The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being

10/3/2014
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The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being

Posted on February 8, 2013 by Peter Turchin
28
The on-line magazine Aeon today published an article (http://www.aeonmagazine.com/livingtogether/peter-turchin-wealth-poverty/) of mine on why economic inequality tends to wax and wane in
very long (secular) cycles, and what consequences it has for the society.
One of the central ideas in the article was that general well-being (that is, of the overwhelming majority
of population) tends to move in the opposite direction from inequality: when inequality grows, wellbeing declines, and vice versa. To illustrate this idea I put together an infographic, which was later
modified by the Aeons graphic designer. The result was visually pleasing, but I felt that the changes
obscured certain features of the graph that I felt were important. I did not press the point, because
generally the editors at the Aeon made excellent suggestions, and greatly improved my text. Also, I am
a techno-geek when it comes to the analysis (graphical and statistical) of dynamics Ive been doing it
for nearly 30 years and wrote two technical books on it, so what I see is very different from what the
regular reader sees. I generally prefer austere black-and-white graphs, and use colors only when it is
necessary to make a point. A good scientific graph should be clear, not pretty.
A popular article, like the one on the Aeon, is not a place to provide the gory details of the analysis
underlying the infographic. Because the topic is quite controversial, I am sure my critics will want to
know these details so that they can rebut me. Eventually these details will be published as part of the
book that I am working on, but the graph has been published now, so I will use this blog to provide the
background to the figure. Many of my readers may also be interested in the view from the kitchen of
where curves come from.So welcome to the kitchen.
First, here is the infographic in the form that I prefer.
http://socialevolutionforum.com/2013/02/08/the-double-helix-of-inequality-and-well-being/
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(http://socialevolutionforum.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/infograph.jpg)The red curve shows the peaks

