HON. ARIEL C. SANTOS, as Labor Arbiter of the National Capital Region, petitioner, vs. HON.

WILLIAM BAYHON, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, NCR, BRANCH XXIII, Manila,
ATTY. NICOLAS GEROCHI, JR., ATTY. MARJORIE DOCDOCIL, PRISCILLA CARRERA,
DECISION

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order, Labor Arbiter Ariel C.
Santos (herein petitioner) questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction to prevent the enforcement of the writ of execution in a labor case, and said Judge's order dated
May 31, 1989 citing him (petitioner) for indirect contempt and ordering his arrest for disobeying the
injunction.
On November 6, 1985, a decision was rendered by Labor Arbiter Ceferina Diosana in NLRC-NCR Case No. 1313-85 entitled, "Kamapi vs. Poly-Plastic Products and/or Anthony Ching," in favor of Kamapi. The decision
was affirmed in toto by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on August 18, 1987. After the
decision had become final and executory, Kamapi obtained a writ of execution against the properties,
consisting of machineries and equipment, of Poly-Plastic Products or Anthony Ching. However, respondent
Priscilla Carrera filed a third party claim alleging that Anthony Ching had sold the machinery and pieces of
equipment to her. Nevertheless, the public auction sale proceeded on March 29, 1988. It was conducted by
Deputy Sheriff Jaime Pambuan in the presence of Carrera and her counsel after the judgment creditor had
posted an indemnity bond of P115,000 in favor of the deputy sheriff to answer for any damage that he
may incur should it be found later that the third-party claim is valid and lawful.
On April 4, 1988, Carrera filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 88-44154) her claim to
the levied properties and obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining Labor Arbiter Diosana and NLRC
Deputy Sheriff Pambuan from issuing a certificate of sale over the levied properties.
On April 12, 1988, Diosana inhibited herself from hearing Carrera's third-party complaint. The case was re
raffled and assigned to Labor Arbiter Ariel Santos.
During the hearing of the third-party claim by Labor Arbiter Santos on April 26, 1988, Carrera's counsel,
Atty. Nicolas Gerochi, Jr., submitted a xerox copy of the alleged deed of sale but the petitioner asked to see
the original. Atty. Gerochi brought to the May 9, 1988 hearing the supposed original copy but upon
comparison, it was found to be not the original of the xerox copy that was presented by Atty. Gerochi. On
May 11, 1988, Labor Arbiter Santos issued an order declaring the xerox copy of the deed of sale fictitious
and allowing the execution to proceed against the properties of Poly-Plastic Products.
Santos and Pambuan filed a motion to dismiss the civil case or the ground that the RTC did not have
jurisdiction over the labor case, for exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the NLRC (Art. 255, Labor Code) and
no injunction or restraining order may be issued by any court or entity in a labor dispute.
On April 22, 1988, Judge William Bayhon of RTC, Manila, issued an order enjoining Labor Arbiter Ceferina
Diosana and sheriff Jaime Pambuan from enforcing the writ of execution against the properties claimed by
Carrera pending the determination of the validity of the sale made in her favor by the judgment debtor
Poly-Plastic Products and Anthony Ching.
On May 13, 1988, Atty. Gerochi filed in Civil Case No. 884154 an urgent omnibus motion praying that
herein petitioner be cited for indirect contempt for disobeving the order of the court dated April 22, 1988
and to order his arrest.
On May 31, 1989, Judge William Bayhon issued an order declaring Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of indirect contempt, ordering his immediate arrest, sentencing him to seven (7) days in jail, and to pay a
fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He further ordered the return of the
machineries and equipment of Priscilla Carrera. Santos forthwith elevated the matter to this Court for
review on the ground that Judge Bayhon's arrest order dated May 31, 1989 is a nullity because Art. 254 of
the Labor Code prohibits the issuance of an injunction or restraining order "in any case involving or
growing out of labor disputes . . . except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code."
Article 218 speaks of the power of the Commission to issue an injunction due to a labor dispute, while Art.
264 refers to the power of the same Commission to issue injunction in case of strikes or lockouts.
Petitioner alleges further that Judge Bayhon has no jurisdiction to cite petitioner for contempt, for the case
grew out of a labor dispute.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that Judge Bayhon has jurisdiction over the third party claim for
respondent Carrera was never a party in the labor dispute between Anthony Ching (judgment debtor) and
the members of the Kamapi (judgment creditors), and she had no employer-employee relationship with
any of them.

