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KEITH
CHAMBERLIN
is instructor
in history at Montana
State University,
touched the
surface of Lower California lightly, but underneath the placid peninsular cover was the same discontent which erupted so violently on the
mainland. In the peninsula it was held in check by the scantiness of the
Mexican population and the cautious policies of Esteban Cantui, governor of the Northern District for almost six crucial years. With the
ending of Carranza'sregime, Cantu was forced out of his northwestern
stronghold by the victors in the Agua Prieta revolt and Lower California
was drawn slowly into closer relations with the rest of the Mexican
nation. In the three decades which followed Cantu's "abdication" the
old Lower California largely disappeared and a pair of nationalistic
territories emerged, almost entirely freed from foreign control. The
activities which brought about this transition are interesting in themselves, but they are even more striking when it is clear that they were
not entirely the result of accident; planned development, which sought
to minimize foreign influences, was the core of these activities for over
a third of a century. The key to this planning was the deliberate colonizing of the northern section of the peninsula by Mexicans to eliminate
American interests and to minimize American influences.
At the peak of American control in Lower California, about 1885,
little that was Mexican remained. Lands, mineral resources, culture,
population, orientation, and even the apparent destiny of the territory
were American. To try to make that destiny more certain there were
many blatant annexationists eager to cut the tie of Mexican sovereignty
and complete another "Texas cycle." Through failure of many mining
and "colonization" ventures and the ending of the orchilla dye industry,
American activity declined markedly by 1915. Even during this era
there were conspiracies and attempts by American and mixed groups to
wrest the peninsula from the feeble Mexican grasp. The most notorious
* A summary of this artice was read at the Seattle meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of
the American Historical Association in December, 1948.
[43]
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Not only was development of the Mexicali Valley tied to the slow
pace of the California-Mexico Land and Cattle Company; it was also
held back by the company's reluctance to sell lands. Instead of selling,
Otis leased lands in tracts of from fifty to one thousand acres. The only
significant exception appears to have been the lease to Adolph M. Shenk
in 1921 which covered 12,000 acres." Rates for these leases ran from one
dollar per acre yearly for undeveloped land up to ten dollars an acre for
fully developed land. Taxes and other assessments totaled one dollar
and thirty cents an acre. Thus, the minimum rental of $115 for undeveloped fifty-acre tracts and $565 for those ready for cultivation kept
lands out of Mexican hands. Theoretically, a crop mortgage system,
with rental equaling from 15 to 25 per cent of the crop, allowed Mexicans
to secure holdings. However, the company clearly preferred to import
Chinese until 1917, for these Orientals formed cooperatives and developed virgin tracts at their own expense, thus bringing income for the
company through leases and saving it the huge expense of land development. By 1919, when the first large numbers of Mexican workers appeared, there were 5,000 Chinese farmers around Mexicali growing 80
per cent of the region's cotton, which was almost its only crop.7
In spite of undeniable advantages to this developmental system from
the company's viewpoint, it was dangerous to continue it for long in the
face of the rising "land and bread" movements during the later years of
the Diaz regime. Since the company made almost no concessions to this
nationalistic, revolutionary generation until forced to do so in the 1930's,
it remained for years as the symbol of "American oppression" in the
Northern District of Lower California. Thus, the term "American
interests" should normally be interpreted as "The California-Mexico
Land and Cattle Company," or the Otis-Chandler interests.
5 Mexican West Coast and Lower California, 282,
302, 303.
"Ibid., 308,
390. In addition, the company sold 16,000 acres near Hechicera to John Cudahy
of Chicago in 1912, which he used mainly for raising Duroc-Jersey hogs. (Ibid., 307, and New
York Times, April 1, 1919, p. 3).
7 Mexican West Coast and Lower California,
305-308. There were few other American holdings in the area at any time. The Southern Pacific Company, which took over the Lower
California properties of the pioneering California Development Company of 1899 after the
floods of 1905-1907, sold its lands as rapidly as possible and was not conspicuous outside of
its operation of the Inter-California Railroad. The Cudahy purchase of 1912, referred to
above, was almost insignificant in comparison with the Otis' properties.