and valleys of economic inequality, while the blue curve depicts the ups and downs of popular wellbeing. Heres a very important point: the curves reflect not absolute levels of these two variables, but
deviations around a trend. We all know that the United States changed dramatically between 1800 and
2000 population grew by orders of magnitude, GDP and GDP per capita expanded, life expectancies
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increased, and the quality of life generally improved. Generally speaking, the causes of these changes
are quite well understood. But it does not mean that the change has occurred smoothly. Many variables
of interest to the structural-demographic theory (which explains the dynamics of inequality and wellbeing, among other things) have grown rapidly for some decades and then stagnated, or even declined
in subsequent periods. Then they resumed growing, and so on. I am interested in capturing these
oscillations around the rising trend, and the standard way of focusing on such deviations, called
detrending, is to subtract the trend from the data.
Heres an illustration using the average age of first marriage as a proxy (indicator) of social mood.
Generally speaking, when people feel optimistic about their future economic prospects they tend to get
married early. If, on the other hand, they are unsure that they will have a well-paying job next year,
they tend to delay marriage until they work up to a more secure position, or save some money.
However, age of first marriage is only imperfectly correlated with social optimism, because it is also
affected by other factors. For example, today people who are completely secure in their economic
prospects tend to marry later than people in similar position who lived two centuries ago. For a variety
of reasons, as societies modernized, people tend to marry later.
Heres what the actual data for the average age of first marriage of American women looks like:
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(http://socialevolutionforum.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/detrending.png)
The top half shows that the basic pattern is one of up, down, and again up around a rising mean. In the
bottom half I subtracted the trend, so now the numbers are fluctuating around the zero line.
There could be other reasons why the average age of marriage is an imperfect indicator of social
optimism. For example, changes in tax laws that affect marriage penalty (or, conversely, marriage
advantage) may result in many people delaying marriage (or deciding to marry earlier). Additionally,
while being able to marry when you found the love of your life (instead of waiting for years until you
can afford it) is certainly a good thing, its just one thing of many that makes us happy. Thus, if we
want to get at such a generic parameter as well-being its best to approach it with several proxies.
This is why I used four different indicators to approximate the generalized well-being curve. In addition
to social optimism, proxied by marriage age, I also looked at an economic indicator and two biological
(health) indicators. The economic indicator is the wage of production workers divided by the GDP per
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capita. Basically it tells us how the fruits of economic growth are distributed actually paid as wages to
workers, or paid out as dividends to share-holders or as compensation to CEOs.
The health aspect of well-being is captured with two proxies: life expectancy and the average stature
(height). Life expectancy is an obvious measure of the quality of life, and so is average stature as is
documented in voluminous literature (including writings by the Nobel laureate Robert Fogel).
To combine the four variables into a single index, I did the following. First, I log-transformed each
variable to make peaks and valleys more symmetric. Then I detrended them, as with the age of
marriage above. Finally I divided them by the standard deviation, which brings them all to the same
scale. Heres what the four curves look like when plotted together after detrending and scaling (note
that marriage age was flipped upside down, because it is earlier age that correlates with well-being):
(http://socialevolutionforum.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/wellbeing.jpg)
It is clear that there is a general tendency for these variables to move up and down together. However,
this correlation is by no means perfect. The erratic fluctuations are partly due to what is known as
measurement noise. This is particularly important for earlier periods, when collecting national
statistics has not yet been perfected. But, in addition, fluctuations also reflect genuinely different
dynamics of these proxies for well-being. In my tax law example, such legislation could affect marriage
age, but not life expectancy, while the introduction of penicillin will affect life expectancy, but not
marriage age. By averaging the four curves (the thick line) we smooth out those erratic fluctuations,
and bring out the cyclic component. This average is then my best estimate of the generalized wellbeing curve, and it is the blue curve plotted in the main graph.
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The red curve is easier to explain. It is based on the idea of Kevin Philips (as explained in the Aeon
article) to measure inequality by the ratio of the largest private fortune to the wealth of a typical
(median) household:
year
Largest
Median
Ratio
Fortune
Wealth
(1000)
($$mln)
($$)
1803
300
10
1830
350
17
1848
20
400
50
1868
40
500
80
1875
105
500
210
1890
200
540
370
1912
1000
800
1250
1921
1000
1250
800
1940
1500
1750
857
1962
1000
7200
139
1982
2000
33,300
60
1992
8000
43,200
185
1999
85,000
60,000
1417
2005
46,500
102,844
452
2010
54,000
66,740
809
Ratio is log-transformed, detrended, and scaled in the same way as other variables, after which it
becomes the red curve in the main graph.
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Its pretty obvious that the red and blue curves are close to being mirror opposites of each other. During
the integrative phases of the secular cycles well-being is high and inequality low. During the
disintegrative phases well-being is low and inequality is high.
This does not mean that there is a direct causal connection, that inequality directly depresses quality of
life for the majority of population. Or that quality of life directly depresses inequality. Rather, these two
variables are different facets of some integrated whole. The Aeon article traces out the interconnections
between these and other structural-demographic variables (in dynamical systems there is no cause and
effect, each variable is both a cause and an effect).
In particular, if you look closer, you can see that trend reversals of the two curves are slightly out of
phase: inequality tends to turn the corner after well-being.
The main graph also lists some iconic events that illustrate the back-and-forth swings of American
history. The events on the left hand side, coded with red, are typical disintegrative phase occurrences.
Mostly I am showing such instances of political instability as riots, violent labor strikes, and, of course,
the American Civil War. Note how they tend to bunch up during the periods of growing inequality. I
have also added Social Darwinism and Greed is Good on the left side of the ledger, for reasons
explained in the Aeon article.
On the right hand side and coded blue, I list some of the more important integrative occurrences.
Unlike internal wars (such as the American Civil War that divided the nation) external wars (War of
1812, World War II) are listed on the right side of the ledger, because they were powerful unifying (and
therefore integrative) events.
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1.
Tagged: cliodynamics, inequality, social change, structural-demographic

Posted in: Blogs (http://socialevolutionforum.com/category/blogs/)
28 Responses The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being

1.
tgreernmT. Greer
February 9, 2013
Two questions:
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1) What is the data base for changing height stature of Americans?

