Sunteți pe pagina 1din 9

A Healer Reinforcement Approach to Smart Grid

Self-Healing by Redundancy Improvement


Alireza Shahsavari, Alireza Fereidunian, Hamid Lesani
f School
2 Electrical

of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

Engineering Faculty, K. N Toosi University of Technology and School of ECE, University of


Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract- Smart Grid is expected to heal the electricity


distribution system to improve its reliability, known as self
healing capability. Self-healing can be performed in system
level (like restoration and local generation), in component level,
or by reinforcing the healer system reinforcement (called as
healer healing). Smart Grid literature chiefly focuses on the
two former approaches;

while,

the latter has gained less

attention despite merit. A proper healer reinforcement method

is expanding redundancy,

in both control

and protection

subsystems. The redundancy expansion and the consequent


self-healed distribution network is anticipated to express lower
outage times,
welfare.

thus higher reliability and increased social

This paper investigates the effect of redundancy

expansion on reinforcement of the Smart Grid healer, by


reliability modeling of protection and control subsystems. The
positive effect of the proposed healer reinforcement approach
on the overall Smart Grid reliability is shown on RBTS4, and
the results are discussed then.
Keywords-Smart Grid, Self-healing, Healer Reinforcement;
Reliability Modeling; Redundancy Expansion; Non-Dominated
Solutions.

NOTATION
The notation used throughout this paper is reproduced
below for quick reference.

st.
nu
!

Aline
J

Atrans.
J

Abusbar
J

Lline
J

Ltrans.
J

LBusbar
J

r.line
!)

r.trans.
!)

r.busbar
!)

In!

Life cycle of study;


Number of load points;
Average annual time that the load point i is out
of supply (h/yr);
Average load per customer in load point i
(kW/cust.);
Number of customers in load point i (kW/cust.);
Lines failure rate of section j (f/km.yr);
Transformers failure rate of section j(f/yr);
Busbar failure rate of section j (f/yr);
Length of section j lines (km);
Number of transformer in section j ;
Number of busbars in section j ;
Average outage time of section
per fault in
section j lines (hIt);
Average outage time of section
per fault in
section j transformers (hIt);
Average outage time of section
per fault in
section j busbar (hIt);
Inflation rate;

Int

Interest rate;
Residential load coefficient;
Commercial load coefficient;
Industrial load coefficient;
Public customer load coefficient;
Critical public customer load coefficient;
Residential customers interruption function;
Commercial customers interruption function;
Industrial customers interruption function;
Public customers interruption function;
Critical public customers interruption function;
JCCPC
ENS
Energy Not Supplied per year (kWh/yr);
CENS Cost of Energy Not Supplied per year($ US/yr);
TCENS the Total Cost of Energy Not Supplied during
life cycle of study;
Economic Factor;
the Average Interruption Cost for load point i
($ US/kW);
Total Cost of Redundancy expansion;
TCR
Total Planning Investment;
TPJ
Redundancy expansion Benefit.
RB

wfes
wfomm
wfnd
C
w[
PC
wf
J CRes
J Ccomm
J Ci nd
J CPC

I. INTRODUCTION
IGH reliability requirement is considered as the main
challenge in modern grids; specifically in electric
power distribution systems which are in charge of delivering
the electrical energy to the consumers. Smart grid satisfies
this reliability requirement this obstacle by the self-healing
capability [1].
A self-healing system uses information, sensing, control
and communication technologies to handle issues and
unwanted events by eliminating or minimizing their
disadvantageous effect for maximizing reliability [2, 3].
Self-healing can be performed in system level (like local
generation and capability of automatic fault detection,
isolation, and service restoration), in component level, or by
healer system reinforcement which we named it as healer
healing. In [4], we introduced a novel framework for self
healing methodologies.
Healer reinforcement method is developed into wide area
approaches. A pragmatic approach is improving its
redundancy, in both control and protection subsystems.

