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Article
Abstract This study analyses the history of Hindu
fundamentalism up to the present time, as it developed since
Indias independence. In the course of its rise, Hindutva destroyed
the Gandhian symbolism of non-violence, reinterpreted cultural
symbols to become political signs and prepared the ground for
communal violence. Secularists and the religious out-group,
Muslims, became targeted as enemies. During the resulting Hindu
ethnic dominance, religion was converted from a faith into an
ideology. The sequence of events in the development of this
movement repeats the common scheme of a religious
fundamentalist movement that serves the nationalist goals of
political leaders. It is argued that such groups cannot reasonably
be conceptualized in terms of an individual psychology or
personality, that is, a trait, but as a cultural movement that unites
people sharing membership of a social class, that is, a
sociocultural state. Such movements, in contrast to Abrahamic
religious fundamentalisms, do not form well-established stable
groups over time, but are more like a waxing and waning political
movement where membership is determined by social class and
ethnic identity. Their politics trigger a heightened awareness of
ethnic identity, prime a religiously ideological mindset and, as a
consequence, release communal violence.
Key Words culture change, ethnic identity, fundamentalism,
Gandhi, Hindu religion, symbolism, violence
Ragini Sen
Logistics, Mumbai, India
Wolfgang Wagner
Johannes Kepler Universitt Linz, Austria, and;
University of the Basque Country, San Sebastin, Spain
Cultural Mechanics of
Fundamentalism: Religion as
Ideology, Divided Identities and
Violence in Post-Gandhi India
Introduction
The rise of religious fundamentalism appears to be inversely related to
modernity and secularism. Even if something like religious orthodoxy
Culture & Psychology Copyright 2009 SAGE Publications
(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore) http://cap.sagepub.com
Vol. 15(3): 299326 [DOI: 10.1177/1354067X09337869]
and fundamentalism has always existed in the past, its presence, when
in contrast to secular world views, becomes particularly apparent
(Berger, 1992; Fox, 2007; Rock, 2004). These shades of religious beliefs
and ways of living are conspicuously resistant to scientific advancement, economic change and development, and periodically erupt into
bouts of individual and collective violence against people, groups
and symbolically charged objects. None of the big religions is exempt
from such tendencies, be it the three Abrahamic religions, Judaism,
Christianity and Islam, or Hinduism, Confucianism and, to a certain
extent, even Buddhism (Almond, Appleby, & Sivan, 2003; Bermanis,
Canetti-Nisim, & Pedahzur, 2004; Bhatt & Mukta, 2000; Ellens & Ellens,
2004; Keyes & Wellman, 2007). This topic, hence, is without doubt a
central issue in modern times and a source of increasing worry in
contemporary societies. In this study we focus on Hindutva fundamentalism in contemporary India, how it developed in recent history
and how it depends on rejecting the symbolism of Gandhis nonviolence, which is widely esteemed as a landmark achievement in the
course of Indias struggle for independence from the British Empire.
Fundamentalism is an iridescent concept; everybody understands it
in everyday and academic talk, but being a contextual phenomenon, it
escapes easy definition. May it suffice to call religious fundamentalism
the activity of a group that is directed against the dissolution of
traditional order in the course of modernization (Riesebrodt, 1993) and
that is characterized by a discernible pattern of religious militancy
(Almond, Appleby, & Sivan, 2003, p. 17). This mindset draws on a
distinct religious and ethnic identity, erects strict borders towards other
groups and justifies violence against them by their mere otherness.
Emerson and Hartman (2006) name some ideological and organizational characteristics. For these authors, fundamentalism is a reaction
to the marginalization of religion in contemporary society; it has a
dualistic world view whereby everything is either good or evil; fundamentalists believe absolutely in the divine origin of their sacred texts;
and some share a belief in millennialism and messianism, which will
leave true believers victorious at the end.
Not all fundamentalist movements fulfil all these criteria simultaneously and indeed there are differences between the group of
Abrahamic religions and those of Middle and East Asian origin
(Billings & Scott, 1994; Munson, 1995). In the former religions, mostly,
fundamentalist groups exist as a stable phenomenon where members
socialize their children through the family and special schools to
become members themselves (Altemeyer, 2003; Bermanis, CanettiNisim, & Pedahzur, 2004; Beyerlein, 2004; Godwin, Godwin, &
300
Mumbai
Ahmedabad
Hyderabad
Meerut
Aligarh
Vadodra
Delhi
Kolkata
1137
1119
312
265
160
109
93
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Method
Sample
Twenty in-depth interviews (10 in each religious group) were carried
out among Hindu and Muslim, semi-literate married males, aged
2535 years, who resided in Dharavi. In order to establish a social
network, help was received from contacts (i.e. people familiar with the
milieu, social class and religion).
