Perceptual Judgments and Particulars in Plato's Later Philosophy

Author(s): Edith Watson Schipper

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1961), pp. 102-109
Published by: BRILL
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PerceptualJudgmentsand Particulars
in Plato's Later Philosophy
EDITH WATSON

THROUGHOUT

SCHIPPER

the centuries since Plato wrote, interpretationsof his

theory of forms, from Aristotle's criticisms to the exhaustive

commentaries of modern times, have varied with the philosophies
on which they have been based. These divergent interpretations may be
divided into two groups. One group holds that Plato maintained his
doctrine of forms as contained in his earlier and middle dialogues
throughout his writings, only clarifying it and developing its consequences
in his later dialogues. To this group belong Ritter and probably Cornford,
notwithstanding the latter's insistance that the later dialogues consider
(but do not solve) the problems of the concrete, particular thing, and
of the "separate reality of the forms", which the earlier dialogues left
unsolved.' The other group, represented in their various ways by Burnet,
Robin, Stenzel, agree in holding that the earlier theory of forms was
fundamentally altered in the later dialogues from the Theaetetus on. They
base their theories not only on the internal evidence of the dialogues, but
on some references by Aristotle to the forms as "numbers", which are
distinguished from "mathematicals", and are generated from "the One
and the dyad of the Great-and-Small".2 Members of this group, however
they diverge on the significance of Aristotle's references, yet agree that
Plato's original problem of the participation of sensible, particular things
in forms is superseded by the problem of the method of dialectical
investigation or, in Burnet's words, of giving an "intelligible account"
of appearances.3
This paper holds, following the views of the latter group, that there is
a nmarkeddifference between the earlier and later doctrines of forms.
The difference does not consist in Plato's abandonning his earlier theory
for one of form-numbers. For, however fornm-numbersbe construed,
their nature and knowability and relation to each other and to particulars
must be explained. They should at least solve the difficulties of the earlier
I

Cornford, Plato's Theoryof Knowledge,N.Y., The Liberal Arts Press, 19S7, pp. 6,
Burnet, GreekPhilosophy, London, Macmillan, 1955, p. 314.
3 lbid, pp. 348-9.
2

102

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1
2

5.

theory they supplant. And this, it seems to me, the theories of formnumbers which have been developed do not do. In this paper, I should
like to show that Plato in no sense abandonned the fundamental doctrines
of the theory of forms. Rather, he elaborated the doctrine, defining
(what was left a question before) the nature of the sensible particulars
which the forms were said to describe, and the relation of the forms to
them and to each other. He was thus able to bring out his basic doctrines
more consistently and comprehensively, without the difficulties involved
in the participation of sensible, particular things in the universal forms.
I
Theinterrelatedforms
In the later dialogues from the Theaetetuson, as in the earlier dialogues,
the forms are the unsensed, definable and intelligible, and hence permanent objects of knowledge. Forms are still what, in contrast to
evanescent sensations, are lasting enough to formulate. They are not
sensed, nor can any sensory image of them be had. Forms are not pictured
or imagined. They are the conceivable or understandable objects of
knowledge. They are what are named, described, or stated in any reasoned
examination or account (X6yoq) of things. They are the objects of
reasoning (8axyea0au), and necessary for it.J
It follows that forms, being the conceivable characteristics which may
apply to any number of sensed particulars, are, so far forth, universal.
Aristotle and subsequent philosophy called them so, though Plato never
used the term, nor explicitly brought out the problem of universals.
However, they are contrasted with the sensed particulars which they
describe. They are the unitary classes, defining characteristics, or
relations which any experienced particulars conceivable in the same
way may exemplify. In the Theaetetus, Plato speaks of them as "the
common terms which apply to everything", such as "existence, and nonexistence, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also
unity and numbers in general as applied to them (perceptions)". Later,
the value-characteristics of "honourable and dishonourable, good and
bad" are added.2 Thus, Plato has a clear-cur distinction between the
universals in terms of which we formulate and understand our experience
and the fluctuating, non-recurring sensed particulars which they describe
and relate.
1 Parmenides I 35

2 Theaet. i85,

b-c.

