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Philippine Airlines Inc. vs. Phil. Airlines Employees Association (2008) G.R.
142399
Facts:
In 1987, petitioner PAL and respondent and PALEA entered into a CBA covering
the period of 1986-1989. Part of said agreement required PAL to pay its rankand-file employees 13th month pay and Christmas bonus. The 13 th month pay,
equivalent to one month current basic pay, shall be paid in advance in May
consistent with the existing practice while the Christmas bonus, equivalent to one
month current basic pay as of November 30, shall be paid in December.
In 1988, prior to the payment of the 13 th month pay, PAL released a guideline
stating that the only employees eligible for payment of 13 th month pay are those
ground employees in the general payroll who are regular as of April 30, 1988.
Others not falling in said category shall receive their 13th month pay on or before
December 24, 1988.
Respondent PALEA assailed the implementation of the said guideline on the
ground that all employees of PAL, regular or non-regular, must be paid their 13 th
month pay. In response thereto, PAL informed PALEA that rank-and-file
employees who were regularized after 30 th of April 1988 were not entitled to the
13th month pay as they were already given their Christmas bonuses on
December 9, 1988 per the Implementing Rules of PD 851.
Issue:
Whether the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus can be equated to the Christmas
bonus.
Held:
The 13th month pay or mid-year bonus can be equated to the Christmas bonus.
In the case under consideration, the provision for the payment of the Christmas
bonus, apart from the 13th month pay, was incorporated into the 1986-1989 CBA
between respondent PALEA and petitioner PAL without any condition. The
Christmas bonus, payable in December of every year, is distinguished from the
13thmonth pay, due yearly in May, for which reason it was denominated as the

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mid-year bonus. Such being the case, the only logical inference that could be
derived therefrom is that petitioner PAL intended to give the members of the
bargaining unit, represented by respondent PALEA, a Christmas bonus over and
above its legally mandated obligation to grant the 13 th month pay.
In United CMC Textile Workers Union v. The Labor Arbiter, one of the issues
passed upon by the Court was whether or not an employer who was already
paying Christmas bonus pursuant to a CBA, was still bound to pay the 13 th month
pay pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 851 which provides that A bonus under
the CBA is an obligation created by the contract between the management and
workers while the 13th month pay is mandated by the law.Finding that the
intention of the parties to the CBA was that the Christmas bonus was meant to be
on top of the 13th month pay, the Court ordered the employer to pay the
employees both.
It must be stressed that in the 1986-1989 CBA, petitioner PAL agreed to pay its
employees 1) the 13th month pay or the mid-year bonus, and 2) the Christmas
bonus. The 13th month pay, guaranteed by Presidential Decree No. 851, is
explicitly covered or provided for as the mid-year bonus in the CBA, while the
Christmas bonus is evidently and distinctly a separate benefit. Petitioner PAL
may not be allowed to brush off said distinction, and unilaterally and arbitrarily
declare that for non-regular employees, their Christmas bonus is the same as or
equivalent to the 13th month pay. As it had willfully and intentionally agreed to
under the terms of the CBA, petitioner PAL must pay its regular and non-regular
employees who are members of the bargaining unit represented by respondent
PALEA their 13th month pay or mid-year bonus separately from and in addition to
their Christmas bonus.
Mercidar Fishing Corporation vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 112574. October 8, 1998; 297 SCRA 440
Facts:
Private respondent employed as a bodegero or ships quartermaster
complained of being constructively dismissed by petitioner corporation when the
latter refused him assignments aboard its boats after he had reported to work.

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The Larbor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner corporation to reinstate

complainant with back wages, pay him his 13th month pay and incentive leave.
Petitioner claims that it cannot be held liable for service incentive leave pay by
fishermen in its employ as the latter supposedly are field personnel and thus
not entitled to such pay under the Labor Code.
Article 82 of the Labor Code provides among others that field personnel shall
refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from
the principal place of business or branch of office of the employer and whose
actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
Issue:
WON fishermen are considered field personnel.
Held:
No. Although fishermen perform non-agricultural work away from their employers
business offices, the fact remains that throughout the duration of their work they
are under the effective control and supervision of the employer through the
vessels patron or master.