From the Sfstem configuration point of view, the


redundancy improvement leads to achieve a self-healer
distribution
network.
The
consequent
self-healed
distribution network anticipated to express lower outage
times, in both frequency and duration of interruptions, thus
higher reliability and increased social welfare.
Reliability requirement specifies the degree of
redundancy enhancement. On the other hand, it is
conceivable that overall budget is run over by ting up
high degree of ra:lundalt pcths. Thus, it is necessary to do a
compromise between reliability requirement and investment
of redundancy expansion. Economically, the utility cost will
generally increase as consumers are provided with higher
reliability. On the other hand, the consumer costs associated
with supply interruptions will decrease as the reliability
increases. The total costs to society will therefore be the sum
of these two individual costs. This total cost exhibits a
minimum and so an optimum or target level of reliability is
achieved.
From the reliability aspect, enhancing the redundancy in
control subsystem is expected to influence on duration of an
interruption and by enhancing it in protection subsystem
expected to influence on both duration and frequency of an
interruption. The redundancy enhancement in control
subsystem decreases SAIDI (System Average Interruption
Duration Index) and in protection subsystem decreases both
SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index) and
SAIDI.
All in all, healer reinforcement approach by using of
redundancy approach possesses some technical and
economical benefits. For instance, improving overall
reliability indices and decreasing total cost of energy not
supplied. However, it incurs more installation cost
maintenance. Hence, it is necessary to economically analyz;
the healer reinforcement by redundancy approach.
In [3], reliability models for protection and control
subsystems are presented and different redundancy schemes
are checked. However the impact of redundancy expansion
?n overall reliability did not discussed. In [4, 5], redundancy
m some parts of the protective system is examined and
A.Abbarin and Fotuhi-Firuzabad extended a Markov model
and examined redundancy and protective components
effects. In [7], a technical novel framework is introduced for
redundancy approach in both control and protection
subsystem.
This paper investigates the effect of redundancy
.
.
expansIOn on remforcement of the Smart Grid healer, by
reliability modeling of protection and control subsystems.
The positive effect of the proposed healer reinforcement
approach on the overall Smart Grid reliability is shown on
RBTS4. The effect of redundancy expansion is checked in
both subsystems individually on RBTS4. Also the
economical and technical effects of redundancy expansion
on subsystems are investigated and best solution is selected
by using non-dominated solution, the results are discussed
then. In section 2, by modifying these models different
redundant paths have been defined. Next in section 3
reliability achievements of implementing redundanc
approach has been presented and possible redundant sets
have been introduced as a Non-Dominated solution and final
redundant set has been selected through max-min approach.

II. METHOD
A.

Research Methodology

For evaluating the overall smart grid reliability and the


positive effect of redundancy expansion on reinforcement of
the Smart Grid healer, the reliability of protection and
control subsystems should be modeled. Reliability modeling
for protection and control systems and different redundant
schemes are presented, in section 2.3.
Figure. l shows the flowchart of the overall and load point
base reliability evaluation. In this flowchart, ARPM and
ARTM represent Auto-Restoration Probability Matrix and
Average Restoration Time Matrix, respectively. ARPM is
calculated by conditional probabilities and depends on the
allocated automatic and manual switches, protection devices
and probability of their successful operation [8]. In [3]
ARPM is calculated by using RadPow software base on
event tree, while in this article, reliability evaluations are
simulated in a home developed program. ARTM is
calculated by conditional probability and depends on
switching time and the calculated ARPM. Redundancy
influences the values of protection and control block in the
flowchart; therefore, redundancy affects the system
reliability.
Feeders' Evaluation

Figure.I.Flowchart of the reliability evaluation

B. Problem Formulation
As mentioned before, the economical and technical
effects of redundancy expansion on subsystems are
investigated in this paper by using prepared models and
evaluation flowchart. For investigating technical impact of
redundancy expansion some reliability indices are
examined, for instance, SAIFI, SAIDI, CAIDI, AENS and
ASAI, which are expressed in [9, lO]. To evaluate the
economical the impact of the proposed healer reinforcement
by components redundancy expansion on the system

reliability, total cost of energy not supplied (TCENS) during


the life cycle is examined, which is expressed as:

ny LP

TCENS =

L Li CENSi
n=l

(EF) n

(1)

AlC-! (U!)
Ui

(2)

1 +I n f
_ _ _ _ .:....
1 + I nt

(4)

In equation (2), AI Ci(Ui) is computed by equation eq.(5),


j is the faulted section.