46
During the critical days of the socialist invasion of 1911, when it appeared possible that Mexico might lose control of the peninsula, Provisional President De la Barra sent Major Esteban Cantfi to Mexicali
with an infantry company. Cantui found the town in the hands of a
private army raised by the Americans in the district who were intent
on protecting their properties at all costs. After disbanding the private
force, Cantii adopted a cautious policy of placating the Americans in an
obvious effort to prevent creation of an incident which might have led
to a call by Americans on both sides of the line for United States protective occupation of the area. It seems clear that Cantuiand others felt that
such occupation might end only with United States annexation.8
De la Barra and his contemporaries recognized that defense of the
peninsula suffered from the meagerness of the Mexican population.
Accordingly, he promised that as soon as the invasion was beaten back
he would send a commission to the territory to study methods of colonizing it with mainland Mexicans and of opening a railroad across the
Colorado to keep the new colonists in closer contact with the rest of the
republic.9This appears to have been the first official promise of eventual
Mexicanization.
The outbreak of widespread civil war on the mainland made it impossible for the national government to follow up the De la Barra
promise for many years. For a time various factions carried mainland
disturbances to the peninsula, but in 1914 Cantui's fellow officers accepted his leadership and ended the disorder. On January 15, 1915,
Cantuibegan his six-year "reign" as de facto civil and military governor
of the Northern District of Lower California.1
Canti's major accomplishment was to preserve Mexican sovereignty
over the peninsula during the Social Revolution. Twice he forestalled
possible United States occupation, during the Veracruz crisis of 1914
and the Pershing invasion later, by proclaiming his state neutral." His
high taxes temporarily alienated American interests2 but in time he won
8 Hector Gonzilez, "The Northern District of Lower California," in F. C. Farr, ed., The
History of Imperial County, California (Berkeley, 1918), 299-301.
9 El Correo de la Tarde (Mazatlan), 30 de junio, 1911, p. 8.
10Vivanco y Villegas, op. cit., 329; Gonzilez, op. cit., 304-308. Only after Carranza failed
in an attempt to oust Cantui, 1916-1917, did any mainland government accept his almost
autonomous regime. Harry Carr, "The Kingdom of Cantd; Why Lower California Is an
Oasis of Perfect Peace in Bloody Mexico," Sunset, XXXVIII (1917), 65-66; Morris M. Rathbun, "Facts about Lower California," The Mexican Review, I (1917), 9.
Carr., op. cit., 65-66; New York Times, June 19, 1916, p. 2.
2 Early in 1915, apparently as a direct result of Cantd's heavy export tax on cattle, Harry
Chandler became involved in an alleged conspiracy to oust the governor. This resulted in
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guaranteeing them work for the entire year. However, then as now,
thousands slipped across into the Imperial Valley where pastures seemed
greener.'
Cantuiand his advisers recognized that Mexicans would be more likely
to remain in the territory if they could hope to obtain lands of their
own and escape peonage. This became especially evident when the Carranza government reported, incorrectly, that titles to the Otis held lands
were invalid and they were being retaken for redistribution.9 Once this
confusion had been overcome, Cantu tried to alleviate the rising discontent by resettling Mexicans from the United States on lands in the
Valle de las Palmas, east of Tijuana, in August and September, 1919.'
However, until Rodriguez Dam was completed during the Cirdenas era,
these lands were marginal for agriculture and the settlers were angry
because only a handful of Mexicans received Mexicali Valley lands even
by 1922.21 Since the era of expropriations was not yet at hand and Cantu
could scarcely alienate his American supporters by considering such a
step, the landless were dissatisfied. Consequently, the governor lost Mexican backing.2 During the Agua Prieta revolt Cantu remained loyal to
Carranzaand after Chinese, Mexicans, and Americans had deserted him,
De la Huerta was able to force him to resign, in September, 1920.
It is apparent from Mexican census figures for 1910 and 1921 that
49
mainly from Sonora and Sinaloa, and from the Southern District of the
territory." It is not likely that much of this increase took place until
anarchy was ended by Cantu late in 1914.
No revolutionary changes followed the ousting of Cantu. In fact, there
was little significant break with his plans and policies until 1935. Early
in 1921 President Obregon ordered the Secretary of Fomento to study
methods for "extensive colonization" of Mexicans in the territory and
for development of resources there to keep the colonists profitably
occupied so they would remain. This revived De la Barra's promise of
1911. In addition, he ordered construction of an all-Mexican railroad
from Magdalena, Sonora, to Ensenada, a project which originated, likewise, in the year of the socialist invasion. He decided that the road might
be built either by the government or by a private concessionaire, as
circumstances demanded.'