The petition has no merit, for the power of the NLRC to execute its judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor (Special Servicing Corp. vs. Centro La Paz, 121 SCRA
748).
The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of
another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief,
applies only when no third-party claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
133 SCRA 142). When a third-party, or a stranger to the action, asserts a claim over the property levied
upon, the claimant may vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which may
stop the execution of the judgment on property not belonging to the judgment
debtor. The following rulings of this Court are apropos:
"When the sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his authority, seizes a stranger's property, the writ of
injunction, which is issued to stop the auction sale of that property, is not an interference with the writ of
execution issued by another court because the writ of execution was improperly implemented by the
sheriff. Under that writ, he could attach the property of the judgment debtor. He is not authorized to levy
upon the property of the third claimant." (National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs. Vera, 133 SCRA
259.)
"There is no question that the writ of execution was issued against the judgment debtors (the Former
Owner) in Civil Case No. Q29325, Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) Branch IV of Quezon
City. However, what was levied upon by the Sheriff are the properties allegedly owned by the New Owners
of the TML Garments, Inc. This fact of ownership was claimed by the New Owners or petitioners herein in
their Motion to Intervene before the trial court. Petitioners contend that they were not the original parties
impleaded as co-defendants in Civil Case No. Q-29325; that they were not summoned to appear before the
court; that they did not participate in any manner in the proceedings before the court and that the decision
of the court a quo did not include them as judgment debtors who should pay the judgment debt, and
therefore to compel them to pay the obligation incurred by the former owner of TML Garments, Inc.,
without due process of law will amount to a deprivation of their property. Wellsettled is the rule that a writ
of execution can only be issued against one who is a party to the action and not against one who, not
being a party in the case, has not yet had his day in court." (New Owners/ Management of TML Garments,
Inc. vs. Zaragoza, 170 SCRA 563.)
"If the disputed property did not belong to the judgment debtor in NLRC Case No. 7-2577-84, it could not
be validly levied upon by the sheriff for the satisfaction of the judgment therein." (Pealosa, et al. vs. Hon.
Villanueva, et al., 177 SCRA 778.)
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Manila had jurisdiction to stop by injunction the National Labor
Relations Commission's sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of the property claimed by the
private respondent, to satisfy the claims of the labor union against the Poly-Plastic Products.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
HON. ARIEL C. SANTOS, as Labor Arbiter of the National Capital Region, petitioner, vs. HON. WILLIAM
BAYHON, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, NCR, BRANCH XXIII, Manila, ATTY. NICOLAS
GEROCHI, JR., ATTY. MARJORIE DOCDOCIL, PRISCILLA CARRERA, respondents.
Jose Espinas for petitioner.
Nicolas A. Gerochi, Jr. for respondent and on his own behalf., G.R. No. 88643, 1991 Jul 23, 1st Division

Padlan v. Dinglasan,
G.R. No. 180321March 20, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent
was
the
registered
owner
of
a
parcel
of
land.
While
on
board a jeepney, respondents mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one
Maura regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a
real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owners copy of the TCT from
respondent and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots. Through a falsified deed of sale,
Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. Maura sold one of the lots to one Lorna who sold the same to petitioner
for P4,000.00. Respondents filed a case Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC. Summons was,
thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan. The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner to be a
buyer in good faith and, consequently, dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC
and ordered the cancellation of the TCT.
ISSUE:
Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
HELD:
NO. In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic
as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred bylaw and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause
of action. The Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the
complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, theonly basis
of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the
amount of P4,000.00. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for
the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA, petitioner, vs. MARIO and MARGIE LAURON,respondents.