2) Do you believe that the rise in average-age-married during the last 30 years to be a reflection of
uncertainty in the future, or as is the standard interpretation, a direct result of the sexual revolution?
If it is the second, wouldnt that tend to skew the data somewhat?
Reply
T. Greer
February 9, 2013
Oops, sorry, scratch the second question. Posted these after reading the Aoen essay. I ought ot
have paid a bit closer attention to the blog post itself!
Reply
Peter Turchin
February 9, 2013
The stature data is from the Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition (Table
Bd653-687. Selected anthropometric measurements-height, weight, and body mass index: 17101989). There is more up-to date data in papers by anthropometricists like John Komlos, but I am
still analyzing those data. The problem is that until humans reach the age of the early 20s we
dont really know what their height will be. So this makes it difficult to find out what stature did
in the last 20 years. However, Komlos made much progress looking at the body length of
infants, so we should be able to get a handle on it.
In any case, for the period up to 2000 (which is when the curve ends) we are on solid grounds.
Reply
O.A.Wehmanen
November 20, 2013
Stature as a measure of general nutrition level is a good choice, but it has a lag built in, and
with the very low recent price of food may not be as meaningful now as it it was 100 years
ago.
Reply
2.
dantae
February 11, 2013
Very interested and nice tutorial for me on detrending. Have you published more formally on the 8/18
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Very interested and nice tutorial for me on detrending. Have you published more formally on the
idea of using marriage age as an important component of optimism/well being or can you point me
to other such discussions? Have you considered whether male marriage age indexes other
information than female marriage age? Thanks
Reply
Peter Turchin
February 11, 2013
The curve of male ages of marriage essentially parallels that for females. On average, men tend
to marry a few years later, but the ups and downs are the same. So it really has something to do
with generalized optimism. A fun book to read about social moods is John Castis Mood
Matters:
Mood Matters: From Rising Skirt Lengths to the Collapse of World Powers
And I will be making a more extended argument in my forthcoming book, to which the Aeon
article refers.
Reply
Robert Wendell
December 6, 2013
Perhaps its relevant to this question that my wife and I happened to get married at the same
time? The only way any difference in marriage age between the sexes can exist is by virtue
of age differences within each marrying couple.
Reply
3.
John Lilburne
February 15, 2013
The pendulum swings, but sometimes the clock breaks.
The kondratiev cycle is a subset of the demographic cycle that you present so nicely in your books
and articles. The K cycle is basically driven debt/demograpy/innovation which has been significant
since the birth of the industrial world. Peopl who follow the kcycle also believe that we are entering
a period of stress from now right through till about 2013, when hope fully the debt has its jubilee
and the innovation that is accumulating in PV energy, Nanotechnology, biotechnology can be
applied.
However there are major discontinuities that are approaching. Firstly the hostile elite that rules the9/18
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However there are major discontinuities that are approaching. Firstly the hostile elite that rules the
USA whose plans appear to be to extract maximum financial wealth and displace the Wasps, are in
such a position to change the whole political game in the USA. Obama has been given the power to
kill on a whima reversal of everthing that america stood for. The declining power of the west
means that they can no longer impose order on many parts of the world particularly the middle
east. This is occuring at the time when conventional crude production has already peaked and small
disturbances can create immense volatility. Lastly the USA was always an island continent
effectively free of outside influences. Now with the rise of China and Islamic power will have to start
facing fundamental changes in its power relationships and take second place in obtaining resources.
There is a significant chance that if not in the current downside, then in the K-summer (c 2040)
during a time when resources become tight and whites become a minority, that there will be
fundamental and dramatic changes in the whole world system. will it be from republic to principate
or from Romulus Augustus to Odoacer is an interesting question
4.
Reply
cardiffkook
February 18, 2013
Nevertheless, when Communism collapsed, its significance was seriously misread. Its true that the
Soviet economy could not compete with a system based on free markets plus policies and norms
that promoted equity. Yet the fall of the Soviet Union was interpreted as a vindication of free
markets, period. The triumphalist, heady atmosphere of the 1990s was highly conducive to the
spread of Ayn Randism and other individualist ideologies. The unwritten social contract that had
emerged during the New Deal and braved the challenges of the Second World War had faded from
memory.
A simpler explanation is that the skilled US worker gained post WWII due to the lack of worldwide
competition, this began to erode as more women and minorities and competitors from other free
nations entered the system. With the fall of Communism and the expansion of technology, the
competition among laborers became substantially more fierce. Capital has flourished by
capitalizing on a surplus of labor.
On a broader scale, this has been the best period ever for workers worldwide. The important
dynamic today is not between some imaginary zero sum battle between the wealthiest capitalists
and workers, but between advantaged first world workers finally being placed on equal footing
with third world workers, minorities and women. More people have emerged from poverty in past
decade than ever before, and it is because the playing field for labor has become more fair, not less.
5.
Reply
cal48koho
February 22, 2013
Questions on the inequality Graph
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I am a newbie to Cliodynamics and I have questions on the methodology of Kevin Philips graph of
inequality using ratios of the highest net worth to the median net worth. It would seem to me that
we should be using the median of all the highest net worth fortunes rather than choosing a single
high net worth fortune as an index point. I just finished Secular Cycles and you chose the quantity
of the elites as a factor in the cycles. It seems to me your approach makes more sense than Phillips.
The tacit assumption in my comment is that I think inequality is understated by Philips. I wonder
how you would redraw the graph which I find less readable on a vertical axis than the more
traditional horizontal.
Reply
Peter Turchin
February 23, 2013
The problem with estimating the median of the highest fortunes is that it is not clear how to
define this class unambiguously. What is the cut-off point? In medieval France there was a
categorical legal distinction between noblemen and commoners. So it would make sense to
calculate the median or the mean of noble fortunes. But in America there is no such categorical
distinction. The top 0.1 percent grades into the top 1 percent who grade into the top 10 percent,
and so on.
Reply
hugh owens md
February 23, 2013
Thank you for your explanation. Clear enough . It seems we are dealing with a Gaussian
distribution function which would be superior to point function analysis. . Contemporary
data would be no problem, but distant data? My point is that do you think that current
income inequality is understated by the graph? If this is such an important variable in
cliodynamics, than accurate quantification is essential, especially in view of the commonly
repeated meme of vastly increasing income inequality in the US, especially since 1980.
Reply
6.
Peter Turchin
February 23, 2013
Remember that the graph was detrended. Its purpose is to identify the turning points, not the
relative height of peaks and troughs. Also, the curve is based on wealth, not income inequality.
However, both wealth and income inequality turned a corner in the late 1970s and has been rapidly
increasing. So the increase since 1980 is real enough.
Reply
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7.
Chekov
February 27, 2013
Hi Peter,
Great blog post and article in Aeon. Just one question it seems to me that there are two distinct
and different factors driving the upward trends in the well-being measure in your models the
threat of revolution in this period from the US, while the supply of labor is the one that you focus on
for the older societies. I dont think that this is problematic per se it is a reasonable conjecture that
the threat of revolution was what prevented the modern examples from requiring a huge
population decline in order to turn the corner. If this is indeed the case then the differentiating factor
would be the pre-existing widespread belief in a revolutionary alternative (i.e. socialism) in the
modern examples, which the elites were sufficiently afraid of to usher in reforms that caused the
cycle to turn the corner without any huge population cull.
The problem is, however, that we currently no longer have such a widespread belief in an
alternative and there is little or no prospect of a generalised labour shortage in the West given
automation, productivity improvements, etc. This would suggest to me that the next trough in the
well-being curve will require cataclysm for the corner to be turned.
Am I reading this right or am I missing something?
Reply
Peter Turchin
February 28, 2013
I think of these two mechanisms as working together in an interactive way. Greatly simplifying,
the threat of revolution caused a shift of social mood among the elites that caused them to adopt
a number of reforms. One of them was immigration reform that essentially shut down
immigration and decreased the supply of labor. Things are more complex, of course.
Immigration Acts were not the only reforms that were adopted in the Progressive Era and later
New Deal, and in fact most historians dont consider them as a major part of action duirng this
period.
On the effects of technlological change on labor supply one of the best articles is by Randall
Collins. If you cant find it, Ill try to dig up the link later.
Reply
8.
David Hochfelder
March 9, 2013
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Would it be useful to measure wealth inequality by using the Gini coefficient and income inequality
by the difference between mean and median income?
Reply
Peter Turchin
April 7, 2013
These are valid ways of measuring inequality, but I prefer not to use them, because they are
difficult to interpret. Opaque. When Gini goes from 0.6 to 0.65, what does it really mean? So I
prefer to look at such measures as the median to the lowest 10 %, the upper 10% (>90%) to
median, and upper 1%, 0.1% and 0.001% to median. Such numbers are much more directly
understandable.
Reply
9.
Emulator
April 7, 2013
I was thinking about how age of first marriage indirectly measures social and economic optimism,
and started wondering if marriage itself might also be a measure of asabiya. Specifically, could a
breakdown of marriage be an indicator of general individualism and mistrust? Lower asabiya
might percolate down to the individual levels. Thus, I figured that a breakdown in families might be
an indication of moralists (social conservatives) losing out to saints (social liberals) and knaves.
So, I looked for data, and found this: http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-126.pdf
Its interesting, because there is a very clear cut drop in percent of children in two-children
households starting with the sexual revolution in the 60s, which goes along perfectly with your
double helix. On the other hand, the previous data is not as clear cut. There is a small rise in percent
of children living in two-parent households starting around 1900 and extending for a few decades,
which coincides with the integrative phase. But I could just as easily argue that this may be due to
increases in life expectancy (i.e. it might not have been that children were born less out of wedlock,
but that both parents tended to be alive). However, looking at the trends in the difference between
the percent of children living with father only and the percent of children living with mother only
suggests otherwise (we wouldnt expect fathers to start dying less but mothers to start dying more,
so the difference would likely be due to single motherhood).
Ill see if I can try to dig up data prior to 1880. If my hypothesis is correct, we would have seen an
increase in the difference between the percent of children living with mother only and the percent of
children living with father only.
Reply
Peter Turchin
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April 7, 2013
I have been aware of these trends, but havent seen the data. I need to think about the
significance of this for structural-demographic processes, though. Thanks very much for
bringing these data up!
Reply
O.A.Wehmanen
November 20, 2013
Living in two parent households does not mean birth parents. Many children were sent West to
be adopted by farm families where labor was needed. I do not know if this was enough to affect
the gross statistics.
Reply
10.
Georgetta
August 7, 2013
I all the time emailed this weblog post page to all my associates, since if like to
read it then my links will too.
11.
Reply
Robert Wendell
October 24, 2013
The best theory of history Im aware of before yours is R. Buckminster Fullers theory of the Great
Pirates, although the latter is not at all rigorous in any mathematical sense. It seems that your elite
class roughly corresponds, in principle at least, to the Great Pirates or their modern equivalent,
whose real power is cyclical. These cycles would seem to correspond to an increase in power for the
elite originating in and supported by the general well-being of the society in question during
inclusive economic phases until the sense of entitlement this fosters in the elite (modern equivalent of
the divine right of kings) rises to the point of self-destructive feedback in extractive economic
phases. A virtual penny for your thoughts (grossly under-priced, Im sure).
12.
Reply
Robert Wendell
October 24, 2013
By the way, Peter, are you familiar with this relatively recent Swiss study uncovering the network14/18
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By the way, Peter, are you familiar with this relatively recent Swiss study uncovering the network
topology of financial control in transnational corporations: The Network of Global Corporate
Control? Heres the link:
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1107/1107.5728v2.pdf
If you can possibly find the time, you might also find these articles, with links to various pertinent
studies, interesting:
http://writerbeat.com/articles/592-Practical-Reality-Check-I
http://writerbeat.com/articles/709-Practical-Reality-Check-II
13.
Reply
Slartibartfarst
December 29, 2013
Interesting, and probably true.
This same/similar idea was put forward in the Stanford Research Institute report The Changing
Images of Man (1982).
14.
Reply
Robert
January 1, 2014
