Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal & Desierto

Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that
slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4,
2000. Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited
reactions of rage. On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At
1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo
Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to
be the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo
immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal
of power, the Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against
him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the
Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as
the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in
the same service of our country. Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the
office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in
the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that

respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, Petitioner

Vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIYAB,
JOVENCITO ZUO, LEONARD GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G.
TOLENTINO, The Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274,
Respondents, LAURO VIZCONDE, Intervenor.
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, Petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6)
other persons were charged of crime of Rape with Homicide on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N.
Visconde; her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their
home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila, upon filing of a letter
of compalint by the National Bureau of Invistigation (NBI). The Department of Justice (DOJ)
formed a panel of Prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuo to
conduct the preliminary investigation.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime at
bar as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October
27, 1992. Petitioner argues that the statement of Jessica Alfaro (state witness) were inherently
weak and uncorroborated. They assail its credibility and inconsistencies of her first and second
statement. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine
witness to clarify the alleged inconsistencies, furthermore, they argues for the issuance of
warrant of arrest of Judge Raul De Leon and Judge Amelita Tolentino against them without
conducting the preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent Judges De Leon and Tolentino committed grave abuse when they
failed to conduct a preliminary investigation before issuing warrants of arrest against petitioners,
and the DOJ Panel in holding that there is a probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape
with homicide.
2. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied the petitioners their constitutional right to due process
during their preliminary investigation
3. Whether or not DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to
charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.

HELD:
1. No. The court ruled that the respondent Judges did not commit grave abuse of discretion. In
arrest cases there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that
the person to be arrested committed it. Sec. 6, Rule 112 of Rules of Court simply provides that
Upon filing of information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of
accused. Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law 34 repudiate the
submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination
of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
The Court also holds that the DOJ panel did not commit grave abuse of discretion on holding
that there is a probable to charge petitioners a crime of rape with homicide. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner.
2. No. There is no merit in this contention. Petitioners were afforded all the opportunities to be
heard. Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by appearing in the
initial hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the second hearing on July 14, 1995. From the time
the panel declared the termination of the preliminary investigation on July 14, 1995, twentyseven (27) days elapsed before the resolution was promulgated. The DOJ Panel precisely
allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the
evidence submitted more fully.
3. No. Section 9, Rule 119 38 gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an
accused to be a state witness. An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint

by the court in order that he may be a State Witness may upon his petition be admitted to the
Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act.

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for
petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated
and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive
Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No.
Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void. Ratio: In the light of the
construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment
in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation
to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8
Art. VIII.

Sarmiento v. Mison
156 SCRA 579 G.R. No. 79974
December 17, 1987
FACTS: Petitioners, Atty. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Atty. Juanito Jarcilla, seek to enjoin
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Misons
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other
hand, maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
A petition of prohibition was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the appointments of Mison et. al. is unconstitutional?
RULING: NO. Under the 1935 Constitution, the commission was frequently transformed into a
venue of horse- trading and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution,
consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive
amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check
on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and
the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the
1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and
leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those
in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of heads of bureaus from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to appoint 4 groups of officers:
(1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.

Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as
amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972). RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however,
RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while
the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the
President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no
longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
The President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without
submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus
entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
Petition and petition in intervention was DISMISSSED without costs.

Blaquerra v Alcala
295 SCRA 411 G.R. No. 109406
September 11, 1998
FACTS: Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies
who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292i(EO
292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos
(President Ramos) issued Administrative Order No. 29 (AO 29) authorizing the grant of
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and
reiterating the prohibition under Section 7of Administrative Order No. 268 (AO 268),
enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President.
Section 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of
CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1

hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of the excess within a period
of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of this Order. In compliance
therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the
herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts
needed to cover the alleged overpayments. To prevent the respondents from making further
deductions from their salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before the Supreme Court
to seek relief.
ISSUES: Whether or not, Administrative Order Nos. 29 and 268 are valid and constitutional.
RULING: YES. The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of
productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization
among government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal
payment of incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his power of control by
modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the President, thereby resulting in the uneven
distribution of government resources. In the view of the President, respondents did a mistake
which had to be corrected. In so acting, the President exercised a constitutionally-protected
prerogative .
In upholding the constitutionality of AO 268 and AO 29, the Court reiterates the well-entrenched
doctrine that in interpreting statutes, that which will avoid a finding of unconstitutionality is to
be preferred.
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, the Court cannot countenance
the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have
already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and
circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in
the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the
same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
Petitions was DISMISSED, and further deductions from the salaries and allowances of
petitioners were enjoined.

Rodolfo Llamas vs Exec Sec Orbos

& Mariano Ocampo III
Pardon Applicable to Administrative Cases

FACTS: Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other
complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft
and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his
vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned
with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90
day suspension imposed upon him.
ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases.
HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly
see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more
reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious
than criminal offenses.

FRANKLIN DRILON, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, SILVESTRE BELLO III, in his
capacity as the Undersecretary of Justice, and AURELIO TRAMPE, in his capacity as the Acting
City Fiscal of Iloilo,petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RODOLFO GANZON,
and RAUL PAREDES, respondents.
The Department of Justice has brought suit to annul the Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on October 25, 1989, prohibiting the Government from pursuing criminal actions
against the private respondents for the death of Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez during early
martial law.
It appears that sometime in 1973, the private respondents were charged with double murder
before Military Commission No. 34. On July 27, 1973, the military promulgated a decision
acquitting Raul Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo Ganzon to life imprisonment with hard labor.
Paredes was thereupon released from custody while Ganzon was made to serve sentence until he
was released on March 25, 1978 and placed under house arrest under guard.
In 1988, administration having changed, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez directed State
Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation against the private respondents
for the above murders. The private respondents moved for dismissal, in Ganzon's case, on the
ground that he, had been extended an absolute pardon by the President Ferdinand Marcos, and
he, having been previously convicted, can no longer be tried anew, and in Paredes' case, on the
ground that he, Paredes, had been acquitted. Trampe, however, denied both requests and

reconsideration having been likewise denied, the private respondents went to the Court of
Appeals on prohibition.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition of the respondents. That is why the petitioners alleged
that the Court of Appeals, in granting prohibition, committed a grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
WON the pardoning power of the President is final and unappealable.
HELD:
Under the 1973 Constitution, the "pardoning power" of the President (that is, to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures) is final and unappealable so is
commutation of sentence, in which the Chief Executive reduces a sentence. It extinguishes
criminal liability partially, and has the effect changing the penalty to a lesser one.
The petition was DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED.