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From the Autopoiesis to the Allopoiesis of Law

Author(s): Marcelo Neves
Source: Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp. 242-264
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Cardiff University
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JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY

VOLUME28, NUMBER2, JUNE2001

ISSN: 0263-323X, pp. 242-64

From the Autopoiesis to the Allopoiesis of Law

MARCELONEVES*

Thisarticle discusses the empirical limits of the concept of autopoiesis of

law in world society today. The argument is based principally on
observation of the problems of reproduction of the legal system in
peripheral countries'. The central thesis of the article is that, in the
countries of 'peripheralmodernity'the reproduction of the legal system
is blocked by a wide variety of social factors, in such a way that one can
speak more of the allopoiesis than the autopoiesis of law. Beginning with
a biological concept, the article considers the sociological concept of
autopoiesis, and then analyzes the concept of autopoiesis of law. Based
on this theoretical parameter, the argument about the allopoiesis of law
in the 'peripheralcountries' is presented. Finally, the article returns to
the central theme of the allopoiesis of law in 'peripheral countries' and
points to the indications of a normative concept of autopoiesis of law in
the theories of Niklas Luhmannand Gunther Teubner.

I. INTRODUCTION
In this article I intend to identify the empirical limits of the systemic concept
of autopoiesis of law in world society today. The argument is based
principally on the observation of the problems of reproduction of the legal
systems in 'peripheral' countries also known as 'underdeveloped', 'in
development' or Third World. From a theoretical point of view, in the
foreground is a confrontation of this observation with Luhmann's systems
theory, but I also consider the postmodern model of the autopoiesis of law.
The central thesis of the article is that in the countries of 'peripheral
modernity', the permanentand generalized impediment to the reproductionof
the legal system created by a wide variety of social factors, such as money,
power, and relationships, makes the operational autonomy of law practically
* Federal
University of Pernambuco, Recife. Brazil. Presently Visiting
Professor at the University of Frankfurt, Robert-Mayer-Str. 5, D-60014
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
This article was translatedby MargaretGriesse and Jeffrey Hoff.
242
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impossible,in such a way that one can speak of the allopoiesisof law in
of
contrastto the idea of an autopoieticlaw. This meansthatthe reproduction
environment.
law is over-determined
its
social
variables
of
by
It is obviousthatin the space of this article,I cannotcompletelydevelop
my argument.I will first briefly present the central thesis containedin
argumentsmore broadly elaboratedand discussed in previous works.
these studieshave not been publishedin English.This article
Unfortunately,
serves,nevertheless,as an introductionto the ideas which I presentin these
otherworksin much greaterdetail.
In the followingexplanation,I will pointin the firstplaceto the biological
origin of the concept of autopoiesis, to consider its reception and
transformationby the social sciences, concentratingon the Luhmannian
paradigm(II).I will thenspecificallyconsidertheconceptof autopoiesisof law
as a social system,underliningLuhmann'stheorywithoutfailingto consider,
variantsof theconceptof autopoieticlaw (III).Once
however,thepost-modern
the parametersare established,I will then discuss the centralthesis of the
article,the idea thatthe autopoiesisof law has no empiricplausibilityin the
majorityof countriesof the worldsocietytoday,andwill maintainthatin the
of the 'peripheral
circumstances
of socialandlegalreproduction
modernity',a
are
of
codes
and
criteria
of
communication
destructivelyimposedin
miscellany
all of the spheresof sociallife andthusimplythe allopoiesisof law.To support
and overthis point I will highlightthat the relationsof under-integration
factors
and
the same
at
in
the
constitute
determining
integration
legal system
time, result from the allopoietic reproductionof law (IV). In the final
considerations,I will focus on the centralthesis, emphasizingthe empirical
limits,bothof the functionalistconceptas well as the post-modernnotionof
in extensivepartsof current
autopoiesisof law, consideringlegalreproduction
worldsociety;in this step,I will pointto theindicationsof a normativeconcept
of autopoiesisof law, whichappearsto me to be presentin thetheoryof Niklas
Luhmannandin the conceptsof GuntherTeubner(V).
II. FROMBIOLOGICALTO SOCIALAUTOPOIESIS
The conceptof autopoiesishas its originin the biologicaltheoryof Maturana
and Varela.1Etymologically,the wordcomes fromthe Greekaut6s ('self)
andpoiesis ('creation', 'production').2In the first instance,it refers to the
qualityof a system to build for itself the componentsof which it consists.
The life-systemsare definedaccordinglyas autopoieticmachines:
I Compare H.R. Maturana and F.J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The
Realization of the Living (1980) 73-123; H.R. Maturanaand F.J. Varela, Der
Baum der Erkenntnis(1987, 3rd edn.) 55-60; H.R. Maturana,Die Organisationund
Verkirperung von Wirklichkeit. Ausgewdhlte Arbeiten zur biologischen
Epistemologie (1982) 141-2, 157ff., 279-80.
2 Maturanaand Varela, id. (1980) XVII.
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An autopoieticmachineis a machineorganized(definedas a unity)a network

of processes of production(transformation
and destruction)of components
that produces the components which: (i) through their interactionsand
transformations
continuouslyregenerateand realize the networkof processes
(relations)thatproducethem;and(ii) constituteit (the machine)as a concrete
unity in the space in which they (the components)exist by specifying the
topologicaldomainof its realizationas such a network.3
It deals, therefore, with a homeostatic system,4 characterized by closure in
the production and reproduction of elements.5 Thus, it is an attempt to break
with a tradition which holds that the conservation and evolution of the
species would be conditioned and decided basically by environmental
factors. On the contrary, the conservation of living-beings (individuals) is
connected to their ability for autopoietic reproduction.6
Luhmann'sintroductionof the concept of autopoiesis in the social sciences
has found wide resonance.7 His conception of autopoiesis deviates from
Maturana'sbiological conception in so far as it distinguishes between (psychic
and social) meaning systems and (organic and neurophysiological) nonmeaning systems.8 According to Luhmann, in the biological theory of
3 id., pp.78-79. See, also,p. 135;Maturana,
op. cit.,n. 1, pp. 141-2, 158, 184-5,280.
Teubnercalledthis the 'official'definitionof autopoiesis.CompareG. Teubner,
Recht als autopoietisches System (1989) 32.

4 Maturana
andVarela,op. cit. (1980),n. 1, p. 78.
5 See, for example,id., p. 127,in regardto the nervoussystem.
6 Compareid., pp. 117-18,for a criticalperspectiveof theideologicalimplications
of
Darwinisttheory.

7 See, primarily,N. Luhmann,Soziale Systeme: Grundrifieiner allgemeinen Theorie

(1987); H.Haferkampand M. Schmid (eds.), Sinn, Kommunikationund soziale
Differenzierung:Beitrage zu LuhmannsTheoriesozialer Systeme(1987); D. Baecker
et al. (eds.), Theorie als Passion: Niklas Luhmann zum 60. Geburtstag (1987)
394 ff.; G. Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society
(1987); G. Teubnerand A. Febbrajo(eds.), State, Law, and Economyas Autopoietic
Systems:Regulationand autonomyin a new perspective- EuropeanYearbookin the

Sociologyof Law(1992).Fora critiqueof thereceptionof theconceptof autopoiesis

by the socialsciencessee W. L. Biihl,'GrenzenderAutopoiesis'(1989)39 Kolner

Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 225; for a comprehensive

perspectiveon Luhmann'ssystemstheory,see W. KrawietzandM. Welker(eds.),

Kritik der Theorie sozialer Systeme: Auseinandersetzungen mit Luhmanns

(1992, 2nd edn.).Fora discourse-theoretical

Hauptwerk
critique,see J. Habermas,
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (1988) 426-45. Zolo designates

autopoiesisas an ideologicallyconservativeparadigm.See D. Zolo, 'Autopoiesis:

un paradigma conservatore' (1986) 1 Micro Mega 129.

8 For another interpretationSee K.-H. Ladeur, 'Perspektiven einer post-modernen
Rechtstheorie:Zur Auseinandersetzungmit N. LuhmannsKonzeptder "Einheitdes

383, at 408-9. Comparealso G. Teubner,

Rechtssystems
"'(1985) 16 Rechtstheorie
op. cit., n. 3, pp. 38, 43, 46; G. Teubner, 'Gesellschaftsordnungdurch

Gesetzgebungslirm? Autopoietische Geschlossenheit als Problem fiir die

Rechtssetzung'(1988) 13 Jahrbuchfiir Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie45, at

andVarelaasserted
whoin connectionwithMaturana
51, in oppositionto Luhmann,
the impossibilityof partialautopoiesisof the social systems.See N. Luhmann,
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autopoiesis, there is a radicalizedconception of closure, since in the production

of relations between system and environment an observer outside the system,
that is to say, another system, is needed.9 In the case of meaning systems
however, 'self-observation becomes the necessary component of autopoietic
reproduction'.10Meaning systems maintain their autopoietic character, in so
far as they refer simultaneously to themselves (inwards) and to their
environment(outwards),and therefore,operateinternallywith the fundamental
difference between system and environment.11Their complete closure is not
impairedhowever, since meaning is related only to meaning and can only be
changed through meaning.12But the introductionof the 'system/environment
distinction' within the meaning systems (self-observation as the 'operative
element of autopoiesis')13 enables a new combination of closure and
environmental openness, so that the circularity of autopoiesis can be
interruptedby reference to the environment.14 According to Luhmann'stheory
of autopoietic social systems, environment functions in regard to system not
merely as the 'infrastructuralcondition of the possibility for the constitutionof
the elements' 5 nor as only disturbance,noise, bruit;16it is more, namely, 'the
system's ground'.17 In relation to the system, many different types of
environmentaldeterminantsare at work, but they are only first inserted into the
system if it attributesits form to them according to its own differences.18
Luhmann's conception of the closure of self-referential meaning systems,
especially the social systems, not only differs from the biological theory of
autopoiesis, but also deviates even more clearly from the opposition of
closed and open systems which was at the base of the classic systems
theory.19 The concept of closed systems 'acquires a new meaning in
Recht"' (1985)6 Zeitschrift
fiir Rechtssoziologie
'EinigeProblememit "reflexivem
1, at 2; N. Luhmann,'Autopoiesisals soziologischerBegriff in Sinn, Kom-

munikationund soziale Differenzierung,eds. W. Krawietz and M. Welker (1992,

2nd ed.) 307, at 318; Maturanaand Varela, op. cit. (1980), n. 1, p. 94; Maturana,op.

cit., n. 1, p. 301.
9 Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 7, p. 64.
10 id.
11
12
13
14
15
16

id.
id.
id., p. 63.
id., p. 64-65.
id., p. 60.
For Francisco Varela, noise ('bruit' - 'couplage par cloture' in opposition to
'couplage par input') functions as the typical form of environmentalinfluence on
the autonomous systems. See F. Varela, 'L'auto-organisation:de l'apparence au

mecanisme'in L'auto-organisation:
De la physiqueaupolitique,eds.P. Dumouchel

and J.-P. Dupuy (1983) 147.

17 Luhmann,op. cit., n. 7, p. 602.
18 '[...] ground is always withoutform.' id.
19 Compare id., p. 63-64. For a summary of this standpointof the classic systems

theory,See L. von Bertalanffy,'AllgemeineSystemtheorie:

Wege zu einerneuen
mathesis universalis' (1957) 5/6 Deutsche Universitdtszeitung8, at 10-12.
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comparison with earlier systems theory. It no longer indicates systems that

exist (almost) without environments, that is, that can determine themselves
(almost) completely.'20 In other words: 'Closure does not, however, mean
the absence of an environment nor does it mean complete self-determination
by itself.'21 It deals with the autonomy of the system, not its autarchy.22
Operative closure 'is rather the condition of possibility for openness. All
openness is based on closure.'23 The combination of closure and openness
can be considered under two perspectives:
(i) although a meaning system practices 'control of its own possibilities for
negation while producing its own elements' (closure), this control
depends on the conditions of choice between yes and no (openness);24
the
control of the possibility of negation (closure) enables a continuous
(ii)
and stable (or at least less unstable) selective relationship of the system
to its environment (adequate openness).
Influenced by Maturana and Varela, Luhmann emphatically defines the
concept of autopoiesis as the self-reference of systemic elements: 'One can
call a system self-referential if it itself constitutes the elements that compose
it as functional unities ...,25 Here we are dealing primarily with the unitary
reproduction of the elements that are constituted by the system and at the
same time constituting the same system,26 and not with the self-organization
or the structural maintenance of the system.27 From this point of view,
Luhmann considers the unity of the system primarily as 'unity of the final
elements of which the system consists and unity of the processes into which
the operations of the system combine these elements.'28 Accordingly, he
formulates 'that an autopoietic system constitutes the elements of which it
consists through the elements of which it consists and, in this way, sets limits
20 Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 7, p. 602.
21 N. Luhmann,
'Die Einheitdes Rechtssystems'
129,at 133.
(1983) 14 Rechtstheorie
22 N. Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren(1983) 69; G. Teubner, 'Reflexives
Recht: Entwicklungsmodelledes Rechts in vergleichenderPerspektive' (1982) 68
Archivfir Rechts und Sozialphilosophie 13, at 20. 'Autonomy of law refers to the

but not to its causal independenceof the

circularityof its self-reproduction,
environment.'
GuntherTeubner,op. cit., n. 3, p. 47. Thus,it does not deal with

(causal) isolation. See N. LuhmannSoziologischeAufklirung 6: Die Soziologie und

der Mensch(1995) 15; N. Luhmann,Die Gesellschaftder Gesellschaft(1997) 68; N.
Luhmann,Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1993) 43-4.

23 Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 7, p. 606;ComparealsoLuhmann,
op. cit. (1997),n. 22, p. 68.
24 Luhmann, op. cit., n. 7, p. 603; See, also, N. Luhmann, Okologische

Kommunikation:Kanndie modeme Gesellschaftsich auf okologische Gefdhrdungen

einstellen? (1986) 83.
25 Luhmann,op. cit., n. 7, p. 59.

26 'Elementsareelementsonlyfor systems,whichuse themas a unityandwhichthey

areonly throughthe systems.'Luhmann,
id., p. 43.

27 Luhmann,op. cit., n. 21, p. 132.

28 id., p. 131.

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which do not exist in the infrastructuralcomplexity of the environment of the

,29
system.29
Nevertheless, Luhmann's conception of autopoiesis does not restrict itself
to basal self-reference that is found in the difference between element and
relation.30 Basal self-reference is presented as 'the minimal form of selfreference'31 and constitutes one of the three moments of autopoiesis;32 the
others would be reflexivity and reflection, which are based on the distinction
between before and after or between system and environment.33
'Reflexivity' and 'reflection' are more precise concepts than the extensive
category of reflexive mechanisms formulated earlier by Luhmann.34
'Reflexivity' involves the reference of a process to itself, or better, to a
process of the same type.35 What is meant here, for example, is the learning
of learning, the regulating of norm-making, the power of power and the
decisions over decisions.36 However, such a formulation, inadequately
characterizes reflexivity as a type of self-reference in terms of an autopoietic
system. Taking this into consideration, Luhmann attempts to define it more
exactly: 'We would like to speak of processual self-reference or reflexivity
only when this re-entry into the process is articulated using the process's
means.'37 This can be formulated differently with the systems theory model:
reflexivity as a mechanism within an autopoietic system implies that the
referring process and the referred process are structuredby the same binary
coding and, in connection with this, the criteria and programmes of the
former re-enter partially into the latter. Accordingly, it is not enough to refer
to the regulating of norm-making, because a religious or ethical regulating of
the creation of legal norms as well as a 'natural-lawruling' of the production
29 id., p. 132. See, also, Luhmann,op. cit. (1997), n. 22, p. 65-66.

30 Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 7, p. 600-01.
31 id., p. 600.
32 Even here should the equatingof autopoiesisand elementaryself-reference
(compareid., p. 602) be understoodin a relativeand restrictedway within
Luhmann'ssystems theory.
33 id., p. 601-02.
34 See N. Luhmann, 'Reflexive Mechanismen' in N. Luhmann, Soziologische
Aufklarung1: Aufsdtzezur Theorie sozialer Systeme (1984, 5th edn.) 92.
35 In this regardsee, primarily,Luhmann,op. cit., n. 7, pp. 601, 610-16. Distinguishing

this systemicconceptfromthe logicalconceptof reflexivity,Luhmannnotes: 'It

indicates a relation which meets the conditions that each part standsby itself in the
same relation as to the other. [...] We do not hold to this definition, because the
exact identity of the reflexive relation would obstructthe very argumentwhich we
want to develop: the increasein efficiency throughreflexivity. A mechanismshall be
considered as reflexive here then, if it intends an object that is the same type of
mechanism, which in turn refers to its own type.' Luhmann,op. cit., n. 34, p. 109,
fn.6.
36 id., pp. 94-99.
37 Luhmann,op. cit., n., p. 611. According to Luhmannhimself (id., p. 611 note 31)
this distinction was missing from his earlier work on this subject, first published in
17 Soziale Welt (1966) 1: Luhmann,op. cit., n. 34.

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of positive legal norms would represent, in this narrower sense, no

reflexivity in the norm-making.
In the case of reflection, which presupposes basal self-reference and
reflexivity, 'the self is the system to which the self-referential operation
attributes itself', not simply the systemic elements or processes.8 As a
'theory of the system in the system'39 it implies the conceptual elaboration of
'the system's identity in distinction to the environment'. It is, therefore, 'a
form of concentrated self-reference'41 that enables the questioning of the
very identity of the system.42
While Luhmann conceives autopoiesis in three interdependent moments
(self-reference, reflexivity, and reflection), Teubner proposes a more
extensive concept, defining it as the 'hypercyclic connection' of element,
process, structure, and identity.43 It seems to me, however, that Luhmann's
model of autopoiesis does not contradictthe idea of 'hypercyclic connection'
because it includes the structural element. Luhmann did not restrict
autopoietic reproduction to elementary self-reference but claimed that it
only amounted to the minimum form of autopoiesis. What characterizes the
conception of the autopoietic systems is that it starts from the operative
aspects, and does not refer primarily to the structuraldimension (autonomy).
In relation to social systems, 'as constituted on the basis of a unified (selfreferential) nexus of communications',44 it is society which forms the more
38 Compare Luhmann, op. cit., n. 7, p. 601; N. Luhmann, 'Selbstreflexion des
Rechtssystems: Rechtstheorie in gesellschaftstheoretischer Perspektive' in N.
Luhmann,Ausdifferenzierungdes Rechts (1981) 419, at 423.
39 id., pp. 422, 446.

40 Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 7, p. 620.
41 Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 38, p. 423.

42 N. Luhmann,Funktionder Religion (1982) 59.

43 Teubner,op. cit., n. 3, pp. 36-40; G. Teubner,'Hyperzyklusin Recht und

Organisation. Zum Verhiiltnis von Selbstbeobachtung, Selbstkonstitution und

Autopoiese' in Sinn, Kommunikationund soziale Differenzierung,eds. W. Krawietz
and M. Welker (1992, 2nd edn.) 89, at 106ff. Compare, also, G. Teubner,
Zur Steigerung von Selbstreferenzim Recht' in Theorie als
'Episodenverknupfung.
Passion, eds. D. Baecker et al. (1987) 423.
44 Luhmann, op. cit., n. 7, p. 92. According to Luhmann (id., p. 43-4) the social
systems as autopoietic communicationcontexts are built through their emergence
from 'above', they constitute themselves in the way in which they propose and
operationalizea new differencefrom system and environmentat anotherlevel. They
are not the result of the accumulation of infrastructuralelements, such as
consciousness, human beings, and so on. On the contrary, the living-beings are
presentedaccordingto Maturanaand Varela's distinctionof autopoiesis of the first,
second and third order as components of the social systems (emergence from
'under').CompareMaturanaand Varela, op. cit. (1980), n. 1, pp. 107-11; Maturana
and Varela, op. cit. (1987), n. 1, pp. 196 ff. See, also, Teubner,op. cit., n. 3, pp. 401. It is necessary here to note that the primarybiological concept of the society
(genus) of Maturanaand Varela is more extensive than the concept of the human
society (species). CompareMaturanaand Varela,id. (1980), pp. xxiv-xxx; Maturana
and Varela, id. (1987), pp. 196ff.
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extensive system. The elementary units of society, the communications,45

that are built through the synthesis of information, utterance, and
understanding46exist only within society, not in its environment, in such a
way that society can be characterizedas 'real-necessarily closed'.47 Although
the reproduction of communications realizes itself within the society
exclusively (self-referential closure), communications exist inevitably about
the (psychic, organic, and chemical) environment (openness).48
The autopoietic character of the subsystems of the society, however,
cannot be clarified in this same way: communication is the elementary unit
of all social systems; in the environment of all subsystems of society, there
is communication; for these subsystems, not only does communication
develop about the environment but also communication with the
environment.49 Only when a social system has a specific code difference
of yes and no, can it be characterized as self-referentially closed (and
consequently as environmentally open).50 By means of the very binary
systemic coding of yes and no, the elementary units of the system are
from external
reproduced internally and clearly distinguished
communication.51

SYSTEM
III. LAW AS AUTOPOIETIC
The differentiation of law in modem society has been interpreted as the
control of the code difference between legal and illegal by a functional
system specialized for this purpose.52 According to Luhmann's paradigm,
this new position of law presupposes an advance over the pre-moder society
which is differentiated according to the stratification principle (vertically).
To the extent that the differentiation principle was based on a distinction
between 'upper' and 'under', only the 'highest', that is, the political system,
had self-referential autonomy.53 Law remained overdetermined by politics
and a political-legitimizing static moral; it did not have its own specific code
difference between 'yes' and 'no' exclusively. The legal system in modem
45
46
47
48
49
50

Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 7, pp. 192-3.
Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 7, pp. 193ff.
op. cit., n. 21, p. 137.See, also,Luhmann.,
Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 7, pp. 60-1.
Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 21, p. 137.
id., pp. 137-8.
See id., p. 134;Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 24, p. 83; N.
op. cit., n. 7, p. 603; Luhmann,
Luhmann,'Die Codierungdes Rechtssystems'(1986) 17 Rechtstheorie171, at 171-2.

51 Aboutbinarycodingsee, generally,Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 24, pp. 75 ff.
52 Luhmann,op. cit., n. 50, p. 171. See, in regardto the social systemsin general,
Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 24, pp. 85-6.

53 N. Luhmann, 'Machtkreislaufund Recht in Demokratien' (1981) 2 Zeitschriftfur

Rechtssoziologie 158, at 159-60; N. Luhmann,Rechtssoziologie (1987, 3rd edn.)
168 ff.

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society implies the control of the binary code legal/illegal exclusively by the
legal system, which gains in this way its operative closure.54
In this sense, positivity is understood as the self-determination as well as
the operative closure of the law.55 As with the other differentiated social
systems, we are not dealing here with autarchy,(quasi-) lack of environment.
If the exclusive use of the binary code legal/illegal leads to operative closure,
the choice between legal and illegal is determined by the environment. On
the other hand, the self-determination of law is based on the distinction
between normative and cognitive expectations56that only become clear once
the binary coding of legal and illegal is exclusively used through the legal
system. On the basis of the differentiation between 'normative and
cognitive' the operative closure of the legal system is secured simultaneously
with its environmental openness. Concerning this, Luhmann writes:
Legal systems use this differenceto combine the closure of recursiveselfproductionand the openness of their relationto the environment.In other
words, law is a normatively closed but cognitively open system. [...] The norm

qualityservesthe autopoiesisof the system,its self-continuationin difference

to the environment.The cognitive quality serves the co-ordinationof this
processwith the system's environment.57
This results in a connection between concept and interest in the reproduction
of positive law: 'the legal system "factorializes" self-reference through
concepts, hetero-reference on the other hand through interests.'58
In this way, the legal system can process the environmental factors
according to its own criteria, without being directly influenced by these
factors. The legal validity of normative expectations cannot be decided
54 Luhmann,op. cit., n. 24, pp. 125-6. Specificallyaboutthe binarycodingof legal
system,see Luhmann,
op.cit., n. 50;Luhmann,
op.cit. (1993),n. 22, pp. 165ff. It is
to notethatlaw withinthe observation
important
perspectiveof thepoliticalsystem
couldbe characterized
as the secondcodingof politicalpower.CompareLuhmann,
Macht(1988,2ndedn.)34, 48ff., 56.
op. cit., n. 50, p. 199;N. Luhmann,
55 See Luhmann,op. cit. (1993), n. 22, pp. 38-123; N. Luhmann,'Positivitdtals
Selbstbestimmtheitdes Rechts' (1988) 19 Rechtstheorie11; Luhmann,op. cit., n. 21;

Luhmann,
op. cit. (1985),n. 8; Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 38. Luhmannclaimsthatthe
conceptof positivityis theoreticallynot sufficientin so far as it is subjectto the
of decisionism'andunderstood
as a conceptcounterto natural-law,
thatis,
'reproach
does not strictlyamountto the operativeclosureof the legal system.Compare
Luhmann,
op. cit. (1993),n. 22, pp. 38-9.
56 Luhmann,
op.
op. cit., n. 21, pp. 138ff. In regardto this distinction,see Luhmann,
cit., n. 7, pp. 436-43; Luhmann,op. cit. (1987), n. 53, pp. 40-53; M. Neves,
Verfassungund Positivitat des Rechts in der peripherenModeme: Eine theoretische
Betrachtungund eine Interpretationdes Falls Brasilien (1992) 22-3.