AI Ci(Ui) = wfesI CRes (Ui) + wf ommI Ccomm(Ui)


c
+w{ndI Crnd (Ui) + wf I Cpc(Ui) + wf PC I Ccpc (U J (5)
The I C represents interruption cost function for each kind
of consumers. In (6), the total cost of redundancy approach
and upcoming costs is computed. Also by using (7) benefit
of implementing redundancy in distribution system is
computed.

TCR = TCENS +TPI


RB

The probctlility

for

for

improving

TCRnon-redund ant - TCRredund ant

(6)
(7)

the

prota::tion

system's

relial:lility

is

enhancing its ra::tundancy.

a. Feeder Protection (Breakers) Reliability Modeling


For a normally dosa::l breaker the operaing and failure
states are [3]:

123-

(3)
=

reliability.

on the rei iaI:li I ity of its components One etfa::t ive approcrll

4-

EF

A rei ici:lI e prota::tion system improves

network

prota::tion system to operate responding to a fault depends

Where n is the number of years, i is the load point


numbers and EF is the economic factor for evaluation of
present worth/cost factor which changes the cost of time
study to current cost. The CENSi and the EF are written as:

CENS! = ENS! x

distribution systems.
the overall

Passes currents from in its closed state;


Opens successfully when requested to do so;
Fails to open when requested to do so;
Opens inadvertently when not requested.

State 1 and 2 are the desirable conditions and 3 and 4 are


the unwanted ones. 1 and 4 refer to dependability and
security of the protection system [13]. In [9] these two
aspects of reliability in redundant protections system have
been discussed.
Figure3 represents the protection system in term of its
components block diagrams. These blocks related to feeder
protection in which the digital relay unit (DRU) includes the
electronic circuits of signal conditioning and the digital
processing relay system. The auxiliary relay unit (ARU)
contains trip relay (TR) and the associated power supply
unit (PSU).
: PR

................................
:ARt:j..

1---"TF i-.

Figure.3.Block diagram of the base protection scheme, adapted [3]

C. Reliability Modeling for Redundancy


Figure.2 shows smart grid subsystems including control,
protection and IT infrastructure interacting with legacy
system [12]. Protection and control systems in contingencies
conditions are responsible for isolating faulted zone and
supply restorable zones, for minimizing the duration of
interruption and to limit the impact of fault [7, 11], thus the
overall smart grid reliability depends on successful
operation of protection and control systems. In this section,
protection and control subsystems reliability models are
presented and different redundancy extensions are
implemented.
Control and Protection
System

Power Distribution System


(The Legacy System)

IT Infrastructure of Smart Grid


Figure.2. Smart Grid Sub-systems [12]

J) Protection System Reliability Modeling


Protection system is the most important factor to the
secure operation of the electrical power networks, induding

When a permanent fault occurs, all components should


operate correctly, i.e., failure in each block causes fault in
protection operation. From the reliability point of view, all
components are series and the reliability block diagram
(RBD) of the basic protection scheme is shown in figure.4.

Figure.4. Reliability block diagram of the basic protection scheme.

In the basic protection scheme, any failure in each block


causes malfunction in protection operation. Consequently,
back up protection operates and both faulted and faultless
feeders experience outage. The probability of malfunction in
protection scheme reduces by redundancy enhancing in
components. In order to see different redundant protection
schemes, for preventing from unnecessary repetition,
figure.5 shows only sample of reliability block diagram
cases. Cases 2-5 comprise one redundant component in
sequence for Breaker, DRU, ARU, and CT.
Case 6 comprises two DRUs and two ARUs which
prepare two paths; the system is operating if at least one
path is functioning. Case 7 has two breakers and two CTs
and prepares 4 paths; the system is functioning if at least one
of breakers and one of CTs are functioning. Figure.6 shows

the even tree of case 8, it consist of two DRUs and two


ARUs and prepares 4 paths; the system is functioning if at
least one of DRUs and one of ARUs are functioning. Case 9
and case 10 are equal to (n- l) index of reliability, case 10 in
components layer and case 9 in system layer. Assuming the
failure events of the components blocks are independent,
also the probability of each basic component operation is
equal to table l and the probability of each redundant
component operation is 0.95% of the basic component.
Table2 shows the probabilities of base case and redundant
protection cases operation.