The Obregon government planned to build the railroad itself, but
stockpiling of materials proved too expensive. Therefore, in 1924 it
turned the task over to the California-Mexico Land and Cattle Company
with a contract originally calling for completion of the first link, from
Mexicali to the head of the Gulf of California, by May, 1928. In return,
the company was to receive a ninety-nine-year operating lease. After
several changes of plans and time extensions, a total of only twenty-five
miles of track was completed by 1930 when the world depression forced
temporary abandonment of the project." Not until 1938 was it revived.
Since colonization depended directly upon the water supply, Obregon
had a commission study methods for its better use and development.
23Mxico, Secretaria de Fomento, Colonizaci6n e Industria, Direcci6n General de Estadistica,
Territorio de la Baja California (Mexico, 1913), 21; Mexico, Secretaria de la Economia
Nacional, Direcci6n General de Estadistica, Quinto censo de poblacidn, z5 de mayo, z93o: Baja
California, Distrito Norte, vol. I, tomo II (Mexico, 1933), 1.
24 Christian Science Monitor,
February 17, 1921, p. 4. The colonization survey was made,
though not at government expense, apparently. In 1924 was published the bilingual Baja
California al dia by Aurelio de Vivanco y Villegas, to which this article makes frequent reference. It is clearly the result of such a survey as ordered by Obreg6n.
25Andrew R. Boone, "Mexico's Land of Promise in the West," Current History, XXIX
(1929), 562-563; Vivanco y Villegas, op. cit., 390, 391, 410. Investigators of the railroad project
almost unanimously have ignored the underlying reasons for its construction in their amazement that it should ever have been considered without a larger population and greater
resources to assure an adequate revenue. Such evaluation in purely economic terms overlooks
the fact that the Mexican government intended that the railroad should primarily end
peninsular isolation. Certainly, when De la Barra first suggested it, there could scarcely have
been an economic motivation. Since Laguna District cotton monopolized the Mexican home
market and Mexicali cotton, and cattle, had to rely on export markets, it is difficult to see just
what economic motivation could have been behind the project even in the 1920'S. For contrary
views see: Mexican West Coast and Lower California, 329; Ronald L. Ives, "The Sonora
Railroad Project," Journal of Geography, XLVIII (1949), 197-206.
50
ingly upon the far from wholesome parasitical activities along the border
for their livelihood. The influences existing there alarmed nationalistic
Mexicans who recognized that they were Americanizing the region.
During 1930 Mexicans had an opportunity to evaluate their position
in the peninsula, and the results were disturbing. Early in the year there
appeared in the United States Congress a rumor that the International
26 San Francisco Chronicle, March 11, 1921, p. 4; New York Times, March 8, 1928, p. 41;
March 9, 1930, sect. III, p. 2; Vivanco y Villegas, op. cit., 255; Boone, op. cit., 560, 564.
27 Mexican West Coast and Lower California, 165, 307; Diario Oficial, 15 de abril, 1921, p.
1638.
28Late in the decade, Governor Rodriguez and American associates opened the Agua
Caliente Casino and Jockey Club, which continued very profitably until closed by Cardenas
in 1935. This and similar ventures served the same purpose as under Cant6: to supply capital
for other industries and for territorial government. San Diego Union, March 18, 1938, sect. I,
pp. 1, 2.
29 Peveril
Meigs, 3d, The Dominican Mission Frontier of Lower California (Berkeley, 1935),
162.
"8Quinto censo de poblacidn, vol. I, tomo II, 36, 37. Over 40,000 were Mexicans and 6,600 of
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Mexico Land and Cattle Company's properties and from the Circle Bar
Ranch. These were to be divided as ejidos among villages in existence
before signing of the April 14 contract. Expropriation stimulated sales,
for it made clear that leisurely disposal of the properties might be
disastrousfor American interests. To encourage forced sales, the National
Bank of Ejidal Credit loaned one million pesos to cooperative farmers
in the Mexicali Valley.'
In view of the temporary character of previous Mexicanization proposals there was naturally some hesitation among Americans in accepting
the Cardenasmeasuresas permanent. Accordingly, some tried to dissuade
Mexicans from aiding the ejido program by telling those who had purchased lands under the 1936 contract that it was likely that their lands
would be expropriated, too. After an investigation by Dr. Gabino
Vazquez, director of the Agrarian Department, Cardenas declared publicly that all those holding less than 150 hectares would be allowed to
keep their lands. Since almost two hundred new colonists were affected
by the decree the resettlement program obtained increased support.'
By the end of 1937, some 97,121 hectares of formerly American-held
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