57 Luhmann,
of
op. cit., n. 21, p. 139.See, also,N. Luhmann,'TheSelf-Reproduction
the Law andits Limits'in Direitoe MudanfaSocial,ed. F. A. de MirandaRosa
(1984) 107, at pp. 110ff.;Luhmann,
op. cit. (1993),n. 22, pp. 77ff.
58 N. Luhmann, 'Interesse und Interessenjurisprudenz im Spannungsfeld von
Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung' (1990) 12 Zeitschrift fur Neuere Rechts-

op. cit. (1993),n. 22, pp. 393ff.

geschichte1, at 10. See Luhmann,
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directly in accordance with economic interests, political criteria, ethical

ideas or even scientific propositions,59 but it depends on selective,
conceptual filtration processes within the legal system.6" The ability of
positive law to learn (that is, the cognitively open dimension) enables it to
change in order to adapt to the complex and 'high-speed' environment.
Normative closure prevents the fusion of the legal system with the
environment, and requires the 'digitizing' of environmental information.
The social differentiation of law is simply the making possible of the
mediation by the law system of these two orientations.61The adaptability of
law is reinforced in this way and not prevented - as it would be claimed in
respect to closure that is absent of environment; but it occurs according to
the specific, inner criteria of an environmentally sensitive system that is
capable of learning.62
From this point of view, self-referential closure, that is, normativity for the
legal system, does not serve as the system's end in itself but rather as a
condition for openness.63 The radicalization of the thesis that closure is the
absence of environment, misjudges the central problem concerning the
connectivity (in opposition to simple repetition) between elementary
events.64 Only under the conditions of cognitive openness to the environment
(the capacity to learn) can the legal system take measures to deparadoxicalize its self-reference and, therefore, ensure connectivity for
furtheroperations.65The cognitive closure of the legal system would produce
an insurmountable paradox of autopoiesis, and make the interru6tion of
interdependence through reference to the environment impossible.6
59 In regardto scientificknowledge,Luhmannaffirms:'It would be, therefore,
certainlyfatal and above all politicallyfatal for the legal systemif it could be
of centraltheoreticalelementsor througha
revolutionized
througha substitution
op. cit. (1985),n. 8, p. 17. See, also,N. Luhmann,
changein paradigm.'Luhmann,
Die Wissenschaftder Gesellschaft (1990) 593-4, 663-4 and with regard to the

of law andscienceLuhmann,
op.cit. (1993),n. 22, pp. 86, 91-2. In
interdependence
contrast,withinthe particular
perspectiveof ClaudioandSolangeSoutothe law is
partiallydefinedin termsof thecriteriaof empiricalscientificknowledge.Compare
C. SoutoandS. Souto,Sociologiado Direito(1981)101, 106-13;C. Souto,Ciencia
e Etica no Direito: uma alternativade modernidade(1992) 43-5; C. Souto,
Grundlagendes Sozialen(1984) 82-4, 91-2; C.
Allgemeinstewissenschaftliche
Souto,TeoriaSociologicado Direitoe PrdticaForense(1978)85-117.
60 'External
areneither,on theone hand,ignored,noron theotherhand,
developments
directlyconvertedintointernaleffectsaccordingto the "stimulus-response-schema"
but,rather,theywouldbe filteredaccordingto the criteriaof selectivitywithinthe
structureof the law andadaptedto the internallogic of normativedevelopment.'
Teubner,op. cit., n. 22, p. 21.
61 Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 21, pp. 152-3.
62 Compareid., p. 136.
63 Luhmann,
op. cit. (1993),n. 22, pp. 76, 79.
op. cit., n. 7, p. 606; Luhmann,
64 Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 7, p. 62.
65 Compareid., p. 59.
66 Compareid., p. 65.

251
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On the other hand, the interruption of normative closure through the

questioning of the binary code legal/illegal, would impair the autonomy of
the legal system, leading to heteronomizing paradoxes:
If a systemuses a differenceguideas code for the totalityof its operations,this
self-applicationof the code on the code must be excluded.Self-referenceis
admittedonly withinthe code, and thenoperationalizedas negation.... The
autonomyof the system is nothing other than operatingaccording to the
standardsof the code itself, and that is because this de-paradoxicalizesthe
paradox of self-reference.

According to Luhmann's conception, the 'self-application of the code on the

code' not only results in heteronomizing effects but also implies a rigidity in
the legal system, in so far as the connectivity of the autopoietic reproduction
would be in this way obstructed.
Particularly at this point, the divergences between Luhmann's theory of
positivity and the new conceptions which relate law to values or moral
become noticeable.68 That not only the supression of the immediate
determination of the law through political interests, desires or criteria of the
powerful, but also the moral neutralization of the legal system is inherent in
the positivity of law, makes a theory of justice as exterior as well as superior
criteria of positive law irrelevant for Luhmann: 'All values, that may
circulate in general social discourse are, after the differentiation of a legal
system, either legally irrelevant or intrinsic values of the law.'69
67 Luhmann,
op. cit (1985),n. 8, p. 6. In relationto the socialsystemsin generalsee,
and
also,Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 24, pp. 76-7, 80-81. Aboutthe de-paradoxicalizing
thede-tautologizing
of thelawthroughthecode 'legal/illegal'see Luhmann,
op.cit.
(1993),n. 22, especiallyp. 168-69.
68 Compare, primarily, N. Luhmann, 'Gerechtigkeit in den Rechtssystemen der

modemenGesellschaft'
in op. cit., n. 38, p. 374;Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 55; Luhmann,
on
op.cit. (1993),n. 22, pp.214-38;NiklasLuhmann,
'QuodOmnesTangit:Remarks
JiirgenHabermas's
LegalTheory'(1996)17 CardozoLawReview883.Fora critical

perspective, R. Dreier, 'Zu Luhmanns systemtheoretischerNeuformulierungdes

in his Recht - Moral - Ideologie: Studienzur Rechtstheorie
Gerechtigkeitsproblems'
(1981) 270; J. Habermas,Faktizitdtund Geltung: Beitrdge zur Diskurstheoriedes
Rechts und des demokratischenRechtsstaats (1992) 573-80; J. Habermas, Die
Einbeziehungdes Anderen:Studienzur politischen Theorie(1996) 393-8; R. Alexy,
Theorie der JuristischenArgumentation:Die Theorie des rationalen Diskurses als
Theorie der juristischen Begriindung (1983) 161-5; K. Giinther, Der Sinn fir
in Moral undRecht (1988) 318-34. In defence
Angemessenheit:Anwendungsdiskurse
of Luhmann'sapproachsee B. Kasprzik,'Ist die Rechtspositivismusdebatte
beendbar?
Zur RechtstheorieNiklas Luhmanns'(1985) 16 Rechtstheorie367.

69 Luhmann,
Luhmann's
op. cit., n. 55, p. 27. Forthis reasonKasprzikcharacterizes
as de-fundamentalizing.
See Kasprzik,
approach
op.cit.,n. 68, p. 368ff. Admittedly,
the validityof the code 'legal/illegal',whichis the differenceguideto autopoietic
of law accordingto Luhmann,is also independent
of a 'basicnorm'
reproduction
(Kelsen)or of a 'ruleof recognition'(Hart).CompareH. Kelsen,ReineRechtslehre
(1960, 2nd edn.) 196-227; H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1945)

11Off.;H.L.A.Hart,TheConceptof Law(1994,2ndedn.)94 ff.; Luhmann,

op. cit.,
n. 21, pp. 140-1;Giinther,op. cit., n. 68, p. 328. In addition,one can observethat
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Consequently justice can only be considered within the legal system as

adequate complexity (outer justice) or as consistency of decisions (inner
justice).70 In other words, it is, on the one hand, about adequate cognitive
environmental openness or adaptablity (external), on the other, about the
capacity for connection of normative autopoietic reproduction (internal).
According to this, the positivity of law does not restrict itself to displacing
problems of justification in the sense of Habermas's discourse theory,71
rather,it signifies the elimination of these problems. The fact that law fulfills
its function of congruent generalization of behaviour expectations in face of
a highly-complex environment, flooded with different normative expectations, necessitates, according to Luhmann, a more radical exoneration of
ethical as well as moral justifications, whether these are material or argumentative-procedural.72 Giving relevance to considerations in regard to
universal values would result in the inflexibility of the legal system,
obstruction of its selective task, and would have, therefore, dysfunctional
effects. In short: according to Luhmann's conception of the positivity of law,
Kelsen's concept of the self-productionof law remainsat the structurallevel of the
legal system and consequently- in contrastto the interpretationof FranqoisOst - is
not linked to the autopoieticparadigmwhich primarilyrefers to the operativelevel
and the circularity of the reproduction of law. Compare H. Kelsen, Reine
Rechtslehre (1960, 2nd ed.) 73, 228, 283; F. Ost, 'Entre ordre et desordre: le jeu
du droit. Discussion du paradigme autopoietique applique au droit' (1986) 31
Archives de Philosophie du Droit 133, 141-4. In contrastto the approachof either
model see, particularlyin regard to the cognitive openness of the legal system in
Luhmann,L. Reisinger, 'Der StaatsbegriffKelsens und LuhmannsTheorie sozialer
Systeme'(1982) 4 (Beiheft)Rechtstheorie483. For a systemic reinterpretationof the
theory of basic norms, see M. Pawlik, 'Die Lehre von der Grundnormals eine
Theorie der Beobachtungzweiter Ordnung'(1994) 25 Rechtstheorie451.
70 Luhmann,op. cit., n. 55, pp. 26-7. Compare,also, Luhmann,op. cit. (1981), n. 68,
pp. 388 ff.; Luhmann,op. cit. (1993), n. 22, pp. 225-6.
71 'The particularaccomplishmentof the positivization of the legal order consists in
displacingproblems of justification, that is, in relieving the technical administration
of the law of such problemsover broad expanses, but not in doing away with them.'
J. Habermas,Theoriedes Kommunikativen
Handelns(1982, 2nd edn.) 354. Laterthe
opposition to Luhmann's concept of positivity as systemic autonomy would be
expressedmore sharply:'A legal system acquiresautonomynot only for itself alone.
It is autonomousonly in the way in which institutionalizedproceduresfor legislation
andjurisdictionguaranteeimpartialformationof judgment and will and in this way
procurean entrancefor ethical proceduralrationalityequally in law and politics.' J.
Habermas,'Wie ist Legitimitit durchLegalitdtmoglich?' (1987) 20 KritischeJustiz
1, at 16. CompareHabermas,op. cit. (1992), n. 68, p. 599, where the expressions
'judgement'and 'ethical' in each case would be replaced with the words 'opinion'
and 'moral'.
72 Accordingto Luhmann'... discursiverationalforms of clarificationfrom acceptable
as well as unacceptablevalue positions remain today imbedded in the area of mere
experience. The centralproposalof practicalphilosophy that by arguingaboutwhat
is currentlycalled value, one could come closer to action, is no longer defendablein
the presentcondition of a world very rich in possibilities.' Luhmann,op. cit. (1981),
n. 68, p. 389, fn. 33.
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that is, the normative closure and cognitive openness of modem law, the
problem of justice is redirected to the question around the adequate
complexity of the legal system and the consistency of its decisions.

IV. THE ALLOPOIESIS OF LAW

Luhmann's model of modern (positive) law as an autopoietic system is, from
an empirical viewpoint, subject to restrictions. Allopoietic determination
prevails in most states in which the modem (world) society is segmented
politically and legally.73 First, some explanations are necessary.
Setting autopoiesis against allopoiesis does not deal with the logical
problem of overcoming the paradox of self-reference.74The debate between
Hart and Ross concerning the logical possibility of self-reference in law has
been guided along these lines.75 On the one hand, Hart made objections to
Kelsen's response to the argument that 'a never-ending series of sanctions'
in the relation between sanctioning norms and sanctioned norms would be in
contradiction to the notion of law as coercive order;76on the other hand, he
raised objection against Ross's thesis that the amendment of the articles of
the Constitution governing the very procedure of amendment of the
Constitution would be a 'logical absurdity'.77Hart presented the conclusive
argument,that law forms no logical system of propositions and consequently
allows of self-reference.78
In terms of the systems theoretical conception of autopoiesis, selfreference belongs to the reality of law as social system, it is not considered a
logical problem:
Herethe conceptof self-reference(reflection,reflexivity)is detachedfromits
classicallocationin humanconsciousnessor in the subjectand transferredto
the domainof objects,namely,to real systemsas the object of science. One
therebygains a certaindistancefrom the purely logical difficultiesof selfreference.79
At the same time, in this context it is no longer the thinking about law which
is called self-referential but the law itself.80 Autopoietic self-reference is not,
73 In thisregard,see Neves, op. cit., n. 56.
74 See Teubner,n. 3, pp. 14-15.
75 See H.L.A.Hart,'Self-Referring
and
Laws'in H.L.A.Hart,Essaysin Jurisprudence
Philosophy(1983) 170;A. Ross, On Lawand Justice(1959) 80-4; A. Ross, 'On
Self-Reference
anda Puzzlein Constitutional
Law' (1969)78 Mind1.
76 CompareHart,id., pp. 170-3; Kelsen,op. cit. (1945),n. 69, p. 28-9.
77 CompareRoss,op. cit. (1959),n. 75, pp. 80-4 andop. cit. (1969),n. 75, especially
pp. 4-5, 20-1, 23-4; Hart,id., pp. 175ff.
78 CompareHart,id., pp. 177-8.
79 Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 7, p. 58.
80 Teubner,op. cit., n. 3, p. 18.
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therefore, a problem to be overcome but rather an indispensable condition

for the operative and structuralunity of the legal system.
I am not referring here to the distinction between self-referred and alloreferred systems in terms of the biological conception of Maturana,in which
the distinction is made between 'systems that could only be characterized
with reference to themselves' and 'systems that could only be characterized
with reference to a context'.81 In the case of social systems, operative
autopoiesis is combined with cognitive reference to the environment. The
informative hetero-reference is a prerequisite to operative self-reference and
vice-versa. In the legal system, this means, as I have already noted in the last
section, the combination of normative closure and cognitive openness. Law
as an autopoietic system is at the same time normatively symmetric and
cognitively assymmetric.82 Only if there is an external assymetricalization
on the level of normative orientation, the problem of allopoiesis as negation
of the operative self-reference of law appears. Derived etymologically from
the Greek words dllos ('other') and poiesis ('creation', 'production'), this
word designates the (re)production of a system through the criteria,
programmes, and codes of its environment. The corresponding system is
determined by immediate factors from external reality, so that the very
difference between system and environment loses its meaning. On the other
hand, allopoietic obstructions of the system are incompatible with the ability
to learn (cognitive openness) and consequently with the very notion that
reference to the environment implies the interruptionof the interdependence
of the elements of the system.
The criticism of Luhmann's conception of the autopoiesis of the legal
system has been developed primarily by the supporters of postmodern legal
theory.83Ladeur bases his argument on the plurality of legal discourses and
therefore objects to the concept of law as a congruent generalization of
normative expectations, since such a concept is associated with an
instrumental conception of language as 'sign-system'84 and hence, the
81 Maturana,
in MatumaandVarela,op. cit. (1980),n. 1, p. xiii.
82 Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 57, p. 111. In relationto socialsystemsin general,compare
n. 7, pp. 65, 262.
Luhmann,
83 See Teubner, op. cit., n. 22; Teubner, op. cit. (1992) and op. cit. (1987), n. 43;
Teubner,op. cit., n. 8; Teubner,op. cit., n. 3; G. Teubnerand H. Willke, 'Kontext
und Autonomie:GesellschaftlicheSelbststeuerungdurch reflexives Recht' (1984) 6
ZeitschriftfiirRechtssoziologie4; Ladeur,op. cit., n. 8; K.-H. Ladeur, "Abwdgung'
- ein neues Rechtsparadigma?Vonder Einheitder Rechtsordnungzur Pluralitdtder
Rechtsdiskurse' (1983) 69 Archiv fiir Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 463; K.-H.
Ladeur,'Abwdgung'- ein neues Paradigmades Verwaltungsrechts:von der Einheit
der Rechtsordnungzum Rechtspluralismus(1984) 153ff., 222ff.; K.-H. Ladeur,
PostmoderneRechtstheorie(1992) 80ff. For an overview see, also, Neves, op. cit.,

n. 56, pp. 41-4. Fromanotherstandpoint,see M. Rosenfeld,JustInterpretations:

Law between Ethics and Politics (1998) 89-113.

84 Ladeur,op. cit., n. 8, pp. 415, 417-18, note 131. For a softer critiquesee Ladeur,op.
cit. (1992), n. 83, pp. 127-8.
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historic heterogeneity and discontinuity of 'language games' are not considered.85It follows that one speaks not of (supposed) consensus but rather
of the compatibility of dissensus.86 Autopoiesis becomes more flexible as
'the level of the virtualizing of structureand function'87 makes the network
of the different social systems possible, which requires 'a legal culture of
uncertainty'.88Ladeur affirms the pluralization instead of the unity of law89
as well as the constitutive character of 'disorder' for 'interest weighing'
('Abwigung') as legal paradigm.90But he retains the concept of autopoiesis.
This is conceived in a pluralistic sense as presupposing 'the increasing
heterogeneity and situative differentiation of the spheres of social and
administrative action'91 and as requiring the situative-topical handling of
law.92 It is not negated: autopoietic reproduction realizes itself within the
context of a 'local logic' for the legal doctrine.93There would be merely a
pluralization of autopoiesis.
The model proposed earlier by Teubner and Willke points to another
direction. In an attempt to bring together Luhmann's systems theory with
Habermas's discourse theory, the concept of 'reflexive law' is introduced,
which is presented as a reaction to the functional differentiation of society
(Luhmann) and as an 'external constitution' for discursive self-reflection in
other social systems (Habermas).94'Reflexive law' is conceived as a type of
85 K.-H. Ladeur,'"ProzeduraleRationalitdt"- Steigerungder Legitimationsfdhigkeit
oder der Leistungsfiihigkeit des Rechtssystems?' (1986) 7 Zeitschrift fur
Rechtssoziologie 265, at 268, fn. 8.
86 id., p. 273.