[G.R. No. 140364. August 15, 2000]

ACE NAVIGATION CO., INC. and/or CONNING SHIPPING LTD., petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRTEENTH DIVISION), NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION) and ORLANDO ALONSAGAY,
respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Facts:
In June 1994, Ace Navigation Co., Inc. (Ace Nav) recruited private respondent
Orlando Alonsagay to work as a bartender on board the vessel M/V "Orient
Express" owned by its principal, Conning Shipping Ltd. (Conning). Under their
POEA approved contract of employment, Orlando shall receive a monthly basic

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salary of four hundred fifty U.S. dollars (U.S. $450.00), flat rate, including
overtime pay for 12 hours of work daily plus tips of two U.S. dollars (U.S. $2.00)
per passenger per day. He, was also entitled to 2.5 days of vacation leave with
pay each month. The contract was to last for one (1) year.
Orlando was deployed and boarded M/V "Orient Express" at the seaport of Hong
Kong. After the expiration of the contract on June 13, 1995, Orlando returned to
the Philippines and demanded from Ace Nav his vacation leave pay. Ace Nav did
not pay him immediately. It told him that he should have been paid prior to his
disembarkation and repatriation to the Philippines. Moreover, Conning did not
remit any amount for his vacation leave pay. Ace Nav, however, promised to
verify the matter and asked Orlando to return after a few days. Orlando never
returned.
On November 25, 1995, Orlando filed a complaint. On November 15, 1996,
Labor Arbiter Felipe P. Pati ordered Ace Nav and Conning to pay jointly and
severally Orlando his vacation leave pay of US$450.00. The claim for tips of
Orlando was dismissed for lack of merit
Orlando appealedto the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on
February 3, 1997. the NLRC ordered Ace Nav and Conning to pay the unpaid
tips of Orlando which amounted to US$36,000.00 in addition to his vacation
leave pay. Ace Nav and Conning filed a motion for reconsideration on February 2,
1998 which was denied on May 20, 1999.
On July 2, 1999, Ace Nav and Conning filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals to annul the decision of the NLRC dismissing the petition. Their
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are liable to pay the tips to Orlando.
Held:
The word [tip] has several meanings, with origins more or less obscure,
connected with "tap" and with "top." In the sense of a sum of money given for
good service, other languages are more specific, e.g., Fr. pourboire, for drink. It is
suggested that [the word] is formed from the practice, in early 18th c. London

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coffeehouses, of having a box in which persons in a hurry would drop a small

coin, to gain immediate attention. The box was labelled To Insure Promptness;
then just with the initials T.I.P
It is more frequently used to indicate additional compensation, and in this sense
"tip" is defined as meaning a gratuity; a gift; a present; a fee; money given, as to
a servant to secure better or more prompt service. A tip may range from pure gift
out of benevolence or friendship, to a compensation for a service measured by
its supposed value but not fixed by an agreement, although usually the word is
applied to what is paid to a servant in addition to the regular compensation for his
service in order to secure better service or in recognition of it. It has been said
that a tip denotes a voluntary act, but it also has been said that from the very
beginning of the practice of tipping it was evident that, whether considered from
the standpoint of the giver or the recipient, a tip lacked the essential element of a
gift, namely, the free bestowing of a gratuity without a consideration, and that,
despite its apparent voluntariness, there is an element of compulsion in tipping.
Tipping is done to get the attention and secure the immediate services of a
waiter, porter or others for their services. Since a tip is considered a pure gift out
of benevolence or friendship, it can not be demanded from the customer.
Whether or not tips will be given is dependent on the will and generosity of the
giver. Although a customer may give a tip as a consideration for services
rendered, its value still depends on the giver. They are given in addition to the
compensation by the employer. A gratuity given by an employer in order to
inspire the employee to exert more effort in his work is more appropriately called
a bonus.
The NLRC and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners were liable to pay tips to
Orlando because of the contract of employment.
"The record of this case shows that the respondent, in the Contract of
Employment xxx undertook to pay to complainant 'tips of U.S.$2.00 per
passenger per day.' Yet, there is no showing that the said undertaking was
complied with by the respondents.