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him and now why do they not leave us in peace? Why dont they take
Gandhism to Pakistan? (H)
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1991; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Kammen, 1993; Wagner, 1998) and
helped in the creation of a strong Hindu identity.
The present data provide an example of how political entrepreneurs
concoct stories to help create new political realities (Hunt, 1984). We
believe that Hindu revivalists, in their attempt to create a Hindu India,
superimposed the new elementthat Gandhi was responsible for the
division of Indiaon memories of the past. Gandhis big mistake
began to occupy centre stage and became the anchor for anti-Gandhi
discourse.
Our surmise is that the first attempts to rewrite history begin with
whispered smear campaigns and in an atmosphere charged with
communal distrust, the person who upholds the middle ground
becomes the first casualty. Gandhi, who had for a long time stood as a
supreme product of this multi-religious history and was a symbol of
communal harmony and peace, thus became its primary target.
Thereby, through manipulation of a symbol and the rewriting of
history, Hindu ideologues tried to modify the existing knowledge base.
Our data show the dynamics whereby historical events and the
surrounding narratives were selectively employed by politicians (in
this case, Hindu revivalists) to legitimize their hidden agendas (Liu &
Laszlo, 2007). They astutely used significant images rooted in the past
to manipulate the present. Experiences were thus concretized into
symbols (R. Sen & Wagner, 2005), which led to representation of events
and figures. Gandhi too was meted this fate by Hindu revivalists.
Destroying Cultural Symbolism
The research highlights the fact that in the changed circumstances of
contemporary Indian society, the perception of Gandhis cultural
symbolism, used for non-violence or peaceful resistance, had moved
towards a more Hindutva framework. Respondents from both the
communities in Dharavi were quick to reject the basic tenets of
Gandhian thinking in relation to non-violence. Gandhis ideas were
viewed as anachronistic and not in synch with modern reality,
although the views on Gandhi himself were divided: The world has
changed, people want to move fast. All this is for the old fashioned and
not in keeping with the present (H).
Respondents felt that Gandhis beliefs had become history, which,
when read, was a wonderful tale, but was perceived as many light
years away from reality. There was a mute desire, a mere glimmer, to
replicate it, but it was perceived as wishful thinking and set aside when
referenced to the harsh reality of their existing situations. The respondents across the communities also showed a desire for the common
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The philosophy of simple living; high thinking and peaceful coexistence of all religions (sarvadharma sambhav) was used by Gandhi to
bring about a change in social perception. Amongst our respondents,
this philosophy had been turned on its head and was perceived as a
luxury that could be indulged in only by the privileged. They felt that
all these high thoughts could only be the prerogative of those who
were comfortable and did not have to fight for their daily survival:
They have the time and means to be good. We survive. No time for all this
goodness stuff. Do your job and get on. At best dont pick up a fight (lafda).
Besides, what do we have to give up . . . our clothes, our children? All this
is time-pass (pastime) for the rich (bade log). (H)
ashram to another. It is conjectured that perhaps because of the inconvenience of carrying fire over long distances, a safe symbolthe
saffron flagwas created. Triangular and often forked saffron flags are
seen fluttering atop most Sikh and Hindu temples. While Sikhs regard
it as a militant colour, Buddhist monks and Hindu saints wear robes of
this colour as a mark of the renunciation of material life. However, our
respondents in Dharavi immediately associated the saffron colour with
the BJP and its allies: This [the saffron flag] is symbolic of the Shiv Sena
and the BJP. Whole of Mumbai is full of such flags. In Dharavi they are
all over the place (H).
This is the Maratha Tigers [local name by which Bal Thackeray, who is head
of the rightwing Shiv Sena, is addressed in Maharashtra] colour. When he
roars (garajna) everybody stops in their tracks. We should have his flag
everywhere. (H)
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Figure 3. Aum or Om (this was not a separate visual shown to the respondents, but is a
modified version of the symbol embedded in the visual of the saffron flag)
The rest of the symbols are religious. Now they are trying to provoke
the Hindus to become militant. This is clear and we feel insecure (M).