186c.

Ail translations are by Cornford unless otherwise indicated.

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These universal forms are said to exist. Plato who followed in the
Parmenidean and Pythagorean tradition, could not fail to call the definite
objects of thought real or existent. Yet, their existence adds nothing to
their definition or function of being what is disclosed by reasoning. They
are not thereby the physical causes of particulars. They are not "hypostatized". They are not "substances" in the Aristotelian sense of what has
predicates. They are the characteristics or relations which are directly
and completely known in our reasoning, and they have no characteristics
other than what is known. As the objects of knowledge, which must be
about something,they are assumed to exist, from the beginning to the
end of Plato's writings.1
In the later dialogues - and here they add to the earlier ones - the
universal forms are essentially related, and knowledge of them involves
knowledge of their discriminations and interconnections. The Sophist
shows how certain classes or yrvmare connected with others. These ykvn
are representative of all forms, since they have the same characteristics,
and since they have always been synonymous with et8n. Moreover,
Plato's language shows that what is said about them holds of all classes.
One class or form is included in another class or in its negative class.
Thus, one class is said to be connected with or to participate in (xoLvGvetv)
another class. Participation is no longer, as it would seem to be in the
Phaedo, a relation between a particular thing and a form. It is a relation
of class-inclusion between forms Inclusion of one class in another or in
its negative is the "mingling and communication" of forms which all
discourse is about.2 All our reasoning and argumentation, through its
statements, connects and differentiates the forms.3
It has often been held, especially in contemporary philosophy, that
Plato no longer assumed forms in his later dialogues. For instance,
Gilbert Ryle has maintained such a thesis in connection with the
Parmenides,especially. He argues cogently - though this point is subordinated to a purely logical one - that Parmenides' arguments criticising
the theory of forms show that, "Itis apparently illegitimate to assert that
Forms have this, that, or any relation to their instances. . ." Since, as he
claims, the theory of forms made this assertion, the later Plato, speaking
through Parmenides, was criticising his own theory, whose untenability
I

See esp. Rep. 476a-477b; Parm. 123b-c; Timacus Sib-d.

' Soph. 2S3, 2S9e-26ob.

3 R. C. Cross brings out a similar point, in a more linguistic context, in his Logosand
the Formsin Plato, Mind, vol. 63, I9S4, pp. 445, 446-7. However, I would hold that the
forms are related not only as predicates to subjects.
IO4

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he saw and which he consequently must have abandonned.1 Yet, it may

be countered, Plato did not hold, as Mr. Ryle claims he did, that the
forms were "substances" and so instances of the qualities they defined.
He never said, nor could he, that the unsensed form of hotness was hot,
that of largeness large, nor that of duality dual. Moreover, in his earlier
dialogues, he left unanswered the question of how a form must be related
to a particular instance. He himself confessed, in the Phaedo.2 that the
manner of participation of a particular in a form was a question. Thus,
Parmenides' arguments criticise possible and perhaps current notions of
participation of a particular in a form. In his later theory, as I have tried
to show, Plato showed that forms were related not to particular instances but to each other - which they can be, since they are not Mr.
Ryle's "substances". Thus, Plato clarified and consistently worked out
his earlier theory: he did not abandon it.
That the theory of forms was not essential to the Tlheaetetushas been
argued differently by Richard Robinson. He contends, against Cornford,
that Plato's arguments showing the impossibility of error do not presuppose that it could be explained on the basis of forms.3 Yet, it seems
to me, his contention is true only if a form is a separate, unrelated entity,
which is and is known and cannot be interchanged with what is not and
so is not known. When forms are related to forms different from them,
as in the Sophist- and, for Plato, only forms are definite enough to relate
- false judgment can be explained, as I shall try to show. Throughout the
Theaetetus,Plato assumes what fulfills the same functions and has the same
characteristics as the forms have always had. Plato prepares for them by
his typical argument that there can be no knowledge of mere sensation,
which is too fleeting to even name.4 Even perceptual judgments, he then
says, are about the "common terms" like number and existence, which,
no more than the forms, are given to sensation; but about which there
is reasoning (auXXoyLta[6q).5 He thus essentially repeats what he has
said in the Phaedo in the context of Pythagorean myths, that what is
perceived always "falls short" of the ideal standard by which it is known
in reasoning. Moreover, that etlo4 and Be?o are no longer used for
"form" is unimportant. Plato could well be avoiding use of a label which
was surrounded with literary and Pythagorean imagery and which had
1

Ryle, Plato'sParmenides,
I and II, Mind,vol. 48,

Phaedo, Iood.

3 Robinson, Formsand Errorin

' Theaet. i82a-I83b.
6

1939.

esp. pp.

Plato'sTheaetetus,
Phil. Review, vol

I41,

59,

314-5.

I950,

pp.

II-I3.

Theaet. i86d.
lo5

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the current dualistic connotations of the "friends of the forms" of the

Sophist. But he still maintained the fundamentals of his theory of forms.
Mr. Robinson further claims that, in the Theaetetus, the definition of
knowledge as "true opinion with logos is held to be wrong in all three
senses of logos", and adds that knowledge cannot be so defined "no matter
what we suppose its objects to be".' Yet Plato does not say that it is
wrong to define knowledge as true opinion with logos in the third sense
of "knowledge of a distinguishing difference". He merely says it is
begging the question. Knowledge, for Plato - as Mr. Robinson himself
recognizes - must always be based on logos, a reasoned and dialectical
examination. And such an examination, we have seen, is about the
related forms.
II
PerceptualJudgmentsand Particulars
Bound up with the later conception of forms as essentially interrelated
and discriminated is the different conception of sensed particulars. In
the earlier dialogues and in the Timaeus, whose Pythagorean speaker often
reverts to the earlier epistemology, sensed, particular things, such as the
"many beautiful things", fingers, equal sticks, or fire, had a kind of
shadowy semi-existence, which was contrasted to the real existance
(6vT&c 6,v-) of the forms. Things "corresponded to", "participated in",
and were named and defined by the forms, though the nature of this
participation was an enigma. Moreover, these changing, apparent, semiexistent particular things were grasped by an erring opinion or conjecture
(a6ix), which was contrasted to the unerring knowledge of the unchanging forms. There seemed to be a sharp distinction between a
groping conjecture about things and infallible knowledge of forms.
In the later dialogues, there is no such opinion about or special mode
of access to particular things. For 86'o has changed its meaning, and is
translated "judgment" by Burnet, Taylor, Cornford. In Burnet's words,
it has taken on the "Platonic" as distinct from the "Socratic" nmeaning.2
Judgment is no longer a way of grasping sensed things which does not
involve knowledge of the forms. It remains fallible, and nmaybe true or
false. But it, too, as well as dialectic and the spoken XOyogtranslated
"statement", is X6yoqas a thinking or reasoning; and is about the interI
2

Robinson, Op. Cit. pp. 13, 14.

Burnet, Op.cit., p. 248.

i o6

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connectedformsonly.1 It has already been described, in the Theaetetus,as

a decision resulting from the mind "talking to itself, asking questions
and answering them, and saying Yes or No".2 A6Ro is no longer an
uncertain conjecture about sensed particulars apart from forms.
Yet 86io:, unlike dialectic, which is accompanied by a more exact
account, is erring. Plato's solution of the problem of error is that true
judgments relate the forms as they really are related, while false
judgments relate them differently. For the whole discussion in the
Sophist of the interrelations of the forms, which makes the distinction
between a form simply not existing, and its being different from other
forms, is introduced in order to account for error. The Theaetetus had
already established that error was impossible so long as what were
interchanged were unrelated entities which existed and were known
and so could not be confused with what did not exist and could not be
known. Error is possible when the forms - which alone are definite
enough to be known - are interrelated. Thus, the false perceptual
judgment, "Theaetetus, whom I am talking to at this moment, flies",
connects the forms applicable to the appearance of the interlocutor,
Theaetetus, differentlv from the way they are connected in reality3.
Just as knowledge of the interconnections of the forms is necessary for
true discourse (X6yo4), so a lack of this knowledge leads to error.
The problenmis: how are we to know in what way forms are connected
"in reality"? The judgment used for an example is perceptual, and must
be referred to perceptions. Yet, for Plato, perceptions alone can never
reveal how forms are related. There seems to be no justification for
Cornford's interpretation of the judgment as one about the "existing
fact", where the perceived individual, Theaetetus, participates in a
form.4 For, in the later dialogues, Plato no longer assumes perceived
individual entities participating in forms. Forms "participate in" each
other. Only Xo6yo, whether dialectic or the inner "question and answer"
of judgment, can tell us how they are related.
Nevertheless, these judgments must apply to perceptions. Plato says:
"And suppose judgment occurs, not independently, but by means
of perception, (V' aOi~aeco4), the only right name for such a
I Soph.
263e-264a.
25ge,
2 Theaez. i9oa.
3 Soph. 263a-d.

4 Cornford, Op.cit.,

31-45.

1 07

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state of mind is 'appearing', (apv'nzaLx).. . . we have found

thinkingto be a dialogue of the mind with itself, and judgment to
be the conclusion of thinking, and what we mean by 'it appears'
a blend of perception and judgment. .*" 1
(Evce-raL)
Both true and falsejudgments,then, may be appliedto perceptions. The
particularappearance,which also may be true or false,2 is a product of
applyingjudgmentsabout the interrelationsof the forms to perceptions.
These judgmentsapply to perceptualexperience throughformulating,
clarifying, and making definite the interrelations it may be said to
manifest.They must connect and discriminateforms in detail if they are
to formulatethe distinctionsof experience. The Philebusemphasizesthat
the grammarianshould not jump from indeterminateexperience to its
most generalcharacteristics,but must havea knowledgeof the "number
and nature of sounds". Similarly, the musicianmust have knowledge of
the "numberand quality of the intervalsof the voice in respect to high
and low pitch and all the combinationsderived from them..." 3 Thus,
true judgment about the interconnectionsof the forms must formulate
experience precisely and in detail. It must clarify and bring out the
distinctionsof the particularappearancesof experience.
For perceptual experience is given, but is not, in itself, clearly
articulated. Already, in the Republic,Plato said that the non-contradictory forms were distinguishedfrom sensed things in order to clear up
the confusionsof perception.4 Experience is the indefinite, the flux of
of the Philebus,the continuityof differing degrees
sensation, the &7mtepov
of sensed qualities, which Burnetidentifiedwith the "Great-and-Small".
Its inescapablegivenness is similar to what is described in the Timaeus
as that which comes about by necessity, and can never be entirely
or explainedby reason.Thoughit containsa limitlessvariety
"persuaded"
of felt qualities, it does not give us discrete, particularentities. Rather,
the distinctions which can define particularswithin it must be brought
out and formulatedby interconnectingthe forms applyingto it.
In summary,this interpretationof Plato's philosophyhas tried to show
that his fundamentalinsightthat we canhaveknowledgeor true judgment
only of what is definite and capable of formulation or statement, is
'

Soph. 264a-b.

* Soph.263d. Falseappearanceswould seem to be those which are called dream images

and reflections, in 266c.
0 Phil. i7C-e, Fowler's trans., Loeb Lib.

' Rep. 24e.

o8

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reaffirmedin all its comprehensivenessin his later writings. It could

not be fully brought out so long as there was some special grasp (86koc)
of particular,sensed thingsapartfrom forms. In the later dialogues, such
particular, semi-existent entities are not given to perception. They
"neverreally are" in the familiarwords of the Timaeus.Yet, particular
appearancesin the flux of experience are definedand made intelligible
by judgmentsabout the interrelatedforms.
University
of Miami,CoralGables,Florida

I09

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