[G.R. No. 179011. April 15, 2013.]
Facts:
On February 12, 2003, petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed with the Municipal Trial Court(MTC) of Lambunao, Iloilo a
Complaint for ejectment against the spouses Mario and Margie Lauron on the subject lot owned by Lilia, the petitioner's mother.
Sometime in 1980, respondents Mario and Margie Lauron, through the tolerance of the heirs of Lilia, constructed a
residential building of strong materials on the northwest portion of the lot covering an area of one hundred square meters; that the
heirs of Lilia made various demands for respondents to vacate the premises and even exerted earnest efforts to compromise with them
but the same was unavailingand the petitioner reiterated the demand on respondents to vacate the subject lot on January 15,2003, but
respondents continued to unlawfully withhold such possession. In their Answer, respondents claimed that petitioner had no cause of
action against them, since they are not the owners of the residential building standing on petitioner's lot, but Mildred Kascher
(Mildred), sister of respondent Margie, as shown by the tax declaration in Mildred's name. On November 14, 2003, the MTC rendered
its Decision in favor of the plaintiff. Based on the allegations and evidence presented, it appeared that petitioner is one of the heirs of
Lilia Castigador Catedrilla, the owner of the subject lot and that respondents are occupying the subject lot; that petitioner is a party
who may bring the suit in accordance with Article 487 of the Civil Code; and as a co-owner, petitioner is allowed to bring this action
for ejectment under Section 1,Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; that respondents are also the proper party to be sued as they are the
occupants of the subject lot which they do not own. Respondents filed their appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City,
which rendered its Order and affirmed the decision of MTC. The CA issued its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the
RTC. The CA found that only petitioner filed the case for ejectment against respondents and ruled that the other heirs should have
been impleaded as plaintiffs citing Section 1, Rule 7 and Section 7, Rule 3 of
theRules of Court; that the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non forthe exercise of judicial power; that when
an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed as without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs,
the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the respondents.
Issue:
Whether Petitioner can file the action without impleading his co-owners.
Held/Ratio:
Yes.
Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners. In Wee v. De Castro, wherein petitioner therein argued
that the respondent cannot maintain an action for ejectment against him, without joining all his co-owners, we ruled in this wise:
Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164246
January 15, 2014
HERMINIA ACBANG, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 01, SECOND
JUDICIAL REGION, TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, and SPOUSES MAXIMO LOPEZ and HEIDI L.
LOPEZ,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
To stay the immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment case, the defendant must perfect an
appeal, file a supersedeas bond, and periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of
the appeal. Otherwise, the writ of execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff.
The Case
By petition for prohibition, the petitioner, a defendant-appellant in Civil Case No. 6302 of the Regional Trial
Court RTC), Branch 1, in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, assails the order issued on March 31, 2004 by
respondent Judge Jimmy H.F. Luczon, Jr. Judge Luczon) granting the motion for execution against her and
her co-defendants on the ground that she had not posted any supersedeas bond to stay the execution. 1
Antecedents
Respondent Spouses Maximo and Heidi Lopez (Spouses Lopez) commenced an ejectment suit against the
petitioner, her son Benjamin Acbang, Jr. and his wife Jean (Acbangs) in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Alcala, Cagayan (Civil Case No. 64). The defendants did not file their answer. Thus, the MTC rendered its
decision on January 12, 2004 in favor of the Spouses Lopez, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and as against
defendants as follows:
a) The plaintiffs are the true and lawful owners of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T139163.
b) The defendants are directed to vacate immediately the land in suit which is covered and described in
TCT No. T-139163, copy of the title is marked as Annex "A" of the complaint.
c) The defendants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amount of P5,000.00
as attorneys fees.
d) The defendants are ordered to pay the costs.2
The petitioner appealed to the RTC.
In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for the execution of the decision pending appeal in the
RTC,3 alleging that the defendants had not filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution. The Acbangs
opposed the motion for execution pending appeal, 4 insisting that the failure of the Spouses Lopez to move
for the execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the immediate execution; and that,
therefore, there was nothing to stay, rendering the filing of the supersedeas bond unnecessary.
In his assailed order dated March 31, 2004, Judge Luczon granted the motion for immediate execution, viz:
The Motion for Execution is hereby granted, there being no Motion to Fix Supersedeas bond filed by [the
Acbangs] as of the date of the filing of the Motion.
The opposition of [the spouses Lopez] on the appeal taken by [the Acbangs] is hereby denied because
under the rules the loosing [sic] party may appeal the case even if they did not post their supercedeas
[sic] bond. [The spouses Lopez] then are given 15 days from today within which to file their memorandum
and [the Acbangs] are also given similar period to file their reply on the memorandum of [the spouses