87 Ladeur,op. cit., p. 8, p. 414.

88 id., p. 423. In this regard see K.-H. Ladeur, 'Gesetzinterpretation,'Richterrecht'

und Konventionsbildung in Kognitivistischer Perspektive - Handeln unter
Ungewif3heitsbedingungenund richterliches Entscheiden' (1991) 77 Archiv fir
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 176; K.-H. Ladeur, 'Selbstorganisation sozialer
Systeme und Prozeduralisierung des Rechts: Von der Schrankenziehung zur
Steuerung von Beziehungsnetzen' in Wachsende Staatsaufgaben - sinkende
Steuerungsfihigkeitdes Rechts, ed. D. Grimm (1990) 187; K.-H. Ladeur, op. cit.
(1992), n. 83; K.-H. Ladeur, Das Umweltrechtder Wissensgesellschaft: Von der
Gefahrenabwehrzum Risikomanagement(1995).
89 Ladeur,op. cit. (1983), n. 83, especially pp. 479-83; Ladeur,op. cit. (1984), n. 83.
90 id. (1983), p. 478. For the application of this theoretical concept to a concrete
constitutional question, see K.-H. Ladeur, 'Ein Vorschlag zur dogmatischen
Neukonstruktiondes Grundrechtsaus Art. 8 GG als Recht auf "Ordnungsstorung"'
(1987) 20 Kritische Justiz 150; and, in counterpoint,see T. Blanke, 'Kritik der
systemfunktionalenInterpretationder Demonstrationsfreiheit'(1987) 20 Kritische
Justiz 157.

91 Ladeur,op. cit., n. 85, p. 273.

92 Ladeur,op. cit (1983), n. 83, p. 472. See, also, Ladeur,op. cit. (1984),n. 83, pp.
205ff.
93 Ladeur,op. cit., n. 8, p. 426.
94 TeubnerandWillke,op. cit., n. 83, pp. 24-30; Teubner,op. cit., n. 22, pp. 44-51.
For diverse critical perspectives on this subject, see Luhmann,op. cit. (1985), n. 8;
P. Nahamowitz, "'Reflexives Recht": Das unmogliche Ideal eines post256
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law that has overcome the limits of formal-rational law and material-legal
rationality.95In the first case (formal rationality) there is an insensitivity in
relation to the requirements of the social context; material-rational law
cannot respond adequately to the functional differentiation of society and,
thus, cannot further the autonomy of the legal system. 'Reflexive law'
regulates the autonomous societal context by giving the affected subsystems
a social constitution, 'which respects their own dynamics, but which imposes
at the same time those social restrictions, that come out of the conditions of
the interplay of all parts and that regulate the context for any individual
part.'96Differently from Luhmann's paradigm, this construction presupposes
that the social subsystems are not found only in circumstances of reciprocal
observations; systemic interference is not to be excluded.97 The autopoiesis
of the legal system is not denied in this way, but on the contrary, double
autopoiesis is affirmed that of law and that of social subsystems.98
With the development of his pluralistic and postmodern legal conception,
Teubner introduces the distinction between autopoietic law, partially
autonomous law and socially diffuse law.99 He starts from the premise that
the autopoietic legal system constitutes itself through the hypercyclic
connection of system components, namely legal procedure (process), legal
act (element), legal norm (structure),and legal doctrine (identity). In the case
of partially autonomous law, there is the self-referential constitution of the
respective system components, but not their hypercyclic connection.
Therefore, self-referential (re)production of legal acts refers only to legal
acts, that of legal norms to legal norms, that of legal procedures only to legal
procedures, and that of legal-doctrinal arguments and statements to legaldoctrinal arguments and statements; however, these diverse system
components do not join themselves together in an autopoietic hypercycle.
Finally, we have socially diffuse law, in which the system components are
produced without legal differentiation, simply as conflict (process), action
interventionistischenSteuerungskonzepts'(1985) 6 Zeitschriftfir Rechtssoziologie
29; R. Munch, 'Die Sprachlose Systemtheorie. Systemdifferenzierung und
Integrationdurch Indifferenz'(1985) 6 Zeitschriftfir Rechtssoziologie 19.

95 TeubnerandWillke,id., pp. 19-24; Teubner,id., pp. 23-9.

96 Teubnerand Willke, id., p. 7.

97 See Teubner,op. cit., n. 8, pp. 52-9; Teubner,op. cit., n. 3, pp. 96ff.
98 Teubner, id. (n. 8), pp. 46-8; Teubner, id. (n. 3), pp. 88-90. For a critical
perspective, see P. Nahamowitz, 'AutopoietischeRechtstheorie:mit dem baldigen
Ableben ist zu rechnen - Kritische Anmerkungenzu: Gunther Teubner,Recht als
autopoietisches System' (1990) 11 Zeitschriftfiir Rechtstheorie 137. For a counter

responseto Nahamowitz'scritiquesee N. Luhmann,'SteuerungdurchRecht?

Einige klarstellendeBemerkungen'(1991) 12 Zeitschriftfiir Rechtssoziologie 142.

ohneSubjekteoder
Fora departure
frombothpositions,see W. Kargl,'Gesellschaft

Subjekte ohne Gesellschaft? Kritik der rechtssoziologischen Autopoiese-Kritik'

(1991) 12 Zeitschriftfir Rechtssoziologie 120.
99 See Teubner, op. cit., n. 3, p. 49 ff.; Teubner, op. cit (1992), n. 43, pp. 106 ff.;
Teubner,op. cit., (1987), n. 43, pp. 432ff.
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(element), social norm (structure), and world view (identity). In distinguishing these three types of constitution as well as reproduction of the
components of the legal system, Teubner is led to the following aporia: in
dealing with the same area of validity, how are the conflicts between these
three different types of legal systems resolved? He answers with the concept
of intersystemic collision law,100 which is also valid for 'the conflict
between the state legal order and plural social quasi-legal orders'.101 The
question remains however: does intersystemic collision law represent an
autopoietic legal system, a partially autonomous law or a socially diffuse
law? In the case of these last two forms, there would be, strictly speaking, no
autopoietic law; if it was characterized as autopoietic law then there would
be, in the strict sense, no partially autonomous or socially diffuse law in
existence.102

When I speak of allopoietic law, I refer to the territoriallydelimited state

law itself. Here it should be made clear that in certain fixedly demarcated
territorial spheres of validity the functional differentiation of a domain of
legal action and experience has not adequately developed, and therefore, no
self-referential system was built, that would be capable, in a congruently
generalized way in terms of the respective society, of orienting the normative
expectations and of regulating the interpersonalbehavioural contexts. This is
not about the conventional model of legal pluralism in which the distinction
is made between 'official' autonomous law and informally and diffusely
constructed legal spheres. On one hand, this differentiation leads us to the
aforementioned insurmountable aporie in regard to the mechanisms of
solving intersystemic conflicts, since the prevalence of one of the legal types
implies the absorption of the other. On the other hand, the pluralistic
postmodern conception of European origin attempts to emphasize the
relationship of extra-state 'quasi-legal' mechanisms and operationally
autonomous, state law. Within this present article, I claim to determine
something more radical, namely, the very lack of operative autonomy of the
positive law of state. This means the precedence of other difference codes,
particularly the economic (have/not-have) and the political (power/nopower), over the code legal/illegal to the detriment of the efficiency,
functionality, and even the rationality of law.
In affirming the entanglement of the preference codes and criteria of the
various spheres of social life (economy, politics, family, and so on) with
the binary code of law, one cannot overlook that each autopoietic system is
100 Teubner,op. cit., n. 3, pp. 123-48.
101 id., pp. 135-8.
102 In regardto the collision of discoursesTeubnerhas recentlymade a different
formulation:
on the basis of the conceptof re-entry,collisionlaw and collision
discourseis installedin the collidinglaw andcollidingdiscourserespectively.See
G. Teubner,'De CollisioneDiscursuum:Communicative
Rationalitiesin Law,
Morality,andPolitics'(1996) 17 CardozoLawReview901, at 907-18.
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always conditioned by factors of its environment and this is the prerequisite