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"It was thus a serious error on the part of the Labor Arbiter to rule that the tips
were already paid, much less to rule that said tips were directly paid to the crew
of M/V "ORIENT PRINCESS." With Article 4 of the Labor Code reminding us that
doubts should be resolved in favor of labor, we all the more find it compelling to
rule that the complainant is still entitled to the contractually covenanted sum of
US$36,000.00. xxx."
We disagree. The contract of employment between petitioners and Orlando is
categorical that the monthly salary of Orlando is US$450.00 flat rate. This already
included his overtime pay which is integrated in his 12 hours of work. The words
"plus tips of US$2.00 per passenger per day" were written at the line for
overtime. Since payment for overtime was included in the monthly salary of
Orlando, the supposed tips mentioned in the contract should be deemed included
thereat.
The actuations of Orlando during his employment also show that he was aware
his monthly salary is only US$450.00, no more no less. He did not raise any
complaint about the non-payment of his tips during the entire duration of his
employment. After the expiration of his contract, he demanded payment only of
his vacation leave pay. He did not immediately seek the payment of tips. He only
asked for the payment of tips when he filed this case before the labor arbiter. This
shows that the alleged non-payment of tips was a mere afterthought to bloat up
his claim. The records of the case do not show that Orlando was deprived of any
monthly salary. It will now be unjust to impose a burden on the employer who
performed the contract in good faith.
Furthermore, it is presumed that the parties were aware of the plain, ordinary and
common meaning of the word "tip." As a bartender, Orlando can not feign
ignorance on the practice of tipping and that tips are normally paid by customers
and not by the employer.
It is also absurd that petitioners intended to give Orlando a salary higher than
that of the ship captain. As petitioners point out, the captain of M/V "Orient
Princess" receives US$3,000.00 per month while Orlando will receive

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US$3,450.00 per month if the tip of US$2.00 per passenger per day will be given
in addition to his US$450.00 monthly salary. It will be against common sense for
an employer to give a lower ranked employee a higher compensation than an
employee who holds the highest position in an enterprise.
However, Orlando should be paid his vacation leave pay. Petitioners denied this
liability by raising the defense that the usual practice is that vacation leave pay is
given before repatriation. But as the labor arbiter correctly observed, petitioners
did not present any evidence to prove that they already paid the amount. The
burden of proving payment was not discharged by the petitioners.
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 53508 are reversed and
set aside. The decision of the labor arbiter ordering petitioners to pay jointly and
severally the unpaid vacation leave pay of private respondent, Orlando
Alonsagay, in the amount of US$450.00 and dismissing his other claim for lack of
merit is reinstated.

Union of Filipro Employees v. Vivar

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Facts:
Filipro Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) had excluded sales personnel from the
holiday pay award and changed the divisor in the computation of benefits from
251 to 261 days. Both Filipro and the Union of Filipro Employees submitted the
case for voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as
voluntary arbitrator. In his decision, Vivar directed Filipro to pay its monthly paid
employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject only to the
exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal restrictions
as are provided for in the Code.
With the decision by Vivar, Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the
limitation of the award to 3 years, (2) exclusion of its sales personnel (consisted
by salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical
representatives) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the
holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and
sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor. On the same light, the Union
filed their answer that the award should be made effective from the date of
effectivity of the Labor Code, their sales personnel are not field personnel and
are therefore entitled to holiday pay, and the use of 251 as divisor is an
established employee benefit which cannot be diminished. Vivar issued an order
declaring that the effectivity of the holiday pay award shall retroact to November
1, 1974, the date of effectivity of the labor Code. However, he adjudged the sales
personnel are field personnel and, as such, are not entitled to holiday pay. He
likewise ruled that the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 due to the
grant of 10 days holiday pay and ordered the reimbursement of overpayment for
overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay due to the use of 251
days as divisor. Treating the motions for partial reconsideration of the parties,
Vivar forwarded the case to the NLRC, which remanded the case to Vivar on the
ground that it has no jurisdiction to review decisions in voluntary arbitration
cases. In a letter, Vivar refused to take cognizance of the case because,
according to him, he had resigned from service already.
Ruling:

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1. Whether or not Nestles sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay

Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article
defines field personnel as non-agricultural employees who regularly perform
their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty.
It is undisputed that these sales personnel start their field work at 8:00 a.m. after
having reported to the office and come back to the office at 4:00 p.m. or 4:30
p.m. if they are Makati-based. However, the Union maintains that the period
between 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. comprises the sales personnels working
hours which can be determined with reasonable certainty. However, the court
does not agree. The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be
reasonably ascertained. The company has no way of determining whether or not
these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to
field work and come back at 4:30 p.m., really spend the hours in between in
actual field work. Moreover, the Court fails to see how the company can monitor
the number of actual hours spend in field work by an employee through
imposition of sanctions on absenteeism.
2. Whether or not, related to the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be
changed from 251 to 261 days and whether or not the previous use of 251 as
divisor resulted in overpayment for overtime The use of 251 days divisor by
Filipro indicates that holiday pay is not yet included in the employees salary,
otherwise the divisor should have been 261. It must be stressed that the daily
rate, assuming there are no intervening salary increases, is a constant figure
for the purpose of computing overtime and night differential pay and
commutation of sick and vacation leave credits. Necessarily, the daily rate
should also be the same for computing the 10 unpaid holidays.
The respondent Arbitrators order to change the divisor from 251 to 261 days
would result in a lower daily rate which is violative of the prohibition or non-

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diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the Labor Code. To maintain the
same daily rate if the divisor is adjusted to 261 days, then the dividend, which
represents the employees annual salary, should correspondingly be increased
too incorporate the holiday pay. Moreover, the reckoning period for the
application of the holiday award is October 23, 1984.

ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPPORATION VS. CA

425 SCRA 478. March 15, 2004
FACTS:
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through Undersecretary
Cresenciano B.Trajano, issued an Explanatory Bulletin, wherein it clarified, that
employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage, which, apart from being
Good Friday, and, therefore, a legal holiday, is also Araw ng Kagitingan, which is
also a legal holiday, even if unworked. Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner
Asian Transmission Corporation opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100%
of their basic pay.
Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. In
accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining

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Agreement existing between petitioner and BATLU, the controversy was

submitted for voluntary arbitration. The Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered
a decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees "200% and not just
100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked. In deciding in favor of the
Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU), the Voluntary Arbitrator held
that Article 94 of the Labor Code provides for holiday pay for every regular
holiday, the computation of which is determined by a legal formula which is not
changed by the fact that there are two holidays falling on one day; and that that
the law, as amended, enumerates 12 regular holidays for every year, and should
not be interpreted as authorizing a reduction to nine the number of paid regular
holidays "just because April 9 (Araw ng Kagitingan) in certain years, is also Holy
Friday or Maundy Thursday.
The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, holding that
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and BATLU, the law
governing the relations between them, clearly recognizes their intent to consider
Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, on whatever date they may fall in any
calendar year, as paid legal holidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that
"there is no condition, qualification or exception for any variance from the clear
intent that all holidays shall be compensated. The Court of Appeals further held
that "in the absence of an explicit provision in law which provides for [a] reduction
of holiday pay if two holidays happen to fall on the same day, any doubt in the
interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code provisions on holiday pay
must be resolved in favor of labor. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two regular
holidays which fall on the same day
RULING:
Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional
imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor. Its purpose is not merely
"to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account of work
interruptions. In other words, although the worker is forced to take arrest, he
earns what he should earn, that is, his holiday pay.

