People vs.

Vera
FACTS: Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal
to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for
probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge
Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The
IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu
Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered
alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it
is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person.

ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when

the Probation Law provides that ony in those provinces
in which the respective provincial boards have provided
for the salary of a probation officer may the probation
system be applied.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as
pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition
of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because
there is no set standard provided by Congress on how
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the constitution and the
doctrine of the non del egability of power. Further, it is a
violation of equity so protected by the constitution.

VILLEGAS VS. HIUCHIONG

[86 SCRA 270; NO L-29646; 10 NOV1978]
Facts:
The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of
Manila on February22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance
making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed
in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business
or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an
emplo yment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes. Hiu
Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was emplo yed in Manila filed a petition
praying for the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the
enforcement of said ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or notthere a violation of equal protection by virtue Ordinance
6537.
HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay
down any criterion orstandard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion.
Hence an undue delegation of power. Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable
not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it.
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid
classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation.

DUMLAO VS. COMELEC

[95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980]

Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution.
Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already
received retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run
for the same local elective office from which he has retired.
Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the
equal protection and due process rights.
Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification
based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case, employees 65
years of age have been classified differently from younger employees. The
former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter are not.

Himagan vs. People

FACTS: Petitioner, a policeman assigned w/ the medical co. of the PNP HQ at
Camp Catitigan, Davao City was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr.
and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder
and attempted murder were filed w/ the RTC, the trial court issued an order
suspending petitioner until termination of the case on the basis of Sec. 47 of RA
6975. Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension relying on Sec.
42 of PD 807, that his suspension should be limited to 90 days and also, on our
ruling in Deloso v. SB, and Layno v. SB. The motion and the subsequent MFR
were denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by
the Constitution.
HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from
office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is
six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The
suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second
sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The
two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of
suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be
finished.

Qunito vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution
declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto
resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only
copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD: NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006
repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit
to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court
upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there
was no violation of the equal protection clause. However in the present case, the
Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter
dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt
squarely challenge Sec. 66.