Here it is perhaps worth emphasizing that this change in cultural
tools, such as social representations, was not driven by an internal
dialogue, but was fuelled by collective controversy. The decodification
of visuals did not take place in a cultural, semantic or political void,
but in an environment that was heavily loaded with discourse. Sometimes our respondents reduced a semiotic mediator (e.g. the saffron
colour), which represented several things simultaneously, to a sign
with a single meaning (Hindutva). Through this reduction, the colour
was objectified as a representation of Hindutva. The addition of a new
element, the sword, to a repertoire of religious symbols and the
concomitant reactions, which gathered momentum at the societal level,
were a by-product of a social trend, which was then known as the
saffron (bhagwa) wave.
From 1991 onwards, the distribution of tridents for the symbolic
self-defence of the Hindus and trishul-diksha (consecration or initiation
by giving a trident; Shrimali, 2003) had gained currency. In such an
atmosphere, as the interviewees indicate, the Hindus became more
belligerent and the Muslims apprehensive, but retaliatory. Such actions
and accounts, an escalation in militancy and aggression amongst both
the communities are clear examples of social representations going
public in words and deeds. Social representing is not a sterile process
limited to theoretical and image factors, but comprises behaviour.
Violence was justifiably unleashed and led to riots. When this occurs,
noticeable changes in the symbolic sphere more often than not precede
the enactment of a representation.
Condemning Secularism
According to Hindu and Muslim respondents, the spirit of retributive
violence engulfed both communities. The interviewees responses
show that any dissidence against the holy alliance between religion
and politics was generally not tolerated. It was brushed aside as
pseudo-secularism. Hindus described secularists as clones of the
anglicized native who, having imbibed western values, was elitist, out
of touch with the real India and was always ashamed to assert his or
her own religious demands. They stood in the dock accused of using
double standards when taking a stand on religious issues and the
general feeling among the respondents was that most English-speaking
Hindus are not open to shedding their anti-Hindu rhetoric. In affective
terms, the respondents resented this group, calling them glamorous
and arrogant.
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The general feeling among Hindu respondents was that enough was
enough and it was time that Hindus demanded respect and put
peopleMuslims and secularistsin their place. Proponents of the
Hindu cohort also often referred to secularists as ideological enemies
and had coined a term for them: Macaulays children. The descriptors
associated with Hindu secularists by the Hindu respondentshead in
the clouds (airy fairy), talk gibberish in English (angrezi mein git-pit),
weak Indians, without spine, brown sahibs/memsahibs, clones of the
British (angrez), westernized, smugshow, and we surmise, that by
prefixing secularism with pseudo-, the definition of the entire
baggage associated with secularism, a previously firmly held representation, was being changed. Thus, by changing the definition of secularism, the Hindu ideologues had successfully, to some extent, changed
collective thought and thereby increased their hold on the Hindu
mindset. We believe that this representation of the secularists, when
intertwined with the Hindutva slogan, Say with pride that you are a
Hindu (Garv se kaho ki Hindu ho), not only increased the distance of the
common people from the secularists, but also helped in consolidating
ethnic identities and further fragmented the society along communal
lines. Thereby, Hindutva, through the use of cultural signs, created
social turmoil and impacted the thinking of the common man.
At the time of the fieldwork, there was movement taking place
regarding the perception of secularists and Gandhi. The perception of
both by a section of Hindu respondents, as discussed above, was in
direct contrast to that held by the Muslim respondents as well as some
Hindus. This group referred to secularists as, saviours, symbolic of
hope and security, protectors of the minorities and, because of them
we can still live in India. Muslim respondents, as well as some Hindu
respondents, echoed a similar feeling for Gandhi, remarking that he
symbolized hope in an increasingly hostile atmosphere and, hence,
was seen as the sole protector of the Muslims: Gandhis philosophy
did not create partition. Gandhi had said that, first cut me into two
pieces, then divide the country (9M).
The overall responses show that the perceptions of Hindu/Muslim
secularists and of Gandhi had begun to serve as markers of salient
group boundaries. These boundaries were beginning to catalyze the
formation of ethnic identity, which was becoming increasingly rigid and
tenets of religious behaviour were getting less fuzzy and more clearly
demarcated. Testimony to this social change is reflected in the interviewees responses. If Muslim secularists were perceived as having
sold out to the trio of Zionists, Hindu revivalists and US, forgotten
Islam and were mere pretenders and there was underscoring of the
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divided identity may have been as a result of the shift from religion
as faith (Nandy, 1990) to religion as ideology and concomitantly a
crystallizing of a fundamentalist and uni-dimensional religious
identity. In the following discussion, we use the term religion as faith
in a Gandhian sense, meaning the lived experience, the deeds, the
personal example. Traditionally, Hinduism is not a religion, but a
philosophy of life and hence open to change. However, religion as
ideology, as defined here, is perceived as didactic, demanding commitment, expansion of its territory, and has a set of commandments that
are not to be trespassed. The boundaries are defined and its protection
attains paramount significance.
Religion as Ideology and Consolidation of Ethnic Identity
Our respondents pointed out that during the BJP regime, both Hindus
and Muslims had gradually set aside the rich cultural heritage of
syncretic religion and rode roughshod on these little traditions. Rustic
homilies, exotic and integrated remixes, which served as a spiritual
balm, were replaced by didactic religious tenets. Consequently, the
lines of ethnic identity were becoming clearly demarcated and
syncretic culture did not seem to be attractive. It appeared to have lost
its pull.
Some people in the villages are just Muslims in name. They live with Hindus
and have forgotten the ways of Islam. What is the right thing to eat? They
drink [alcohol]. This is not allowed in Islam; it is haram (prohibited). That
which is made by rotting is haram. (M)
The respondents felt that there had been an erosion of their ethnic
identity and that this should be rectified. Thus, social positions and
newly emerging ethnic identities had to be enacted and the use of
violence became sanctioned.
Importantly, in the entire discourse, affect and cognition were invariably discussed in terms of the collective: communal passion (kaumi
jazba), protectors of Hindus/Hinduism (Hinduoan ke rakshak), we
(humsab), those people (woh log), social pressure (samaj ka dabav), and
so on. The attribution for any act or deed was rarely in the first person
singular. In fact, the common people, through whom most acts of
violence were committed, absolved themselves from all responsibility
regarding such violence. Although they conducted the violence, it was
not seen as an act associated with their own identity, but was solely
attributed to political ambition. Philosophically stated, the underlying
element was: Those who have to dig a hole every day to drink water
[the poor] how can they be involved? (H). Dig a hole every day
characterizes their helplessness and justifies the behaviour of those
who dwell in the slums. Their harsh reality allowed them to explain
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Conclusions
The present research shows how fundamentalist politics is based on a
redefinition of what constitutes religion, in the course of which the
symbolic realm undergoes profound changes. The meaning of the
saffron colour, for example, changed from sacred fire to signify incendiary militancy, as did other cultural elements. Equally, the representation of the past is being cleansed and historical events are
rearranged in the interest of ethnic division and readiness for collective violence.
Our respondents alluded to religion as their all-encompassing and
exclusive identity that sets them apart from their neighbours who do
not share in the same creed, hence creating sharp divisions between the
proximal ethnic groups of Hindus and Muslims. Driven by factors
more akin to an ideological mindset, people begin to mould their
behaviour within the straitjacket of pre-specified terms of reference,
which are circulated at the collective level. Such overarching systems
of partitioning lead to the creation of different ethnic identities where
a singular trait, based on religion, foments the entire structure of the
identity and hastily reduces the complexity of identity to a unidimensional phenomenon (A. Sen, 2006).
In the present case of the growth of Hindu fundamentalism, the
symbolic non-violence inherited from Gandhis struggle for Indian
independence from the British Empire was one of the symbolic
obstacles that had to be turned from its feet onto its head, and successfully so. Gandhis symbolism, non-violence and ethnic tolerance
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References
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New Delhi: Roli Books.
Almond, G.A., Appleby, R.S., & Sivan, E. (2003). Strong religion: The rise of
fundamentalisms around the world. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Altemeyer, B. (2003). Why do religious fundamentalists tend to be prejudiced?
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 13(1), 1728.
Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B.E. (1992). Authoritarianism, religious
fundamentalism, quest, and prejudice. International Journal for the Psychology
of Religion, 2(2), 113133.
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Biographies
RAGINI SEN earned her PhD from the London School of Economics and
Political Sciences and is the author of We, the Billion (Sage, 2003). She has
worked as Head of Social Research, India and Nepal, with MARG (now
AC-Nielsen). Dr Sen has been a senior fellow at the Observer Research
Foundation and has also lectured at the University of Delhi. She is currently
Director, Logistics India. ADDRESS: 103 Marian Terrace, 68 Chapel Road,
Bandra West, Mumbai-400050, India. [email: raginisen@gmail.com]
WOLFGANG WAGNER is Professor at Johannes Kepler University, Linz,
Austria and at the University of the Basque Country, San Sebastin, Spain. His
research is on societal psychology, social representations, racism and the
popularization of science. He recently co-published Everyday discourse and
common sense: The theory of social representations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) and
co-edited Meaning in action: Construction, narratives and representations
(Springer, 2008). [email: w.wagner@jku.at]
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