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It is also intended to enable the worker to participate in the national celebrations

held during the days identified as with great historical and cultural significance.
Independence Day (June 12), Araw ng Kagitingan (April 9),National Heroes Day
(last Sunday of August), Bonifacio Day(November 30) and Rizal Day (December
30) were declared national holidays to afford Filipinos with a recurring opportunity
to commemorate the heroism of the Filipino people, promote national identity,
and deepen the spirit of patriotism. Labor Day (May 1) is a day traditionally
reserved to celebrate the contributions of the working class to the development of
the nation, while the religious holidays designated in Executive Order No. 203
allow the worker to celebrate his faith with his family.
As reflected above, Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, afford a worker the
enjoyment of 12paid regular holidays. The provision is mandatory, regardless of
whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily basis. Since a worker is
entitled to the enjoyment of 12 paid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays
fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to 11 the 12 holiday pay
benefits a worker is entitled to receive. It is elementary, under the rules of
statutory construction, that when the language of the law is clear and
unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at
bar, there is nothing in the law which provides or indicates that the entitlement to
12 days of holiday pay shall be reduced to 11 when two holidays fall on the same
day.
In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provide that all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing
rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. For the working mans
welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. Moreover, Sec.
11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the Labor Code provides
that "Nothing in the law or the rules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or
reducing any benefits, supplements or payments for unworked regular holidays
as provided in existing individual or collective agreement or employer practice or
policy. From the pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by the parties,
petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legal holidays as required by law.

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THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. HON. BLAS F.

OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretaryof Labor, and THE
CHARTERED BANK
G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985
Facts:
On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation
of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint with the Regional
Office No. IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE) against Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal
holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal
holidays from November 1, 1974. The Minister of Labor dismissed the Chartered
Bank Employees Associations claim for lack of merit basing its decision on
Section 2, Rule IV, Book Ill of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9,
which respectively provide: Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month.
Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of
working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established
minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether
worked or not. POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO: All Regional Directors
SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS the rules implementing PD 850 have
clarified the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays.
Before PD 850, the number of working days a year in a firm was considered
important in determining entitlement tithe benefit. Thus, where an employee was
working for at least 313 days, he was considered definitely already paid. If he

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was working for less than 313, there was no certainty whether the ten (10) paid
legal holidays were already paid to him or not. The ten (10) paid legal holidays
law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the case of
monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten
(10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit. Under the rules implementing
PD 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the
entitlement of monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is this: 'If the
monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly
minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is
presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if
deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months
where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. These
new interpretations must be uniformly and consistently upheld.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred and acted contrary to law in
promulgating Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy
Instruction No. 9.
Held:
Yes. The Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority
granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to promulgate the
necessary implementing rules and regulations. While it is true that the Minister
has the authority in the performance of his duty to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement, construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is
limited by provisions of the statute sought to be implemented, construed or
clarified.

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PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC et al

G.R. No. 132805
Feb. 2, 1999
FACTS:
Private respondent Dr. Fabros was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner
company. He was assigned at the PAL Medical Clinic and was on duty from 4:00
in the afternoon until 12:00 midnight.
On Feb.17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, Dr. FAbros left the clinic to have
his dinner at his residence, which was abou t5-minute drive away. A few minutes
later, the clinic received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo Services. One of
its employeeshad suffered a heart attack. The nurse on duty, Mr. Eusebio, called
private respondent at home to inform him of the emergency. The patient arrived
at the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and Mr. Eusebio immediately rushed him to the
hospital. When Dr. Fabros reached the clinic at around 7:51 in the evening, Mr.
Eusebio had already left with the patient to the hospital. The patient died the
following day.
Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director ordered the Chief Flight
Surgeon to conduct an investigation. In his explanation, Dr. Fabros asserted that
he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal break; that he immediately left his
residence upon being informed by Mr. Eusebio about the emergency and he
arrived at the clinic a few minutes later; that Mr. Eusebio panicked and brought
the patient to the hospital without waiting for him.
Finding private respondents explanation unacceptable, the management
charged private respondent with abandonment of post while on duty. He denied
that he abandoned his post on February 17, 1994. He said that he only left the
clinic to have his dinner at home. In fact, he returned to the clinic at 7:51 in the
evening upon being informed of the emergency.
After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, he was
given a suspension for three months effective December 16, 1994.

