Rosales vs.

Rosales, 148 SCRA

69(1987)

decedent, with the State as the final

intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of
a provision which makes a daughter-in-law
an intestate heir of the deceased all the
more confirms our observation. If the
legislature intended to make the surviving
spouse an intestate heir of the parent-inlaw, it would have so provided in the Code.

Facts: On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V.

Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died
intestate. She was survived by her husband
Fortunato T. Rosales and their two (2)
children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio
Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
pre-deceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow
Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The
estate of the deceased has an estimated
gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).

The aforesaid provision of law refers to the

estate of the deceased spouse in which
case the surviving spouse (widow or
widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not
apply to the estate of a parent in law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered
a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this
observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 71 SCRA
262; 265, L-42257, June 14, 1976, to wit:
"We hold that the title to the fishing boat
should be determined in Civil Case No.
3597 (not in the intestate proceeding)
because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope
L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who,
although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third
person with respect to his estate.

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes

instituted
the
proceedings
for
the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In the
course of the intestate proceedings, the
trial court issued an Order dated June
16,1972 declaring the following individuals
the legal heirs of the deceased and
prescribing their respective share of the
estate
Fortunato T. Rosales (husband), ; Magna
R. Acebes (daughter), ; Macikequerox
Rosales, ; and Antonio Rosales (son), .

By the same token, the provision of Article

999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not
support petitioner's claim. A careful
examination of the said Article confirms
that the estate contemplated therein is the
estate of the deceased spouse. The estate
which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of
the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the motherin-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate
of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox
Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by
the right of representation as provided by
Article 981 of the Code.

Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of

the estate in her capacity as the surviving
spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of
the deceased, claiming that she is a
compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
together with her son, Macikequerox
Rosales.
Thus,
Irenea
Rosales
sought
the
reconsideration of the aforementioned
Orders. The trial court denied her plea.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Is a widow (surviving spouse) an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law?

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA vs. ESTELA

DIZON, et al.
G.R. No. L-24561
June 30, 1970

Held: There is no provision in the Civil

Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her motherin-law. The entire code is devoid of any
provision which entitles her to inherit from
her mother-in-law either by her own right or
by the right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the
order of intestate succession (Articles 978
to 1014) enumerate with meticulous
exactitude the intestate heirs of a

Facts: The testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a

widow, died and was survived by seven
compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate
children and a legitimate granddaughter,
who is the only legitimate child and heir of
a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said
decedent. Six of these seven compulsory
1

heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrixappellee) are the oppositors-appellants.

account of their legitime, instead of some

of the real properties left by the Testatrix;

The deceased testatrix left a last will.

Named beneficiaries in her will were the
above-mentioned
compulsory
heirs,
together with seven other legitimate
grandchildren. In her will, the testatrix
divided, distributed and disposed of all her
properties among her above-named heirs.

Held: Decisive of the issues at bar is the

fact that the testatrix' testamentary
disposition was in the nature of a partition
of her estate by will. Thus, in the third
paragraph of her will, , she expressly
provided that "it is my wish and I command
that my property be divided" in accordance
with
the
dispositions
immediately
thereafter following, whereby she specified
each real property in her estate and
designated the particular heir among her
seven compulsory heirs and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the
same.

Testate proceedings were in due course

commenced and by order, the last will and
testament of the decedent was duly
allowed and admitted to probate, and the
appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was
In her will, the testatrix "commanded that
her property be divided" in accordance with
her testamentary disposition, whereby she
devised and bequeathed specific real
properties comprising practically the entire
bulk of her estate among her six children
and eight grandchildren.

This was a valid partition 10 of her estate,

as contemplated and authorized in the first
paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code,
providing that "(S)hould a person make a
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos
or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime
of the compulsory heirs." This right of a
testator to partition his estate is subject
only to the right of compulsory heirs to
their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides
the safeguard for the right of such
compulsory heirs:

The executrix filed her project of partition

while on the other hand, oppositors
submitted their own counter-project of
partition. It was is then observed that the
executrix and the oppositors differ in
respect to the source from which the
portion or portions shall be taken in order
to fully restore the impaired legitime.

ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the

testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that
the same be fully satisfied.

The lower court, after hearing, sustained

and approved the executrix' project of
partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907
of the New Civil Code specifically provide
that when the legitime is impaired or
prejudiced, the same shall be completed
and satisfied. CA likewise decidedly ruled
against them. Hence, this appeal.

ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that

impair or diminish the legitime of the
compulsory heirs shall be reduced on
petition of the same, insofar as they may
be inofficious or excessive.

Issues:

This was properly complied with in the

executrix-appellee's project of partition,
wherein the five oppositors-appellants,
were
adjudicated
the
properties
respectively distributed and assigned to
them by the testatrix in her will, and the
differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken
from the cash and/or properties of the
executrix-appellee, Marina, and their cooppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly
were favored by the testatrix and received
in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.

1. Whether or not the testamentary

dispositions made in the testatrix' will are
in the nature of devises imputable to the
free portion of her estate, and therefore
subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to
the devise plus their legitime under Article
1063, or merely to demand completion of
their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil
Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be
compelled to accept payment in cash on
2

Oppositors err in their premises, for the

adjudications and assignments in the
testatrix' will of specific properties to
specific heirs cannot be considered all
devises, for it clearly appear from the
whole context of the will and the disposition
by the testatrix of her whole estate (save
for some small properties of little value
already noted at the beginning of this
opinion) that her clear intention was to
partition her whole estate through her will.

exceed that of the disposable portion and

of the share pertaining to him as legitime."
For "diversity of apportionment is the usual
reason for making a testament; otherwise,
the decedent might as well die intestate."
Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions
by the testatrix constituted a partition by
will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of
the Civil Code and of the other cited codal
provisions upholding the primacy of the
testator's last will and testament, have to
be respected insofar as they do not
prejudice the legitime of the other
compulsory heirs.

The repeated use of the words "I bequeath"

in her testamentary dispositions acquire no
legal significance, such as to convert the
same into devises to be taken solely from
the free one-half disposable portion of the
estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent
that her testamentary dispositions were by
way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as
heirs and not as mere devisees, and that
said dispositions were therefore on account
of the respective legitimes of the
compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in
the
fourth
paragraph
of
her
will,
immediately following her testamentary
adjudications in the third paragraph in this
wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in
case any of those I named as my heirs in
this testament any of them shall die before
I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced
at the time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said deceased."

Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the

Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not
deemed subject to collation, if the testator
has not otherwise provided, but the
legitime shall in any case remain
unimpaired"
and
invoking
of
the
construction thereof given by some
authorities that "'not deemed subject to
collation' in this article really means not
imputable to or chargeable against the
legitime", while it may have some
plausibility in an appropriate case, has no
application in the present case. Here, we
have a case of a distribution and partition
of the entire estate by the testatrix, without
her having made any previous donations
during her lifetime which would require
collation to determine the legitime of each
heir nor having left merely some properties
by will which would call for the application
of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code
on collation. The amount of the legitime of
the heirs is here determined and
undisputed.

Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in

error. The testamentary dispositions of the
testatrix, being dispositions in favor of
compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken
only from the free portion of the estate, as
contended, for the second paragraph of
Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely
provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory
heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this
Code with regard to the legitime of said
heirs."

With this resolution of the decisive issue

raised
by
oppositors-appellants,
the
secondary issues are likewise necessarily
resolved. Their right was merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article
906 of the Civil Code and this has been
complied with in the approved project of
partition, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of
the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned
by the testatrix principally to the executrixappellee.

And even going by oppositors' own theory

of bequests, the second paragraph of
Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the
case of the executrix-appellee, who
admittedly was favored by the testatrix
with the large bulk of her estate in
providing that "(T)he devisee who is
entitled to a legitime may retain the entire
property, provided its value does not

Neither may the appellants legally insist on

their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being
3

paid in cash, per the approved project of

partition. The properties are not available
for the purpose, as the testatrix had
specifically partitioned and distributed
them to her heirs, and the heirs are called
upon, as far as feasible to comply with and
give effect to the intention of the testatrix
as solemnized in her will, by implementing
her manifest wish of transmitting the real
properties
intact
to
her
named
beneficiaries, principally the executrixappellee.

prohibition to collate as an exception to

Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered
collation and equally divided the net estate
of the decedent, including the fruits of the
donated property, between Buhay and
Rosalinda.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in declaring that the deed of donation
did not prohibit collation?
Held: NO. The Supreme Court agrees with
the respondent court that there is nothing
in
the
above
provisions
expressly
prohibiting the collation of the donated
properties. As the said court correctly
observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli"
merely
described
the
donation
as
"irrevocable" and should not be construed
as an express prohibition against collation.6
The fact that a donation is irrevocable does
not necessarily exempt the subject thereof
from the collation required under Article
1061.

De Roma vs. Court of Appeals, 152

SCRA 205(1987)
Facts: Candelaria de Roma had two legally
adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and
Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on
April
30,
1971,
and
administration
proceedings were instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna by the private
respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay
was appointed administratrix and in due
time filed an inventory of the estate. This
was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground
that certain properties earlier donated by
Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof,
had not been included.

The Court surmise from the use of such

terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the
deed of donation that it was prepared by a
lawyer, and we may also presume he
understood the legal consequences of the
donation being made. It is reasonable to
suppose, given the precise language of the
document, that he would have included
therein an express prohibition to collate if
that had been the donor's intention.

The properties in question consisted of

seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding
their valuation; what the parties cannot
agree upon is whether these lands are
subject to collation. The private respondent
vigorously argues that it is, conformably to
Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for
her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has
no obligation to collate because the
decedent prohibited such collation and the
donation was not officious.

Anything less than such express prohibition

will not suffice under the clear language of
Article 1062. The suggestion that there was
an
implied
prohibition
because
the
properties donated were imputable to the
free portion of the decedent's estate merits
little consideration. Imputation is not the
question here, nor is it claimed that the
disputed donation is officious. The sole
issue is whether or not there was an
express prohibition to collate, and we see
none.

The issue was resolved in favor of the

petitioner by the trial court, which held that
the decedent, when she made the donation
in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited
collation. Moreover, the donation did not
impair the legitimes of the two adopted
daughters as it could be accommodated in,
and in fact was imputed to, the free portion
of Candelaria's estate

The intention to exempt from collation

should
be
expressed
plainly
and
unequivocally as an exception to the
general rule announced in Article 1062.
Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but
the rule, which is categorical enough.

On appeal, the order of the trial court was

reversed, the respondent court holding that
the deed of donation contained no express
4

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, et al vs. THE

HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 89783
February 19, 1992

defendants, jointly and severally, to

reconvey ownership and possession of all
such properties to the plaintiffs plus
payment of damages.

Facts: Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will

and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina,
as the sole and universal heir of all his
properties. The will was drawn up by his
wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser,
Attorney
Salvador
Lorayes.
Attorney
Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being
childless, they had agreed that their
properties, after both of them shall have
died should revert to their respective sides
of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties
would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e.,
brothers and sisters or nephews and
nieces), and those of Catalina to her
"Jaucian relatives."

The Locsins appealed to the Court of

Appeals which affirmed the trial court's
decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the private
respondents (nephews and nieces of Dona
Catalina) are entitled to inherit the subject
properties?
Held: No. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring the private
respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa
Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit
the properties which she had already
disposed of more than ten (10) years
before her death. For those properties did
not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e.,
"the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of (the
decedent's) death and those which have
accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession."

Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer and in

due time, his will was probated without any
opposition from both sides of the family. As
directed in his will, Doa Catalina was
appointed executrix of his estate.
Don
Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry
out the terms of their compact, hence, nine
(9) years after his death, Doa Catalina
began transferring, by sale, donation or
assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her
own, properties to their respective nephews
and nieces.

The rights to a person's succession are

transmitted from the moment of his death,
and do not vest in his heirs until such time.
Property
which
Doa
Catalina
had
transferred or conveyed to other persons
during her lifetime no longer formed part of
her estate at the time of her death to which
her heirs may lay claim. Had she died
intestate, only the property that remained
in her estate at the time of her death
devolved to her legal heirs; and even if
those transfers were, one and all, treated
as donations, the right arising under certain
circumstances to impugn and compel the
reduction or revocation of a decedent's
gifts inter vivos does not inure to the
respondents since neither they nor the
donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.