of the self-referential connection of the system components. But in this
case, there is the 'conversion' or 'digitalization' of the external factors
through the code and the criteria of the corresponding system. A system
expresses itself as autopoietic if it is able to reinterpret the environmental
determinants according to its own observation. Provided that, on the
contrary, the agents of the state legal system put aside the binary code
legal/illegal and the corresponding criteria, and act, as well as orient their
expectations, in accordance with the direct pressures of the economy,
power, family relationships, and so on, one can claim the existence of the
allopoiesis of law. We are not dealing here with the localized phenomenon
of system corruption at the cost of structural coupling in organizations, as
has occurred in the democratic and constitutional states in Western Europe
and North America,'03 nor are we dealing with the 'rejection value' in the
terms of Gotthard Giinther,104since both presuppose the autopoieses of the
corresponding systems. Under the typical conditions for the reproduction of
law in the peripheral modem states, the so-called system corruption has a
tendency towards generalization,105so that the very principle of functional
differentiation is affected and situations of allopoiesis of the law are
brought forth.106 Therefore, we are not dealing with the eventual
obstructions of autopoietic reproduction of positive law, that are to be
overcome through complementary immunization mechanisms of the same
legal system. The problem implies the generalized compromising of the
operative autonomy of law. The boundaries between legal system and
environment dissolve, even in respect to an alleged social diffuse law
without state.
Allopoiesis affects the basal self-reference (legality), reflexivity (constitutionality), and reflection (legitimacy) as constitutive moments of the
operationally closed reproduction of the legal system. It impairs also the
hetero-reference, that is, the function and the performances of the law.107
According to Teubner's model, allopoiesis first implies the non-constitution

103 Luhmann,
op. cit. (1993),n. 22, pp. 81-2 andpassim.

104 G. Giinther,'CyberneticOntology and TransjunctionalOperations'in his Beitrdge

zur Grundlegungeiner operationsfahigenDialektik (1976) 249, at 286 ff.; compare

Luhmann,
op.cit. (1993),n. 22, pp. 81, 181,187,
op.cit., n. 50, p. 181ff.; Luhmann,

545 ff.; Luhmann,op. cit. (1997), n. 22, p. 751 ff.

105 See Neves, op. cit., n. 56, where the concept of 'the peripheralmodernity' is more
precisely described (at pp. 72-81).
106 Luhmannacknowledgesthat 'in the extremecase' of system corruption'one can not
talk any more of autopoieticclosing' (Luhmann,op. cit. (1993), n. 22, p. 82), but from
this he drawsno consistentempiricalconsequencesfor his theoreticalconstruction,in
so far as he still insists very stronglyon the primacyof functionaldifferentiationin the
currentworld society. See id., p. 572; Luhmann,op. cit. (1997), n. 22, p. 743.
107 In regard to the problem of self-reference and hetero-referencein situations of
allopoiesis see a detailed examinationin Neves, op. cit., n. 56, pp. 147-215.
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as well as the generalized obstruction of the hypercyclic connection of the

systemic components (legal act, norm, procedure, and doctrine). However, it
can mean even more: namely, that these systemic components are not selfreferentially constituted. In this case, the boundaries between legal system
and environment become not only weak or opaque, they vanish.
The typical problem of the 'peripheral modernity' in regard to the
allopoiesis of law108 amounts to the weakness, irrelevance as well as the
absence of the constitution as a structuralcoupling of politics and law,109a
mechanism that 'makes a legal solution of the self-reference problem of the
political system and at the same time a political solution of the self-reference
problem of the legal system possible.' 10The political takes precedence over
the legal so that one can hardly speak of operative autonomy or functional
differentiation of both systems. And this situation occurs not only in the
autocratic experiences, in which the destructive effect of the power code
over the legal code, or more exactly, the superiority of the political over the
legal already on the level of constitutional legislation is structurally
determined. With symbolic constitutionalization,1" in the context of which
the constitutional text adopts the democratic model of rule of law, the
problem of the destructive interference of politics in the legal system only
appears in the course of the application of the constitution. If one considers
the 'concretizing' of the constitution in the narrower, strictly legal technical
sense as the construction of the 'legal norm' and the 'decision norm' in each
12
a semantic distortion of constitutional clauses can already
particularcase,
be found: the content of meaning that is attributedto them in the concrete
case often deviates from any generalizable interpretationof the principles of
the democratic and constitutional state. If 'concretizing' is defined in the
wider sense, so that the actual realization of the constitution is also included,
one can conclude that there is a scandalous divergence between the
constitutional model based on democratic principles and rule of law, on the
one hand, and political and legal practice, on the other hand. In general
terms, there is a lack of constitutional normativity consistent with the
constitutional text. The obstructing of the constitution concretizing process
by diverse particularisticinterests implies a de-legalizing political reality and
a de-constitutionalizing legal practice. In regard to law, this means that the
108 See id.
109 N. Luhmann,'Verfassungals evolutionare Errungenschaft'
(1990) 9 RechtshistorischesJournal176, at 193ff.; Luhmann,
op. cit. (1993),n. 22, pp. 470ff.
110 Luhmann,
id. (1990),p. 202.
111 M. Neves, SymbolischeKonstitutionalisierung(1998).

112 In this regard,see F. Miiller,JuristischeMethodik(1995, 6th edn.) 166-74; F.

Miiller, StrukturierendeRechtslehre (1994, 2nd edn.) 263; R. Christensen, 'Der

Richter als Mund des sprechenden Textes. Zur Kritik des gestezespositivistischen
Textmodells'in Untersuchungenzur Rechtslinguistik:InterdisziplindreStudien zu
praktischer Semantik und strukturierender Rechtslehre in Grundfragen der

juristischenMethodik,ed. F. Miiller(1989)47, at 87-91.

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constitution as 'that form with which the legal system reacts to its own
autonomy' 13 is not sufficiently concretized or constructed.
The problem which occurs when the constitution does not become a
mechanism of legal operative autonomy, particularlyin the case of semantic
distortions of the constitutional text in the course of the concretizing process,
is closely related with the generalized problem of 'social exclusion' within
the peripheral countries, carried out from 'below' as well as from 'above'.
We are no longer dealing here with 'secondary exclusion' but rather
'primaryexclusion'.114 The first case evokes no questioning or destruction of
the legal code but rather the code 'only limits the actual extension of its
validity'.115 In the second case, exclusion is expanded and intensified
resulting in the releasing and generalizing of destructive consequences which
act against the validity of differentiating legal codes and against a
constitution based on the rule of law and which represents the structural
coupling of law and politics. This is not about a mild meta-difference of
inclusion and exclusion in Luhmann's terms, which would mediate the codes
of the functional systems and, thus, pervade the functional differentiation of
society and the differentiation of law as well as the constitutional order,116
but rather about the generalized phenomena of exclusion that questions and
threatens functional differentiation, the autonomy of the law and constitutional normativity.117More exactly, we are not talking in this context about
social 'exclusion', as if communicative isolation of population groups from
each other could still be possible in the modem world society. It seems to me
it is not appropriateto speak of sphere of inclusion (in which 'people count
as persons') and sphere of exclusion (in which 'people are considered no
longer as persons but as bodies')118 as if both could be clearly distinguished.
The problem consists in the generalization of relations of over-integration
113 Luhmann,
closesthelegalsystemby
op.cit. (1990),n. 109,p. 187.'Theconstitution
regulatingthis systemas a spherewherethe constitutionis presentas well. It
constitutesthe legal systemas a closedsystemthroughre-entryintothe system.'
114 F. Miiller, Wer ist das Volk: Die Grundfrageder Demokratie - Elemente einer
VerfassungstheorieVI (1997) 50-6.

115 id., p. 51.

116 Luhmann,
op. cit. (1997),n. 22, p. 632; Luhmann,
op. cit. (1993),n. 22, p. 583.
117 Luhmannacknowledges:'The differenceof inclusionand exclusionhas grave
of
effects,sinceon theone handit is broughtaboutby the functionaldifferentiation
the world society, on the otherhand, it hinders,if not prevents,the regional
of conditionsof functionaldifferentiation'.
id. (1997),p. 168.
Luhmann,
production
In otherwordsit is a matterof a difference'thatadmittedlythroughfunctional
differentiation
is generatedbut is, in the end, incompatible
with it.' Luhmann,id,
(1993), p. 582 (emphasismine). Luhmanninsists however, that despite the
as in the LatinAmericancase, the
generalizedconditionsof 'inclusion/exclusion'
eliminationof the autopoiesisof the law does not occur.Luhmann,id. (1997),p.
632.
118 id. (1997), pp. 632 ff.; N. Luhmann,'Inklusionund Exklusion' in his Soziologische
Aufkliirung6: Die Soziologie und der Mensch (1995) 237, 259-64, 262; Luhmann,

id. (1993),pp. 584-5.