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Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner.

On July 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the suspension
of private respondent illegal. It also ordered petitioner to pay private respondent
the amount equivalent to all the benefits he should have received during his
period of suspension plus P500,000.00 moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after finding that the decision of the
Labor Arbiter is supported by the facts on record and the law on the matter. The
NLRC likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1.
WON the nullifying of the 3-month suspension by the NLRC erroneous.
2.

WON the awarding of moral damages is proper.

HELD:
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The portion of the assailed decision
awarding moral damages to private respondent is DELETED. All other aspects of
the decision are AFFIRMED
The legality of private respondents suspension: Dr. Fabros left the clinic that
night only to have his dinner at his house, which was only a few minutes drive
away from the clinic. His whereabouts were known to the nurse on duty so that
he could be easily reached in case of emergency. Upon being informed of Mr.
Acostas condition, private respondent immediately left his home and returned to
the clinic. These facts belie petitioners claim of abandonment. Petitioner argues
that being a full-time employee, private respondent is obliged to stay in the
company premises for not less than eight (8) hours. Hence, he may not leave the
company premises during such time, even to take his meals. We are not
impressed. Art. 83 and 85 of the Labor Code read: Art. 83. Normal hours of work.
The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a
day. Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one

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million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one
hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5)
days a week, exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigencies of the
service require that such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours,
in which case they shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty
per cent (30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes of
this Article, health personnel shall include: resident physicians, nurses,
nutritionists, dieticians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians,
paramedical technicians, psychologists, midwives, attendants and all other
hospital or clinic personnel. (emphasis supplied) Art. 85. Meal periods. Subject
to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be the duty
of every employer to give his employees not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off
for their regular meals. Sec. 7, Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code further states: Sec. 7. Meal and Rest Periods.
Every employer shall give his employees, regardless of sex, not less than one (1)
hour time-off for regular meals, except in the following cases when a meal period
of not less than twenty (20) minutes may be given by the employer provided that
such shorter meal period is credited as compensable hours worked of the
employee; (a) Where the work is non-manual work in nature or does not involve
strenuous physical exertion; (b) Where the establishment regularly operates not
less than sixteen hours a day; (c) In cases of actual or impending emergencies or
there is urgent work to be performed on machineries, equipment or installations
to avoid serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer; and (d) Where
the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods. Rest periods
or coffee breaks running from five (5) to twenty (20) minutes shall be considered
as compensable working time. Thus, the eight-hour work period does not include
the meal break. Nowhere in the law may it be inferred that employees must take
their meals within the company premises. Employees are not prohibited from
going out of the premises as long as they return to their posts on time. Private
respondents act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not constitute
abandonment. 2. The award of moral damages: Not every employee who is
illegally dismissed or suspended is entitled to damages. As a rule, moral

Pua, Rochel April

Labor Law Review

Case Digest

damages are recoverable only where the dismissal or suspension of the

employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to
labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the management of petitioner
company was moved by some evil motive in suspending private respondent. It
suspended private respondent on an honest, albeit erroneous, belief that private
respondents act of leaving the company premises to take his meal at home
constituted abandonment of post which warrants the penalty of suspension.
Under the circumstances, we hold that private respondent is not entitled to moral
damages.