It seems reasonable to assume we all know that some amount of income inequality is natural, since
we as individuals have varying abilities to contribute productively to the economy. This begs the
question of at what level income inequality is natural and/or (perhaps also) optimal. If we look at
income inequality as a causal factor with respect to well being, as your model as I understand it
assumes, this seems to imply that well being is maximized at some optimum income inequality
level that we could possibly deduce from this data and use to guide policy decisions.
Judging from the very few cycles available in our history as displayed in the double helix graphic,
it looks like well being peaks a few years earlier than the income inequality bottoms. If we assume
some time delay between a hypothetical optimal level of income inequality and maximum well
being, this appears to imply that some level well before the minimums of income inequality is ideal.
In other words, too much distance in either direction from a hypothetical ideal level of income
inequality reduces overall well being.
This looks to be rather strongly reinforced not only by the earlier peak, but by the substantial
decreases in well being preceding the minimum points of income inequality. Since this graphic is
detrended, it is not possible to deduce anything reliable about this from the graphic, since no ratio
representing income equality is consistent along the time axis. In fact, the fairly radical changes in
ratios over time for the same distance from the central axis raises the doubt that any long term
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absolute value could ever be deduced from the available data (detrended or not). However, there
still might exist some way to derive a short term optimum value within a given economy. I would
love to know what consideration you have given this or your current thoughts about it if not.
15.
Reply
Robert
January 1, 2014
Addendum: The assumption of some hypothetical ideal or natural level of income inequality
seems to explain why economic systems like Marxism or heavily socialist systems that work to
eliminate inequality or reduce it too much are doomed to failure. If we assume that there is a
theoretical ideal for income inequality that perfectly rewards with absolute fairness each individuals
true economic contribution to society, this could well explain why too much or too little net income
inequality at a societal level would reduce the well being of that society.
I would think that there would be some psychological nuance that factors into this simple and
perhaps overly simplistic view. It seems likely that having some safety net would remove
counterproductive anxiety that could otherwise reduce productivity by reducing individual
resilience or recuperative potential. This is obviously one possible example of an exception to what
an overly literal interpretation of how a theoretical ideal for income inequality that perfectly
rewards with absolute fairness each individuals true economic contribution to society might
actually translate to optimum economic function.
My personal interest in what I regard as your very important work is inspired by how it applies to
good government. By good government I refer to how we might structure government and
positively constrain how it legislates with the aim to optimize economic function and its fairness. I
suspect optimum economic function and fairness tempered by compassion for the genuinely
incapacitated are in practice equivalent terms. I dont pretend that we could structure to fully
conform to such an ideal, but I suspect we could greatly reduce the bumps in the road with an
adequate governmental and legal suspension system, if you will indulge the metaphor.
16.
Reply
Robert
January 6, 2014
Peter, Im realizing I was wrong in stating that you assume a causal relationship between income
inequality and societal well being. The following are my admittedly highly speculative thoughts in
reaction to your research:
Income inequality that is too low or excessively reduced politically (Marxism) fails to reward the
economic merit of individual contributions adequately to motivate overall productivity and
resulting societal well being while rewarding too much those who fail to contribute. Thats the
essence of why fully Marxist economies guarantee failure.
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Income inequality that is too high rewards the financial elite too much for too little genuine
economic merit in their contributions to society while rewarding the less wealthy too little for their
valuable work. That is the essence of what threatens to turn highly extractive economies into failed
states. Its not as if we had no examples of any of this.
This should make it very clear why the financial elite who promote conditions that favor high
income inequality use the clear failure of Marxism to support their schemes. Its an easy game to
play, since history has already demonstrated the utter failure of Marxism while the evils at the
opposite extreme are less obvious, making it a simple matter to misdirect attention by inflating