[3, 14, 15, 17]. Communication systems are non-negligible


and

requisite infrastructures for data exchanges in these three


layers [16]. In this paper, the reliability of automation
control systems is investigated into two layers, local control
system and central control system.
The central control system performs functions, including
control and monitoring of all substation equipments,
accumulate and process local controls data, dispatch control
commands and receive results. The local control system
consists of remote terminal units (RTUs), these devices
exquisite various types of information, execute commands
from the central center and reporting status after
implemented commands to the central center.
A rei icD! e control systan improves the overall smai grid
rei icDi I ity. The probabi I ity for the control systan to operate

Case 6

Case 8
Non-redundant Protection system 1
Non-redundant Protection system 2
Case 9

responding to a commald depends on the reliability of its


components.

One effective approcdl for improving the

control systan rei icDi I ity is enhalo ng its redundalCY.


Case 10

Figure.5. Reliability block diagram of different


redundancy schemes in protection systems

CT

i
i

ARUI
0

ARU2

Fault

i->'---:-----:

I: Trips

2: Trips

3: Fails to Trips

Outcome

-"";""----i
F
I-'-F _--+-__+-_-1

F _-+__+-_-+__+-_-i

4: Trips
5: Trips
6: Fails to Trips

7: Fails to Trips

8: Fails to Trips

.. _---'----'---""'"""---'-----' 9: Fails to TrillS


L..:.F _

Figure.7,8 represents control system consists of local and


central layers in term of component block diagrams. Central
control includes Power Supply Unit (PSU), Central
Processing Unit (CPU), Memory Unit (MU), controller and
Communication Interface (CI). The main components in
local control system are Switching Device (SD), battery and
charger or Power Supply Unit (PSU), power actuator
(Drive), Current transformer and Voltage Transformer
(CTIVT), Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), Fault Passage
Indicator (FPI) and Communication Interface (CI). The
RTU includes central processing unit (CPU), Input / Output
interface (I/O). A typical RTU possess eight digital inputs
(D!) and eight digital outputs (DO), also may equipped with
six analog inputs [3, 11, 14, 15].
Ccntral Computer

Controller

[ I
I
cPu

Figure.6. Event tree of case 8

b. Fuses Reliability Modeling


Fuses in automated distribution systems have direct
impact on systems reliability. Fuse in low voltage branches
decreases duration and frequency of interruptions. From the
reliability point view, fuse is independent device and its
reliability block diagram is one block.
2.

Control System Reliability Modeling

Distribution automation and control systems consist of


three functions; line's facilities or secondary substations,
primary substations, and distribution control centers (DCC)

Power Supply
Urnt
Communication
Interface

(a)

Figure.8.(a). Block diagram of the base central control system


(b). Block diagram of the base local control system; adapted [3, II, 14, 15]

index of reliability, case 10 in components layer and case 9


in system layer. Assuming independent failure events for the
components, also considering the probability of each
component operation is equal to table 1 and the probability
of redundant component operation is 0.95% of the basic
component. Table 2 shows the probabilities of base case and
redundant cases operation.
b. Local Control Reliability Modeling

In order to achieve a proper operating control system,


each component in both local and central control layers
should operates correctly, i.e., any individual event that
causes failure of each component in local/central control
layers fails the local/central control system. From the
reliability point of view, all components are connected in
series. Assuming failure events are independent, equations
(8) and (9) represent the probabilities of non-redundant local
and central control operation.

P(cent ral cont rol)


P(local co nt rol)

P(PSU) P( Co nt roller) '


P( CPU) . P(MU) . P( CI)

In order to see the effect of redundancy expansion in local


control system, figure. 10 shows reliability block diagrams of
four different redundancy schemes in local control system.
Also case 2-6 comprise one redundant component III
sequence for CI, PSU, RTU, power actuator, and FPI.

Local control system 1

(8)

Local control system 2

P(SD) . P( CT) ' P(PSU) P(F PI)


. P(PA) . P(RTU) . P( CI)
(9)

Case 9

a. Central Control Reliability Modeling


In order to see different redundant central control
schemes, figure.9 shows reliability block diagrams of four
different redundancy schemes in central control system. For
preventing from unnecessary repetition, figure4 shows only
sample of reliability block diagram cases. Cases 2-6
comprise one redundant component in sequence for CI,
PSU, CPU, MU and controller.

Case 7

Case 10

Figure.lO. Reliability block diagram of different


redundancy schemes in local control systems

As discussed in protection and control modeling, table2


shows the probabilities of base and redundant local control
cases operation, assuming independent failure events for the
components, also considering the probability of each
component operation is equal to table 1 and the probability
of redundant component operation is 0.95% of the basic
component.
Tablel. Components reliability, adapted [3]

Protection system
Case 8
Central control system 1

Central control system 2


Case 9

Case 10

Figure.9. Reliability block diagram of different


redundancy schemes in central control systems

Case 7 comprises two CPUs, MUs, and controller which


prepare two paths, and Case 8 is alike case 2, which
prepares 8 paths; the system is functioning if at least one of
paths is functioning. Case 9 and case 10 are equal to (n- l)

Control system
Central Control

Local Control

Component

Reliability

Component

Reliability

Component

CT

0.98 5

PSU

0.995

SO

Reliability

0.990

DRU

0.990

CPU

0.994

PSU

0.995

ARU

0.98 8

MU

0.993

PA

0.992

0.993

Controller

0.98 7

CTIVT

0.990

CI

0.997

FPI

0.990

RTU

0.993

CI

0.997

Table2 antICipates the redundancy improves the


probability of successful protection and control operation.
Comparison between case 6 and 8 of protection system (or
case 7 and 8 in control system) illustrates redundant
components connection is extremely important, parallel
connections make more reliable than series. As expected,
redundancy in components layer is more reliable than the
redundancy in system layer, case 9 and 10 indicate that.
Table2. Probabilities of each considered cases operation

Control System

Protection System
Case

Feeder

Central

Fuse

Protection

Local Control

Control

Base

0.956704

0.90

0.966431

0.943378

Case 2

0.963066

0.91

0.969185

0.946066

Case 3

0.965792

0.92

0.971021

0.947859

Case 4

0.967610

0.93

0.971940

0.949651

Case 5

0.970337

0.94

0.972858

0.950547

Case 6

0.975597

0.95

0.978366

0.952340

Case 7

0.97678 9

0.96

0.98 7800

0.959456

Case 8

0.976802

0.97

0.990486

0.961405

Case 9

0.990442

0.98

0.991534

0.980680

Case 10

0.997310

0.99

0.998027

0.996561

OutageJ)ul"3rioll(min)

Figure. 12. Interruption Cost of customer classes; adapted [ 18, 19]

III. Case Study


A.

B. Numerical Results

Example Case

The effect of the proposed healer reinforcement approach


on the overall Smart Grid reliability is shown on RBTS4.
The RBTS has 5 buses (Bus2-Bus6), two buses (Bus2,
Bus4) are defined as distribution network. Figure. 11 shows
RBTS4 which has three supply points, seven feeders, 38
load points, 4770 customers, and the peak and average load
40 MW and 24.58 MW, respectively. Customers data and
lines length are taken from [18]. Table3 shows components
and lines failure rates and average repair or replacement
time per failure. For evaluating the reliability, auto
switching time and manual switching time are assumed 40
seconds and l.5 hour, respectively. Life cycle of study is
considered 25 years, also inflation rate and interest rate 6%
and 7%, respectively. Figure.I2 shows the Ie s of different
customer types.
S3W

lIkV

By using presented reliability models for subsystems, the


positive effect of redundancy approach in each subsystem
on the RBTS4 network is investigated, afterwards impact of
redundancy in all subsystems is checked and the best
solution is selected for objective function(s) for non
dominated solutions.
J) Impact of redundancy in control system
This section presents impact of redundancy in control
system base on explained modeling in part "C" of section 1.
For investigating the positive impact of redundancy III
control system on the network, the protection system is
considered in base case. Comparing these 100 cases
determines that the CENS is decreased about 7% also the
SAIDI is decreased about 9%, as shows in figures 13, 14.

