfonso Lantin. He wants to change his
name because he is called by his Pinoy friend, Alfonso; his fathers name is Placido
Lantin; he wants to have a Filipino name upon being a Filipino citizen; there is no
pending case against him and if there be, he would answer for it. ALLOWED.
Government appeals. The State has an interest in the names. Changing is a
privilege not a right. There should be proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason to justify the change. Like, 1. A ridiculous name or hard to pronounce or
write, 2. Change of status, 3. To avoid confusion.
Ruling:
Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason to justify. His claim which
is merely supported by his own testimony cannot overcome the fact that the name
given him from the very beginning as Haw Liong as in fact this is the name that
appears in his landing certificate. In his business dealing, he never used the name
Alfonso Lantin.
Llaneta vs Agrava
Atanacia Llaneta was once married to Serafin Ferrer, they had Victoriano. Serafin
died and Anatacia saw another man and their love bore a child, Teresita. All her life,
Teresita was known as a Ferrer. She later discovered her registered name is Llaneta,
and that she is an illegitimate child. Teresita petitioned to change her name to avoid
confusion and difficulties. DENIED.
Ruling:
Petitioner established she has been using Ferrer all her life. Even Serafins next
of kin tolerated and still approve of her use of the same. The CA denied such
change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship. The
principle remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name
would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief. In the case at b
ar, Serafins widowed mother Victoria
have come forward in earnest support of the petition. No opposition came forth and
Teresita has a spotless record. GRANTED

Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name sincechildhood until she
discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced
that the correction was justified.The OSG timely appealed praying for the reversal
and setting asideof the RTC decision. For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of

Mercaderas given name "is in truth a material correction as it wouldmodify or

increase substantive rights", which would have been proper had she filed a petition
under Rule 103 and proved any of thegrounds therefor.The CA was not persuaded.
In its December 9, 2008 Decision, theappellate court affirmed the questioned RTC
order.On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of Mercadera,
the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed its Comment onJuly 3, 2009.
ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERREDON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
GRANTING THE CHANGE INRESPONDENTS NAME UNDER RULE 103.
HELD:
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or
surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the CivilCode. This rule provides the
procedure for an independent specialproceeding in court to establish the status of a
person involving hisrelations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard
to, therest of the community. Essentially, a change of name does not defineor effect
a change of ones existing family relations or in the rightsand duties flowing
therefrom. It does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.Rule 108, on the other
hand, implements judicial proceedings for thecorrection or cancellation of entries in
the civil registry pursuant to

Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to "acts,events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons,"also as enumerated in Article
408 of the same law.In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion
from"MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material
correction tantamount to a change of name whichentails a modification or increase
in substantive rights. For the OSG,this is a substantial error that requires compliance
with the procedureunder Rule 103, and not Rule 108. A change of ones name under
Rule 103 can be granted, only ongrounds provided by law, there must be a proper
and compellingreason for the change and proof that the person requesting will
beprejudiced by the use of his official name. In petitions for correction,only clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in thecivil registry may be raised.
Considering that the enumeration inSection 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of
name," the correctionof a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice
it tosay, not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule103.
Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.Thus, the petition
filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly fallsunder Rule 108 as it simply sought a
correction of a misspelled givenname. To correct simply means "to make or set
aright; to remove thefaults or error from." To change means "to replace something
withsomething else of the same kind or with something that serves as asubstitute."
From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearlyprayed for the lower court "to
remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to
make or set aright" thesame to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." The
CA didnot allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow wasthe

correction of her misspelled given name which she had beenusing ever since she
could remember.

Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarialproceeding before the

lower court. The publication and posting of thenotice of hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation and thenotices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are
sufficientindicia of an adverse proceeding. Considering that the OSG did notoppose
the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex partewhen it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that theproceedings in the lower court
were procedurally defective.Wherefore, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Gregory Ong
G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007

Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court
Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a naturalborn citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are circumstances that entail
factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings.
FACTS:

This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive
Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen,
born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that even if it were
granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth, his father was finally
granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make
respondent Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that
he is a natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ declaring him to be such.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen

RULING: xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged

subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and
the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent
Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of
respondent Ong's ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail
factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as
to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence
would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino
citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong
has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his
citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent
Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the
Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.