Eventually, Doa Catalina died. However,

four years before her death, she had made
a will affirming and ratifying the transfers
she had made during her lifetime in favor
of her husband's, and her own, relatives.
Six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise,
some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces
who had already received their legacies
and hereditary shares from her estate, filed
action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi
City to recover the properties which she
had conveyed to the Locsins during her
lifetime, alleging that the conveyances
were inofficious, without consideration, and
intended solely to circumvent the laws on
succession.

There is thus no basis for assuming an

intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had
received from her late husband to his
nephews and nieces, an intent to
circumvent the law in violation of the
private
respondents'
rights
to
her
succession. Said respondents are not her
compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended
that she had any such, hence there were no

After the trial, judgment was rendered in

favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against
the Locsin defendants declaring the
plaintiffs the rightful heirs and entitled to
the entire estate and ordering the
5

legitimes that could conceivably be

impaired by any transfer of her property
during her lifetime.

Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance

of Letters of Administration," on April 28,
2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati, and alleged, inter alia, that a
parcel of land located in Teresa Village,
Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation,
transferred by the decedent to petitioner
the validity of which donation respondents
assailed, "may be considered as an
advance legitime" of petitioner.

All that the respondents had was an

expectancy that in nowise restricted her
freedom to dispose of even her entire
estate subject only to the limitation set
forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it
were breached, the respondents may not
invoke:

The probate court found the Deed of

Donation as valid and went on to hold that
it is subject to collation following Article
1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all

the present property of the donor or part
thereof, provided he reserves, in full
ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means
for the support of himself, and of all
relatives who, at the time of the
acceptance of the donation, are by law
entitled to be supported by the donor.
Without such reservation, the donation
shall be reduced on petition of any person
affected.

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with

other compulsory heirs, must bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right
which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter,
by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals

likewise erred in not dismissing this action
for annulment and reconveyance on the
ground
of
prescription.
Commenced
decades after the transactions had been
consummated, and six (6) years after Doa
Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4)
years after the subject transactions were
recorded in the Registry of Property,
whether considered an action based on
fraud, or one to redress an injury to the
rights of the plaintiffs. The private
respondents may not feign ignorance of
said transactions because the registration
of the deeds was constructive notice
thereof to them and the whole world.

Issue: Whether or not the subject property

donated by Amelia is subject to collation?
Held: The term collation has two distinct
concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of
donations made by the testator to the
value of the hereditary estate; and second,
it is the return to the hereditary estate of
property disposed of by lucrative title by
the testator during his lifetime. The
purposes of collation are to secure equality
among the compulsory heirs in so far as is
possible, and to determine the free portion,
after finding the legitime, so that inofficious
donations may be reduced. Collation takes
place when there are compulsory heirs, one
of its purposes being to determine the
legitime and the free portion. If there is no
compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is

granted. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Arellano vs. Pascual, 638 SCRA

826(2010)

The records do not show that the decedent

left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by
his siblings, who are his collateral relatives
and, therefore, are not entitled to any
legitimethat part of the testators
property which he cannot dispose of
because the law has reserved it for
compulsory heirs. The compulsory heirs

Facts: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on

January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P.
Arellano who is represented by her
daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and
Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco
Pascual
and
Miguel
N.
Pascual.
Respondents filed a petition for "Judicial
6

may be classified into (1) primary, (2)

secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary
compulsory heirs are those who have
precedence over and exclude other
compulsory heirs; legitimate children and
descendants are primary compulsory heirs.
The secondary compulsory heirs are those
who succeed only in the absence of the
primary heirs; the legitimate parents and
ascendants are secondary compulsory
heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are
those who succeed together with the
primary or the secondary compulsory heirs;
the illegitimate children, and the surviving
spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.
The decedent not having left any
compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his
properties, even if nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His
donation to petitioner, assuming that it was
valid, is deemed as donation made to a
stranger, chargeable against the free
portion of the estate. There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.