Lopez]. Afterwhich (sic) the case shall be submitted for decision with or without the memorandum from the
parties.
SO ORDERED.5
The petitioner moved for reconsideration,6 stressing that the filing of the supersedeas bond was for the
purpose of staying the execution; and that she as a defendant would not be placed in a position to stay the
execution by filing a supersedeas bond unless she was first notified of the filing of the motion for
immediate execution.
The RTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 26, 2004, 7 viz:
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendant Herminia Acbang is denied, for the reason that the Court
finds no cause or reason to recall the order granting appellees motion for execution. There was no
supersedeas bond filed by [the Acbangs], so the execution of the decision is proper.
As the office of the supersedeas bond is to stay the execution of the decision, the same should be filed
before the Motion For Writ of Execution is filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The petitioner then brought the petition for prohibition directly in this Court on July 2, 2004, submitting
that Judge Luczon thereby committed grave error in granting the motion for immediate execution of the
Spouses Lopez without first fixing the supersedeas bond as prayed for by the Acbangs.
It appears that the RTC rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 6302 on July 30, 2004, 9 finding that the
petitioner had not received the summons, and that the sheriffs return did not show the steps taken by the
server to insure the petitioners receipt of the summons, like the tender of the summons to her; that the
non-service of the summons on her resulted in the MTC not acquiring jurisdiction over her; and that the
MTCs decision in Civil Case No. 64 dated January 14, 2004 was void as far as she was concerned. Thus, the
RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court declares that the decision rendered by the Municipal
Trial Court of Alcala, Cagayan dated January 14, 2004 is null and void, as far as defendant Herminia Acbang
is concerned.
The MTC of Alcala is Ordered to reopen the case and served [sic] the summons to Herminia Acbang and
conduct the proceedings without any delay.
It is so adjudged.10
In the petition, the petitioner insists that the Spouses Lopezs motion for execution pending appeal should
be filed before she posted a supersedeas bond. She argues that even if the MTCs decision was
immediately executory, it did not mean that a motion for execution was dispensable; and that the Spouses
Lopez waived their right to the immediate execution when they did not file a motion for execution in the
MTC.
On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez claim that the issuance of a writ of execution was ministerial
because of the defendants failure to file a supersedeas bond prior to or at the time of the filing of their
notice of appeal in the MTC.
Ruling
Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate
court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment
of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or
period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the
clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government
depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by
agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to
withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the
payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court,
upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment
appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the
appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for
purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful
possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession and
restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
disposing of the appeal.
Here, there was no indication of the date when the petitioner filed her notice of appeal. Her petition stated
simply that she had filed a "timely notice of appeal which was given due course without the respondents
filing a motion for execution in the Municipal Trial Court of Alcala, the court a quo." 11 On the other hand,
the Spouses Lopez filed in the RTC their motion for execution pending appeal on February 19, 2004.
The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals 12 is instructive on the means of staying the immediate execution of a
judgment in an ejectment case, to wit:

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in
order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To
stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision
requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a
supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of
the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright
execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative." Hence,
if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate
execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not
stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond
should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.
In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but the
defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede s bond; and
(3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Although the
petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for execution pending appeal before
the court may issue an order for the immediate execution of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally
correct in pointing out that they were entitled to the immediate execution of the judgment in view of the
Ac bangs failure to comply with all of the three abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate
execution. The filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the
immediate execution without the filing of the sufficient supersede s bond and the deposit of the accruing
rentals.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the decision of the R TC favored the petitioner because it declared the
judgment of the MTC void as far as she was concerned for lack of jurisdiction over her person. The RTC thus
directed the MTC to cause the service of the summons on her and to conduct further proceedings without
any delay. In effect, the supervening declaration of the nullity of the judgment being sought to be executed
against her has rendered moot and academic the issue in this special civil action as far as she was
concerned.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for prohibition for being moot and academic, without
pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Swagman Hotels vs. CA

Facts: Sometime in 1996 and 1997, Swagman through Atty. Infante and Hegerty, its president and vicepresident, respectively, obtained from Christian loans evidenced by three promissory notes dated 7 August
1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997. Each of thepromissory notes is in the amount of US$50,000 payable
after three years from its date with an interest of 15% per annum payable every three months. In a letter dated
16 December 1998, Christian informed the petitioner corporation that he was terminating the loans and
demanded from the latter payment of said loans.
On 2 February 1999, Christian filed with the RTC a complaint for a sum of money and damages against
the petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante.
The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vice-president, filed an Answer raising as defenses
lack of cause ofaction. According to them, Christian had no cause of action because the three promissory
notes were not yet due and demandable.
The trial court ruled that under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint which
states no cause ofaction may be cured by evidence presented without objection. Thus, even if the plaintiff had
no cause of action at the time he filed the instant complaint, as defendants obligation are not yet due and
demandable then, he may nevertheless recover on the first twopromissory notes in view of the introduction of
evidence showing that the obligations covered by the two promissory notes are now due and demandable.
When the instant case was filed on February 2, 1999, none of the promissory notes was due and demandable,
but , the first and the second promissory notes have already matured during the course of the proceeding.

Hence, payment is already due.

This finding was affirmed in toto by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual
of a cause of action during the pendency of the case.
Held: No. Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an actionfor recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the
right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
Such interpretation by the trial court and CA of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
erroneous. The curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the
complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts.Amendments of
pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a
case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities, and
that all other matters included in the case may be determined ina single proceeding, thereby avoiding
multiplicity of suits.