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and under-integration into the different social systems.119 These relations

imply hierarchical positions towards the functional systems, positions which
are not guided by principles but factually conditioned. In these relations, one
is integrated into the social systems 'from above' or 'from below', with the
consequence that their autonomous reproduction is obstructed. The overintegration pole has access to the products and benefits of the social systems,
without being simultaneously dependent on their constraints and rules
(positive integration), while the under-integrated pole is dependent on the
rules and constraints without having access to the products and benefits
(negative integration), so that at both poles, defective inclusion as well as
partial exclusion exists.120
In regardto law, this means that the over-integratedhave access to the law
(as well as to legal protection and legal action), without having to fulfill the
duties and responsibilities imposed by the legal system (impunity), while in
contrast the under-integrated have no access to legal action and legal
protection, although they are very strictly submitted to duties, responsibilities, and freedom-limiting penalties.121In the highly complex modem world,
there are, admittedly, no absolute over-integrated or under-integrated
positions, because these positions are not based, as in pre-moder societies,
on solid principles or norms but depend on concrete factual conditions of
communication reproduction;however, there are parts of the population that
are regularly found in the superior or in the inferior pole of the relations of
over-integration and under-integration. For the supra-citizen and the subcitizen, the constitution forms no horizon for their legal and political action
and experience: for the former, the constitution could be used, not used, or
119 CompareNeves, op. cit., n. 56, pp. 78-9, 94-8, 155-6; M. Neves, 'Entre
Subintegracao e Sobreintegracdo:A Cidadania Inexistente' (1994) 37 Dados Revista de Ciencias Sociais 253; M. Neves, 'Do Pluralismo Juridico a Misceldnea
Social: 0 Problema da Falta de Identidade da(s) Esfera(s) de Juridicidade na
Moderidade Periferica e suas Implicaoies na AmericaLatina' (1995) 5 Direito em
Debate 7.

in contrastto my
120 Fromthe standpoint
of dependenceratherthanaccess,Luhmann,
definesthe 'areaof exclusion'as highlyintegratedand the 'areaof
formulation,
inclusion'as less integrated.
Luhmann,
op. cit. (1993)n. 22, pp. 584-5; Luhmann,
op. cit. (1997),n. 22, pp. 631-2; Luhmann,
op. cit., n. 118,p. 259-60. In this way
wouldbe understood
'as thereductionof thedegreeof
integration
uni-dimensionally
freedomof subsystems'as well as 'restrictionof the degree of freedomfor
selection', and therefore,negatively as dependentand not positively as access. See
Luhmann, op. cit. (1997), n. 22, pp. 603, 631. However, according to my
formulation,under-integrationand over-integrationimply in each case insufficient
'inclusion' (therefore, partial exclusion), be it for lack of access (of positive
integration) to the social systems, be it for lack of dependence (of negative
integration)on them.
121 Following this argumentsee, for Latin America, G. O'Donnell, 'Polyarchiesand the
(Un)Rule of Law in Latin America:A PartialConclusion' in The (Un)Rule of Law
and the Underprivilegedin LatinAmerica,eds. J.E. Mendez, G. O'Donnell, and P.S.

Pinheiro(1999)303, especiallyat 312.

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misusedaccordingto the concretecontexts of interests;for the latter,the

fundamentalrightsand guaranteesproclaimedin the Constitutionare alien.
and underIt follows thatthe generalizationof relationsof over-integration
and
in
in
law, leads to
integration the social subsystems,especially politics
the breakdownof the constitutionas basic (sub)orderof legal and political
communications.
And for law, this meansthatits reproductionis suppressed
throughcommunicativeattributionswhich eitherfrom 'above ' or 'below'
are determinedaccordingto other binarycodes. In this way. law is compressedthroughverticaldeterminantsfromthe environment,so that,despite
all the increasesin complexityand correspondingdemandsfor functional
differentiationor system autonomy,it lacks self-referentialcircularityor
operativeclosure.
V. FINALCONSIDERATIONS:
FROMEMPIRICREALITYTO THE
OF AUTOPOIESISOF LAW
DEMANDS
NORMATIVE
So conceived,the allopoiesisof law, as a typicalproblemof the 'peripheral
states',cannotbe understoodthroughthe postmoderntheoryof law, which
while denyingthe unity of law as an operationallyclosed communication
chain, claims that the legal system constructsitself as a communication
networkpluralisticallyand thus includes (de)constructiveuncertaintyand
instability(Ladeur).The predominantlyallopoietic determinationof the
structures(norms), elements (actions), processes (conflicts) and identity
(worldview)of law in the currenthighly-complexworldimplies destructive
insecurity in regard to the practice of conflict resolution and to the
orientationof normativeexpectations.Thus, as in the case of Brazil, the
generalizationof the code legal/illegal in the sense of a preferencefor
and obstructing
inclusionbecomesimpossible,andthe direct,particularistic
of law, aboveall the
interferenceof varioussocial factorsin the reproduction
heteronomizinginterferenceof the economic and political interests, is
of the legal code to the code have/notpromoted.The resultingsubordination
have and the code power/no-poweris neither oriented by highly moral
principles nor internally determinedor controlled through criteria and
programmesof differentiatedfunctionalsystems,but rather,is conditioned
throughactual 'social exclusion'. This has grave destructiveeffects on the
integrationof society and is, of course, incompatiblewith the idea of the
autopoiesis of law. For this situation, which is dominant in countless
communicativecontextsof today'sworldsociety and in the majorityof the
regions of the globe, the existing approachesof systems theory, whether
based on the functionalmodel or on the postmodernparadigm,offer no
adequateexplanatorymodel.
It appearsto me that the concept of the autopoiesis of law can be
subjectedto a readingfrom a normativepoint of view. Althoughthis is not
the line takenby eitherLuhmannor Teubner,we find indicationsof such an
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interpretation in both of their works. In the now highly complex world

society, a functional requirement has been established that has with
normative implications - but which does not constitute a generalized
empiric reality, nor even a dominant one - that the codes and programmes of
a sphere of communication are not directly imposed on the other sphere of
communication. It demands the respect for autonomy of all and any social
discourse. 22 For example, it is imperative of justice in a complex society
that 'the central point of internal rationality of an autonomous social sector,
such as research, health or education, should not be substitutedby economic
rationality.'123 In general, it can be said that the rationality of a field of
communication should not be reduced to that of another or affirm that the
codes and criteria of an autonomous social sphere should not be sabotaged
by the demands of another. In this sense, Luhmann himself emphasizes that
'sabotage of the code now becomes a moral problem - something like
corruption in politics and law or doping in sport or the purchase of love, or
the manipulation of data in empirical research.'124With reference to the
various games of language, a discursive justice is imposed as 'justice in the
face of the heterogeneous'.125In this perspective, justice means 'the relation
between discursive identity and alterity, not, however, based on the
perspective of a third party, but from the singular perspective of respective
discourse in light of other discursive worlds'.26 In sum, justice presupposes
and demands the recognition of discursive plurality and the systemic
complexity of world society today, implying respect for the autonomy of the
discursive spheres or of the systems of communication. The concept of
autopoiesis of law refers exactly to the way in which the law builds its
autonomy as a sphere of communication, acquiring identity and discursive
alterity. Thus, if the law is usurped (and in this manner rights are denied) by
a wild politics corruptedby money, the result is structuralinjustice, as occurs
principally in the countries of peripheral modernity, characterized by a
political culture of illegality contrary to the rule of law and by the
tremendous fragility of law before the destructive expansionism of the means
of money in a globalized economy.

122 G. Teubner, 'Altera Pars Audiatur: Das Recht in der Kollision anderer
(1996) 65 (Beiheft) Archiv fur Rechts- und
Universalititsanspriiche'
Sozialphilosophie 199, at 218.
123 G. Teubner, 'Nach der Privatisierung?Diskurskonflikteim Privatrecht' (1998) 19
Zeitschriftfiir Rechtssoziologie 8, at 21.

124 Luhmann,
op. cit. (1997),n. 22, p. 1043.

125 W. Welsch, 'Gesellschaftohne Meta-Erzahlung?'in Die Modernisierungmoderner

Gesellschaften:Verhandlungendes 25. Deutschen Soziologentages in Frankfurtam
Main 1990, ed. W. Zapf (1991) 174, at 176.

126 Teubner,op. cit., n. 123, p. 218.

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