I<o,t;-, ....!.-t::;-.!...
...
--i!.!...
.--!:;---,*:...
.rh...., -----------------l

..!!....--=--..::.,----t;.,,--=. i

7.8

"" t t ,

ji 7rt 1r :ri;:
t
" :"
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1'
I
---.!'----tlt;;-..!!.--I!!I;..::...... . ... . .... . ...<1>*.....................)

"

"

7.9

"

. .. .. ,

... ....

...

..

'"
7.7

2 7.6
C/O

r5

7.5
7..4

Case31
7..

ease 2

Cac 3
asc 4"
casC5
Highcr
Redun cae6ca'iC7
d,1Il1 L
Oea/ C Case8 Cac .
Ontrol
tase 10'

Figure.!3. Calculated the cost of energy not supplied (CENS) of redundant


control cases

Figure.I1. RBTS4 configuration with automatic and manual switches


Table3. Components failure rates and average repair time [3, 18]
Repair Time(h)

Component

Failure Rate(Vyear)

Lines

0.065 (II km)

Transformers

0.015 (1/Comp.)

5-8 (Replacement)

Busbar

0.001 (1/Comp.)

1-2

Figure. 14. System average interruption duration index (SAlOl) of


redundant control cases

For evaluating TCR bye equation (6) components


reliability-cost curve is required. In [17, 20] protection and

control facilities prices are exist, component's reliability


cost curve is an upward concavity exponential function [9,
10], Thus the reliability-cost curve for subsystems
consequence of components reliability-cost curve and can be
calculated.
Figure15 shows total cost of redundant planning in central
and local control, as shown minimum TCR consequences of
case 8 for both local and central control, it shows that by
implementing more redundant for instance cases 9 or 10,
planning costs increases more than decreased TCENS.

As discussed in control system TCR calculates by using


reliability-cost curve. Figure 18 shows total cost of
redundant planning in protection system, as shown
minimum TCR consequences of case 8 for feeder protection
and fuses with 98% reliability.

'

106
1.826
1.824
1.822
Vl 1.82

1.818
'"
1.816
1.814
1.812
Case
Case 3
,"-CasL81-..J.--=e1 ease2 ca';"33 -:"C:C
Case5 \ CO\\tt" O\
=:;C"=S$s;'::::::c
::'
'
C '4i-:;C
C " '5 C 6
Case .,:dunda
Case8 Case Case10
High Redundant "
LOCal C::,

1.82
L815

Figurel5. Total cost of redundancy of redundant control cases

C. Impact of redundancy in protection system


This section presents impact of redundancy in protection
system base on explained modeling in part "C" of section II.
For investigating the positive impact of redundancy in
protection system on network, the control system is modeled
as the base case. By comparing 100 possible cases
determines that the CENS is reduced about 8% also the
SAID! is reduced about 10%, as shows in figure 16, 17.

7.

7.7

7.6
8 7.5
U7.4
7.3
7.2
Case
I

ease

Case

3 cas;'gh Case 5
I'

Case
Cac
Case
Re</undam Feeder
Prorcclion

/-

Case9 Case

10

:iP\\\'1o{ruS
C3

Figure.16. Calculated the cost of energy not supplied (CENS) of redundant

Case S

o ,..
.

Case 6

Case?

ection

Casc9

Case 10

protection cases
I

3. 2.3.

Non-Dominated Solutions

In the proposed models for redundancy approach, there


are 100 possible schemes for control system and 100 for
protection system, thereupon there are 10000 possible
schemes. Figure19 shows possible solutions. System planner
can choose one of the solutions that satisfies the planning
objective functions. There are some methods for selecting
the best solution from the set of solutions according to the
planner objective functions one of them is max-min
approach [20, 21]. In order to apply max-min approach,
values of all objective functions must be normalized by
using equations (10-12). Afterwards, minimum of each
normalized objective function is selected as a max-min
value, next maximum value of max-min is selected as the
final solution. By using mentioned approach, case 8 is
selected for local control, central control, protection system
and fuses with 0.98 reliability.
.

0 90

Case 4

High Redundant Feeder Prot

Figure. 18. Calculated the cost of energy not supplied of redundant

TCRn
t

0.98

protection cases

'.8
Cascl

TCRmax - TCRi
TCRmax - TCRmi n

------

(10)

SAIFImax - SAIFIRi
SAIFIni =
.
SAIFImax - SAIFIRmm

(11)

SAIDImax - SAIDIi
SAIDIni =
SAIDImax - SAIDImm
.

(12)

xlO

'

FigureI9. Possible Solutions

Figure.17. System average interruption duration index (SAlOl) of


redundant protection cases

Figure20, 21 show differences between the CENS and the


average annual outage time for the base case and
recommended case, respectively. By implementing
redundancy improved cases all indices improve as shows in

table4, SAIFI, SAID!, CAID!, and AENS decreases 4.72%,


10.396%, 5.95%, 10.86% , respectively, and ASAI
increases. Moreover present worth of redundancy benefit is
73678 (US $) during the life cycle.

Case

SAIFI

SAIDI

CAIDI

AENS

ASAI

Base Case

0.45015

0.44879

0.99698

1.8352

0.999948

0.428 8 8

0.40213

0.93765

1.6358

0.999954

Optimal
Redundant case

Table4. Overall reliability indices

necessary to perform sensitivity analysis, it makes the


problem smaller and possible solutions will be less.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors would like to thank Mr. Aruin Ghafouri for


his valuable help, comments, and suggestions.
REFERENCE
[I] Kazemi, sh., "Reliability Evaluation of Smart Distribution Grids", Doctoral
dissertation, Aalto university publication series 69/20II
[2]

Tianyou, L1., Bingyin,xu.,

"The

Self-healing

Technologies

of

Smart

Distribution Grid", 2010 China International Conference on Electricity


Distribution
[3] He, Ying., "Modeling and Evaluation Effect of Automation, Protection, and
..

6000

.. ..

.. ..

-Base Case

___

oRelduntcsl_l_l""'. _c ...... ------- r'\_L....:I __ .:___

.. .. ..-..._.._.._.._.._..._.._.._.._.._..._.._.._.._.._..._.._.._.._.._..._.._.._.._.._..._.._.._.._.._..._.._.._.._.._.._.._..._.._.._.._.._..._.._.._.._.._..._.._.._.._.._..._.._.._.._.._..._.._.._.._-

.. _ _ ... _.._ .._ _ _ ... _.._ .._ _ _ ... _.._ _ _

5000

..-... -..-.._.. -..-... -..-.._.. -..-... -..-.._.. -..-... -..-.._.. -..-... -..-.._.. -..-... -..-.._.. -..-... -..-.._.. -.._.. -..-... -.. -.._.. -..-... -.. -.._.. -..-... -.. -.._.. -..-... -.. -.._.. -..-... -.. -.._

.. -.

doctoral

Systems",

""ork for Self-Healing


industry, Decembe r

4000
'"

3000
'"
z
"" 2000
U
1000

, 2011
...-.. -.._.. -..-...-.. -.._.

..

- .. -..:..-..-...-..-.._..-..-...-..-.._..-..-...-..-.._..-..

dundancy and Effect


.. -..-.._.. -. .... -..-..
-' "-" : m Reliability", 5th
:
ics Engineering, 5-9

-'-.-__ __________
I

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14151617181920 21 22 23 24252627282930 31 32 33 3435363738


Load Point

Figure.20. Load Points CENS


-Base Case

' 0.9

08+",,,,,----,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,---,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,---,,,,,,,,,,,,,,---,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.---

--- Optimal Redundant Case

.................---................

---................----...............---................--_.................---.................---.............

e 0.7
'"
i 06.
<5 05
.
" 04
/i
. + ..---It --:;=........--- 1 ..--\\ -li'<. --\ ..............
0.3
0.2 +..........- --........:::..'---.................--4.......---...::..:::.=.---.................---...:::..:::.;.---................----...............
..
..........

<

..........

.Jf-

---

O. I

O L-__________________________________________________
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 1415161718192021 22 23 2425262728293031 32 33 3435363738
L.oad Point

Figure.21. Load Points average annual outage time

IV. CONCLUSION
This paper presented an approach to healer reinforcement
in smart distribution grids by redundancy expansion in
protection and control subsystem. The protection and
control systems were modeled and redundancy schemes in
proposed models used for investigating the effect of the
proposed method. The overall reliability ofRBTS4 network
was calculated for the proposed redundancy expansion
method which improved all indices, for instance: SAIFI,
SAID! and CENS were decreased by implementing the
selected redundancy set. Also the proposed method was
examined economically and the redundancy benefit was
calculated for the life cycle of study.
Further research may be conducted on modeling more
components details. The related systems was divided into
five to seven components and only ten redundant cases was
selected for subsystems, however possible cases were more
than ten. For instance, there would be thirty two different
cases for redundant central control system. Also, it is

[7] Kasztenny, B., Hunt, R.,Vaziri,M., "Protection and Control Redundancy


Considerations in Medium Voltage Distribution Systems". Protective Relay
2007.
[8]Fereidunian,

AR.,

Lesani,

H.,

Lucas,C.,

"Distribution

System

Reconfiguration Using Pattern Recognizer Neural Networks", International


Journal of Engineering (UE), Transactions B: Applications, Vo1.15, No.2,
July 2002, pp.135-144
[9] billinton, R., Allan, R., "Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems" , second
edition, ISBN 0-306-45259-6, Plenum Press,1996
[IO]Hoang Pham, "Handbook of Reliability Engineering", Rutgers

University

Piscataway New Jersey, USA [SBN 1852334533.


[II] AREVA, "Network Protection and Automation Guide", first edition July
2002, ISBN : 2-9518589-0-6
[12] Fereidunian, A, Lucas, C., Lesani, H., Rahmani, R., Wymore, AW., "A
Policy-Driven Method for IT Infrastructure Selection in Power Distribution

Automation System", International Review of Electrical Engineering, Vol.


5, No. 2, Part B, March-April 2010, pp. 671-682.
[13]Boroomand, F., Fereidunian, A, Zamani, M.A, Amozegar, M., Jamalabadi,
H.R., Nasrollahi, H., Moghimi, M., Lesani, H., Lucas C., "Cyber Security
for Smart Grid: A Human-Automation Interaction Framework", In Proc. of
the IEEE PES [SGT, Gothenburg, Sweden, Oct. 11-13, 2010
[14] Northcote-Green, J., Robert Wilson,"Control and Automation of Electrical
Power Distribution Systems".2006, ISBN - 13: 978 - 0 - 8247 - 2631 - 7.
[15] Momoh, J.A, "Electric Power Distribution, Automation, Protection, and
Control".2007, International Standard Book Number-13: 978-1-4200-0625
[16] Fereidunian, A, Nordman, M., Lesani, H., Lucas, C., Lehtonen, M., "A
Systems Approach to Information Technology (IT) Infrastructure Design
for Utility Management Automation Systems", Iranian Journal of Electrical
and Electronic Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 3&4, July 2006, pp. 91-105.
[17] Ying He, Goran Andersson, Ron N. Allan, "Modeling the Impact of
Automation and Control on the Reliability of Distribution Systems", 2000
IEEE,79-84
[18] Allan.R.N, billinton.R, SJariefl, Goel.L, So.K.S , "A Reliability Test
System for Educational Purposes-Basic Distribution System Data and
Results",IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vo16, N02, May 1991
[19] Chao-Shun, Chia-Hung Lin, Hui-Jen Chuang, Chung-Sheng Li, Ming-Yang
Huang, Chia-Wen
Distribution

Huang, "Optimal Placement of Line Switches for

Automation

Systems

Using

Immune

Algorithm".

IEEE

TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 21, NO. 3, AUGUST


2006.
[20] Tippachon, W., Rerkpreedapong, D., "Multi objective optimal placement of
switches and protective devices in electric power distribution systems using
ant colony optimization" Electric Power Systems Research 79 (2009) 11711178
[21]Chollot,

Yves;

Biasse,

Jean-marc;

Malot,

Alain;

Feeder

automation

improves medium voltage network operating efficiency, SmartGrids for


Distribution,

Page(s): I - 4

2008.

lET-CiRED.

CIRED

Seminar

23-24

June

2008

S-ar putea să vă placă și