Galicto vs Aquino III

667 SCRA 150 G.R. No. 193978
Promulgated on February 28, 2012
Facts:
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III exposed anomalies in the financial management of the
Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System, the National Power Corporation and the National Food Authority.
Because of this, the Senate prompted to conduct legislative inquiries on the matter of activities of GOCC
and issued Resolution No. 17 s. 2010, urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually
large and excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of
GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs). President Aquino issued E.O 7 strengthening the
supervision of compensation levels of GOCCs and GFIs by controlling the grant of excessive salaries,
allowances and other benefits.
However, petitioner Jelbert Galicto allegedly questions the constitutionality of E.O 7 in his
capacity as a lawyer and as an employee of PhilHealth Regional Office. As he allegedly stands to be
prejudiced by E.O 7 because it suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grant of salary increase and
other benefits granted to the GOCC and GFI officials. Moreover, he claims interest in making sure that
laws and orders by government officials are legally issued and implemented.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Galicto has a locus standi in bringing the petition before the
Court.
Ruling:

No, the SC said that petitioner cannot claim legal stance because petitioner is simply concerned about
his entitlement to future salary increases.
A public officer has a vested right only to salaries already earned or accrued. Salary increases are a mere
expectancy volatile and dependent on various variables in nature.
His assertion of legal impediment under Section 9 of E.O 7 of any future increase in petitioners
compensation will only depend on usual factors considered by proper authorities was misleading and incorrect
due to the concept of injury as an element of Locus standi. He only points out the denial of a reasonable
expectation which is not a subject of harm to go against the law.
His membership of Philippine Bar and a PhilHealth official does not suffice to clothe his legal standing.
Thus, Petitioner failed to satisfy irreducible minimum condition to trigger the exercise of judicial power.
STAT CON PRINCIPLE OF LOCUS STANDI
Locus Standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law
or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case.
The party is directly subject to an adverse effect by the statute or action in question, and the harm suffered will
continue unless the court grants relief in the form of damages or a finding that the law either does not apply to
the party or that the law is void or can be nullified. This is called the "something to lose" doctrine, in which the
party has standing because they directly will be harmed by the conditions for which they are asking the court for
relief. A person cannot bring a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law unless the plaintiff can demonstrate
that he/she/it is or will "imminently" be harmed by the law.
Otherwise, the court will rule that the plaintiff "lacks standing" to bring the suit, and will dismiss the case
without considering the merits of the claim of unconstitutionality. To have a court declare a law
unconstitutional, there must be a valid reason for the lawsuit. The party suing must have something to lose in
order to sue unless it has automatic standing by action of law.

G.R. No. 156596 August 24, 2007INFANTE vs. ARAN BUILDERS INC.
FACTS:
Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa Citywas an action for revival of judgment
filed on June 6, 2001 by Aran Builders,Inc. (private respondent) against AdelaidaInfante
(petitioner).The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, which became final andexecutory,in an action for specific performance
and damages. The judgment rendered was in favor of AdelaidaInfante.Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the action (for revival of judgment) on the grounds that the
Muntinlupa RTC hasno jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was
improperly laid. Private respondent opposed themotion.The Muntinlupa RTC issued an
order dismissing the Motion.Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific
performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a personal actionand, therefore, the
suit to revive the judgment therein is also personal in nature; and that, consequently, the
venue ofthe action for revival of judgment is either Makati City or Paraaque City where
private respondent and petitionerrespectively reside, at the election of private
respondent.On the other hand, private respondent maintains tha
t the subject action for revival judgment is quasi in
rem because
it involves and affects vested or adjudged right on a real property; and that,
consequently, venue lies in

MuntinlupaCity where the property is situated.The CA ruled in favor of herein private

respondent reasoning that the judgment sought to be revived was rendered inan action
involving title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, the action for revival
of judgment is thenan action
in rem
which should be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the real property is
located.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint for revival of judgment is an action
in rem
which was correctly filed with the RTC of theplace where the disputed real property is
located
.
RULING:
Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:Section 1.
Venue of real actions
. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interesttherein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein
thereal property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.x xxxSection 2.
Venue of personal actions
. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where theplaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendantsresides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found,
at the election of the plaintiff.Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of
whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action ora
personal action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue
, if the action for revival of judgment affects title to orpossession of real
property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with
the court of the placewhere the real property is located
. If such
action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a
personalaction that may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff
or defendant resides.
The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final and executory judgment has
ordered herein petitioner to execute adeed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang
Subdivision in favor of herein private respondent; pay all pertinent taxes inconnection
with said sale; register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala
Corporation the certificateof title issued in the name of private respondent. The same
judgment ordered private respondent to pay petitioner the sum ofP321,918.25 upon
petitioner's compliance with the aforementioned order. It is further alleged that
petitioner refused to