Marxist tendencies and blaming all the wrong things. But either excessively high or low income
inequality excessively rewards the wrong people for their contributions. Very high income
inequality excessively rewards the wealthy while very low income inequality excessively rewards
unproductive slackers and fails to motivate productive enterprise.
These factors motivate less productive workers to favor socialist tendencies while motivating those
with an aristocratic sense of entitlement to favor laissez-faire (unpoliced) capitalism. I see this as the
essence of political conflict in any society. The ideal situation would be willing, productive economic
contributors who sincerely desire fair compensation to everyone for the genuine economic merit in
their individual contributions.
However, selfish desire for unearned advantage is a common human flaw as abundantly illustrated
in gambling addictions, a sense of unmerited wealth as ones due by virtue of mere social status
(aristocratic entitlement, divine right of kings, etc.), exploitation of others for personal gain justified
only by the power to do so, theft, fraud, abuse of government safety nets like welfare and food
stamps, etc. Selfish desire for unearned advantage is common to all these social ailments at both
ends of the social/financial spectrum.
I see this is as the root cause of the excessive oscillations back and forth between the extremes of
high and low income inequality around whatever level at which it would naturally settle if these
human flaws were absent. I suspect that just as law and law enforcement ideally and fortunately
often successfully reduce criminal behavior in decently well-ordered societies and so increase
protection for law abiding citizens, intelligent legal and economic structures based on this
understanding could also potentially reduce substantially the wild extremes of income inequality
generated by the flawed human tendency to selfishly seek unmerited rewards at the expense of
society.
The failure to recognize the dual nature, the double-edged sword of selfish interest is in my opinion
the great gaping hole in Ayn Rands thinking. She praises it in entrepreneurs, ignoring the ethics or
lack of it in the means and pretending that efficient markets abound and automatically selfregulate. Meanwhile, she despises precisely the same selfishness as it manifests in free-loaders at the
other end of the spectrum. Ill-gotten gains for the wealthy are just as despicable as free-loading on
welfare, food stamps, or disability by someone perfectly capable of earning an adequate living.
Worse, there is a vast difference in their proportion of the economy, making the free-loading
(exploitative, predatory, crony) component of the self-entitled wealthy by far the biggest potential
threat to societal well being as long as we avoid a Marxist ideal that pretends to eliminate the
natural inequality of income and wealth. (Precisely because income inequality is natural and so in
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practice impossible to eliminate, Marxism guarantees frightfully enormous levels of political

hypocrisy, as if politics were not already intrinsically hypocritical.) The current paranoia regarding
Marxism on the current far right is just the result of the entitled wealthy successfully enlisting grass
roots political help in their fight against anything that would reduce their ability to suck up
unearned money from the economy at largein other words, from all the rest of us.
Currently I see most if not virtually all conservatives as completely clueless regarding both these
issues and which end of the swing were now experiencing. They keep trying to justify with Ayn
Rand or whomever else a situation that is economically unsustainable in any practical economic
scenario.
17.
Reply
Robert
January 6, 2014
Peter, I think you will find this research on the psychological effect on ordinary subjects when made
to feel even briefly rich with play money very interesting in light of your observations of elite
behaviors:
http://planetsave.com/2013/12/23/a-rigged-game-of-monopoly-reveals-how-feeling-wealthychanges-our-behavior-ted-video/
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28 Responses The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being

The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum

1) What is the data base for changing height stature of Americans?

The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum

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The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum

The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum

The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum

The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum

The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum

The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum

The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum

The Double Helix of Inequality and Well-Being | Social Evolution Forum

practice impossible to eliminate, Marxism guarantees frightfully enormous levels of political

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